Goodland Company, Inc. v. Asia United Bank , et al.

G.R. No. 195561, March 14, 2012

DOCTRINE: Splitting a cause of action; Forum Shopping - There is forum shopping when
the following elements are present: A) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the
same interests in both actions; B) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and C) the identity of the two preceding particulars such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.

FACTS:

Goodland Company mortgaged its two parcels of land situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna through a Third
Party Real Estate Mortgage (REM) with Smartnet to secure the loans extended by Asia United Bank
(AUB). Petitioner also executed another REM for its Makati properties. Both the REMs were signed
by its President Gilbert Guy. AUB registered the mortgages with the Registry of Deed at the
concerned properties. Afterwards, Goodland repudiated the REMs. Hence, Goodland filed a
complaint for annulment of mortgage before the RTC of Bian, Laguna on the ground that the REM
was falsified and against the agreement that the blank mortgage would only serve as a comfort
document and not to be registered by AUB.

Smartnet defaulted on its loan obligation which prompted AUB to extra-judicially foreclose the
REM and then was issued a Certificate of Sale registered with the Registry of Deeds. Goodland filed
another case seeking for the annulment of the foreclosure sale and enjoin consolidation of the title
in favor of AUB. AUB moved to dismiss both the cases filed by Goodland on the ground of forum
shopping and litis pendentia. It was granted. On appeal, the decision of the RTC were reversed. As to
the Makati properties, the same case was filed by Goodland including the President of AUB and the
notarizing lawyer whose signature was falsified. The same was contradicted by AUB but this time,
the motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping, non-payment of proper docket fees, and
litis pendentia were denied. AUB argued that there was no service of summons, thus the court never
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents. On appeal, the CA held Goodland guilty
of forum shopping for failing to inform AUB of the other case filed while the case on the REM is
pending.

ISSUE:
Is Goodland Company guilty of forum shopping?

HELD:

Yes. All the elements of forum shopping are present in this case. There is forum shopping
when the following elements are present:

a. identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;
b. identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and
 c. the identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
There can be no dispute that the prayer for relief in the two cases was based on the same
attendant facts in the execution of REMs over petitioner’s properties in favor of AUB. While the
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, consolidation of ownership in AUB and issuance of title in the
latter’s name were set forth only in the second case, these were simply the expected consequences of
the REM transaction in the first case. There is also identity of parties. The parties in the first and
second case are substantially the same as they represent the same interest and offices. Goodland’s
argument that the certification and verification appended to its complaint satisfactorily conforms
with the requirements of the required certificate of non-forum shopping. However, the Supreme
Court disagrees. Goodland filed a certificate which is partly false and misleading.

The elements of litis pendentia are also present. It refers to the situation where two actions
are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari in G.R. Nos. 195546 and 195561 are
both DENIED. The Decision dated September 15, 2010 and Resolution dated January 31, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90418 are hereby AFFIRMED.
 Paglaum Management & Development Corp. and Health MarketingTechnologies, Inc. v.
Union Bank of the Philippines, et al.
G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012

DOCTRINE: Venue of Real Actions - The general rule in Rule 4 is that the venue is on where
the property is located. However, among the exceptions is where the parties have validly agreed in
writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.

FACTS:

Paglaum Management and Development Corporation (PAGLAUM) is theregistered owner ofthree

parcels of land located in the Province of Cebu with Benjamin B. Dy, the president ofpetitioner
Health Marketing Technologies, Inc. (HealthTech) as co-owner. On 3 February 1994,Union Bank of
thePhilippines (Union Bank) extended HealthTech a credit line in the amount ofP 10,000,000 which
was eventually increased to 36,500,000. This was secured by three realestate mortgage on the lands.

The venue in the real estate mortgage was stipulated to be in Makati, Metro Manila or in theplace
where any of the Mortgaged Properties is located (Cebu), at the absolute option of the Mortgagee,
the parties hereto waiving any other venue. Unfortunately, Healthtech is havingdifficulties on paying
its obligation. They both executed a Restructuring Agreement whereby it
states that that any action or proceeding arising out of or in connectiontherewith shall
becommenced in Makati City, with both parties waiving any other venue. Healthtech still defaulted
on the obligation. Union Bank foreclosed the properties through anauction sale, bought it as the sole
bidder as secured a Certificate of Sale. Healthcare filed acomplaint for annulment of sale and titles
on the RTC of MAKATI. The RTC ruled in favor ofHealthtech and restrained restraining Union
Bank from proceeding with the auction sale. UnionBank filed a Motion to Dismiss citing lack of
jurisdiction and improper venue. RTC of Makatigranted Union Banks motion to dismiss. CA
affirmed Makati RTC. Union Bank argues that the Restructuring Agreement only pertains to the
loan and does notaffect the stipulations in the real mortgage which states that it has the option to
choose thevenue. Healthtech argues the restructuring agreement also carries with it the venue for
thesettlement of cases for the real mortgages. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC Makati is a proper venue for the case

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that an action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is nodifferent
from an action to annul a private sale of real property. Therefore, this case falls underRule 4. The
general rule in Rule 4 is that the venue is on where the property is located.However, among the
exceptions is where the parties have validly agreed in writing before thefiling of the action on the
exclusive venue thereof. The Supreme Court adds that the merestipulation on the venue of an
action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties
must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive.Failure to do so would result to the parties
stipulating additional venues for the case.In the case at bar, both the stipulation in the Real Estate
Mortgage and the RestructuringAgreement have words of exclusivity. The Supreme Court
held that the Restructuring Agreement should prevail as this modified the entire loan obligation.
The later RestructuringAgreement reveals the intention of the parties to implement a restrictive
venue stipulation, whichapplies not only to the principal obligation, but also to the mortgages

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision dated 31 May 2007 and
Resolution dated 24 July 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 82053 of the Court of Appeals, as well as the
Orders dated 11 March 2003 and 19 September 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, Branch 134, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 01-1567 is
hereby REINSTATED.
 Financial Building Corp. v. Forbes Park PARK Association
G.R. No. 133119, August 17, 2000

DOCTRINE: Failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim -compulsory

counterclaim is one whicharises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction oroccurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party’sclaim. If it is within the jurisdiction of the court and
it does notrequire for its adjudication the presence of third parties overwhom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction, such compulsorycounterclaim is barred if it is not set up in the action filed by
theopposing party.

FACTS:

The then Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (hereafter, USSR) was the owner of a 4,223 square
meter residential lot located at No. 10, Narra Place, Forbes Park Village in Makati City. On
December 2, 1985, the USSR engaged the services of Financial Building for the construction of a
multi-level office and staff apartment building at the said lot, which would be used by the Trade
Representative of the USSR.Due to the USSRs representation that it would be building a residence
for its Trade Representative, Forbes Park authorized its construction and work began shortly
thereafter.
On June 30, 1986, Forbes Park reminded the USSR of existing regulations authorizing only the
construction of a single-family residential building in each lot within the village. It also elicited a
reassurance from the USSR that such restriction has been complied with.Promptly, the USSR gave
its assurance that it has been complying with all regulations of Forbes Park.Despite this, Financial
Building submitted to the Makati City Government a second building plan for the construction of a
multi-level apartment building, which was different from the first plan for the construction of a
residential building submitted to Forbes Park.
Forbes Park discovered the second plan and subsequent ocular inspection of the USSRs subject
lot confirmed the violation of the deed of restrictions. Thus, it enjoined further construction
work. On March 27, 1987, Forbes Park suspended all permits of entry for the personnel and
materials of Financial Building in the said construction site. The parties attempted to meet to settle
their differences but it did not push through.
Instead, on April 9, 1987, Financial Building filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila, a Complaintfor Injunction and Damages with a prayer for Preliminary Injunction against
Forbes Park docketed as Civil Case No. 16540. The latter, in turn, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that Financial Building had no cause of action because it was not the real party-in-interest.
On April 28, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction against Forbes Park but
the Court of Appeals nullified it and dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. 16540 altogether. We
affirmed the said dismissal in our Resolution,promulgated on April 6, 1988, in G.R. No. 79319
entitled Financial Building Corporation, et al. vs. Forbes Park Association, et al.
 After Financial Buildings case, G.R. No. 79319, was terminated with finality, Forbes Park
sought to vindicate its rights by filing on October 27, 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati a
Complaintfor Damages, against Financial Building, docketed as Civil Case No. 89-5522, arising from
the violation of its rules and regulations. The damages claimed are in the following amounts: (a)
P3,000,000.00 as actual damages; (b) P1,000,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P1,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and (d) P1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees.On September 26, 1994, the trial court
rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. 89-5522 in favor of Forbes Park and against Financial
Building
ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint filed by respondent FPA despite the fact that its alleged claims and
causes of action therein are barred by prior judgment and/or are deemed waived for its failure to
interpose the same as compulsory counterclaims in civil case no. 16540

HELD:
The instant case is barred due to Forbes Parks failure to set it up as a compulsory counterclaim in
Civil Case No. 16540, the prior injunction suit initiated by Financial Building against Forbes Park.
A compulsory counterclaim is one which arises out of or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. If it is within the
jurisdiction of the court and it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, such compulsory counterclaim is barred if it is not set
up in the action filed by the opposing party.
Thus, a compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of a separate action but it should instead be
asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence, which gave rise to it.
Undoubtedly, the prior Civil Case No. 16540 and the instant case arose from the same occurrence
the construction work done by Financial Building on the USSRs lot in Forbes Park Village. The
issues of fact and law in both cases are identical. The factual issue is whether the structures erected
by Financial Building violate Forbes Parks rules and regulations, whereas the legal issue is whether
Financial Building, as an independent contractor working for the USSR, could be enjoined from
continuing with the construction and be held liable for damages if it is found to have violated
Forbes Parks rules.
As a result of the controversy, Financial Building seized the initiative by filing the prior injunction
case, which was anchored on the contention that Forbes Parks prohibition on the construction work
in the subject premises was improper. The instant case on the other hand was initiated by Forbes
Park to compel Financial Building to remove the same structures it has erected in the same premises
involved in the prior case and to claim damages for undertaking the said construction. Thus, the
logical relation between the two cases is patent and it is obvious that substantially the same evidence
is involved in the said cases.
Moreover, the two cases involve the same parties. The aggregate amount of the claims in the instant
case is within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court, had it been set up as a counterclaim in Civil
Case No. 16540.Therefore, Forbes Parks claims in the instant case should have been filed as a
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 16540.
Since Forbes Park filed a motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 16540, its existing compulsory
counterclaim at that time is now barred.
DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the Decision dated March 20, 1998
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48194 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Costs
against respondent Forbes Park Association, Inc.

Manotoc v. Court of Appeals

499 SCRA 21

DOCTRINE: Substituted service - In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the

defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the
defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within
a reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of
summons is permitted, it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of
service.

FACTS:

Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a Summons addressed to petitioner
at Alexandra Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City.The Summons and a
copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of
petitioner at the condominium unit mentioned earlier. When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the
trial court declared her in default. Petitioner, filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons.

Trial court rejected Manotoc’s Motion to Dismiss and relied on the presumption that the sheriff’s
substituted service was made in the regular performance of official duty, and such presumption
stood in the absence of proof to the contrary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Substituted service was valid.

HELD:

NO.
Requirements for Substituted Service, Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which
applies to this case can be broken down to the following requirements: (1)Impossibility of Prompt
Personal Service (2)Specific Details in the Return (3)A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion (4)A
Competent Person in Charge.

A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of material data on
the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid
reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that
personal service has become impossible or unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of
“on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons . . . personally,” “at
reasonable hours during the day,” and “to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is usually
out of her place and/or residence or premises.”

Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith
to locate the defendant through more direct means. Respondent Trajano failed to demonstrate
that there was strict compliance with the requirements of the then Section 8, Rule 14 (now Section
7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), the proceedings held before the trial court perforce
must be annulled.
DISPOSITIVE:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and the
assailed March 17, 1997 Decision and October 8, 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals and the
October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Pasig City, Branch 163 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
 Ma. Carminia Calderon, etc. v. Jose Antonio F. Roxas
G.R. No. 185595, January 9, 2013

DOCTRINE: Provisional Remedies - Provisional remedies are writs and processes available
during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect
certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a
final judgment in the case.

FACTS:

Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were married
on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four children. On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed
an Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The trial court issued an Order granting petitioner’s application for support pendente lite.
respondent filed a Motion to Reduce Support. The trial court rendered its Decision declaring null
and void the marriage, awarding the custody of the parties’ minor children to their mother, ordering
the respondent Jose Antonio Roxas to provide support to the children, and dissolving the
community property or conjugal partnership property of the parties. Petitioner through counsel filed
a Notice of Appeal from the Orders.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the matter of support pendent lite is alreadyinterlocutory and final

HELD:

The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support in arrears, as the
term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration
of nullity of marriage, and are therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor
did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s claims as to the ground of
psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody, support and conjugal assets.

The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite which may be
availed of at the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the
judgment or final order. On March 4, 2003, this Court promulgated the Rule on Provisional
Orders which shall govern the issuance of provisional orders during the pendency of cases for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of voidable marriage and legal separation. These
include orders for spousal support, child support, child custody, visitation rights, hold departure,
protection and administration of common property.

Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory aspect of the assailed
orders pertains only to private respondent’s motion to reduce support which was granted, and to her
own motion to increase support, which was denied.

Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action which may
be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending
rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are
provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the
action, and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result
of the main action. The subject orders on the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to
the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED, for lack of merit. The Decision
dated September 9, 2008 and Resolution dated December 15, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 85384 are AFFIRMED.With costs against the petitioner.
 Province of CamarinesSurv. Court of Appeals
600 SCRA 569

DOCTRINE: Declaratory Relief - Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person

interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to
determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or
regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.

FACTS:

The property subject of the instant case is a parcel of land, known as Plaza Rizal, situated within
the territory of the City of Naga. Plaza Rizal is located in front of the old provincial capitol building,
where the Provincial Government of Camarines Sur used to have its seat, at the time when the then
Municipality of Naga was still the provincial capital. Republic Act No. 305 took effect and, by virtue
thereof, the Municipality of Naga was converted into the City of Naga. Subsequently, RA No. 1336
was approved, transferring the site of the provincial capitol of Camarines Sur from the City of Naga
to the barrio of Palestina, Municipality of Pili. The Municipality of Pili was also named as the new
provincial capital.

Sometime in 1997, City of Naga filed a complaint for Declaratory Relief and/ Quieting of Title
against Camarines Sur. City of Naga alleged that CamSur possessed and claimed ownership of
Plaza Rizal by virtue of a Tax declaration over said property in the name of the province. As a result,
Camarines Sur had long exercised administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal, to the
exclusion of the City of Naga. The situation had created a conflict of interest between the parties
herein and had generated animosities among their respective officials. City of Naga seeks a
declaration that the administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal should be vested in it
given that the said property is within its territorial jurisdiction invoking Sec. 2, Art. I of R.A. 305 or
the Charter of Naga City.

CamSur filed an answer with Motion to Dismiss alleging that the complaint lacked factual and legal
basis. It further alleged that the remedy of Declaratory Relief was inappropriate because there was
no justiciable controversy since ownership of said subject belongs to CamSur and it has been under
its control and supervision since time immemorial. Also, the remedy of quieting of title was
inappropriate since Naga City had no equitable title to Plaza Rizal that needed protection. Motion to
dismiss was denied because the legal issues required evidentiary matters that can only be settled in a
full-blown trial.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of City of Naga. Court saidx xx Since [Section 2, Article I] of
[Republic Act No.] 305 defines the territory of [the City of] Naga and Plaza Rizal is within
its territorial jurisdiction, ergo, it is the City [of Naga] who has the right of administrative
control and management of Plaza Rizal.”

Camarines Sur filed with the Court vis-à-vis a petition for review on Certiorari after having denied
its MR. RTC referred the case to the Court of Appeals. SIDE ISSUE: Court of Appeals mistook
the petition for review on Certiorari (Rule 45) as a petition for Certiorari (Rule 65)and the CA denied
the petition by saying that Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal
and that the case would still fail because there was no grave abuse of discretion.

CamSur now then filed the instant petition for Certiorai(Rule 65) arguing that the Court of Appeals
went beyond its authority and gravely abused its discretion when it treated and resolved the Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65, which must allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, and which cannot be made a
substitute for a lost appeal. Camarines Sur insists that what it filed was a Petition under Rule 45,
which raised all reversible errors committed by the RTC and presented all questions of laws.

In the same petition CamSur pleads for this Court to decide on the questions of law raised in the
dismissed petition. CamSur alleges that the filing of the Complaint for Declaratory Relief and/or
Quieting of Title was improper as it was hinged on a pretended controversy. Essentially, the
complaint of the City of Naga did not show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on
one side, and a denial thereof, on the other.

ISSUE:

WON the petition for Declaratory relief is proper.

HELD:

YES, the City of Naga properly resorted to the filing of an action for declaratory relief. Declaratory
relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity
arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his
rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. In the instant case, the
controversy concerns the construction of the provisions of Republic Act No. 305 or the
Charter of the City of Naga. Specifically, the City of Naga seeks an interpretation of Section 2,
Article I of its Charter, as well as a declaration of the rights of the parties to this case. The requisites
of an action for declaratory relief are:

(1) there must be a justiciable controversy between persons whose interests are
adverse;
(2) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and
(3) the issue is ripe for judicial determination

The instant case falls under the requisites: First, the interests of the City of Naga and Camarines
Sur in this case are adverse. The assertion by the City of Naga of a superior right to the
administrative control and management of Plaza Rizal, because said property of the public domain is
within its territorial jurisdiction, is clearly antagonistic to and inconsistent with the insistence of
Camarines Sur. Second, City of Naga asserted as a result of CamSur’s ownership, former could not
introduce improvements on Plaza Rizal; its constituents were denied adequate use of said property,
since Camarines Sur required that the latters permission must first be sought for the use of the same;
and it was still Camarines Sur that was able to continuously use Plaza Rizal for its own programs and
projects. Therefore, City of Naga undoubtedly has a legal interest in the controversy because
Plaza Rizal is within its jurisdiction. Lastly, the issue is ripe for determination in view of the
conflicting interest of the parties to which litigation is inevitable and no adequate relief is
available in any other form or proceeding.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is hereby DISMISSED. The administrative control and supervision of Plaza Rizal is hereby
vested in the City of Naga. Costs against petitioner.
 Barrazona v. RTC of Baguio Branch 61
486 SCRA 555
DOCTRINE: Exceptions to filing of motion for reconsideration before filing petition -While
an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non-appeallable, however, if the denial is
without or in excess of jurisdiction, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies from such order
of denial.

FACTS:

San-an Realty filed with the RTC a complaint for collection of sum of money against Barrazona,
alleging that the latter defaulted in the payment of the monthly rentals and that it has demanded the
payment of her overdue account, now amounting to P971,838.15, the last demand to vacate and
payment of arrears having been made in writing on March 27, 2002.

Barrazona filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the complaint considering that the allegations therein clearly indicate that the action is one for
ejectment (illegal detainer) which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.

The RTC denied the motion. Hence, Barrazona filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner should have first filed a motion for reconsideration before resorting to
the extraordinary suit of certiorari

Held:
While an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non-appeallable, however, if the
denial is without or in excess of jurisdiction, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies from
such order of denial.In Time, Inc. v. Reyes, this Court, speaking through Justice J.B. L. Reyes, held:
The motion to dismiss was predicated on the respondent courts lack of jurisdiction to entertain the
action; and the rulings of this Court are that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in
case of a denial or deferment of an action or on the basis of a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. Verily, the writ of certiorari is granted to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court did not agree with the respondent’s contention that petitioner should have first
filed a motion for reconsideration before resorting to the remedy of certiorari. While the rule is that
before certiorari may be availed of, petitioner must first file a motion for reconsideration with the
lower court of the act or order complained of, however, such rule is not without exception. We
have, in several instances, dispensed with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a lower courts
ruling, such as: where the proceedings in which the error occurred is a patent nullity; where the
question is purely of law; when public interest is involved; where judicial intervention is urgent or its
application may cause great and irreparable damage; and where the court a quo has no jurisdiction,as
in this case.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated June 19, 2002 issued by the RTC,
Branch 61, Baguio City, in Civil Case No. 5238-R, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Heirs of Restar v. Heirs of Cichon
475 SCRA 731

DOCTRINE: Action for partition imprescriptible; exceptions - While the action to demand
partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by
prescriptionwhere there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are
apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.

FACTS:

Emilio Restar died intestate, leaving eight children-compulsory heirs. Restar’s eldest child, Flores, on
the basis of a Joint Affidavit he executed with Helen Restar, caused the cancellation of Tax
Declaration in Restar’s name. The same covers a 5,918 square meter parcel of land in Aklan which
was among the properties left by Restar. Flores thereafter sought the issuance of another Tax
Declaration in his name. Flores later on died.

Ten years later, the heirs of Flores’ sisters, Dolores R. Cichon, et. al. (Heirs of Cichon) filed a
Complaint against Flores’ heirs for “partition of the lot, declaration of nullity of documents,
ownership with damages and preliminary injunction” before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Aklan alleging that the widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to hold on to the lot to
finance the education of her children, to which they agreed on the condition that after the children
had finished their education, it would be divided into eight equal parts; and upon their demand for
partition of the lot, the defendants Flores‘ heirs refused, they claiming that they were the lawful
owners thereof as they had inherited it from Flores. Flores‘ heirs claimed that they had been in
possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years and have been paying
realty taxes since time immemorial. And they denied having shared with the plaintiffs the produce of
the lot or that upon Flores’ death in 1989, Esmenia requested the plaintiffs to allow her to hold on
to it to finance her children’s education, they contending that by 1977, the children had already
finished their respective courses.

The RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores and his heirs had performed acts sufficient to constitute
repudiation of the co-ownership, concluded that they had acquired the lot by prescription. The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision finding that there was no adequate notice by Flores to his
co-heirs of the repudiation of the co-ownership and neither was there a categorical assertion by the
defendants of their exclusive right to the entire lot that barred the plaintiffs’ claim of ownership.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Heirs of Flores acquired ownership over the lot by extraordinary prescription

HELD:

While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may
acquire ownership thereof by prescriptionwhere there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership,
and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.

Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a
period of ten years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be
extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.

When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate
succession. Heirs of Chichon never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim
thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition subject of the present
petition. In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar’s death and exercised acts of
dominion thereon — tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the
produce thereof. Flores’ possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription
after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New Civil
Code.

Heirs of Cichon did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog,
Lezo, Aklan way back in 1945, they also had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in
Cerrudo and Palale, Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973 (exhibit “20”). If they were able to demand
the partition, why then did they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle
once and for all the inheritance from their father Emilio Restar, considering that at that time all
of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar, were still alive and participated in the
signing of the extra-judicial partition?

Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs: the cancellation of the
tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing another in his name; the execution of a
Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents;
payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share
therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents.
And Flores’ adverse possession was continued by his heirs.

The trial court’s finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for more than 38 years
possessed the land in open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of owner — which
length of possession had never been questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of the heirs of Cichon,
being thus duly supported by substantial evidence, he and his heirs have become owner of the lot by
extraordinary prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex.
DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the June 30, 1999 decision of the trial court
is REINSTATED.