a. People v.
v. Andre Marti GR 81561 January 18, 1991 The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded
FACTS: On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his
common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4)
gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes attended to them. The appellant informed Anita
Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes
then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant,
however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and
gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. Before delivery of appellant's box to the
Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of
Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His
curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt
dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper
protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the
cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof.
NBI: Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and
requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane
wrapper. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office.
Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes'
office at Ermita, Manila. Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages
were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps, removed the
styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana
leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers. It turned out
that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist.
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. The RTC convicted the appellants.
ISSUE: Whether the objects obtained are admissible as evidence against appellants.
RULUNG: NO. This Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence
obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process
the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court wherein the admissibility of
evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck
down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizures. It must be noted, however, that in all those
cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting
through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.
was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity
and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. In the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked
against the State. The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable
search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be
admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that
which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.
b. Velasquez –Rodriguez vs Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human rights, July 29,
1988
FACTS: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights submitted the instant case to
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on April 24, 1986. It originated in a petition
(No. 7920) against the State of Honduras, which the Secretariat of the Commission. On
September 12, 1981, Mr. Angel Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez, a student at the
National Autonomous University of Honduras is involved in activities that the State
considers dangerous to national security. Between 4:30 and 5:00 pm, several heavily
armed men in civilian clothes, driving a white Ford vehicle without license plates, kidnap
Mr. Velásquez Rodríguez from a parking lot in downtown Tegucigalpa. He was taken to
an armed forces station located in Barrio El Manchén of Tegucigalpa, where he is
detained by members of the National Office of Investigations and the Honduran Armed
Forces, who accuse him of political crimes, and subject him to harsh interrogation and
torture. He is moved to the First Infantry Battalion, an armed forces command area, near
Tegucigalpa. The police and security forces deny that he was ever detained there.
Between 1981 and 1984, approximately 150 people disappear in Honduras.
These disappearances all follow a similar pattern: the victims are kidnapped by force
from public places in broad daylight by armed men in civilian clothes and disguises. It is
common knowledge that the kidnappings are carried out by military personnel or the
police, or persons acting under government orders. The victims are usually persons
whom the authorities consider to be dangerous to State security, and who have been
under surveillance for long periods of time. Military and police officials either deny these
disappearances or claim that they are incapable of preventing or investigating them,
unable to punish those responsible, or powerless to help locate the victims or their
remains.
Police and security forces denied involvement and the courts would not hear the family’s
case. The Honduras government, which was a military dictatorship at the time, refused to
cooperate with the Commission when the family filed a petition. The Inter-American
Convention does not expressly prohibit forced disappearances. However, the practice is
a violation of several articles of the Convention:
1. Article 1 – duty to guarantee rights;
2. Article 4 – right to life (clandestine execution without trial, clandestine burial);
3. Art 5 – right to personal integrity (prolonged isolation and imprisonment;
incommunicado detention);
4. Art 7 – right to personal liberty (arbitrary deprivation of liberty; infringement of the
right to be taken before a judge to review the legality of arrest).
Forced disappearances also constitute a violation of something more than individual
articles because it shows a crass abandonment of the principle of human dignity and the
values of the Inter-American system and the Convention.
ISSUES:
(1) Can the disappearance be the responsibility of the State even if committed by private
persons; if so, in what circumstances?
(2) Burden and standard of proof in disappearance cases;
(3) Compensation/redress in disappearance cases;
(4) Exhaustion of local remedies.
RULING:
(1) The Court found government agents responsible directly for the abduction of Mr
Velasquez. But, it said that even if the government was not directly liable, it would
still be liable for the violations found because of its breach of Article 1.1. If the
kidnapping had been carried out by private persons, the government would be liable
because:
a) Art 1.1 requires state parties to “ensure” rights guaranteed by the Convention;
b) “ensure” means that the State is required to organize its “government apparatus” and
all structures through which public power is exercised to ensure free and full
enjoyment of human rights;
c) The State must prevent, investigate and punish and violation of those rights; and, if
possible, attempt to restore violated rights and provide compensation;
d) An act violating human rights which is not directly imputable to a State initially will
lead to State responsibility not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of
due diligence to prevent or to respond to the violation;
e) The duty to investigate is not a duty to achieve results, but rather to “seriously
investigate.”
(2) Burden and standard of proof: The initial burden will fall upon the Commission to
show an “official practice of disappearances” carried out or tolerated by the
government and that in the instant case the disappearance can be linked to that
practice. The burden will then shift to the government, in that it will be up to the State
to show what happened to the disappeared person, and that it was not related to any
such official practice. The reversal of the burden is justified because: the State
“cannot rely on the defense that the complainant has failed to present evidence when
it cannot be obtained without State co-operation”; and the State controls the means
to verify acts occurring within its territory.
(3) Compensation/redress: In the instant case, no redress to the victim can be made and
his rights cannot be restored or compensation paid; But the Court can still order that
the consequences of the breach be remedied and just compensation paid to the
next-of-kin of the victim.
(4) Exhaustion of local remedies: The government submitted a brief prepared by the
Honduran Bar Association identifying legal remedies available in cases of
disappearance of persons (ie. Appeal, cassation, criminal complaint, habeas corpus).
It alleged that the Applicants have not exhausted them.
Commission: the remedies identified were ineffective. Three writs of habeas corpus had
been filed by the family of the victim, and they achieved nothing. There was a
widespread practice of intimidation of judges and lawyers, and of police ignoring judicial
decisions. If the State alleges non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, it must show
remedies that could have been utilized and the opposing party must either show that it
exhausted them. The Court held that if a remedy is ineffective, it needs not be exhausted.
The legal remedies identified were available only in theory, rather than in practice,
because the imprisonment was clandestine and formal requirements made them
inapplicable in practice; authorities against whom they were brought simply ignored them;
and the attorneys and judges were threatened by the authorities. Remedies must be
more than mere formalities before they are required to be exhausted. The case
contributed to the end of the systematic practice of disappearances; challenged the
pervasive culture of impunity and deniability; and was the first case in an international
tribunal to declare the practice of forced disappearances illegal.
c. Nicaragua v United States of America, International Court of Justice, June 27, 1986
FACTS: The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America (1986) is
a public international law case decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The
ICJ ruled in favor of Nicaragua and against the United States and awarded reparations to
Nicaragua. Nicaragua charged that the United States, in recruiting, training, arming,
equipping, financing, supplying and otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding, and
directing military and paramilitary actions in and against Nicaragua, had violated its treaty
obligations to Nicaragua under: Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter; Articles 18
and 20 of the Charter of the Organization of American States; Article 8 of the Convention
on Rights and Duties of States; Article I, Third, of the Convention concerning the Duties
and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife.
That the United States had breached international law by violating the sovereignty of
Nicaragua by armed attacks against Nicaragua by air, land and sea; incursions into
Nicaraguan territorial waters; aerial trespass into Nicaraguan airspace; efforts by direct
and indirect means to coerce and intimidate the Government of Nicaragua; using force
and the threat of force against Nicaragua; intervening in the internal affairs of Nicaragua;
infringing upon the freedom of the high seas and interrupting peaceful maritime
commerce; killing, wounding and kidnapping citizens of Nicaragua.
Nicaragua demanded that all such actions cease and that the United States had an
obligation to pay reparations to the government for damage to their people, property, and
economy. It is noteworthy that the United States, the defaulting party, was the only
member that put forward arguments against the validity of the judgment of the court,
arguing that it passed a decision that it "had neither the jurisdiction nor the competence
to render." Members that sided with the United States in opposing Nicaragua's claims did
not challenge the court's jurisdiction, its findings, or the substantive merits of the case.
RULING: The ICJ held that the U.S. had violated international
law by supporting the Contras in their rebellion against the Nicaraguan government and
by mining Nicaragua's harbors. The United States refused to participate in the
proceedings after the Court rejected its argument that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear
the case. The U.S. also blocked enforcement of the judgment by the United Nations
Security Council and thereby prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any
compensation. Nicaragua, under the later, post-FSLN government of Violeta Chamorro,
withdrew the complaint from the court in September 1992 following a repeal of the law
which had required the country to seek compensation.
The Court found in its verdict that the United States was "in breach of its obligations
under customary international law not to use force against another State", "not to
intervene in its affairs", "not to violate its sovereignty", "not to interrupt peaceful maritime
commerce", and "in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956."
1. Decides that in adjudicating the dispute brought before it by the Application filed
by the Republic of Nicaragua on 9 April 1984, the Court is required to apply the
"multilateral treaty reservation" contained in proviso (c) to the declaration of
acceptance of jurisdiction made under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of
the Court by the Government of the United States of America deposited on 26
August 1946;
2. Rejects the justification of collective self-defense maintained by the United
States of America in connection with the military and paramilitary activities in and
against Nicaragua the subject of this case;
3. Decides that the United States of America, by training, arming, equipping,
financing and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting
and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has
acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation
under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another
State;
4. Decides that the United States of America, by certain attacks on Nicaraguan
territory in 1983–1984, namely attacks on Puerto Sandino on 13 September and
14 October 1983, an attack on Corinto on 10 October 1983; an attack on Potosi
Naval Base on 4/5 January 1984, an attack on San Juan del Sur on 7 March
1984; attacks on patrol boats at Puerto Sandino on 28 and 30 March 1984; and
an attack on San Juan del Norte on 9 April 1984; and further by those acts of
intervention referred to in subparagraph (3) hereof which involve the use of
force, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation
under customary international law not to use force against another State;
5. Decides that the United States of America, by directing or authorizing over
Rights of Nicaraguan territory, and by the acts imputable to the United States
referred to in subparagraph (4) hereof, has acted, against the Republic of
Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to
violate the sovereignty of another State;
6. Decides that, by laying mines in the internal or territorial waters of the Republic
of Nicaragua during the first months of 1984, the United States of America has
acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligations
under customary international law not to use force against another State,
not to intervene in its affairs, not to violate its sovereignty and not to
interrupt peaceful maritime commerce;
7. Decides that, by the acts referred to in subparagraph (6) hereof the United
States of America has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its
obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation between the United States of America and the Republic of Nicaragua
signed at Managua on 21 January 1956;
8. Decides that the United States of America, by failing to make known the
existence and location of the mines laid by it, referred to in subparagraph (6)
 hereof, has acted in breach of its obligations under customary international law
in this respect;
9. Finds that the United States of America, by producing in 1983 a manual entitled
'Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas', and disseminating it to contra
forces, has encouraged the commission by them of acts contrary to general
principles of humanitarian law; but does not find a basis for concluding that any
such acts which may have been committed are imputable to the United States of
America as acts of the United States of America;
10. Decides that the United States of America, by the attacks on Nicaraguan territory
referred to in subparagraph (4) hereof, and by declaring a general embargo on
trade with Nicaragua on 1 May 1985, has committed acts calculated to deprive
of its object and purpose the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956;
11. Decides that the United States of America, by the attacks on Nicaraguan territory
referred to in subparagraph (4) hereof, and by declaring a general embargo on
trade with Nicaragua on 1 May 1985, has acted in breach of its obligations under
Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956;
12. Decides that the United States of America is under a duty immediately to cease
and to refrain from all such acts as may constitute breaches of the foregoing
legal obligations;
13. Decides that the United States of America is under an obligation to make
reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the
breaches of obligations under customary international law enumerated above;
14. Decides that the United States of America is under an obligation to make
reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the
breaches of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956;
15. Decides that the form and amount of such reparation, failing agreement between
the Parties, will be settled by the Court, and reserves for this purpose the
subsequent procedure in the case;
16. Recalls to both Parties their obligation to seek a solution to their disputes by
peaceful means in accordance with international law.
d. Oposa v Factoran GR 101063, July 30, 1993
FACTS: The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological
Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the
purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to
numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the
country. Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to: Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act of defendant constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for
the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiffs have exhausted all
administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served
upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant,
however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the
Court.
Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled
without the requisite hearing violates the requirements of due process.
RULING: In the resolution of the case, the Court held that: The petitioners have the
right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court. The case at bar is subject to
judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the
requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court.
According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of
this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He the same article:
strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
Constitution.
health consciousness among them.
The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration
generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created
self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners
world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
— the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.
Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the clause. If he had done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to
minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly
generations to come. respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes
in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly
The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to
pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the
allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the national interest so
committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions
requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession,
based on unverified data.
permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein .
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced
All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is
property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides: Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent
Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
questioned timber license agreements.

e. The Writ of Kalikasan, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC Rule 7
A Writ of Kalikasan is a legal remedy under Philippine law that provides protection of
one's Constitutional right to a healthy environment, as outlined in Section 16, Article II of
the Philippine Constitution. For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must
concur:
1. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology;
2. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity; and
3. The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces.
It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated.
f. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)
FACTS: Gen. Yamashita (Petitioner) was Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army
Group of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands during World War 2. -On
September 3, 1945, Petitioner surrendered to and became a prisoner of war of the United
States Army Forces in Baguio, Philippine Islands. -On September 25, 1945, by the order
of Lt. Gen. Wilhelm Styer, Commanding General of the US Army Forces, Western
Pacific, Petitioner Yamashita was charged with the violation on the Law of War and
committing monstrous crimes against the American and Filipino peoples. -Trial was held
before a military commission of five army officers and was later found guilty and
sentenced to death. -Petitioner then filed for Habeas Corpus and a prohibition against Lt.
Gen. William Styer. -Petitioner is praying for a reinstatement from a confinement as a war
criminal back to a prisoner of war status.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
1) Lack of Jurisdiction of the Military Commission.
2) That the Philippines is not an occupied territory and thus the military commission
cannot exercise jurisdiction.
3) Spain, the “Protecting Power” of Japan has not yet been given notice of trial contrary
to the provisions of the Geneva Convention.
4) That there was no charge against petitioners of an offense against the laws of war.
5) That the Military Commission denied petitioner of a fair trial.
RULING: The Supreme Court of the Philippines denied the petition and ruled that the
commission was validly constituted. - the order creating the commission for the trial of
petitioner was authorized by military command, and was in complete conformity to the
Act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such tribunals for the trial of offenses against
the law of war committed by enemy combatants. - “We cannot say that there is no
authority to convene a commission after hostilities have ended to try violations of the law
of war committed before their cessation, at least until peace has been officially
recognized by treaty or proclamation of the political branch of the Government. In fact, in
most instances, the practical administration of the system of military justice under the law
of war would fail if such authority were thought to end with the cessation of hostilities. For
only after their cessation could the greater number of offenders and the principal ones be
apprehended and subjected to trial.”
Court also ruled that ‘while commander of armed forces of Japan at war with the United
States of America and its allies, unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as
commander to control the operations of the members of his command, permitting them to
commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against people of the United States and of
its allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines, and he . . . thereby violated the
laws of war." -there were numerous evidences to prove that “"a deliberate plan and
purpose to massacre and exterminate a large part of the civilian population of Batangas
Province, and to devastate and destroy public, private, and religious property therein, as
a result of which more than 25,000 men, women and children, all unarmed noncombatant
civilians, were brutally mistreated and killed, without cause or trial, and entire settlements
were devastated and destroyed wantonly and without military necessity." -in International
law, these are recognized as violations on the law of war. -while it was not alleged, that
Petitioner did commit these acts directly by himself, as a commanding officer he should
have “to control the operations of the members of his command by "permitting them to
commit" the extensive and widespread atrocities specified. The question, then, is whether
the law of war imposes”. This is supported by the Hague Convention. -the Geneva
Convention’s stipulation that the detaining power must notify first the protecting power
applies only to persons on judicial proceedings while still a prisoner of war. In the present
case, he no longer is such. Hence, petition denied.
g. Kuroda v Jalandoni , GR No. L- 2662, March 26, 1949
FACTS: Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army
and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during
Second World War. He was charged before a military commission convened by the Chief
of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and
failed to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the
Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war”. The said military
commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive Order 68 of the President of
the Philippines.
Kuroda challenged the validity of Executive Order 68. His arguments, were as follows:
(1) Executive Order 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of
our constitutional law but also our local laws.
(2) Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of
the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a
signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947 and, therefore, he is charged
with “crime” not based on law, national or international
(3) Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors in this case because they are not
qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the
appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order 68 had violated the provisions of our
constitutional law
Discussions: The provision of Article 2 Sec 3 states that “The Philippines renounces war
as an instrument of national policy, adopts generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice
freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations”. Every State is, by reason of its
membership in the family of nations, bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part of its own laws.
RULING: No. Executive Order 68 has not violated the provision of our constitutional law.
The tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. This executive order is in accordance with
Article 2 Sec 3, of Constitution. It is in accordance with generally accepted principles of
international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and
other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all
persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and
other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war.
The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and
regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international
law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)
Furthermore, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to
parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this
special law.
Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?
The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No.
68.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day
including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or
civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of
the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation
of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable
therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68
the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and
policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner
for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention
because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947.
It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions
form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international
law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the
United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and
principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately
general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have
been or shall be a signatory.