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 CASE 2016-0071: J.O.S.

MANAGING BUILDERS VS UNITED OVERSEAS BANK PHILIPPINES (FORMERLY KNOWN AS


WESTMONT BANK), EMMANUEL T. MANGOSING AND DAVID GOH CHAI ENG, (G.R. NO. 219815, 14 SEPT 2016,
JARDELEZA, J.) (SUBJECT/S:: 3-DAY NOTICE RULE; FILING MOTION TO DISMISS AFTER FILING ANSWER; INDIRECT
CONTEMPT) (BRIEF TITLE: J.O.S. MANAGING BUILDERS VS. UNITED OVERSEAS BANK ET AL)

DISPOSITIVE:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The October 7, 2014 and July 20, 2015 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 87 in Civil Case No. Q-11-69413 are hereby REVERSED. The case is REMANDED to the
court a quo for continuance of the trial of the case.

SO ORDERED.”

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:

RTC DISMISSED THE CONTEMPT CHARGE FOR BEEING MOOT. IT ALSO GRANTS RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO EXPUNGE
PETITIONER’S MR FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE THREE DAY NOTICE RULE. PETITIONER THEN FILED PETITION
DIRECTLY TO SC (NOT PASSING CA) RAISING QUESTIONS OF LAW. DID PETITIONER VIOLATE THE RULE ON HIERARCHY
OF COURTS?

NO.

THE RULES PROVIDES THAT IN ALL CASES WHERE ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW ARE RAISED OR INVOLVED, THE APPEAL
SHALL BE BEFORE SC.

HEARING WAS SET FOR NOV 7. RESPONDENTS ONLY RECEIVED NOTICE FROM PETITIONER ON NOV 6. RTC EXPUNGED
PETITIONER’S MR BECAUSE IT VIOLATED THE 3 DAY RULE ON MOTIONS. WAS RTC CORRECT?

NO.

THE THREE-DAY NOTICE REQUIREMENT IS NOT A HARD-AND-FAST RULE. A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE
PROCEDURAL RULES IS PROPER WHERE THE LAPSE IN THE LITERAL OBSERVANCE OF A RULE OF PROCEDURE HAS NOT
PREJUDICED THE ADVERSE PARTY AND HAS NOT DEPRIVED THE COURT OF ITS AUTHORITY.

WHAT IS THE BASIS OF THE THREE DAY NOTICE RULE?


SECTION 4, RULE 15 OF THE RULES, PROVIDES THAT:

SEC. 4. HEARING OF MOTION. -EXCEPT FOR MOTIONS WHICH THE COURT MAY ACT UPON WITHOUT PREJUDICING
THE RIGHTS OF THE ADVERSE PARTY, EVERY WRITTEN MOTION SHALL BE SET FOR HEARING BY THE APPLICANT.

EVERY WRITTEN MOTION REQUIRED TO BE HEARD AND THE NOTICE OF THE HEARING THEREOF SHALL BE SERVED IN
SUCH A MANNER AS TO ENSURE ITS RECEIPT BY THE OTHER PARTY AT LEAST THREE (3) DAYS BEFORE THE DATE OF
HEARING, UNLESS THE COURT FOR GOOD CAUSE SETS THE HEARING ON SHORTER NOTICE.

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THIS RULE??

IT IS MANDATORY.

IT IS AN INTEGRAL COMPONENT OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE RULE?

TO AVOID SURPRISES UPON RESPONDENT AND TO GRANT IT SUFFICIENT TIME TO STUDY THE MOTION AND TO
ENABLE IT TO MEET THE ARGUMENTS INTERPOSED.

WHAT IS THE TEST OF THE OBSERVANCE OF THE 3 DAY NOTICE RULE?

THE TEST IS THE PRESENCE OF OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, AS WELL AS TO HAVE TIME TO STUDY THE MOTION AND
MEANINGFULLY OPPOSE OR CONTROVERT THE GROUNDS UPON WHICH IT IS BASED.35

THUS WHEN RESPONDENT FILED OPPOSITION AND RAISED ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CONTENTS OF THE MOTION
HE WAS AFFORDED OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS SIDE.

WHEN THE ADVERSE PARTY HAD BEEN AFFORDED SUCH OPPORTUNITY, AND HAS BEEN INDEED HEARD THROUGH
THE PLEADINGS FILED IN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION, THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE THREE-DAY NOTICE
REQUIREMENT IS DEEMED REALIZED.
IN SUCH CASE, THE REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH.

AFTER RESPONDENT FILED ANSWER TO THE CONTEMPT CHARGE, THEY FILED MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND
THAT THE CA IN THE FORECLOSURE ANNULMENT CASE REVERSED THE RTC DECISION AND THEREFORE THERE IS NO
MORE BASIS FOR THE CONTEMPT CASE. PETITIONER SAID RESPONDENT’S ACTION WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE THE
RULES PROVIDE THAT MOTION TO DISMISS MUST BE FILED ONLY BEFORE AN ANSWER IS FILED. IS PETITIONER
CORRECT?

NO.

IN OBANDO V. FIGUERAS,41 WE HELD THAT THE PERIOD TO FILE A MOTION TO DISMISS DEPENDS UPON THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE.

EVEN AFTER AN ANSWER HAS BEEN FILED, THE COURT HAS ALLOWED A DEFENDANT TO FILE A MOTION TO DISMISS
ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS: (1) LACK OF JURISDICTION, (2) LITIS PENDENTIA, (3) LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION, AND
(4) DISCOVERY DURING TRIAL OF EVIDENCE THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL.

RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS WAS BASED ON AN EVENT THAT TRANSPIRED AFTER IT FILED ITS ANSWER. THIS
EVENT WAS THE DISMISSAL BY CA OF THE ANNULMENT OF FORECLOSURE CASE.

THE CONTEMPT CASE IS BASED ON PETITIONER’S SELLING THE PROPERTY DESPITE AN INJUNCTION PROHIBITING
SUCH ACT. BUT THE MAIN CASE WAS LATER DISMISSED BY CA. RESPONDENT THEN FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS
CONTEMPT CASE BECAUSE THE INJUNCTION VIOLATED IS ALREADY DISSOLVED. RTC AGREED AND IMMEDIATELY
DISMISSED THE CONTEMPT CASE EVEN THOUGH IT WAS JUST ON PRE-TRIAL STAGE ON THE GROUND THAT THE CASE
WAS MOOT. WAS RTC CORRECT?

NO.

A CASE IS MOOT WHEN IT CEASES TO PRESENT A , JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY BY VIRTUE OF SUPERVENING EVENTS
SO THAT A DECLARATION THEREON WOULD BE OF NO PRACTICAL VALUE.47 COURTS DECLINE JURISDICTION OVER IT
AS THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL RELIEF TO WHICH PETITIONER WILL BE ENTITLED AND WHICH · WILL ANYWAY BE
NEGATED BY THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION.

HERE, THE CONSEQUENT DISSOLUTION OF THE 2000 WRIT DID NOT RENDER THE CONTEMPT CASE MOOT AND
ACADEMIC.

THE ACT WAS COMMITTED WHILE THE INJUNCTION WAS STILL EFFECTIVE.
AN INJUNCTION OR RESTRAINING ORDER WHICH IS NOT VOID MUST BE OBEYED WHILE IT REMAINS IN FULL FORCE
AND EFFECT, AND HAS NOT BEEN OVERTURNED, THAT IS, IN GENERAL, UNTIL THE INJUNCTION OR RESTRAINING
ORDER HAS BEEN SET ASIDE, VACATED, OR MODIFIED.

THE INJUNCTION MUST BE OBEYED IRRESPECTIVE OF THE ULTIMATE VALIDITY OF THE ORDER, AND NO MATTER HOW
UNREASONABLE AND UNJUST THE INJUNCTION MAY BE IN ITS TERMS.

ARE RESPONDENTS THEN ALREADY GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT?

IT IS NOT FOR SC TO DECIDE.

IT MAY BE NOTED THAT THE CONTEMPT CASE WAS HOWEVER DISMISSED WHILE IT WAS ONLY IN THE PRE-TRIAL
STAGE AND CLEARLY BEFORE THE PARTIES COULD PRESENT THEIR EVIDENCE.

PROCEEDINGS FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT REQUIRE NORMAL ADVERSARIAL PROCEDURES. IT IS NOT
SUMMARY IN CHARACTER. THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF THE CONTUMACIOUS ACT COMMITTED
OUTSIDE THE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE JUDGE GENERALLY NEED THE OBSERVANCE OF ALL THE ELEMENTS OF
DUE PROCESS OF LAW, THAT IS, NOTICE, WRITTEN CHARGES, AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO DENY AND TO DEFEND SUCH
CHARGES BEFORE GUILT IS ADJUDGED AND SENTENCE IMPOSED.

THUS, THE CONTEMPT CASE WAS REFERRED TO RTC FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

 G. R. No. 185145, Feb. 5, 2014

SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA, Petitioners,


vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. and EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff,
Province of Bulacan, Respondents.

Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale,
certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) and
Emmanuel L. Ortega (Ortega) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City
Metrobank is a domestic banking corporation existing under Philippine laws, while Ortega is the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff of the Malolos RTC.

After the filing of the parties’ pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena
Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require Metrobank’s officers to appear and testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses during
the August 31, 2006 hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to their loan
with Metrobank, as well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners’ 200-square meter land in
Meycauayan, Bulacan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20411.

Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that for lack of a proper notice of hearing, the Motion must be denied; that being a
litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to set a date and time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro forma;
that pursuant to Sections 1 and 611 of Rule 25 of the Rules, Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse parties – may
not be compelled to appear and testify in court for the petitioners since they were not initially served with written
interrogatories; that petitioners have not shown the materiality and relevance of the documents sought to be produced in
court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for evidence.

Petitioners submitted a Reply stating that the lack of a proper notice of hearing was cured by the filing of Metrobank’s
Opposition; that applying the principle of liberality, the defect may be ignored; that leave of court is not necessary for the
taking of Metrobank’s officers’ depositions; that for their case, the issuance of a subpoena is not unreasonable and oppressive,
but instead favorable to Metrobank, since it will present the testimony of these officers just the same during the presentation
of its own evidence; that the documents sought to be produced are relevant and will prove whether petitioners have paid their
obligations to Metrobank in full, and will settle the issue relative to the validity or invalidity of the foreclosure proceedings; and
that the Rules do not prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its own witness.

Issue:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN REQUIRING NOTICE AND HEARING (SECS. 4 AND 5, RULE
15, RULES OF COURT) FOR A MERE MOTION FOR SUBPOENA OF RESPONDENT BANK’S OFFICERS WHEN SUCH REQUIREMENTS
APPLY ONLY TO DEPOSITION UNDER SEC. 6, RULE 25, RULES OF COURT.

Held:
On the procedural issue, it is quite clear that Metrobank was notified of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad
Testificandum; in fact, it filed a timely Opposition thereto. The technical defect of lack of notice of hearing was thus cured by
the filing of the Opposition.

As officers of the adverse party Metrobank are being compelled to testify as the calling party’s main witnesses; likewise, they
are tasked to bring with them documents which shall comprise the petitioners’ principal evidence. This is not without
significant consequences that affect the interests of the adverse party, as will be shown below.

As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written
interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides –

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.


Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written
interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending
appeal.

One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain order and
facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party
beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand
as its witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it
produces no significant result that prior written interrogatories might bring.

Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony, compelling the adverse party to take the
witness stand may result in the calling party damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or
information useful to its case through the facility of written interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then the calling of the
adverse party to the witness stand could only serve to weaken its own case as a result of the calling party’s being bound by the
adverse party’s testimony, which may only be worthless and instead detrimental to the calling party’s cause.

Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant,
and thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.

Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise prevents the calling
party from conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold
its own in resolving a dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court practices such as fishing for
evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only constitute a waste
of the court’s precious time, if not pointless entertainment.

In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to
present documents in Metrobank’s possession as part of their principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners
may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobank’s
officers – who are considered adverse parties as well, based on the principle that corporations act only through their officers
and duly authorized agents – as their main witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain access to Metrobank’s documentary
evidence for the purpose of making it their own. This is tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of their
opponent. The burden of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim
using their own evidence, then the adverse party Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from its own defense.

It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, be compelled to give
testimony in court by the adverse party who has not served written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against the
very principles of justice and fair play; they would want that Metrobank provide the very evidence with which to prosecute and
build their case from the start. This they may not be allowed to do.

Finally, the Court may not turn a blind eye to the possible consequences of such a move by petitioners. As one of their causes of
action in their Complaint, petitioners’ claim that they were not furnished with specific documents relative to their loan
agreement with Metrobank at the time they obtained the loan and while it was outstanding. If Metrobank were to willingly
provide petitioners with these documents even before petitioners can present evidence to show that indeed they were never
furnished the same, any inferences generated from this would certainly not be useful for Metrobank. One may be that by
providing petitioners with these documents, Metrobank would be admitting that indeed, it did not furnish petitioners with
these documents prior to the signing of the loan agreement, and while the loan was outstanding, in violation of the law.

 Preysler v. Manila Southcoast (Short title)


GR # 171872 | June 28, 2010
Petition: Petition for Review of CA decision
Petitioner: Fausto R. Preysler, Jr.
Respondents: Manila Southcoast Development Corporation
(Rule 15, Rules on Civil Procedure)

DOCTRINE
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal
observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority.

FACTS
- Preysler filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batangas a complaint for forcible entry against Manila
Southcoast Development Corporation.
o The subject matter of the complaint is a parcel of land with an area of 21,922 square meters located in Sitio Kutad,
Barangay Papaya, Nasugbu, Batangas.
o The disputed land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. TF-1217 in the name of Preysler, is also within the
property covered by TCT No. T-72097 in the name of respondent.company. TCT No. T-72097 covers three contiguous parcels of
land with an aggregate area of 86,507,778 square meters.
- MTC: Ruled in favor of Preysler and ordered respondent company to vacate the disputed land covered by TCT No. TF-
1217 and to return the possession.
- RTC: Reversed the MTC decision and dismissed the complaint
- Preysler received the RTC Decision on 9 February 2004 and thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
set for hearing on 26 February 2004.
- Preysler sent a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration to respondent company’s counsel by registered mail on 23
February 2004.
- During the 26 February 2004 scheduled hearing of the motion, the RTC judge reset the hearing to 2 April 2004
because the courts calendar could not accommodate the hearing of the motion.
- It was only on 3 March 2004, or 6 days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, that respondents counsel
received a copy of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
- The rescheduled hearing on 2 April 2004 was again reset on 7 May 2004 because the RTC judge was on official leave.
- The 7 May 2004 hearing was further reset to 6 August 2004. After the hearing, respondent company filed its Motion
to Dismiss dated 9 August 2004, claiming that non-compliance with the three-day notice rule did not toll the running of the
period of appeal, which rendered the decision final.
- RTC: On October 4, 2004, denied the Motion for Reconsideration for failure to appeal within the 15 days
reglementary period and declaring the 22 January 2004 Decision as final and executory.
o Motion for Reconsideration was fatally flawed for failure to observe the three-day notice rule.
o Preysler filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 4 October 2004.
- RTC: In its Order dated 22 February 2005, dismissed the Omnibus Motion.
- A petition for certiorari was then filed with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion for alleged failure to observe the three-day notice
rule.
- CA: Dismissed the petition.
o The three-day notice rule under Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is mandatory and non-
compliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma.
o As found by the RTC, Preysler’s Motion for Reconsideration dated 12 February 2004 was received by respondent only
on 3 March 2004, or six days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004.
o All violations of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 are deemed fatal.
- Thus, this petition.

ISSUE/S
1. W/N the CA committed grave error in affirming the ruling of RTC that the three-day notice rule was violated

PROVISIONS

Rule 15

Section 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure
its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing
on shorter notice. (4a)

Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and
date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. (5a)

Section 6. Proof of service necessary. — No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of
service thereof. (6a)

RULING & RATIO


1. YES
- In upholding the RTC, CA relied mainly on petitioners alleged violation of the notice requirements under Sections 4, 5,
and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court which read:
- The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in
the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its
authority.
- Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
- This Court has indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is
the requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply with the requirement.
- As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period
for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
- As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the Rules is not intended
for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the
adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court.
- The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully
oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.
- The requirement of notice of time and hearing in the pleading filed by a party is necessary only to apprise the other of
the actions of the former. Under the circumstances of the present case, the purpose of a notice of hearing was served.
- In this case, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the three-day notice rule. However, the
Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that although respondent received petitioners Motion for Reconsideration six days after
the scheduled hearing on 26 February 2004, the said hearing was reset three (3) times with due notice to the parties.
- It was only on 6 August 2004, or more than five months after respondent received a copy of petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly, respondent had more than sufficient time to oppose
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. In fact, respondent did oppose the motion when it filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 9
August 2004.
- In view of the circumstances of this case, we find that there was substantial compliance with procedural due process.
Instead of dismissing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration based merely on the alleged procedural lapses, the RTC should
have resolved the motion based on the merits.
- The RTC likewise erred in dismissing petitioners Omnibus Motion for allegedly failing to comply with the three-day
notice requirement.
o Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof
shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of the
hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 22 November 2005 and the Resolution dated 3 March
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89621. We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Nasugbu,
Batangas to resolve petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion on the merits.

SO ORDERED.

 KKK FOUNDATIONVS. HON. ADELINA CALDERON-BARGAS

FACTS:On March 1, 2002, petitioner, filed a complaint for Annulment of Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage
and/or Nullification of Sheriff’s Auction Sale and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.3 Petitioner alleged that: (1) the auction sale was made with fraud and/or bad faith since there was no public
bidding; (2) the sheriff did not post the requisite Notice of Sheriff’s Sale; (3) the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure was fatally
defective since it sought to foreclose properties of two different entities; (4) the foreclosed properties were awarded and sold
to Imelda A. Angeles for an inadequate bid of only P4,181,450; and (5) the auction sale involved eight parcels of land covered by
individual titles but the same were sold en masse. On March 7, 2002, Judge Calderon-Bargas issued TRO preventing Angeles
from consolidating her ownership to the foreclosed properties. On even date, petitioner and Angeles executed a Compromise
Agreement wherein petitioner agreed to pay Angeles the bid price of the eight parcels of land within 20 days. The parties then
filed a Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement.On April 1, 2002, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall
Compromise Agreement since the other property owner and other trustees of petitioner were not consulted prior to the
signing of the agreement. Angeles opposed the motion.Judge Calderon-Bargas issued an Order stating that Record shows that
the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Recall Compromise Agreement and Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement both failed to
comply with Sec[s]. 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure. Both proceedings have no specific date of hearing. The reason why
the Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement up to now has not yet been acted upon was that it has no date of hearing.Thus,
these are considered mere scrap[s] of paper. The TC approved the Compromise Agreement. Angeles then moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution. The TC required petitioner to comment on the motion within ten (10) days.TC directed the Clerk
of Court to issue a writ of execution. On the same date, the trial court received petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File
Comment with Entry of Appearance which was denied on October 10, 2002. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration of the
October 3, 2002 Order.Petitioner came to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. The CA denied the petition and ruled
that petitioner was not deprived of due process when the trial court issued the October 3, 2002 and the October 10, 2002
Orders since it was given sufficient time to file its comment. The appellate court did not rule on the second and third issues
after noting that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the October 3, 2002 Order had not yet been resolved by the trial
court. It did not resolve the issues even after the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on December 12,
2003,11 ratiocinating that the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration did not operate to reinstate the
petition because at the time it was filed, petitioner had no cause of action.Hence , this petition.

ISSUES: WON the trial court seriously erred: (1) in issuing the October 3, 2002 and the October 10, 2002 Orders without
awaiting petitioner’s comment; (2) in granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution although it lacked the requisite
notice of hearing; and (3) in issuing the writ of execution since it varied the tenor of the decision dated June 28, 2002.

HELD:
On the first issue, we note that in its September 9, 2002 Order, the trial court gave petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment
to Angeles’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. While petitioner claims that it received the Order only on September 21,
2002, Angeles counters that petitioner received it on September 12, 2002. We are more inclined to believe Angeles’s allegation
since the trial court itself declared in its Order dated October 10, 2002 that the Order dated September 9, 2002 was personally
served upon petitioner on September 12, 2002.13 Thus, petitioner had until September 22, 2002 within which to file its
comment or to request for an extension of time. Consequently, petitioner’s motion for extension and comment were not
seasonably filed and such procedural lapse binds petitioner.

Anent the second issue, a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 1514 of the Rules of Court
is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to
act upon. Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory
requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these requirements renders their motions fatally defective. However,
there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These exceptions are: (1) where a rigid application will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final
and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial
justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the
court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed.A notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process to afford the
adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through such notice, the adverse party is given
time to study and answer the arguments in the motion. Records show that while Angeles’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution contained a notice of hearing, it did not particularly state the date and time of the hearing. However, scstill find that
petitioner was not denied procedural due process. Upon receiving the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the trial court
issued an Order dated September 9, 2002 giving petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment. The trial court ruled on the motion
only after the reglementary period to file comment lapsed. Clearly, petitioner was given time to study and comment on the
motion for which reason, the very purpose of a notice of hearing had been achieved.Procedural due process is not based solely
on a mechanical and literal application that renders any deviation inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules are liberally
construed to promote their objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any action and
proceeding.

On the last issue, SC note that the Compromise Agreement approved by the trial court in its Decision dated June 28, 2002
merely provided that petitioner would pay Angeles the bid price of P5,500,000, for the eight parcels of land subject of the
auction sale, within twenty (20) days. Upon payment, Angeles would execute a Certificate of Deed of Redemption and a Deed
of Cancellation of Mortgage, and surrender to petitioner the titles to the eight parcels of land. Nevertheless, when the trial
court issued the writ of execution, the writ gave Sheriff Bisnar the option "to allow the consolidation of the subject real
properties in favor of the defendant Imelda Angeles."

Undoubtedly, the writ of execution imposed upon petitioner an alternative obligation which was not included or contemplated
in the Compromise Agreement. While the complaint originally sought to restrain Angeles from consolidating her ownership to
the foreclosed properties, that has been superseded by the Compromise Agreement. Therefore, the writ of execution which
directed Sheriff Bisnar to "cause the Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal, to allow the consolidation of the subject real properties
in favor of the defendant Imelda Angeles" is clearly erroneous because the judgment under execution failed to provide for
consolidation. Because the writ of execution varied the terms of the judgment and exceeded them, it had no validity. The writ
of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed, as it may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to
enforce. Neither may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony
with the judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has pro tanto no validity.20

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2003 and the Resolution dated
May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73965 are MODIFIED such that the writ of execution issued on October
11, 2002 by Judge Adelina Calderon-Bargas is declared NULL and VOID.
SC ordered that the case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, Branch 78, which is hereby ORDERED to
issue another writ of execution against petitioner KKK Foundation, Inc., in conformity with the Decision dated June 28, 2002 of
the trial court. This is without prejudice to filing a new motion for consolidation by respondent Angeles.