Political Law: Constitutional Law

REBECCA FULLIDO v GINO GRILLI

G.R. No. 215014, February 29, 2016 SECOND DIVISION (MENDOZA, J.)

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Constitutional restraint against foreign

ownership of lands: Under Section 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
natural resources shall not be alienated, except with respect to public
agricultural lands and in such cases, the alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens. The prohibition, however, is not limited to the sale of lands to
foreigners. It also covers leases of lands amounting to the transfer of all or
substantially all the rights of dominion.

FACTS:

In 1994, Gino Grilli, an Italian national, met Rebecca Fullido in Bohol where
he courted her. In 1995, Grilli decided to build a residential house where he
and Fullido would to stay whenever he would be vacationing in the country.
Grilli financially assisted Fullido in procuring a lot located in Biking I, Dauis,
Bohol, from her parents which was registered in her name. On the said
property, they constructed a house, which was funded by Grilli. Upon
completion, they maintained a common-law relationship and lived there
whenever Grilli was on vacation in the Philippines twice a year.

In 1998, Grilli and Fullido executed a contract of lease, a memorandum of

agreement (MOA) and a special power of attorney (SPA), to define their
respective rights over the house and lot. The lease contract stipulated, among
others, that Grilli as the lessee, would rent the lot, registered in the name of
Fullido, for a period of fifty years, to be automatically renewed for another fifty
years upon its expiration in the amount of P10, 000.00 for the whole term of the
lease contract; and that Fullido as the lessor, was prohibited from selling,
donating, or encumbering the said lot without the written consent of Grilli. SPA
allowed him to administer, manage and transfer the house and lot on behalf of
Fullido.

Initially, their relationship was harmonious, but it turned sour after 16

years of living together. Both charged each other with infidelity. They could not
agree who should leave the common property, and Grilli sent formal letters to
Fullido demanding that she vacate the property.

ISSUE:

Was the contract void for violating Art. XII of the Constitution?

RULING:

Yes. Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, natural

resources shall not be alienated, except with respect to public agricultural lands
and in such cases, the alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. Concomitantly,
Section 5 thereof states that, save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines.

The prohibition, however, is not limited to the sale of lands to foreigners.

It also covers leases of lands amounting to the transfer of all or substantially all
the rights of dominion.

Based on the above-cited constitutional limitation, the Court finds that

the lease contract and the MOA in the present case are null and void for
virtually transferring the reigns of the land to a foreigner. Evidently, the lease
contract and the MOA operated hand-in-hand to strip Fullido of any dignified
right over her own property.

The said contracts attempted to guise themselves as a lease, but a closer

scrutiny of the same revealed that they were intended to transfer the dominion
of a land to a foreigner in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Even if Fullido voluntary executed the same, no amount of
consent from the parties could legalize an unconstitutional agreement. The
lease contract and the MOA do not deserve an iota of validity and must be
rightfully struck down as null and void for being repugnant to the fundamental
law. These void documents cannot be the source of rights and must be treated
as mere scraps of paper.
 Political Law: Constitutional Law

JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES v THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, & JESSICA

LUCILA G. REYES v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN et. al.
G.R. Nos. 212593-94 & G.R.Nos. 213163-78, March 15, 2016 THIRD
DIVISION (PERLAS-BERNABE J.)

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction of Ombudsman: Once the

public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable cause and thus,
elevates the case to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial
determination of probable cause is made in order to determine if a warrant of
arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the accused.

FACTS:

Petitioners Jessica Lucila "Gigi" G. Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Jo

Christine L. Napoles and James Christopher L. Napoles are all charged as co-
conspirators for their respective participations in the anomalous Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, involving the illegal utilization and
pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
(Senator Enrile) for the years 2004 to 2010.

The Ombudsman issued the assailed Joint finding probable cause

against, inter alia, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis of one (1) count of
Plunder, and against Reyes, Janet Napoles, De Asis, and the Napoles siblings
for fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Accordingly,
separate motions for reconsideration were timely filed by Reyes, Janet
Napoles, the Napoles siblings, and De Asis.

The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding probable cause for the

issuance of warrants of arrest against "all the accused," opining therein that the
filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause was a mere
superfluity given that it was its bounden duty to personally evaluate the
resolution of the Ombudsman and the supporting evidence before it determines
the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.

ISSUE:

Did the Ombudsman and/or the Sandiganbayan committed any grave

abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions ultimately finding
probable cause against petitioners for the charges against them.

RULING:

No. Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines

probable cause and thus, elevates the case to the trial court (or the
Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of probable cause is made in order to
determine if a warrant of arrest should be issued ordering the detention of the
accused.

In the case of People v. Castillo, the court held that:

“There are two kinds of determination of probable

case: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during
preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he
believes to have committed the crime as defined by
law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise
stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority
to determine whether or not a criminal case must be
filed in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment
of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may
not be compelled to pass upon.”

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the

other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted; there is necessity
for placing the accused under custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue
the arrest warrant.

Verily, when a criminal Information is filed before the trial court, the
judge, motu proprio or upon motion of the accused, is entitled to make his own
assessment of the evidence on record to determine whether there is probable
cause to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with the trial; or in the
absence thereof, to order the immediate dismissal of the criminal case. This is
in line with the fundamental doctrine that "once a complaint or information is
filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the
conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the
court." As such, the determination of probable cause was within the power of
the Ombudsman.

Political Law: Constitutional Law

UNDERSECRETARY AUSTERE A. PANADERO v COMELEC

GR No. 215548, Apr 05, 2016 EN BANC (REYES, J.)

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Contempt Power: The power to punish for

contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice."

FACTS:

Limbona was among the persons found to be guilty of grave misconduct,

oppression and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which he
committed while he was still the Chairman of Barangay Kalanganan Lower,
Pantar, Lanao del Norte, and in relation to the killing of Hadji Abdul Rasid
Onos, the former Municipal Vice Mayor of Pantar. Limbona was meted the
penalty of dismissal from public service, with the accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in the government service. The DILG,
petitioners, was directed to immediately implement the ruling against Limbona,
pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 17 (Ombudsman
Rules of Procedure) in relation to Memorandum Circular No. 1, series of 2006.

On November 15, 2013, the Ombudsman issued Order forwarding to the

DILG Secretary a copy of its Decision against Limbona for implementation, as it
had become final and executory in 2011. The order indicated that Limbona had
been elected as Municipal Mayor of Pantar. Acting on the order, Usec. Panadero
issued, on April 3, 2014, a Memorandum directing RD Burdeos, as the RD of
the DILG Region X Office, to cause the immediate implementation of the
Ombudsman decision insofar as Limbona was concerned. On April 21, 2014,
however, RD Burdeos reported that he received from Limbona's counsel a copy
of the Resolution dated June 6, 2013 issued by the COMELEC First Division,
dismissing the petition for disqualification filed against Limbona.

On May 5, 2014, the DILG served the dismissal order of Limbona, which
led to his removal from office and the assumption to the mayoralty of then Vice
Mayor Tago. Displeased by the DILG's actions, Limbona filed with the
COMELEC a petition to cite the petitioners for indirect contempt.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners guilty of indirect contempt?

RULING:

No. The Court finds that the actions of the petitioners do not constitute
indirect contempt. In serving the dismissal order of Limbona and allowing Tago
to assume the vacated mayoralty post, the petitioners could not be said to have
disobeyed the resolutions of the COMELEC in the disqualification case, much
less did so, in a manner that was characterized with contempt against the
COMELEC
.
Contrary to the COMELEC's finding, the DILG did not blatantly disregard
the resolutions of the COMELEC. Records indicate that it did not simply ignore
the COMELEC issuances, notwithstanding the fact that it only obtained notice
thereof through Limbona's counsel and not directly from the COMELEC.
Considering that the implementation of the order to dismiss Limbona was upon
the instance of the Ombudsman, the DILG still took recourse by seeking
clarification from the Ombudsman, which nonetheless later reiterated the
instruction to implement the decision in the administrative case. These
circumstances show good faith on the part of the petitioners, and negate a
supposed intent to plainly disobey the COMELEC.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall

be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure
that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The
refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of
the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure
shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
 Political Law: Constitutional Law

GLENN CHONG AND ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY, REPRESENTED BY NORMAN

v CABRERA v SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 217725, May 31, 2016 (REYES, J)

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Constitutionality of a Law: Settled is the

rule that every law is presumed valid. Courts are to adopt a liberal
interpretation in favor of the constitutionality of legislation, as Congress is
deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just law. To strike down a law as
unconstitutional, the petitioners have the burden to prove a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of
proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation
because to invalidate a law based on baseless supposition is an affront to the
wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which
approved it.

FACTS:

R.A. No. 8436 authorized the adoption of an automated election system

(AES). R.A. No. 9369 was signed into law, amending R.A. No. 8436 the former
Section’s 8, 9, 10 and 11 which calls for the creation of the Advisory Council
(AC) and the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC). Glenn Chong and Ang
Kapatiran Party (petitioners) assail the constitutionality of the creation of the
AC and the TEC. Petitioner Chong alleged that AC and the TEC are so patently
incompatible with a functioning COMELEC. That AC dictates upon the
COMELEC in regard with the technology to be applied in the AES.

On the other hand, Respondents provide that the existence of the AC and
the TEC does not limit or prevent the exercise of the COMELEC s constitutional
mandate to enforce election laws. It also argued that the AC and the TEC
merely ensure that the COMELEC will put in place an effective AES that will
clearly and accurately reflect the will of the sovereign people. Lastly, the power
to provide these safeguards is within the authority of the Congress, whose
power includes the power to ensure the faithful execution of its policies. RA
9369 also enjoys the presumption of validity.

ISSUE:

Should the provision of RA 9369 creating the advisory council and

technical evaluation committee be declared unconstitutional for being violative
of Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?

RULING:

No. The AC and the TEC's functions are merely advisory and
recommendatory in nature. The functions of the AC are recommendatory, as
can be gleaned from the assailed provision itself in Section 9 of R.A. No. 8436
which provides that the functions of the AC are merely to recommend, to
provide advice and/or assistance, and to participate as nonvoting members
with respect to the COMELEC s fulfillment of its mandate and authority to use
the AES, and which in all instances, is subject to the approval and final
decision of the COMELEC. On the other hand, the TEC's exclusive function is to
certify, through an established international certification entity to be chosen by
the COMELEC from the recommendations of the AC that the AES, including its
hardware and software components, is operating properly, securely, and
accurately, in accordance with the provisions of law.
 In this case the Court ruled that RA 9369 is considered valid because
Petitioner Chong failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption
that the assailed provisions are valid and constitutional since they failed to
present substantial evidence to support their claim. Settled is the rule that
every law is presumed valid. Courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor
of the constitutionality of legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a
valid, sensible, and just law. To strike down a law as unconstitutional, the
petitioners have the burden to prove a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing
unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate a
law based on baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
 Political Law: Constitutional Law

ACCREDITED LOCAL PUBLISHERS et. al. v SAMUEL L. DEL ROSARIO, Clerk III,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union
A.M No. P-14-3213 July 12, 2016 PER CURIAM

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Public Office is a Public Trust; The Constitution

has enshrined the principle that a public office is a public trust. The Court will not
tolerate or condone any conduct, act, or omission that falls short of the exacting
norms of public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of
the judiciary.

FACTS:

The weekly Ilocandia Publishers and other complainants were Accredited Local
Publishers of judicial or legal notices. As such, they were authorized to participate in
the raffle draws scheduled before RTC Branch 67 of Bauang, La Union. The accused
Del Rosario and other publishers of conspired so that the latter would be the
publishers of judicial and legal notices in cases that had not undergone the process of
raffle, to the prejudice of complainants and in violation of Presidential Decree 1079
(Regulating Publication Of Judicial Notices, Advertisements For Public Biddings,
Notices Of Auction Sales And Other Similar Notices). In his Answer, respondent Del
Rosario admitted referring some cases for publication to certain newspaper publishers
or their representatives without the required raffle. He claimed that he had referred
litigants to those publishers because they charged lower rates, and not because he
was motivated by any monetary gain.

In her affidavit, certain Abarra alleged that in exchange for a certain amount of
money intended for the medicines of respondent Del Rosario, the latter submitted a
judicial notice to the Ilocos Herald for publication. Abarra claimed that publisher
Peralta did not know that the notice had not been raffled. When Del Rosario gave her a
second notice for publication, Abarra said that Peralta already knew it had not been
raffled. As a result, Peralta did not publish the second judicial notice.

The Investigating Judge finds respondent Samuel del Rosario, to have violated
the law on raffle of judicial notices, as admitted by him, which is conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service, and punishable with dismissal.

ISSUE:

Is the act of Del Rosario considered as grave misconduct that will warrant his
dismissal in the public service?

RULING:

Yes, Del Rosario himself admittedly failed to refer the notices for publication to
the Office of the Clerk of Court for the conduct of raffle. His failure to do so was in
clear violation of A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC in relation to P.D. 1079. He claims that he
directly gave notices for publication sans the required raffle, because "other
newspapers charge very high amounts and he [took] pity [on] poor litigants." Yet he
miserably failed to adduce evidence to support his allegation that there were indigent
litigants who had sought his help for referrals to publishers that would charge lower
rates than the others.

The Supreme Court reiterated that it shall not hesitate to impose the ultimate
penalty on those who have fallen short of their accountabilities. No less than the
Constitution has enshrined the principle that a public office is a public trust. The
Court will not tolerate or condone any conduct, act, or omission that falls short of the
exacting norms of public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the
image of the judiciary.

As such, since Del Rosario did not abide the provision of P.D 1079 as regards
the said raffle of cases, he is dismissed from the Public Service as Clerk III of the
Regional Trial Court 67 of Bauang La Union.
 Political Law: Constitutional Law

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC.

G.R. No. 196596, NOVEMBER 9, 2016, EN BANC (BRION, J.:)

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Tax exemption of non-stock non-profit

educational institutions: The revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions proved to have been used actually, directly, and exclusively
for educational purposes are exempt from duties and taxes

FACTS:

The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued to DLSU Letter of Authority (LOA)
No. 2794 authorizing its revenue officers to examine the latter's books of accounts and
other accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for the period Fiscal Year
Ending 2003 and Unverified Prior Years.

The BIR through a Formal Letter of Demand assessed DLSU the following
deficiency taxes: (1) income tax on rental earnings from restaurants/canteens and
bookstores operating within the campus; (2) value-added tax (VAI) on business income;
and (3) documentary stamp tax (DSI) on loans and lease contracts. The BIR demanded
the payment of ₱17,303,001.12, inclusive of surcharge, interest and penalty
for taxable years 2001, 2002 and 2003. DLSU protested the assessment. The
Commissioner failed to act on the protest; DLSU, a non-stock, non-profit educational
institution, principally anchored its petition on Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of the
Constitution, which reads:

(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions

used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxes and duties. xxx.

ISSUE:

Is DLSU's income and revenues proved to have been used actually, directly and
exclusively for educational purposes exempt from duties and taxes?

RULING:

YES. The revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions

proved to have been used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes
are exempt from duties and taxes. DLSU rests it case on Article XIV, Section 4 (3) of
the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used
actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall
be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the
corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the
manner provided by law.
Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may
likewise be entitled to such exemptions subject to
the limitations provided by law including restrictions on dividends and
provisions for reinvestment.

The court observes that:

First, the constitutional provision refers to two kinds of educational institutions: (1)
non-stock, non-profit educational institutions and (2) proprietary educational
institutions;

Second, DLSU falls under the first category. Even the Commissioner admits the status
of DLSU as a non-stock, non-profit educational institution;
Third, while DLSU's claim for tax exemption arises from and is based on the
Constitution, the Constitution, in the same provision, also imposes certain conditions
to avail of the exemption;

Fourth, there is a marked distinction between the treatment of non-stock, non-profit

educational institutions and proprietary educational institutions. The tax exemption
granted to non-stock, non-profit educational institutions is conditioned only on the
actual, direct and exclusive use of their revenues and assets for educational purposes.
While tax exemptions may also be granted to proprietary educational institutions,
these exemptions may be subject to limitations imposed by Congress; and

For all these reasons, the court held that the income and revenues of DLSU proven to
have been used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes are exempt
from duties and taxes.
 Law: Constitutional Law

HENRY R. GIRON v HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA et.

al.
G.R. No. 218463, March 01, 2017 SECOND DIVISION (MENDOZA, J.)

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Public Accountability: The condonation doctrine

has been abandoned by the Court in Carpio-Morales. In the said case, the Court
declared the doctrine as unconstitutional, but stressed that its application should only
be prospective.

FACTS:

Henry R. Giron, together with Marcelo B. Macasinag, Eliseo M. Cruz, Benjamin

Q. Osi and Crisanto A. Canciller, filed before the Ombudsman a complaint for
Dishonesty, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Section 389 (b) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7160 against Arnaldo A. Cando, then the Barangay Chairman of Capri, for
illegally using electricity in three (3) of his computer shops.

The case was endorsed to the Special Investigation Committee on

Administrative Cases against Elective Barangay Officials (Committee) for a hearing.
The investigation, however, was suspended because of the coming Barangay Elections.
Cando vied for the position of Barangay Kagawad and won. He assumed office. The
City Council adopted the Resolution of the Committee recommending the dismissal of
the case against Cando for being moot and academic. It cited as basis the doctrine
first enunciated in Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija and reiterated
in Aguinaldo v. Santos, where the Court stated that "a public official cannot be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor." Giron moved for
reconsideration, arguing that the doctrine of condonation was only applicable when
the re-election of the public official was to the same position. The same was however
denied.

ISSUE:

Is the condonation doctrine unconstitutional as it violates public accountability

of the Constitution?

RULING:

Yes. The condonation doctrine is unconstitutional. The condonation doctrine

has been abandoned by the Court in Carpio-Morales. In the said case, the Court
declared the doctrine as unconstitutional, but stressed that its application should only
be prospective.

On this issue, considering the ratio decidendi behind the doctrine, the Court
agrees with the interpretation of the administrative tribunals below that the
condonation doctrine applies to a public official elected to another office. The
underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms. Thus, in Carpio-
Morales, the basic considerations are the following: first, the penalty of removal may
not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term
is separate and distinct; second, an elective official's re-election serves as a
condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
therefor; and third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have
known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers. In this case,
it is a given fact that the body politic, who elected him to another office, was the same.

It should be stressed, however, that the doctrine is now abandoned. As

concluded in the said case, In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon
the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases
following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia,
Jr. which were all relied upon by the Court of Appeals.
 Political Law: Constitutional Law

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION, PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALFI), et al. v

HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, et al.
GR No. 217872, August 24, 2016 SECOND DIVISION (MENDOZA, J.)

MARIA CONCEPCION S. NOCHE, et al. v

HON. JANETTE L. GARIN, et al.
GR No. 221866, August 24, 2016 SECOND DIVISION (MENDOZA, J.)

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Quasi-Judicial Power; Quasi-judicial power is

known as the power of the administrative agency to determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself.

FACTS:

The subject of the case sprouted from Imbong v. Ochoa and other cases where
the court declared Republic Act No. 10354 (RH Law) and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations as not unconstitutional, save for several provisions which were declared
as violative of the Constitution.

Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines (ALFFI) opposed the unilateral
act of the Food and Drugs Administration on re-certifying the contraceptive drugs
named Implanon and Implanon NXT. The basis of their opposition hinges on the fact
that these drugs are abortifacients. Thus, according to them, they should have been
given notice of the certification proceedings, and a chance to present evidence that
indeed such drugs are abortifacients.

Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioners are not entitled to
notice and hearing because the said proceedings are done in the exercise of its
regulatory power, not quasi-judicial power; also, they alleged that the Honorable
Supreme Court is incompetent to rule on the instant controversy due to the same
reason.

ISSUE:

Is the controversy outside of the scope of Judicial Review?

RULING:

Yes. Quasi-judicial power is known as the power of the administrative agency to

determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in accordance
with the standards laid down by the law itself. As it involves the exercise of discretion
in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties, the proper exercise of quasi-
judicial power requires the concurrence of two elements: one, jurisdiction which must
be acquired by the administrative body and two, the observance of the requirements of
due process, that is, the right to notice and hearing.”

Thus, on the argument that the certification proceedings were conducted by the
FDA in the exercise of its “regulatory powers” and, therefore, beyond judicial review,
the Court holds that it has the power to review all acts and decisions where there is a
commission of grave abuse of discretion. No less than the Constitution decrees that
the Court must exercise its duty to ensure that no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Such is committed when there is a violation of the
constitutional mandate that “no person is deprived of life, liberty, and property
without due process of law.” The Court’s power cannot be curtailed by the FDA’s
invocation of its regulatory power.”
 Political Law: Constitutional Law

MINDANAO SHOPPING DESTINATION CORPORATION, et al. v

HON. RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, in his capacity as Mayor of Davao City, et al. GR
No. 211093, June 6, 2017 EN BANC (PERALTA, J.)

DOCTRINE: Local Government Code; Scope of the Taxing Power of LGU’s: Local
Government Units shall have the authority to adjust the tax rates as prescribed by the
Local Government Code; it does not cover local taxes which were not enacted in
accordance with its provisions.

FACTS:

In 2005, Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao City, after due notice and hearing,
enacted the assailed Davao City Ordinance No. 158-05, Series of 2005, otherwise
known as "An Ordinance Approving the 2005 Revenue Code of the City of Davao”. In
this ordinance, it will require the businesses to pay a tax rate of 1.5% or an increase of
200% from the previous rate. Mindanao Shopping Destination Corporation et.al,
corporations engaged in the business of retailing, claimed that they used to pay only
50% of 1 % of the business tax rate under the old Davao City Ordinance No. 230,
Series of 1990. They believed that the increase is not allowed under Republic
Act (RA) No. 7160, The Local Government Code. Consequently, invoking the LGC,
petitioners appealed to the DOJ, docketed as MTO-DOJ Case No. 02-2006, asserting
the unconstitutionality and illegality of Section 69 (d), for being unjust, excessive,
oppressive, confiscatory and contrary to the 1987 Constitution and the provisions of
the LGC.

Meanwhile, on September 26, 2006, Davao City Ordinance No. 0253, Series of
2006 (Amended Ordinance), amended Section 69 (d) of the questioned ordinance. In it,
tax rate on retailers with gross receipts in excess of ₱400,000.00 was reduced from
one and one-half percent (1 1/2%) to one and one-fourth percent (1 1/4%). With the
development, Mindanao Shopping maintained that the adjustment in the tax base no
longer exceeds the limitation as set forth in Section 191 of the LGC considering that
the current Davao City tax rate of 1.25% on retailers with gross receipts/sales of over
₱400,000.00 under the assailed ordinance is way below or 0.25% short of the
maximum tax rates of 1.5% for cities sanctioned by the LGC. Respondents insist that
there is thus no increase or adjustment to speak of under the premises which is
violative of Section 191 of the LGC.

ISSUE:

Did the assailed ordinance violate the limitations imposed by the Local
Government Code?

RULING:
 No. It can be shown that the assailed ordinance does not violate the limitation
imposed by Section 191 of the LGC on the adjustment of tax rate for Section 191 of
the LGC presupposes that the following requirements are present for it to apply, to wit:
(i) there is a tax ordinance that already imposes a tax in accordance with the
provisions of the LGC; and (ii) there is a second tax ordinance that made adjustment
on the tax rate fixed by the first tax ordinance. In the instant case, both elements are
not present.

As to the first requirement, it cannot be said that the old tax ordinance (first
ordinance) was imposed in accordance with the provisions of the LGC. To reiterate, the
old tax ordinance of Davao City was enacted before the LGC came into law. Thus, the
assailed new ordinance, Davao City Ordinance No. 158-05, Series of 2005 was actually
the first to impose the tax on retailers in accordance with the provisions of the LGC.

As to the second requirement, the new tax ordinance (second ordinance)

imposed the new tax base and the new tax rate as provided by the LGC for retailers. It
must be emphasized that a tax has two components, a tax base and a tax rate.
However, Section 191 contemplates a situation where there is already an existing tax
as authorized under the LGC and only a change in the tax rate would be effected.
Again, the new ordinance Davao City provided, not only a tax rate, but also a tax base
that were appropriate for retailers, following the parameters provided under the LGC.
Suffice it to say, the second requirement is absent.

Thus, given the absence of the above two requirements for the application of
Section 191 of the LGC, there is no reason for the latter to cover a situation where the
ordinance, as in this case, was an initial implementation of R.A. 7160.
 Political Law: Constitutional Law

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIIPINES, et al. v

COMMISION ON ELECTIONS, et al.
GR No. 159139, June 6, 2017 EN BANC (JARDELEZA, J.)

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, et al. v MA. MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ

GR No. 174777/ 159139, June 6, 2017 EN BANC (JARDELEZA, J.)

DOCTRINE: Constitutional Law; Power of the Ombudsman; The determination of

probable cause-that is, one made for the purpose of filing an information in court-is
essentially an executive function and not a judicial one.

FACTS:

In Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on

Elections (COMELEC), the Court nullified the COMELEC's award to Mega Pacific
Consortium Inc. (MPEI) of the procurement contract involving the Automated
Counting Machines (ACM’s) for the 2004 national elections. The Court found that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it awarded the contract to an entity
which failed to establish itself as a proper consortium, and despite the ACM's failure to
meet certain technical requirements.

As mandated by the Infotech Decision, the Ombudsman initiated a fact-finding

investigation. Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation later filed a
related complaint with the Ombudsman against COMELEC officials and stockholders
of MPEI. The Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman filed a supplemental
complaint. These cases were later on consolidated by the Ombudsman. The
investigating panel of the Office of the Ombudsman reconvened to carry out further
investigation and clarificatory hearings. They invited resource persons and witnesses
to testify and present relevant documents and papers in order to determine criminal
liability of the public and private respondents in the Ombudsman cases.

Aggrieved by the Ombudsman's reversal, the petitioners filed the present special
civil action for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 174777 seeking to nullify the
Ombudsman's Supplemental Resolution and to cite the Ombudsman in contempt.

ISSUE:

Does the Ombudsman have the power to determine whether the criminal case
will be filed or not?

RULING:
 Yes. The 1987 Constitution clothed the Ombudsman with authority to
investigate offenses committed by public officers and employees. In Casing v.
Ombudsman, the Court stated that:

The Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 endowed the Office of the
Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its investigatory and
prosecutory powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public
officials and employees. Specifically, the determination of whether
probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and
circumstances, should be filed or not is basically its call.

Therefore, the determination of probable cause-that is, one made for the
purpose of filing an information in court-is essentially an executive function and not a
judicial one. The State's self-preserving power to prosecute violators of its penal laws
is a necessary component of the Executive's power and responsibility to faithfully
execute the laws of the land.