contract – for all intents and purposes and despite his
claim that his signature on the certified contract was
C.F. SHARP vs. PIONEER INSURANCE AND
SURETY
GR NO. 179459
FEBRUARY 15, 2012
Is local private employment agency may liable for
breach of contract for failure to deploy a seafarer?
YES
Failure to deploy constitutes breach of contract, thereby
entitling the seafarer to damages:
We take exception to the Court of Appeals conclusion that
damages are not recoverable by a worker who was not
deployed by his agency. The fact that the POEA Rules are
silent as to the payment of damages to the affected
seafarer does not mean that the seafarer is precluded from
claiming the same. The sanctions provided for non-
deployment do not end with the suspension or
cancellation of license or fine and the return of all
documents at no cost to the worker. They do not forfend
a seafarer from instituting an action for damages against
the employer or agency which has failed to deploy him.
Can the agency be held liable for unjustifiably
refusing to return the documents of the employees?
YES for MORAL DAMAGES
The Court agrees with the appellate court that C.F. Sharp
committed an actionable wrong when it unreasonably
withheld documents, thus preventing respondents from
seeking lucrative employment elsewhere. That C.F. Sharp
arbitrarily imposed a condition that the documents would
only be released upon signing of a quitclaim is tantamount
to bad faith because it effectively deprived respondents of
resort to legal remedies.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
PRINCESS JOY PLACEMENT AND GENERAL
SERVICES, INC. vs. GERMAN A. BINALLA
G.R. No. 197005
June 4, 2014
Is contract substitution a ground for illegal
recruitment? YES
Under Article 34 (i) of the Labor Code on prohibited
practices, "it shall be unlawful for any individual,
entity, licensee, or holder of authority to substitute or
alter employment contracts approved and verified by
the Department of Labor and Employment from the
time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and
including the periods of expiration of the same without
the approval of the Secretary of Labor." Further,
contract substitution constitutes "illegal recruitment"
under Article 38 (I) of the Code.
Binalla was a victim of contract substitution. He worked
under an employment contract whose terms were inferior
to the terms certified by the POEA. Under the four-year
contract he signed and implemented by his employer, Al
Adwani, he was paid only SR1500.00 or US$400 a
month; whereas, under the POEA- certified two-year
contract, he was to be paid $550.00. The POEA-certified
forged – was the contract that governed Binalla’s
employment with Al Adwani as it was the contract that
the Philippine government officially recognized and
which formed the basis of his deployment to Saudi
Arabia. Clearly, the four-year contract signed by Binalla
substituted for the POEA-certified contract.
PERT CPM PANPOWER EXPONENT CO. VS.
VINUYA
GR NO. 197528
SEPTEMBER 5, 2012
What is contract substitution?
Art. 34. Prohibited Practices. It shall be unlawful for any
individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority:
xxxx
(i) To substitute or alter employment contracts
approved and verified by the Department of Labor
from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up
to and including the periods of expiration of the same
without the approval of the Secretary of Labor.
Further, Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by
R.A. 8042, defined "illegal recruitment" to include the
following act: (i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice
of the worker, employment contracts approved and
verified by the Department of Labor and Employment
from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties
up to and including the period of the expiration of the
same without the approval of the Department of Labor
and Employment.
The agency and Modern Metal are guilty of contract
substitution. The respondents entered into a POEA-
approved two-year employment contract, with Modern
Metal providing among others, as earlier discussed, for a
monthly salary of 1350 AED. On April 2, 2007, Modern
Metal issued to them appointment letters whereby the
respondents were hired for a longer three-year period and
a reduced salary, from 1,100 AED to 1,200 AED, among
other provisions. Then, on May 5, 2007, they were
required to sign new employment contracts reflecting the
same terms contained in their appointment letters, except
that this time, they were hired as "ordinary laborer," no
longer aluminum fabricator/installer. The respondents
complained with the agency about the contract
substitution, but the agency refused or failed to act on the
matter.
SUSANA R. SY vs. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE
CARRIERS, INC., and/or SSC SHIP
MANAGEMENT PTE., LTD.
G.R. No. 191740
February 11, 2013
Can the family of a seafarer ask for death benefits
when the seafarer dies while on shore leave and the
cause of his death is drowning( with 20% alcohol
found in his urine)? NO
Clearly, to be entitled for death compensation benefits
from the employer, the death of the seafarer (1) must be
work-related; and (2) must happen during the term of
the employment contract. Under the Amended POEA
Contract, work-relatedness is now an important
requirement. The qualification that death must be work-
related has made it necessary to show a causal connection
between a seafarer’s work and his death to be
compensable.
Under the 2000 POEA Amended Employment Contract,
work-related injury is defined as an injury(ies) resulting
in disability or death arising out of and in the course of
employment. Thus, there is a need to show that the injury
resulting to disability or death must arise (1) out of
employment, and (2) in the course of employment.
"In the course of employment” happens when it takes
place within the period of the employment, at a place
where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is
fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something
incidental thereto.
While AB Sy's employment relationship with respondents
did not stop but continues to be in force even when he was
on shore leave, their contract clearly provides that it is not
enough that death occurred during the term of the
employment contract, but must be work-related to be
compensable. There is a need to show the connection of
AB Sy's death with the performance of his duty as a
seaman. As we found, AB Sy was not in the
performance of his duty as a seaman, but was doing an
act for his own personal benefit at the time of the
accident. The cause of AB Sy’s death at the time he was
on shore leave which was drowning, was not brought
about by a risk which was only peculiar to his
employment as a seaman. In fact, he was in no different
circumstance with other people walking along the
riverside who might also drown if no due care to one’s
safety is exercised. Petitioner failed to establish by
substantial evidence her right to the entitlement of the
benefits provided by law.
PEOPLE VS. VELASCO
GR NO. 195668
JUNE 25, 2014
What are the essential elements of illegal recruitment
committed in large scale?
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in
large scale are: (1) that the accused engaged in acts of
recruitment and placement of workers as defined
under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or in any
prohibited activities under Article 34 of the same
Code; (2) that the accused had not complied with the
guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment with respect to the requirement to secure
a license or authority to recruit and deploy workers;
and (3) that the accused committed the unlawful acts
against 3 or more persons. In simplest terms, illegal
recruitment is committed by persons who, without
authority from the government, give the impression that
they have the power to send workers abroad for
employment purposes.
Inovero was therefore found to be guilty of illegal
recruitment. First, private complainants Baful and
Brizuela commonly testified that Inovero was the one
who conducted orientations/briefings on them;
informed them, among others, on how much their salary
would be as caregivers in Japan; and what to wear when
they finally will be deployed. Second, when Diala
introduced her (Inovero) to private complainant Amoyo
as one of the owners of HARVEL, Inovero did not bother
to correct said representation. Inovero’s silence is clearly
an implied acquiescence to said representation.
Third, Inovero, while conducting orientation on private
complainant Brizuela, represented herself as the one
expediting the release of applicants’ working visa for
Japan.
Fourth, in a Certification issued and attested to by
POEA’s Versoza – Inovero had no license nor
authority to recruit for overseas employment.
What is her liability as a co-conspirator?
The nature of the obligation of the co-conspirators in the
commission of the crime requires solidarity, and each
debtor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation.
As a co-conspirator, then, Inovero’s civil liability was
similar to that of a joint tortfeasor under the rules of the
civil law. Joint tortfeasors are those who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who
approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They
are also referred to as those who act together in
committing wrong or whose acts, if independent of each
other, unite in causing a single injury.
Hence, Inovero’s liability towards the victims of their
illegal recruitment was solidary, regardless of whether
she actually received the amounts paid or not, and
notwithstanding that her co-accused, having escaped
arrest until now, have remained untried.
JEBSENS* MARITIME, INC., SEA CHEFS
LTD.,** and ENRIQUE M. ABOITIZ vs. FLORVIN
G. RAPIZ
G.R. No. 218871
January 11, 2017
Can the seafarer be entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits for his failure to have a gainful
employment for a period of more than 120 days? NOT
NECESSARILY
In the case, records reveal that on October 14, 2011,
respondent was medically repatriated for what was
initially diagnosed by the ship doctor as "Tendovaginitis
DeQuevain." As early as January 24, 2012, or just 102
days from repatriation, the company-designated
physician had already given his final assessment on
respondent when he diagnosed the latter with "Flexor
Carpi Radialis Tendinitis, Right; Sprain, Right
thumb; ExtensorCarpi Ulnaris Tendinitis, Right" and
gave a final disability rating of "Grade 11" pursuant to
the disability grading provided in the 2010 POEA-SEC.
In view of the final disability rating made by the
company-designated physician classifying respondent's
disability as merely permanent and partial- which was
not refuted by the independent physician except that
respondent's condition was classified as a Grade 10
disability - it is plain error to award permanent and total
disability benefits to respondent.
STATUS MARITIME CORP. VS. DOCTOLERO
GR NO. 198968
JANUARY 18, 2017

Can the seafarer file his claim for disability benefits
even before the lapse of the 120 day period for the
company physician to determine the degree of his
disability? NO, SUCH CLAIM WOULD BE
DEEMED PREMATURE.
While the fact that Doctolero suffered the disability
during the term of his contract was undisputed, it was
evident that he had filed his complaint for disability
benefits before the company--designated physician
could determine the nature and extent of his disability,
or before even the lapse of the initial 120-day period.
With Doctolero still undergoing further tests, the
company-designated physician had no occasion to
determine the nature and extent of his disability upon
which to base Doctolero's "fit to work" certification or
disability grading. Consequently, the petitioners correctly
argued that Doctolero had no cause of action for
disability pay and sickness allowance at the time of the
filing of his complaint.
In order for a seafarer's claim for total and permanent
disability benefits to prosper, any of the following
conditions should be present:
(a)The company-designated physician failed to issue a
declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or
disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and
there is no indication that further medical treatment would
address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an
extension of the period to 240 days;
(b)240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by
the company designated physician;
(c)The company-designated physician declared that he is
fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as
the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor
chosen under Section 20-8(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a
contrary opinion;
(d)The company-designated physician acknowledged that
he is partially permanently disabled but other doctors who
he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer,
believed that his disability is not only permanent but total
as well;
(e)The company-designated physician recognized that he
is totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute
on the disability grading;
(f)The company-designated physician determined that his
medical condition is not compensable or work-related
under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the
third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-
SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work;
(g)The company-designated physician declared him
totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses
to pay him the corresponding benefits; and
(h)The company-designated physician declared him
partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or
240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform
his usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods.
MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING VS. RAMOS
GR NO. 184256
JANUARY 18, 2017
When is a disability permanent and partial?
Disability does not refer to the injury or the pain that
it has occasioned, but to the loss or impairment of
earning capacity. There is disability when there is a
diminution of earning power because of actual absence
from work. This absence must be due to the injury or
illness arising from, and in the course of, employment.
Thus, the basis of compensation is reduction of earning
power.
Section 2 of Rule VII of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation provides:
(c) A disability is partial and permanent if as a result
of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a
permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his
body.
Permanent partial disability occurs when an employee
loses the use of any particular anatomical part of his body
which disables him to continue with his former work.
In this case, while petitioners' own company-designated
physician, Dr. Dolor, certified that respondent was still fit
to work, the former admitted in the same breath that
respondent's left eye could no longer be improved by
medical treatment. As early as 13 April 2002, Dr. Dolor
had in fact diagnosed respondent's left eye as permanently
disabled.
During the span of roughly two years, he was not able
to reassume work as a seaman, resulting in the loss and
impairment of his earning capacity. It is also interesting
to note that despite petitioners' contentions that
respondent had been diagnosed as fit to return to work, no
reemployment offer was ever extended to him.
CAREER PHILS. SHIP MGT. VS. ACUB
GR NO. 215595
APRIL 26, 2017
What is the effect of the failure of the company
physician to give his diagnosis within the 120 day
period? THE DISABILITY BECOMES
PERMANENT AND TOTAL
It was only after the lapse of more than six (6) months
that the company-designated physician issued a
certification declaring respondent to be entitled to a
disability rating of Grade 10, going beyond the period
of 120 days, without justifiable reason. As such, since
the company-designated physician failed to give his
assessment within the period of 120 days, without
justifiable reason, respondent's disability was correctly
adjudged to be permanent and total.
The current rule provides:
(1) that mere inability to work for a period of 120 days
does not entitle a seafarer to permanent and total
disability benefits;
(2) that the determination of the fitness of a seafarer for
sea duty is within the province of the company-
designated physician, subject to the periods prescribed
by law;
(3) that the company-designated physician has an initial
120 days to determine the fitness or disability of the
seafarer; and
(4) that the period of treatment may only be extended to
240 days if a sufficient justification exists such as when
further medical treatment is required or when the
seafarer is uncooperative.
TSM SHIPPING PHILS. INC. VS. PATINO
GR NO. 210289
 MARCH 20, 2017
What is the effect of filing a claim for disability benefit
before the lapse of the 120 day period? THE CASE
SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR BEING
PREMATURE
Upon respondent's repatriation on May 24, 2010, he was
given extensive medical attention by the company-
designated physician. On August 17, 2010, an interim
assessment of Grade 10 was given by Dr. Cruz as
respondent was still undergoing further treatment and
physical therapy. However, on September 8, 2010, or
107 days since repatriation, respondent filed a
complaint tor total and permanent disability benefits.
During this time, he was considered under temporary total
disability inasmuch as the 120/240-day period had not yet
lapsed. Evidently, the complaint was prematurely filed.
MST MARINE SERVICES VS. ASUNCION
GR NO. 211335
MARCH 27, 2017
What is the rule on third-doctor referral?
While a seafarer is not precluded from seeking a second
opinion or consulting his own physician, if his physician's
conclusion is contrary to that of the company-designated
physician, the rule is clear that a third physician must be
jointly appointed by the employer and the seafarer for
a final assessment. Without a third-doctor consultation
and in the absence of any indication which would cast
doubt on the veracity of the company-designated
physician's assessment, the company-designated
physician's findings shall prevail.
In the case, Asuncion neither sought to be referred to a
third doctor nor did he offer any explanation for his non-
observance of this procedure. As a matter of fact, when he
filed the complaint for payment of disability benefits on
January 6, 2010, he did so without any factual medical
basis. To recall, it was only on March 10, 2010 when
Asuncion consulted his own physician, whereas, the
company-designated physician assessed Asuncion with
Disability Grade 8 on March 16, 2010. Thus, at the time
he filed his complaint, there was no medical basis
supporting his claim at all. Asuncion's complaint was
clearly premature
NORTH SEA MARINE SERVICES CORP. VS.
ENRIQUEZ
GR NO. 201806
What is the effect of failure to comply with the
procedure regarding third doctor referral? THE
FINDINGS OF THE COMPANY DESIGNATED
PHYSICIAN SHALL PREVAIL
It is clearly provided in the POEA-SEC that in order to
claim disability benefits, it is the company-designated
physician who must proclaim that the seafarer
suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial,
due to either injury or illness, during the term of his
employment. If the doctor appointed by the seafarer
makes a finding contrary to that of the assessment of the
company-designated physician, a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the employer and seafarer
whose decision shall be binding on both of them. In
Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., the Court
pronounced that while a seafarer has the right to seek a
second and even a third opinion, the final determination
of whose decision must prevail must be done in
accordance with this agreed procedure. The Court went
on to emphasize that failure to observe this will make
the company-designated physician's assessment final
and binding.
Upon repatriation on October 5, 2008, respondent's
condition was medically evaluated and treated by the
company-designated physicians. Respondent was
subjected to continuous medical examination by Dr.
Rabago, underwent surgery under the care of an
orthopedic specialist, and received physical therapy from
a physiatrist. On December 17, 2008, Dr. Rabago, the
orthopedic surgeon, and the physiatrist assessed
respondent fit to resume sea duties. On February 25, 2009,
respondent sought an independent opinion from Dr.
Garduce who assessed him to be unfit for sea duties.
However, respondent did not refer these conflicting
assessments to a third doctor in accordance with the
mandated procedure. In fine, the company-designated
physician's assessment was not effectively disputed;
hence, the Court has no option but to declare Dr. Rabago's
fit to work declaration as final and binding. Moreover, the
same was made before the lapse of the 120 day period.
CF SHARP CREW MGT. VS. ORBETA
GR NO. 211111
SEPTEMBER 25, 2017
What is medical abandonment and its effect?
The Court held that a seafarer is guilty of medical
abandonment for his failure to complete his treatment
before the lapse of the 240-day period, which prevents
the company physician from declaring him fit to work
or assessing his disability. Filing a claim before the lapse
of such period or before the finding of the company
physician is deemed premature.
As a general rule, without any disability assessment from
the company physician, the claim for disability
compensation cannot prosper. Section 20(D) of the
POEA-SEC instructs that no compensation and benefits
shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity,
disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful
or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties. A
seafarer is duty-bound to complete his medical treatment
until declared fit to work or assessed with a permanent
disability grading.
DISTINCT CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE CASE
However, in the case respondent might have treated the
company-designated physician's June 16, 2010
temporary diagnosis as the final assessment of his
condition, which prompted him to secure the opinion of
Dr. Escutin and thereafter file the case prematurely. For
this he cannot be completely blamed; indeed, he might
have proceeded under the impression that he was
being shortchanged. Given his position in the
employment relation, his distrust for the petitioners is not
completely unwarranted.
Consequently, respondent is entitled only to
compensation equivalent to or commensurate with his
injury.
 TSM SHIPPING VS. DE CHAVEZ
GR NO. 198225
SEPTEMBER 27, 2017
Can the seafarer’s family ask for death benefits if the
cause of the seafarer’s death is suicide? NO
UNDER SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND
BENEFITS: A COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
FOR DEATH
D. No compensation and benefits shall be payable in
respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of
the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act
or intentional breach of his duties, provided however, that
the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity,
disability or death is directly attributable to the seafarer.
Given the evidence on record, the Court holds that Ryan's
death was due to his own deliberate act and deed. Indeed
the Medical Certificate of Death prepared by Dr. Sung
Yeoul Hung of the Ulsan City Hospital, who, it is
presumed, must have examined Ryan's cadaver, and the
INTECO's Report which contained information involving
the self-same death, must be deemed as substantial
evidence of that fact. The material facts set forth in the
Decisions of both the LA and the NLRC constitute
substantial evidence that Ryan took his own life, that he
died by his own hands. "That [the seafarer's] death was
result of his willful act is matter of defense.
CAREER PHILIPPINES SHIPMANAGMENT VS.
GODINEZ
GR NO. 206826
OCTOBER 2, 2017
Can disability benefits be claimed for bipolar illness
allegedly aggravated by working condition? YES.
Work-connected mental illnesses or disorders are
compensable.
When Godinez applied for work with Career, he was an
innocent boy of 20; his stint with Career would be his very
first employment as a seafarer onboard an ocean-going
vessel. He was lacking in experience and knowledge, yet
full of innocence, dreams, idealism, positive expectations,
enthusiasm, and optimism. All these were shattered by
his horrible experience onboard the "M/V Norviken,"
under the hands of Dayo, who unnecessarily exposed
the young, inexperienced, and innocent boy to a
different reality, a cruel one, and robbed him of the
positive expectations and dreams he had coming to his
very first job as a seafarer. His uncalled for cruelty
broke the heart and spirit of this fledgling until he could
no longer take it. The conditions of work, the elements,
the environment, the fear and loneliness, the strange
surroundings, and the unnecessary cruelty and lack of
understanding and compassion of his immediate superior,
the weight of all these was too much for the young man to
handle. Like a tender twig in a vicious storm, he snapped.
The inhumane treatment inflicted upon this green,
fragile, and innocent fledgling; the harsh environment
and conditions of work he was exposed to for the very
first time in his young life; the indifference of his
superiors despite realizing what was happening to
him; and the utter lack of a professional and medical
response to the boy's progressing medical condition,
led to the complete breakdown of Godinez's body,
mind, and spirit.
The Court finds as well that Godinez suffered
permanent total disability, as there has been no
definite medical assessment by the company-
designated physician regarding his condition - even up
to now. "The company-designated doctor is expected to
arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to
work or. to determine [the degree of] his disability within
a period of 120 or 240 days from repatriation, [as the case
may be. If after the lapse of the 120/240-day period the
seafarer remains incapacitated and the company-
designated physician has not yet declared him fit to work
or determined his degree of disability,] the seafarer is
deemed totally and permanently disabled.
LEONCIO VS. MARITIME SERVICES
GR NO. 230357
DECEMBER 2017
Is concealment of a stenting procedure (coronary
artery disease) undertaken by seafarer belie his claim
for disability benefits?
In this case, nothing can be plainer than the meaning of
the word "illness" as referring to a disease or injury
afflicting a person's body. By the doctrine of noscitor a
sociis, "condition" likewise refers to the state of one's
health. Neither of these words refers to a medical
procedure undergone by a seafarer in connection with
an "illness or condition" already known to the
employer as far back as 2001. For this, the Court extends
its full concurrence to the conclusion reached by the
Labor Arbiter that the employer cannot validly decry his
supposed concealment and fraudulent misrepresentation
of Leoncio's illness on account of the non-disclosure of
the stenting procedure.
He was given his medical repatriation on account of
his disease in 2001, for which he was compensated and
even demoted by MST Marine, he cannot be
considered to have concealed the same during his
PEME in 2014.
As it is, the stenting procedure undergone by Leoncio on
his LAD and LCX arteries is nothing more than an
attempt to discontinue the steady progression of his illness
or condition—his CAD/HCVD, which was already
known by his employers. Simply, a stenting procedure is
the "placement of a small wire mesh tube called a stent to
help prop the artery open and decrease its chance of
narrowing again."As it is, the procedure was intended to
improve his health condition. Surely, the non-disclosure
thereof does not diminish MST Marine's knowledge of
the "illness or condition" he had already been
diagnosed with since 2001. Undeniably then, Leoncio's
failure to reveal the said procedure [does not amount
to a concealment of a pre-existing "illness or
condition" that can bar his claim for disability benefit
and compensation.
Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC lists cardiovascular
disease as a compensable work-related condition.
Further, in several cases, cardiovascular disease,
coronary artery disease, as well as other heart
ailments, were held to be compensable.
 TAGUD VS. BSM CREW SERVICES CENTRE
PHILS.
GR NO. 219370
DECEMBER 6, 2017

What is the effect of failure comply with the

mandatory reporting requirement within 3 days from
arrival in the Philippines?

The three-day mandatory reporting requirement must be

strictly observed since within three days from
repatriation, it would be fairly manageable for the
company-designated physician to identify whether the
illness or injury was contracted during the term of the
seafarer's employment or that his working conditions
increased the risk of contracting the ailment.
Moreover, the post-employment medical examination
within three days from arrival is required to ascertain the
seafarer's physical condition, since to ignore the rule
would set a precedent with negative repercussions
because it would open the floodgates to seafarers claiming
disability benefits that are not work-related or which arose
after the employment. It would certainly be unfair to the
employer who would have difficulty determining the
cause of a claimant's illness considering the passage of
time. In such a case, the employer would have no
protection against unrelated claims. Therefore, it is the
company-designated physician who must proclaim that
the seafarer suffered a permanent disability, whether total
or partial, due to either illness or injury, during the term
of the latter's employment.

In the present case, Tagud disembarked in Singapore and

was repatriated to Manila on 8 November 2008. He
alleged that he reported to his manning agency but was
not given any assistance or referred to a company-
designated physician. However, Tagud did not present
any evidence to prove that he tried to submit himself
to a company-designated physician within three
working days upon his return. Tagud did not also
present any letter that he was physically incapacitated
to see the company- designated physician in order to
be exempted from the rule. It took him about four
months from repatriation or on 9 and 10 March 2009 to
seek medical attention for pain in his upper right
extremities, not from respondents' company-designated
physician, but at a private clinic in Caloocan City. No
other documents were submitted to prove that he asserted
his rights against the company, or that he immediately
took action to seek medical assistance from the company,
within three days from his repatriation.

It is true that the POEA standard employment contract is

designed primarily for the protection and benefit of
Filipino seafarers in the pursuit of their employment on
board ocean-going vessels and its provisions should be
construed and applied fairly, reasonably, and liberally in
favor or for the benefit of the seafarer and his dependents.
However, one who claims entitlement to the benefits
provided by law should not only comply with the
procedural requirements of law but must also establish his
right to the benefits by substantial evidence. The burden,
therefore, rests on Tagud to show that he suffered or
contracted his illness or injury, while still employed as a
seafarer, which resulted in his permanent disability.
Unfortunately, Tagud failed to discharge this burden.