Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.

Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant slaughtered or caused to be
slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal
treasure of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147,
an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.

It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no municipal
slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not
prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of
the Act are as follows:

SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon permit secured
from the municipal treasure. Before issuing the permit for the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the
municipal treasurer shall require for branded cattle the production of the original certificate of ownership and certificates
of transfer showing title in the person applying for the permit, and for unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy said
treasurer as to the ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has been requested.

SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer unless such animals are unfit
for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a permit be given to slaughter for food any animal of any
kind which is not fit for human consumption.

SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued by him, and such record shall show
the name and residence of the owner, and the class, sex, age, brands, knots of radiated hair commonly know as remolinos
or cowlicks, and other marks of identification of the animal for the slaughter of which permit is issued and the date on
which such permit is issued. Names of owners shall be alphabetically arranged in the record, together with date of permit.

A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the provincial treasurer, who shall file
and properly index the same under the name of the owner, together with date of permit.

SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption or killing for food at the municipal
slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, shall be punished by a fine
of not less than ten nor more than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not less than one
month nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the prohibition contained in section
30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle for human consumption in a municipal
slaughter without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a
municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer; and it is urged that the municipality
of Carmen not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to
cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that municipality.

We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large cattle for
human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and
specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty
provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a
permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal
slaughterhouse without such permit.

It may be admitted at once, that the pertinent language of those sections taken by itself and examined apart from the
context fairly admits of two constructions: one whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as
limiting and restricting both the word "slaughtered" and the words "killed for food" in section 30, and the words
"slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption" and the words "killing for food" in section 33; and the
other whereby the phrase "at the municipal slaughterhouse" may be taken as limiting and restricting merely the words
"killed for food" and "killing for food" as used in those sections. But upon a reading of the whole Act, and keeping in mind
the manifest and expressed purpose and object of its enactment, it is very clear that the latter construction is that which
should be adopted.

The Act primarily seeks to protect the "large cattle" of the Philippine Islands against theft and to make easy the recovery
and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed, or stolen. To this end it provides an elaborate and
compulsory system for the separate branding and registry of ownership of all such cattle throughout the Islands, whereby
owners are enabled readily and easily to establish their title; it prohibits and invalidates all transfers of large cattle
unaccompanied by certificates of transfer issued by the proper officer in the municipality where the contract of sale is
made; and it provides also for the disposition of thieves or persons unlawfully in possession, so as to protect the rights of
the true owners. All this, manifestly, in order to make it difficult for any one but the rightful owner of such cattle to retain
them in his possession or to dispose of them to others. But the usefulness of this elaborate and compulsory system of
identification, resting as it does on the official registry of the brands and marks on each separate animal throughout the
Islands, would be largely impaired, if not totally destroyed, if such animals were requiring proof of ownership and the
production of certificates of registry by the person slaughtering or causing them to be slaughtered, and this especially if the
animals were slaughtered privately or in a clandestine manner outside of a municipal slaughterhouse. Hence, as it would
appear, sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a municipal
slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping
of detailed records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.

If, however, the construction be placed on these sections which is contended for by the appellant, it will readily be seen
that all these carefully worked out provisions for the registry and record of the brands and marks of identification of all
large cattle in the Islands would prove in large part abortion, since thieves and persons unlawfully in possession of such
cattle, and naturally would, evade the provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside of municipal slaughterhouses,
and thus enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing without exposing themselves to the danger of detection incident to the
bringing of the animals to the public slaughterhouse, where the brands and other identification marks might be scrutinized
and proof of ownership required.

Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted
which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute
was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute
and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. We are of opinion, therefore, that sections
30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large
cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.

It is not essential that an explanation be found for the express prohibition in these sections of the "killing for food at a
municipal slaughterhouse" of such animals, despite the fact that this prohibition is clearly included in the general
prohibition of the slaughter of such animals for human consumption anywhere; but it is not improbable that the
requirement for the issue of a permit in such cases was expressly and specifically mentioned out of superabundance of
precaution, and to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding in the event that some of the municipalities should be disposed
to modify or vary the general provisions of the law by the passage of local ordinances or regulations for the control of
municipal slaughterhouse.

Similar reasoning applied to the specific provisions of section 31 of the Act leads to the same conclusion. One of the
secondary purposes of the law, as set out in that section, is to prevent the slaughter for food of carabaos fit for agricultural
and draft purposes, and of all animals unfit for human consumption. A construction which would limit the prohibitions and
penalties prescribed in the statute to the killing of such animals in municipal slaughterhouses, leaving unprohibited and
unpenalized their slaughter outside of such establishments, so manifestly tends to defeat the purpose and object of the
legislator, that unless imperatively demanded by the language of the statute it should be rejected; and, as we have already
indicated, the language of the statute is clearly susceptible of the construction which we have placed upon it, which tends
to make effective the provisions of this as well as all the other sections of the Act.

It appears that the defendant did in fact apply for a permit to slaughter his carabao, and that it was denied him on the
ground that the animal was not unfit "for agricultural work or for draft purposes." Counsel for appellant contends that the
statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption as food, without first
obtaining a permit which can not be procured in the event that the animal is not unfit "for agricultural work or draft
purposes," is unconstitutional and in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902),
which provides that "no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."

It is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this provision of the statute constitutes a
taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of
the owners, or that it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of the police power of the State. But whatever may be the
basis of his contention, we are of opinion, appropriating, with necessary modifications understood, the language of that
great jurist, Chief Justice Shaw (in the case of Com. vs. Tewksbury, 11 Met., 55, where the question involved was the
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting and penalizing the taking or carrying away by any person, including the owner, of
any stones, gravel, or sand, from any of the beaches in the town of Chesea,) that the law in question "is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the
legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the
rights of the public. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the
equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interest of the community."

It may be conceded that the benificial use and exclusive enjoyment of the property of all carabao owners in these Islands is
to a greater or less degree interfered with by the provisions of the statute; and that, without inquiring what quantum of
interest thus passes from the owners of such cattle, it is an interest the deprivation of which detracts from their right and
authority, and in some degree interferes with their exclusive possession and control of their property, so that if the
regulations in question were enacted for purely private purpose, the statute, in so far as these regulations are concerned,
would be a violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill relied on be appellant; but we are satisfied that it is not such a
taking, such an interference with the right and title of the owners, as is involved in the exercise by the State of the right of
eminent domain, so as to entitle these owners to compensation, and that it is no more than "a just restrain of an injurious
private use of the property, which the legislature had authority to impose."

In the case of Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 84), wherein the doctrine laid down in Com. vs. Tewksbury (supra) was reviewed
and affirmed, the same eminent jurist who wrote the former opinion, in distinguishing the exercise of the right of eminent
domain from the exercise of the sovereign police powers of the State, said:

We think it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property,
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated
that is shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor
injurious to the rights of the community. . . . Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to
such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restrain
and regulations establish by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient.

This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the right of a government to take and appropriate private property
to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it; which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable
compensation therefor. The power we allude to is rather the police power, the power vested in the legislature by the
constitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.

It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power than to mark its boundaries or prescribe
limits to its exercise.

Applying these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed by the law on the slaughter for human consumption of
carabaos fit for agricultural work and draft purpose is not an appropriation of property interests to a "public use," and is
not, therefore, within the principle of the exercise by the State of the right of eminent domain. It is fact a mere restriction
or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be determental to the public welfare. And we think that
an examination of the general provisions of the statute in relation to the public interest which it seeks to safeguard and the
public necessities for which it provides, leaves no room for doubt that the limitations and restraints imposed upon the
exercise of rights of ownership by the particular provisions of the statute under consideration were imposed not for private
purposes but, strictly, in the promotion of the "general welfare" and "the public interest" in the exercise of the sovereign
police power which every State possesses for the general public welfare and which "reaches to every species of property
within the commonwealth."

For several years prior to the enactment of the statute a virulent contagious or infectious disease had threatened the total
extinction of carabaos in these Islands, in many sections sweeping away seventy, eighty, and in some cases as much as
ninety and even one hundred per cent of these animals. Agriculture being the principal occupation of the people, and the
carabao being the work animal almost exclusively in use in the fields as well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the
disease with which they were infected struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of the country. large areas of
productive land lay waste for years, and the production of rice, the staple food of the inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to
such an extent that the impoverished people were compelled to spend many millions of pesos in its importation,
notwithstanding the fact that with sufficient work animals to cultivate the fields the arable rice lands of the country could
easily be made to produce a supply more that sufficient for its own needs. The drain upon the resources of the Islands was
such that famine soon began to make itself felt, hope sank in the breast of the people, and in many provinces the energies
of the breadwinners seemed to be paralyzed by the apparently hopeless struggle for existence with which they were
confronted.
To meet these conditions, large sums of money were expended by the Government in relieving the immediate needs of the
starving people, three millions of dollars were voted by the Congress of the United States as a relief or famine fund, public
works were undertaken to furnish employment in the provinces where the need was most pressing, and every effort made
to alleviate the suffering incident to the widespread failure of the crops throughout the Islands, due in large measure to the
lack of animals fit for agricultural work and draft purposes.

Such measures, however, could only temporarily relieve the situation, because in an agricultural community material
progress and permanent prosperity could hardly be hoped for in the absence of the work animals upon which such a
community must necessarily rely for the cultivation of the fields and the transportation of the products of the fields to
market. Accordingly efforts were made by the Government to increase the supply of these animals by importation, but, as
appears from the official reports on this subject, hope for the future depended largely on the conservation of those
animals which had been spared from the ravages of the diseased, and their redistribution throughout the Islands where
the need for them was greatest.

At large expense, the services of experts were employed, with a view to the discovery and applications of preventive and
curative remedies, and it is hoped that these measures have proved in some degree successful in protecting the present
inadequate supply of large cattle, and that the gradual increase and redistribution of these animals throughout the
Archipelago, in response to the operation of the laws of supply and demand, will ultimately results in practically relieving
those sections which suffered most by the loss of their work animals.

As was to be expected under such conditions, the price of carabaos rapidly increase from the three to five fold or more,
and it may fairly be presumed that even if the conservative measures now adopted prove entirely successful, the scant
supply will keep the price of these animals at a high figure until the natural increase shall have more nearly equalized the
supply to the demand.

Coincident with and probably intimately connected with this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the crime of cattle stealing
became extremely prevalent throughout the Islands, necessitating the enactment of a special law penalizing with the
severest penalties the theft of carabaos and other personal property by roving bands; and it must be assumed from the
legislative authority found that the general welfare of the Islands necessitated the enactment of special and somewhat
burdensome provisions for the branding and registration of large cattle, and supervision and restriction of their slaughter
for food. It will hardly be questioned that the provisions of the statute touching the branding and registration of such
cattle, and prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter of diseased cattle for food were enacted in the due and proper exercise
of the police power of the State; and we are of opinion that, under all the circumstances, the provision of the statute
prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for work were in like manner enacted in
the due and proper exercise of that power, justified by the exigent necessities of existing conditions, and the right of the
State to protect itself against the overwhelming disaster incident to the further reduction of the supply of animals fit for
agricultural work or draft purposes.

It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in these Islands, and disclosed by the official reports and records of the
administrative and legislative departments of the Government, that not merely the material welfare and future prosperity
of this agricultural community were threatened by the ravages of the disease which swept away the work animals during
the years prior to the enactment of the law under consideration, but that the very life and existence of the inhabitants of
these Islands as a civilized people would be more or less imperiled by the continued destruction of large cattle by disease
or otherwise. Confronted by such conditions, there can be no doubt of the right of the Legislature to adopt reasonable
measures for the preservation of work animals, even to the extent of prohibiting and penalizing what would, under
ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper exercise of rights of ownership and control of the private property
of the citizen. The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the invasion of private
property by police regulation can be justified, we think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by
the provision of the law under discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.

As stated by Mr. Justice Brown in his opinion in the case of Lawton vs. Steele (152 U.S., 133, 136):

The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of discussion in the appellate courts
of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and
morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public
nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or
otherwise endangering the lives of passers-by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of
diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the
regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds; the restriction of
objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those
afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene
publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are
sold. Beyond this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large
discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what
measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S.,
1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The
legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper
exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court.

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was
required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition
of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes
was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of
such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy
the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and
dangerously affected.

Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this "general police
power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or,
upon acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."

And Cooley in his "Constitutional Limitations" (6th ed., p. 738) says:

It would be quite impossible to enumerate all the instances in which the police power is or may be exercised, because the
various cases in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may conflict with a similar exercise by others, or may be
detrimental to the public order or safety, are infinite in number and in variety. And there are other cases where it becomes
necessary for the public authorities to interfere with the control by individuals of their property, and even to destroy it,
where the owners themselves have fully observed all their duties to their fellows and to the State, but where, nevertheless,
some controlling public necessity demands the interference or destruction. A strong instance of this description is where it
becomes necessary to take, use, or destroy the private property of individuals to prevent the spreading of a fire, the
ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any other great public calamity. Here the individual is in no degree
in fault, but his interest must yield to that "necessity" which "knows no law." The establishment of limits within the denser
portions of cities and villages within which buildings constructed of inflammable materials shall not be erected or repaired
may also, in some cases, be equivalent to a destruction of private property; but regulations for this purpose have been
sustained notwithstanding this result. Wharf lines may also be established for the general good, even though they prevent
the owners of water-fronts from building out on soil which constitutes private property. And, whenever the legislature
deem it necessary to the protection of a harbor to forbid the removal of stones, gravel, or sand from the beach, they may
establish regulations to that effect under penalties, and make them applicable to the owners of the soil equally with other
persons. Such regulations are only "a just restraint of an injurious use of property, which the legislature have authority" to
impose.

So a particular use of property may sometimes be forbidden, where, by a change of circumstances, and without the fault of
the power, that which was once lawful, proper, and unobjectionable has now become a public nuisance, endangering the
public health or the public safety. Milldams are sometimes destroyed upon this grounds; and churchyards which prove, in
the advance of urban population, to be detrimental to the public health, or in danger of becoming so, are liable to be
closed against further use for cemetery purposes.

These citations from some of the highest judicial and text-book authorities in the United States clearly indicate the wide
scope and extent which has there been given to the doctrine us in our opinion that the provision of the statute in question
being a proper exercise of that power is not in violation of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill, which provide that
"no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," a provision
which itself is adopted from the Constitution of the United States, and is found in substance in the constitution of most if
not all of the States of the Union.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be affirmed with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10572 December 21, 1915

FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL and STEWART TAIT, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
JAMES J. RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for appellant.

Aitken and DeSelms for appellees.

TRENT, J.:

The judgment appealed from in this case perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant and his deputies from collecting
and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax mentioned and described in subsection (b) of section
100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property
of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be, offensive to the sight; and decrees
the cancellation of the bond given by the plaintiffs to secure the issuance of the preliminary injunction granted soon after
the commencement of this action.

This case divides itself into two parts and gives rise to two main questions; (1) that relating to the power of the court to
restrain by injunction the collection of the tax complained of, and (2) that relating to the validity of those provisions of
subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, conferring power upon the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign,
signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.

The first question is one of the jurisdiction and is of vital importance to the Government. The sections of Act No. 2339,
which bear directly upon the subject, are 139 and 140. The first expressly forbids the use of an injunction to stay the
collection of any internal revenue tax; the second provides a remedy for any wrong in connection with such taxes, and this
remedy was intended to be exclusive, thereby precluding the remedy by injunction, which remedy is claimed to be
constitutional. The two sections, then, involve the right of a dissatisfied taxpayers to use an exceptional remedy to test the
validity of any tax or to determine any other question connected therewith, and the question whether the remedy by
injunction is exceptional.

Preventive remedies of the courts are extraordinary and are not the usual remedies. The origin and history of the writ of
injunction show that it has always been regarded as an extraordinary, preventive remedy, as distinguished from the
common course of the law to redress evils after they have been consummated. No injunction issues as of course, but is
granted only upon the oath of a party and when there is no adequate remedy at law. The Government does, by section 139
and 140, take away the preventive remedy of injunction, if it ever existed, and leaves the taxpayer, in a contest with it, the
same ordinary remedial actions which prevail between citizen and citizen. The Attorney-General, on behalf of the
defendant, contends that there is no provisions of the paramount law which prohibits such a course. While, on the other
hand, counsel for plaintiffs urge that the two sections are unconstitutional because (a) they attempt to deprive aggrieved
taxpayers of all substantial remedy for the protection of their property, thereby, in effect, depriving them of their property
without due process of law, and (b) they attempt to diminish the jurisdiction of the courts, as conferred upon them by Acts
Nos. 136 and 190, which jurisdiction was ratified and confirmed by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

In the first place, it has been suggested that section 139 does not apply to the tax in question because the section, in
speaking of a "tax," means only legal taxes; and that an illegal tax (the one complained of) is not a tax, and, therefore, does
not fall within the inhibition of the section, and may be restrained by injunction. There is no force in this suggestion. The
inhibition applies to all internal revenue taxes imposes, or authorized to be imposed, by Act No. 2339. (Snyder vs. Marks,
109 U.S., 189.) And, furthermore, the mere fact that a tax is illegal, or that the law, by virtue of which it is imposed, is
unconstitutional, does not authorize a court of equity to restrain its collection by injunction. There must be a further
showing that there are special circumstances which bring the case under some well recognized head of equity
jurisprudence, such as that irreparable injury, multiplicity of suits, or a cloud upon title to real estate will result, and also
that there is, as we have indicated, no adequate remedy at law. This is the settled law in the United States, even in the
absence of statutory enactments such as sections 139 and 140. (Hannewinkle vs. Mayor, etc., of Georgetown, 82 U.S., 547;
Indiana Mfg. Co. vs. Koehne, 188 U.S., 681; Ohio Tax cases, 232 U. S., 576, 587; Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. R. Co. vs. Board of
Public Works, 172 U. S., 32; Shelton vs. Plat, 139 U.S., 591; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S., 575.) Therefore, this branch of
the case must be controlled by sections 139 and 140, unless the same be held unconstitutional, and consequently, null and
void.
The right and power of judicial tribunals to declare whether enactments of the legislature exceed the constitutional
limitations and are invalid has always been considered a grave responsibility, as well as a solemn duty. The courts invariably
give the most careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation and application of the Constitution, and
approach constitutional questions with great deliberation, exercising their power in this respect with the greatest possible
caution and even reluctance; and they should never declare a statute void, unless its invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond
reasonable doubt. To justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, or a provision of a state constitution
to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States, the case must be so clear to be free from doubt, and the
conflict of the statute with the constitution must be irreconcilable, because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom, the
integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until the
contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in no doubtful case will the judiciary pronounce a legislative act to
be contrary to the constitution. To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity. (6
Ruling Case Law, secs. 71, 72, and 73, and cases cited therein.)

It is also the settled law in the United States that "due process of law" does not always require, in respect to the
Government, the same process that is required between citizens, though it generally implies and includes regular
allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial according to some well settled course of judicial proceedings. The case with
which we are dealing is in point. A citizen's property, both real and personal, may be taken, and usually is taken, by the
government in payment of its taxes without any judicial proceedings whatever. In this country, as well as in the United
States, the officer charged with the collection of taxes is authorized to seize and sell the property of delinquent taxpayers
without applying to the courts for assistance, and the constitutionality of the law authorizing this procedure never has
been seriously questioned. (City of Philadelphia vs. [Diehl] The Collector, 5 Wall., 720; Nicholl vs. U.S., 7 Wall., 122, and
cases cited.) This must necessarily be the course, because it is upon taxation that the Government chiefly relies to obtain
the means to carry on its operations, and it is of the utmost importance that the modes adopted to enforce the collection
of the taxes levied should be summary and interfered with as little as possible. No government could exist if every litigious
man were permitted to delay the collection of its taxes. This principle of public policy must be constantly borne in mind in
determining cases such as the one under consideration.

With these principles to guide us, we will proceed to inquire whether there is any merit in the two propositions insisted
upon by counsel for the plaintiffs. Section 5 of the Philippine Bill provides: "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the law."

The origin and history of these provisions are well-known. They are found in substance in the Constitution of the United
States and in that of ever state in the Union.

Section 3224 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, effective since 1867, provides that: "No suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court."

Section 139, with which we have been dealing, reads: "No court shall have authority to grant an injunction to restrain the
collection of any internal-revenue tax."

A comparison of these two sections show that they are essentially the same. Both expressly prohibit the restraining of
taxes by injunction. If the Supreme Court of the United States has clearly and definitely held that the provisions of section
3224 do not violate the "due process of law" and "equal protection of the law" clauses in the Constitution, we would be
going too far to hold that section 139 violates those same provisions in the Philippine Bill. That the Supreme Court of the
United States has so held, cannot be doubted.

In Cheatham vs. United States (92 U.S., 85,89) which involved the validity of an income tax levied by an act of Congress
prior to the one in issue in the case of Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (157 U.S., 429) the court, through Mr. Justice
Miller, said: "If there existed in the courts, state or National, any general power of impeding or controlling the collection of
taxes, or relieving the hardship incident to taxation, the very existence of the government might be placed in the power of
a hostile judiciary. (Dows vs. The City of Chicago, 11 Wall., 108.) While a free course of remonstrance and appeal is allowed
within the departments before the money is finally exacted, the General Government has wisely made the payment of the
tax claimed, whether of customs or of internal revenue, a condition precedent to a resort to the courts by the party against
whom the tax is assessed. In the internal revenue branch it has further prescribed that no such suit shall be brought until
the remedy by appeal has been tried; and, if brought after this, it must be within six months after the decision on the
appeal. We regard this as a condition on which alone the government consents to litigate the lawfulness of the original tax.
It is not a hard condition. Few governments have conceded such a right on any condition. If the compliance with this
condition requires the party aggrieved to pay the money, he must do it."

Again, in State Railroad Tax Cases (92 U.S., 575, 613), the court said: "That there might be no misunderstanding of the
universality of this principle, it was expressly enacted, in 1867, that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment
or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court." (Rev, Stat., sec. 3224.) And though this was intended to apply
alone to taxes levied by the United States, it shows the sense of Congress of the evils to be feared if courts of justice could,
in any case, interfere with the process of collecting taxes on which the government depends for its continued existence. It
is a wise policy. It is founded in the simple philosophy derived from the experience of ages, that the payment of taxes has
to be enforced by summary and stringent means against a reluctant and often adverse sentiment; and to do this
successfully, other instrumentalities and other modes of procedure are necessary, than those which belong to courts of
justice."

And again, in Snyder vs. Marks (109 U.S., 189), the court said: "The remedy of a suit to recover back the tax after it is paid is
provided by statute, and a suit to restrain its collection is forbidden. The remedy so given is exclusive, and no other remedy
can be substituted for it. Such has been the current of decisions in the Circuit Courts of the United States, and we are
satisfied it is a correct view of the law."itc-a1f

In the consideration of the plaintiffs' second proposition, we will attempt to show (1) that the Philippine courts never have
had, since the American occupation, the power to restrain by injunction the collection of any tax imposed by the Insular
Government for its own purpose and benefit, and (2) that assuming that our courts had or have such power, this power has
not been diminished or curtailed by sections 139 and 140.

We will first review briefly the former and present systems of taxation. Upon the American occupation of the Philippine,
there was found a fairly complete system of taxation. This system was continued in force by the military authorities, with
but few changes, until the Civil Government assumed charge of the subject. The principal sources of revenue under the
Spanish regime were derived from customs receipts, the so-called industrial taxes, the urbana taxes, the stamp tax, the
personal cedula tax, and the sale of the public domain. The industrial and urbana taxes constituted practically an income
tax of some 5 per cent on the net income of persons engaged in industrial and commercial pursuits and on the income of
owners of improved city property. The sale of stamped paper and adhesive stamp tax. The cedula tax was a graduated tax,
ranging from nothing up to P37.50. The revenue derived from the sale of the public domain was not considered a tax. The
American authorities at once abolished the cedula tax, but later restored it in a modified form, charging for each cedula
twenty centavos, an amount which was supposed to be just sufficient to cover the cost of issuance. The urbana tax was
abolished by Act No. 223, effective September 6, 1901.

The "Municipal Code" (Act No. 82) and the Provincial Government Act (No. 83), both enacted in 1901, authorize municipal
councils and provincial boards to impose an ad valorem tax on real estate. The Municipal Code did not apply to the city of
Manila. This city was given a special charter (Act No. 183), effective August 30, 1901; Under this charter the Municipal
Board of Manila is authorized and empowered to impose taxes upon real estate and, like municipal councils, to license and
regulate certain occupations. Customs matters were completely reorganized by Act No. 355, effective at the port of Manila
on February 7, 1902, and at other ports in the Philippine Islands the day after the receipt of a certified copy of the Act. The
Internal Revenue Law of 1904 (Act No. 1189), repealed all existing laws, ordinances, etc., imposing taxes upon the persons,
objects, or occupations taxed under that act, and all industrial taxes and stamp taxes imposed under the Spanish regime
were eliminated, but the industrial tax was continued in force until January 1, 1905. This Internal Revenue Law did not take
away from municipal councils, provincial boards, and the Municipal Board of the city of Manila the power to impose taxes
upon real estate. This Act (No. 1189), with its amendments, was repealed by Act No. 2339, an act "revising and
consolidating the laws relative to internal revenue."

Section 84 of Act No. 82 provides that "No court shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed under this
act until the taxpayer shall have paid, under protest, the taxes assessed against him, . . . ."

This inhibition was inserted in section 17 of Act No. 83 and applies to taxes imposed by provincial boards. The inhibition
was not inserted in the Manila Charter until the passage of Act No. 1793, effective October 12, 1907. Act No. 355 expressly
makes the payment of the exactions claimed a condition precedent to a resort to the courts by dissatisfied importers.
Section 52 of Act No. 1189 provides "That no courts shall have authority to grant an injunction restraining the collection of
any taxes imposed by virtue of the provisions of this Act, but the remedy of the taxpayer who claims that he is unjustly
assessed or taxed shall be by payment under protest of the sum claimed from him by the Collector of Internal Revenue and
by action to recover back the sum claimed to have been illegally collected."

Sections 139 and 140 of Act No. 2339 contain, as we have indicated, the same prohibition and remedy. The result is that
the courts have been expressly forbidden, in every act creating or imposing taxes or imposts enacted by the legislative
body of the Philippines since the American occupation, to entertain any suit assailing the validity of any tax or impost thus
imposed until the tax shall have been paid under protest. The only taxes which have not been brought within the express
inhibition were those included in that part of the old Spanish system which completely disappeared on or before January 1,
1905, and possibly the old customs duties which disappeared in February, 1902.

Section 56 of the Organic Act (No. 136), effective June 16, 1901, provides that "Courts of First Instance shall have original
jurisdiction:

xxx xxx xxx

2. In all civil actions which involve the ... legality of any tax, impost, or assessment, . . . .
xxx xxx xxx

7. Said courts and their judges, or any of them, shall have power to issue writs of injunction, mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus in their respective provinces and districts, in the manner provided in the
Code of Civil Procedure.

The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190), effective October 1, 1901, which deals with the subject of
injunctions, are sections 162 to 172, inclusive. Injunctions, as here defined, are of two kinds; preliminary and final. The
former may be granted at any time after the commencement of the action and before final judgment, and the latter at the
termination of the trial as the relief or part of the relief prayed for (sec. 162). Any judge of the Supreme Court may grant a
preliminary injunction in any action pending in that court or in any Court of First Instance. A preliminary injunction may
also be granted by a judge of the Court of First Instance in actions pending in his district in which he has original jurisdiction
(sec. 163). But such injunctions may be granted only when the complaint shows facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief
demanded (sec. 166), and before a final or permanent injunction can be granted, it must appear upon the trial of the
action that the plaintiff is entitled to have commission or continuance of the acts complained of perpetually restrained
(sec. 171). These provisions authorize the institution in Courts of First Instance of what are known as "injunction suits," the
sole object of which is to obtain the issuance of a final injunction. They also authorize the granting of injunctions as aiders
in ordinary civil actions. We have defined in Davesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil. Rep., 273), an injunction to be "A "special remedy"
adopted in that code (Act 190) from American practice, and originally borrowed from English legal procedure, which was
there issued by the authority and under the seal of a court of equity, and limited, as in other cases where equitable relief is
sought, to those cases where there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law,"which will not be granted while
the rights between the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will
be done,"which cannot be compensated in damages . . .

By paragraph 2 of section 56 of Act No. 136, supra, and the provisions of the various subsequent Acts heretofore
mentioned, the Insular Government has consented to litigate with aggrieved persons the validity of any original tax or
impost imposed by it on condition that this be done in ordinary civil actions after the taxes or exactions shall have been
paid. But it is said that paragraph 2 confers original jurisdiction upon Courts of First Instance to hear and determine "all civil
actions" which involve the validity of any tax, impost or assessment, and that if the all-inclusive words "all" and "any" be
given their natural and unrestricted meaning, no action wherein that question is involved can arise over which such courts
do not have jurisdiction. (Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. Rep., 44.) This is true. But the term "civil actions" had its well defined
meaning at the time the paragraph was enacted. The same legislative body which enacted paragraph 2 on June 16, 1901,
had, just a few months prior to that time, defined the only kind of action in which the legality of any tax imposed by it
might be assailed. (Sec. 84, Act 82, enacted January 31, 1901, and sec. 17, Act No. 83, enacted February 6, 1901.) That kind
of action being payment of the tax under protest and an ordinary suit to recover and no other, there can be no doubt that
Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction over all such actions. The subsequent legislation on the same subject shows clearly
that the Commission, in enacting paragraph 2, supra, did not intend to change or modify in any way section 84 of Act No.
82 and section 17 of Act No. 83, but, on the contrary, it was intended that "civil actions," mentioned in said paragraph,
should be understood to mean, in so far as testing the legality of taxes were concerned, only those of the kind and
character provided for in the two sections above mentioned. It is also urged that the power to restrain by injunction the
collection of taxes or imposts is conferred upon Courts of First Instance by paragraph 7 of section 56, supra. This paragraph
does empower those courts to grant injunctions, both preliminary and final, in any civil action pending in their districts,
provided always, that the complaint shows facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief demanded. Injunction suits, such as the
one at bar, are "civil actions," but of a special or extraordinary character. It cannot be said that the Commission intended to
give a broader or different meaning to the word "action," used in Chapter 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure in connection
with injunctions, than it gave to the same word found in paragraph 2 of section 56 of the Organic Act. The Insular
Government, in exercising the power conferred upon it by the Congress of the United States, has declared that the citizens
and residents of this country shall pay certain specified taxes and imposts. The power to tax necessarily carries with it the
power to collect the taxes. This being true, the weight of authority supports the proposition that the Government may fix
the conditions upon which it will consent to litigate the validity of its original taxes. (Tennessee vs. Sneed, 96 U.S., 69.)

We must, therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 and 7 of section 56 of Act No. 136, construed in the light of the prior and
subsequent legislation to which we have referred, and the legislative and judicial history of the same subject in the United
States with which the Commission was familiar, do not empower Courts of firs Instance to interfere by injunction with the
collection of the taxes in question in this case.1awphil.net

If we are in error as to the scope of paragraph 2 and 7, supra, and the Commission did intend to confer the power upon the
courts to restrain the collection of taxes, it does not necessarily follow that this power or jurisdiction has been taken away
by section 139 of Act No. 2339, for the reason that all agree that an injunction will not issue in any case if there is an
adequate remedy at law. The very nature of the writ itself prevents its issuance under such circumstances. Legislation
forbidding the issuing of injunctions in such cases is unnecessary. So the only question to be here determined is whether
the remedy provided for in section 140 of Act No. 2339 is adequate. If it is, the writs which form the basis of this appeal
should not have been issued. If this is the correct view, the authority to issue injunctions will not have been taken away by
section 139, but rendered inoperative only by reason of an adequate remedy having been made available.

The legislative body of the Philippine Islands has declared from the beginning (Act No. 82) that payment under protest and
suit to recover is an adequate remedy to test the legality of any tax or impost, and that this remedy is exclusive. Can we say
that the remedy is not adequate or that it is not exclusive, or both? The plaintiffs in the case at bar are the first, in so far as
we are aware, to question either the adequacy or exclusiveness of this remedy. We will refer to a few cases in the United
States where statutes similar to sections 139 and 140 have been construed and applied.

In May, 1874, one Bloomstein presented a petition to the circuit court sitting in Nashville, Tennessee, stating that his real
and personal property had been assessed for state taxes in the year 1872 to the amount of $132.60; that he tendered to
the collector this amount in "funds receivable by law for such purposes;" and that the collector refused to receive the
same. He prayed for an alternative writ of mandamus to compel the collector to receive the bills in payment for such taxes,
or to show cause to the contrary. To this petition the collector, in his answer, set up the defense that the petitioner's suit
was expressly prohibited by the Act of the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, passed in 1873. The petition was
dismissed and the relief prayed for refused. An appeal to the supreme court of the State resulted in the affirmance of the
judgment of the lower court. The case was then carried to the Supreme Court of the United States (Tennessee vs. Sneed,
96 U. S., 69), where the judgment was again affirmed.

The two sections of the Act of [March 21,] 1873, drawn in question in that cases, read as follows:

1. That in all cases in which an officer, charged by law with the collection of revenue due the State, shall institute any
proceeding, or take any steps for the collection of the same, alleged or claimed to be due by said officer from any citizen,
the party against whom the proceeding or step is taken shall, if he conceives the same to be unjust or illegal, or against any
statute or clause of the Constitution of the State, pay the same under protest; and, upon his making said payment, the
officer or collector shall pay such revenue into the State Treasury, giving notice at the time of payment to the Comptroller
that the same was paid under protest; and the party paying said revenue may, at any time within thirty days after making
said payment, and not longer thereafter, sue the said officer having collected said sum, for the recovery thereof. And the
same may be tried in any court having the jurisdiction of the amount and parties; and, if it be determined that the same
was wrongfully collected, as not being due from said party to the State, for any reason going to the merits of the same,
then the court trying the case may certify of record that the same was wrongfully paid and ought to be refunded; and
thereupon the Comptroller shall issue his warrant for the same, which shall be paid in preference to other claims on the
Treasury.

2. That there shall be no other remedy, in any case of the collection of revenue, or attempt to collect revenue illegally, or
attempt to collect revenue in funds only receivable by said officer under the law, the same being other or different funds
than such as the tax payer may tender, or claim the right to pay, than that above provided; and no writ for the prevention
of the collection of any revenue claimed, or to hinder or delay the collection of the same, shall in anywise issue, either
injunction, supersedeas, prohibition, or any other writ or process whatever; but in all cases in which, for any reason, any
person shall claim that the tax so collected was wrongfully or illegally collected, the remedy for said party shall be as above
provided, and in no other manner."

In discussing the adequacy of the remedy provided by the Tennessee Legislature, as above set forth, the Supreme Court of
the United States, in the case just cited, said: "This remedy is simple and effective. A suit at law to recover money
unlawfully exacted is as speedy, as easily tried, and less complicated than a proceeding by mandamus. ... In revenue cases,
whether arising upon its (United States) Internal Revenue Laws or those providing for the collection of duties upon foreign
imports, it (United States) adopts the rule prescribed by the State of Tennessee. It requires the contestant to pay the
amount as fixed by the Government, and gives him power to sue the collector, and in such suit to test the legality of the
tax. There is nothing illegal or even harsh in this. It is a wise and reasonable precaution for the security of the
Government."

Thomas C. Platt commenced an action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Tennessee to
restrain the collection of a license tax from the company which he represented. The defense was that sections 1 and 2 of
the Act of 1873, supra, prohibited the bringing of that suit. This case also reached the Supreme Court of the United States.
(Shelton vs. Platt, 139 U. 591.) In speaking of the inhibitory provisions of sections 1 and 2 of the Act of 1873, the court said:
"This Act has been sanctioned and applied by the Courts of Tennessee. (Nashville vs.Smith, 86 Tenn., 213; Louisville & N. R.
Co. vs. State, 8 Heisk., 663, 804.) It is, as counsel observe, similar to the Act of Congress forbidding suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of taxes under the Internal Revenue Laws, in respect to which this court held that
the remedy by suit to recover back the tax after payment, provided for by the Statute, was exclusive. (Snyder vs. Marks, of
this character has been called for by the embarrassments resulting from the improvident employment of the writ of
injunction in arresting the collection of the public revenue; and, even in its absence, the strong arm of the court of
chancery ought not to be interposed in that direction except where resort to that court is grounded upon the settled
principles which govern its jurisdiction."
In Louisville & N.R. Co. vs. State (8 Heisk. [64 Tenn.], 663, 804), cited by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Shelton vs. Platt, supra, the court said: "It was urged that this statute (sections 1 and 2 of the Act of 1873, supra) is
unconstitutional and void, as it deprives the citizen of the remedy by certiorari, guaranteed by the organic law."

By the 10th section of the sixth article of the Constitution, [Tennessee] it is provided that: "The judges or justices of inferior
courts of law and equity shall have power in all civil cases to issue writs of certiorari, to remove any cause, or the transcript
of the record thereof, from any inferior jurisdiction into such court of law, on sufficient cause, supported by oath or
affirmation."

The court held the act valid as not being in conflict with these provisions of the State constitution.

In Eddy vs. The Township of Lee (73 Mich., 123), the complainants sought to enjoin the collection of certain taxes for the
year 1886. The defendants, in support of their demurrer, insisted that the remedy by injunction had been taken away by
section 107 of the Act of 1885, which section reads as follows: "No injunction shall issue to stay proceedings for the
assessment or collection of taxes under this Act."

It was claimed by the complainants that the above quoted provisions of the Act of 1885 were unconstitutional and void as
being in conflict with article 6, sec. 8, of the Constitution, which provides that: "The circuit courts shall have original
jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by law. ... They shall also
have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, and other writs necessary to
carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees."

Mr. Justice Champlin, speaking for the court, said: "I have no doubt that the Legislature has the constitutional authority,
where it has provided a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law to recover back taxes illegally assessed and collected,
to take away the remedy by injunction to restrain their collection."

Section 9 of the Philippine Bill reads in part as follows: "That the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the
Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall
hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands, subject to the power of said Government to change the
practice and method of procedure."

It will be seen that this section has not taken away from the Philippine Government the power to change the practice and
method of procedure. If sections 139 and 140, considered together, and this must always be done, are nothing more than a
mode of procedure, then it would seem that the Legislature did not exceed its constitutional authority in enacting them.
Conceding for the moment that the duly authorized procedure for the determination of the validity of any tax, impost, or
assessment was by injunction suits and that this method was available to aggrieved taxpayers prior to the passage of Act
No. 2339, may the Legislature change this method of procedure? That the Legislature has the power to do this, there can
be no doubt, provided some other adequate remedy is substituted in lieu thereof. In speaking of the modes of enforcing
rights created by contracts, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Tennessee vs. Sneed, supra, said: "The rule seems to
be that in modes of proceedings and of forms to enforce the contract the Legislature has the control, and may enlarge,
limit or alter them, provided that it does not deny a remedy, or so embarrass it with conditions and restrictions as seriously
to impair the value of the right."

In that case the petitioner urged that the Acts of 1873 were laws impairing the obligation of the contract contained in the
charter of the Bank of Tennessee, which contract was entered into with the State in 1838. It was claimed that this was done
by placing such impediments and obstructions in the way of its enforcement, thereby so impairing the remedies as
practically to render the obligation of no value. In disposing of this contention, the court said: "If we assume that prior to
1873 the relator had authority to prosecute his claim against the State by mandamus, and that by the statutes of that year
the further use of that form was prohibited to him, the question remains. whether an effectual remedy was left to him or
provided for him. We think the regulation of the statute gave him an abundant means of enforcing such right as he
possessed. It provided that he might pay his claim to the collector under protest, giving notice thereof to the Comptroller
of the Treasury; that at any time within thirty days thereafter he might sue the officer making the collection; that the case
should be tried by any court having jurisdiction and, if found in favor of the plaintiff on the merits, the court should certify
that the same was wrongfully paid and ought to be refunded and the Comptroller should thereupon issue his warrant
therefor, which should be paid in preference to other claim on the Treasury."

But great stress is laid upon the fact that the plaintiffs in the case under consideration are unable to pay the taxes assessed
against them and that if the law is enforced, they will be compelled to suspend business. This point may be best answered
by quoting from the case of Youngblood vs. Sexton (32 Mich., 406), wherein Judge Cooley, speaking for the court, said: "But
if this consideration is sufficient to justify the transfer of a controversy from a court of law to a court of equity, then every
controversy where money is demanded may be made the subject of equitable cognizance. To enforce against a dealer a
promissory note may in some cases as effectually break up his business as to collect from him a tax of equal amount. This is
not what is known to the law as irreparable injury. The courts have never recognized the consequences of the mere
enforcement of a money demand as falling within that category."
Certain specified sections of Act No. 2339 were amended by Act No. 2432, enacted December 23, 1914, effective January
1, 1915, by imposing increased and additional taxes. Act No. 2432 was amended, were ratified by the Congress of the
United States on March 4, 1915. The opposition manifested against the taxes imposed by Acts Nos. 2339 and 2432 is a
matter of local history. A great many business men thought the taxes thus imposed were too high. If the collection of the
new taxes on signs, signboards, and billboards may be restrained, we see no well-founded reason why injunctions cannot
be granted restraining the collection of all or at least a number of the other increased taxes. The fact that this may be done,
shows the wisdom of the Legislature in denying the use of the writ of injunction to restrain the collection of any tax
imposed by the Acts. When this was done, an equitable remedy was made available to all dissatisfied taxpayers.

The question now arises whether, the case being one of which the court below had no jurisdiction, this court, on appeal,
shall proceed to express an opinion upon the validity of provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339,
imposing the taxes complained of. As a general rule, an opinion on the merits of a controversy ought to be declined when
the court is powerless to give the relief demanded. But it is claimed that this case is, in many particulars, exceptional. It is
true that it has been argued on the merits, and there is no reason for any suggestion or suspicion that it is not a bona fide
controversy. The legal points involved in the merits have been presented with force, clearness, and great ability by the
learned counsel of both sides. If the law assailed were still in force, we would feel that an opinion on its validity would be
justifiable, but, as the amendment became effective on January 1, 1915, we think it advisable to proceed no further with
this branch of the case.

The next question arises in connection with the supplementary complaint, the object of which is to enjoin the Collector of
Internal Revenue from removing certain billboards, the property of the plaintiffs located upon private lands in the Province
of Rizal. The plaintiffs allege that the billboards here in question "in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious
to the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons." The defendant denies these allegations in
his answer and claims that after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls, he
"decided that the billboard complained of was and still is offensive to the sight, and is otherwise a nuisance." The plaintiffs
proved by Mr. Churchill that the "billboards were quite a distance from the road and that they were strongly built, not
dangerous to the safety of the people, and contained no advertising matter which is filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the
morals of the community." The defendant presented no testimony upon this point. In the agreed statement of facts
submitted by the parties, the plaintiffs "admit that the billboards mentioned were and still are offensive to the sight."

The pertinent provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339 read: "If after due investigation the Collector of
Internal Revenue shall decide that any sign, signboard, or billboard displayed or exposed to public view is offensive to the
sight or is otherwise a nuisance, he may by summary order direct the removal of such sign, signboard, or billboard, and if
same is not removed within ten days after he has issued such order he my himself cause its removal, and the sign,
signboard, or billboard shall thereupon be forfeited to the Government, and the owner thereof charged with the expenses
of the removal so effected. When the sign, signboard, or billboard ordered to be removed as herein provided shall not
comply with the provisions of the general regulations of the Collector of Internal Revenue, no rebate or refund shall be
allowed for any portion of a year for which the tax may have been paid. Otherwise, the Collector of Internal Revenue may
in his discretion make a proportionate refund of the tax for the portion of the year remaining for which the taxes were
paid. An appeal may be had from the order of the Collector of Internal Revenue to the Secretary of Finance and Justice
whose decision thereon shall be final."

The Attorney-General, on behalf of the defendant, says: "The question which the case presents under this head for
determination, resolves itself into this inquiry: Is the suppression of advertising signs displayed or exposed to public view,
which are admittedly offensive to the sight, conducive to the public interest?"

And cunsel for the plaintiffs states the question thus: "We contend that that portion of section 100 of Act No. 2339,
empowering the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove billboards as nuisances, if objectionable to the sight, is
unconstitutional, as constituting a deprivation of property without due process of law."

From the position taken by counsel for both sides, it is clear that our inquiry is limited to the question whether the
enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government; for all property is
held subject to that power.

As a consequence of the foregoing, all discussion and authorities cited, which go to the power of the state to authorize
administrative officers to find, as a fact, that legitimate trades, callings, and businesses are, under certain circumstances,
statutory nuisances, and whether the procedure prescribed for this purpose is due process of law, are foreign to the issue
here presented.

There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and
that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all
republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the
purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be
invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort,
it should not be disturbed by the courts. The courts cannot substitute their own views for what is proper in the premises
for those of the Legislature. In Munn vs. Illinois (94 U.S., 113), the United States Supreme Court states the rule thus: "If no
state of circumstances could exist to justify such statute, then we may declare this one void because in excess of the
legislative power of this state; but if it could, we must presume it did. Of the propriety of legislative interference, within the
scope of the legislative power, a legislature is the exclusive judge."

This rule very fully discussed and declared in Powell vs. Pennsylvania (127 U.S., 678) — "oleo-margarine" case. (See also
Crowley vs. Christensen, 137 U.S., 86, 87; Camfield vs. U.S., 167 U.S., 518.) While the state may interfere wherever the
public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not
only what the interest of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests; yet, its
determination in these matters is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. (Lawton vs. Steele,
152 U.S., 133.) Can it be said judicially that signs, signboards, and billboards, which are admittedly offensive to the sight,
are not with the category of things which interfere with the public safety, welfare, and comfort, and therefore beyond the
reach of the police power of the Philippine Government?

The numerous attempts which have been made to limit by definition the scope of the police power are only interesting as
illustrating its rapid extension within comparatively recent years to points heretofore deemed entirely within the field of
private liberty and property rights. Blackstone's definition of the police power was as follows: "The due regulation and
domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well governed family, are bound to
conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neigborhood, and good manners, to be decent, industrious,
and inoffensive in their respective stations." (Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 162.)

Chanceller Kent considered the police power the authority of the state "to regulate unwholesome trades, slaughter houses,
operations offensive to the senses." Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts defined it as follows: "The power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." (Com. vs. Alger, 7 Cush., 53.)

In the case of Butchers' Union Slaughter-house, etc. Co. vs. Crescent City Live Stock Landing, etc. Co. (111 U.S., 746), it was
suggested that the public health and public morals are matters of legislative concern of which the legislature cannot divest
itself. (See State vs. Mountain Timber Co. [1913], 75 Wash., 581, where these definitions are collated.)

In Champer vs. Greencastle (138 Ind., 339), it was said: "The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and
complete definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe regulations for
the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any
of the provisions of the organic law." (Quoted with approval in Hopkins vs. Richmond [Va., 1915], 86 S.E., 139.)

In Com. vs. Plymouth Coal Co. ([1911] 232 Pa., 141), it was said: "The police power of the state is difficult of definition, but
it has been held by the courts to be the right to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection,
comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which does not encroach on a like power vested in congress or state
legislatures by the federal constitution, or does not violate the provisions of the organic law; and it has been expressly held
that the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution was not designed to interfere with the exercise of that power
by the state."

In People vs. Brazee ([Mich., 1914], 149 N.W., 1053), it was said: "It [the police power] has for its object the improvement
of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "he
greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon
subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions
demand correction."

In 8 Cyc., 863, it is said: "Police power is the name given to that inherent sovereignty which it is the right and duty of the
government or its agents to exercise whenever public policy, in a broad sense, demands, for the benefit of society at large,
regulations to guard its morals, safety, health, order or to insure in any respect such economic conditions as an advancing
civilization of a high complex character requires." (As quoted with approval in Stettler vs.O'Hara [1914], 69 Ore, 519.)

Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States has said in Noble State Bank vs. Haskell (219 U.S. [1911], 575: "It may be
said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is
sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately
necessary to the public welfare."

This statement, recent as it is, has been quoted with approval by several courts. (Cunningham vs. Northwestern Imp. Co.
[1911], 44 Mont., 180; State vs. Mountain Timber Co. [1913], 75 Wash., 581; McDavid vs. Bank of Bay Minette [Ala., 1915],
69 Sou., 452; Hopkins vs. City of Richmond [Va., 1915], 86 S.E., 139; State vs. Philipps [Miss. 1915], 67 Sou., 651.)

It was said in Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 85), per Shaw, C.J., that: "It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence
and sources of this police power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise." In Stone vs. Mississippi
(101 U.S., 814), it was said: "Many attempts have been made in this court and elsewhere to define the police power, but
never with entire success. It is always easier to determine whether a particular case comes within the general scope of the
power, than to give an abstract definition of the power itself, which will be in all respects accurate."

Other courts have held the same vow of efforts to evolve a satisfactory definition of the police power. Manifestly,
definitions which fail to anticipate cases properly within the scope of the police power are deficient. It is necessary,
therefore, to confine our discussion to the principle involved and determine whether the cases as they come up are within
that principle. The basic idea of civil polity in the United States is that government should interfere with individual effort
only to the extent necessary to preserve a healthy social and economic condition of the country. State interference with
the use of private property may be exercised in three ways. First, through the power of taxation, second, through the
power of eminent domain, and third, through the police power. Buy the first method it is assumed that the individual
receives the equivalent of the tax in the form of protection and benefit he receives from the government as such. By the
second method he receives the market value of the property taken from him. But under the third method the benefits he
derived are only such as may arise from the maintenance of a healthy economic standard of society and is often referred to
as damnum absque injuria. (Com. vs. Plymouth Coal Co. 232 Pa., 141; Bemis vs. Guirl Drainage Co., 182 Ind., 36.) There was
a time when state interference with the use of private property under the guise of the police power was practically
confined to the suppression of common nuisances. At the present day, however, industry is organized along lines which
make it possible for large combinations of capital to profit at the expense of the socio-economic progress of the nation by
controlling prices and dictating to industrial workers wages and conditions of labor. Not only this but the universal use of
mechanical contrivances by producers and common carriers has enormously increased the toll of human life and limb in
the production and distribution of consumption goods. To the extent that these businesses affect not only the public
health, safety, and morals, but also the general social and economic life of the nation, it has been and will continue to be
necessary for the state to interfere by regulation. By so doing, it is true that the enjoyment of private property is interfered
with in no small degree and in ways that would have been considered entirely unnecessary in years gone by. The regulation
of rates charged by common carriers, for instance, or the limitation of hours of work in industrial establishments have only
a very indirect bearing upon the public health, safety, and morals, but do bear directly upon social and economic
conditions. To permit each individual unit of society to feel that his industry will bring a fair return; to see that his work
shall be done under conditions that will not either immediately or eventually ruin his health; to prevent the artificial
inflation of prices of the things which are necessary for his physical well being are matters which the individual is no longer
capable of attending to himself. It is within the province of the police power to render assistance to the people to the
extent that may be necessary to safeguard these rights. Hence, laws providing for the regulation of wages and hours of
labor of coal miners (Rail & River Coal Co. vs. Taylor, 234 U.S., 224); requiring payment of employees of railroads and other
industrial concerns in legal tender and requiring salaries to be paid semimonthly (Erie R.R. Co. vs. Williams, 233 U.S., 685);
providing a maximum number of hours of labor for women (Miller vs. Wilson, U.S. Sup. Ct. [Feb. 23, 1915], Adv. Opns., p.
342); prohibiting child labor (Sturges & Burn vs. Beauchamp, 231 U.S., 320); restricting the hours of labor in public
laundries (In re Wong Wing, 167 Cal., 109); limiting hours of labor in industrial establishment generally (State vs. Bunting,
71 Ore., 259); Sunday Closing Laws (State vs. Nicholls [Ore., 1915], 151 Pac., 473; People vs. C. Klinck Packing Co. [N.Y.,
1915], 108 N. E., 278; Hiller vs. State [Md., 1914], 92 Atl., 842; State vs. Penny, 42 Mont., 118; City of Springfield vs. Richter,
257 Ill., 578, 580; State vs. Hondros [S.C., 1915], 84 S.E., 781); have all been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power.
Again, workmen's compensation laws have been quite generally upheld. These statutes discard the common law theory
that employers are not liable for industrial accidents and make them responsible for all accidents resulting from trade risks,
it being considered that such accidents are a legitimate charge against production and that the employer by controlling the
prices of his product may shift the burden to the community. Laws requiring state banks to join in establishing a depositors'
guarantee fund have also been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court in Noble State Bank vs. Haskell (219 U. S., 104), and
Assaria State Bank vs. Dolley (219 U.S., 121).

Offensive noises and smells have been for a long time considered susceptible of suppression in thickly populated districts.
Barring livery stables from such locations was approved of in Reinman vs. Little Rock (U.S. Sup. Ct. [Apr. 5, 1915], U.S. Adv.
Opns., p. 511). And a municipal ordinance was recently upheld (People vs. Ericsson, 263 Ill., 368), which prohibited the
location of garages within two hundred feet of any hospital, church, or school, or in any block used exclusively for
residential purposes, unless the consent of the majority of the property owners be obtained. Such statutes as these are
usually upheld on the theory of safeguarding the public health. But we apprehend that in point of fact they have little
bearing upon the health of the normal person, but a great deal to do with his physical comfort and convenience and not a
little to do with his peace of mind. Without entering into the realm of psychology, we think it quite demonstrable that sight
is as valuable to a human being as any of his other senses, and that the proper ministration to this sense conduces as much
to his contentment as the care bestowed upon the senses of hearing or smell, and probably as much as both together.
Objects may be offensive to the eye as well as to the nose or ear. Man's esthetic feelings are constantly being appealed to
through his sense of sight. Large investments have been made in theaters and other forms of amusement, in paintings and
spectacular displays, the success of which depends in great part upon the appeal made through the sense of sight. Moving
picture shows could not possible without the sense of sight. Governments have spent millions on parks and boulevards and
other forms of civic beauty, the first aim of which is to appeal to the sense of sight. Why, then, should the Government not
interpose to protect from annoyance this most valuable of man's senses as readily as to protect him from offensive noises
and smells?

The advertising industry is a legitimate one. It is at the same time a cause and an effect of the great industrial age through
which the world is now passing. Millions are spent each year in this manner to guide the consumer to the articles which he
needs. The sense of sight is the primary essential to advertising success. Billboard advertising, as it is now conducted, is a
comparatively recent form of advertising. It is conducted out of doors and along the arteries of travel, and compels
attention by the strategic locations of the boards, which obstruct the range of vision at points where travelers are most
likely to direct their eyes. Beautiful landscapes are marred or may not be seen at all by the traveler because of the gaudy
array of posters announcing a particular kind of breakfast food, or underwear, the coming of a circus, an incomparable
soap, nostrums or medicines for the curing of all the ills to which the flesh is heir, etc. It is quite natural for people to
protest against this indiscriminate and wholesale use of the landscape by advertisers and the intrusion of tradesmen upon
their hours of leisure and relaxation from work. Outdoor life must lose much of its charm and pleasure if this form of
advertising is permitted to continue unhampered until it converts the streets and highways into veritable canyons through
which the world must travel in going to work or in search of outdoor pleasure.

The success of billboard advertising depends not so much upon the use of private property as it does upon the use of the
channels of travel used by the general public. Suppose that the owner of private property, who so vigorously objects to the
restriction of this form of advertising, should require the advertiser to paste his posters upon the billboards so that they
would face the interior of the property instead of the exterior. Billboard advertising would die a natural death if this were
done, and its real dependency not upon the unrestricted use of private property but upon the unrestricted use of the
public highways is at once apparent. Ostensibly located on private property, the real and sole value of the billboard is its
proximity to the public thoroughfares. Hence, we conceive that the regulation of billboards and their restriction is not so
much a regulation of private property as it is a regulation of the use of the streets and other public thoroughfares.

We would not be understood as saying that billboard advertising is not a legitimate business any more than we would say
that a livery stable or an automobile garage is not. Even a billboard is more sightly than piles of rubbish or an open sewer.
But all these businesses are offensive to the senses under certain conditions.

It has been urged against ministering to the sense of sight that tastes are so diversified that there is no safe standard of
legislation in this direction. We answer in the language of the Supreme Court in Noble State Bank vs.Haskell (219 U.S., 104),
and which has already been adopted by several state courts (see supra), that "the prevailing morality or strong and
preponderating opinion" demands such legislation. The agitation against the unrestrained development of the billboard
business has produced results in nearly all the countries of Europe. (Ency. Britannica, vol. 1, pp. 237-240.) Many drastic
ordinances and state laws have been passed in the United States seeking to make the business amenable to regulation. But
their regulation in the United states is hampered by what we conceive an unwarranted restriction upon the scope of the
police power by the courts. If the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in
the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which
encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power. A source of annoyance and irritation to the public does
not minister to the comfort and convenience of the public. And we are of the opinion that the prevailing sentiment is
manifestly against the erection of billboards which are offensive to the sight.

We do not consider that we are in conflict with the decision in Eubank vs. Richmond (226 U.S., 137), where a municipal
ordinance establishing a building line to which property owners must conform was held unconstitutional. As we have
pointed out, billboard advertising is not so much a use of private property as it is a use of the public thoroughfares. It
derives its value to the power solely because the posters are exposed to the public gaze. It may well be that the state may
not require private property owners to conform to a building line, but may prescribe the conditions under which they shall
make use of the adjoining streets and highways. Nor is the law in question to be held invalid as denying equal protection of
the laws. In Keokee Coke Co. vs. Taylor (234 U.S., 224), it was said: "It is more pressed that the act discriminates
unconstitutionally against certain classes. But while there are differences of opinion as to the degree and kind of
discrimination permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is established by repeated decisions that a statute aimed at
what is deemed an evil, and hitting it presumably where experience shows it to be most felt, is not to be upset by thinking
up and enumerating other instances to which it might have been applied equally well, so far as the court can see. That is
for the legislature to judge unless the case is very clear."

But we have not overlooked the fact that we are not in harmony with the highest courts of a number of the states in the
American Union upon this point. Those courts being of the opinion that statutes which are prompted and inspired by
esthetic considerations merely, having for their sole purpose the promotion and gratification of the esthetic sense, and not
the promotion or protection of the public safety, the public peace and good order of society, must be held invalid and
contrary to constitutional provisions holding inviolate the rights of private property. Or, in other words, the police power
cannot interfere with private property rights for purely esthetic purposes. The courts, taking this view, rest their decisions
upon the proposition that the esthetic sense is disassociated entirely from any relation to the public health, morals,
comfort, or general welfare and is, therefore, beyond the police power of the state. But we are of the opinion, as above
indicated, that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not
disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well recognized
principle to further application. (Fruend on Police Power, p. 166.)

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the action dismissed upon the merits, with
costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

DECISION ON THE MOTION FOR A REHEARING, JANUARY 24, 1916.

TRENT, J.:

Counsel for the plaintiffs call our attention to the case of Ex parte Young (209 U.S., 123); and say that they are of the
opinion that this case "is the absolutely determinative of the question of jurisdiction in injunctions of this kind." We did not
refer to this case in our former opinion because we were satisfied that the reasoning of the case is not applicable to section
100 (b), 139 and 140 of Act No. 2339. The principles announced in the Young case are stated as follows: "It may therefore
be said that when the penalties for disobedience are by fines so enormous and imprisonment so severe as to intimidate
the company and its officers from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation, the result is the same as if
the law in terms prohibited the company from seeking judicial construction of laws which deeply affect its rights.

It is urged that there is no principle upon which to base the claim that a person is entitled to disobey a statute at least
once, for the purpose of testing its validity without subjecting himself to the penalties for disobedience provided by the
statute in case it is valid. This is not an accurate statement of the case. Ordinarily a law creating offenses in the nature of
misdemeanors or felonies relates to a subject over which the jurisdiction of the legislature is complete in any event. In
these case, however, of the establishment of certain rates without any hearing, the validity of such rates necessarily
depends upon whether they are high enough to permit at least some return upon the investment (how much it is not now
necessary to state), and an inquiry as to that fact is a proper subject of judicial investigation. If it turns out that the rates are
too low for that purpose, then they are illegal. Now, to impose upon a party interested the burden of obtaining a judicial
decision of such a question (no prior hearing having ever been given) only upon the condition that, if unsuccessful, he must
suffer imprisonment and pay fines as provided in these acts, is, in effect, to close up all approaches to the courts, and thus
prevent any hearing upon the question whether the rates as provided by the acts are not too low, and therefore invalid.
The distinction is obvious between a case where the validity of the acts depends upon the existence of a fact which can be
determined only after investigation of a very complicated and technical character, and the ordinary case of a statute upon a
subject requiring no such investigation and over which the jurisdiction of the legislature is complete in any event.

An examination of the sections of our Internal Revenue Law and of the circumstances under which and the purposes for
which they were enacted, will show that, unlike the statutes under consideration in the above cited case, their enactment
involved no attempt on the part of the Legislature to prevent dissatisfied taxpayers "from resorting to the courts to test the
validity of the legislation;" no effort to prevent any inquiry as to their validity. While section 139 does prevent the testing of
the validity of subsection (b) of section 100 in injunction suits instituted for the purpose of restraining the collection of
internal revenue taxes, section 140 provides a complete remedy for that purpose. And furthermore, the validity of
subsection (b) does not depend upon "the existence of a fact which can be determined only after investigation of a very
complicated and technical character," but the jurisdiction of the Legislature over the subject with which the subsection
deals "is complete in any event." The judgment of the court in the Young case rests upon the proposition that the aggrieved
parties had no adequate remedy at law.

Neither did we overlook the case of General Oil Co. vs. Crain (209 U.S., 211), decided the same day and citing Ex
parte Young, supra. In that case the plaintiff was a Tennessee corporation, with its principal place of business in Memphis,
Tennessee. It was engaged in the manufacture and sale of coal oil, etc. Its wells and plant were located in Pennsylvania and
Ohio. Memphis was not only its place of business, at which place it sold oil to the residents of Tennessee, but also a
distributing point to which oils were shipped from Pennsylvania and Ohio and unloaded into various tanks for the purpose
of being forwarded to the Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi customers. Notwithstanding the fact that the company
separated its oils, which were designated to meet the requirements of the orders from those States, from the oils for sale
in Tennessee, the defendant insisted that he had a right, under the Act of the Tennessee Legislature, approved April 21,
1899, to inspect all the oils unlocated in Memphis, whether for sale in that State or not, and charge and collect for such
inspection a regular fee of twenty-five cents per barrel. The company, being advised that the defendant had no such right,
instituted this action in the inferior States court for the purpose of enjoining the defendant, upon the grounds stated in the
bill, from inspecting or attempting to inspect its oils. Upon trial, the preliminary injunction which had been granted at the
commencement of the action, was continued in force. Upon appeal, the supreme court of the State of Tennessee decided
that the suit was one against the State and reversed the judgment of the Chancellor. In the Supreme Court of the United
States, where the case was reviewed upon a writ of error, the contentions of the parties were stated by the court as
follows: "It is contended by defendant in error that this court is without jurisdiction because no matter sought to be
litigated by plaintiff in error was determined by the Supreme Court of Tennessee. The court simply held, it is paid, that,
under the laws of the State, it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for any purpose. And it is insisted "hat this holding
involved no Federal question, but only the powers and jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Tennessee, in respect to
which the Supreme Court of Tennessee is the final arbiter."

Opposing these contentions, plaintiff in error urges that whether a suit is one against a State cannot depend upon the
declaration of a statute, but depends upon the essential nature ofthe suit, and that the Supreme Court recognized that the
statute "aded nothing to the axiomatic principle that the State, as a sovereign, is not subject to suit save by its own
consent."And it is hence insisted that the court by dismissing the bill gave effect to the law which was attacked. It is further
insisted that the bill undoubtedly present rights under the Constitution of the United States and conditions which entitle
plaintiff in error to an injunction for the protection of such rights, and that a statute of the State which operates to deny
such rights, or such relief, `is itself in conflict with the Constitution of the United States."

That statute of Tennessee, which the supreme court of that State construed and held to be prohibitory of the suit, was an
act passed February 28, 1873, which provides: "That no court in the State of Tennessee has, nor shall hereafter have, any
power, jurisdiction, or authority to entertain any suit against the State, or any officer acting by the authority of the State,
with a view to reach the State, its treasury, funds or property; and all such suits now pending, or hereafter brought, shall be
dismissed as to the State, or such officer, on motion, plea or demurrer of the law officer of the State, or counsel employed
by the State."

The Supreme Court of the United States, after reviewing many cases, said: "Necessarily, to give adequate protection to
constitutional rights a distinction must be made between valid and invalid state laws, as determining the character of the
suit against state officers. And the suit at bar illustrates the necessity. If a suit against state officer is precluded in the
national courts by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, and may be forbidden by a State to its courts, as it is
contended in the case at bar that it may be, without power of review by this court, it must be evident that an easy way is
open to prevent the enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution; and the Fourteenth Amendment, which is
directed at state action, could be nullified as to much of its operation. ... It being then the right of a party to be protected
against a law which violates a constitutional right, whether by its terms or the manner of its enforcement, it is manifest
that a decision which denies such protection gives effect to the law, and the decision is reviewable by this court."

The court then proceeded to consider whether the law of 1899 would, if administered against the oils in question, violate
any constitutional right of the plaintiff and after finding and adjudging that the oils were not in movement through the
States, that they had reached the destination of their first shipment, and were held there, not in necessary delay at means
of transportation but for the business purposes and profit of the company, and resting its judgment upon the taxing power
of the State, affirmed the decree of the supreme court of the State of Tennessee.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction because
the suit was one against the State, which was prohibited by the Tennessee Legislature. The Supreme Court of the United
States took jurisdiction of the controversy for the reasons above quoted and sustained the Act of 1899 as a revenue law.

The case of Tennessee vs. Sneed (96 U.S., 69), and Shelton vs. Platt (139 U.S., 591), relied upon in our former opinion, were
not cited in General Oil Co. vs. Crain, supra, because the questions presented and the statutes under consideration were
entirely different. The Act approved March 31, 1873, expressly prohibits the courts from restraining the collection of any
tax, leaving the dissatisfied taxpayer to his exclusive remedy — payment under protest and suit to recover — while the Act
approved February 28, 1873, prohibits suits against the State.

In upholding the statute which authorizes the removal of signboards or billboards upon the sole ground that they are
offensive to the sight, we recognized the fact that we are not in harmony with various state courts in the American Union.
We have just examined the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois in the recent case (October [December],
1914) of Thomas Cusack Co. vs. City of Chicago (267 Ill., 344), wherein the court upheld the validity of a municipal
ordinances, which reads as follows: "707. Frontage consents required. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or
corporation to erect or construct any bill-board or sign-board in any block on any public street in which one-half of the
buildings on both sides of the street are used exclusively for residence purposes, without first obtaining the consent, in
writing, of the owners or duly authorized agents of said owners owning a majority of the frontage of the property, on both
sides of the street, in the block in which such bill-board or sign-board is to be erected, constructed or located. Such written
consent shall be filed with the commissioner of buildings before a permit shall be issued for the erection, construction or
location of such bill-board or sign-board."

The evidence which the Illinois court relied upon was the danger of fires, the fact that billboards promote the commission
of various immoral and filthy acts by disorderly persons, and the inadequate police protection furnished to residential
districts. The last objection has no virtue unless one or the other of the other objections are valid. If the billboard industry
does, in fact, promote such municipal evils to noticeable extent, it seems a curious inconsistency that a majority of the
property owners on a given block may legalize the business. However, the decision is undoubtedly a considerable advance
over the views taken by other high courts in the United States and distinguishes several Illinois decisions. It is an advance
because it permits the suppression of billboards where they are undesirable. The ordinance which the court approved will
no doubt cause the virtual suppression of the business in the residential districts. Hence, it is recognized that under certain
circumstances billboards may be suppressed as an unlawful use of private property. Logically, it would seem that the
premise of fact relied upon is not very solid. Objections to the billboard upon police, sanitary, and moral grounds have
been, as pointed out by counsel for Churchill and Tait, duly considered by numerous high courts in the United States, and,
with one exception, have been rejected as without foundation. The exception is the Supreme Court of Missouri, which
advances practically the same line of reasoning as has the Illinois court in this recent case. (St. Louis Gunning Advt.
Co. vs. City of St. Louis, 137 S. W., 929.) In fact, the Illinois court, in Haller Sign Works vs. Physical Culture Training School
(249 Ill., 436), "distinguished" in the recent case, said: "There is nothing inherently dangerous to the health or safety of the
public in structures that are properly erected for advertising purposes."

If a billboard is so constructed as to offer no room for objections on sanitary or moral grounds, it would seem that the
ordinance above quoted would have to be sustained upon the very grounds which we have advanced in sustaining our own
statute.

It might be well to note that billboard legislation in the United States is attempting to eradicate a business which has
already been firmly established. This business was allowed to expand unchecked until its very extent called attention to its
objectionable features. In the Philippine Islands such legislation has almost anticipated the business, which is not yet of
such proportions that it can be said to be fairly established. It may be that the courts in the United States have committed
themselves to a course of decisions with respect to billboard advertising, the full consequences of which were not
perceived for the reason that the development of the business has been so recent that the objectionable features of it did
not present themselves clearly to the courts nor to the people. We, in this country, have the benefit of the experience of
the people of the United States and may make our legislation preventive rather than corrective. There are in this country,
moreover, on every hand in those districts where Spanish civilization has held sway for so many centuries, examples of
architecture now belonging to a past age, and which are attractive not only to the residents of the country but to visitors. If
the billboard industry is permitted without constraint or control to hide these historic sites from the passerby, the country
will be less attractive to the tourist and the people will suffer a district economic loss.

The motion for a rehearing is therefore denied.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, and Carson, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Higinio V. Catalan for Appellee.

Prila, Pardalis & Pejo for appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE; BUILDING PERMIT; UNDEFINED AND
UNLIMITED DELEGATION OF POWER. — Where an ordinance of a Municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any
standard to guide or limit the mayor’s action; expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit; enumerates no
conditions for its grant or refusal; and entirely lacks standards thus confering upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited
delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful. (People v. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil.
71; Schloss Poster Adv. Co., Inc. v. City of Rock Hill, Et Al., 2 SE [2d], pp. 394-395)

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN REASONABLE AND OPPRESSIVE. — A Municipal Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive if it
operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; it then oversteps the bounds of police
power without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of
neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the
interest of the general welfare and, in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to sight (Churchill and Tait v.
Rafferty, 32 Phil., 580), the State may not, under guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. To
legally achieve that result, the landowner should be given just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicting defendants-appellants Juan F. Fajardo
and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having
constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza.

It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the
municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a
written permit from the Municipal Mayor.

SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued.

SEC. 3. PENALTY — Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall make the violation liable to pay a fine
of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the
discretion of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be
removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house.

SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY — This ordinance shall take effect on its approval." (Orig. Recs., P. 3)

Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son-in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a
written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station
on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo’s name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by
a creek (Exh. D). On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building
would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for
a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with
the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house
having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property.

On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines
Sur, for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, which affirmed the
conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in
question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National
Highway to the said public plaza." From this decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter
forwarded the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.

We find that the appealed conviction can not stand.

A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that under it the mayor has absolute discretion to issue or
deny a permit. The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor’s action. No
purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed; no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not
merely a case of deficient standards; standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary
and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an undefined and
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid (People v. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Primicias
v. Fugoso, 80 Phil., 71; Schloss Poster Adv. Co. v. Rock Hill, 2 SE (2d) 392).

The ordinance in question in no way controls or guides the discretion vested thereby in the respondents. It prescribes no
uniform rule upon which the special permission of the city is to be granted. Thus the city is clothed with the uncontrolled
power to capriciously grant the privilege to some and deny it to others; to refuse the application of one landowner or
lessee and to grant that of another, when for all material purposes, the two are applying for precisely the same privileges
under the same circumstances. The danger of such an ordinance is that it makes possible arbitrary discriminations and
abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatever, other than the unregulated arbitrary will
of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested. Fundamental rights under our government do
not depend for their existence upon such a slender and uncertain thread. Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a
discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and
invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the
authorities cited above sustain this conclusion."cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x

"As was said in City of Richmond v. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112, 28 N. E. 312, 314 13 L. R. A. 587, 28 Am. St. Rep. 180: ‘It seems
from the foregoing authorities to be well established that municipal ordinances placing restrictions upon lawful conduct or
the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid, specify the rules and conditions to be observed in such conduct or
business; and must admit of the exercise of the privilege of all citizens alike who will comply with such rules and conditions;
and must not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of any arbitrary discrimination by the municipal
authorities between citizens who will so comply." (Schloss Poster Adv. Co., Inc. v. City of Rock Hill, Et Al., 2 SE (2d), pp. 394-
395).

It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can refuse a permit solely in case that the proposed building "destroys
the view of the public plaza or occupies any public property" (as stated in its section 3); and in fact, the refusal of the
Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to the appellant was predicated on the ground that the proposed building would
"destroy the view of the public plaza" by preventing its being seen from the public highway. Even thus interpreted, the
ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates — to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their
own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just
compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as
conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the general
welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait v. Rafferty, 32 Phil.
580), the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property
and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now
stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants’ land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the
ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would,
in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being
urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an
opportunity to be heard.

"An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes,
it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such
case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of
taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden." (Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR.
1110, 1116).

‘A regulation which substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of his property is confiscation and is a deprivation
within the meaning of the 14th Amendment." (Sundlum v. Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451; also Eaton v. Sweeny, 177 NE 412;
Taylor v. Jacksonville, 133 So. 114).

"Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it cannot be said to set aside such
property to a use but constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Use of property is an element of
ownership therein. Regardless of the opinion of zealots that property may properly, by zoning, be utterly destroyed without
compensation, such principle finds no support in the genius of our government nor in the principles of justice as we known
them. Such a doctrine shocks the sense of justice. If it be of public benefit that property remain open and unused, then
certainly the public, and not the private individuals, should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for such property
under the rules of law governing the condemnation of private property for public use. (Tews v. Woolhiser (1933) 352 111.
212, 185 N.E. 827) (Emphasis supplied.)

The validity of the ordinance in question was justified by the court below under section 2243, par. (c), of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended. This section provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The municipal council shall have authority to exercise
the following discretionary powers:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within
them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal
council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The
fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under the provisions of the section above quoted, however, the power of the municipal council to require the issuance of
building permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous parts of the town and prescribing the kinds of
buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them. As there is absolutely no showing in this case that the
municipal council had either established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings
to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not
conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c) aforequoted.

We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines
Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is therefore null and void. Hence, the conviction of herein
appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-
appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.

Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.

J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance
No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it
"unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be
reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.

The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and
general manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his
capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner
non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating
hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly
paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more than
P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as
Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).

After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being
beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground
that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the
challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would
impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in the
same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or
lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any
person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence,
wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the
nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex
would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a
certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound
together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open
for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional
and void again on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague,
indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-
incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance
of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and
laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion
which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of
Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels,
motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful
for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the
challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended
party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the
due process clause.

There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and
void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor
to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding the respondent
Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the
provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After
setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable
relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the
guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty
against self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law,
respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.

Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964,
which reads:

1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the
president and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all
having the capacity to sue and be sued;

2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila
charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for
the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;

3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita
districts in Manila;

4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on
June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent
regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of
Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor
(Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);

5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance (now
Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;

6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and
motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila.1äwphï1.ñët

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the
validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party
who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise
refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February
4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of
what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance
"null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and referring to the alleged
constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a
question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for
decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision
passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right
and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to
the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore,
null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain
him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.

As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance.
Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional
adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity
that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is
all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the
facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary
should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation.2

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere
better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American
Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned
deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the
specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such
factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation
of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due
process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is
immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, 4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs." 5 It would be,
to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to
be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. 6 Negatively
put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the
alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of
motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal
haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form,
prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory
provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the
increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than
legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that the
stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.`

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy
and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant; 8 provide a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of
public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days
other than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines; 14 and prohibiting any person from
keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise used, 15 all of
which are intended to protect public morals.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power,
which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and
other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty
or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guaranty may call for correction by the courts.

We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the question of due
process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell
its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase
Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official
action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. 17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of
officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic]
traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental
principles of our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or
phrases.21

It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking
body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that
what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the
face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case
must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such
character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance
even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such
features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain
particulars, its alleged vagueness.

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and
motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and
second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees
could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of
non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. 22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu
Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee
may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations
are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule,
declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might
otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount
of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been
upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared
unreasonable.23

Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the
American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court
had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and
municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for
public purposes, just and uniform.25

As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for
revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the
amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power
measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of
significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of
their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that
plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain
conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their
present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a
case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the
police power embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that
power."27

Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to
lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be
charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command
of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral
or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could
it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an
undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every
regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus:
"One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as
understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good
of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do
exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to
reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of
the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power." 28

A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law,
and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail
over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because
then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace
and order and happiness for all.29

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to
contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some
extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected
with public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider. 32 How justify then the
allegation of a denial of due process?

Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the principles of
vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the
alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however,
point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as
indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are
those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him at about the same time
or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the
maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which
from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease
thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance
void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General
Construction Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible
to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice
Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit
but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 35

That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and
determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it.
Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a
reversal of the appealed decision.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO,
ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but hear me first!" It is
this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.

The said executive order reads in full as follows:

WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;

WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against
inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the
disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.

(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President

Republic of the Philippines

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner
sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they
could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality
of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has
now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is
imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also
a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question raised
there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered
enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not,
as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an
entirely different matter.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions,
they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest
tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all
cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be
made in the first instance by these lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in
fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will
be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts
should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On
the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished
jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of
retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule
instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that
the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided
thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever
the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he
could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of
law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has
reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was
supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really
necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine
ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.

It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language
to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process
clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal
to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P.
Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary
because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and
immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity
of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as
the changing times and circumstances may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine
themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the
clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to
be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they
arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due
process — and in so doing sums it all up — as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of
fair play." 12

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth
not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law
of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark
of the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the
ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the
law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before
an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the
question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation
of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in
leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality.
A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the
vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed
with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial
system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of
law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power
of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the
famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who,
out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted
exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption
is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed
therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the
immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic
drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense
may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily
padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances,
previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or
the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained
by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for
the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described
as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing
taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him
even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically
everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as
long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not
only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater
number.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in
Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was
issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset
the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on
these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect
and preserve them.

A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been
convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the
Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate
killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the
reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient
famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had
spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held
that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was
required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition
of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes
was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of
such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy
the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and
dangerously affected.

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method
chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these
animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot
say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that
to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and
no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining
the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will
make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live
animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either
to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the
sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the
statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial
and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property
being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the
government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered
confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-
old guaranty of elementary fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary
action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the
exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit,
the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The
properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why
the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused
being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the
police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only
after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in
the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the
case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it
is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make
their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone
may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a
clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power
to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these
reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's
carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that
time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent
of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own
responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had
the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.

The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never
have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become a faitaccompli despite
its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump
boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed
without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever
they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and
impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned
to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the
petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988

CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY, Branch 11, and the CITY OF
BUTUAN, respondents-appellees.

Romeo B. Sanchez, Eduardo Deza Mercado and Wilfred D. Asis for petitioners.

The City Legal Officer for respondents-appeliees.

GANCAYCO, J.:

At issue in the petition for review before Us is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the
Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, the title and text of which are reproduced below:

ORDINANCE--640

ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF
SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES, CONTESTS OR OTHER
PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR
TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET

xxx xxx xxx

Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan in session assembled, that:

SECTION 1—It shall be unlawful for any person, group of persons, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of selling
admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require children
between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets intended for adults but should
charge only one-half of the value of the said tickets.

SECTION 2—Any person violating the provisions of this Ordinance shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not less
than TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) but not more than SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) or an imprisonment of not less
than TWO (2) MONTHS or not more than SIX (6) MONTHS or both such firm and imprisonment in the discretion of the
Court.

If the violator be a firm or corporation the penalty shall be imposed upon the Manager, Agent or Representative of such
firm or corporation.

SECTION 3—This ordinance shall take effect upon its approval.

Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown
Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively. Aggrieved by the effect of Ordinance No. 640, they filed a complaint
before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil Case No. 237 on June 30,
1969 praying, inter alia, that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. 1

Upon motion of the petitioners, 2 a temporary restraining order was issued on July 14, 1969 by the court a quo enjoining
the respondent City of Butuan and its officials from enforcing Ordinance No. 640. 3 On July 29, 1969, respondents filed their
answer sustaining the validity of the ordinance. 4

On January 30, 1973, the litigants filed their stipulation of facts. 5 On June 4, 1973, the respondent court rendered its
decision, 6 the dispositive part of which reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby adjudges in favor of the respondents and against the petitioners,
as follows:

1. Declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid: Provided, however, that the fine for a single
offense shall not exceed TWO HUNDRED PESOS, as prescribed in the aforequoted Section 15 (nn) of Rep. Act No. 523;

2. Dissolving the restraining order issued by this Court; and;

3. Dismissing the complaint, with costs against the petitioners.

4. SO ORDERED. 7

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration 8 of the decision of the court a quo which was denied in a resolution of
the said court dated November 10, 1973. 9

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid
exercise of police power.

Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in
Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523, the Charter of the City of Butuan, which states:

Sec. 15. General powers and duties of the Board — Except as otherwise provided by law, and subject to the conditions and
limitations thereof, the Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(n) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following; . . . theaters, theatrical performances,
cinematographs, public exhibitions and all other performances and places of amusements ...

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent City of Butuan, on the other hand, attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general
welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law, which provides:

(nn) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city
and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred
by this Act, and to fix the penalties for the violation of the ordinances, which shall not exceed a two hundred peso fine or
six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.

We can see from the aforecited Section 15(n) that the power to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for theaters,
theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and other places of amusement has been expressly granted to
the City of Butuan under its charter. But the question which needs to be resolved is this: does this power to regulate
include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement whether
under its general grant of power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City?

This is the first time this Court is confronted with the question of direct interference by the local government with the
operation of theaters, cinematographs and the like to the extent of fixing the prices of admission to these places. Previous
decisions of this Court involved the power to impose license fees upon businesses of this nature as a corollary to the power
of the local government to regulate them. Ordinances which required moviehouses or theaters to increase the price of
their admission tickets supposedly to cover the license fees have been held to be invalid for these impositions were
considered as not merely license fees but taxes for purposes of revenue and not regulation which the cities have no power
to exact, 10 unless expressly granted by its charter. 11

Applying the ruling in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 12 where the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power to
control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and amusement, the
Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the business shall be
exercised.

While in a New York case, 13 an ordinance which regulates the business of selling admission tickets to public exhibitions or
performances by virtue of the power of cities under the General City Law "to maintain order, enforce the laws, protect
property and preserve and care for the safety, health, comfort and general welfare of the inhabitants of the city and visitors
thereto; and for any of said purposes, to regulate and license occupations" was considered not to be within the scope of
any duty or power implied in the charter. It was held therein that the power of regulation of public exhibitions and places
of amusement within the city granted by the charter does not carry with it any authority to interfere with the price of
admission to such places or the resale of tickets or tokens of admission.

In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition
are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local
government. 14 Thus, in People v. Chan, 15 an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs from
selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power. Still in
another case, 16 the validity of an ordinance of the City of Bacolod prohibiting admission of two or more persons in
moviehouses and other amusement places with the use of only one ticket was sustained as a valid regulatory police
measure not only in the interest of preventing fraud in so far as municipal taxes are concerned but also in accordance with
public health, public safety, and the general welfare.
The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under its power to
regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the general welfare clause to
justify the enactment of said ordinance.

To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 17 The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive,
but is subject to the supervision of the courts. 18

Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive,
unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts,
considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission prices for general
admission, balcony and lodge.

In Homeowners' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Municipal Board of the City of Manila, 19 this Court held:

The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially police power, Inasmuch as the same generally entails a
curtailment of the liberty, the rights and/or the property of persons, which are protected and even guaranteed by the
Constitution, the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the
regard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of
the Constitution of Liberty, otherwise known as the Bill of Rights — the police power measure must be reasonable. In other
words, individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of police power to the extent only — and only to the
extent--that may be fairly required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

What is the reason behind the enactment of Ordinance No. 640?

A reading of the minutes of the regular session of the Municipal Board when the ordinance in question was passed shows
that a certain Councilor Calo, the proponent of the measure, had taken into account the complaints of parents that for
them to pay the full price of admission for their children is too financially burdensome.

The trial court advances the view that "even if the subject ordinance does not spell out its raison d'etre in all probability
the respondents were impelled by the awareness that children are entitled to share in the joys of their elders, but that
considering that, apart from size, children between the ages of seven and twelve cannot fully grasp the nuance of movies
or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances, the admission prices with respect to them ought to be
reduced. 19a

We must bear in mind that there must be public necessity which demands the adoption of proper measures to secure the
ends sought to be attained by the enactment of the ordinance, and the large discretion is necessarily vested in the
legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for
the protection of such interests. 20 The methods or means used to protect the public health, morals, safety or welfare,
must have some relation to the end in view, for under the guise of the police power, personal rights and those pertaining
to private property will not be permitted to be arbitralily invaded by the legislative department. 21

We agree with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes
and means.22 The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to
shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves, A reduction in the
price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear
the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise
penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its
implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years
of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not
provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth
certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We
can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover,
there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the
general welfare.

Respondent City of Butuan claims that it was impelled to protect the youth from the pernicious practice of movie operators
and other public exhibitions promoters or the like of demanding equal price for their admission tickets along with the
adults. This practice is allegedly repugnant and unconscionable to the interest of the City in the furtherance of the
prosperity, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and the general well-being of its inhabitants.
There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The petitioners are merely conducting
their legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture. There is
nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for both children and adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion
to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such performances.

Respondent City of Butuan claims that Ordinance No. 640 is reasonable and necessary to lessen the economic burden of
parents whose minor children are lured by the attractive nuisance being maintained by the petitioners. Respondent further
alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by movie house operators. We fail to see how the
children are exploited if they pay the full price of admission. They are treated with the same quality of entertainment as
the adults. The supposition of the trial court that because of their age children cannot fully grasp the nuances of such
entertainment as adults do fails to convince Us that the reduction in admission ticket price is justifiable. In fact, by the very
claim of respondent that movies and the like are attractive nuisances, it is difficult to comprehend why the municipal board
passed the subject ordinance. How can the municipal authorities consider the movies an attractive nuisance and yet
encourage parents and children to patronize them by lowering the price of admission for children? Perhaps, there is
some ,truth to the argument of petitioners that Ordinance No. 640 is detrimental to the public good and the general
welfare of society for it encourages children of tender age to frequent the movies, rather than attend to their studies in
school or be in their homes.

Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be discouraged from
exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the
ordinance and still earn profits for themselves. For after all, these movie house and theater operators cannot be compelled
to exhibit any particular kind of film except those films which may be dictated by public demand and those which are
restricted by censorship laws. So instead of children being able to share in the joys of their elders as envisioned by the trial
court, there will be a dearth of wholesome and educational movies for them to enjoy.

There are a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court and the various state courts of the United States which upheld
the right of the proprietor of a theater to fix the price of an admission ticket as against the right of the state to interfere in
this regard and which We consider applicable to the case at bar.

A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater or it
may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the
theater and observe the performance on condition that he behaves properly. 23 Such ticket, therefore, represents a right,
Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right
of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in
the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to
sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain. 24 So that an act prohibiting the sale of tickets to theaters or
other places of amusement at more than the regular price was held invalid as conflicting with the state constitution
securing the right of property. 25

In Collister vs. Hayman, 26 it was held:

The defendants were conducting a private business, which, even if clothed with a public interest, was without a franchise
to accommodate the public, and they had the right to control it, the same as the proprietors of any other business, subject
to such obligations as were placed upon them by statute. Unlike a carrier of passengers, for instance, with a franchise from
the state, and hence under obligation to transport anyone who applies and to continue the business year in and year out,
the proprietors of a theater can open and close their place at will, and no one can make a lawful complaint. They can
charge what they choose for admission to their theater. They can limit the number admitted. They can refuse to sell tickets
and collect the price of admission at the door. They can preserve order and enforce quiet while the performance is going
on. They can make it a part of the contract and condition of admission, by giving due notice and printing the condition in
the ticket that no one shall be admitted under 21 years of age, or that men only or women only shall be admitted, or that a
woman cannot enter unless she is accompanied by a male escort, and the like. The proprietors, in the control of their
business, may regulate the terms of admission in any reasonable way. If those terms are not satisfactory, no one is obliged
to buy a ticket or make the contract. If the terms are satisfactory, and the contract is made, the minds of the parties meet
upon the condition, and the purchaser impliedly promises to perform it.

In Tyson and Bro. — United Theater Ticket Officers, Inc. vs. Banton, 27 the United States Supreme Court held:

... And certainly a place of entertainment is in no legal sense a public utility; and quite as certainly, its activities are not such
that their enjoyment can be regarded under any conditions from the point of view of an emergency.

The interest of the public in theaters and other places of entertainment may be more nearly, and with better reason,
assimilated to the like interest in provision stores and markets and in the rental of houses and apartments for residence
purposes; although in importance it fails below such an interest in the proportion that food and shelter are of more
moment than amusement or instruction. As we have shown there is no legislative power to fix the prices of provisions or
clothing, or the rental charges for houses and apartments, in the absence of some controlling emergency; and we are
unable to perceive any dissimilarities of such quality or degree as to justify a different rule in respect of amusements and
entertainment ...

We are in consonance with the foregoing observations and conclusions of American courts. In this jurisdiction, legislation
had been passed controlling the prices of goods commodities and drugs during periods of emergency, 28limiting the net
profits of public utility 29 as well as regulating rentals of residential apartments for a limited period, 30as a matter of national
policy in the interest of public health and safety, economic security and the general welfare of the people. And these laws
cannot be impugned as unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

However, the same could not be said of theaters, cinematographs and other exhibitions. In no sense could these
businesses be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with the
admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with
public interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as a medium for the
communication of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by our people of issues and
public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable. 31People of all ages flock to movie
houses, games and other public exhibitions for recreation and relaxation. The government realizing their importance has
seen it fit to enact censorship laws to regulate the movie industry. 32 Their aesthetic entertainment and even educational
values cannot be underestimated. Even police measures regulating the operation of these businesses have been upheld in
order to safeguard public health and safety.

Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power, the same must be resolved
in the negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the
bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting
to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under
the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. 33 A police measure for the
regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise
by the citizens of their property rights. 34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is
an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the
proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think
most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away. 36

Respondent City of Butuan argues that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the ordinance. This maybe the
rule but it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the
ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face
of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. 37 The exercise of police power by the local government is valid
unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. 38

Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its
face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted
and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of
trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,

vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, respondents.

Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.

R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations
angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth.
Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as
an affront to the welfare of the city.

The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its
operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation,
Inc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there
during the Christmas season.

The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted
Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:

ORDINANCE NO. 3353

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY
ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION
OF CASINO.

BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro, in session assembled that:

Sec. 1. — That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no
business permit shall be issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the operation of casino within the city limits.

Sec. 2. — That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any persons, partnership or corporation to use its
business establishment or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for casino operation and other gambling
activities.

Sec. 3. — PENALTIES. — Any violation of such existing business permit as defined in the preceding section shall suffer the
following penalties, to wit:

a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for the first offense and a fine of P1,000.00/day

b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for the second offense, and a fine of P3,000.00/day

c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and imprisonment of One (1) year, for the third and subsequent offenses.

Sec. 4. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication thereof.

Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows:

ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.

WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295;

WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the
establishment of CASINO;
WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and
to cancel existing Business Permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion
thereof for the operation of CASINO;

WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and
under Art. 99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local Government Code, the City Council as the
Legislative Body shall enact measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and general welfare of the people
and/or regulate or prohibit such activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social and moral
welfare of the community;

NOW THEREFORE,

BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:

Sec. 1. — The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby prohibited.

Sec. 2. — Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following penalties:

a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor, partnership or corporation undertaking the
operation, conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof;

b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at
the discretion of the court against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person responsible in the establishment, conduct
and maintenance of gambling CASINO.

Sec. 3. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in a local newspaper of general circulation.

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental
petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued
the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993. 2

Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 3 They
aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that:

1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro does not have the power and authority
to prohibit the establishment and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the City's territorial limits.

2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) — (v) of R.A. 7160
could only mean "illegal gambling."

3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore invalid on that point.

4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that
point.

5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the general powers and purposes of the
instrumentality concerned and inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.

6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA
53 in disposing of the issues presented in this present case.

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos
on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation, 4 this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the
national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs.

Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in
the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare
Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:

Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity
and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort
and convenience of their inhabitants.

In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:

Sec. 458. — Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of
the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided
for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this
connection, shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public
places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gamblingand other
prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of
drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials
or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;

This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and businesses within their territorial limits
in the interest of the general welfare. 5

The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos
because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and
even by the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds
of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos
may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them
within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government Code.

It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25,
and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the
nation. In giving the local government units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social problems, the
Local Government Code has recognized the competence of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best
expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of the State.

The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local government units to prevent and suppress
gambling and other prohibited games of chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant allforms of gambling
without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from
the scope of their power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done. The
fact that it did not do so simply means that the local government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling
within their territories, including the operation of casinos.

The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The
Code is not only a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them.
More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not
conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follows:

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations,
or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the
doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal
interpretation in favor of the local government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically provides:

Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:

(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any
question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;

xxx xxx xxx

(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government
units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and
several decisions of this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State
policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the old case
of U.S. v. Salaveria,7 which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The petitioners decry
the immorality of gambling. They also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a martial law instrument")
in creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines."

This is the opportune time to stress an important point.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to
the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that
matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own
discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of
gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but
permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this
Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of
conflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom,
morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and
executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever
way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately
judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.

The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93
as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law
and not by our own convictions on the propriety of gambling.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance must
conform to the following substantive requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to
prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes
games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in
claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is
clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given
the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is
associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling
which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.

We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous efforts
of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more
than short shrift from this Court.

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein
insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The
petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for
an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the Local
Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been,
not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino
over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is
permissible because one law can change or repeal another law.

It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree has only been "modifiedpro
tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code
has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only
prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of
the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units have now no
choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under
this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by
the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR
cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its
powers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos.

It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the
provision which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code.
Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced below, will disclose
the omission:

Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code," Executive
Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.

(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances
related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.

(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of
Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential
Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed
and rendered of no force and effect.

(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects.

(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this
Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended;
Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of
Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations,
or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 10 this Court explained:

The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption that if the act of later date clearly
reveals an intention on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect; but
there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending rule of statutory
construction that the intention to repeal a former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two
statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question arises bear to each other the relation of general to special.

There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent points out,
PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of
Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes,
and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two
statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact
been improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government.

It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive
confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect
as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the
Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if
possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local
Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their
territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the
Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually complementary.

This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by
law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The
petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between
these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following this theory,
the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery
as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A.
983.

In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the
ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character
and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance
despite the prohibition of gambling in general.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments
are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they
have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into
them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge
and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can
suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the
State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation
themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. 11

This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we
here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than
under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes
the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment
on the local government units of the power to tax, 12 which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large,
however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or
violate it.

The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their constituents and their
apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view
that "the hope of large or easy gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman" 13 and that "habitual
gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The social scourge of gambling must be
stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit." George Washington called gambling "the child of
avarice, the brother of iniquity and the father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the legislature to
decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the
Local Government Code. That decision can be revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the Constitution as the
touchstone of all official acts. We do not find such contravention here.

We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local
Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling
prohibited by law.

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a
mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance
No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy
announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with
costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 94-8729

TINA B. BENNIS, PETITIONER v. MICHIGAN

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of michigan

[March 4, 1996]

Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner was a joint owner, with her husband, of an automobile in which her husband engaged in sexual activity with a
prostitute. A Michigan court ordered the automobile forfeited as a public nuisance, with no offset for her interest,
notwithstanding her lack of knowledge of her husband's activity. We hold that the Michigan court order did not offend the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Detroit police arrested John Bennis after observing him engaged in a sexual act with a prostitute in the automobile while it
was parked on a Detroit city street. Bennis was convicted of gross indecency. [n.1] The State then sued both Bennis and his
wife, petitioner Tina B. Bennis, to have the car declared a public nuisance and abated as such under §§600.3801 [n.2] and
600.3825 [n.3] of Michigan's Compiled Laws.

Petitioner defended against the abatement of her interest in the car on the ground that, when she entrusted her husband
to use the car, she did not know that he would use it to violate Michigan's indecency law. The Wayne County Circuit Court
rejected this argument, declared the car a public nuisance, and ordered the car's abatement. In reaching this disposition,
the trial court judge recognized the remedial discretion he had under Michigan's case law. App. 21. He took into account
the couple's ownership of "another automobile," so they would not be left "without transportation." Id., at 25. He also
mentioned his authority to order the payment of one half of the sale proceeds, after the deduction of costs, to "the
innocent co title holder." Id., at 21. He declined to order such a division of sale proceeds in this case because of the age and
value of the car (an 11 year old Pontiac sedan recently purchased by John and Tina Bennis for $600); he commented in this
regard: "[T]here's practically nothing left minus costs in a situation such as this." Id., at 25.

The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that regardless of the language of Michigan Compiled Law
§600.3815(2), [n.4] Michigan Supreme Court precedent interpreting this section prevented the State from abating
petitioner's interest absent proof that she knew to what end the car would be used. Alternatively, the intermediate
appellate court ruled that the conduct in question did not qualify as a public nuisance because only one occurrence was
shown and there was no evidence of payment for the sexual act. 200 Mich. App. 670, 504 N. W. 2d 731 (1993).

The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the abatement in its entirety. 447 Mich. 719,
527 N. W. 2d 483 (1994). It concluded as a matter of state law that the episode in the Bennis vehicle was an abatable
nuisance. Rejecting the Court of Appeals' interpretation of §600.3815(2), the court then announced that, in order to abate
an owner's interest in a vehicle, Michigan does not need to prove that the owner knew or agreed that her vehicle would be
used in a manner proscribed by §600.3801 when she entrusted it to another user. Id., at 737, 527 N. W. 2d, at 492. The
court next addressed petitioner's federal constitutional challenges to the State's abatement scheme: The court assumed
that petitioner did not know of or consent to the misuse of the Bennis car, and concluded in light of our decisions in Van
Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465(1926), and Calero Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), that Michigan's
failure to provide an innocent owner defense was "without constitutional consequence." 447 Mich., at 740-741, 527 N. W.
2d, at 493-494. The Michigan Supreme Court specifically noted that, in its view, an owner's interest may not be abated
when "a vehicle is used without the owner's consent." Id., at 742, n. 36, 527 N. W. 2d, at 495, n. 36. Furthermore, the court
confirmed the trial court's description of the nuisance abatement proceeding as an "equitable action," and considered it
"critical" that the trial judge so comprehended the statute. Id., at 742, 527 N. W. 2d, at 495.

We granted certiorari in order to determine whether Michigan's abatement scheme has deprived petitioner of her interest
in the forfeited car without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, or has taken her interest for public use
without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. 515 U. S. ___
(1995). We affirm.

The gravamen of petitioner's due process claim is not that she was denied notice or an opportunity to contest the
abatement of her car; she was accorded both. Compare United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. ___
(1993). Rather, she claims she was entitled to contest the abatement by showing she did not know her husband would use
it to violate Michigan's indecency law. But a long and unbroken line of cases holds that an owner's interest in property may
be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be put to
such use.
Our earliest opinion to this effect is Justice Story's opinion for the Court in The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1 (1827). The Palmyra,
which had been commissioned as a privateer by the King of Spain and had attacked a United States vessel, was captured by
a United States war ship and brought into Charleston, South Carolina, for adjudication. Id., at 8. On the Government's
appeal from the Circuit Court's acquittal of the vessel, it was contended by the owner that the vessel could not be forfeited
until he was convicted for the privateering. The Court rejected this contention, explaining: "The thing is here primarily
considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing." Id., at 14. In another admiralty
forfeiture decision 17 years later, Justice Story wrote for the Court that in in rem admiralty proceedings "the acts of the
master and crew . . . bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty; and he impliedly submits
to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship by reason of their unlawful or wanton
wrongs." Harmony v. United States, 2 How. 210, 234 (1844) (emphasis added).

In Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1878), this Court upheld the forfeiture of property used by a lessee
in fraudulently avoiding federal alcohol taxes, observing: "Cases often arise where the property of the owner is forfeited on
account of the fraud, neglect, or misconduct of those intrusted with its possession, care, and custody, even when the
owner is otherwise without fault . . . and it has always been held . . . that the acts of [the possessors] bind the interest of
the owner . . . whether he be innocent or guilty."

In Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926), this Court upheld the forfeiture of a purchaser's interest in a car misused by the
seller. Van Oster purchased an automobile from a dealer but agreed that the dealer might retain possession for use in its
business. The dealer allowed an associate to use the automobile, and the associate used it for the illegal transportation of
intoxicating liquor. Id., at 465-466. The State brought a forfeiture action pursuant to a Kansas statute, and Van Oster
defended on the ground that the transportation of the liquor in the car was without her knowledge or authority. This Court
rejected Van Oster's claim:

"It is not unknown or indeed uncommon for the law to visit upon the owner of property the unpleasant consequences of
the unauthorized action of one to whom he has entrusted it. Much of the jurisdiction in admiralty, so much of the statute
and common law of liens as enables a mere bailee to subject the bailed property to a lien, the power of a vendor of
chattels in possession to sell and convey good title to a stranger, are familiar examples. . . . They suggest that certain uses of
property may be regarded as so undesirable that the owner surrenders his control at his peril. . . .

"It has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property entrusted by the innocent owner or lienor to another who
uses it in violation of the revenue laws of the United States is not a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment." Id., at 467-468.

The Van Oster Court relied on J. W. Goldsmith, Jr. Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921), in which the Court upheld
the forfeiture of a seller's interest in a car misused by the purchaser. The automobile was forfeited after the purchaser
transported bootleg distilled spirits in it, and the selling dealership lost the title retained as security for unpaid purchase
money. Id., at 508-509. The Court discussed the arguments for and against allowing the forfeiture of the interest of an
owner who was "without guilt," id., at 510, and concluded that "whether the reason for [the challenged forfeiture scheme]
be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced," id.,
at 511. [n.5]

In Calero Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), the most recent decision on point, the Court reviewed
the same cases discussed above, and concluded that "the innocence of the owner of property subject to forfeiture has
almost uniformly been rejected as a defense." Id., at 683. Petitioner is in the same position as the various owners involved
in the forfeiture cases beginning with The Palmyra in 1827. She did not know that her car would be used in an illegal
activity that would subject it to forfeiture. But under these cases the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not protect her interest against forfeiture by the government.

Petitioner relies on a passage from Calero Toledo, that "it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of . . . an
owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all
that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property." 416 U. S., at 689. But she concedes that
this comment was obiter dictum, and "[i]t is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that we must
attend." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U. S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 4). And the holding of Calero
Toledo on this point was that the interest of a yacht rental company in one of its leased yachts could be forfeited because
of its use for transportation of controlled substances, even though the company was " `in no way . . . involved in the
criminal enterprise carried on by [the] lessee' and `had no knowledge that its property was being used in connection with
or in violation of [Puerto Rican Law].' " 416 U. S., at 668. Petitioner has made no showing beyond that here.

The dissent argues that our cases treat contraband differently from instrumentalities used to convey contraband, like cars:
Objects in the former class are forfeitable "however blameless or unknowing their owners may be," post, at 2, but with
respect to an instrumentality in the latter class, an owner's innocence is no defense only to the "principal use being made
of that property," id., at 4. However, this Court's precedent has never made the due process inquiry depend on whether
the use for which the instrumentality was forfeited was the principal use. If it had, perhaps cases like Calero Toledo, in
which Justice Douglas noted in dissent that there was no showing that the "yacht had been notoriously used in smuggling
drugs . . . and so far as we know only one marihuana cigarette was found on the yacht," 416 U. S., at 693 (opinion
dissenting in part), might have been decided differently.

The dissent also suggests that The Palmyra line of cases "would justify the confiscation of an ocean liner just because one
of its passengers sinned while on board." Post, at 5. None of our cases have held that an ocean liner may be confiscated
because of the activities of one passenger. We said in Goldsmith Grant, and we repeat here, that "[w]hen such application
shall be made it will be time enough to pronounce upon it." 254 U. S., at 512.

Notwithstanding this well established authority rejecting the innocent owner defense, petitioner argues that we should in
effect overrule it by importing a culpability requirement from cases having at best a tangential relation to the "innocent
owner" doctrine in forfeiture cases. She cites Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), for the proposition that a criminal
defendant may not be punished for a crime if he is found to be not guilty. She also argues that our holding
in Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. ___ (1993), that the Excessive Fines Clause [n.6] limits the scope of civil forfeiture
judgments, "would be difficult to reconcile with any rule allowing truly innocent persons to be punished by civil forfeiture."
Brief for Petitioner 18-19, n. 12.

In Foucha the Court held that a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity in a criminal trial could not be thereafter
confined indefinitely by the State without a showing that he was either dangerous or mentally ill. Petitioner argues that our
statement that in those circumstances a State has no "punitive interest" which would justify continued detention, 504 U. S.,
at 80, requires that Michigan demonstrate a punitive interest in depriving her of her interest in the forfeited car. But,
putting aside the extent to which a forfeiture proceeding is "punishment" in the first place, Foucha did not purport to
discuss, let alone overrule, The Palmyra line of cases.

In Austin, the Court held that because "forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the owner," forfeiture proceedings are
subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines. 509 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15).
There was no occasion in that case to deal with the validity of the "innocent owner defense," other than to point out that if
a forfeiture statute allows such a defense, the defense is additional evidence that the statute itself is "punitive" in
motive. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14-15). In this case, however, Michigan's Supreme Court emphasized with respect to the
forfeiture proceeding at issue: "It is not contested that this is an equitable action," in which the trial judge has discretion to
consider "alternatives [to] abating the entire interest in the vehicle." 447 Mich., at 742, 527 N. W. 2d, at 495.

In any event, for the reasons pointed out in Calero Toledo and Van Oster, forfeiture also serves a deterrent purpose distinct
from any punitive purpose. Forfeiture of property prevents illegal uses "both by preventing further illicit use of the
[property] and by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable." Calero Toledo, supra, at
687. This deterrent mechanism is hardly unique to forfeiture. For instance, because Michigan also deters dangerous driving
by making a motor vehicle owner liable for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a driver who had the owner's consent
to use it, petitioner was also potentially liable for her husband's use of the car in violation of Michigan negligence law.
Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. §257.401 (1990). "The law thus builds a secondary defense against a forbidden use and precludes
evasions by dispensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry as to collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged
innocent owner." Van Oster, 272 U. S., at 467-468.

Petitioner also claims that the forfeiture in this case was a taking of private property for public use in violation of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. But if the forfeiture
proceeding here in question did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the property in the automobile was transferred by
virtue of that proceeding from petitioner to the State. The government may not be required to compensate an owner for
property which it has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental authority other than the power of
eminent domain. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492 (1973); see United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 125 (1967).

At bottom, petitioner's claims depend on an argument that the Michigan forfeiture statute is unfair because it relieves
prosecutors from the burden of separating co owners who are complicit in the wrongful use of property from innocent co
owners. This argument, in the abstract, has considerable appeal, as we acknowledged in Goldsmith Grant, 254 U. S., at 510.
Its force is reduced in the instant case, however, by the Michigan Supreme Court's confirmation of the trial court's remedial
discretion, see supra, at 4, and petitioner's recognition that Michigan may forfeit her and her husband's car whether or not
she is entitled to an offset for her interest in it, Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, 9.

We conclude today, as we concluded 75 years ago, that the cases authorizing actions of the kind at issue are "too firmly
fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced." Goldsmith Grant, supra, at 511. The
State here sought to deter illegal activity that contributes to neighborhood deterioration and unsafe streets. The Bennis
automobile, it is conceded, facilitated and was used in criminal activity. Both the trial court and the Michigan Supreme
Court followed our longstanding practice, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan is therefore

Affirmed.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CRUZAN, by her parents and co-guardians, CRUZAN et ux. v. DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH, et al.

certiorari to the supreme court of missouri

No.881503. Argued December 6, 1989 — Decided June 25, 1990

Petitioner Nancy Cruzan is incompetent, having sustained severe injuries in an automobile accident, and now lies in a
Missouri state hospital in what is referred to as a persistent vegetative state: generally, a condition in which a person
exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function. The State is bearing the cost of her care.
Hospital employees refused, without court approval, to honor the request of Cruzan's parents, co-petitioners here, to
terminate her artificial nutrition and hydration, since that would result in death. A state trial court authorized the
termination, finding that a person in Cruzan's condition has a fundamental right under the State and Federal Constitutions
to direct or refuse the withdrawal of death-prolonging procedures, and that Cruzan's expression to a former housemate
that she would not wish to continue her life if sick or injured unless she could live at least halfway normally suggested that
she would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration. The State Supreme Court reversed. While recognizing
a right to refuse treatment embodied in the common-law doctrine of informed consent, the court questioned its
applicability in this case. It also declined to read into the State Constitution a broad right to privacy that would support an
unrestricted right to refuse treatment and expressed doubt that the Federal Constitution embodied such a right. The court
then decided that the State Living Will statute embodied a state policy strongly favoring the preservation of life, and that
Cruzan's statements to her housemate were unreliable for the purpose of determining her intent. It rejected the argument
that her parents were entitled to order the termination of her medical treatment, concluding that no person can assume
that choice for an incompetent in the absence of the formalities required by the Living Will statute or clear and convincing
evidence of the patient's wishes.

1. The United States Constitution does not forbid Missouri to require that evidence of an incompetent's wishes as to the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Pp.520.

(a) Most state courts have based a right to refuse treatment on the common-law right to informed consent, see, e.g., In re
Storar, 52 N. Y. 2d 363, 420 N. E. 2d 64, or on both that right and a constitutional privacy right, see, e.g., Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saike wicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N. E. 2d 417. In addition to relying on state constitutions and
the common law, state courts have also turned to state statutes for guidance, see, e.g., Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal.
App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840. However, these sources are not available to this Court, where the question is simply
whether the Federal Constitution prohibits Missouri from choosing the rule of law which it did. Pp.513.

(b) A competent person has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing unwanted medical treatment.
Cf., e.g., Jacob son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 2430. However, the question whether that constitutional right has been
violated must be determined by balancing the liberty interest against relevant state interests. For purposes of this case, it is
assumed that a competent person would have a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition. This does not mean that an incompetent person should possess the same right, since such a person is unable to
make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise that hypothetical right or any other right. While Missouri has in effect
recognized that under certain circumstances a surrogate may act for the patient in electing to withdraw hydration and
nutrition and thus cause death, it has established a procedural safeguard to assure that the surrogate's action conforms as
best it may to the wishes expressed by the patient while competent. Pp.1416.

(c) It is permissible for Missouri, in its proceedings, to apply a clear and convincing evidence standard, which is an
appropriate standard when the individual interests at stake are both particularly important and more substantial than mere
loss of money, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756. Here, Missouri has a general interest in the protection and
preservation of human life, as well as other, more particular interests, at stake. It may legitimately seek to safeguard the
personal element of an individual's choice between life and death. The State is also entitled to guard against potential
abuses by surrogates who may not act to protect the patient. Similarly, it is entitled to consider that a judicial proceeding
regarding an incompetent's wishes may not be adversarial, with the added guarantee of accurate factfinding that the
adversary process brings with it. The State may also properly decline to make judgments about the "quality" of a particular
individual's life and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against the
constitutionally protected interests of the individual. It is self-evident that these interests are more substantial, both on an
individual and societal level, than those involved in a common civil dispute. The clear and convincing evidence standard
also serves as a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants. Missouri may
permissibly place the increased risk of an erroneous decision on those seeking to terminate life-sustaining treatment. An
erroneous decision not to terminate results in a maintenance of the status quo, with at least the potential that a wrong
decision will eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated by an event such as an advancement in medical science or the
patient's unexpected death. However, an erroneous decision to withdraw such treatment is not susceptible of correction.
Although Missouri's proof requirement may have frustrated the effectuation of Cruzan's not-fully-expressed desires, the
Constitution does not require general rules to work flawlessly. Pp.1620.
2. The State Supreme Court did not commit constitutional error in concluding that the evidence adduced at trial did not
amount to clear and convincing proof of Cruzan's desire to have hydration and nutrition withdrawn. The trial court had not
adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard, and Cruzan's observations that she did not want to live life as a
"vegetable" did not deal in terms with withdrawal of medical treatment or of hydration and nutrition. Pp.2021.

3. The Due Process Clause does not require a State to accept the "substituted judgment" of close family members in the
absence of substantial proof that their views reflect the patient's. This Court's decision upholding a State's favored
treatment of traditional family relationships, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. , may not be turned into a constitutional
requirement that a State must recognize the primacy of these relationships in a situation like this. Nor may a decision
upholding a State's right to permit family decisionmaking, Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, be turned into a constitutional
requirement that the State recognize such decisionmaking. Nancy Cruzan's parents would surely be qualified to exercise
such a right of "substituted judgment" were it required by the Constitution. However, for the same reasons that Missouri
may require clear and convincing evidence of a patient's wishes, it may also choose to defer only to those wishes rather
than confide the decision to close family members. Pp.2122.

760 S. W. 2d 408, affirmed.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 157036. June 9, 2004]

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; DIRECTOR
GENERAL HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE PNP, et al., respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation. The maintenance of peace and order [1] and
the protection of the people against violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be
construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties.

Before us is a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence [2] (Guidelines) issued on January 31, 2003, by
respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).

The facts are undisputed:

In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP stressing the need
for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief,
respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR), thus:

THERE IS ALSO NEED TO FOCUS ON THE HIGH PROFILE CRIMES THAT TEND TO DISTURB THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERIMETERS
OF THE COMMUNITY THE LATEST BEING THE KILLING OF FORMER NPA LEADER ROLLY KINTANAR. I UNDERSTAND WE
ALREADY HAVE THE IDENTITY OF THE CULPRIT. LET US BRING THEM TO THE BAR OF JUSTICE.

THE NPA WILL FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT THEIR PLOTS IF OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CAN RID
THEMSELVES OF RASCALS IN UNIFORM, AND ALSO IF WE ENFORCE A GUN BAN IN PUBLIC PLACES.

THUS, I AM DIRECTING THE PNP CHIEF TO SUSPEND INDEFINITELY THE ISSUANCE OF PERMIT TO CARRY FIREARMS IN
PUBLIC PLACES. THE ISSUANCE OF PERMITS WILL NOW BE LIMITED ONLY TO OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF GUNS
AND NOT TO CARRYING THEM IN PUBLIC PLACES. FROM NOW ON, ONLY THE UNIFORMED MEN IN THE MILITARY AND
AUTHORIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS CAN CARRY FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES, AND ONLY PURSUANT TO
EXISTING LAW.CIVILIAN OWNERS MAY NO LONGER BRING THEIR FIREARMS OUTSIDE THEIR RESIDENCES. THOSE WHO
WANT TO USE THEIR GUNS FOR TARGET PRACTICE WILL BE GIVEN SPECIAL AND TEMPORARY PERMITS FROM TIME TO
TIME ONLY FOR THAT PURPOSE. AND THEY MAY NOT LOAD THEIR GUNS WITH BULLETS UNTIL THEY ARE IN THE
PREMISES OF THE FIRING RANGE.

WE CANNOT DISREGARD THE PARAMOUNT NEED FOR LAW AND ORDER. JUST AS WE CANNOT BE HEEDLESS OF OUR
PEOPLES ASPIRATIONS FOR PEACE.

Acting on President Arroyos directive, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines quoted as follows:

TO : All Concerned

FROM : Chief, PNP

SUBJECT : Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence.

DATE : January 31, 2003

1. Reference: PD 1866 dated June 29, 1983 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

2. General:

The possession and carrying of firearms outside of residence is a privilege granted by the State to its citizens for their
individual protection against all threats of lawlessness and security.

As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license, special permit, certificate of registration or MR) are
prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of residence. However, the Chief, Philippine National Police may, in
meritorious cases as determined by him and under conditions as he may impose, authorize such person or persons to carry
firearms outside of residence.

3. Purposes:

This Memorandum prescribes the guidelines in the implementation of the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of
residence as provided for in the Implementing Rules and Regulations, Presidential Decree No. 1866, dated June 29, 1983
and as directed by PGMA. It also prescribes the conditions, requirements and procedures under which exemption from the
ban may be granted.

4. Specific Instructions on the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms:

a. All PTCFOR are hereby revoked. Authorized holders of licensed firearms covered with valid PTCFOR may re-apply for a
new PTCFOR in accordance with the conditions hereinafter prescribed.

b. All holders of licensed or government firearms are hereby prohibited from carrying their firearms outside their
residence except those covered with mission/letter orders and duty detail orders issued by competent authority
pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that the said exception shall pertain only to organic and regular
employees.

5. The following persons may be authorized to carry firearms outside of residence.

a. All persons whose application for a new PTCFOR has been approved, provided, that the persons and security of those so
authorized are under actual threat, or by the nature of their position, occupation and profession are under imminent
danger.

b. All organic and regular employees with Mission/Letter Orders granted by their respective agencies so authorized
pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such Mission/Letter Orders is valid only for the duration of the official
mission which in no case shall be more than ten (10) days.

c. All guards covered with Duty Detail Orders granted by their respective security agencies so authorized pursuant to
Section 4, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such DDO shall in no case exceed 24-hour duration.

d. Members of duly recognized Gun Clubs issued Permit to Transport (PTT) by the PNP for purposes of practice and
competition, provided, that such firearms while in transit must not be loaded with ammunition and secured in an
appropriate box or case detached from the person.

e. Authorized members of the Diplomatic Corps.

6. Requirements for issuance of new PTCFOR:

a. Written request by the applicant addressed to Chief, PNP stating his qualification to possess firearm and the reasons why
he needs to carry firearm outside of residence.

b. Xerox copy of current firearm license duly authenticated by Records Branch, FED;

c. Proof of actual threat, the details of which should be issued by the Chief of Police/Provincial or City Directors and duly
validated by C, RIID;

d. Copy of Drug Test Clearance, duly authenticated by the Drug Testing Center, if photocopied;

e. Copy of DI/ RIID clearance, duly authenticated by ODI/RIID, if photocopied;

f. Copy of Neuro-Psychiatric Clearance duly authenticated by NP Testing Center, if photocopied;

g. Copy of Certificate of Attendance to a Gun Safety Seminar, duly validated by Chief, Operations Branch, FED;

h. NBI Clearance;

i. Two (2) ID pictures (2 x 2) taken not earlier than one (1) year from date of filing of application; and

j. Proof of Payment

7. Procedures:

a. Applications may be filed directly to the Office of the PTCFOR Secretariat in Camp Crame. In the provinces, the
applications may also be submitted to the Police Regional Offices (PROs) and Provincial/City Police Offices (P/CPOs) for
initial processing before they are forwarded to the office of the PTCFOR Secretariat. The processors, after ascertaining that
the documentary requirements are in order, shall issue the Order of Payment (OP) indicating the amount of fees payable by
the applicant, who in turn shall pay the fees to the Land Bank.

b. Applications, which are duly processed and prepared in accordance with existing rules and regulations, shall be
forwarded to the OCPNP for approval.

c. Upon approval of the application, OCPNP will issue PTCFOR valid for one (1) year from date of issue.

d. Applications for renewal of PTCFOR shall be processed in accordance with the provisions of par. 6 above.
e. Application for possession and carrying of firearms by diplomats in the Philippines shall be processed in accordance with
NHQ PNP Memo dated September 25, 2000, with Subj: Possession and Carrying of Firearms by Diplomats in the
Philippines.

8. Restrictions in the Carrying of Firearms:

a. The firearm must not be displayed or exposed to public view, except those authorized in uniform and in the performance
of their official duties.

b. The firearm shall not be brought inside public drinking and amusement places, and all other commercial or public
establishments.

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request
was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo,
as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division. He anchored his petition
on the following grounds:

THE PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY MUCH LESS BY A MERE SPEECH TO ALTER, MODIFY OR AMEND THE LAW
ON FIREARMS BY IMPOSING A GUN BAN AND CANCELING EXISTING PERMITS FOR GUNS TO BE CARRIED OUTSIDE
RESIDENCES.

II

OFFICIALLY, THERE IS NO PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCE ON THE GUN BAN; THE PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH NEVER INVOKED POLICE
POWER TO JUSTIFY THE GUN BAN; THE PRESIDENTS VERBAL DECLARATION ON GUN BAN VIOLATED THE PEOPLES RIGHT TO
PROTECT LIFE AND THEIR PROPERTY RIGHT TO CARRY FIREARMS.

III

THE PNP CHIEF HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE QUESTIONED GUIDELINES BECAUSE:

1) THERE IS NO LAW, STATUTE OR EXECUTIVE ORDER WHICH GRANTS THE PNP CHIEF THE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE
THE PNP GUIDELINES.

2) THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF PD 1866 CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF ANOTHER SET OF
IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES.

3) THE PRESIDENTS SPEECH CANNOT BE A BASIS FOR THE PROMULGATION OF IMPLEMENTNG GUIDELINES ON THE GUN
BAN.

IV

ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP GUIDELINES IMPLEMENT PD 1866, AND THE AMENDMENTS THERETO, THE PNP
CHIEF STILL HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE SAME BECAUSE

1) PER SEC 6, RA 8294, WHICH AMENDS PD 1866, THE IRR SHALL BE PROMULGATED JOINTLY BY THE DOJ AND THE DILG.

2) SEC. 8, PD 1866 STATES THAT THE IRR SHALL BE PROMULGATED BY THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY.

THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION BECAUSE:

1) THE RIGHT TO OWN AND CARRY A FIREARM IS NECESSARILY INTERTWINED WITH THE PEOPLES INHERENT RIGHT TO LIFE
AND TO PROTECT LIFE. THUS, THE PNP GUIDELINES DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF THIS RIGHT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
FOR:

A) THE PNP GUIDELINES DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF HIS MOST POTENT, IF NOT HIS ONLY, MEANS TO DEFEND HIMSELF.

B) THE QUESTIONED GUIDELINES STRIPPED PETITIONER OF HIS MEANS OF PROTECTION AGAINST CRIME DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE STATE COULD NOT POSSIBLY PROTECT ITS CITIZENS DUE TO THE INADEQUACY AND INEFFICIENCY OF THE POLICE
FORCE.

2) THE OWNESHIP AND CARRYING OF FIREARMS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY RIGHTS WHICH CANNOT
BE TAKEN AWAY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND WITHOUT JUST CAUSE.

VI
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP GUIDELINES WERE ISSUED IN THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER, THE SAME IS
AN INVALID EXERCISE THEREOF SINCE THE MEANS USED THEREFOR ARE UNREASONABLE AND UNNCESSARY FOR THE
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ITS PURPOSE TO DETER AND PREVENT CRIME THEREBY BECOMING UNDULY OPPRESSIVE TO LAW-
ABIDING GUN-OWNERS.

VII

THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE AND CONFISCATORY SINCE IT REVOKED ALL EXISTING PERMITS TO CARRY
WITHOUT, HOWEVER, REFUNDING THE PAYMENT THE PNP RECEIVED FROM THOSE WHO ALREADY PAID THEREFOR.

VIII

THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION BECAUSE THEY ARE DIRECTED AT
AND OPPRESSIVE ONLY TO LAW-ABIDING GUN OWNERS WHILE LEAVING OTHER GUN-OWNERS THE LAWBREAKERS
(KIDNAPPERS, ROBBERS, HOLD-UPPERS, MNLF, MILF, ABU SAYYAF COLLECTIVELY, AND NPA) UNTOUCHED.

IX

THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE AND UNFAIR BECAUSE THEY WERE IMPLEMENTED LONG BEFORE THEY
WERE PUBLISHED.

THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE EFFECTIVELY AN EX POST FACTO LAW SINCE THEY APPLY RETROACTIVELY AND PUNISH ALL
THOSE WHO WERE ALREADY GRANTED PERMITS TO CARRY OUTSIDE OF RESIDENCE LONG BEFORE THEIR PROMULGATION.

Petitioners submissions may be synthesized into five (5) major issues:

First, whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines;

Second, whether the citizens right to bear arms is a constitutional right?;

Third, whether the revocation of petitioners PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines is a violation of his right to
property?;

Fourth, whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power?; and

Fifth, whether the assailed Guidelines constitute an ex post facto law?

The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, in
refutation of petitioners arguments, he contends that: (1) the PNP Chief is authorized to issue the assailed
Guidelines; (2) petitioner does not have a constitutional right to own and carry firearms; (3) the assailed Guidelines do not
violate the due process clause of the Constitution; and (4) the assailed Guidelines do not constitute an ex post facto law.

Initially, we must resolve the procedural barrier.

On the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that the doctrine is not an iron-clad dictum. In
several instances where this Court was confronted with cases of national interest and of serious implications, it never
hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial determination of the cases. [3] The case at bar is of similar
import as it involves the citizens right to bear arms.

Authority of the PNP Chief

Relying on the principle of separation of powers, petitioner argues that only Congress can withhold his right to bear
arms. In revoking all existing PTCFOR, President Arroyo and respondent Ebdane transgressed the settled principle and
arrogated upon themselves a power they do not possess the legislative power.

We are not persuaded.

It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and
substantially independent departments: the legislative, the executive and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of
the matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. [4]

Pertinently, the power to make laws the legislative power is vested in Congress. [5] Congress may not escape its duties and
responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that delegata potestas non potest delegari delegated power may not be
delegated.[6]

The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing power to
certain persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and
directors.[7] Such licensing power includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations. [8]

The evolution of our laws on firearms shows that since the early days of our Republic, the legislatures tendency was always
towards the delegation of power. Act No. 1780, [9] delegated upon the Governor-General (now the President) the authority
(1) to approve or disapprove applications of any person for a license to deal in firearms or to possess the same for personal
protection, hunting and other lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any time.[10] Further, it authorized him to
issue regulations which he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the Act. [11] With the enactment of Act No.
2711, the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, the laws on firearms were integrated. [12] The Act retained the authority of
the Governor General provided in Act No. 1780. Subsequently, the growing complexity in the Office of the Governor-
General resulted in the delegation of his authority to the Chief of the Constabulary. On January 21, 1919, Acting Governor-
General Charles E. Yeater issued Executive Order No. 8 [13] authorizing and directing the Chief of Constabulary to act on his
behalf in approving and disapproving applications for personal, special and hunting licenses. This was followed by
Executive Order No. 61[14] designating the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as the government custodian of all firearms,
ammunitions and explosives. Executive Order No. 215,[15] issued by President Diosdado Macapagal on December 3, 1965,
granted the Chief of the Constabulary, not only the authority to approve or disapprove applications for personal, special
and hunting license, but also the authority to revoke the same. With the foregoing developments, it is accurate to say that
the Chief of the Constabulary had exercised the authority for a long time. In fact, subsequent issuances such as Sections 2
and 3 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Presidential Decree No. 1866 [16] perpetuate such authority of the Chief
of the Constabulary. Section 2 specifically provides that any person or entity desiring to possess any firearm shall first
secure the necessary permit/license/authority from the Chief of the Constabulary. With regard to the issuance of
PTCFOR, Section 3 imparts: The Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such
conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. These provisions
are issued pursuant to the general power granted by P.D. No. 1866 empowering him to promulgate rules and regulations
for the effective implementation of the decree.[17] At this juncture, it bears emphasis that P.D. No. 1866 is the chief law
governing possession of firearms in the Philippines and that it was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise
of his legislative power.[18]

In an attempt to evade the application of the above-mentioned laws and regulations, petitioner argues that the Chief of the
PNP is not the same as the Chief of the Constabulary, the PC being a mere unit or component of the newly established
PNP. He contends further that Republic Act No. 8294 [19] amended P.D. No. 1866 such that the authority to issue rules and
regulations regarding firearms is now jointly vested in the Department of Justice and the DILG, not the Chief of the
Constabulary.[20]

Petitioners submission is bereft of merit.

By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975,[21] the Philippine National Police (PNP) absorbed the Philippine Constabulary
(PC). Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latters licensing
authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNPs powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and
explosives in accordance with law.[22] This is in conjunction with the PNP Chiefs power to issue detailed implementing
policies and instructions on such matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties of
the PNP.[23]

Contrary to petitioners contention, R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief of the Constabulary (now the PNP Chief) of his
authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of P.D. No. 1866. For one, R.A. No. 8294 did
not repeal entirely P.D. No. 1866. It merely provides for the reduction of penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Thus,
the provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to the Chief of the Constabulary the authority to issue rules and regulations
regarding firearms remains effective. Correspondingly, the Implementing Rules and Regulations dated September 15, 1997
jointly issued by the Department of Justice and the DILG pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 8294 deal only with the
automatic review, by the Director of the Bureau of Corrections or the Warden of a provincial or city jail, of the records of
convicts for violations of P.D. No. 1866. The Rules seek to give effect to the beneficent provisions of R.A. No. 8294, thereby
ensuring the early release and reintegration of the convicts into the community.

Clearly, both P.D. No. 1866 and R.A. No. 6975 authorize the PNP Chief to issue the assailed guidelines.

Corollarily, petitioner disputes President Arroyos declaration of a nationwide gun ban, arguing that she has no authority to
alter, modify, or amend the law on firearms through a mere speech.

First, it must be emphasized that President Arroyos speech was just an expression of her policy and a directive to her
subordinate. It cannot, therefore, be argued that President Arroyo enacted a law through a mere speech.

Second, at the apex of the entire executive officialdom is the President. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution specifies
his power as Chief Executive, thus: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As Chief Executive, President Arroyo holds the steering wheel
that controls the course of her government. She lays down policies in the execution of her plans and programs. Whatever
policy she chooses, she has her subordinates to implement them. In short, she has the power of control. Whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to her subordinate, she may act directly or merely direct the
performance of a duty.[24] Thus, when President Arroyo directed respondent Ebdane to suspend the issuance of PTCFOR,
she was just directing a subordinate to perform an assigned duty. Such act is well within the prerogative of her office.

II

Right to bear arms: Constitutional or Statutory?

Petitioner earnestly contends that his right to bear arms is a constitutionally-protected right. This, he mainly anchors on
various American authorities. We therefore find it imperative to determine the nature of the right in light of American
jurisprudence.

The bearing of arms is a tradition deeply rooted in the English and American society. It antedates not only the American
Constitution but also the discovery of firearms. [25]

A provision commonly invoked by the American people to justify their possession of firearms is the Second Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States of America, which reads:

A well regulated militia, being necessary for the security of free state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.

An examination of the historical background of the foregoing provision shows that it pertains to the citizens collective right
to take arms in defense of the State, not to the citizens individual right to own and possess arms. The setting under which
the right was contemplated has a profound connection with the keeping and maintenance of a militia or an armed
citizenry. That this is how the right was construed is evident in early American cases.

The first case involving the interpretation of the Second Amendment that reached the United States Supreme Court
is United States vs. Miller.[26] Here, the indictment charged the defendants with transporting an unregistered Stevens
shotgun without the required stamped written order, contrary to the National Firearms Act. The defendants filed a
demurrer challenging the facial validity of the indictment on the ground that the National Firearms Act offends the
inhibition of the Second Amendment. The District Court sustained the demurrer and quashed the indictment. On appeal,
the Supreme Court interpreted the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment as referring to the collective right
of those comprising the Militia a body of citizens enrolled for military discipline. It does not pertain to the individual
right of citizen to bear arm. Miller expresses its holding as follows:

In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen
inches in length at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,
we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not
within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the
common defense.

The same doctrine was re-echoed in Cases vs. United States.[27] Here, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Federal
Firearms Act, as applied to appellant, does not conflict with the Second Amendment. It ruled that:

While [appellants] weapon may be capable of military use, or while at least familiarity with it might be regarded as of value
in training a person to use a comparable weapon of military type and caliber, still there is no evidence that the appellant
was or ever had been a member of any military organization or that his use of the weapon under the circumstances
disclosed was in preparation for a military career. In fact, the only inference possible is that the appellant at the time
charged in the indictment was in possession of, transporting, and using the firearm and ammunition purely and simply
on a frolic of his own and without any thought or intention of contributing to the efficiency of the well regulated militia
which the Second amendment was designed to foster as necessary to the security of a free state.

With the foregoing jurisprudence, it is erroneous to assume that the US Constitution grants upon the American people the
right to bear arms. In a more explicit language, the United States vs. Cruikshank[28] decreed: The right of the people to keep
and bear arms is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any way dependent upon that
instrument. Likewise, in People vs. Persce,[29] the Court of Appeals said: Neither is there any constitutional provision
securing the right to bear arms which prohibits legislation with reference to such weapons as are specifically before us for
consideration. The provision in the Constitution of the United States that the right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed is not designed to control legislation by the state.

With more reason, the right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Our
Constitution contains no provision similar to the Second Amendment, as we aptly observed in the early case of United
States vs. Villareal:[30]
The only contention of counsel which would appear to necessitate comment is the claim that the statute penalizing the
carrying of concealed weapons and prohibiting the keeping and the use of firearms without a license, is in violation of the
provisions of section 5 of the Philippine Bill of Rights.

Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in the United States Constitution against the infringement of the
right of the people of the United States to keep and bear arms (U. S. Constitution, amendment 2), which is not included
in the Philippine Bill. But it may be well, in passing, to point out that in no event could this constitutional guaranty have
any bearing on the case at bar, not only because it has not been expressly extended to the Philippine Islands, but also
because it has been uniformly held that both this and similar provisions in State constitutions apply only to arms used in
civilized warfare (see cases cited in 40 Cyc., 853, note 18); x x x.

Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right to bear arms is
a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a mere statutory creation. What then are the laws that grant
such right to the Filipinos? The first real firearm law is Act No. 1780 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 12,
1907. It was passed to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use and transfer of firearms. Section 9 thereof
provides:

SECTION 9. Any person desiring to possess one or more firearms for personal protection, or for use in hunting or other
lawful purposes only, and ammunition therefor, shall make application for a license to possess such firearm or firearms
or ammunition as hereinafter provided. Upon making such application, and before receiving the license, the applicant
shall make a cash deposit in the postal savings bank in the sum of one hundred pesos for each firearm for which the license
is to be issued, or in lieu thereof he may give a bond in such form as the Governor-General may prescribe, payable to the
Government of the Philippine Islands, in the sum of two hundred pesos for each such firearm: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That
persons who are actually members of gun clubs, duly formed and organized at the time of the passage of this Act, who at
such time have a license to possess firearms, shall not be required to make the deposit or give the bond prescribed by this
section, and the bond duly executed by such person in accordance with existing law shall continue to be security for the
safekeeping of such arms.

The foregoing provision was restated in Section 887 [31] of Act No. 2711 that integrated the firearm laws. Thereafter,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1866. It codified the laws on illegal possession, manufacture, dealing in,
acquisition of firearms, ammunitions or explosives and imposed stiffer penalties for their violation. R.A. No. 8294 amended
some of the provisions of P.D. No. 1866 by reducing the imposable penalties. Being a mere statutory creation, the right to
bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right.

III

Vested Property Right

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law. Petitioner invokes this provision, asserting that the revocation of his PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed
Guidelines deprived him of his vested property right without due process of law and in violation of the equal protection of
law.

Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest
exists.[32] The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property
nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry,[33] we ruled that a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more emphatic pronouncement,
we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.[34] that:

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner, in arguing that his PTCFOR is a constitutionally protected property right, relied heavily on Bell vs.
Burson[35] wherein the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that once a license is issued, continued possession may become essential
in the pursuit of livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interest of
the licensees.

Petitioners reliance on Bell is misplaced. This case involves a drivers license, not a license to bear arms. The catena of
American jurisprudence involving license to bear arms is perfectly in accord with our ruling that a PTCFOR is neither a
property nor a property right. In Erdelyi vs. OBrien,[36] the plaintiff who was denied a license to carry a firearm brought suit
against the defendant who was the Chief of Police of the City of Manhattan Beach, on the ground that the denial violated
her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. The United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit
ruled that Erdelyi did not have a property interest in obtaining a license to carry a firearm, ratiocinating as follows:
Property interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment do not arise whenever a person
has only an abstract need or desire for, or unilateral expectation of a benefit.x x x Rather, they arise from legitimate
claims of entitlement defined by existing rules or understanding that stem from an independent source, such as state
law. x x x

Concealed weapons are closely regulated by the State of California. x x x Whether the statute creates a property interest
in concealed weapons licenses depends largely upon the extent to which the statute contains mandatory language that
restricts the discretion of the [issuing authority] to deny licenses to applicants who claim to meet the minimum
eligibility requirements. x x x Where state law gives the issuing authority broad discretion to grant or deny license
application in a closely regulated field, initial applicants do not have a property right in such licenses protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Jacobson, supra, 627 F.2d at 180 (gaming license under Nevada law);

Similar doctrine was announced in Potts vs. City of Philadelphia,[37] Conway vs. King,[38] Nichols vs. County of Sta. Clara,
[39]
and Gross vs. Norton.[40] These cases enunciated that the test whether the statute creates a property right or interest
depends largely on the extent of discretion granted to the issuing authority.

In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious
cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry
them outside of residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a
property right protected under our Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an
absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be
reasonably imposed.[41] A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one
of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is
not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the
meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights.[42] The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co,[43]held: The
correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the
State is always revocable.

The foregoing jurisprudence has been resonating in the Philippines as early as 1908. Thus, in The Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Amechazurra[44] we ruled:

x x x no private person is bound to keep arms. Whether he does or not is entirely optional with himself, but if, for his own
convenience or pleasure, he desires to possess arms, he must do so upon such terms as the Government sees fit to impose,
for the right to keep and bear arms is not secured to him by law. The Government can impose upon him such terms as it
pleases. If he is not satisfied with the terms imposed, he should decline to accept them, but, if for the purpose of securing
possession of the arms he does agree to such conditions, he must fulfill them.

IV

Police Power

At any rate, assuming that petitioners PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot
be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the States police power. All property in the state is held
subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare.

In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus:

(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police
power; and

(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.

Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the essence of the constitutional guarantees of substantive due
process, equal protection, and non-impairment of property rights.

It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the
society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the New Peoples Army (NPA), which tends to
disturb the peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the
motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general.

The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive.In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely
prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However,
those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a
reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry
their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it
would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to
apprehend them.

Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise of the
police power.[45] In State vs. Reams,[46] it was held that the legislature may regulate the right to bear arms in a manner
conducive to the public peace. With the promotion of public peace as its objective and the revocation of all PTCFOR as the
means, we are convinced that the issuance of the assailed Guidelines constitutes a reasonable exercise of police
power. The ruling in United States vs. Villareal,[47] is relevant, thus:

We think there can be no question as to the reasonableness of a statutory regulation prohibiting the carrying of concealed
weapons as a police measure well calculated to restrict the too frequent resort to such weapons in moments of anger and
excitement. We do not doubt that the strict enforcement of such a regulation would tend to increase the security of life
and limb, and to suppress crime and lawlessness, in any community wherein the practice of carrying concealed weapons
prevails, and this without being unduly oppressive upon the individual owners of these weapons. It follows that its
enactment by the legislature is a proper and legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.

Ex post facto law

In Mekin vs. Wolfe,[48] an ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an action done before the passing of
the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it
greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.

We see no reason to devote much discussion on the matter. Ex post facto law prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.[49] The
assailed Guidelines cannot be considered as an ex post facto law because it is prospective in its application. Contrary to
petitioners argument, it would not result in the punishment of acts previously committed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 146494 July 14, 2004

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner,

vs.
MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated 13 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 48784. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cebu City ("trial court"),
which held that Milagros Orbiso Montesclaros is entitled to survivorship pension.

The Facts

Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros ("Nicolas") married Milagros Orbiso ("Milagros") on 10 July
1983.3 Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he married Milagros who was then 43 years old.

On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") an application for retirement
benefits effective 18 February 1985 under Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act
of 1977 ("PD 1146"). In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his sole beneficiary. 4 Nicolas' last
day of actual service was on 17 February 1985. 5 On 31 January 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas' application for retirement
"effective 17 February 1984," granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity
thereafter.6 Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146. On 8
June 1992, GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no right to survivorship
pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension.7 According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of
retirement on "17 February 1984."

On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the validity of
Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension.

On 9 November 1994, the trial court rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for survivorship pension. The trial court
ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the benefits due including interest. Citing Articles 115 8 and 1179 of the Family Code, the trial
court held that retirement benefits, which the pensioner has earned for services rendered and for which the pensioner has
contributed through monthly salary deductions, are onerous acquisitions. Since retirement benefits are property the
pensioner acquired through labor, such benefits are conjugal property. The trial court held that the prohibition in Section
18 of PD 1146 is deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The Family Code has retroactive
effect if it does not prejudice or impair vested rights.

GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition for review.

In the meantime, in a letter dated 10 January 2003, Milagros informed the Court that she has accepted GSIS' decision
disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension and that she is no longer interested in pursuing the
case.10 Commenting on Milagros' letter, GSIS asserts that the Court must decide the case on the merits. 11

The Court will resolve the issue despite the manifestation of Milagros. The issue involves not only the claim of Milagros but
also that of other surviving spouses who are similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny based on the
proviso. Social justice and public interest demand that we resolve the constitutionality of the proviso.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the retirement benefits are onerous and conjugal because the
pension came from the deceased pensioner's salary deductions. The Court of Appeals held that the pension is not
gratuitous since it is a deferred compensation for services rendered.

The Issues

GSIS raises the following issues:

1. Whether Section 16 of PD 1146 entitles Milagros to survivorship pension;

2. Whether retirement benefits form part of conjugal property;

3. Whether Articles 254 and 256 of the Family Code repealed Section 18 of PD 1146. 12

The Court's Ruling

The pertinent provisions of PD 1146 on survivorship benefits read:

SEC. 16. Survivorship Benefits. When a member or pensioner dies, the beneficiary shall be entitled to survivorship benefits
provided for in sections seventeen and eighteen hereunder. The survivorship pension shall consist of:

(1) basic survivorship pension which is fifty percent of the basic monthly pension; and

(2) dependent's pension not exceeding fifty percent of the basic monthly pension payable in accordance with the rules and
regulations prescribed by the System.

SEC. 17. Death of a Member. (a) Upon the death of a member, the primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to:

(1) the basic monthly pension which is guaranteed for five years; Provided, That, at the option of the beneficiaries, it may
be paid in lump sum as defined in this Act: Provided, further, That, the member is entitled to old-age pension at the time of
his death; or

(2) the basic survivorship pension which is guaranteed for thirty months and the dependent's pension; Provided, That, the
deceased had paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions within the five-year period immediately preceding his death, or
a total of at least one hundred eighty monthly contributions prior to his death.

(b) At the end of the guaranteed periods mentioned in the preceding sub-section (a), the survivorship pension shall be paid
as follows:

(1) when the dependent spouse is the only survivor, he shall receive the basic survivorship pension for life or until he
remarries;

(2) when only dependent children are the survivors, they shall be entitled to the survivorship pension for as long as they
are qualified;

(3) when the survivors are the dependent spouse and the dependent children, they shall be entitled to the survivorship
pension so long as there are dependent children and, thereafter, the surviving spouse shall receive the basic survivorship
pension for life or until he remarries.

(c) In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the secondary beneficiaries designated by the deceased and recorded in the
System, shall be entitled to:

(1) a cash payment equivalent to thirty times the basic survivorship pension when the member is qualified for old-age
pension; or

(2) a cash payment equivalent to fifty percent of the average monthly compensation for each year he paid contributions,
but not less than five hundred pesos; Provided, That, the member paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions within the
five-year period immediately preceding his death or paid a total of at least one hundred eighty monthly contributions prior
to his death.

(d) When the primary beneficiaries are not entitled to the benefits mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section, they shall
receive a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent of the average monthly compensation for each year the
member paid contributions, but not less than five hundred pesos. In the absence of primary beneficiaries, the amount shall
revert to the funds of the System.

SEC. 18. Death of a Pensioner. Upon the death of a pensioner, the primary beneficiaries shall receive the applicable pension
mentioned under paragraph (b) of section seventeen of this Act: Provided, That, the dependent spouse shall not be
entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension. When the pensioner dies within the period covered by the lump sum, the survivorship pension
shall be paid only after the expiration of the said period. This shall also apply to the pensioners living as of the effectivity of
this Act, but the survivorship benefit shall be based on the monthly pension being received at the time of death. (Emphasis
supplied)

Under PD 1146, the primary beneficiaries are (1) the dependent spouse until such spouse remarries, and (2) the
dependent children.13 The secondary beneficiaries are the dependent parents and legitimate descendants except
dependent children.14 The law defines dependent as "the legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted, acknowledged natural or
illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one years of age or is over twenty-one
years of age but physically or mentally incapacitated and incapable of self-support." The term also includes the legitimate
spouse dependent for support on the member, and the legitimate parent wholly dependent on the member for support. 15
The main question for resolution is the validity of the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146, which proviso prohibits the
dependent spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner within three years
before the pensioner qualified for the pension ("the proviso").

We hold that the proviso, which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros' claim, is unconstitutional because
it violates the due process clause. The proviso is also discriminatory and denies equal protection of the law.

Retirement Benefits as Property Interest

Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government employee to pay monthly contributions. PD 1146
mandates the government to include in its annual appropriation the necessary amounts for its share of the contributions. It
is compulsory on the government employer to take off and withhold from the employees' monthly salaries their
contributions and to remit the same to GSIS. 16 The government employer must also remit its corresponding share to
GSIS.17 Considering the mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the government pensions do not
constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation.

In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or
vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment. 18 The reason for providing retirement
benefits is to compensate service to the government. Retirement benefits to government employees are part of
emolument to encourage and retain qualified employees in the government service. Retirement benefits to government
employees reward them for giving the best years of their lives in the service of their country. 19

Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is
protected by the due process clause.20 Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to
immediate payment under pre-existing law.21 Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as
provided under the terms of the public employees' pension statute. 22 No law can deprive such person of his pension rights
without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard. 23

In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also provides for benefits to survivors of deceased government
employees and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the dependent spouse is one of the beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A
widow's right to receive pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husband's contractual
compensation.24

Denial of Due Process

The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." The
proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly denying a dependent spouse's claim for survivorship pension if the dependent
spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period. There is outright confiscation of
benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. The proviso undermines
the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits to
government employees and their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the government
employees.

The "whereas" clauses of PD 1146 state:

WHEREAS, the Government Service Insurance System in promoting the efficiency and welfare of the employees of the
Government of the Philippines, administers the laws that grant to its members social security and insurance benefits;

WHEREAS, it is necessary to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System; to
guarantee to the government employee all the benefits due him; and to expand and increase the benefits made available
to him and his dependents to the extent permitted by available resources;

WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws have impeded the efficient and effective discharge by the System of its functions and
have unduly hampered the System from being more responsive to the dramatic changes of the times and from meeting the
increasing needs and expectations of the Filipino public servant;

WHEREAS, provisions of existing laws that have prejudiced, rather than benefited, the government employee; restricted,
rather than broadened, his benefits, prolonged, rather than facilitated the payment of benefits, must now yield to his
paramount welfare;

WHEREAS, the social security and insurance benefits of government employees must be continuously re-examined and
improved to assure comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance programs that will provide benefits
responsive to their needs and those of their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, retirement, and other
contingencies; and to serve as a fitting reward for dedicated public service;

WHEREAS, in the light of existing economic conditions affecting the welfare of government employees, there is a need to
expand and improve the social security and insurance programs administered by the Government Service Insurance
System, specifically, among others, by increasing pension benefits, expanding disability benefits, introducing survivorship
benefits, introducing sickness and income benefits, and eventually extending the compulsory coverage of these programs
to all government employees regardless of employment status.

PD 1146 has the following purposes:

a. to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System;

b. to guarantee to the government employee all the benefits due him; and

c. to expand, increase, and improve the social security and insurance benefits made available to him and his dependents
such as:

· increasing pension benefits

· expanding disability benefits

· introducing survivorship benefits

· introducing sickness income benefits

· extending compulsory membership to all government employees irrespective of status 25

The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and qualified beneficiaries of the deceased member or pensioner to
cushion the beneficiaries against the adverse economic effects resulting from the death of the wage earner or pensioner. 26

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive survivor's benefits under a pension system. However,
statutes sometimes require that the spouse should have married the employee for a certain period before the employee's
death to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gain. One example is the Illinois Pension Code which restricts
survivor's annuity benefits to a surviving spouse who was married to a state employee for at least one year before the
employee's death. The Illinois pension system classifies spouses into those married less than one year before a member's
death and those married one year or more. The classification seeks to prevent conscious adverse risk selection of deathbed
marriages where a terminally ill member of the pension system marries another so that person becomes eligible for
benefits. In Sneddon v. The State Employee's Retirement System of Illinois,27 the Appellate Court of Illinois held that such
classification was based on difference in situation and circumstance, bore a rational relation to the purpose of the statute,
and was therefore not in violation of constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.

A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the
law.28 The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must
be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to
all members of the same class.29 Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided
there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another. 30

The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against the dependent spouse who
contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. 31Under the proviso,
even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the pensioner's death, the dependent
spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner
qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the
purpose of the proviso is to prevent "deathbed marriages," then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year
prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification
does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years
before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension
benefits.

Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason Congress deleted the proviso in
Republic Act No. 8291 ("RA 8291"),32 otherwise known as the "Government Service Insurance Act of 1997," the law revising
the old charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married the
member immediately before the member's death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS proves
that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely to receive the benefit. 33

Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three years before retirement or death of a
member are sham marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically
forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years
before the member's retirement or death. The law acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse contracted the
marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a sweeping
classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted
the social legislation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit. We declare VOID for being violative of the constitutional guarantees
of due process and equal protection of the law the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146, which proviso
states that "the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted
within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension." The Government Service Insurance System cannot deny
the claim of Milagros O. Montesclaros for survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 162777. August 31, 2004]

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by its Chairman, BENJAMIN S. ABALOS,
ESMERALDA AMORA-LADRA, in her capacity as Acting Director IV, National Capital Judicial Region, Commission on
Elections, and the SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

In this petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, Francisco I. Chavez stands as
a taxpayer and a citizen asking this Court to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its
Resolution No. 6520, dated January 6, 2004. The assailed provision is, as follows:

Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing
the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or
mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public
office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or television station within 3 days
after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall
be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain establishments to endorse their
products. On August 18, 2003, he authorized a certain Andrew So to use his name and image for 96 North, a clothing
company. Petitioner also signed Endorsement Agreements with Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation
and another corporation involved in the amusement and video games business, G-Box. These last two agreements were
entered into on October 14, 2003 and November 10, 2003, respectively.Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards
were set up along the Balintawak Interchange of the North Expressway. One billboard showed petitioner promoting the
plastic products of Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation, and the other two showed petitioner endorsing
the clothes of 96 North. One more billboard was set up along Roxas Boulevardshowing petitioner promoting the game and
amusement parlors of G-Box.

On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator under Alyansa ng
Pag-asa, a tripartite alliance of three political parties: PROMDI, REPORMA, and Aksyon Demokratiko.

On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section 32, the provision assailed
herein. On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELECs Law
Department. He replied, on January 29, 2004, by requesting the COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may have
violated the assailed provision. He sent another letter dated February 23, 2004, this time asking the COMELEC that he be
exempted from the application of Section 32, considering that the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements
and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.

The COMELEC answered petitioners request by issuing another letter, dated February 27, 2004, wherein it ordered him to
remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his request.

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez asks this Court that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed
provision. He urges this Court to declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross violation
of the non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4) contrary
to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.

Is Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 an invalid exercise of police power? Petitioner argues that the billboards,
while they exhibit his name and image, do not at all announce his candidacy for any public office nor solicit support for
such candidacy from the electorate. They are, he claims, mere product endorsements and not election
propaganda. Prohibiting, therefore, their exhibition to the public is not within the scope of the powers of the COMELEC, he
concludes.

This Court takes a contrary view. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety, and the general welfare of the people. [1] To
determine the validity of a police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in general, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals?

A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and
to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on
one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage
in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid reason for the exercise of police
power as held in National Press Club v. COMELEC, [2] wherein the petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Section
11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibited the sale or donation of print space and air time for campaigning or other
political purposes, except to the COMELEC. The obvious intention of this provision is to equalize, as far as practicable, the
situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge
campaign war chests. This Court ruled therein that this objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which,
like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society,
and by the prevalence of poverty, with so many of our population falling below the poverty line.

Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements and do not announce nor
solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan political activity is
defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office.
Activities included under this definition are:

(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate

(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate
for public office;

(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate;
or

(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.[3] (underscoring ours)

It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private
individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because the same
indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required
petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for
public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make
themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending
their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual intending to run
for public office within the next few months, could pay private corporations to use him as their image model with the
intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a
doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning:

Sec. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be unlawful for any person,
whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity except during the campaign period. x x x [4]

Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises
or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants,
special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.

Under the abovementioned Constitutional provision, the COMELEC is expressly authorized to supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all media communication or information to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space. All these
are aimed at the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

Neither is Section 32 of Resolution No. 6520 a gross violation of the non-impairment clause. The non-impairment clause of
the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government. [5] Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for
public office, without regard to the level of financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the
public.The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this interest. Time and again, this Court has said
that contracts affecting public interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal
order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the
promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is
subject to and limited by the paramount police power. [6]
Furthermore, this Court notes that the very contracts entered into by petitioner provide that the endorsers photograph
and image shall be utilized in whatever form, mode and manner in keeping with norms of decency, reasonableness,
morals and law;[7] and in whatever form, mode and manner not contrary to law and norms of decency,[8] and in whatever
form, mode and manner in keeping with norms of decency, reasonableness, morals and law.[9]

Petitioner also claims that Section 32 of Resolution No. 6520 is in the nature of an ex post facto law. He urges this Court to
believe that the assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable for an election offense for not removing such
advertisement, even if at the time the said advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly legal. Hence, it makes a
person, whose name or image is featured in any such advertisement, liable for premature campaigning under the Omnibus
Election Code.[10] A close scrutiny of this rationale, however, demonstrates its lack of persuasiveness. Section 32, although
not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said offense. Laws of this nature must operate
prospectively, except when they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense defined in the
assailed provision is not the putting up of propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls
and other materials showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on
television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof
becomes a candidate for public office. Nor does it prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts for such
propaganda materials by an individual who subsequently becomes a candidate for public office. One definitely does not
commit an offense by entering into a contract with private parties to use his name and image to endorse certain products
prior to his becoming a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non-
removal of the described propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the
candidate for public office fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be liable under
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it indicated in the assailed
provision that it shall operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.

Next, petitioner urges that Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act. According to him, under this law, billboards are
already permitted as lawful election propaganda. He claims, therefore, that the COMELEC, in effectively prohibiting the use
of billboards as a form of election propaganda through the assailed provision, violated the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners
argument is not tenable. The Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed provision does not prohibit billboards as
lawful election propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize, as much as
practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular and rich candidates from gaining undue advantage in
exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. [11] Moreover, by regulating the use of such election
propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing its duty under the law. Under Sections 3 and 13 of the Fair Elections
Act, all election propaganda are subject to the supervision and regulation by the COMELEC:

SECTION 3. Lawful Election Propaganda. -- Election propaganda, whether on television, cable television radio, newspapers
or any other medium is hereby allowed for all registered political parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations participating under the party list elections and for all bona fide candidates seeking national and local elective
positions subject to the limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political parties observance of truth in
advertising and to the supervision and regulation by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

For the purpose of this Act, lawful election propaganda shall include:

3.1. Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials the size of which does not exceed eight
and one half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;

3.2. Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular political party or candidate for public
office;

3.3. Cloth, paper or cardboard posters whether framed or posted, with an area not exceeding two(2) feet by three (3) feet,
except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of said meeting or
rally, streamers not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet in size, shall be allowed: Provided, That said streamers may be
displayed five (5) days before the date of the meeting or rally and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said
meeting or rally;

3.4. Paid advertisements in print or broadcast media: Provided, That the advertisements shall follow the requirements set
forth in Section 4 of this Act; and

3.5. All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code or this Act.

xxx

SECTION 13. Authority of the COMELEC to Promulgate Rules; Election Offenses. - The COMELEC shall promulgate and
furnish all political parties and candidates and the mass media entities the rules and regulations for the implementation of
this Act, consistent with the criteria established in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution and Section 86 of the Omnibus
Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
Rules and regulations promulgated by the COMELEC under and by authority of this Section shall take effect on the seventh
day after their publication in at least two (2) daily newspapers of general circulation. Prior to effectivity of said rules and
regulations, no political advertisement or propaganda for or against any candidate or political party shall be published or
broadcast through mass media.

Violation of this Act and the rules and regulations of the COMELEC issued to implement this Act shall be an election offense
punishable under the first and second paragraphs of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

Finally, petitioner contends that Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is invalid because of overbreadth.

A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to State regulations may not be achieved by means that
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. [12]

The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It only disallows the continued display of a
persons propaganda materials and advertisements after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start of the
campaign period. Said materials and advertisements must also show his name and image.

There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and advertisements. During the campaign period, these
may be used subject only to reasonable limitations necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of preventing
premature campaigning and promoting equality of opportunities among all candidates.

The provision, therefore, is not invalid on the ground of overbreadth.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is declared valid and
constitutional. The prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.

Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., on official leave.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005]

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC., respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and from Lucena City, assailed,
via a petition for prohibition and injunction[1] against the City of Lucena, its Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Lucena before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the
ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. The salient provisions of the ordinances are:

Ordinance No. 1631[2]

AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE,
ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA

xxx

SECTION 1. There is hereby granted to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its successors or assigns, hereinafter
referred to as the grantee, a franchise to construct, finance, establish, operate, and maintain a common bus-jeepney
terminal facility in the City of Lucena.

SECTION 2. This franchise shall continue for a period of twenty-five years, counted from the approval of this Ordinance, and
renewable at the option of the grantee for another period of twenty-five (25) years upon such expiration.

xxx

SECTION 4. Responsibilities and Obligations of the City Government of Lucena. During the existence of the franchise, the
City Government of Lucena shall have the following responsibilities and obligations:

xxx

(c) It shall not grant any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney terminal.

xxx

Ordinance No. 1778[3]

AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN
PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR THIS PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND ORDINANCE NO.
1557, SERIES OF 1995

xxx

SECTION 1. The entrance to the City of Lucena of all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys is hereby
regulated as follows:

(a) All buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby
directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers.

(b) All temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this
ordinance.

xxx

SECTION 3. a) Section 1 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses from other municipalities and/or local government units going to Lucena
City are directed to proceed to the Common Terminal located at Diversion Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, to unload and load
passengers.

xxx

c) Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local government units
shall utilize the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal at Diversion Road, Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, this City, and no
other terminals shall be situated inside or within the City of Lucena;
d) Section 4 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local government units
shall avail of the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal which is hereby designated as the officially sanctioned
common terminal for the City of Lucena;

e) Section 5 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:

The Lucena Grand Central Terminal is the permanent common terminal as this is the entity which was given the exclusiv
e franchise by the Sangguniang Panglungsod under Ordinance No. 1631;(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

These ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable for another twenty five years, to one
entity for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located
outside the city proper, were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by
the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city, as the Explanatory Note-Whereas Clause adopting
Ordinance No. 1778 states:

WHEREAS, in line with the worsening traffic condition of the City of Lucena, and with the purpose of easing and regulating
the flow of the same, it is imperative that the Buses, Mini-Buses and out-of-town jeepneys be prohibited from maintaining
terminals within the City, but instead directing to proceed to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal for purposes of picking-up
and/or dropping off their passengers;[4]

Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected by the ordinances.

Petitioner, Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., claiming legal interest as the grantee of the exclusive franchise for the
operation of the common terminal,[5] was allowed to intervene in the petition before the trial court.

In the hearing conducted on November 25, 1998, all the parties agreed to dispense with the presentation of evidence and
to submit the case for resolution solely on the basis of the pleadings filed. [6]

By Order of March 31, 1999,[7] Branch 54 of the Lucena RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

1. Declaring City Ordinance No. 1631 as valid, having been issued in the exercise of the police power of the City
Government of Lucena insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., to construct, finance,
establish, operate and maintain common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena;

2. But however, declaring the provision of Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 to the effect that the City Government shall not
grant any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or jeepney terminal, as illegal and
ultra vires because it contravenes the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government
Code;

3. Declaring City Ordinance No. 1778 as null and void, the same being also an ultra vires act of the City Government of
Lucena arising from an invalid, oppressive and unreasonable exercise of the police power, more specifically, declaring illegal
[sections 1(b), 3(c) and 3(e)];

4. Ordering the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition and/or Injunction directing the respondents public officials, the City Mayor
and the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Lucena, to cease and desist from implementing Ordinance No. 1778 insofar as said
ordinance prohibits or curtails petitioner from maintaining and operating its own bus terminal subject to the conditions
provided for in Ordinance No. 1557, Sec. 3, which authorizes the construction of terminal outside the poblacion of Lucena
City; and likewise, insofar as said ordinance directs and compels the petitioner to use the Lucena Grand Central Terminal
Inc., and furthermore, insofar as it declares that no other terminals shall be situated, constructed, maintained or
established inside or within the City of Lucena; and furthermore,

5. The Motion to Dismiss filed by the Intervenor, Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc., dated October 19, 1998, is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)[8]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[9] of the trial courts order having been denied by Order of August 6, 1999, [10] it
elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before this Court. [11] This Court, by Resolution of November 24, 1999,
[12]
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals with which it has concurrent jurisdiction, no special and important reason
having been cited for it to take cognizance thereof in the first instance.

By Decision of December 15, 2000,[13] the appellate court dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the
trial court. Its motion for reconsideration [14] having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution dated June 5, 2001,
[15]
petitioner once again comes to this Court via petition for review, [16] this time assailing the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
Decision on the petition hinges on two issues, to wit: (1) whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the case, it not having
furnished the Office of the Solicitor General copy of the orders it issued therein, and (2) whether the City of Lucena
properly exercised its police power when it enacted the subject ordinances.

Petitioner argues that since the trial court failed to serve a copy of its assailed orders upon the Office of the Solicitor
General, it never acquired jurisdiction over the case, it citing Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules which provides:

SEC. 22. Notice to the Solicitor General.In any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order,
presidential decree, rules or regulations, the court in its discretion, may require the appearance of the Solicitor
General who may be heard in person or through representative duly designated by him. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Furthermore, petitioner invokes Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 63 which respectively provide:

SEC. 3. Notice on Solicitor General. In any action which involves the validity of a statute, executive order or regulation, or
any other governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party assailing the same and shall be
entitled to be heard upon such question.

SEC. 4. Local government ordinances. In any action involving the validity of a local government ordinance, the
corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local government unit involved shall be similarly notified and entitled to be
heard. If such ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Solicitor General shall also be notified and entitled to be
heard. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Nowhere, however, is it stated in the above-quoted rules that failure to notify the Solicitor General about the action is a
jurisdictional defect.

In fact, Rule 3, Section 22 gives the courts in any action involving the validity of any ordinance, inter alia, discretion to
notify the Solicitor General.

Section 4 of Rule 63, which more specifically deals with cases assailing the constitutionality, not just the validity, of a local
government ordinance, directs that the Solicitor General shall also be notified and entitled to be heard. Who will notify
him, Sec. 3 of the same rule provides it is the party which is assailing the local governments ordinance.

More importantly, however, this Court finds that no procedural defect, fatal or otherwise, attended the disposition of the
case. For respondent actually served a copy of its petition upon the Office of the Solicitor General on October 1, 1998, two
days after it was filed. The Solicitor General has issued a Certification to that effect. [17] There was thus compliance with
above-quoted rules.

Respecting the issue of whether police power was properly exercised when the subject ordinances were enacted: As with
the State, the local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to
be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful
subject and lawful method.[18]

That traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern, cannot be gainsaid. In Calalang v. Williams[19] which
involved a statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control
traffic on national roads, this Court held:

In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare.
It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. [20] (Emphasis supplied)

The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they
involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is
thus present.

Respondents suggestion to have this Court look behind the explicit objective of the ordinances which, to it, was actually to
benefit the private interest of petitioner by coercing all bus operators to patronize its terminal does not lie. [21] Lim v.
Pacquing[22] instructs:

. . . [T]his Court cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771 was enacted to benefit a select group which was later given
authority to operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The examination of legislative motivation is generally prohibited.
(Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971] per Black, J.) There is, in the first place, absolute lack of
evidence to support ADCs allegation of improper motivation in the issuance of PD No. 771. In the second place, as already
averred, this Court cannot go behind the expressed and proclaimed purposes of PD No. 771, which are reasonable and
even laudable. (Underscoring supplied)[23]
This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain
its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, [24] the subject ordinances prohibit
the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the operation of
only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to petitioner. The common
carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the
facilities of petitioner.

In De la Cruz v. Paras,[25] this Court declared unconstitutional an ordinance characterized by overbreadth. In that case, the
Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan prohibited the operation of all night clubs, cabarets and dance halls within its jurisdiction
for the protection of public morals. Held the Court:

It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable.
The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attainedby a measure that does not encompass
too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved co
uld have been attained by reasonablerestrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria
should be heeded: The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal
or property rights under the guise of police regulation. It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this
instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing
those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.
(Underscoring supplied)[26]

In Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,[27] this Court, in declaring unconstitutional the resolution subject thereof, advanced a
similar consideration. That case involved a resolution issued by the Professional Regulation Commission which prohibited
examinees from attending review classes and receiving handout materials, tips, and the like three days before the date of
examination in order to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations in accountancy. Besides being
unreasonable on its face and violative of academic freedom, the measure was found to be more sweeping than what was
necessary, viz:

Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure
examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means
of review or preparation on those last three precious days when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they
have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day
itself would be like uprooting the tree to get rid of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to
find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from
their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be
set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)[28]

As in De la Cruz[29] and Lupangco,[30] the ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what
is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by
petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly
found by the appellate court. [31] What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to
stop it right there.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised
within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. (Underscoring supplied) [32]

A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.

From the memorandum[33] filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had
identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the
streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing
traffic on the city streets.

Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the
existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the
traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled
to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of
terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that
even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.
Petitioner argues, however, that other solutions for the traffic problem have already been tried but proven ineffective. But
the grant of an exclusive franchise to petitioner has not been shown to be the only solution to the problem.

While the Sangguniang Panlungsod, via Ordinance No. 1557, [34] previously directed bus owners and operators to put up
their terminals outside the poblacion of Lucena City, petitioner informs that said ordinance only resulted in the relocation
of terminals to other well-populated barangays, thereby giving rise to traffic congestion in those areas. [35] Assuming that
information to be true, the Sangguniang Panlungsod was not without remedy. It could have defined, among other
considerations, in a more precise manner, the area of relocation to avoid such consequences.

As for petitioners argument that the challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the power of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to [r]egulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibitencroachments or obstacles thereon and, when
necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public
places:[36] Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads, they are not obstacles.
The buses which indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the city streets are. The power then of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments and obstacles does not extend to terminals.

Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself,
cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the community.

But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their alleged indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they
are nuisance per accidens, not per se.

Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings, as was
done in the case at bar.

In Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals,[37] this Court held:

Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial
proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property
and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The
storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights of
property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing
conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
(Underscoring supplied)[38]

In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac [39] where the appellant-municipality similarly argued that the terminal
involved therein is a nuisance that may be abated by the Municipal Council via an ordinance, this Court held: Suffice it to
say that in the abatement of nuisances the provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 694-707) must be observed and followed.
This appellant failed to do.

As for petitioners claim that the challenged ordinances have actually been proven effective in easing traffic congestion:
Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from whether it is reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness, not
its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness,
then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective.

The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting the establishment of a common
terminal, and similar expressions of support from the private sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court by
petitioner. The weight of popular opinion, however, must be balanced with that of an individuals rights.

There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few
notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a
right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would
deny him that right.[40]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 118127. April 12, 2005]

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as
Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, HON. ERNESTO A. NIEVA, HON.
GONZALO P. GONZALES, HON. AVELINO S. CAILIAN, HON. ROBERTO C. OCAMPO, HON. ALBERTO DOMINGO, HON.
HONORIO U. LOPEZ, HON. FRANCISCO G. VARONA, JR., HON. ROMUALDO S. MARANAN, HON. NESTOR C. PONCE, JR.,
HON. HUMBERTO B. BASCO, HON. FLAVIANO F. CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ROMEO G. RIVERA, HON. MANUEL M. ZARCAL,
HON. PEDRO S. DE JESUS, HON. BERNARDITO C. ANG, HON. MANUEL L. QUIN, HON. JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, HON. CHIKA G.
GO, HON. VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, HON. ERNESTO V.P. MACEDA, JR., HON. ROLANDO P. NIETO, HON. DANILO V.
ROLEDA, HON. GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., HON. MA. PAZ E. HERRERA, HON. JOEY D. HIZON, HON. FELIXBERTO D.
ESPIRITU, HON. KARLO Q. BUTIONG, HON. ROGELIO P. DELA PAZ, HON. BERNARDO D. RAGAZA, HON. MA. CORAZON R.
CABALLES, HON. CASIMIRO C. SISON, HON. BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, JR., HON. MA. LOURDES M. ISIP, HON. ALEXANDER
S. RICAFORT, HON. ERNESTO F. RIVERA, HON. LEONARDO L. ANGAT, and HON. JOCELYN B. DAWIS, in their capacity as
councilors of the City of Manila, petitioners, vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and
MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what you feel bad after.

Ernest Hermingway

Death in the Afternoon, Ch. 1

It is a moral and political axiom that any dishonorable act, if performed by oneself, is less immoral than if performed by
someone else, who would be well-intentioned in his dishonesty.

J. Christopher Gerald

Bonaparte in Egypt, Ch. I

The Courts commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental law of the land. It is
foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals. And if it need be, the Court will not hesitate
to make the hammer fall, and heavily in the words of Justice Laurel, and uphold the constitutional guarantees when faced
with laws that, though not lacking in zeal to promote morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitutionality.

The pivotal issue in this Petition[1] under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure seeking the reversal
of the Decision[2] in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 (lower court), [3] is the
validity of Ordinance No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.[4]

The antecedents are as follows:

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating
hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.[5] It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. [6] On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order [7] (RTC Petition) with
the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L.
Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it
includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. [8]

Enacted by the City Council[9] on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the
said Ordinance is entitled

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF

AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.[10]

The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person, partnership,
corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in
the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to
contract and engage in, any business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where
women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and
adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to:
1. Sauna Parlors

2. Massage Parlors

3. Karaoke Bars

4. Beerhouses

5. Night Clubs

6. Day Clubs

7. Super Clubs

8. Discotheques

9. Cabarets

10. Dance Halls

11. Motels

12. Inns

SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are prohibited from issuing
permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and accepting payments for the operation of business
enumerated in the preceding section.

SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the businesses enumerated in Section 1
hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of this ordinance within which to wind up business
operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of
business allowable within the area,such as but not limited to:

1. Curio or antique shop

2. Souvenir Shops

3. Handicrafts display centers

4. Art galleries

5. Records and music shops

6. Restaurants

7. Coffee shops

8. Flower shops

9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for wholesome family entertainment that cater to
both local and foreign clientele.

10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows, stage and theatrical plays, art
exhibitions, concerts and the like.

11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the zoning ordinances for
Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage depot, dock or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service
station, light industry with any machinery, or funeral establishments.

SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment of one
(1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, that in case of
juridical person, the President, the General Manager, or person-in-charge of operation shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED
FURTHER, that in case of subsequent violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed
and padlocked permanently.

SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.

Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993.

Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)

In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited
establishments, motels and inns such as MTDCs Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for
amusement or entertainment and they were not services or facilities for entertainment, nor did they use women as tools
for entertainment, and neither did they disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants or adversely affect the social and
moral welfare of the community.[11]

MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The City Council
has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv) [12] of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the
Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 499[13] which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone
with certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure
of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected; (4)
The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate
business prior to its enactment; (5) The Ordinance violates MTDCs constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and
constitutes an invasion of plaintiffs property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing
is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of
equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not
pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-
Malate area but not outside of this area. [14]

In their Answer[15] dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to
prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community as provided for
in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code, [16] which reads, thus:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the
city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided
for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

....

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the general
welfare and for said purpose shall:

....

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities, including
theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors,
and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for amusement or
entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension
or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community.

Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila,[17] petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in the above-quoted
provision included the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of exhibition and amusement. [18]

Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral
welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409,
[19]
otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila) [20] which reads, thus:

ARTICLE III

THE MUNICIPAL BOARD

...

Section 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:

...

(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city
and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred
by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six
months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.

Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private respondent had the burden to
prove its illegality or unconstitutionality.[21]
Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the latter simply
disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a commercial zone.
[22]
The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in operation.
[23]
The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation as there
existed substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila. [24]

On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order
against the enforcement of the Ordinance.[25] And on 16 July 1993, again in an intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC. [26]

After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners from
implementing the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of said Decisionreads:[27]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of the City of Manila null and
void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that had been issued by this Court against the defendant.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.[28]

Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal[29] on 12 December 1994, manifesting that they are elevating the
case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law. [30]

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower
court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and
oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499[31] which
allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring
the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.[32]

In the Petition and in its Memorandum,[33] petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the lower court.
They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of the State and
the general welfare clause exercised by local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of
Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. [34] They allege that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of validity. [35]

In its Memorandum[36] dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is void
for being repugnant to the general law. It reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power;
that it is violative of due process, confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful business; that it is
violative of the equal protection clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated discretion in
the execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.

This is an opportune time to express the Courts deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-Malate area being its home
for several decades. A long-time resident, the Court witnessed the areas many turn of events. It relished its glory days and
endured its days of infamy. Much as the Court harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila and yearns to restore its
lost grandeur, it believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end. The Court is of the opinion, and so holds,
that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.

The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates a constitutional
provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the Constitution.
The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts at rendering them worthless.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it
must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
[37]

Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws.
[38]
The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of
consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the
Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local
government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power
from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter.[39]
This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new
provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national legislature is still the principal of the
local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. [40]

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as
agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed with police power in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. [41] This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the
Code, known as the general welfare clause, viz:

SECTION 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity
and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort
and convenience of their inhabitants.

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case, the sangguniang
panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code.
[42]
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations
thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. [43] In the case at bar,
the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to
general laws.

The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:

SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. [44]

SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men.[45]

SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of laws.[46]

Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. [47]

A. The Ordinance infringes

the Due Process Clause

The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat (N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. . . .[48]

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action
should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. This standard is
aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice, [49] and as such it is a
limitation upon the exercise of the police power. [50]

The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals;
to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the government, unrestrained by the established
principles of private rights and distributive justice; to protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from
seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure
to all persons equal and impartial justice and the benefit of the general law. [51]

The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and partnerships are persons
within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned. [52]

This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called procedural due process and
substantive due process.
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives
a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what
form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action. [53]

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away a
persons life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification
for the governments action.[54] Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends
very much on the level of scrutiny used. [55] For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied,
substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an
area where strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive
due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. [56]

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or
despotically[57] as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due
to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears
emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare.[58] Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person
to his life, liberty and property.[59]

Requisites for the valid exercise

of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from
the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. [60] It must be evident that no
other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded.[61]

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights[62] a violation of the due process clause.

The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the establishments in the Ermita-
Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs,
bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels and motels. Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case
of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila [63] had already taken judicial notice of
the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to existence of
motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven
for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.[64]

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the
community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City
Councils police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable regulations looking to the
promotion of the moral and social values of the community. However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals and the
eradication of the communitys social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained
by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their
conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the
social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and establishments of the like which
the City Council may lawfully prohibit,[65] it is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors,
massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns.
This is not warranted under the accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits
which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.

That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal prostitution is of no
moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent
of places that it may even take place in the substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance. If the
flawed logic of the Ordinance were to be followed, in the remote instance that an immoral sexual act transpires in a church
cloister or a court chamber, we would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila ordering the closure of the church or court
concerned. Every house, building, park, curb, street or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the
prohibition. Simply because there are no pure places where there are impure men. Indeed, even the Scripture and the
Tradition of Christians churches continually recall the presence and universality of sin in mans history. [66]

The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be said to be injurious to the
health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the deplorable human activity that may occur within
its premises. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished.
It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption. If that
were so and if that were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only be purged of its supposed social ills, it would
be extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not, in its every nook and cranny would be laid
bare to the estimation of the authorities.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape
morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building
or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the
establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.

While petitioners earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable, they unwittingly punish even the
proprietors and operators of wholesome, innocent establishments. In the instant case, there is a clear invasion of personal
or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and
property in terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of Manila so
desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as
daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its
authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; [67] and it may even impose increased license fees. In other
words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.

Means employed are

constitutionally infirm

The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs,
super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners
and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of
the Ordinancewithin which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area or
convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area. Further, it states in Section 4 that in cases of
subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and
padlocked permanently.

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental
interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty and property.

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be
free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by
his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare. [68] In accordance with this case, the
rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. [69]

The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents,[70] sought to clarify the meaning of liberty. It said:

While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty. . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognizedas essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no
doubt that the meaning of liberty must be broad indeed.

In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. In explaining the respect the
Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these choices, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:

These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty
is the right to define ones own concept of existence, of meaning, of universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood where they formed under compulsion of the State. [71]

Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of the Ordinance may
seek autonomy for these purposes.

Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate
sexual conduct within the motels premisesbe it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any
fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution. [72] Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with
others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the
Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. [73] Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them
the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do not run afoul of the
law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.

Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy as
well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedomit is the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. [74]

The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As the
case of Morfe v. Mutuc,[75] borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:

Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed,
they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the
consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that
experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of
others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense
free.

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a
compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty;
in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into
the personal life of the citizen.[76]

There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the Court chooses to exercise
restraint and restrict itself to the issues presented when it should. The previous pronouncements of the Court are not to be
interpreted as a license for adults to engage in criminal conduct. The reprehensibility of such conduct is not diminished.
The Court only reaffirms and guarantees their right to make this choice. Should they be prosecuted for their illegal conduct,
they should suffer the consequences of the choice they have made. That, ultimately, is their choice.

Modality employed is

unlawful taking

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of
its property.[77] The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate
area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or
convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can
not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property
without just compensation.[78] It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.

The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the Constitution. This is a
restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The constitutional provision is about ensuring that
the government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the
government takes away a persons property to benefit society, then society should pay. The principal purpose of the
guarantee is to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. [79]

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates
or physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the governments regulation leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of the property. [80]

In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,[81] it was held that a taking also could be found if government
regulation of the use of property went too far. When regulation reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support the act. While property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. [82]
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking.
In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was a question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by general
propositions. On many other occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation
constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require
that the economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the government and thus borne by the public as a
whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the public action. [83]

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. [84] A
regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owners point of view,
equivalent to a taking unless principles of nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make
the use prohibitable.[85] When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses
in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking. [86]

A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require compensation under the takings
clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking
nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulations economic effect on the
landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the
character of government action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent the
government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.[87]

A restriction on use of property may also constitute a taking if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed expectations of the owner. [88]

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments three (3) months from its approval within
which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said
businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area. The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a
closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner
converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed business, the structure which housed the previous business will be
left empty and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he will likewise leave the entire establishment idle.
Consideration must be given to the substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices which the owner reasonably
expects to be returned within a period of time. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable
use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.

The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed
businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4
of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a taking of private property.

The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the Ermita-Malate area.
In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional burden imposed on the owner to build
another establishment solely from his coffers. The proffered solution does not put an end to the problem, it merely
relocates it. Not only is this impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The conversion into allowed
enterprises is just as ridiculous. How may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop, art gallery or
music lounge without essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private property without due process of law,
nay, even without compensation.

The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the government. The burden on
the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed permanently after a subsequent violation should
be borne by the public as this end benefits them as a whole.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid
exercise of police power, which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes
the taking of such property without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious
purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of
justice as we know them. The police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal
interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain. It needs restating that the property
taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose while the
property taken under the power of eminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore wholesome.
[89]
If it be of public benefit that a wholesome property remain unused or relegated to a particular purpose, then certainly
the public should bear the cost of reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private property for public use. [90]
Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners actions. It in no way controls or guides
the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth the
conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary
and unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its
execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have
established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. [91]

Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify the
rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the
exercise, of unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions. [92]

Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,[93] as cited in People v. Nazario,[94] the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance
that had made it illegal for three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by. The ordinance was nullified as it imposed no standard at all because one may never know
in advance what annoys some people but does not annoy others.

Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to disturb the community,
annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The cited case supports the
nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process
clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. This is a
sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which
amounts to an interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we take a
resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property.

Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable regulation which is a far cry from the ill-
considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council.

In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas,[95] the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating sexually oriented businesses,
which are defined to include adult arcades, bookstores, video stores, cabarets, motels, and theaters as well as escort
agencies, nude model studio and sexual encounter centers. Among other things, the ordinance required that such
businesses be licensed. A group of motel owners were among the three groups of businesses that filed separate suits
challenging the ordinance. The motel owners asserted that the city violated the due process clause by failing to produce
adequate support for its supposition that renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours resulted in increased crime and other
secondary effects. They likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour limitation on the rental of motel rooms placed an
unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of association. Anent the first contention, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a study which the city considered, was adequate to
support the citys determination that motels permitting room rentals for fewer than ten (10 ) hours should be included
within the licensing scheme. As regards the second point, the Court held that limiting motel room rentals to ten (10) hours
will have no discernible effect on personal bonds as those bonds that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer
than ten (10) hours are not those that have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the nation by cultivating
and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.

The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. It imposed reasonable
restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.

The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,[96] it needs pointing out, is
also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure which regulated the mode in which motels
may conduct business in order to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality. Necessarily, there
was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels.
The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. [97]

The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and personal
rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the guise of exercising
police power, be upheld as valid.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some and unjustly discriminate against others. [98] The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied
the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. [99] The equal
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. [100] It limits governmental discrimination. The equal
protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned. [101]

The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise:

What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: The ideal situation is for the laws
benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be
excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea
of law. There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact exists cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law
susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee
then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the general welfare be
promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely
affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act
assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the
very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote
from the Tuason decision anew that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or
that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection
and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked
upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. [102]

Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate
only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. [103] The classification must, as an
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.

2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. [104]

In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or
other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and
other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions
bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but
not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills
the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to
engage in prostitution. It is not any less grave a sin when men engage in it. And why would the assumption that there is an
ongoing immoral activity apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when men are in harness? This
discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to important government
objectives.[105] Thus, the discrimination is invalid.

Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with prevailing laws.

C. The Ordinance is repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not
prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and maintenance of motels, hotels
and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv), which provides that:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the
city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided
for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
...

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the general
welfare and for said purpose shall:

...

(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports . . . .

While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities,
and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, which
reads as follows:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the
city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided
for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

...

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the general
welfare and for said purpose shall:

...

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities, including
theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors,
and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for amusement or
entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension
or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community.

Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other
similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the
general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment,
operation and maintenance of such establishments. It is well to recall the rulings of the Court in Kwong Sing v. City of
Manila[106] that:

The word regulate, as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code, means and includes the power to
control, to govern, and to restrain; but regulate should not be construed as synonymous with suppress or prohibit.
Consequently, under the power to regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as to
the mode in which the employment or business shall be exercised. [107]

And in People v. Esguerra,[108] wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of the Municipality of Tacloban which prohibited the
selling, giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the municipality is empowered only to regulate the same and not
prohibit. The Court therein declared that:

(A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to regulate or to license and
regulate the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly withheld. [109]

These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners assertion [110] that they were modified by the Code vesting upon City
Councils prohibitory powers.

Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the first clause of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its
powers to regulate, suppress and suspend such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly
those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or
entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community are stated in the second and third
clauses, respectively of the same Section. The several powers of the City Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the
Code, it is pertinent to emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates that the clauses in which
these powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to justify being put together in a single
enumeration or paragraph.[111] These powers, therefore, should not be confused, commingled or consolidated as to create a
conglomerated and unified power of regulation, suppression and prohibition. [112]

The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to regulation
among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments
(Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for
entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among other
events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the
inhabitants or certain forms of amusement or entertainment which the City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.

The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied
or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be
construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be
construed against the City Council. [113] Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium.
This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the
construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise come under
the rule of strict construction.[114]

The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare clause of the
Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without merit. On the first point, the ruling of
the Court in People v. Esguerra,[115] is instructive. It held that:

The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section 2238 of the Revised Administrative
Code, refers to matters not covered by the other provisions of the same Code, and therefore it can not be applied to
intoxicating liquors, for the power to regulate the selling, giving away and dispensing thereof is granted specifically by
section 2242 (g) to municipal councils. To hold that, under the general power granted by section 2238, a municipal council
may enact the ordinance in question, notwithstanding the provision of section 2242 (g), would be to make the latter
superfluous and nugatory, because the power to prohibit, includes the power to regulate, the selling, giving away and
dispensing of intoxicating liquors.

On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will must necessarily prevail
and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or later statute
repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter, which are irreconcilably
inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative will. [116] If there is an
inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes, both relating to the same subject matter, which cannot be removed by
any fair and reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of the legislative will which must prevail and
override the earlier.[117]

Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions contrary to those of an
existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals have been divided into two general classes: those
which occur where an act is so inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of the two can remain
in force and those which occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a substitute
therefor. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest expression of the legislative will should
prevail.[118]

In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of
this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Thus, submitting to petitioners interpretation that the Revised
Charter of Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the Charter stating such must be
considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latters provisions granting the City Council mere regulatory
powers.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety
of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels
are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per
accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its
summary abatement without judicial intervention. [119]

Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and establishments in another
section of the Code which is reproduced as follows:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the
city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided
for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this
connection, shall:

...
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in public
places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other
prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of
drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials
or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;

...

If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the establishments enumerated in
Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of the matters it may
prohibit under the above-quoted Section. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these establishments with houses of
ill-repute and expand the City Councils powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an
effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these establishments may only be regulated in their
establishment, operation and maintenance.

It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That these establishments are
recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local
Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths,
hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the contractors defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section also
defined amusement as a pleasurable diversion and entertainment, synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun;
and amusement places to include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one
seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances. Thus, it can be inferred that the Code
considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula
singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to
each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict
grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under consideration appear in different sections or
are widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies. [120]

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued
by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed
the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump
or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is
that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact
but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law. [121] As succinctly illustrated in Solicitor General v.
Metropolitan Manila Authority:[122]

The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to
legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to
create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested
with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government units cannot
contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactment in question, which are
merely local in origin cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. [123]

Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the rule, it has already been
held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption
must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is
established by proper evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive,
partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. [124]

Conclusion

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is
constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not
sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City
Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for the
cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such character deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of
the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City
Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or
conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws not even under the
guise of police power.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring the Ordinance void is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur

Panganiban, J., in the result.

Ynares- Santiago, J., concur in the result only.

G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), GABRIELA, Fr. Jose Dizon, Renato Constantino, Jr.,
Froyel Yaneza, and Fahima Tajar, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine
National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police District Chief
Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169848 April 25, 2006

Jess Del Prado, Wilson Fortaleza, Leody de Guzman, Pedro Pinlac, Carmelita Morante, Rasti Delizo, Paul Bangay, Marie Jo
Ocampo, Lilia dela Cruz, Cristeta Ramos, Adelaida Ramos, Mary Grace Gonzales, Michael Torres, Rendo Sabusap,
Precious Balute, Roxanne Magboo, Ernie Bautista, Joseph de Jesus, Margarita Escober, Djoannalyn Janier, Magdalena
Sellote, Manny Quiazon, Ericson Dizon, Nenita Cruzat, Leonardo De los Reyes, Pedrito Fadrigon, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his official capacity as The Executive Secretary and in his personal capacity, ANGELO REYES, in his
official capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, ARTURO LOMIBAO, in his official capacity as the
Chief, Philippine National Police, VIDAL QUEROL, in his official capacity as the Chief, National Capital Regional Police
Office (NCRPO), PEDRO BULAONG, in his official capacity as the Chief, Manila Police District (MPD) AND ALL OTHER
PUBLIC OFFICERS GARCIA, and AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION AND
INSTRUCTIONS, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 169881 April 25, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by its Chairperson ELMER C. LABOG and Secretary General JOEL MAGLUNSOD,
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President,
JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, GILDA SUMILANG, FRANCISCO LASTRELLA, and
ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP DIRECTOR GENRAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, HONORABLE MAYOR LITO ATIENZA,
and PNP MPD CHIEF SUPT. PEDRO BULAONG, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Petitioners come in three groups.

The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838,1 allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and
that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was
violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.

The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in G.R. No. 169848,2 who allege that they were
injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently
dispersed by the police. They further assert that on October 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacañang
to protest issuances of the Palace which, they claim, put the country under an "undeclared" martial rule, and the protest
was likewise dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries.

The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No. 169881,3 allege that they conduct peaceful mass
actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual members as citizens, specifically the right to
peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of "Calibrated Preemptive Response" (CPR)
being followed to implement it.

KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but
police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their
members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled
to proceed along España Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police
officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly
dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. 4 Three other rallyists were arrested.

All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as
well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the CPR
policy recently announced.
B.P. No. 880, "The Public Assembly Act of 1985," provides:

Batas Pambansa Blg. 880

An Act Ensuring The Free Exercise By The People Of Their Right Peaceably To Assemble And Petition The Government [And]
For Other Purposes

Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled:

Section 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. – The constitutional right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure
the free exercise of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the law.

Sec. 3. Definition of terms. – For purposes of this Act:

(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or concerted
action held in a public place for the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general public on
any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the
government for redress of grievances.

The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be
governed by local ordinances; Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall be
faithfully observed.

The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and
employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the
Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.

(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street, bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza,
square, and/or any open space of public ownership where the people are allowed access.

(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping
authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.

(d) "Modification of a permit" shall include the change of the place and time of the public assembly, rerouting of the
parade or street march, the volume of loud-speakers or sound system and similar changes.

Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required. – A written permit shall be required for any person or persons to
organize and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be
done or made in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case only the consent
of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in the campus of a government-owned and operated
educational institution which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings
or rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by this Act.

Sec. 5. Application requirements. – All applications for a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:

(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public
assembly; the date, time and duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be used.

(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of the applicant under Section 8 hereof.

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended
activity is to be held, at least five (5) working days before the scheduled public assembly.

(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor
shall cause the same to immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.

Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application. –

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the
premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or
modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within
forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting
such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed
hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.

Sec. 7. Use of Public throroughfare. – Should the proposed public assembly involve the use, for an appreciable length of
time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent
grave public inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or reroute the vehicular
traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue interference with the free flow of commerce and
trade.

Sec. 8. Responsibility of applicant. – It shall be the duty and responsibility of the leaders and organizers of a public assembly
to take all reasonable measures and steps to the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in
accordance with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:

(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;|avvphi|.net

(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of
the public assembly;

(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to the end that the public assembly may be held
peacefully;

(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the time stated in the permit; and

(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do any act unduly interfering with the rights of
other persons not participating in the public assembly.

Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. – Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of
a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a
responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away from the area of
activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.

Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. – It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is
requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper
protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is primordial. Towards this
end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:

(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their
nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must
observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;

(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton
or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;

(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is
attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.

Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. – No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an
assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:

(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of
the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police
or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;

(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking
officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after
allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;

(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during
the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended;

(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a ground for
dispersal.

Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. – When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit
is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.

Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. – The following shall constitute violations of the Act:

(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or organizer without having first secured that
written permit where a permit is required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in any
place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no person can be punished or held criminally liable
for participating in or attending an otherwise peaceful assembly;

(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the provisions of this Act by the mayor or any
other official acting in his behalf;

(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of the application for a permit by the mayor or
any official acting in his behalf;

(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;

(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public
assembly;

(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;

(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public
assembly or on the occasion thereof:

1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;

2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;

3. the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;

4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;

5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns
and loud sound systems.

Sec. 14. Penalties. – Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited acts defined in the immediately
preceding section shall be punished as follows:

(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one month and one day to six months;

(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six
months and one day to six years;

(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years without
prejudice to prosecution under Presidential Decree No. 1866;

(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of one day to thirty days.

Sec. 15. Freedom parks. – Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act
establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as
practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time
without the need of any prior permit.

In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the
period of six months from the effectivity this Act.
Sec. 16. Constitutionality. – Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity or
constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected thereby.

Sec. 17. Repealing clause. – All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions, orders, ordinances or parts thereof which
are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

Sec. 18. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, October 22, 1985.

CPR, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by Malacañang dated September 21, 2005, shown in Annex
"A" to the Petition in G.R. No. 169848, thus:

Malacañang Official

Manila, Philippines NEWS

Release No. 2 September 21, 2005

STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

On Unlawful Mass Actions

In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame the political situation, sow
disorder and incite people against the duly constituted authorities, we have instructed the PNP as well as the local
government units to strictly enforce a "no permit, no rally" policy, disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest
all persons violating the laws of the land as well as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations.

The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The authorities will not stand
aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are
inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of the national community.

Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to be protected by a vigilant
and proactive government.

We appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful conduct befitting of a democratic society.

The President’s call for unity and reconciliation stands, based on the rule of law.

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. 5

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or
absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought.
Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful
cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also,
the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being
tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to
peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It
also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its
provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.

Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two standards stated in the
laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent.

Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in
B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.

Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and therefore B.P. No.
880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this
right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence
of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as
certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.

As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can
perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the
maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the
people of the right to peaceably assemble.

Respondents in G.R. No. 169838 are Eduardo Ermita, as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor Lito Atienza, Chief, of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Gen. Arturo Lomibao, National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) Chief,
PNP Maj. Gen. Vidal Querol, and Manila Police District (MPD) Chief Gen. Pedro Bulaong.

Respondents in G.R. No. 169848 are Eduardo Ermita as Executive Secretary and in his personal capacity; Angelo Reyes, as
Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments; Arturo Lomibao, as Chief Vidal Querol, as Chief, NCRPO; Pedro Bulaong,
as Chief, MPD, and all other public officers and private individuals acting under their control, supervision and instruction.

Respondents in G.R. No. 169881 are the Honorable Executive Secretary, PNP Director General Arturo Lomibao, the
Honorable Mayor Joselito Atienza, and PNP MPD Chief Pedro Bulaong.

Respondents argue that:

1. Petitioners have no standing because they have not presented evidence that they had been "injured, arrested or
detained because of the CPR," and that "those arrested stand to be charged with violating Batas Pambansa [No.] 880 and
other offenses."

2. Neither B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void on its face. Petitioners cannot honestly claim that the time, place and manner
regulation embodied in B.P. No. 880 violates the three-pronged test for such a measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is content-
neutral, i.e., it has no reference to content of regulated speech; (b) B.P. No. 880 is narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, i.e., the interest cannot be equally well served by a means that is less intrusive of free speech
interests; and (c) B.P. No. 880 leaves open alternative channels for communication of the information. 6

3. B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral as seen from the text of the law. Section 5 requires the statement of the public assembly’s
time, place and manner of conduct. It entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue
interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880 authorizes the denial of a permit
on the basis of a rally’s program content or the statements of the speakers therein, except under the constitutional precept
of the "clear and present danger test." The status of B.P. No. 880 as a content-neutral regulation has been recognized
in Osmeña v. Comelec.7

4. Adiong v. Comelec8 held that B.P. No. 880 is a content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public
assemblies and the law passes the test for such regulation, namely, these regulations need only a substantial governmental
interest to support them.

5. Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court9 held that a local chief executive has the authority to exercise police power to
meet "the demands of the common good in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience." Furthermore, the
discretion given to the mayor is narrowly circumscribed by Sections 5 (d), and 6 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), 13 and 15 of the law.

6. The standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent. "Clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will
create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health" and
"imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil" both express the meaning of the "clear and present danger test." 10

7. CPR is simply the responsible and judicious use of means allowed by existing laws and ordinances to protect public
interest and restore public order. Thus, it is not accurate to call it a new rule but rather it is a more pro-active and dynamic
enforcement of existing laws, regulations and ordinances to prevent chaos in the streets. It does not replace the rule of
maximum tolerance in B.P. No. 880.

Respondent Mayor Joselito Atienza, for his part, submitted in his Comment that the petition in G.R. No. 169838 should be
dismissed on the ground that Republic Act No. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No.
880; that his denials of permits were under the "clear and present danger" rule as there was a clamor to stop rallies that
disrupt the economy and to protect the lives of other people; that J. B. L. Reyes v. Bagatsing,11 Primicias v.
Fugoso,12 and Jacinto v. CA,13 have affirmed the constitutionality of requiring a permit; that the permit is for the use of a
public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulation because it covers all
rallies.

The petitions were ordered consolidated on February 14, 2006. After the submission of all the Comments, the Court set the
cases for oral arguments on April 4, 2006, 14 stating the principal issues, as follows:

1. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a) and 14(a) thereof, and Republic
Act No. 7160:

(a) Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations?

(b) Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness?

(c) Do they constitute prior restraint?

(d) Are they undue delegations of powers to Mayors?

(e) Do they violate international human rights treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

2. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR):

(a) Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness?

(b) Is it void for lack of publication?

(c) Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the rallies of September 26 and October 4, 5 and 6, 2005?

During the course of the oral arguments, the following developments took place and were approved and/or noted by the
Court:

1. Petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual
issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September
20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.

2. The Solicitor General agreed with the observation of the Chief Justice that CPR should no longer be used as a legal term
inasmuch as, according to respondents, it was merely a "catchword" intended to clarify what was thought to be a
misunderstanding of the maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. No. 880 and that, as stated in the affidavit executed by
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and submitted to the Ombudsman, it does not replace B.P. No. 880 and the maximum
tolerance policy embodied in that law.

The Court will now proceed to address the principal issues, taking into account the foregoing developments.

Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the
right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all who
would publicly assemble in the nation’s streets and parks. They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies
without the required permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the
Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed
the public assemblies held without the permit.

Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection.
For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto v. CA,15 the Court, as early as the onset of this century, in U.S. v.
Apurado,16 already upheld the right to assembly and petition, as follows:

There is no question as to the petitioners’ rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of
grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in
peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and 8 of
the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed
pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these rights. As early as the onset of this century, this
Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly and petition and even went as far as to acknowledge:

"It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against
grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement,
and the greater, the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the disciplinary control of
the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such
disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and
tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would
become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable
manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes
which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct
occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must
be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly
and a tumultuous uprising."
Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso,17 the Court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition
over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks.

Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this Court said:

The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are
fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it
is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute
for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious
to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
termed the sovereign "police power," which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the
government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil
rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their
legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose. 18

Reyes v. Bagatsing19 further expounded on the right and its limits, as follows:

1. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful
assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for
redress of grievances." Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or
contempt proceedings unless there be a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to
prevent." Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of
matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a
necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion
of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or
coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not
identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the
judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a
limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate
public interest.

2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and peaceable assembly better expressed than in this
excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of
the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful
means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes
of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of violence can
lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be
sheltered by the Constitution." What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal
or printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety valve,
allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the
peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. Nor is
this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It means more than just the right to be heard of the person who feels
aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth
hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is
guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion
under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is
ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in an early
Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United States v. Apurado: "It is rather to be expected that more or less
disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on
such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense
the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers." It
bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism
must be avoided. To give free rein to one’s destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high
estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.
There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of
Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality
opinion, of 1939 vintage, of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: "Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has,
from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the
United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the
interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or
denied." The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in
Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this Court categorically affirmed that plazas or parks and streets are
outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. Reference
was made to such plaza "being a promenade for public use," which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To
repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally starting from a
public park that is the Luneta.

4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the US embassy, hardly two blocks away
at the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that the then Mayor
Fugoso of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court categorically
declared: "Our conclusion finds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In
that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. chap. 145, section 2, providing that no parade or procession upon any ground
abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town
or from licensing committee,’ was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing
board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its
decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that ‘a statute
requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local
authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as
the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a
consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the public
convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to
issue or refuse license, * * *. "Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be
ignored: "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public
order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The authority of a municipality to
impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never
been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon
which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this
recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public
convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other
circumstances would be entitled to protection."

xxx

6. x x x The principle under American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: "The question,
if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting
is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of
the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects." There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a
gathering were marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty parties
should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in
determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires
that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant
circumstances, still the assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is that the
permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking
for the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."

xxx

8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date,
the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the
one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public
official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at
another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test
be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must
be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our
scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, -- even more so than on the other
departments – rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No
verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes
"as the sovereign prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of
justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. x x x.

B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court rendered its decision in Reyes.

The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes:

Reyes v. Bagatsing B.P. No. 880

(G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983,
125 SCRA 553, 569)
8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to
hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority
of the date, the public place where and the time when
it will take place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required. Such application should be
filed well ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may be valid
objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but
at another public place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear
and present danger test be the standard for the
decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such
an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil,
the applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse,
must be transmitted to them at the earliest
opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse
to the proper judicial authority.
Sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required.--
A written permit shall be required for any person or
persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a
public place. However, no permit shall be required if
the public assembly shall be done or made in a
freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or
in private property, in which case only the consent of
the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required, or in the campus of a government-owned
and operated educational institution which shall be
subject to the rules and regulations of said educational
institution. Political meetings or rallies held during any
election campaign period as provided for by law are
not covered by this Act.
Sec. 5. Application requirements.-- All applications for
a permit shall comply with the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall
include the names of the leaders or organizers; the
purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and
duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for
the intended activity; and the probable number of
persons participating, the transport and the public
address systems to be used.

(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and

responsibility of applicant under Section 8 hereof.

(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the

mayor of the city or municipality in whose jurisdiction
the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5)
working days before the scheduled public assembly.

(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be

duly acknowledged in writing, the office of the city or
municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately
be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or
municipal building.

Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application. –

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official

acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall

 act on the application within two (2) working days
from the date the application was filed, failing which,
the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any
reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
refuse to accept the application for a permit, said
application shall be posted by the applicant on the
premises of the office of the mayor and shall be
deemed to have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent

and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the
denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard
on the matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and

served on the applica[nt] within twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf

denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in
his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in
an appropriate court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial

Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the
Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be
appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight
(48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond
and record on appeal shall be required. A decision
granting such permit or modifying it in terms
satisfactory to the applicant shall be immediately
executory.

(g) All cases filed in court under this section shall be

decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of
filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately
endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in
his absence, to the next in rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the

Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal

appeals are hereby allowed.

It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates
the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec,20 where the Court referred to it
as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies. 21

A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies22 that would
use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for
lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion,"
"protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The
words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot
be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of
the expressions in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, thus:

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Article 20

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

xxx

Article 29

1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the
just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Article 19.

1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through
any other media of his choice.

3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It
may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions. "Public" does not have to be
defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known. Webster’s Dictionary defines it, thus: 23

public, n, x x x 2a: an organized body of people x x x 3: a group of people distinguished by common interests or
characteristics x x x.

Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The law refers to "rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or
any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place." So it does not cover any and all kinds of gatherings.

Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent
needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent.

There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.

As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard – the clear and present
danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to "imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially
means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same power
independently under Republic Act No. 7160 24 is thus not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued
by the parties in their arguments.

Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through the creation of freedom
parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time:

Sec. 15. Freedom parks. – Every city and municipality in the country shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act
establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as
practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time
without the need of any prior permit.

In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish the freedom parks within the
period of six months from the effectivity this Act.

This brings up the point, however, of compliance with this provision.

The Solicitor General stated during the oral arguments that, to his knowledge, only Cebu City has declared a freedom park
– Fuente Osmeña.

That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since been converted into a golf course, he added.
If this is so, the degree of observance of B.P. No. 880’s mandate that every city and municipality set aside a freedom park
within six months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20 years ago, would be pathetic and regrettable. The matter appears to
have been taken for granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose from the peaceful revolution of 1986.

Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential part of the law’s system of regulation of the people’s
exercise of their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from
the finality of this Decision, no prior permit may be required for the exercise of such right in any public park or plaza of a
city or municipality until that city or municipality shall have complied with Section 15 of the law. For without such
alternative forum, to deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right. Advance notices should, however, be given to
the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings.

The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR. As stated earlier, the Solicitor General has conceded that the use of the
term should now be discontinued, since it does not mean anything other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in
B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit of respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, submitted by the Solicitor
General, thus:

14. The truth of the matter is the policy of "calibrated preemptive response" is in consonance with the legal definition of
"maximum tolerance" under Section 3 (c) of B.P. Blg. 880, which is the "highest degree of restraint that the military, police
and other peacekeeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same." Unfortunately,
however, the phrase "maximum tolerance" has acquired a different meaning over the years. Many have taken it to mean
inaction on the part of law enforcers even in the face of mayhem and serious threats to public order. More so, other felt
that they need not bother secure a permit when holding rallies thinking this would be "tolerated." Clearly, the popular
connotation of "maximum tolerance" has departed from its real essence under B.P. Blg. 880.

15. It should be emphasized that the policy of maximum tolerance is provided under the same law which requires all pubic
assemblies to have a permit, which allows the dispersal of rallies without a permit, and which recognizes certain instances
when water cannons may be used. This could only mean that "maximum tolerance" is not in conflict with a "no permit, no
rally policy" or with the dispersal and use of water cannons under certain circumstances for indeed, the maximum amount
of tolerance required is dependent on how peaceful or unruly a mass action is. Our law enforcers should calibrate their
response based on the circumstances on the ground with the view to preempting the outbreak of violence.

16. Thus, when I stated that calibrated preemptive response is being enforced in lieu of maximum tolerance I clearly was
not referring to its legal definition but to the distorted and much abused definition that it has now acquired. I only wanted
to disabuse the minds of the public from the notion that law enforcers would shirk their responsibility of keeping the peace
even when confronted with dangerously threatening behavior. I wanted to send a message that we would no longer be lax
in enforcing the law but would henceforth follow it to the letter. Thus I said, "we have instructed the PNP as well as the
local government units to strictly enforce a no permit, no rally policy . . . arrest all persons violating the laws of the land . . .
unlawful mass actions will be dispersed." None of these is at loggerheads with the letter and spirit of Batas Pambansa Blg.
880. It is thus absurd for complainants to even claim that I ordered my co-respondents to violate any law. 25

At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose
if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be
followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum tolerance, which specifically means the
following:

Sec. 3. Definition of terms. – For purposes of this Act:

xxx

(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other peace keeping
authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the same.

xxx

Sec. 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities. – Law enforcement agencies shall not interfere with the holding of
a public assembly. However, to adequately ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a
responsible police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meters away from the area of
activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.

Sec. 10. Police assistance when requested. – It shall be imperative for law enforcement agencies, when their assistance is
requested by the leaders or organizers, to perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper
protection to those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is
primordial.1avvphil.net Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following guidelines:

(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their
nameplates and units to which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their uniform and must
observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of firearms but may be equipped with baton
or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;

(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device shall not be used unless the public assembly is
attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.

Sec. 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit. – No public assembly with a permit shall be dispersed. However, when an
assembly becomes violent, the police may disperse such public assembly as follows:

(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law enforcement contingent shall call the attention of
the leaders of the public assembly and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;

(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects from the participants are thrown at the police
or at the non-participants, or at any property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;

(c) If the violence or disturbance prevailing as stated in the preceding subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking
officer of the law enforcement contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly, and after
allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to forthwith disperse;

(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during the public assembly unless he violates during
the assembly a law, statute, ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended;

(d) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or breach of the peace during the public assembly shall not constitute a ground for
dispersal.

xxx

Sec. 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit. – When the public assembly is held without a permit where a permit
is required, the said public assembly may be peacefully dispersed.

Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. – The following shall constitute violations of the Act:

(e) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly;

(f) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement agency or any person to disperse the public
assembly;

(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters from the area of activity of the public
assembly or on the occasion thereof:

xxx

4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;

5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns
and loud sound systems.

Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do not act on applications for
a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed.
In such a situation, as a necessary consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an
application duly filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their application without
the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the
authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed
following the procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.

In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly
vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that "in cases involving liberty, the scales
of justice should weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the
dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy
presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to heightenedscrutiny."26

For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck
down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify
abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict
freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being
insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the
power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger"
standard.

In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30
days within which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks
are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned
shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an assembly therein.
The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly
activities.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa
No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and
municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices,
no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a
city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated Preemptive Response
(CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents
are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance. The petitions
are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
EN BANC

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, G.R. No. 167798

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF

LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG

MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU),

JOSELITO V. USTAREZ,

EMILIA P. DAPULANG,

SALVADOR T. CARRANZA,

MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and

ROQUE M. TAN,

Petitioners,

- versus -

THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,

NATIONAL ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,

and THE SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and

MANAGEMENT,

Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

BAYAN MUNA Representatives G.R. No. 167930

SATUR C. OCAMPO, TEODORO

A. CASIO, and JOEL G. VIRADOR, Present:

GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY

Representative LIZA L. MAZA, PANGANIBAN, C.J.,

ANAKPAWIS Representatives PUNO,

RAFAEL V. MARIANO QUISUMBING,

and CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, YNARES-SANTIAGO,

Rep. FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

Rep. EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, CARPIO,

Rep. LORENZO R. TAADA III, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO CORONA,

and RENATO M. REYES, JR. CARPIO-MORALES,

of BAYAN, MARIE HILAO-ENRIQUEZ CALLEJO, SR.,

of KARAPATAN, ANTONIO L. TINIO AZCUNA,

of ACT, FERDINAND GAITE TINGA,

of COURAGE, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG CHICO-NAZARIO,

of AGHAM, WILFREDO MARBELLA GARCIA, and

of KMP, LANA LINABAN of GABRIELA, VELASCO, Jr., JJ.

AMADO GAT INCIONG,

RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR.,

DEAN PACIFICO H. AGABIN,

SHARON R. DUREMDES of the

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

IN THE PHILIPPINES, and

BRO. EDMUNDO L. FERNANDEZ (FSC)

of the ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR

RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS OF THE

PHILIPPINES (AMRSP),

Petitioners,

- versus -

EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as

Executive Secretary, ROMULO NERI,

in his capacity as Director-General

of the NATIONAL ECONOMIC and

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA)

and the Administrator of the Promulgated:

NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO),

Respondents. April 19, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads:

REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO

STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, good governance is a major thrust of this Administration;

WHEREAS, the existing multiple identification systems in government have created unnecessary and costly redundancies
and higher costs to government, while making it inconvenient for individuals to be holding several identification cards;

WHEREAS, there is urgent need to streamline and integrate the processes and issuance of identification cards in
government to reduce costs and to provide greater convenience for those transacting business with government;

WHEREAS, a unified identification system will facilitate private businesses, enhance the integrity and reliability of
government-issued identification cards in private transactions, and prevent violations of laws involving false names and
identities.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following:

Section 1. Adoption of a unified multi-purpose identification (ID) system for government. All government agencies,
including government-owned and controlled corporations, are hereby directed to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system
to ensure the attainment of the following objectives:

a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the government and the public brought about by the
use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database containing the same or related information;

b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and those availing of government
services;

c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID card as provided under
this executive order;

d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and

e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service.

Section 2. Coverage All government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their
members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order.

Section 3. Data requirement for the unified ID system The data to be collected and recorded by the participating agencies
shall be limited to the following:

Name

Home Address

Sex

Picture

Signature

Date of Birth

Place of Birth

Marital Status

Names of Parents
Height

Weight

Two index fingers and two thumbmarks

Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others

Tax Identification Number (TIN)

Provided that a corresponding ID number issued by the participating agency and a common reference number shall form
part of the stored ID data and, together with at least the first five items listed above, including the print of the right
thumbmark, or any of the fingerprints as collected and stored, shall appear on the face or back of the ID card for visual
verification purposes.

Section 4. Authorizing the Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, to Harmonize All
Government Identification Systems. The Director-General, National Economic Development Authority, is hereby authorized
to streamline and harmonize all government ID systems.

Section 5. Functions and responsibilities of the Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority. In
addition to his organic functions and responsibilities, the Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority,
shall have the following functions and responsibilities:

a. Adopt within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this executive order a unified government ID system containing only
such data and features, as indicated in Section 3 above, to validly establish the identity of the card holder:

b. Enter into agreements with local governments, through their respective leagues of governors or mayors, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and with other branches or instrumentalities of the government, for the purpose of
ensuring government-wide adoption of and support to this effort to streamline the ID systems in government;

b. Call on any other government agency or institution, or create subcommittees or technical working groups, to
provide such assistance as may be necessary or required for the effective performance of its functions; and

d. Promulgate such rules or regulations as may be necessary in pursuance of the objectives of this executive order.

Section 6. Safeguards. The Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, and the pertinent agencies
shall adopt such safeguard as may be necessary and adequate to ensure that the right to privacy of an individual takes
precedence over efficient public service delivery. Such safeguards shall, as a minimum, include the following:

a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of establishing the identity of a person, shall
be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;

b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a persons right to privacy shall be allowed or
tolerated under this order;

c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall be instituted;

d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written
authorization of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;

e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security features and cryptographic technology; and

f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for any correction or revision of relevant data,
or under such conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card shall prescribe.

Section 7. Funding. Such funds as may be recommended by the Department of Budget and Management shall be provided
to carry out the objectives of this executive order.

Section 8. Repealing clause. All executive orders or issuances, or portions thereof, which are inconsistent with
this executive order, are hereby revoked, amended or modified accordingly.

Section 9. Effectivity. This executive order shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 13 th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and Five.
Thus, under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to
adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative
functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right
to privacy.[1]

Petitioners in G.R. No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void based on the following grounds:

1. EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards and violates the decision of this Honorable Court in Ople v. Torres et
al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998. It also violates RA 8282 otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997.

2. The Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as she has no power to issue EO 420. Furthermore, the
implementation of the EO will use public funds not appropriated by Congress for that purpose.

3. EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to privacy

(i) It allows access to personal confidential data without the owners consent.

(ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or penalties for any violation of its provisions.

(iii) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the necessity of EO 420.

4. Granting without conceding that the President may issue EO 420, the Executive Order was issued without public hearing.

5. EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on equal protection of laws and results in the discriminatory treatment of
and penalizes those without ID.[2]

Issues

Essentially, the petitions raise two issues. First, petitioners claim that EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the
President. Second, petitioners claim that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy.

Respondents question the legal standing of petitioners and the ripeness of the petitions. Even assuming that petitioners
are bereft of legal standing, the Court considers the issues raised under the circumstances of paramount public concern or
of transcendental significance to the people. The petitions also present a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial
determination because all government entities currently issuing identification cards are mandated to implement EO 420,
which petitioners claim is patently unconstitutional. Hence, the Court takes cognizance of the petitions.

The Courts Ruling

The petitions are without merit.

On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power

Section 2 of EO 420 provides, Coverage. All government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations
issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order. EO 420 applies only to
government entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions under existing laws. These government entities have
already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420. Examples of these government entities are the GSIS,[3] SSS,[4] Philhealth,
[5]
Mayors Office,[6] LTO,[7] PRC,[8] and similar government entities.

Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system. Thus, all government
entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and
format for their IDs. Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and format, namely:

a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the government and the public brought about
by the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database containing the same or related information;

b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and those availing of
government services;

c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID card as provided under this
executive order;

d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and

e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service.

In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability,
insure compatibility, and provide convenience to the people served by government entities.

Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the uniform ID system to only 14 specific items,
namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) Marital
Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent
distinguishing features like moles or others; and (14) Tax Identification Number.

These limited and specific data are the usual data required for personal identification by government entities, and even by
the private sector. Any one who applies for or renews a drivers license provides to the LTO all these 14 specific data.

At present, government entities like LTO require considerably more data from applicants for identification purposes. EO 420
will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in the ID databases of the government entities. Government
entities cannot collect or record data, for identification purposes, other than the 14 specific data.

Various laws allow several government entities to collect and record data for their ID systems, either expressly or impliedly
by the nature of the functions of these government entities. Under their existing ID systems, some government entities
collect and record more data than what EO 420 allows. At present, the data collected and recorded by government entities
are disparate, and the IDs they issue are dissimilar.

In the case of the Supreme Court, [9] the IDs that the Court issues to all its employees, including the Justices, contain 15
specific data, namely: (1) Name; (2) Picture; (3) Position; (4) Office Code Number; (5) ID Number; (6) Height; (7) Weight; (8)
Complexion; (9) Color of Hair; (10) Blood Type; (11) Right Thumbmark; (12) Tax Identification Number; (13) GSIS Policy
Number; (14) Name and Address of Person to be Notified in Case of Emergency; and (15) Signature. If we consider that the
picture in the ID can generally also show the sex of the employee, the Courts ID actually contains 16 data.

In contrast, the uniform ID format under Section 3 of EO 420 requires only the first five items listed in Section 3, plus the
fingerprint, agency number and the common reference number, or only eight specific data. Thus, at present, the Supreme
Courts ID contains far more data than the proposed uniform ID for government entities under EO 420. The nature of the
data contained in the Supreme Court ID is also far more financially sensitive, specifically the Tax Identification Number.

Making the data collection and recording of government entities unified, and making their ID formats uniform, will
admittedly achieve substantial benefits. These benefits are savings in terms of procurement of equipment and supplies,
compatibility in systems as to hardware and software, ease of verification and thus increased reliability of data, and the
user-friendliness of a single ID format for all government entities.

There is no dispute that government entities can individually limit the collection and recording of their data to the 14
specific items in Section 3 of EO 420. There is also no dispute that these government entities can individually adopt the ID
format as specified in Section 3 of EO 420. Such an act is certainly within the authority of the heads or governing boards of
the government entities that are already authorized under existing laws to issue IDs.

A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these
existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the government
entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they can
also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in substantial savings,
greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of
legislative power.

Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive
department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. The same Section also mandates the
President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of
their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency,
reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and
does not need any implementing legislation.

Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the
Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the
COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID cards. [10] This only shows that EO 420 does not
establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all
branches of government.

The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. There are several laws
mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. [11] The
adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in
general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not usurped
legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents constitutional power of control
over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make,
alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures
efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of government entities
under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.

The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID card does not require
legislation. Private employers routinely issue ID cards to their employees. Private and public schools also routinely issue ID
cards to their students. Even private clubs and associations issue ID cards to their members. The purpose of all these ID
cards is simply to insure the proper identification of a person as an employee, student, or member of a club. These ID
cards, although imposed as a condition for exercising a privilege, are voluntary because a person is not compelled to be an
employee, student or member of a club.

What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system. First, when the implementation of
an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second,
when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the independent constitutional
commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card
system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such
purpose, such that the citizens right to privacy is infringed.

In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government
entities covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all branches of
government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of
personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are
far less than the data collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.

EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420
applies only to government entities that under existing laws are already collecting data and issuing ID cards as part of their
governmental functions. Every government entity that presently issues an ID card will still issue its own ID card under its
own name. The only difference is that the ID card will contain only the five data specified in Section 3 of EO 420, plus the
fingerprint, the agency ID number, and the common reference number which is needed for cross-verification to ensure
integrity and reliability of identification.

This Court should not interfere how government entities under the Executive department should undertake cost savings,
achieve efficiency in operations, insure compatibility of equipment and systems, and provide user-friendly service to the
public. The collection of ID data and issuance of ID cards are day-to-day functions of many government entities under
existing laws. Even the Supreme Court has its own ID system for employees of the Court and all first and second level
courts. The Court is even trying to unify its ID system with those of the appellate courts, namely the Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals.

There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts within the Judiciary. The same is true for
government entities under the Executive department.If government entities under the Executive department decide to
unify their existing ID data collection and ID card issuance systems to achieve savings, efficiency, compatibility and
convenience, such act does not involve the exercise of any legislative power. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not
constitute usurpation of legislative power.

On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy

All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance
of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government
entities violate their right to privacy. There have also been no complaints of abuse by these government entities in the
collection and recording of personal identification data.

In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of government entities prior to EO 420 violate their
right to privacy. Since petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis to complain against the unified ID
system under EO 420. The data collected and stored for the unified ID system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14
specific data, and the ID card itself will show only eight specific data. The data collection, recording and ID card system
under EO 420 will even require less data collected, stored and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to EO 420.

Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind, nature and extent of data to be collected and
stored for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record only the 14 specific data mentioned
in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven
less data than what the Supreme Courts ID shows.

Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities prescribing safeguards on the collection,
recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to protect the right to privacy. Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, the
following safeguards are instituted:

a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of establishing the identity of a
person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;

b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a persons right to privacy be allowed
or tolerated under this order;

c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall be instituted;

d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly confidential and a personal or
written authorization of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;

e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security features and cryptographic
technology;

f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for any correction or revision of
relevant data, or under such conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card shall prescribe.

On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected,
recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards
to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict
administrative safeguards.

The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. Some one hundred
countries have compulsory national ID systems, including democracies such as Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, Greece,
Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other countries which do not have national ID systems, like the United States, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the Nordic Countries and Sweden, have sectoral cards for health, social or other public
services.[12] Even with EO 420, the Philippines will still fall under the countries that do not have compulsory national ID
systems but allow only sectoral cards for social security, health services, and other specific purposes.

Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, and LTO cannot perform effectively and
efficiently their mandated functions under existing laws. Without a reliable ID system, GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and similar
government entities stand to suffer substantial losses arising from false names and identities. The integrity of the LTOs
licensing system will suffer in the absence of a reliable ID system.
The dissenting opinion cites three American decisions on the right to privacy, namely, Griswold v. Connecticut,
[13]
U.S. Justice Department v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,[14] and Whalen v. Roe.[15] The last two decisions
actually support the validity of EO 420, while the first is inapplicable to the present case.

In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law that prohibited the use and distribution of
contraceptives because enforcement of the law would allow the police entry into the bedrooms of married
couples. Declared the U.S. Supreme Court: Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of the marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding
the marriage relationship. Because the facts and the issue involved in Griswold are materially different from the present
case, Griswold has no persuasive bearing on the present case.

In U.S. Justice Department, the issue was not whether the State could collect and store information on individuals from
public records nationwide but whether the State could withhold such information from the press. The premise of the issue
in U.S. Justice Department is that the State can collect and store in a central database information on citizens gathered
from public records across the country. In fact, the law authorized the Department of Justice to collect and preserve
fingerprints and other criminal identification records nationwide. The law also authorized the Department of Justice to
exchange such information with officials of States, cities and other institutions.The Department of Justice treated such
information as confidential. A CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee demanded the criminal records of
four members of a family pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Freedom of
Information Act expressly exempts release of information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, and the information demanded falls under that category of exempt information.

With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected and recorded under EO 420 are
treated as strictly confidential under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential but also personal
matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the peoples right to information on matters of public
concern. The data treated as strictly confidential under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern,
these data cannot be released to the public or the press. Thus, the ruling in U.S. Justice Department does not collide with
EO 420 but actually supports the validity EO 420.

Whalen v. Roe is the leading American case on the constitutional protection for control over information. In Whalen, the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a New York law that required doctors to furnish the government reports
identifying patients who received prescription drugs that have a potential for abuse. The government maintained a central
computerized database containing the names and addresses of the patients, as well as the identity of the prescribing
doctors. The law was assailed because the database allegedly infringed the right to privacy of individuals who want to keep
their personal matters confidential. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the privacy claim, and declared:

Disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health
agencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the
character of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to representatives of the State having responsibility for the health of
the community does not automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy. (Emphasis supplied)

Compared to the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York State in Whalen, the 14 specific data
required for disclosure to the Philippine government under EO 420 are far less sensitive and far less personal. In fact, the
14 specific data required under EO 420 are routine data for ID systems, unlike the sensitive and potentially embarrassing
medical records of patients taking prescription drugs. Whalen, therefore, carries persuasive force for upholding the
constitutionality of EO 420 as non-violative of the right to privacy.

Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have reiterated Whalen. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
[16]
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a law that required doctors performing abortions to fill up forms, maintain
records for seven years, and allow the inspection of such records by public health officials.The U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that recordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and
that properly respect a patients confidentiality and privacy are permissible.

Again, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, [17] the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a law that required
doctors performing an abortion to file a report to the government that included the doctors name, the womans age, the
number of prior pregnancies and abortions that the woman had, the medical complications from the abortion, the weight
of the fetus, and the marital status of the woman. In case of state-funded institutions, the law made such information
publicly available. In Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: The collection of information with respect to actual patients is a
vital element of medical research, and so it cannot be said that the requirements serve no purpose other than to make
abortion more difficult.

Compared to the disclosure requirements of personal data that the U.S. Supreme Court have upheld
in Whalen, Danforth and Casey as not violative of the right to privacy,the disclosure requirements under EO 420 are far
benign and cannot therefore constitute violation of the right to privacy. EO 420 requires disclosure of 14 personal data that
are routine for ID purposes, data that cannot possibly embarrass or humiliate anyone.

Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere
facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing
comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres[18] is not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that
case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the
subject matter required legislation. As then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his
concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, The voting is decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it is only on this
ground that the petition is granted by this Court.

EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular
functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do not already possess
under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish
a National Computerized Identification Reference System,[19] a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed
executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data
collection and card issuance system where none existed before.

In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of
government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the
public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents constitutional power of control over
government entities in the Executive department, as well as under the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420 is declared VALID.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 158793 June 8, 2006

JAMES MIRASOL, RICHARD SANTIAGO, and LUZON MOTORCYCLISTS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse the Decision dated 10 March 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
147, Makati City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 01-034, as well as the RTC’s Order dated 16 June 2003 which denied petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners assert that Department of Public Works and Highways’ (DPWH) Department Order
No. 74 (DO 74), Department Order No. 215 (DO 215), and the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of
the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) violate Republic Act No. 2000 (RA 2000) or the Limited Access Highway Act. Petitioners also
seek to declare Department Order No. 123 (DO 123) and Administrative Order No. 1 (AO 1) 2 unconstitutional.

Antecedent Facts

The facts are not in dispute. As summarized by the Solicitor General, the facts are as follows:

1. On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a Petition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 01-034. The petition sought the declaration of
nullity of the following administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act 2000, entitled
"Limited Access Highway Act" enacted in 1957:

a. DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968;

b. DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993;

c. Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB).

2. Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH issued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215
declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as limited access facilities.

3. Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of
nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth
of North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.

4. On June 28, 2001, the trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Teofilo Guadiz, after due hearing, issued an order granting
petitioners’ application for preliminary injunction. On July 16, 2001, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial
court, conditioned upon petitioners’ filing of cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00, which petitioners subsequently
complied with.

5. On July 18, 2001, the DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued Department Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with engine
displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways).

6. Upon the assumption of Honorable Presiding Judge Ma. Cristina Cornejo, both the petitioners and respondents were
required to file their respective Memoranda. Petitioners likewise filed [their] Supplemental Memorandum. Thereafter, the
case was deemed submitted for decision.

7. Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court issued the assailed decision dismissing the petition but declaring invalid
DO 123. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition; but it was denied by the trial court in its
Order dated June 16, 2003.3

Hence, this petition.

The RTC’s Ruling

The dispositive portion of the RTC’s Decision dated 10 March 2003 reads:

WHEREFORE, [t]he Petition is denied/dismissed insofar as petitioners seek to declare null and void ab initio DPWH
Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993, Administrative Order No. 1, and Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited
Access Facilities promulgated by the DPWH thru the TRB, the presumed validity thereof not having been overcome; but the
petition is granted insofar as DPWH Department Order No. 123 is concerned, declaring the same to be invalid for being
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.4
The Issues

Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution:

1. WHETHER THE RTC’S DECISION IS ALREADY BARRED BY RES JUDICATA;

2. WHETHER DO 74, DO 215 AND THE TRB REGULATIONS CONTRAVENE RA 2000; AND

3. WHETHER AO 1 AND DO 123 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 5

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

Whether the RTC’s Decision Dismissing Petitioners’ Case is Barred by Res Judicata

Petitioners rely on the RTC’s Order dated 28 June 2001, which granted their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Since respondents did not appeal from that Order, petitioners argue that the Order became "a final judgment" on the
issues. Petitioners conclude that the RTC erred when it subsequently dismissed their petition in its Decision dated 10
March 2003.

Petitioners are mistaken. As the RTC correctly stated, the Order dated 28 June 2001 was not an adjudication on the merits
of the case that would trigger res judicata. A preliminary injunction does not serve as a final determination of the issues. It
is a provisional remedy, which merely serves to preserve the status quo until the court could hear the merits of the
case.6 Thus, Section 9 of Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires the issuance of a final injunction to confirm
the preliminary injunction should the court during trial determine that the acts complained of deserve to be permanently
enjoined. A preliminary injunction is a mere adjunct, an ancillary remedy which exists only as an incident of the main
proceeding.7

Validity of DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB Regulations

Petitioners claim that DO 74,8 DO 215,9 and the TRB’s Rules and Regulations issued under them violate the provisions of RA
2000. They contend that the two issuances unduly expanded the power of the DPWH in Section 4 of RA 2000 to regulate
toll ways. Petitioners assert that the DPWH’s regulatory authority is limited to acts like redesigning curbings or central
dividing sections. They claim that the DPWH is only allowed to re-design the physical structure of toll ways, and not to
determine "who or what can be qualified as toll way users." 10

Section 4 of RA 200011 reads:

SEC. 4. Design of limited access facility. — The Department of Public Works and Communications is authorized to so
design any limited access facility and to so regulate, restrict, or prohibit access as to best serve the traffic for which such
facility is intended; and its determination of such design shall be final. In this connection, it is authorized to divide and
separate any limited access facility into separate roadways by the construction of raised curbings, central dividing sections,
or other physical separations, or by designating such separate roadways by signs, markers, stripes, and the proper lane for
such traffic by appropriate signs, markers, stripes and other devices. No person, shall have any right of ingress or egress to,
from or across limited access facilities to or from abutting lands, except at such designated points at which access may be
permitted, upon such terms and conditions as may be specified from time to time. (Emphasis supplied)

On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of Public Works and Communicationsissued AO 1,
which, among others, prohibited motorcycles on limited access highways. The pertinent provisions of AO 1 read:

SUBJECT: Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Limited Access Highways

By virtue of the authority granted the Secretary [of] Public Works and Communications under Section 3 of R.A. 2000,
otherwise known as the Limited Access Highway Act, the following rules and regulations governing limited access highways
are hereby promulgated for the guidance of all concerned:

xxxx

Section 3 – On limited access highways, it is unlawful for any person or group of persons to:

xxxx

(h) Drive any bicycle, tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle (not motorized);

x x x x12 (Emphasis supplied)

On 5 April 1993, Acting Secretary Edmundo V. Mir of the Department of Public Works and Highways issued DO 74:

SUBJECT: Declaration of the North Luzon Expressway from Balintawak to Tabang and the South Luzon Expressway from
Nichols to Alabang as Limited Access Facilities
Pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2000, a limited access facility is defined as "a highway or street especially
designed for through traffic, and over, from, or to which owners or occupants of abutting land or other persons have no
right or easement or only a limited right or easement of access, light, air or view by reason of the fact that their proper[t]y
abuts upon such limited access facility or for any other reason. Such highways or streets may be parkways, from which
trucks, buses, and other commerical [sic] vehicles shall be excluded; or they may be free ways open to use by all customary
forms of street and highway traffic."

Section 3 of the same Act authorizes the Department of Public Works and Communications (now Department of Public
Works and Highways) "to plan, designate, establish, regulate, vacate, alter, improve, maintain, and provide limited access
facilities for public use wherever it is of the opinion that traffic conditions, present or future, will justify such special
facilities."

Therefore, by virtue of the authority granted above, the Department of Public Works and Highways hereby designates and
declares the Balintawak to Tabang Sections of the North Luzon Expressway, and the Nichols to Alabang Sections of the
South Luzon Expressways, to be LIMITED ACCESS HIGHWAYS/FACILITIES subject to such rules and regulations that may be
imposed by the DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).

In view thereof, the National Capital Region (NCR) of this Department is hereby ordered, after consultation with the TRB
and in coordination with the Philippine National Police (PNP), to close all illegal openings along the said Limited Access
Highways/Facilities. In this connection, the NCR is instructed to organize its own enforcement and security group for the
purpose of assuring the continued closure of the right-of-way fences and the implementation of the rules and regulations
that may be imposed by the DPWH thru the TRB.

This Order shall take effect immediately.13

On 25 June 1998, then DPWH Secretary Gregorio R. Vigilar issued DO 215:

SUBJECT: Declaration of the R-1 Expressway, from Seaside drive to Zapote, C-5 Link Expressway, from Zapote to Noveleta, of
the Manila Cavite Toll Expressway as Limited Access Facility.

Pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2000, a limited access facility is defined as "a highway or street especially
designed for through traffic, and over, from, or to which owners or occupants of abutting land or other persons have no
right or easement or only a limited right or easement of access, light, air or view by reason of the fact that their property
abuts upon such limited access facility or for any other reason. Such highways or streets may be parkways, from which
trucks, buses, and other commercial vehicles shall be excluded; or they may be free ways open to use by all customary
forms of street and highway traffic."

Section 3 of the same Act authorizes the Department of Public Works and Communications (now Department of Public
Works and Highways) "to plan, designate, establish, regulate, vacate, alter, improve, maintain, and provide limited access
facilities for public use wherever it is of the opinion that traffic conditions, present or future, will justify such special
facilities."

Therefore, by virtue of the authority granted above, the Department of Public Works and Highways hereby designates and
declares the R-1 Expressway, C-5 Link Expressway and the R-1 Extension Expressway Sections of the Manila Cavite Toll
Expressway to be LIMITED ACCESS HIGHWAYS/FACILITIES subject to such rules and regulations that may be imposed by the
DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).

In view thereof, the National Capital Region (NCR) of this Department is hereby ordered, after consultation with the TRB
and in coordination with the Philippine National Police (PNP), to close all illegal openings along the said Limited Access
Highways/Facilities. In this connection, the NCR is instructed to organize its own enforcement and security group for the
purpose of assuring the continued closure of the right-of-way fences and the implementation of the rules and regulations
that may be imposed by the DPWH thru the TRB.

This Order shall take effect immediately.14

The RTC held that Section 4 of RA 2000 expressly authorized the DPWH to design limited access facilities and to regulate,
restrict, or prohibit access as to serve the traffic for which such facilities are intended. According to the RTC, such authority
to regulate, restrict, or prohibit logically includes the determination of who and what can and cannot be permitted entry or
access into the limited access facilities. Thus, the RTC concluded that AO 1, DO 74, and the Revised Rules and Regulations
on Limited Access Facilities, which ban motorcycles’ entry or access to the limited access facilities, are not inconsistent with
RA 2000.

RA 2000, otherwise known as the Limited Access Highway Act, was approved on 22 June 1957. Section 4 of RA 2000
provides that "[t]he Department of Public Works and Communications is authorized to so design any limited access facility
and to so regulate, restrict, or prohibit access as to best serve the traffic for which such facility is intended." The RTC
construed this authorization to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities to apply to the Department
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
The RTC’s ruling is based on a wrong premise. The RTC assumed that the DPWH derived its authority from its predecessor,
the Department of Public Works and Communications, which is expressly authorized to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access
to limited access facilities under Section 4 of RA 2000. However, such assumption fails to consider the evolution of the
Department of Public Works and Communications.

Under Act No. 2711, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code, approved on 10 March 1917, there were only
seven executive departments, namely: the Department of the Interior, the Department of Finance, the Department of
Justice, the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, the Department of Public Works and Communications, the
Department of Public Instruction, and the Department of Labor. 15 On 20 June 1964, Republic Act No. 4136 16 created the
Land Transportation Commission under the Department of Public Works and Communications. Later, the Department of
Public Works and Communications was restructured into the Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications.

On 16 May 1974, Presidential Decree No. 458 (PD 458) separated the Bureau of Public Highways from the Department of
Public Works, Transportation and Communications and created it as a department to be known as Department of Public
Highways. Under Section 3 of PD 458, the Department of Public Highways is "responsible for developing and implementing
programs on the construction and maintenance of roads, bridges and airport runways."

With the amendment of the 1973 Philippine Constitution in 1976, resulting in the shift in the form of government, national
agencies were renamed from Departments to Ministries. Thus, the Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications became the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications.

On 23 July 1979, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 546 (EO 546), creating a Ministry of Public
Works and a Ministry of Transportation and Communications.17 Under Section 1 of EO 546, the Ministry of Public
Works assumed the public works functions of the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. The
functions of the Ministry of Public Works were the "construction, maintenance and repair of port works, harbor facilities,
lighthouses, navigational aids, shore protection works, airport buildings and associated facilities, public buildings and
school buildings, monuments and other related structures, as well as undertaking harbor and river dredging works,
reclamation of foreshore and swampland areas, water supply, and flood control and drainage works." 18

On the other hand, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications became the "primary policy, planning,
programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity of the executive branch of the government
in the promotion, development, and regulation of a dependable and coordinated network of transportation and
communication systems."19 The functions of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications were:

a. Coordinate and supervise all activities of the Ministry relative to transportation and communications;

b. Formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for the preparation and implementation of an integrated
and comprehensive transportation and communications system at the national, regional and local levels;

c. Establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communication, and for this
purpose, may call on any agency, corporation, or organization, whether government or private, whose development
programs include transportation and communications as an integral part to participate and assist in the preparation and
implementation of such programs;

d. Regulate, whenever necessary, activities relative to transportation and communications and prescribe and collect fees
in the exercise of such power;

e. Assess, review and provide direction to transportation and communications research and development programs of the
government in coordination with other institutions concerned; and

f. Perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Executive Order. 20 (Emphasis
supplied)

On 27 July 1981, then President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 710 (EO 710), which merged the Ministry of Public
Works and the Ministry of Public Highways for "greater simplicity and economy in operations." 21 The restructured agency
became known as the Ministry of Public Works and Highways. Under Section 1 of EO 710 the functions of the Ministry of
Public Works and the Ministry of Public Highways 22 were transferred to the Ministry of Public Works and Highways.

Upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution in February 1987, the former Ministry of Public Works and Highways became
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the former Ministry of Transportation and Communications
became the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).

DPWH issued DO 74 and DO 215 declaring certain expressways as limited access facilities on 5 April 1993 and 25 June
1998, respectively. Later, the TRB, under the DPWH, issued the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities.
However, on 23 July 1979, long before these department orders and regulations were issued, the Ministry of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications was divided into two agencies – the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications – by virtue of EO 546. The question is, which of these two agencies is now authorized
to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities? 23

Under Section 1 of EO 546, the Ministry of Public Works (now DPWH) assumed the public works functions of the Ministry
of Public Works, Transportation and Communications. On the other hand, among the functions of the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications (now Department of Transportation and Communications [DOTC]) were to (1)
formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for the preparation and implementation of an integrated and
comprehensive transportation and communications systems at the national, regional, and local levels; and (2) regulate,
whenever necessary, activities relative to transportation and communications and prescribe and collect fees in the exercise
of such power. Clearly, under EO 546, it is the DOTC, not the DPWH, which has authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit
access to limited access facilities.

Even under Executive Order No. 125 (EO 125)24 and Executive Order No. 125-A (EO 125-A), 25 which further reorganized the
DOTC, the authority to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations relative to transportation is clearly with the
DOTC.26

Thus, DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain expressways as limited access
facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the
field of transportation and to regulate related activities.

Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation, the TRB 27 cannot derive its power from
the DPWH to issue regulations governing limited access facilities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it
does not possess in the first place. Since DO 74 and DO 215 are void, it follows that the rules implementing them are
likewise void.

Whether AO 1 and DO 123 are Unconstitutional

DPWH Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong issued DO 123 on 18 July 2001. DO 123 reads in part:

SUBJECT: Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Limited Access Highways

By virtue of the authority granted the Secretary of Public Works and Highways under Section 3 of R.A. 2000, otherwise
known as the Limited Access Highway Act, the following revised rules and regulations governing limited access highways
are hereby promulgated for the guidance of all concerned:

1. Administrative Order No. 1 dated February 19, 1968, issued by the Secretary of the then Department of Public Works
and Communications, is hereby amended by deleting the word "motorcycles" mentioned in Section 3(h) thereof.
Therefore, motorcycles are hereby allowed to operate inside the toll roads and limited access highways, subject to the
following:

a. Motorcycles shall have an engine displacement of at least 400 cubic centimeters (cc) provided that:

x x x x28 (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC’s Decision dated 10 March 2003 declared DO 123 unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the equal
protection clause by allowing only motorcycles with at least 400 cubic centimeters engine displacement to use the toll
ways. The RTC reasoned that the creation of a distinction within the class of motorcycles was not based on real differences.

We need not pass upon the constitutionality of the classification of motorcycles under DO 123. As previously discussed, the
DPWH has no authority to regulate limited access highways since EO 546 has devolved this function to the DOTC. Thus, DO
123 is void for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate it.

On the other hand, the assailed portion of AO 1 states:

Section 3. On limited access highways, it is unlawful for any person or group of persons to:

xxxx

(h) Drive any bicycle, tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle (not motorized);

xxxx

Petitioners assail the DPWH’s failure to provide "scientific" and "objective" data on the danger of having motorcycles plying
our highways. They attack this exercise of police power as baseless and unwarranted. Petitioners belabor the fact that
there are studies that provide proof that motorcycles are safe modes of transport. They also claim that AO 1 introduces an
unreasonable classification by singling-out motorcycles from other motorized modes of transport. Finally, petitioners argue
that AO 1 violates their right to travel.

Petitioners’ arguments do not convince us.

We emphasize that the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications issued AO 1 on 19 February
1968.

Section 3 of RA 200029 authorized the issuance of the guidelines. In contrast, DPWH issued DO 74, DO 215 and DO 123 after
EO 546 devolved to the DOTC the authority to regulate limited access highways.

We now discuss the constitutionality of AO 1. Administrative issuances have the force and effect of law. 30 They benefit from
the same presumption of validity and constitutionality enjoyed by statutes. 31 These two precepts place a heavy burden
upon any party assailing governmental regulations. The burden of proving unconstitutionality rests on such party. 32 The
burden becomes heavier when the police power is at issue.

The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state. 33 The
police power is far-reaching in scope and is the "most essential, insistent and illimitable" of all government powers. 34 The
tendency is to extend rather than to restrict the use of police power. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is
reasonableness.35 What is "reasonable" is not subject to exact definition or scientific formulation. No all-embracing test of
reasonableness exists,36 for its determination rests upon human judgment applied to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case.37

We find that AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely outlines several precautionary measures, to which
toll way users must adhere. These rules were designed to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within
limited access facilities. They cover several subjects, from what lanes should be used by a certain vehicle, to maximum
vehicle height. The prohibition of certain types of vehicles is but one of these. None of these rules violates reason. The
purpose of these rules and the logic behind them are quite evident. A toll way is not an ordinary road. The special purpose
for which a toll way is constructed necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the manner of its use and operation.
Inevitably, such rules will restrict certain rights. But the mere fact that certain rights are restricted does not invalidate the
rules.

Consider Section 3(g) of AO 1, which prohibits the conduct of rallies inside toll ways. 38 The regulation affects the right to
peaceably assemble. The exercise of police power involves restriction, restriction being implicit in the power itself. Thus,
the test of constitutionality of a police power measure is limited to an inquiry on whether the restriction imposed on
constitutional rights is reasonable, and not whether it imposes a restriction on those rights.

None of the rules outlined in AO 1 strikes us as arbitrary and capricious. The DPWH, through the Solicitor General,
maintains that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will
compromise safety and traffic considerations. The DPWH points out that the same study the petitioners rely on cites that
the inability of other drivers to detect motorcycles is the predominant cause of accidents. 39 Arguably, prohibiting the use of
motorcycles in toll ways may not be the "best" measure to ensure the safety and comfort of those who ply the toll ways.

However, the means by which the government chooses to act is not judged in terms of what is "best," rather, on simply
whether the act is reasonable. The validity of a police power measure does not depend upon the absolute assurance that
the purpose desired can in fact be probably fully accomplished, or upon the certainty that it will best serve the purpose
intended.40 Reason, not scientific exactitude, is the measure of the validity of the governmental regulation. Arguments
based on what is "best" are arguments reserved for the Legislature’s discussion. Judicial intervention in such matters will
only be warranted if the assailed regulation is patently whimsical. We do not find the situation in this case to be so.

Neither do we find AO 1 oppressive. Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to use the limited access facility. They
are merely being required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on how to use the facility. AO 1 does not
infringe upon petitioners’ right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-

motorized vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access highways. 41 Several cheap, accessible and practical
alternative modes of transport are open to petitioners. There is nothing oppressive in being required to take a bus or drive
a car instead of one’s scooter, bicycle, calesa, or motorcycle upon using a toll way.

Petitioners’ reliance on the studies they gathered is misplaced. Police power does not rely upon the existence of definitive
studies to support its use. Indeed, no requirement exists that the exercise of police power must first be conclusively
justified by research. The yardstick has always been simply whether the government’s act is reasonable and not
oppressive.42 The use of "reason" in this sense is simply meant to guard against arbitrary and capricious government action.
Scientific certainty and conclusiveness, though desirable, may not be demanded in every situation. Otherwise, no
government will be able to act in situations demanding the exercise of its residual powers because it will be tied up
conducting studies.

A police power measure may be assailed upon proof that it unduly violates constitutional limitations like due process and
equal protection of the law. 43 Petitioners’ attempt to seek redress from the motorcycle ban under the aegis of equal
protection must fail. Petitioners’ contention that AO 1 unreasonably singles out motorcycles is specious. To begin with,
classification by itself is not prohibited.44
A classification can only be assailed if it is deemed invidious, that is, it is not based on real or substantial differences. As
explained by Chief Justice Fernando in Bautista v. Juinio:45

x x x To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights
to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoked the equal protection clause only if
they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was
prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that
the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in
the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism
and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every
person under circumstances, which if not identical is analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding the rest.

We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable classification among
modes of transport is the motorized against the non-motorized. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler
truck is substantially different from other light vehicles. The first may be denied access to some roads where the latter are
free to drive. Old vehicles may be reasonably differentiated from newer models. 46 We find that real and substantial
differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those
prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a
motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-
wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.

A classification based on practical convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack
purely theoretical or scientific uniformity. Moreover, we take note that the Philippines is home to a host of unique
motorized modes of transport ranging from modified hand-carts (kuliglig) to bicycle "sidecars" outfitted with a motor. To
follow petitioners’ argument to its logical conclusion would open up toll ways to all these contraptions. Both safety and
traffic considerations militate against any ruling that would bring about such a nightmare.

Petitioners complain that the prohibition on the use of motorcycles in toll ways unduly deprive them of their right to travel.

We are not persuaded.

A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access to certain destinations, its use,
operation, and maintenance require close regulation. Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain
restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms
of transport could use it.

The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll way. The right to travel refers to the
right to move from one place to another. Petitioners can traverse the toll way any time they choose using private or public
four-wheeled vehicles. Petitioners are not denied the right to move from Point A to Point B along the toll way. Petitioners
are free to access the toll way, much as the rest of the public can. The mode by which petitioners wish to travel pertains to
the manner of using the toll way, a subject that can be validly limited by regulation.

Petitioners themselves admit that alternative routes are available to them. Their complaint is that these routes are not the
safest and most convenient. Even if their claim is true, it hardly qualifies as an undue curtailment of their freedom of
movement and travel. The right to travel does not entitle a person to the best form of transport or to the most convenient
route to his destination. The obstructions found in normal streets, which petitioners complain of (i.e., potholes, manholes,
construction barriers, etc.), are not suffered by them alone.

Finally, petitioners assert that their possession of a driver’s license from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) and the fact
that their vehicles are registered with that office entitle them to use all kinds of roads in the country. Again, petitioners are
mistaken. There exists no absolute right to drive. On the contrary, this privilege, is heavily regulated. Only a qualified group
is allowed to drive motor vehicles: those who pass the tests administered by the LTO. A driver’s license issued by the LTO
merely allows one to drive a particular mode of transport. It is not a license to drive or operate any form of transportation
on any type of road. Vehicle registration in the LTO on the other hand merely signifies the roadworthiness of a vehicle. This
does not preclude the government from prescribing which roads are accessible to certain vehicles.

WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition. We MODIFY the Decision dated 10 March 2003 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 147, Makati City and its Order dated 16 June 2003 in Civil Case No. 01-034. We declare VOID Department Order
Nos. 74, 215, and 123 of the Department of Public Works and Highways, and the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited
Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory Board. We declare VALID Administrative Order No. 1 of the Department of Public
Works and Communications.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
EN BANC

2nd LT. SALVADOR PARREO represented by G.R. No. 162224

his daughter Myrna P. Caintic,

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO,* C.J.,

QUISUMBING,**

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

GARCIA,

VELASCO, JR., and

NACHURA, JJ.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT and Promulgated:

CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED

FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents. June 7, 2007

x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari[1] assailing the 9 January 2003 Decision[2] and 13 January 2004 Resolution[3] of
the Commission on Audit (COA).

The Antecedent Facts

Salvador Parreo (petitioner) served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32 years. On 5 January 1982, petitioner
retired from the Philippine Constabulary with the rank of 2 nd Lieutenant. Petitioner availed, and received payment, of a
lump sum pension equivalent to three years pay. In 1985, petitioner started receiving his monthly pension amounting
to P13,680.

Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioners
monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 [4] (PD 1638), as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1650.[5] Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be
removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner requested
for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied the request.

Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension.

The Ruling of the Commission on Audit

In its 9 January 2003 Decision, the COA denied petitioners claim for lack of jurisdiction. The COA ruled:

It becomes immediately noticeable that the resolution of the issue at hand hinges upon the validity of Section 27 of P.D.
No. 1638, as amended. Pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution, whenever a dispute involves the validity of laws, the
courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not only
the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void. (Tatad vs. Secretary of Department
of Energy, 281 SCRA 330) That being so, prudence dictates that this Commission defer to the authority and jurisdiction of
the judiciary to rule in the first instance upon the constitutionality of the provision in question.

Premises considered, the request is denied for lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate the same. Claimant is advised to file his
claim with the proper court of original jurisdiction. [6]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner alleged that the COA has the power and authority to incidentally
rule on the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Petitioner alleged that a direct recourse to the court
would be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Petitioner further alleged that since his monthly pension
involves government funds, the reason for the termination of the pension is subject to COAs authority and jurisdiction.

In its 13 January 2004 Resolution, the COA denied the motion. The COA ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply if the administrative body has, in the first place, no jurisdiction over the case. The
COA further ruled that even if it assumed jurisdiction over the claim, petitioners entitlement to the retirement benefits he
was previously receiving must necessarily cease upon the loss of his Filipino citizenship in accordance with Section 27 of PD
1638, as amended.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. Whether Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, is constitutional;

2. Whether the COA has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended; and

3. Whether PD 1638, as amended, has retroactive or prospective effect. [7]

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Jurisdiction of the COA

Petitioner filed his money claim before the COA. A money claim is a demand for payment of a sum of money,
reimbursement or compensation arising from law or contract due from or owing to a government agency. [8] Under
Commonwealth Act No. 327,[9] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1445, [10] money claims against the government shall
be filed before the COA.[11]

Section 2(1), Article IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution prescribes the powers of the COA, as follows:

Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis; (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices
that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving
subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting
institution to submit such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the
audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are
necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such
period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.

The jurisdiction of the COA over money claims against the government does not include the power to rule on the
constitutionality or validity of laws. The 1987 Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare
unconstitutional a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation in this Court and in all Regional Trial Courts. [12] Petitioners money claim essentially involved the
constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners money claim.

Petitioner submits that the COA has the authority to order the restoration of his pension even without ruling on the
constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. The COA actually ruled on the matter in its 13 January
2004 Resolution, thus:

Furthermore, assuming arguendo that this Commission assumed jurisdiction over the instant case, claimants entitlement
to the retirement benefits he was previously receiving must necessarily be severed or stopped upon the loss of his Filipino
citizenship as prescribed in Section 27, P.D. No. 1638, as amended by P.D. No. 1650. [13]

The COA effectively denied petitioners claim because of the loss of his Filipino citizenship.
Application of PD 1638, as amended

Petitioner alleges that PD 1638, as amended, should apply prospectively. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees
with petitioner. The OSG argues that PD 1638, as amended, should apply only to those who joined the military service after
its effectivity, citing Sections 33 and 35, thus:

Section 33. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed in any manner to reduce whatever retirement and separation pay or
gratuity or other monetary benefits which any person is heretofore receiving or is entitled to receive under the provisions
of existing law.

xxxx

Section. 35. Except those necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Decree and to preserve the rights granted to
retired or separated military personnel, all laws, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

The OSG further argues that retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of the retirees. Article 4 of the Civil Code
provides: Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Section 36 of PD 1638, as amended,
provides that it shall take effect upon its approval. It was signed on 10 September 1979. PD 1638, as amended, does not
provide for its retroactive application. There is no question that PD 1638, as amended, applies prospectively.

However, we do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner and the OSG that PD 1638, as amended, should apply only
to those who joined the military after its effectivity.Since PD 1638, as amended, is about the new system of retirement and
separation from service of military personnel, it should apply to those who were in the service at the time of its
approval. In fact, Section 2 of PD 1638, as amended, provides that th[e] Decree shall apply to all military personnel in the
service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.PD 1638, as amended, was signed on 10 September 1979. Petitioner retired
in 1982, long after the approval of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the provisions of PD 1638, as amended, apply to
petitioner.

Petitioner Has No Vested Right to his

Retirement Benefits

Petitioner alleges that Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, deprives him of his property which the Constitution and
statutes vest in him. Petitioner alleges that his pension, being a property vested by the Constitution, cannot be removed or
taken from him just because he became a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner further alleges that the termination of
his monthly pension is a penalty equivalent to deprivation of his life.

The allegations have no merit. PD 1638, as amended, does not impair any vested right or interest of petitioner. Where the
employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to the benefits that is protected by the
due process clause.[14] At the time of the approval of PD 1638 and at the time of its amendment, petitioner was still in
active service. Hence, petitioners retirement benefits were only future benefits and did not constitute a vested
right. Before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in an employee, he must have met the stated conditions of
eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age, and length of service. [15] It is only upon retirement that military
personnel acquire a vested right to retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire
a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. [16]
Further, the retirement benefits of military personnel are purely gratuitous in nature. They are not similar to pension plans
where employee participation is mandatory, hence, the employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension which
forms part of the compensation.[17]

Constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638

Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, provides:

Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall be carried in the retired list of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and
his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss.

The OSG agrees with petitioner that Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, is unconstitutional. The OSG argues that the
obligation imposed on petitioner to retain his Filipino citizenship as a condition for him to remain in the AFP retired list and
receive his retirement benefit is contrary to public policy and welfare, oppressive, discriminatory, and violative of the due
process clause of the Constitution. The OSG argues that the retirement law is in the nature of a contract between the
government and its employees. The OSG further argues that Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, discriminates against AFP
retirees who have changed their nationality.

We do not agree.

The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject to reasonable classification. [18] To be
reasonable, the classification (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to each
member of the class.[19]

There is compliance with all these conditions. There is a substantial difference between retirees who are citizens of
the Philippines and retirees who lost their Filipino citizenship by naturalization in another country, such as petitioner in the
case before us. The constitutional right of the state to require all citizens to render personal and military
service[20]necessarily includes not only private citizens but also citizens who have retired from military service. A retiree
who had lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the state. Thus, he may no longer be compelled by
the state to render compulsory military service when the need arises. Petitioners loss of Filipino citizenship constitutes a
substantial distinction that distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another.[21]

Republic Act No. 7077[22] (RA 7077) affirmed the constitutional right of the state to a Citizen Armed Forces. Section 11 of RA
7077 provides that citizen soldiers or reservists include ex-servicemen and retired officers of the AFP. Hence, even when a
retiree is no longer in the active service, he is still a part of the Citizen Armed Forces. Thus, we do not find the requirement
imposed by Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, oppressive, discriminatory, or contrary to public policy. The state has the
right to impose a reasonable condition that is necessary for national defense. To rule otherwise would be detrimental to
the interest of the state.

There was no denial of due process in this case. When petitioner lost his Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no choice but to
stop his monthly pension in accordance with Section27 of PD 1638, as amended. Petitioner had the opportunity to contest
the termination of his pension when he requested for reconsideration of the removal of his name from the list of retirees
and the termination of his pension. The Judge Advocate General denied the request pursuant to Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended.
Petitioner argues that he can reacquire his Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 [23] (RA 9225), in which case he
will still be considered a natural-born Filipino.However, petitioner alleges that if he reacquires his Filipino citizenship under
RA 9225, he will still not be entitled to his pension because of its prior termination. This situation is speculative. In the first
place, petitioner has not shown that he has any intention of reacquiring, or has done anything to reacquire, his Filipino
citizenship. Secondly, in response to the request for opinion of then AFP Chief of Staff, General Efren L. Abu, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) issued DOJ Opinion No. 12, series of 2005, dated 19 January 2005, thus:

[T]he AFP uniformed personnel retirees, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 and its IRR, are
entitled to pension and gratuity benefits reckoned from the date they have taken their oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. It goes without saying that these retirees have no right to receive such pension benefits during the time
that they have ceased to be Filipinos pursuant to the aforequoted P.D. No. 1638, as amended, and any payment made to
them should be returned to the AFP. x x x.[24]

Hence, petitioner has other recourse if he desires to continue receiving his monthly pension. Just recently, in AASJS
Member-Hector Gumangan Calilung v. Simeon Datumanong,[25] this Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 9225. If
petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship, he will even recover his natural-born citizenship. [26] In Tabasa v. Court of
Appeals,[27] this Court reiterated that [t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship x x x.

Petitioner will be entitled to receive his monthly pension should he reacquire his Filipino citizenship since he will again be
entitled to the benefits and privileges of Filipino citizenship reckoned from the time of his reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship. There is no legal obstacle to the resumption of his retirement benefits from the time he complies again with the
condition of the law, that is, he can receive his retirement benefits provided he is a Filipino citizen.

We acknowledge the service rendered to the country by petitioner and those similarly situated. However, petitioner failed
to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Unless the provision is amended
or repealed in the future, the AFP has to apply Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the 9 January 2003 Decision and 13 January 2004 Resolution of the
Commission on Audit.

SO ORDERED
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 162053 March 7, 2007

ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEE'S ASSOCIATION-AFW (SLMCEA-AFW) AND MARIBEL S. SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) AND ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 29, 2004 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 75732 affirming the decision 2 dated August 23, 2002 rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 026225-00.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Maribel S. Santos was hired as X-Ray Technician in the Radiology department of private respondent St. Luke's
Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) on October 13, 1984. She is a graduate of Associate in Radiologic Technology from The Family
Clinic Incorporated School of Radiologic Technology.

On April 22, 1992, Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as the "Radiologic Technology Act of 1992."
Said law requires that no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the Philippines
without having obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology.

On September 12, 1995, the Assistant Executive Director-Ancillary Services and HR Director of private respondent SLMC
issued a final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology to comply with the requirement of Republic Act No. 7431
by December 31, 1995; otherwise, the unlicensed employee will be transferred to an area which does not require a license
to practice if a slot is available.

On March 4, 1997, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a final notice to petitioner Maribel S. Santos requiring
the latter to comply with Republic Act. No. 7431 by taking and passing the forthcoming examination scheduled in June
1997; otherwise, private respondent SLMC may be compelled to retire her from employment should there be no other
position available where she may be absorbed.

On May 14, 1997, the Director of the Institute of Radiology, AED-Division of Ancillary Services issued a memorandum to
petitioner Maribel S. Santos directing the latter to submit her PRC Registration form/Examination Permit per Memorandum
dated March 4, 1997.

On March 13, 1998, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued another memorandum to petitioner Maribel S. Santos
advising her that only a license can assure her of her continued employment at the Institute of Radiology of the private
respondent SLMC and that the latter is giving her the last chance to take and pass the forthcoming board examination
scheduled in June 1998; otherwise, private respondent SLMC shall be constrained to take action which may include her
separation from employment.

On November 23, 1998, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a notice to petitioner Maribel S. Santos informing
the latter that the management of private respondent SLMC has approved her retirement in lieu of separation pay.

On November 26, 1998, the Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC issued a "Notice of Separation from the
Company" to petitioner Maribel S. Santos effective December 30, 1998 in view of the latter's refusal to accept private
respondent SLMC's offer for early retirement. The notice also states that while said private respondent exerted its efforts to
transfer petitioner Maribel S. Santos to other position/s, her qualifications do not fit with any of the present vacant
positions in the hospital.

In a letter dated December 18, 1998, a certain Jack C. Lappay, President of the Philippine Association of Radiologic
Technologists, Inc., wrote Ms. Judith Betita, Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC, requesting the latter to give
"due consideration" to the organization's three (3) regular members of his organization (petitioner Maribel S. Santos
included) "for not passing yet the Board of Examination for X-ray Technology," "by giving them an assignment in any
department of your hospital awaiting their chance to pass the future Board Exam."

On January 6, 1999, the Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC again issued a "Notice of Separation from the
Company" to petitioner Maribel S. Santos effective February 5, 1999 after the latter failed to present/ submit her appeal for
rechecking to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) of the recent board examination which she took and failed.
On March 2, 1999, petitioner Maribel S. Santos filed a complaint against private respondent SLMC for illegal dismissal and
non-payment of salaries, allowances and other monetary benefits. She likewise prayed for the award of moral and
exemplary damages plus attorney's fees.

In the meantime, petitioner Alliance of Filipino Workers (AFW), through its President and Legal Counsel, in a letter dated
September 22, 1999 addressed to Ms. Rita Marasigan, Human Resources Director of private respondent SLMC, requested
the latter to accommodate petitioner Maribel S. Santos and assign her to the vacant position of CSS Aide in the hospital
arising from the death of an employee more than two (2) months earlier.

In a letter dated September 24, 1999, Ms. Rita Marasigan replied thus:

Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letter of September 22, 1999 formally requesting to fill up the vacant regular position of a CSS Aide in
Ms. Maribel Santos' behalf.

The position is indeed vacant. Please refer to our Recruitment Policy for particulars especially on minimum requirements of
the job and the need to meet said requirements, as well as other pre-employment requirements, in order to be considered
for the vacant position. As a matter of fact, Ms. Santos is welcome to apply for any vacant position on the condition that
she possesses the necessary qualifications.

As to the consensus referred to in your letter, may I correct you that the agreement is, regardless of the vacant position Ms.
Santos decides to apply, she must go through the usual application procedures. The formal letter, I am afraid, will not
suffice for purposes of recruitment processing. As you know, the managers requesting to fill any vacancy has a say on the
matter and correctly so. The manager's inputs are necessarily factored into the standard recruitment procedures. Hence,
the need to undergo the prescribed steps.

Indeed we have gone through the mechanics to accommodate Ms. Santos' transfer while she was employed with SLMC
given the prescribed period. She was given 30 days from issuance of the notice of termination to look for appropriate
openings which incidentally she wittingly declined to utilize. She did this knowing fully well that the consequences would
be that her application beyond the 30-day period or after the effective date of her termination from SLMC would be
considered a re-application with loss of seniority and shall be subjected to the pertinent application procedures.

Needless to mention, one of the 3 X-ray Technologists in similar circumstances as Ms. Santos at the time successfully
managed to get herself transferred to E.R. because she opted to apply for the appropriate vacant position and qualified for
it within the prescribed 30-day period. The other X-ray Technologist, on the other hand, as you may recall, was eventually
terminated not just for his failure to comply with the licensure requirement of the law but for cause (refusal to serve a
customer).

Why Ms. Santos opted to file a complaint before the Labor Courts and not to avail of the opportunity given her, or
assuming she was not qualified for any vacant position even if she tried to look for one within the prescribed period, I
simply cannot understand why she also refused the separation pay offered by Management in an amount beyond the
minimum required by law only to re-apply at SLMC, which option would be available to her anyway even (if she) chose to
accept the separation pay!

Well, here's hoping that our Union can timely influence our employees to choose their options well as it has in the past.

(Signed)
RITA MARASIGAN

Subsequently, in a letter dated December 27, 1999, Ms. Judith Betita, Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC
wrote Mr. Angelito Calderon, President of petitioner union as follows:

Dear Mr. Calderon:

This is with regard to the case of Ms. Maribel Santos. Please recall that last Oct. 8, 1999, Ms. Rita Marasigan, HR Director,
discussed with you and Mr. Greg Del Prado the terms regarding the re-hiring of Ms. Maribel Santos. Ms. Marasigan offered
Ms. Santos the position of Secretary at the Dietary Department. In that meeting, Ms. Santos replied that she would think
about the offer. To date, we still have no definite reply from her. Again, during the conference held on Dec. 14, 1999, Atty.
Martir promised to talk to Ms. Santos, and inform us of her reply by Dec. 21, 1999. Again we failed to hear her reply
through him.

Please be informed that said position is in need of immediate staffing. The Dietary Department has already been
experiencing serious backlog of work due to the said vacancy. Please note that more than 2 months has passed since Ms.
Marasigan offered this compromise. Management cannot afford to wait for her decision while the operation of the said
department suffers from vacancy.
Therefore, Management is giving Ms. Santos until the end of this month to give her decision. If we fail to hear from her or
from you as her representatives by that time, we will consider it as a waiver and we will be forced to offer the position to
other applicants so as not to jeopardize the Dietary Department's operation.

For your immediate action.

(Signed)
JUDITH BETITA
Personnel Manager

On September 5, 2000, the Labor Arbiter came out with a Decision ordering private respondent SLMC to pay petitioner
Maribel S. Santos the amount of One Hundred Fifteen Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱115,500.00) representing her
separation pay. All other claims of petitioner were dismissed for lack of merit.

Dissatisfied, petitioner Maribel S. Santos perfected an appeal with the public respondent NLRC.

On August 23, 2002, public respondent NLRC promulgated its Decision affirming the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It
likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners in its Resolution promulgated on December 27, 2002.

Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which, as previously mentioned, affirmed the decision of the
NLRC.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I. Whether the CA overlooked certain material facts and circumstances on petitioners' legal claim in relation to the
complaint for illegal dismissal.

II. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion and erred in not resolving with clarity the issues on the merit of
petitioner's constitutional right of security of tenure. 3

For its part, private respondent St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) argues in its comment 4 that: 1) the petition should be
dismissed for failure of petitioners to file a motion for reconsideration; 2) the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in upholding the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter's ruling that petitioner was legally dismissed; 3) petitioner was legally and
validly terminated in accordance with Republic Act Nos. 4226 and 7431; 4) private respondent's decision to terminate
petitioner Santos was made in good faith and was not the result of unfair discrimination; and 5) petitioner Santos' non-
transfer to another position in the SLMC was a valid exercise of management prerogative.

The petition lacks merit.

Generally, the Court has always accorded respect and finality to the findings of fact of the CA particularly if they coincide
with those of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and are supported by substantial evidence. 5 True this rule admits of certain
exceptions as, for example, when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, or the findings of fact are not
supported by the evidence on record6 or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. 7 None of
these exceptions, however, has been convincingly shown by petitioners to apply in the present case. Hence, the Court sees
no reason to disturb such findings of fact of the CA.

Ultimately, the issue raised by the parties boils down to whether petitioner Santos was illegally dismissed by private
respondent SLMC on the basis of her inability to secure a certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic
Technology.

The requirement for a certificate of registration is set forth under R.A. No. 7431 8 thus:

Sec. 15. Requirement for the Practice of Radiologic Technology and X-ray Technology. - Unless exempt from the
examinations under Sections 16 and 17 hereof, no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiologic and/or x-ray
technologist in the Philippines without having obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board.

It is significant to note that petitioners expressly concede that the sole cause for petitioner Santos' separation from work is
her failure to pass the board licensure exam for X-ray technicians, a precondition for obtaining the certificate of registration
from the Board. It is argued, though, that petitioner Santos' failure to comply with the certification requirement did not
constitute just cause for termination as it violated her constitutional right to security of tenure. This contention is
untenable.

While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated
pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general
welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or
technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. 9 The
most concrete example of this would be in the field of medicine, the practice of which in all its branches has been closely
regulated by the State. It has long been recognized that the regulation of this field is a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance
among those who would practice medicine. 10 The same rationale applies in the regulation of the practice of radiologic and
x-ray technology. The clear and unmistakable intention of the legislature in prescribing guidelines for persons seeking to
practice in this field is embodied in Section 2 of the law:

Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to upgrade the practice of radiologic technology in the Philippines
for the purpose of protecting the public from the hazards posed by radiation as well as to ensure safe and proper diagnosis,
treatment and research through the application of machines and/or equipment using radiation. 11

In this regard, the Court quotes with approval the disquisition of public respondent NLRC in its decision dated August 23,
2002:

The enactment of R.A. (Nos.) 7431 and 4226 are recognized as an exercise of the State's inherent police power. It should be
noted that the police power embraces the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, educations, good
order, safety or general welfare of the people. The state is justified in prescribing the specific requirements for x-ray
technicians and/or any other professions connected with the health and safety of its citizens. Respondent-appellee being
engaged in the hospital and health care business, is a proper subject of the cited law; thus, having in mind the legal
requirements of these laws, the latter cannot close its eyes and [let] complainant-appellant's private interest override
public interest.

Indeed, complainant-appellant cannot insist on her "sterling work performance without any derogatory record" to make
her qualify as an x-ray technician in the absence of a proper certificate of Registration from the Board of Radiologic
Technology which can only be obtained by passing the required examination. The law is clear that the Certificate of
Registration cannot be substituted by any other requirement to allow a person to practice as a Radiologic Technologist
and/or X-ray Technologist (Technician).12

No malice or ill-will can be imputed upon private respondent as the separation of petitioner Santos was undertaken by it
conformably to an existing statute. It is undeniable that her continued employment without the required Board
certification exposed the hospital to possible sanctions and even to a revocation of its license to operate. Certainly, private
respondent could not be expected to retain petitioner Santos despite the inimical threat posed by the latter to its business.
This notwithstanding, the records bear out the fact that petitioner Santos was given ample opportunity to qualify for the
position and was sufficiently warned that her failure to do so would result in her separation from work in the event there
were no other vacant positions to which she could be transferred. Despite these warnings, petitioner Santos was still
unable to comply and pass the required exam. To reiterate, the requirement for Board certification was set by statute.
Justice, fairness and due process demand that an employer should not be penalized for situations where it had no
participation or control.13

It would be unreasonable to compel private respondent to wait until its license is cancelled and it is materially injured
before removing the cause of the impending evil. Neither can the courts step in to force private respondent to reassign or
transfer petitioner Santos under these circumstances. Petitioner Santos is not in the position to demand that she be given a
different work assignment when what necessitated her transfer in the first place was her own fault or failing. The
prerogative to determine the place or station where an employee is best qualified to serve the interests of the company on
the basis of the his or her qualifications, training and performance belongs solely to the employer. 14 The Labor Code and its
implementing Rules do not vest in the Labor Arbiters nor in the different Divisions of the NLRC (nor in the courts)
managerial authority.15

While our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not
mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights
which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play. 16 Labor laws, to be sure, do not authorize
interference with the employer's judgment in the conduct of the latter's business. Private respondent is free to determine,
using its own discretion and business judgment, all elements of employment, "from hiring to firing" except in cases of
unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. None of these exceptions is present in the instant case.

The fact that another employee, who likewise failed to pass the required exam, was allowed by private respondent to apply
for and transfer to another position with the hospital does not constitute unlawful discrimination. This was a valid exercise
of management prerogative, petitioners not having alleged nor proven that the reassigned employee did not qualify for the
position where she was transferred. In the past, the Court has ruled that an objection founded on the ground that one has
better credentials over the appointee is frowned upon so long as the latter possesses the minimum qualifications for the
position.17 Furthermore, the records show that Ms. Santos did not even seriously apply for another position in the
company.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007

THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority, petitioners,
vs.
VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondent.

x --------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 170657 August 15, 2007

HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, the METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI
FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority,petitioners,
vs.
MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The following conditions in 1969, as observed by this Court:

Vehicles have increased in number. Traffic congestion has moved from bad to worse, from tolerable to critical. The number
of people who use the thoroughfares has multiplied x x x, 1

have remained unchecked and have reverberated to this day. Traffic jams continue to clog the streets of Metro Manila,
bringing vehicles to a standstill at main road arteries during rush hour traffic and sapping people’s energies and patience in
the process.

The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion problem, questions the authority of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.

Specifically challenged are two Orders issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 26 in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224.

The first assailed Order of September 8, 2005,2 which resolved a motion for reconsideration filed by herein respondents,
declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, hereafter referred to as the E.O., "unconstitutional as it constitutes an
unreasonable exercise of police power." The second assailed Order of November 23, 2005 3 denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.

The following facts are not disputed:

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10, 2003, "Providing for the Establishment of Greater
Manila Mass Transport System," the pertinent portions of which read:

WHEREAS, Metro Manila continues to be the center of employment opportunities, trade and commerce of the Greater
Metro Manila area;

WHEREAS, the traffic situation in Metro Manila has affected the adjacent provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, and Rizal,
owing to the continued movement of residents and industries to more affordable and economically viable locations in
these provinces;

WHEREAS, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) is tasked to undertake measures to ease traffic
congestion in Metro Manila and ensure the convenient and efficient travel of commuters within its jurisdiction;

WHEREAS, a primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets that
impedes [sic] the flow of vehicles and commuters due to the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes;

WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along
major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting
public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate the existing transport modes, namely
the buses, the rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to facilitate and ensure efficient travel through the
improved connectivity of the different transport modes;
WHEREAS, the national government must provide the necessary funding requirements to immediately implement and
render operational these projects; and extent to MMDA such other assistance as may be warranted to ensure their
expeditious prosecution.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
law, do hereby order:

Section 1. THE PROJECT. – The project shall be identified as GREATER MANILA TRANSPORT SYSTEM Project.

Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. – In accordance with the plan proposed by MMDA, the project aims to develop four (4)
interim intermodal mass transport terminals to integrate the different transport modes, as well as those that shall
hereafter be developed, to serve the commuting public in the northwest, north, east, south, and southwest of Metro
Manila. Initially, the project shall concentrate on immediately establishing the mass transport terminals for the north and
south Metro Manila commuters as hereinafter described.

Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. – The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), is hereby
designated as the implementing Agency for the project. For this purpose, MMDA is directed to undertake such
infrastructure development work as may be necessary and, thereafter, manage the project until it may be turned-over to
more appropriate agencies, if found suitable and convenient. Specifically, MMDA shall have the following functions and
responsibilities:

a) Cause the preparation of the Master Plan for the projects, including the designs and costing;

b) Coordinate the use of the land and/or properties needed for the project with the respective agencies and/or entities
owning them;

c) Supervise and manage the construction of the necessary structures and facilities;

d) Execute such contracts or agreements as may be necessary, with the appropriate government agencies, entities, and/or
private persons, in accordance with existing laws and pertinent regulations, to facilitate the implementation of the project;

e) Accept, manage and disburse such funds as may be necessary for the construction and/or implementation of the
projects, in accordance with prevailing accounting and audit polices and practice in government.

f) Enlist the assistance of any national government agency, office or department, including local government units,
government-owned or controlled corporations, as may be necessary;

g) Assign or hire the necessary personnel for the above purposes; and

h) Perform such other related functions as may be necessary to enable it to accomplish the objectives and purposes of this
Executive Order.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the
numerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes; 5 and the MMDA had
"recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through
the provision of mass transport terminal facilities" 6 which plan is referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass
Transport System Project (the Project).

The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.

Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued
Resolution No. 03-07 series of 20037 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the
different transport modes via the establishment of common bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to
remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. 8

On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public
transportation with a provincial bus operation, 9 filed a petition for declaratory relief10 before the RTC11 of Manila.

In its petition which was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-105850, Viron alleged that the MMDA, through Chairman Fernando,
was "poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along
EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation." 12 This impending move, it stressed, would
mean the closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City.

Alleging that the MMDA’s authority does not include the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their existing
bus terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property, Viron asked the court to construe the scope, extent and
limitation of the power of the MMDA to regulate traffic under R.A. No. 7924, "An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes."
Viron also asked for a ruling on whether the planned closure of provincial bus terminals would contravene the Public
Service Act and related laws which mandate public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals as a requisite for
the privilege of operating as common carriers.13

Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another provincial bus operator, later filed a similar petition for
declaratory relief14 against Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo and MMDA Chairman Fernando.

Mencorp asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners
and operators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals.

Averring that MMDA Chairman Fernando had begun to implement a plan to close and eliminate all provincial bus terminals
along EDSA and in the whole of the metropolis and to transfer their operations to common bus terminals, 15 Mencorp
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
impending closure of its bus terminals which it was leasing at the corner of EDSA and New York Street in Cubao and at the
intersection of Blumentritt, Laon Laan and Halcon Streets in Quezon City. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-
106224 and was raffled to Branch 47 of the RTC of Manila.

Mencorp’s petition was consolidated on June 19, 2003 with Viron’s petition which was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC,
Manila.

Mencorp’s prayer for a TRO and/or writ of injunction was denied as was its application for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.16

In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDA’s power to
regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly
established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with
the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties
without due process of law should they be required to use the common bus terminals.

Upon the agreement of the parties, they filed their respective position papers in lieu of hearings.

By Decision18 of January 24, 2005, the trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O. pursuant to R.A. No.
7924, which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manila’s basic services including those of transport and traffic
management.

The trial court held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of the State as it satisfied the two tests of lawful
subject matter and lawful means, hence, Viron’s and Mencorp’s property rights must yield to police power.

On the separate motions for reconsideration of Viron and Mencorp, the trial court, by Order of September 8, 2005,
reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority of
the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure of Viron’s and Mencorp’s
existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution of November 23, 2005.

Hence, this petition, which faults the trial court for failing to rule that: (1) the requisites of declaratory relief are not
present, there being no justiciable controversy in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224; and (2) the President has the
authority to undertake or cause the implementation of the Project. 19

Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the
E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Viron
and Mencorp, they argue, failed to produce any letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of
an immediate plan to close down their bus terminals.

And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the
MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the
only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third
persons.

The petition fails.

It is true, as respondents have pointed out, that the alleged deficiency of the consolidated petitions to meet the
requirement of justiciability was not among the issues defined for resolution in the Pre-Trial Order of January 12, 2004. It is
equally true, however, that the question was repeatedly raised by petitioners in their Answer to Viron’s petition, 20 their
Comment of April 29, 2003 opposing Mencorp’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO, 21 and their Position Paper of August 23,
2004.22
In bringing their petitions before the trial court, both respondents pleaded the existence of the essential requisites for their
respective petitions for declaratory relief,23 and refuted petitioners’ contention that a justiciable controversy was
lacking.24 There can be no denying, therefore, that the issue was raised and discussed by the parties before the trial court.

The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a
legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination. 25

The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is satisfied when an actual controversy or the ripening
seeds thereof exist between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and the declaration sought will help
in ending the controversy.26 A question becomes justiciable when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually
contested.27

In the present cases, respondents’ resort to court was prompted by the issuance of the E.O. The 4th Whereas clause of the
E.O. sets out in clear strokes the MMDA’s plan to "decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along
major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting
public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Section 2 of the E.O. thereafter lays down the immediate establishment of common bus terminals for north- and south-
bound commuters. For this purpose, Section 8 directs the Department of Budget and Management to allocate funds of not
more than one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) to cover the cost of the construction of the north and south
terminals. And the E.O. was made effective immediately.

The MMDA’s resolve to immediately implement the Project, its denials to the contrary notwithstanding, is also evident
from telltale circumstances, foremost of which was the passage by the MMC of Resolution No. 03-07, Series of 2003
expressing its full support of the immediate implementation of the Project.

Notable from the 5th Whereas clause of the MMC Resolution is the plan to "remove the bus terminals located along major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila and an urgent need to integrate the different transport modes." The 7th Whereas clause
proceeds to mention the establishment of the North and South terminals.

As alleged in Viron’s petition, a diagram of the GMA-MTS North Bus/Rail Terminal had been drawn up, and construction of
the terminal is already in progress. The MMDA, in its Answer 28 and Position Paper,29 in fact affirmed that the government
had begun to implement the Project.

It thus appears that the issue has already transcended the boundaries of what is merely conjectural or anticipatory.lawphil

Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual issuance by the MMDA of an order for the closure of
respondents’ bus terminals would be foolhardy for, by then, the proper action to bring would no longer be for declaratory
relief which, under Section 1, Rule 63 30 of the Rules of Court, must be brought before there is a breach or violation of rights.

As for petitioners’ contention that the E.O. is a mere administrative issuance which creates no relation with third persons, it
does not persuade. Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the Project for which the concerned government
agencies are directed to coordinate their activities and resources, the existing bus terminals owned, operated or leased by
third persons like respondents would have to be eliminated; and respondents would be forced to operate from the
common bus terminals.

It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would
mean, among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents
claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of law.

Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have]
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.’s] enforcement." 31 Consequently, the established rule that the
constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of
its enforcement has been satisfied by respondents.

On to the merits of the case.

Respondents posit that the MMDA is devoid of authority to order the elimination of their bus terminals under the E.O.
which, they argue, is unconstitutional because it violates both the Constitution and the Public Service Act; and that neither
is the MMDA clothed with such authority under R.A. No. 7924.

Petitioners submit, however, that the real issue concerns the President’s authority to undertake or to cause the
implementation of the Project. They assert that the authority of the President is derived from E.O. No. 125, "Reorganizing
the Ministry of Transportation and Communications Defining its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes," her
residual power and/or E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. They add that the E.O. is also a
valid exercise of the police power.
E.O. No. 125,32 which former President Corazon Aquino issued in the exercise of legislative powers, reorganized the then
Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and Communications. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 22 of E.O. 125, as amended by E.O.
125-A,33 read:

SECTION 4. Mandate. — The Ministry shall be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing,
regulating and administrative entity of the Executive Branch of the government in the promotion, development and
regulation of dependable and coordinated networks of transportationand communication systems as well as in the fast,
safe, efficient and reliable postal, transportation and communications services.

To accomplish such mandate, the Ministry shall have the following objectives:

(a) Promote the development of dependable and coordinated networks of transportation and communications systems;

(b) Guide government and private investment in the development of the country’s intermodal transportation and
communications systems in a most practical, expeditious, and orderly fashion for maximum safety, service, and cost
effectiveness; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

xxxx

SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. — To accomplish its mandate, the Ministry shall have the following powers and
functions:

(a) Formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for the preparation and implementation of integrated and
comprehensive transportation and communications systems at the national, regional and local levels;

(b) Establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications, and for
this purpose, may call on any agency, corporation, or organization, whether public or private, whose development
programs include transportation and communications as an integral part thereof, to participate and assist in the
preparation and implementation of such program;

(c) Assess, review and provide direction to transportation and communications research and development programs of the
government in coordination with other institutions concerned;

(d) Administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and communications; (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

xxxx

SECTION 6. Authority and Responsibility. — The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the
Ministry and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Minister of Transportation and
Communications, hereinafter referred to as the Minister, who shall have supervision and control over the Ministry and
shall be appointed by the President. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

SECTION 22. Implementing Authority of Minister. — The Minister shall issue such orders, rules, regulations and other
issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of this Executive Order.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is readily apparent from the abovequoted provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, that the President, then possessed of
and exercising legislative powers, mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating,
implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and
communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establishand administer comprehensive and
integrated programs for transportation and communications.

As may be seen further, the Minister (now Secretary) of the DOTC is vested with the authority and responsibility to exercise
the mandate given to the department. Accordingly, the DOTC Secretary is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations
and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law.

Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and administer programs and projects for transportation, it
follows that the President may exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the Project, which
admittedly is one for transportation.

Such authority springs from the President’s power of control over all executive departments as well as the obligation for
the faithful execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:

SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.
This constitutional provision is echoed in Section 1, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987. Notably, Section 38,
Chapter 37, Book IV of the same Code defines the President’s power of supervision and control over the executive
departments, viz:

SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. — Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws
defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as
follows:

(1) Supervision and Control. — Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function
is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts;
review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution
of plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the relationship of
particular agencies the word "control" shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate, the President may act directly or
merely direct the performance of a duty. 34

Respecting the President’s authority to order the implementation of the Project in the exercise of the police power of the
State, suffice it to stress that the powers vested in the DOTC Secretary to establish and administer comprehensive and
integrated programs for transportation and communications and to issue orders, rules and regulations to implement such
mandate (which, as previously discussed, may also be exercised by the President) have been so delegated for the good and
welfare of the people. Hence, these powers partake of the nature of police power.

Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the people. 35 This power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people
flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex ─ the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being
delegated.36 By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards 37 as
well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local governments under an express delegation by the Local
Government Code of 1991.38

The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA
as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor.

It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is
authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although
authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality
of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and
regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the
Project in question.

By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the
authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.

In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A.
No. 7924.

To recall, R.A. No. 7924 declared the Metropolitan Manila area 39 as a "special development and administrative region" and
placed the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region under the MMDA.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7924 specifically authorizes the MMDA to perform "planning, monitoring and coordinative functions,
and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services," including
transport and traffic management.40 Section 5 of the same law enumerates the powers and functions of the MMDA as
follows:

(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-term plans and programs for the delivery
of metro-wide services, land use and physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national
development objectives and priorities;

(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term investment programs for metro-wide services
which shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall include the packaging of
projects and presentation to funding institutions;
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for the delivery of specific services under its
jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project management
offices;

(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks
and adopt solutions to problems of implementation;

(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement,
engineering and education. Upon request, it shall be extended assistance and cooperation, including but not limited to,
assignment of personnel, by all other government agencies and offices concerned;

(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of
traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’
licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary
notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its
traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed
security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to
such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose; and

(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery
of basic services to the local government units, when deemed necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of
the local government unit concerned." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The scope of the function of MMDA as an administrative, coordinating and policy-setting body has been settled
in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.41 In that case, the Court stressed:

Clearly, the scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport
and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize
the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe
movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road
regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the
MMDA is expressly authorized to "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation
of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may install and administer a single ticketing system," fix,
impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations.

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.
There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro
Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government
units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to ‘enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare’ of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed
in the charter itself, a ‘development authority.’ It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:

‘SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. — . . .

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and
supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the
autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters.’ 42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project
as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It
follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals.

Even the MMDA’s claimed authority under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quoted
ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this Court’s subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Garin43 that the MMDA is not vested with police power.

Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfy the
two tests of a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a
particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 44 Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.

As early as Calalang v. Williams,45 this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern.
The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads.

Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure
designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety." 47 As such, measures
calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular
traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.

Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed immediately.
Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the
MMDA so determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfares and the inefficient
connectivity of existing transport systems. It is thus beyond cavil that the motivating force behind the issuance of the E.O. is
the interest of the public in general.

Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly
oppressive?

With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila, the E.O. seeks to "eliminate[e] the bus terminals now
located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provid[e] more convenient access to the mass transport system to
the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities x x x." 48 Common carriers with terminals
along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existing bus terminals and
use the MMDA-designated common parking areas.

In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc.,49 two city ordinances were passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Lucena, directing public utility vehicles to unload and load passengers at the Lucena Grand Central Terminal,
which was given the exclusive franchise to operate a single common terminal. Declaring that no other terminals shall be
situated, constructed, maintained or established inside or within the city of Lucena, the sanggunian declared as inoperable
all temporary terminals therein.

The ordinances were challenged before this Court for being unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the measures
constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against monopolies.

Citing De la Cruz v. Paras50 and Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,51 this Court held that the assailed ordinances were
characterized by overbreadth, as they went beyond what was reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem in the city.
And it found that the compulsory use of the Lucena Grand Terminal was unduly oppressive because it would subject its
users to fees, rentals and charges.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised
within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.

A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.

From the memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified
the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the
city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city
streets.

Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the
existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve
the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are
compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for
the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the
specifications.

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that
even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at
all. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As in Lucena, this Court fails to see how the prohibition against the existence of respondents’ terminals can be considered a
reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents’ bus
terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion in the common parking
areas, a case of transference from one site to another.
Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of "colorum" buses, vans and taxis entering Metro Manila and
using the streets for parking and passenger pick-up points, as respondents suggest, might even be more effective in easing
the traffic situation. So would the strict enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of obstructions from major
thoroughfares.

As to the alleged confiscatory character of the E.O., it need only to be stated that respondents’ certificates of public
convenience confer no property right, and are mere licenses or privileges. 52 As such, these must yield to legislation
safeguarding the interest of the people.

Even then, for reasons which bear reiteration, the MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents’ terminals not only
because no authority to implement the Project has been granted nor legislative or police power been delegated to it, but
also because the elimination of the terminals does not satisfy the standards of a valid police power measure.

Finally, an order for the closure of respondents’ terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act.

Paragraph (a), Section 13 of Chapter II of the Public Service Act (now Section 5 of Executive Order No. 202, creating the
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board or LFTRB) vested the Public Service Commission (PSC, now the
LTFRB) with "x x x jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment and other
properties x x x."

Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC was empowered to "impose such conditions as to construction,
equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require" 53 in
approving any franchise or privilege.

Further, Section 16 (g) and (h) of the Public Service Act 54 provided that the Commission shall have the power, upon proper
notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions
mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:

(g) To compel any public service to furnish safe, adequate, and proper service as regards the manner of furnishing the
same as well as the maintenance of the necessary material and equipment.

(h) To require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing
facilities, where in the judgment of said Commission, such extension is reasonable and practicable and will furnish
sufficient business to justify the construction and maintenance of the same and when the financial condition of the said
public service reasonably warrants the original expenditure required in making and operating such extension.(Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generally considered a
necessary service to be provided by provincial bus operators like respondents, hence, the investments they have poured
into the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites. Eliminating the terminals would thus run counter to the provisions of
the Public Service Act.

This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at solving the pestering
problem of traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of the
abominable traffic situation of our roads day in and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change, the law, however. It
needs only to be reiterated that it is the DOTC ─ as the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing,
regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of transportation and communications
─ which has the power to establish and administer a transportation project like the Project subject of the case at bar.

No matter how noble the intentions of the MMDA may be then, any plan, strategy or project which it is not authorized to
implement cannot pass muster.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED. E.O. No. 179 is declared NULL and VOID for
being ultra vires.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quis

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not
separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its
protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed
before this Court.

This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 1 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court
of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The
Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents."

This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) 2 filed before this Court
by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or
their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought
ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other
legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5) 3 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and
the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the
Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest
of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and
other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 1 4 of the 1987 Constitution.5

While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007.
Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to
Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be
considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding
therein respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the specific matter
required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the
petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 18 7 of
the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs. 8

On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule and
further resolved, viz:

WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a
verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and
designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on November
8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the
dispositive portion of which reads, viz:

ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.

The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:

1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial
reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already on file herein;

2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas
within five days from notice of this decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military
and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this
decision.

The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly
authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this
directive.

SO ORDERED.10

Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:

Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several uniformed and
armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso,
Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the
soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.11

On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon,
several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked
him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped
him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced
to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near
the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay. 12

Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la
Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he
was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangaycouncilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa,
with some soldiers and armed men.13

The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the
faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who drove the van
was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who
entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his
abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old. 14

The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of
them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's. The van
stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room.
With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the
head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his
(Raymond's) room and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a
member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was
questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each
time he answered none, they hit him.15

In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute them,
call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their
faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different
from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead
of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in
connection with the respondents' abduction. 16 While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But
once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During
this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food. 17

On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused
him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched
him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture
and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. Before their
torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the next day and kill him. 18

The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise with the
chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand
from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a
fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an
Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to
Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay. 19 He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to
run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of what
he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline
on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was killed.
The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained. 20

For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the wounds were
almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got drunk. 21

Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all
the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels,
bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people 22 had been detained in that bartolina, including his brother
Reynaldo and himself.23

For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with
two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and mango
trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the "DTU." 24

At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine samples and
marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were
aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents
and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of
respondents' urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few
more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti.
Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen.
Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them. 25

One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed men wearing
fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in
a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men. 26

From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were
detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months. When they arrived in
Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the
compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms' length away from
respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked
Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to
face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil
man.27

Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:

Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?"

Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."

Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin
ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko
lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na
sa gobyerno."28

Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the
morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents' house.
Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the presence of
Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymond's
parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would
never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang. 29

When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four "masters" who
were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse. 30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big
white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to
take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make
them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not
be given another chance.31 During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture. 32
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named "Alive,"
was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a
day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The "Alive" made them sleep each time they took it,
and they felt heavy upon waking up.33

After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that
while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While
there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other military men
and civilians.34

After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24 th Infantry Battalion. He was
fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-
minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks. 35

The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned
that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also
ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that
she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had
been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the
day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry. 36

After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeño and
Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as
Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24 th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put
in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime,
their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would
all be killed.37

On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful they were
still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were
brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila.
Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and
Raymond was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got
acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit. 38

On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the
24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007.
Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy"
beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp.
They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock. 39

Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel
with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he
witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was a member
of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house. 40 Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was
brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was
sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes. 41

From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea.
Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five
detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007. 42

In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring
food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:

Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at
nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan,
nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y
sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.

Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa
loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang
bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at
labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi
nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.

Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala
ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.

May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan.
Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.

xxx xxx xxx

Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring
si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di
nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si
Manuel.

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya
kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.

Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald
huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na
kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena. 43

On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald
(Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their
family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer
put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent
themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna. 44

Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining
lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00
each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl
who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they
had saved Php1,400.00 between them.

There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived in
the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents' house did not have
electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and
his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the
guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping
guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity. 45

Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to matters they
witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces
of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18
months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and
told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on
the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.

At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond
and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He
was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte,
Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario
delivered boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded
while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by
Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson." 46

Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized
in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights
violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on
the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination.
His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted
upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results
thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul
Protocol in conducting the examination.47

Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25, 2007
Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement
therein, viz:

13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held
incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas
corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt.
Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24 th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the
7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz,
Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the
writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding
General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no
evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated
June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any
capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were illegally
detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter. 48

Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National
Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers'
alleged abduction. He also claimed that:

7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither does he undertake
command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The principal
responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the Department
(bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the Chief of
Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such
compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive addressed
to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued
by a competent court against any members of the AFP:

(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;

(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which
may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;

(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;

(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that
may have brought about the death or disappearance;

(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and

(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. 49

Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he
received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did
the following:

3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to the
units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent
reappearance of the petitioners.

3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct
the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on
November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24
IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.

3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to
the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparohas been sought for as
soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R.
No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeño pending before the Supreme Court.

3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances
of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel if shown to have
participated or had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the
findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the process. 50

Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No.
179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeño and Merino, which averred among others, viz:

10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24 th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area, I
immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any
detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino being held captive;

11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24 th IB in Limay, Bataan;

12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan
regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their good office;

13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also
alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the
inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain
Cadapan, Empeño and Merino.51

It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.),
M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for
the submission of the Return and would be subsequently submitted. 52

Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall,
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this
Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan. 53 The 24th Infantry
Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.54

On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7 th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito
Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries
under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA
Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to
determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU
auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any. 57 Jimenez testified that this particular investigation
was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the
abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was happening within his territorial
jurisdiction.58

Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements and conducting an
investigation on May 29, 2006.59 The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening. 60 The
investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day.
There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned
and investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six persons. 62

Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements. 63 The six persons were not known to Jimenez as it was in
fact his first time to meet them.64 During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the
Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons. 65

Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to
come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power failure.
Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they were signed
on May 29, 2006.66 When the Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report.
He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006. 67 He then gave his report to the Office
of the Chief of Personnel.68

As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is herein
substantially quoted:

III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from their
respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and
thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil
court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza
and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).

a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "B") states that he was at Sitio
Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church located nearby his
residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy.
Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he
was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those
who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation
or involvement on the abduction of said victims.

b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C") states that he is a resident
of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San
Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active members/sympathizers of
the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in their
province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects,
he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his
residence. He claims further that he just came only to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was
being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about the incident and
claimed that they only implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU.

c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O") states that he is a resident of Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a
neighbor, he was very much aware about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active
supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo.
Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the
house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived home in their place. He claims further that the
only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother
Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they implicated him in
support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo brothers.

d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states that he is a resident of Brgy.
Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his barriomate when
he was still unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006,
he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the incident
lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by alleged members of the
military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him was because there are those people who are angry
with their family particularly victims of summary execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo
who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was living
witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers.

e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states that he is a resident of Sitio
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel,
Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims further that
they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of
the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and
learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely
fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.

f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that he is a resident of Sitio
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na
Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in
their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or
sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the
area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel
in their place and he learned only about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one
of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter. He claims further that he is truly
innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to
destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member.

IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking them to the alleged
abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is
considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation.

Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy and
Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who
did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos
are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first place, they were in
connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting
their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.

V. CONCLUSION

6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction committed by the above named
respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative
punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F.
Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.

8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed. 69

In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the
December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE
INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A)
FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE
INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B)
CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND
DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND
CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE
MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM
FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007. 70

The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to
its beginning.

The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a two-day
National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17,
2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances,"71 hence "representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the
stakeholders in the justice system"72 participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.

On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced
disappearances."73 It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our
people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino
experience of the martial law regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal
killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings."75 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection
of law."76
The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish.77 In 1837, de
Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of
judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists. 78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejón, drafted a
constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan,79 which granted judges the power to protect all persons in the
enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz:

The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of those rights granted to
him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of
the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making no
general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation. 80

Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism. 81 If, after hearing, the judge
determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the official's superiors, to
cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in
question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial
power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by
protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire nation. 82

The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response to
the particular needs of each country.83 It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one
piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human
dignity, her own painful history conceived." 84 What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in
violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal
freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of
statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo
administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants'
rights derived from the agrarian reform process. 85

In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human
rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-
encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights. 86 Other countries
like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of Amparo only to some
constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.87

In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, several of the
above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the Amparo contra
leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found
in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution. 88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial
review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.89

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these remedies may not be
adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness
required to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate
interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne
out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an
action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.91

The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is
curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent
investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further
commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order" 92 to
stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic
rights on August 23, 2007,93 prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including
Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable
remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When
the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as
it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court
granted their motion.

With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in disputing the Decision
of the Court of Appeals states, viz:

The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible
uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent
Raymond Manalo.94

In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause of action, to
determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:

Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:

Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial
evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
(emphases supplied)

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.95

After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were
abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were
continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the
respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with
countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different
senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong
sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang
hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel."97 "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang
nililinis ang bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga
kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang
babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar." 100

We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and
testimony, viz:

...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to
be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house through
the rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely:
Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of
Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as
lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the
abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the
petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7 th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and
their CAFGU auxiliaries.

We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or
sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the
brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation
of the Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This
one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of military
personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he
perfunctorily investigated...

Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners'
captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no
controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told
them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the
abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity
at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably
encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable cause.

In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-
Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to establish that
M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be
then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were boarded
and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)

However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the petitioners were brought away
from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the
captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and
conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a week in a house
of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel,
Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less
three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and
Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners' parents, where only Raymond was
presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario
warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights
violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata
and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the
medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario had a
direct hand in their torture.

It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was
established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was
similarly established.

xxx xxx xxx

As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the
evidence of their participation is overwhelming. 101

We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated by other
independent and credible pieces of evidence. 102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of
respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the
pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, 103 also corroborate respondents' accounts of the
torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay
such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit," 104 firms
up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in said military facility.

In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission considered
similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the
Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's
findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz
regarding her ordeal.106 These statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when she
was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained. 107 She was also examined by a medical doctor
whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with
her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention. 108

With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it
logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the
veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their
statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks
they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of
witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.

We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced
disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity
and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that
they are not "free in every sense of the word" 109 as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they
have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been
held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a
position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security."110 (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they
are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of
their right to security of person.111

Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is "often associated with liberty;" it
is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment."
Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that
their rights "to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places112 fall under the
general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to give an
expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution
which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights."
Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v.
Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the
exercise of that liberty"114 such as a requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation
of liberty"115 or being put under "monitoring and surveillance." 116

In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation
of their right to security.

Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as respondents
assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which provides, viz:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge...

At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person - houses, papers,
and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a person's home and
possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself. 117 The purpose of this provision
was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: 118

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private
security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S.
858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to
the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence. (Tañada and
Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right
against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the
serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for the best
causes and reasons.119 (emphases supplied)

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 120 guarantees essentially the right to be alive 121 - upon which the
enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this
life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established
and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property... pervades
the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." 122 In a broad sense, the right to security of person
"emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It
includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life
but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful
desires of the individual."123

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom
from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some
scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international
human right.124 It is the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." 125 Article 3 of
the UDHR provides, viz:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis supplied)

In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No
one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by
law. (emphasis supplied)

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty
or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused
by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary
from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past
experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually
the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of
the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision. 127

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II
of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded without a search
warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than
a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As
the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. 129

Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as
to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and
psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of
bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-
discussed.

Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of
an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all the more be
protected from these degradations.

An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully
detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of
person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged
ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:

...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time when they could
reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the circumstances in
question.

xxx xxx xxx

... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural obligation under Art.3 to
conduct an effective investigation into his allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that the protection of
the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:

...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms
under general international law or under specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the meaning of article
1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms
include . . . the right to liberty and security of person.132

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the context of the
writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the
State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. 133 As the government
is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person
is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to
victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to
the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez
Rodriguez Case,134viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken
by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an
effective search for the truth by the government. 135

This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted by the
United Nations' Human Rights Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While the right to security
of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to
security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a
deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case involving
death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the
Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:

The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph one could lead to
the view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux préparatoires indicate that
the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to security
of the person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the
only reference to the right of security of person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to
narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States
parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of
law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not
arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to
protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of
non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.139(emphasis
supplied)

The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience who
continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention. In a catena of
cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,141 involving discrimination,
intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the abduction
of the complainant's husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,143 involving the murder
of the complainant's partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his investigation of the murder;
and Chongwe v. Zambia,144 involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.

Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as prohibiting the
State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to
liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human
Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested
by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's requests for information and investigation regarding his
whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person. The
ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of
national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from
arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her
whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard
against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person
has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.147 (emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine whether there is a
continuing violation of respondents' right to security.

First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty and security.

While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would be
killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted to
escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.

This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed
that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by
their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents
were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they
should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya
kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi. 148

The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their escape, this
continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the
military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared such as
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and Manuel Merino, among others.

Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because
of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their movements
or activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be
expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty
and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support
a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed.
These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.

Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military elements to
provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably
failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents' abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation
report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7 th Infantry Division.

The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the
Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first
time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not
propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other
witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.

In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007,
he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the
writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially include
verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of
witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or
disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court. 150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own
affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this
directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the
circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide
results of the investigations to respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by
petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the
investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo.

Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents'
right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat to their
life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise
violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.

Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.

First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection
with their case, except those already in file with the court.

Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo
and Donald Caigas.

Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and charts, and reports of
any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of
medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.

With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents partakes of
the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be
complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2)
the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists
probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 152 In the case at bar,
however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond
Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned
generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced
must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been
shown.

Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a
search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a
protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the
demand of the people such as respondents.

Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:

Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.

Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to
produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control...

In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued
a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material Distributors
(Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and seizure
clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that "cannot be
identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution..."

Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide results of the investigations
conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the
persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher
headquarters."

With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of assignment of
M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant,
improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ of Amparo. They add that it will
unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of military officers and even
unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even death.

On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas,
whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring
the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that
these military officers can be served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for
violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the
medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and
prisoners behind secret walls.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26,
2007 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.

DECISION

Tinga, J.:

With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is confronted anew
with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between
law and morality.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels and
inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city
ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up"
rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional rights to
liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present petition.

This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision 3 in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance
Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns,
Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).

I.

The facts are as follows:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance. 4 The Ordinance is reproduced
in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest, health
and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular.

SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.

SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms,
are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila.

SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve
(12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by
owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning.

SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction
thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1)
year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the
president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of
subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.

SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary to this measure or any
portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.

SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.

Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.

Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.

On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO) 5 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor
Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be
declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it
was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge
customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention 7 on the
ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in
Manila.8 The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels
and motels in Metro Manila.9

On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene. 10 The RTC also notified the Solicitor General of the
proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as
plaintiff.11

On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw. 12 The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993,
directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. 13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993
alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. 14

On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement of the
Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is
constitutional.

During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as the case
involved a purely legal question.16 On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and void.

Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.17

The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the
Constitution."18 Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the
incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the
illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour
stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where the legitimate
purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an inter-province ban on the
transport of carabaos and carabeef.

The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20 The petition was docketed as G.R. No.
112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. 21

Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section
458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government units, the power:

[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. 22

The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the Revised
Manila Charter, thus:

"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity
and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months
imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense. 23

Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of
movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance. 24 First, it held
that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or
operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power
is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is
satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to
operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general. Finally,
as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated by law.

TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari. 25 In their petition and Memorandum, petitioners
in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an
invalid exercise of police power.

II.

We must address the threshold issue of petitioners’ standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments offering
"wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that
the equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not
these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection rights.

Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law
or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on
the principle of separation of powers,26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of
the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.

The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution. 27 The
constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise
definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as
the standard test for a petitioner's standing. 29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated
on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v.
Wright.30

Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits,
third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance. 31

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are
appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to
bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an
‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant
must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his
or her own interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the
Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by
the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our
nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers
to bring suit.34

American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the
fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive
health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections available to their
patients. The Court held that:

"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are
considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them." 36

An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United States Supreme Court held that a
licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a statutory
scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The United States
High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to
their market or function."38

Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the
latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect
permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the
overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. 39 In this case, the
petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that
based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.

We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their
establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.

III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967
decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. 40Ermita-
Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such as
name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house.
This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose
similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar establishments
in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.

The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities
covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals
including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein
there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely
restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its
citizens.

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.41

The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room
more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units
by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.

A.

Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions
warrant.42 Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and
its people.43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the
regulation of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome scope of police power is best
demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system, its use has rarely been
denied.

The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the
police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of
Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated
by his cynicism.

Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection questions,
the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their
political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form of caution
emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political
decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of
government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of
the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal
standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching constitutional questions of the day.

B.

The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition. 48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property
is concerned.

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on
government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures
that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. 49 Procedural due process concerns
itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere.
Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government
action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the
due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or
property.50

The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal
thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is
now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due
process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the
libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired
potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its
application.

C.

The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed with the
evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products. 51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene
Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a
"discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right." 52 Consequently, two standards of judicial review
were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the
rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.

A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for
evaluating classifications based on gender53 and legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed. 56 While the test may have first been articulated in equal
protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well.

We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. 57 Using the
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental
interest.58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive
measures is considered.59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and
the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. 60 Strict scrutiny is used
today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights
as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. 61 The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope
of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, 62 judicial access63and interstate travel.64

If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at
bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to
property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard – the
rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional
rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question.

Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since they seem shorn of
political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the
people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet
fundamental freedoms – which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their
constitutional consequence – that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally
incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or
what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother
presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as inherent,
without doing harm or injury to others.

D.

The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be
free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by
his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[ 65] In accordance with this case, the
rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.[ 66]

The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:

While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be
no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed. 67 [Citations omitted]

It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts
before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery and
fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus
became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.’" 68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is
accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is
constitutionally protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains
significance for our purposes:

The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As the
case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:

Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed,
they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the
consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that
experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of
others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense
free.

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a
compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty;
in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into
the personal life of the citizen.70

We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate
uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time
in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest
between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons
in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs
can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.

E.

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference
with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. 72

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is
affected.73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise
enjoys the presumption of validity.74

Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt
and heavy instrument.75 The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit
activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare
or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus
deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.

The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home, 76 and it is
skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city – the Pearl of the Orient – as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for
the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that
Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a
common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not
to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering incentives
for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.

The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by
applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through
active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and
regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely
paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel
rooms and even apartments.

IV.

We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into
the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion
into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance
rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating
innocuous intentions.

The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary
provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect. 77 The notion that the promotion of public
morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle. 78 The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy
does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular behavior to
penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long
as the pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different interests. 79

To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as a
matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to
legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong. 80 Our penal laws, for
one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and
wrong, they will remain so oriented.

Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also
the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from
non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our
recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State. Independent
and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of
law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because they are entrusted by
the people to uphold the law.81

Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative is
hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the
courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less
drastic means to promote morality.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C.
ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN.
DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO
LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 26 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA — a petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)
and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but denied the latter’s prayers for an inspection order, production order
and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data.

Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to the public of any records in
whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitioner’s Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged
ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the complained incident. Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order,
production order and for the return of the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there is no
evidence that Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents
pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the investigation of this incident
with the end in view of prosecuting those who are responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the
Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as may
be relevant to the grant of these reliefs. 3

We begin with the petitioner’s allegations.

Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. 4 While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program
to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a
member.5 During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April
of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a
future medical mission.7

In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00) in cash,
journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,8 wristwatch, sphygmomanometer,
stethoscope and medicines.9

After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward
Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian,
La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the
loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up. 11

Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner and her
companions to lie on the ground face down. 12 The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of their
leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces. 13

Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her hands. 14 At this
juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their mouths,
to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name. 15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged
petitioner towards the van—bruising her arms, legs and knees. 16 Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded,
petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her. 17 The van then sped away.

After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. 18 Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to alight. 19 After she was
informed that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army
(CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell
from the sound of its metal doors.20 From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and
landing and some construction bustle.21 She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur,
Nueva Ecija.22

What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. 23 The thrust of the interrogations was to
convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold." 24 The torture, on the other hand,
consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the petitioner. 25

Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her sleep. 26 Petitioner was only
relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she became acquainted with a woman named
"Rose" who bathed her.27 There were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her
surroundings.28

Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her interrogators who
introduced themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC." 29 "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured her came
from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was abducted because her name is included in the "Order of Battle." 30

On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle’s house in Quezon City. 31 Before being released,
however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM 32 card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail address with
password,33 a plastic bag containing biscuits and books, 34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of
shoes.35 Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will
happen to her and her family.36

Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given to her. 37 Out of
apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away the cellular
phone with a SIM card.

Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing government files or records
linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this
Court on 1 June 2009.38 Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police
hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
Petitioner likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC." 39

The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even approaching
petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort
Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of
petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special
Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and
subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the respondents any document
pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be
ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,
wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her ₱15,000.00 cash. 40

In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for
hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action. 41 The Resolution also directed the respondents to file their verified
written return.42

On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writs 43 on behalf of the public officials
impleaded as respondents.

We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.

The public respondents label petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture as "stage managed." 44 In support of their
accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the Special Report 45 of
the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and
her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house. 46 From this statement, the public respondents
drew the distinct possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolo’s house, nobody else has any way of knowing
where petitioner and her companions were at the time they were supposedly abducted. 47 This can only mean, the public
respondents concluded, that if ever there was any "abduction" it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the
consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves. 48

Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate 49 of the petitioner, as actually belying her claims that she was
subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while the petitioner alleges that she was
choked and boxed by her abductors—inflictions that could have easily produced remarkable bruises—her Medical
Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps. 50
For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of petitioner’s alleged abduction and
torture, more so any military or police involvement therein. Hence, public respondents conclude that the claims of
abduction and torture was no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at
the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group that she represents. 51

Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist on the dismissal of the
Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from suit, 52 and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in
view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the
commission of such atrocities.53

Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind the
allegations of the petitioner.54 In both the police and military arms of the government machinery, inquiries were set-up in
the following manner:

Police Action

Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009,
when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station to report the presence of heavily
armed men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian.55 Acting on the report, the police station launched an initial
investigation.56

The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the investigators of an abduction
incident involving three (3) persons—later identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward Jandoc
—who were all staying in his house.57 Mr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon,
and was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily armed men who forced their way inside his house. 58Other witnesses to the
abduction also confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue van with an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda
XRM motorcycles with no plate numbers. 59

At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to the different police stations
surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the
effort yielded negative results.60

On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special Report 61 that was transmitted to the
Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent Supt.
Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police Office of Region 3 about the abduction. 62 Follow-up investigations were, at
the same time, pursued.63

On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional Police Office for Region 3,
caused the creation of Special Investigation Task Group—CAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth
investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc. 64

Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations on the victims of the purported
abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators. 65 Task
Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of People’s Rights—
organizations trusted by petitioner—in the hopes of obtaining the latter’s participation in the ongoing
investigations.66 Unfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators requesting for the availability of the petitioner for
inquiries were left unheeded.67

The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the reports 68 that it submitted
to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine National Police. However, as of their latest
report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true identity and
affiliation of the abductors—a fact that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fellow
victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts.69

Military Action

Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know about the alleged abduction and
torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing him and the other respondents to file their
return.70 Immediately thereafter, he issued a Memorandum Directive 71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering
the latter, among others, to conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the
abduction.72

Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP Chief of Staff, sent an
AFP Radio Message73 addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the
Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner. 74
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit instructed public
respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the
Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding the possible involvement of any personnel
assigned at the camp in the purported abduction of the petitioner. 75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped
the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to conduct the investigation. 76

On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation Report 77 detailing the results of its inquiry.
In substance, the report described petitioner’s allegations as "opinionated" and thereby cleared the military from any
involvement in her alleged abduction and torture. 78

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioner’s version that she was indeed
abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by
which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was
telling the truth.80

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that the abduction of the
petitioner was "stage managed," as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only the latter and her
companions knew where they were staying at the time they were forcibly taken. 81 The Court of Appeals further stressed
that the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective
of the very injuries the latter claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed
and then dragged by her abductors onto their van. 82

The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the petitioner, as
manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she was released. 83 This threat, according to the
Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators
who are still at large.84 Thus, the appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing
the public respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence,
their existing investigations involving the abduction.85

The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the petitioner, noting the
existence of "records of investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the CPP-NPA. 86The appellate
court derived the existence of such records from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party-list
representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating in
rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female CPP-NPA member
who wanted out of the organization. According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as
well as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the right
to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on her already volatile security. 87 To this end, the appellate court
granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the public
any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction
and torture.88

The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military or any other person
acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner. 89 The
appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the military was behind
her abduction.90 Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and
torture of petitioner.91 The petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
in view of her immunity from suit.92

Accordingly, the petitioner’s prayers for the return of her personal belongings were denied. 93 Petitioner’s prayers for an
inspection order and production order also met the same fate. 94

Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

AMPARO

A.

Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from any responsibility in her
abduction and torture.95 Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court of Appeals in denying her prayer
for the return of her personal belongings. 96

Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as the sounds of
construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were detailed in her two affidavits and
affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to prove government involvement. 97
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking
civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition. 98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this
Court a pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return
of her belongings.99

Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings

It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification
in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of
command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal
basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition. 100

The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine command responsibility in the context of an amparo
proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that: 102

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed
combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control
in international wars or domestic conflict."103 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, 104foreshadowing the present-
day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his
duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is " an omission mode of individual criminal
liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or
punish the perpetrators105 (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied)

Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in
a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the
nature of the writ itself:

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial
measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of
the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. 106 While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does
not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative
under the applicable substantive law.107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in
turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo: 108

x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. 109(Emphasis supplied)

It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding
does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in
the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded—
not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis,110 the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were given
special and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit:

x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry
the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance.

Responsibility of Public Respondents

At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the public respondents is
to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had
condoned her abduction and torture.111

To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who were behind her ordeal.
Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and torture—i.e., the forcible taking in
broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist
inclinations; and the infliction of physical abuse—which, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced
disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state forces. 112

Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysay—a conclusion that she was
able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place where she was actually detained, and also from the sounds of
construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while thereat. 113

We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that
her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay.

First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous
instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government
orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand
as substantial evidence of the involvement of the government.

In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement
depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving
the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the
true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it
could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.

In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits, 114 the cartographic sketches115of several
of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the
undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner’s abductors.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such
sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the
abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command.

Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established by her mere
estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat.
Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its
face—not only because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere
sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself
doubtful.116 With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner’s claim that she was taken to Fort
Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.

In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were actually affiliated, whether
formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove that
petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps,
in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact
committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a
pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.

Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings

This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the failure of the latter to prove
that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and torture. 117 We agree with the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals, but not entirely with the reason used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the
return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents
responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.

In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already
equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once
the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above,
matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding. 118

But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a person’s right to
be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rights—which are no longer
protected by the writ of amparo.119 Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,120 which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly
excludes the protection of property rights.

B.
The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an inspection of the detention
areas of Fort Magsaysay.121

Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioner’s ordeal, this Court finds
no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree
with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never
intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order. 122 Contrary to the explicit
position123 espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence.

An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo
petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. 124 A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an
inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the
order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is,
nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in
itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.

Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she
was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on
the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.

HABEAS DATA

As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data, by enjoining
the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports,
documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her
abduction and torture." Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this
particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant.

For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of the writ of habeas
data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion 125 of its decision:

Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the investigations
conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually expunged from the records. Petitioner
claimed to be included in the Government’s Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents
against whom false criminal charges were filed based on made up and perjured information.

Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay
party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press conference where they
revealed that they received an information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner
was a communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner holding
firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises.

Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner’s denial that she was the person in said video, there were records of other
investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such
nature have reasonable connections, one way or another, to petitioner’s abduction where she claimed she had been
subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged
membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made available to the public,
Petitioner’s security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being violated or transgressed by persons who have strong
sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated dissemination of said unverified video CD or
reports of Petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available for public consumption without
evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioner’s right to privacy which must be protected by this Court.
We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).

The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals.126 The writ operates to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.

Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least
by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim.127 This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.

The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on record that shows that
any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the
Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the
petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA, was not
adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only
inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their
press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or
photograph.

In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents from
"distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers"
relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents
cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.

Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and
torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioner’s right to
privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.

For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas
data.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE

Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form of responsibility on
the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide Us to a proper disposition of this case.
One, that further investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators
behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its
Constitutional mandate to "investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights," 128must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and
remedial voids.

Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken

Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce substantial evidence
proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and
one-sided investigations conducted by the government itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons alleged
to be involved in an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to
investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the "evidentiary
difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any amparo case. 129

Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguard—requiring the "respondent who is a
public official or employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and
regulations was observed in the performance of duty." 130 Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to
show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they
cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.

With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the
conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar.

A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on the part of the police
investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete with background checks on
the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators
have been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime. Although conducting a background investigation on the victims is a
logical first step in exposing the motive behind the abduction—its necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify
the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with
allegations about the motive of her captors.

Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or non-cooperation of the
petitioner—who, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts. 131 While it may be
conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJAN’s
investigation, this Court believes that the former’s reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not
to explore other means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant leads. 132 Indeed, while the allegations of
government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a court of law—they
are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the
high standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations.

Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJAN’s reports still failed to explain why it never
considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolo—who, along with the victims, is a central witness to the abduction.
The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the
abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioner’s account, was not wearing any mask.1avvphi1
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches included in petitioner’s offer of
exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the
latter’s independent investigation on the abduction and torture of the petitioner. 133 But as mentioned earlier, the CHR
sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date.

In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further investigation under the norm of
extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this case, on the basis of an
incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the
petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in
bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of justice.

To add teeth to the appellate court’s directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the primary task of
conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the CHR. 134 We note that the CHR,
unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and confidence of the petitioner—as evidenced by her
attendance and participation in the hearings already conducted by the commission. 135 Certainly, it would be reasonable to
assume from such cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most
promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution
of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim
protection to the petitioner, also to the CHR.

Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows—

1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture
of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the
necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as
their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.

2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff
of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to
furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to
reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.

3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the
petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those
that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.

4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a
copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide
protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by
this Court.

Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the
above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be
sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such
determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The
Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:

1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for the return of her personal belongings;

2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.

3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any modification that this Court
may make on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations submitted to it under this decision.

4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows—

a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding
the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the
cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant
to petitioner’s abduction and torture.

b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the Commission
on Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the
petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the
Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of
this decision.

d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from
receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to
provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may
hereinafter be determined by this Court.

5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:

a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;

b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the abduction and torture of the
petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this determination—

c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and recommendation of the Commission on
Human Rights—its own report, which shall include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against
the public respondents who were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL
MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those found
responsible and/or accountable.

Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any responsibilities
and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.

Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that are not
contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
 EN BANC

MANILA ELECTRIC G.R. No. 184769

COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A.

SAPITULA,
Present:
Petitioners,

CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,*
versus
PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA, and

SERENO, JJ.
ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM,

Respondent.
Promulgated:

October 5, 2010
x - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of the writ of habeas
data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an employer decides to transfer her
workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein ─ imputing to her disloyalty to the company and
calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?

Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO).

On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of
MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:

MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG
KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB. [1]

Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the
matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police. [2]

By Memorandum[3] dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed
the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk, effective July 18, 2008 in light of
the receipt of reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which
could possibly compromise [her] safety and security.

Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of MERALCOs
Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and
misgivings on the matter, claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the
grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security
of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security in
this wise:

xxxx

I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the alleged accusations and threats
so that at least I could have found out if these are credible or even serious. But as you stated, these came from unknown
individuals and the way they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [ sic]
highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.

Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the management apparently believe, then my
transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a sitting duck so to speak, seems to betray the real
intent of management which is contrary to its expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think
twice on the rationale for managements initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the
management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.
[4]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she
raised.

No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition [5] for the issuance of a writ of habeas
data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008.

By respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide
her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her
safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas
data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the
following:
a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly received by petitioners
on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection;

b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information; and

c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.

Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from
effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.

By Order[6] of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their verified written return. And by
Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondents application for a TRO.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a petition
for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[7]

By Decision[8] of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such time that
petitioners comply with the disclosures required.

The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to
victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and
security are jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her
person.

Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data[9] contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain MERALCOs prerogative as employer
to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth
in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.[10]

Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute, petitioners argue that
although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially questioning the

transfer of her place of work by her employer[11] and the terms and conditions of her employment which arise from an
employer-employee relationship over which the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have
jurisdiction.

Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the Memorandum transferring
respondents place of work which is purely a management prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-2003 [12] expressly
prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in labor-related cases.

Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ only against public
officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding an aggrieved partys person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged
in such activities.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her reassignment to the
Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within
the province of a writ of habeas data.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty
or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth
and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security
against abuse in this age of information technology.

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and
available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided
under prevailing Rules.[13]

Castillo v. Cruz[14] underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario[15] that the writs of amparo and habeas
data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.[16] Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process
clause of the Constitution.[17] It is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate
concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful
violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners refusal to
disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right
to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in
her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at
all.[18] And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work betray[s] the real intent of management] and could
be a punitive move. Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc.
No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 197676 February 4, 2014

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS'ASSOCIATION, Petitioners,
vs.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
COMMISSION, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision 1 dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 42 denying the petition to declare as unconstitutional Sections 28(a), 29 and 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9646.

R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was signed into law on June 29, 2009 by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims to professionalize the real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of
licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners (real estate brokers, appraisers, assessors,
consultants and salespersons) in the country. Prior to its enactment, real estate service practitioners were under the
supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer
Protection (BTRCP), in the exercise of its consumer regulation functions. Such authority is now transferred to the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES)
created under the new law.

The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated on July 21, 2010 by the PRC and PRBRES
under Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010.

On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’
Association (CREBA) instituted Civil Case No. 10-124776 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners sought
to declare as void and unconstitutional the following provisions of R.A. No. 9646:

SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of Real Estate Service. – The provisions of this Act and its rules
and regulations shall not apply to the following:

(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform by himself/herself the acts mentioned in Section 3 hereof
with reference to his/her or its own property, except real estate developers;

xxxx

SEC. 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service. – No person shall practice or offer to practice
real estate service in the Philippines or offer himself/herself as real estate service practitioner, or use the title, word, letter,
figure or any sign tending to convey the impression that one is a real estate service practitioner, or advertise or indicate in
any manner whatsoever that one is qualified to practice the profession, or be appointed as real property appraiser or
assessor in any national government entity or local government unit, unless he/she has satisfactorily passed the licensure
examination given by the Board, except as otherwise provided in this Act, a holder of a valid certificate of registration, and
professional identification card or a valid special/temporary permit duly issued to him/her by the Board and the
Commission, and in the case of real estate brokers and private appraisers, they have paid the required bond as hereto
provided.

xxxx

SEC. 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service. – (a) No partnership or corporation shall engage in the business of
real estate service unless it is duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the persons
authorized to act for the partnership or corporation are all duly registered and licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or
consultants, as the case may be. The partnership or corporation shall regularly submit a list of its real estate service
practitioners to the Commission and to the SEC as part of its annual reportorial requirements. There shall at least be one
(1) licensed real estate broker for every twenty (20) accredited salespersons.

(b) Divisions or departments of partnerships and corporations engaged in marketing or selling any real estate development
project in the regular course of business must be headed by full-time registered and licensed real estate brokers.
(c) Branch offices of real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants must be manned by a duly licensed real estate broker,
appraiser or consultant as the case may be.

In case of resignation or termination from employment of a real estate service practitioner, the same shall be reported by
the employer to the Board within a period not to exceed fifteen (15) days from the date of effectivity of the resignation or
termination.

Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code, a corporation or partnership may hire the services of registered and licensed
real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants on commission basis to perform real estate services and the latter shall be
deemed independent contractors and not employees of such corporations. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because (1) it violates Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which mandates that "[e]very bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof"; (2) it is in direct conflict with Executive Order (E.O.) No. 648 which transferred the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority (NHA) to regulate the real estate trade and business to the Human
Settlements Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which authority includes the issuance
of license to sell of subdivision owners and developers pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957; (3) it violates the due
process clause as it impinges on the real estate developers’ most basic ownership rights, the right to use and dispose
property, which is enshrined in Article 428 of the Civil Code; and (4) Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 9646 violates the equal
protection clause as no substantial distinctions exist between real estate developers and the exempted group mentioned
since both are property owners dealing with their own property.

Additionally, petitioners contended that the lofty goal of nurturing and developing a "corps of technically competent,
reasonable and respected professional real estate service practitioners" is not served by curtailing the right of real estate
developers to conduct their business of selling properties. On the contrary, these restrictions would have disastrous effects
on the real estate industry as the additional cost of commissions would affect the pricing and affordability of real estate
packages. When that happens, petitioners claimed that the millions of jobs and billions in revenues that the real estate
industry generates for the government will be a thing of the past.

After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

On July 12, 2011, the trial court rendered its Decision 2 denying the petition. The trial court held that the assailed provisions
are relevant to the title of the law as they are intended to regulate the practice of real estate service in the country by
ensuring that those who engage in it shall either be a licensed real estate broker, or under the latter’s supervision. It
likewise found no real discord between E.O. No. 648 and R.A. No. 9646 as the latter does not render nugatory the license to
sell granted by the HLURB to real estate developers, which license would still subsist. The only difference is that by virtue of
the new law, real estate developers will now be compelled to hire the services of one licensed real estate broker for every
twenty salespersons to guide and supervise the coterie of salespersons under the employ of the real estate developers.

On the issue of due process, the trial court said that the questioned provisions do not preclude property owners from
using, enjoying, or disposing of their own property because they can still develop and sell their properties except that they
have to secure the services of a licensed real estate broker who shall oversee the actions of the unlicensed real estate
practitioners under their employ. Since the subject provisions merely prescribe the requirements for the regulation of the
practice of real estate services, these are consistent with a valid exercise of the State’s police power. The trial court further
ruled that Section 28(a) does not violate the equal protection clause because the exemption of real estate developers was
anchored on reasonable classification aimed at protecting the buying public from the rampant misrepresentations often
committed by unlicensed real estate practitioners, and to prevent unscrupulous and unethical real estate practices from
flourishing considering the large number of consumers in the regular course of business compared to isolated sale
transactions made by private individuals selling their own property.

Hence, this appeal on the following questions of law:

1. Whether there is a justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to adjudicate;

2. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject" rule under Article VI, Section 26 (1)
of the Philippine Constitution;

3. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648, with respect to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the HLURB to regulate real estate developers;

4. Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they affect the rights of real estate developers, are
unconstitutional for violating substantive due process; and

5. Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate developers differently from other natural or juridical persons who
directly perform acts of real estate service with reference to their own property, is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause.3
The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Justiciable Controversy

The Constitution4 requires as a condition precedent for the exercise of judicial power the existence of an actual controversy
between litigants. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible to judicial resolution.5 The controversy must be justiciable – definite and concrete – touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests, which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a
law.6 In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof on the other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There ought to be
an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 7 An actual case is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 8

There is no question here that petitioners who are real estate developers are entities directly affected by the prohibition on
performing acts constituting practice of real estate service without first complying with the registration and licensing
requirements for brokers and agents under R.A. No. 9646. The possibility of criminal sanctions for disobeying the mandate
of the new law is likewise real. Asserting that the prohibition violates their rights as property owners to dispose of their
properties, petitioners challenged on constitutional grounds the implementation of R.A. No. 9646 which the respondents
defended as a valid legislation pursuant to the State’s police power. The Court thus finds a justiciable controversy that calls
for immediate resolution.

No Violation of One-Title One-Subject Rule

Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution states:

SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary,9 the Court explained the provision as follows:

The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious
and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression
in its title.

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should
receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or
index of the Act.10 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the
statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject and title. 11 An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain
any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general object.12

It is also well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect.13 Indeed, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not
to cripple or impede legislation."14

R.A. No. 9646 is entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Real Estate Service in the Philippines, Creating for the Purpose a
Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." Aside from
provisions establishing a regulatory system for the professionalization of the real estate service sector, the new law
extended its coverage to real estate developers with respect to their own properties. Henceforth, real estate developers
are prohibited from performing acts or transactions constituting real estate service practice without first complying with
registration and licensing requirements for their business, brokers or agents, appraisers, consultants and salespersons.

Petitioners point out that since partnerships or corporations engaged in marketing or selling any real estate development
project in the regular course of business are now required to be headed by full-time, registered and licensed real estate
brokers, this requirement constitutes limitations on the property rights and business prerogatives of real estate developers
which are not all reflected in the title of R.A. No. 9646. Neither are real estate developers, who are already regulated under
a different law, P.D. No. 957, included in the definition of real estate service practitioners.

We hold that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the one-title, one-subject rule.

The primary objective of R.A. No. 9646 is expressed as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes the vital role of real estate service practitioners in the social, political,
economic development and progress of the country by promoting the real estate market, stimulating economic activity and
enhancing government income from real property-based transactions. Hence, it shall develop and nurture through proper
and effective regulation and supervision a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional real
estate service practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the
growth of the real estate industry.

We find that the inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the law’s primary goal of developing "a corps of
technically competent, responsible and respected professional real estate service practitioners whose standards of practice
and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of the real estate industry." Since the marketing
aspect of real estate development projects entails the performance of those acts and transactions defined as real estate
service practices under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9646, it is logically covered by the regulatory scheme to professionalize the
entire real estate service sector.

No Conflict Between R.A. No. 9646

and P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O. No. 648

Petitioners argue that the assailed provisions still cannot be sustained because they conflict with P.D. No. 957 which
decreed that the NHA shall have "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business." Such jurisdiction
includes the authority to issue a license to sell to real estate developers and to register real estate dealers, brokers or
salesmen upon their fulfillment of certain requirements under the law. By imposing limitations on real estate developers’
property rights, petitioners contend that R.A. No. 9646 undermines the licenses to sell issued by the NHA (now the HLURB)
to real estate developers allowing them to sell subdivision lots or condominium units directly to the public. Because the
HLURB has been divested of its exclusive jurisdiction over real estate developers, the result is an implied repeal of P.D. No.
957 as amended by E.O. No. 648, which is not favored in law.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. In order to effect a repeal by
implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be
made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal may
be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character.
The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An
inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. 15 Moreover, the failure to add a specific repealing clause
indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in
the terms of the new and old laws.16

There is nothing in R.A. No. 9646 that repeals any provision of P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O. No. 648. P.D. No. 957,
otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree," 17 vested the NHA with exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with its provisions. It empowered the NHA to
register, approve and monitor real estate development projects and issue licenses to sell to real estate owners and
developers. It further granted the NHA the authority to register and issue/revoke licenses of brokers, dealers and salesmen
engaged in the selling of subdivision lots and condominium units.

E.O. No. 648, issued on February 7, 1981, reorganized the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) and
transferred the regulatory functions of the NHA under P.D. 957 to the HSRC. Among these regulatory functions were the (1)
regulation of the real estate trade and business; (2) registration of subdivision lots and condominium projects; (3) issuance
of license to sell subdivision lots and condominium units in the registered units; (4) approval of performance bond and the
suspension of license to sell; (5) registration of dealers, brokers and salesman engaged in the business of selling subdivision
lots or condominium units; and (6) revocation of registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen. 18

E.O. No. 90, issued on December 17, 1986, renamed the HSRC as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and
was designated as the regulatory body for housing and land development under the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC). To date, HLURB continues to carry out its mandate to register real estate brokers and
salesmen dealing in condominium, memorial parks and subdivision projects pursuant to Section 11 of P.D. No. 957, which
reads:

SECTION 11. Registration of Dealers, Brokers and Salesmen. – No real estate dealer, broker or salesman shall engage in the
business of selling subdivision lots or condominium units unless he has registered himself with the Authority in accordance
with the provisions of this section.
If the Authority shall find that the applicant is of good repute and has complied with the applicable rules of the Authority,
including the payment of the prescribed fee, he shall register such applicant as a dealer, broker or salesman upon filing a
bond, or other security in lieu thereof, in such sum as may be fixed by the Authority conditioned upon his faithful
compliance with the provisions of this Decree: Provided, that the registration of a salesman shall cease upon the
termination of his employment with a dealer or broker.

Every registration under this section shall expire on the thirty-first day of December of each year. Renewal of registration
for the succeeding year shall be granted upon written application therefore made not less than thirty nor more than sixty
days before the first day of the ensuing year and upon payment of the prescribed fee, without the necessity of filing further
statements or information, unless specifically required by the Authority. All applications filed beyond said period shall be
treated as original applications.

The names and addresses of all persons registered as dealers, brokers, or salesmen shall be recorded in a Register of
Brokers, Dealers and Salesmen kept in the Authority which shall be open to public inspection.

On the other hand, Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 requires as a condition precedent for all persons who will engage in acts
constituting real estate service, including advertising in any manner one’s qualifications as a real estate service practitioner,
compliance with licensure examination and other registration requirements including the filing of a bond for real estate
brokers and private appraisers. While Section 11 of P.D. No. 957 imposes registration requirements for dealers, brokers and
salespersons engaged in the selling of subdivision lots and condominium units, Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 regulates all
real estate service practitioners whether private or government. While P.D. No. 957 seeks to supervise brokers and dealers
who are engaged in the sale of subdivision lots and condominium units, R.A. No. 9646 aims to regulate the real estate
service sector in general by professionalizing their ranks and raising the level of ethical standards for licensed real estate
professionals.

There is no conflict of jurisdiction because the HLURB supervises only those real estate service practitioners engaged in the
sale of subdivision lots and condominium projects, specifically for violations of the provisions of P.D. No. 957, and not the
entire real estate service sector which is now under the regulatory powers of the PRBRES. HLURB’s supervision of brokers
and dealers to effectively implement the provisions of P.D. No. 957 does not foreclose regulation of the real estate service
as a profession. Real estate developers already regulated by the HLURB are now further required to comply with the
professional licensure requirements under R.A. No. 9646, as provided in Sections 28, 29 and 32. Plainly, there is no
inconsistency or contradiction in the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 and P.D. No. 957, as amended.

The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with other laws in a way that will form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. The legislature is presumed to have known existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
conflicting laws.19 Congress, therefore, could not be presumed to have intended Sections 28, 29 and 32 of R.A. No. 9646 to
run counter to P.D. No. 957.

No Violation of Due Process

Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 are unduly oppressive and infringe the constitutional rule
against deprivation of property without due process of law. They stress that real estate developers are now burdened by
law to employ licensed real estate brokers to sell, market and dispose of their properties. Despite having invested a lot of
money, time and resources in their projects, petitioners aver that real estate developers will still have less control in
managing their business and will be burdened with additional expenses.

The contention has no basis. There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and enjoyment of property is
caused by the implementation of R.A. No. 9646. If petitioners as property owners feel burdened by the new requirement of
engaging the services of only licensed real estate professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties, such is an
unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure.

Indeed, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as
a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power of the State particularly when their conduct affects the
execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, public health and welfare and public
morals.20 In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violate the due process clause is
to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or
professions.21

Here, the legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of real estate practitioners by increasing their
competence and raising ethical standards as real property transactions are "susceptible to manipulation and corruption,
especially if they are in the hands of unqualified persons working under an ineffective regulatory system." The new
regulatory regime aimed to fully tap the vast potential of the real estate sector for greater contribution to our gross
domestic income, and real estate practitioners "serve a vital role in spearheading the continuous flow of capital, in boosting
investor confidence, and in promoting overall national progress." 22
We thus find R.A. No. 9646 a valid exercise of the State’s police power. As we said in another case challenging the
constitutionality of a law granting discounts to senior citizens:

The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its
object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential, insistent
and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the
legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy
of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.

Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners
that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of
evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in
view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. 23 (Emphasis supplied.)

No Violation of Equal Protection Clause

Section 28 of R.A. No. 9646 exempts from its coverage natural and juridical persons dealing with their own property, and
other persons such as receivers, trustees or assignees in insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings. However, real estate
developers are specifically mentioned as an exception from those enumerated therein. Petitioners argue that this provision
violates the equal protection clause because it unjustifiably treats real estate developers differently from those exempted
persons who also own properties and desire to sell them. They insist that no substantial distinctions exist between ordinary
property owners and real estate developers as the latter, in fact, are more capable of entering into real estate transactions
and do not need the services of licensed real estate brokers.1âwphi1 They assail the RTC decision in citing the reported
fraudulent practices as basis for the exclusion of real estate developers from the exempted group of persons under Section
28(a).

We sustain the trial court’s ruling that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the equal protection clause.

In Ichong v. Hernandez,24 the concept of equal protection was explained as follows:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825). 25

Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the
classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation.26 If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies
equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee. 27

R.A. No. 9646 was intended to provide institutionalized government support for the development of "a corps of highly
respected, technically competent, and disciplined real estate service practitioners, knowledgeable of internationally
accepted standards and practice of the profession." 28 Real estate developers at present constitute a sector that hires or
employs the largest number of brokers, salespersons, appraisers and consultants due to the sheer number of products
(lots, houses and condominium units) they advertise and sell nationwide. As early as in the ‘70s, there has been a
proliferation of errant developers, operators or sellers who have reneged on their representation and obligations to comply
with government regulations such as the provision and maintenance of subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water
system and other basic requirements. To protect the interest of home and lot buyers from fraudulent acts and
manipulations perpetrated by these unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, P.D. No. 957 was
issued to strictly regulate housing and real estate development projects. Hence, in approving R.A. No. 9646, the legislature
rightfully recognized the necessity of imposing the new licensure requirements to all real estate service practitioners,
including and more importantly, those real estate service practitioners working for real estate developers. Unlike
individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses and
condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business which is highly regulated by the State to ensure the
health and safety of home and lot buyers.
The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between ordinary property owners exempted under Section
28(a) and real estate developers like petitioners, and the classification enshrined in R.A. No. 9646 is reasonable and
relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court thus rules that R.A. No. 9646 is valid and constitutional.

Since every law is presumed valid, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that
there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority
may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down. 29

Indeed, "all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality
must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that
if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all
possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a
liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted." 30

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 in
Civil Case No. 10-124776 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203299

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203306

ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), HUKUMAN NG MAMAMAYAN MOVEMENT, INC., JERRY S. YAP, BERTENI "TOTO"
CAUSING, HERNANI Q. CUARE, PERCY LAPID, TRACY CABRERA, RONALDO E. RENTA, CIRILO P. SABARRE, JR., DERVIN
CASTRO, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, represented by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203359

SENATOR TEOFISTO DL GUINGONA III, Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203378

ALEXANDER ADONIS, ELLEN TORDESILLAS, MA. GISELA ORDENES-CASCOLAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., ROMEL R.
BAGARES, and GILBERT T. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, AND THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE-DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203391

HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. ANTONIO TINIO, VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO OF ANAKBAYAN, MA. KATHERINE
ELONA OF THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGIAN, ISABELLE THERESE BAGUISI OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III,
LEILA DE LIMA in her capacity as Secretary of Justice, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203407

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., National Artist BIENVENIDO L.
LUMBERA, Chairperson of Concerned Artists of the Philippines, ELMER C. LABOG, Chairperson of Kilusang Mayo Uno,
CRISTINA E. PALABAY, Secretary General of Karapatan, FERDINAND R. GAITE, Chairperson of COURAGE, JOEL B.
MAGLUNSOD, Vice President of Anakpawis Party-List, LANA R. LINABAN, Secretary General Gabriela Women's Party,
ADOLFO ARES P. GUTIERREZ, and JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, represented by SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., LEILA DE LIMA, Secretary of the Department of
Justice, LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, Executive Director of the Information and Communications Technology Office,
NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, D/GEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, Chief
of the Philippine National Police, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203440

MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, AMPARITA STA. MARIA, RAY PAOLO J. SANTIAGO, GILBERT V.
SEMBRANO, and RYAN JEREMIAH D. QUAN (all of the Ateneo Human Rights Center),Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAQUITO OCHOA in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HONORABLE LEILA DE LIMA in her capacity as
Secretary of Justice, HONORABLE MANUEL ROXAS in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, The CHIEF of the Philippine National Police, The DIRECTOR of the National Bureau of Investigation (all of
the Executive Department of Government), Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203453

NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE (PPI), CENTER FOR MEDIA
FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, ROWENA CARRANZA PARAAN, MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS, JOSEPH ALWYN ALBURO,
ARIEL SEBELLINO AND THE PETITIONERS IN THE e-PETITION http://www.nujp.org/no-to-ra10175/, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING
CENTER, AND ALL AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES OF GOVERNMENT AND ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR
INSTRUCTIONS, ORDERS, DIRECTION IN RELATION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10175, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203454

PAUL CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO & RYAN D. ANDRES, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE THE HON. SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203469

ANTHONY IAN M. CRUZ; MARCELO R. LANDICHO; BENJAMIN NOEL A. ESPINA; MARCK RONALD C. RIMORIN; JULIUS D.
ROCAS; OLIVER RICHARD V. ROBILLO; AARON ERICK A. LOZADA; GERARD ADRIAN P. MAGNAYE; JOSE REGINALD A.
RAMOS; MA. ROSARIO T. JUAN; BRENDALYN P. RAMIREZ; MAUREEN A. HERMITANIO; KRISTINE JOY S. REMENTILLA;
MARICEL O. GRAY; JULIUS IVAN F. CABIGON; BENRALPH S. YU; CEBU BLOGGERS SOCIETY, INC. PRESIDENT RUBEN B.
LICERA, JR; and PINOY EXPAT/OFW BLOG AWARDS, INC. COORDINATOR PEDRO E. RAHON; Petitioners,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President; HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her
capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON. LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his capacity as Executive Director, Information
and Communications Technology Office; HON. NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his capacity as Director, National Bureau
of Investigation; and P/DGEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National Police, Respondents.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203501

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his official capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines; HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his official capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her official capacity as
Secretary of Justice; LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his official capacity as Executive Director, Information and
Communications Technology Office; NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his official capacity as Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation; and DIRECTOR GENERAL NICANOR A. BARTOLOME, in his official capacity as Chief of the
Philippine National Police,Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203509

BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE NERI J. COLMENARES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203515

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. represented by BENNY D. ANTIPORDA in his capacity as President and
in his personal capacity, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRES. BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND ALL OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITIES WHO HAVE HANDS IN THE PASSAGE
AND/OR IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 10175, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203518

PHILIPPINE INTERNET FREEDOM ALLIANCE, composed of DAKILA-PHILIPPINE COLLECTIVE FOR MODERN HEROISM,
represented by Leni Velasco, PARTIDO LAKAS NG MASA, represented by Cesar S. Melencio, FRANCIS EUSTON R. ACERO,
MARLON ANTHONY ROMASANTA TONSON, TEODORO A. CASIÑO, NOEMI LARDIZABAL-DADO, IMELDA ORALES, JAMES
MATTHEW B. MIRAFLOR, JUAN G.M. RAGRAGIO, MARIA FATIMA A. VILLENA, MEDARDO M. MANRIQUE, JR., LAUREN
DADO, MARCO VITTORIA TOBIAS SUMAYAO, IRENE CHIA, ERASTUS NOEL T. DELIZO, CRISTINA SARAH E. OSORIO, ROMEO
FACTOLERIN, NAOMI L. TUPAS, KENNETH KENG, ANA ALEXANDRA C. CASTRO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE
SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE HEAD OF THE
DOJ OFFICE OF CYBERCRIME, and THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING
CENTER, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act
of 2012, unconstitutional and void.

The Facts and the Case

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can
connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable him, among other things, to:

1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs for research, study, amusement,
upliftment, or pure curiosity;

2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public or for special audiences like
associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them;

3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade houses, credit
card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and

5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or telephone.

This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to
and uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information and facility
of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would
want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself of the system to
unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people can
read.

And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the
cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding
him through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to
pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this reason, the government has a legitimate right to
regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings.

Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause havoc to the computer systems and
networks of indispensable or highly useful institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and memories of
innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those computer
systems, networks, programs, and memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these
tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.

But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate
certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order
into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.

Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court extended the
original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent
government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.

The Issues Presented

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as
crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as provisions that would enable the government to track down
and penalize violators. These provisions are:

a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;

c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;

d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;

e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;

f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;

g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;

h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;

i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;

j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;

k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;

l. Section 8 on Penalties;

m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;

n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;

o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;

p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;

q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;

r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;

s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;

t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and

u. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.

Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.

The Rulings of the Court

Section 4(a)(1)

Section 4(a)(1) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:

(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.

Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with the
fundamental rights of the people and should thus be struck down.

The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, 1 useful in determining the
constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative
classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.2 Later, the strict scrutiny standard was used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,
gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights, as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. 3

In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard
since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the
computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct. 4

Petitioners of course fear that this section will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers, professionals who employ tools and
techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither damage the target systems nor steal information. Ethical hackers
evaluate the target system’s security and report back to the owners the vulnerabilities they found in it and give instructions
for how these can be remedied. Ethical hackers are the equivalent of independent auditors who come into an organization
to verify its bookkeeping records.5

Besides, a client’s engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to the extent of the search,
the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. This is referred to as the "get out of jail free card." 6Since the ethical
hacker does his job with prior permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section
4(a)(1).

Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(3) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:

xxxx

(3) Data Interference. – The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data,
electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data interference, it
intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed
freedoms.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be
achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. 7 But
Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, 8 the
act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to
destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents.
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect 9 or the fear of
possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper.
But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind of fear is to render the state powerless
in addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct. 10 Here, the chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since
Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise of
one’s constitutional rights.

Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of proving that under no set of circumstances
will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.11 Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.

Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(6) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:

xxxx

(6) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the
reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name is:

(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the appropriate government agency at
the time of the domain name registration;

(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in case of a personal name; and

(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause 12 in that, not being narrowly
tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of
another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. For example, supposing there exists a well known billionaire-
philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who registers such name
because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who registers the name because it happens to be his real name.
Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction between the two, the law should recognize the difference.

But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio Gandolfo" which happens to be his real name or use it as a pseudo-
name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him
for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-
motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on
ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.

Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(b)(3) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

b) Computer-related Offenses:

xxxx

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion
of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has
yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence,
and transgresses the freedom of the press.

The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. 13 But the Court acknowledged its existence as
early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc,14 it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is
in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.

Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court explained in "In
the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon" 15 the relevance of these zones
to the right to privacy:
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible
unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones
arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized
men," but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks."

Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches 16 and seizures,
which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence. 17 In
assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated
by unreasonable government intrusion.18

The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his residence address, his contact
number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data. 19 The law punishes
those who acquire or use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to
show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as
well as the right to due process of law.

Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold water since the specific
conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are specific
actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to
acquire another’s personal data.

Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered from
accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure information about him that could be published.
But this is not the essence of identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity
information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating information made public
by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft.

The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender, and
it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a
different intent on the part of the perpetrator. 20 As such, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social
investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this
Section.

Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(1) provides:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses.– The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

(1) Cybersex.– The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition
of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.

Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution. 21 They express fear that
private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as
crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common usage,
the term "favor" includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as a
ribbon) usually worn conspicuously." 22 This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as
written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals.

But the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of Congress on this section of the Cybercrime Prevention Act give a
proper perspective on the issue. These deliberations show a lack of intent to penalize a "private showing x x x between and
among two private persons x x x although that may be a form of obscenity to some." 23 The understanding of those who
drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of "engaging in a business" is necessary to constitute the illegal
cybersex.24 The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and
consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam. 25

The subject of Section 4(c)(1)—lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity—is not novel. Article 201 of the RPC
punishes "obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows." The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 penalizes
those who "maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography." 26 The law defines prostitution as any act,
transaction, scheme, or design involving the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in
exchange for money, profit, or any other consideration. 27

The case of Nogales v. People28 shows the extent to which the State can regulate materials that serve no other purpose
than satisfy the market for violence, lust, or pornography. 29 The Court weighed the property rights of individuals against the
public welfare. Private property, if containing pornographic materials, may be forfeited and destroyed. Likewise, engaging
in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived by some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of
the State to eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women.

In any event, consenting adults are protected by the wealth of jurisprudence delineating the bounds of obscenity. 30The
Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only to persons
engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual
organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.

Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(2) provides:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-
Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be
(1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.

It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 31 (ACPA) to cover identical
activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons
who commit child pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPA’s definition of child pornography already embraces
the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Notably, no one has questioned this
ACPA provision.

Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can
complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher
penalty.32 The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the
cyberspace is incalculable.

Petitioners point out that the provision of ACPA that makes it unlawful for any person to "produce, direct, manufacture or
create any form of child pornography"33 clearly relates to the prosecution of persons who aid and abet the core offenses
that ACPA seeks to punish.34 Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse
of a 16-year-old is not criminally liable for producing child pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop
would be. Further, if the author bounces off his ideas on Twitter, anyone who replies to the tweet could be considered
aiding and abetting a cybercrime.

The question of aiding and abetting the offense by simply commenting on it will be discussed elsewhere below. For now
the Court must hold that the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(2) is not successfully challenged.

Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(3) provides:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. – The transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of
computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:

(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or

(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements from the sender to its
existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt
of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source;

(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message; and

(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of the
message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.

The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam." The term "spam"
surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was
said to be making a "spam." The term referred to a Monty Python’s Flying Circus scene in which actors would keep saying
"Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam" when reading options from a menu. 35

The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial communications or spams
are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of
commerce and technology, and interferes with the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams
amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending out spams enters the recipient’s domain without prior
permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.

But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the "efficiency of
computers." Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited ads
by mail. These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What matters is that
the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have
the option to delete or not to read them.

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same
level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to
protection.36 The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.

Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code

Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law

Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.

The RPC provisions on libel read:

Art. 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary,
or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. — A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.

The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to form part of it the provisions of the
RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx
(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.

Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code 37 and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry
with them the requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher
standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction. 38 Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice" from the
accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression.

Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as unconstitutional for otherwise
good jurisprudence requiring "actual malice" could easily be overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v. People 39 even
where the offended parties happened to be public figures.

The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the
charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. 40

There is "actual malice" or malice in fact41 when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it
is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 42 The reckless disregard standard used here requires a high
degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not
sufficient to establish actual malice.43

The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element is required to
establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false, is available where
the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the
Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime
law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of "malice" to
convict the author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. 44

Parenthetically, the Court cannot accept the proposition that its ruling in Fermin disregarded the higher standard of actual
malice or malice in fact when it found Cristinelli Fermin guilty of committing libel against complainants who were public
figures. Actually, the Court found the presence of malice in fact in that case. Thus:

It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make defamatory imputations against
complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by simply making a general denial, convince us that there was no malice on her
part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the article being malicious in itself, but there was also malice in fact, as there
was motive to talk ill against complainants during the electoral campaign. (Emphasis ours)

Indeed, the Court took into account the relatively wide leeway given to utterances against public figures in the above case,
cinema and television personalities, when it modified the penalty of imprisonment to just a fine of ₱6,000.00.

But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law
explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed statement. 45 For his defense,
the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true. 46

Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and the Cybercrime Prevention Act violate the country’s obligations
under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). They point out that in Adonis v. Republic of the
Philippines,47 the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) cited its General Comment 34 to the effect that penal
defamation laws should include the defense of truth.

But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement should constitute an all-encompassing
defense. As it happens, Article 361 recognizes truth as a defense but under the condition that the accused has been
prompted in making the statement by good motives and for justifiable ends. Thus:

Art. 361. Proof of the truth. — In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if
it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for
justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted.

Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the
imputation shall have been made against Government employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their
official duties.

In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.

Besides, the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as petitioners urge, to decriminalize libel. It simply suggested
that defamation laws be crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle freedom of expression. 48Indeed, the ICCPR
states that although everyone should enjoy freedom of expression, its exercise carries with it special duties and
responsibilities. Free speech is not absolute. It is subject to certain restrictions, as may be necessary and as may be
provided by law.49

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government
has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article
353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that
online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.

But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or
article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The
culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.

The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. 50 In a sense, they are a world
apart in terms of quickness of the reader’s reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click
reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the
line to other internet users. Whether these reactions to defamatory statement posted on the internet constitute aiding and
abetting libel, acts that Section 5 of the cybercrime law punishes, is another matter that the Court will deal with next in
relation to Section 5 of the law.

Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 5 provides:

Sec. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an offense:

(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission of any
of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the offenses
enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets or aids in
the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.

The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting
sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the services of the
internet. He points out that existing laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a
crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General argues that plain, ordinary, and common usage is at times sufficient
to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing the law. 51 The legislature is not required to define every single word
contained in the laws they craft.

Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and application in existing laws. When a person aids or abets
another in destroying a forest,52 smuggling merchandise into the country, 53 or interfering in the peaceful picketing of
laborers,54 his action is essentially physical and so is susceptible to easy assessment as criminal in character. These forms of
aiding or abetting lend themselves to the tests of common sense and human experience.

But, when it comes to certain cybercrimes, the waters are muddier and the line of sight is somewhat blurred. The idea of
"aiding or abetting" wrongdoings online threatens the heretofore popular and unchallenged dogmas of cyberspace use.

According to the 2011 Southeast Asia Digital Consumer Report, 33% of Filipinos have accessed the internet within a year,
translating to about 31 million users.55 Based on a recent survey, the Philippines ranks 6th in the top 10 most engaged
countries for social networking.56 Social networking sites build social relations among people who, for example, share
interests, activities, backgrounds, or real-life connections. 57

Two of the most popular of these sites are Facebook and Twitter. As of late 2012, 1.2 billion people with shared interests
use Facebook to get in touch.58 Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open book of who they are, add
other users as friends, and exchange messages, including automatic notifications when they update their profile. 59 A user
can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone, depending on the user’s
privacy settings.

If the post is made available to the public, meaning to everyone and not only to his friends, anyone on Facebook can react
to the posting, clicking any of several buttons of preferences on the program’s screen such as "Like," "Comment," or
"Share." "Like" signifies that the reader likes the posting while "Comment" enables him to post online his feelings or views
about the same, such as "This is great!" When a Facebook user "Shares" a posting, the original "posting" will appear on his
own Facebook profile, consequently making it visible to his down-line Facebook Friends.
Twitter, on the other hand, is an internet social networking and microblogging service that enables its users to send and
read short text-based messages of up to 140 characters. These are known as "Tweets." Microblogging is the practice of
posting small pieces of digital content—which could be in the form of text, pictures, links, short videos, or other media—on
the internet. Instead of friends, a Twitter user has "Followers," those who subscribe to this particular user’s posts, enabling
them to read the same, and "Following," those whom this particular user is subscribed to, enabling him to read their posts.
Like Facebook, a Twitter user can make his tweets available only to his Followers, or to the general public. If a post is
available to the public, any Twitter user can "Retweet" a given posting. Retweeting is just reposting or republishing another
person’s tweet without the need of copying and pasting it.

In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who originates the assailed statement; b) the blog service provider
like Yahoo; c) the internet service provider like PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet café that may have provided the
computer used for posting the blog; e) the person who makes a favorable comment on the blog; and f) the person who
posts a link to the blog site.60 Now, suppose Maria (a blogger) maintains a blog on WordPress.com (blog service provider).
She needs the internet to access her blog so she subscribes to Sun Broadband (Internet Service Provider).

One day, Maria posts on her internet account the statement that a certain married public official has an illicit affair with a
movie star. Linda, one of Maria’s friends who sees this post, comments online, "Yes, this is so true! They are so immoral."
Maria’s original post is then multiplied by her friends and the latter’s friends, and down the line to friends of friends almost
ad infinitum. Nena, who is a stranger to both Maria and Linda, comes across this blog, finds it interesting and so shares the
link to this apparently defamatory blog on her Twitter account. Nena’s "Followers" then "Retweet" the link to that blog site.

Pamela, a Twitter user, stumbles upon a random person’s "Retweet" of Nena’s original tweet and posts this on her
Facebook account. Immediately, Pamela’s Facebook Friends start Liking and making Comments on the assailed posting. A
lot of them even press the Share button, resulting in the further spread of the original posting into tens, hundreds,
thousands, and greater postings.

The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly defamatory statement, "Commenting" on it, or "Sharing" it
with others, to be regarded as "aiding or abetting?" In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on the office bulletin
board a small poster that says, "Armand is a thief!," he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger, seeing the poster,
writes on it, "I like this!," that could not be libel since he did not author the poster. If Arthur, passing by and noticing the
poster, writes on it, "Correct!," would that be libel? No, for he merely expresses agreement with the statement on the
poster. He still is not its author. Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in the physical world is a crime.

But suppose Nestor posts the blog, "Armand is a thief!" on a social networking site. Would a reader and his Friends or
Followers, availing themselves of any of the "Like," "Comment," and "Share" reactions, be guilty of aiding or abetting libel?
And, in the complex world of cyberspace expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable for aiding or abetting
cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime?

Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like, Comment and Share) are
essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their response to the original posting.
Will they be liable for aiding or abetting? And, considering the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds or thousands of
responding "Friends" or "Followers" in the criminal charge to be filed in court, who will make a choice as to who should go
to jail for the outbreak of the challenged posting?

The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of libel would be a square peg in a round hole when applied to
cyberspace libel. Unless the legislature crafts a cyber libel law that takes into account its unique circumstances and culture,
such law will tend to create a chilling effect on the millions that use this new medium of communication in violation of their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to freedom of expression.

The United States Supreme Court faced the same issue in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 61 a case involving the
constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. The law prohibited (1) the knowing transmission, by means
of a telecommunications device, of

"obscene or indecent" communications to any recipient under 18 years of age; and (2) the knowing use of an interactive
computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age or to display in a manner available to a
person under 18 years of age communications that, in context, depict or describe, in terms "patently offensive" as
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.

Those who challenged the Act claim that the law violated the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech for being
overbroad. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and ruled:

The vagueness of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. §223, is a matter of special concern for two
reasons. First, the CDA is a content-based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such a regulation raises special U.S.
Const. amend. I concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech. Second, the CDA is a criminal statute. In
addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction, the CDA threatens violators with penalties including up to
two years in prison for each act of violation. The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent
rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images. As a practical matter, this increased deterrent
effect, coupled with the risk of discriminatory enforcement of vague regulations, poses greater U.S. Const. amend. I
concerns than those implicated by certain civil regulations.

xxxx

The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. § 223, presents a great threat of censoring speech that, in
fact, falls outside the statute's scope. Given the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it unquestionably silences
some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional protection. That danger provides further reason for
insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The CDA’s burden on protected speech cannot be justified if it could be
avoided by a more carefully drafted statute. (Emphasis ours)

Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person’s image with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can
spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that
oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose,
which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace
of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms. 62

If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress
otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should
provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.63 The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express
themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. 64 Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that
punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.

When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness
doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio
explained in his dissent in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, 65 "we must view these statements of the Court on the
inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only insofar as these doctrines
are used to mount ‘facial’ challenges to penal statutes not involving free speech."

In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise any constitutional
ground – absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or vagueness. Here, one
can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing
the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule
is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing. 66

But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on grounds
of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.

The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes violating
free speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may
simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills
him into silence.67

As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of communication. It is inevitable that any
government threat of punishment regarding certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-
protected freedom of expression of the great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on
social media websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.

Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the visibility of a posting on the internet by liking it? Netizens are
not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. When a case is filed, how will
the court ascertain whether or not one netizen’s comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while another comment did
not?

Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react to the original posting but creates an altogether new defamatory story
against Armand like "He beats his wife and children," then that should be considered an original posting published on the
internet. Both the penal code and the cybercrime law clearly punish authors of defamatory publications. Make no mistake,
libel destroys reputations that society values. Allowed to cascade in the internet, it will destroy relationships and, under
certain circumstances, will generate enmity and tension between social or economic groups, races, or religions,
exacerbating existing tension in their relationships.

In regard to the crime that targets child pornography, when "Google procures, stores, and indexes child pornography and
facilitates the completion of transactions involving the dissemination of child pornography," does this make Google and its
users aiders and abettors in the commission of child pornography crimes? 68 Byars highlights a feature in the American law
on child pornography that the Cybercrimes law lacks—the exemption of a provider or notably a plain user of interactive
computer service from civil liability for child pornography as follows:

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider and cannot be held civilly liable for any action voluntarily taken in good
faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene...whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected.69

When a person replies to a Tweet containing child pornography, he effectively republishes it whether wittingly or
unwittingly. Does this make him a willing accomplice to the distribution of child pornography? When a user downloads the
Facebook mobile application, the user may give consent to Facebook to access his contact details. In this way, certain
information is forwarded to third parties and unsolicited commercial communication could be disseminated on the basis of
this information.70 As the source of this information, is the user aiding the distribution of this communication? The
legislature needs to address this clearly to relieve users of annoying fear of possible criminal prosecution.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users
because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares
all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel
are not punishable unless consummated.71 In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of
responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to apply to Section
4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on
System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-
related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section
4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.

The crime of willfully attempting to commit any of these offenses is for the same reason not objectionable. A hacker may
for instance have done all that is necessary to illegally access another party’s computer system but the security employed
by the system’s lawful owner could frustrate his effort. Another hacker may have gained access to usernames and
passwords of others but fail to use these because the system supervisor is alerted. 72 If Section 5 that punishes any person
who willfully attempts to commit this specific offense is not upheld, the owner of the username and password could not
file a complaint against him for attempted hacking. But this is not right. The hacker should not be freed from liability simply
because of the vigilance of a lawful owner or his supervisor.

Petitioners of course claim that Section 5 lacks positive limits and could cover the innocent. 73 While this may be true with
respect to cybercrimes that tend to sneak past the area of free expression, any attempt to commit the other acts specified
in Section 4(a)(1), Section 4(a)(2), Section 4(a)(3), Section 4(a)(4), Section 4(a)(5), Section 4(a)(6), Section 4(b)(1), Section
4(b)(2), Section 4(b)(3), and Section 4(c)(1) as well as the actors aiding and abetting the commission of such acts can be
identified with some reasonable certainty through adroit tracking of their works. Absent concrete proof of the same, the
innocent will of course be spared.

Section 6 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 6 provides:

Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed by, through
and with the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act:
Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.

Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor
General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and
communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the
offender often evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore,
creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.

Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 7 provides:

Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of
any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.

The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely expresses the settled doctrine that a single set of acts may be
prosecuted and penalized simultaneously under two laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code. When two different
laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from
the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. 74 With the
exception of the crimes of online libel and online child pornography, the Court would rather leave the determination of the
correct application of Section 7 to actual cases.

Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again
posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a
violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve
essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel
under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes
the computer system as another means of publication. 75 Charging the offender under both laws would be a blatant
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy. 76

The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA’s scope so as to
include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPA’s definition of child pornography in fact already
covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender under
both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy.

Section 8 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 8 provides:

Sec. 8. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act
shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱200,000.00)
up to a maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both.

Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor
or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) or both.

If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of
at least Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or
both, shall be imposed.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished with
imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱200,000.00) but not exceeding One
million pesos (Ph₱1,000,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished with the
penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided, That the penalty
to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a
computer system.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with imprisonment
of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (Ph₱50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand
pesos (Ph₱250,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with imprisonment one
(1) degree lower than that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos
(Ph₱100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱500,000.00) or both.

Section 8 provides for the penalties for the following crimes: Sections 4(a) on Offenses Against the Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability of Computer Data and Systems; 4(b) on Computer-related Offenses; 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices; when the
crime punishable under 4(a) is committed against critical infrastructure; 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications; and Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting, and Attempt in the Commission
of Cybercrime.

The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature
prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear proportionate to the
evil sought to be punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply
because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of another offense or might just have been connected
with another crime.77 Judges and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise
their range as determined by the legislative department.

The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body. 78

Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 12 provides:

Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized to collect
or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted
by means of a computer system.

Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of underlying
service, but not content, nor identities.

All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.

Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of the
above-stated information.

The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination
under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed,
or is about to be committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is
essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that
there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.

Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data in real time as tending
to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital messages
come from, what kind they are, and where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or recipients
before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be protected from
government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one another.

The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose since a law may require the disclosure
of matters normally considered private but then only upon showing that such requirement has a rational relation to the
purpose of the law,79 that there is a compelling State interest behind the law, and that the provision itself is narrowly
drawn.80 In assessing regulations affecting privacy rights, courts should balance the legitimate concerns of the State against
constitutional guarantees.81

Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a need to put order to the
tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. 82 To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the government
should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.

Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording of traffic data is a part, aims to provide law
enforcement authorities with the power they need for spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes committed in
cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a state business. Indeed, as Chief Justice Sereno points out, the Budapest Convention on
Cybercrimes requires signatory countries to adopt legislative measures to empower state authorities to collect or record
"traffic data, in real time, associated with specified communications." 83 And this is precisely what Section 12 does. It
empowers law enforcement agencies in this country to collect or record such data.

But is not evidence of yesterday’s traffic data, like the scene of the crime after it has been committed, adequate for fighting
cybercrimes and, therefore, real-time data is superfluous for that purpose? Evidently, it is not. Those who commit the
crimes of accessing a computer system without right, 84 transmitting viruses,85 lasciviously exhibiting sexual organs or sexual
activity for favor or consideration;86 and producing child pornography87 could easily evade detection and prosecution by
simply moving the physical location of their computers or laptops from day to day. In this digital age, the wicked can
commit cybercrimes from virtually anywhere: from internet cafés, from kindred places that provide free internet services,
and from unregistered mobile internet connectors. Criminals using cellphones under pre-paid arrangements and with
unregistered SIM cards do not have listed addresses and can neither be located nor identified. There are many ways the
cyber criminals can quickly erase their tracks. Those who peddle child pornography could use relays of computers to
mislead law enforcement authorities regarding their places of operations. Evidently, it is only real-time traffic data
collection or recording and a subsequent recourse to court-issued search and seizure warrant that can succeed in ferreting
them out.

Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of Section 12 are too broad and do not provide ample safeguards against
crossing legal boundaries and invading the people’s right to privacy. The concern is understandable. Indeed, the Court
recognizes in Morfe v. Mutuc88 that certain constitutional guarantees work together to create zones of privacy wherein
governmental powers may not intrude, and that there exists an independent constitutional right of privacy. Such right to be
left alone has been regarded as the beginning of all freedoms. 89

But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe, 90 the United States Supreme Court classified privacy into two categories:
decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making certain
important decisions, while informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the
latter right—the right to informational privacy—that those who oppose government collection or recording of traffic data
in real-time seek to protect.

Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely
without surveillance and intrusion.91 In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court
has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate
expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must
be one society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. 92

Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its application to a particular person or group,
petitioners’ challenge to Section 12 applies to all information and communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the
large segment of the population who use all sorts of electronic devices to communicate with one another. Consequently,
the expectation of privacy is to be measured from the general public’s point of view. Without reasonable expectation of
privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.

As the Solicitor General points out, an ordinary ICT user who courses his communication through a service provider, must
of necessity disclose to the latter, a third person, the traffic data needed for connecting him to the recipient ICT user. For
example, an ICT user who writes a text message intended for another ICT user must furnish his service provider with his
cellphone number and the cellphone number of his recipient, accompanying the message sent. It is this information that
creates the traffic data. Transmitting communications is akin to putting a letter in an envelope properly addressed, sealing it
closed, and sending it through the postal service. Those who post letters have no expectations that no one will read the
information appearing outside the envelope.

Computer data—messages of all kinds—travel across the internet in packets and in a way that may be likened to parcels of
letters or things that are sent through the posts. When data is sent from any one source, the content is broken up into
packets and around each of these packets is a wrapper or header. This header contains the traffic data: information that
tells computers where the packet originated, what kind of data is in the packet (SMS, voice call, video, internet chat
messages, email, online browsing data, etc.), where the packet is going, and how the packet fits together with other
packets.93 The difference is that traffic data sent through the internet at times across the ocean do not disclose the actual
names and addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded internet protocol (IP)
addresses. The packets travel from one computer system to another where their contents are pieced back together.

Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and uncover the
identities of the sender and the recipient.

For example, when one calls to speak to another through his cellphone, the service provider’s communication’s system will
put his voice message into packets and send them to the other person’s cellphone where they are refitted together and
heard. The latter’s spoken reply is sent to the caller in the same way. To be connected by the service provider, the sender
reveals his cellphone number to the service provider when he puts his call through. He also reveals the cellphone number
to the person he calls. The other ways of communicating electronically follow the same basic pattern.

In Smith v. Maryland,94 cited by the Solicitor General, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that telephone users in
the ‘70s must realize that they necessarily convey phone numbers to the telephone company in order to complete a call.
That Court ruled that even if there is an expectation that phone numbers one dials should remain private, such expectation
is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

In much the same way, ICT users must know that they cannot communicate or exchange data with one another over
cyberspace except through some service providers to whom they must submit certain traffic data that are needed for a
successful cyberspace communication. The conveyance of this data takes them out of the private sphere, making the
expectation to privacy in regard to them an expectation that society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable.

The Court, however, agrees with Justices Carpio and Brion that when seemingly random bits of traffic data are gathered in
bulk, pooled together, and analyzed, they reveal patterns of activities which can then be used to create profiles of the
persons under surveillance. With enough traffic data, analysts may be able to determine a person’s close associations,
religious views, political affiliations, even sexual preferences. Such information is likely beyond what the public may expect
to be disclosed, and clearly falls within matters protected by the right to privacy. But has the procedure that Section 12 of
the law provides been drawn narrowly enough to protect individual rights?

Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due cause," to collect or record by technical or electronic means
traffic data in real-time. Petitioners point out that the phrase "due cause" has no precedent in law or jurisprudence and
that whether there is due cause or not is left to the discretion of the police. Replying to this, the Solicitor General asserts
that Congress is not required to define the meaning of every word it uses in drafting the law.

Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law through statutory construction. But the cybercrime law, dealing
with a novel situation, fails to hint at the meaning it intends for the phrase "due cause." The Solicitor General suggests that
"due cause" should mean "just reason or motive" and "adherence to a lawful procedure." But the Court cannot draw this
meaning since Section 12 does not even bother to relate the collection of data to the probable commission of a particular
crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus justifying a general gathering of data. It is akin to the use of a general search
warrant that the Constitution prohibits.

Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be used. Will the law enforcement agencies
use the traffic data to identify the perpetrator of a cyber attack? Or will it be used to build up a case against an identified
suspect? Can the data be used to prevent cybercrimes from happening?

The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says that traffic
data collection should not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing can
prevent law enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender or
receiver and what the data contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to
extortion from certain bad elements in these agencies.

Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified communications." But this
supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target
communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition,"
choosing whatever specified communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy.

The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs to authorize collection of traffic data "in real time" because it is not
possible to get a court warrant that would authorize the search of what is akin to a "moving vehicle." But warrantless
search is associated with a police officer’s determination of probable cause that a crime has been committed, that there is
no opportunity for getting a warrant, and that unless the search is immediately carried out, the thing to be searched stands
to be removed. These preconditions are not provided in Section 12.

The Solicitor General is honest enough to admit that Section 12 provides minimal protection to internet users and that the
procedure envisioned by the law could be better served by providing for more robust safeguards. His bare assurance that
law enforcement authorities will not abuse the provisions of Section 12 is of course not enough. The grant of the power to
track cyberspace communications in real time and determine their sources and destinations must be narrowly drawn to
preclude abuses.95

Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 for being violative of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the
overbreadth doctrine. These doctrines however, have been consistently held by this Court to apply only to free speech
cases. But Section 12 on its own neither regulates nor punishes any type of speech. Therefore, such analysis is unnecessary.

This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred institutions to monitor individuals and
place them under surveillance in ways that have previously been impractical or even impossible. "All the forces of a
technological age x x x operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the capacity
to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian
society."96 The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written with specificity and
definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.

Section 13 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 13 provides:

Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. — The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information relating to
communication services provided by a service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from the
date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the order
from law enforcement authorities requiring its preservation.

Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That once computer
data preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such
service provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to preserve the
computer data until the termination of the case.

The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its compliance.

Petitioners in G.R. 20339197 claim that Section 13 constitutes an undue deprivation of the right to property. They liken the
data preservation order that law enforcement authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment of personal property in civil
forfeiture proceedings. Such order prevents internet users from accessing and disposing of traffic data that essentially
belong to them.

No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to their authors or recipients and are to
be considered private communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep a
copy of the same as they pass its system for the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires
service providers to keep traffic data and subscriber information relating to communication services for at least six months
from the date of the transaction and those relating to content data for at least six months from receipt of the order for
their preservation.

Actually, the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed his computer if he was so minded. The service
provider has never assumed responsibility for their loss or deletion while in its keep.

At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service providers preserve on orders of law
enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of
preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.

Section 14 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 14 provides:

Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue an order
requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit subscriber’s information, traffic data or relevant data in
his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in relation to a valid complaint
officially docketed and assigned for investigation and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of
investigation.

The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners’ objection is that the
issuance of subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a
judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers. 98

Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in
the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure
would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and
correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.

Section 15 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 15 provides:

Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. — Where a search and seizure warrant is properly issued, the
law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.

Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and:

(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;

(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;

(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;

(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and

(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and communications
network.

Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge about the functioning of the
computer system and the measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the
necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and examination.

Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination of the computer data
storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of approval
by the court.

Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established search and seizure procedures. On its
face, however, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure the proper
collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The
exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does
not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements them.

Section 17 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 17 provides:

Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. — Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15, service
providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer
data subject of a preservation and examination.
Section 17 would have the computer data, previous subject of preservation or examination, destroyed or deleted upon the
lapse of the prescribed period. The Solicitor General justifies this as necessary to clear up the service provider’s storage
systems and prevent overload. It would also ensure that investigations are quickly concluded.

Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous preservation or examination violates the
user’s right against deprivation of property without due process of law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that the user has
a demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage
system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in his computer when he generated the data or received
it. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.

Section 19 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to computer data:

Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data.— When a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of
the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.

Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes that this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a
presumption of constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right
mentioned.

Computer data99 may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well as files that contain texts,
images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to go into a lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital space, it
is indisputable that computer data, produced or created by their writers or authors may constitute personal property.
Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while stored in their personal
computers or in the service provider’s systems.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in one’s papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no
search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in
effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice
order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.

The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates as a restriction on the
freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within
constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content alleged to
be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such content violates some
law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one. 100

Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to
determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a
combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present
danger rule.101 Section 19, however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any
provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation to any
penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.

The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the constitutional guarantees to freedom
of expression and against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Section 20 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 20 provides:

Sec. 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders from law
enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision
correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every
noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement authorities.

Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is that the mere failure to comply
constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or valid.

But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829, 102 Section 20 necessarily
incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein. If Congress had intended for Section 20 to constitute an
offense in and of itself, it would not have had to make reference to any other statue or provision.

P.D. 1829 states:

Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both,
shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

x x x.

Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or willfully." There must still be a
judicial determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for non-
compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck
down by the Court.

Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law

Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:

Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.– There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC),
under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies and
for the formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.

Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.– The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time commission of cybercrime
offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT); x x x.

Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or
parameters for it to follow.

In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of
the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 103

Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national
cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow
when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices,
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and user’s assets. 104 This
definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.

Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to "prevent and combat such
[cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels,
and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation." 105 This policy is clearly adopted in the
interest of law and order, which has been considered as sufficient standard. 106 Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise
valid.

WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:

1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial communications;

b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; and

c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer
Data.

2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:

a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right;

b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of viruses;

c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the internet in bad faith to the prejudice of
others;

d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of identifying information belonging to another;
e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or
consideration;

f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;

g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code are committed
with the use of information and communications technologies;

h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;

i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service providers to preserve traffic data and subscriber
information as well as specified content data for six months;

j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued warrant;

k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data under a court-issued warrant;

l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved computer data after the expiration of the prescribed
holding periods;

m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime investigations;

n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);

o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions; and

p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel.

Further, the Court DECLARES:

1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the post;
but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it; and

2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D and
CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3)
on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System

Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related
Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1)
on Cybersex; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on
Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.1âwphi1

Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that authorizes
prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE
EXCEPTION of the crimes of:

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the
Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as

2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175
and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and,
in respect to these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS
IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S.
Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez &
Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio
Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo
Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and
on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor &
Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor,
John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R.
Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael
Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on
behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and
Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary,
Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M.
BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN,
represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION,
represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and
THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos,Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal
capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board
and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G.
NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG
SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M .
Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J.
Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M.
Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J.
SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General,
National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs
Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-
LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS
ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as
Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of
the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the
rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal
capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES,
RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON.
MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA,
ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA
EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE
BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N.
RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently
affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to
allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." 1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people
beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the
revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the
poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very
purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative
branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy
looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and
substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an
inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate.
Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation
vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine
Constitution.

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates 2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-
political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy 4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society.
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking
on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the
profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in
fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their
personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child
Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty.
Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations
unborn (ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities
as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc., 11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a
domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others, 13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the
Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc., 18 and several others19 in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others, 21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in
their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his
capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc. 24 and several others,25 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);

(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc., 27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia,
Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as citizens
(Juat) ;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others, 31in their
capacities as citizens (CFC);

(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Tillah); and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
GROUNDS:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy
against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-
uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. 35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that
the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other
health problems.36

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional
guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the
petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the
constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom. 37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health
programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service,
although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions. 38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR), 39 provides that skilled
health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers,
medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health
midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious
objectors.40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be
allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs. 41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to
satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to
free exercise of religion and the right to free speech. 42

• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law
subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are
compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment. 43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively
be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of
the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services. 44

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor
as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue
that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would
effectively reduce the number of the poor. 45

• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of
imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as
"violation" of the RH Law.46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the
people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of
services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their
affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is
plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although
exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to
another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure. 48

• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH
Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children
in accordance with their beliefs.49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law
forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining
to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a
miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives. 50

• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the
delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in
the Emergency Drugs List (EDL). 51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution. 52

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government
level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and
R.A . No. 9054.54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the
constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in
behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I.
Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez, 57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH), 58 Ana
Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction
with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene. 61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions
for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO),
enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or
until July 17, 2013.62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify
the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral
arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16,
2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court. 63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same
time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties. 64

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive
drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were
allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner." 65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or
anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or
device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be
delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the
population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted
measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth. 67 Among these measures
included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made
part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family
size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79, 68 dated
December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family
planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except
abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 69 Under
that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in
conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and
Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which,
among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including family
planning and sex education.71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From
a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year
2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate.
To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the
peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health
providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for
schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry
out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception,
women's health and population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues
that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of
women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo
ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained." 73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No.
5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a
prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role
that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the
remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent
possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods
and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of
family planning methods, devices and supplies. 74

ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the
following principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge

4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

4] The Family

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

6] Due Process

7] Equal Protection

8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some
procedural impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and
political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a
majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency." 76 The OSG posits that the
authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the
discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with
Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 78 the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the
legislature.79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to
be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that
are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure. 80

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is
often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal
branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme
within its own sphere.81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines; 82 (b)
the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; 83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government. 85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the
courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in
striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of
courtesy and caution.86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. 87 In order to address this, the Constitution
impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and
authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to
determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with
grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH
Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 89 The Court must
demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes
no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or
otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure
that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If
after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the
actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]

As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative
and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was
later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC, 92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada,
the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court
(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis
supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between
them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the
judiciary in that balancing operation.95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and
every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lis mota of the case.96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH
Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for
adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the
petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law
is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that courts do
not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of 102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 103 where the constitutionality of
an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued
that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could
possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act
in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the
controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. 104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger
of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard
on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. 105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, 108 it has expanded
its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this
Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the
Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy,
would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as
applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against
them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. 112

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. 113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a
statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the
statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against third-party standing. 115

Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed
for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even
where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers
Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although
they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the
Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to
sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue
of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has,
on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation
of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR: 119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction
over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social
and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need.
This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder
or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the
issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions
on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these
and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad
spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting
immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which
is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are
being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to
irreparable consequences.

Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court
would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case
has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65.121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true
intent - to act as a population control measure. 123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, 124 and that
the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable. 125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save
lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH
Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the
full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however,
are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law,
however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to
prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It
is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. 126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it
and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth
attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women." 128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission
on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule
"so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in
the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to
equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or
in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act." 129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason
to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions
abortion.130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus,
sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers
of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical
research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has
life.131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of
contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man. 132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that
the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients
are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of
these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be
used for abortifacient purposes.133

Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the
prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that
only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made
accessible to the public.134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting
the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health
Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to
such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive. 135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering
that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he
argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the
implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed. 136
The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. 137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation
of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage.
From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent
fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, 139 and the ratification of numerous international
agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in
order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other
family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the
promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health. 140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of
the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A.
No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the
Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion"
and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life
and guarantee religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it
was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before
conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who
have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view
that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by
the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of
the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary
meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council: 144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important
condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined
by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote;
the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents. 145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male
spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions. 146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v.
Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano, 147 it was written:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that
the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even
prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]

In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for
human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life."
Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child. 149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception"
used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization."
The records reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human
life. x x x.150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the
fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it
takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients,
it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these
processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of
the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the
sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells.
Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.

Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and
human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human. 151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was
not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:

Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase
"fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the
moment of conception."152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying
"from the moment of conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he
would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after
fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the
moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was
going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now
states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.

When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know
today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in
the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and
to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the
uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives
are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered
abortifacient.154

From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall
provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the
right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact
which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. 155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus
prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those
that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to
protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I
would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from
the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of
Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also
actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is
that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet
unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device
which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the
moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. 156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral
arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients. 157

Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin:

There is no life.

Atty. Noche:

So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:

To be protected.

Atty. Noche:

Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche:

Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche:

Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II,
Your Honor, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

Alright.

Atty. Noche:

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158

Medical Meaning

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health
Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an
ovum and forms a viable zygote."159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops." 160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also
concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm
resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages
that ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and
female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that
begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their
pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This
fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being." 162

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology 163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous
process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human
organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes
in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a
genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill
(Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that
fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from
the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome
would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that,
there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited.
Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.

The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual
evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos. 164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following
the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that
the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive
process. They are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm
that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that
pregnancy can be medically detected."167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the
beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human
being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. 168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those
who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the
Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent
the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based
divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court
cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from
conception, explained:

The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion
decision passed by the Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has
opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with
provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to
the uterus for implantation.170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the
destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute
to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health,
the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include
the following:

xxx.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.

2] xx x.

Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or
not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction,
free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest
standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include
abortion, and access to abortifacients.

3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive
order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended
accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH
Law defines an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the
word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion
and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that
either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution,
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion
becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed
exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits
any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation,
as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the
petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has
life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and
implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized
ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to
implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not
sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized
ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of
beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which
kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an
abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to
be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully
attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance
when the contraceptive product or supply will be used. 171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the
Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made
available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under
the second paragraph of the same section that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills,
postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined
the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or
health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or
prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that
primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb. 172

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the
insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR 173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the
qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR,
it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion
or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually
abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism. 174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive.
With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against
abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those
contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not
have the secondary action of acting the same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent
with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be
declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that
have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution."175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must
be upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the
inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals. 176Citing various
studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in
women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased
when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is
associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and
an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction. 177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health"
under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that
women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives. 180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement
of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the
claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women. 181

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor
to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate
health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-
reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the
contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to
implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass
the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a
physician - be maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There
is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the
Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated
proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still
require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the
public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without
prescription.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of
Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of
said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by
RA No. 4729 which provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute
whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by
a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of
preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system
for the primary purpose of preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not
more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the
discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever
nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the
consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the
petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is
completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor
the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local
government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments
shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall
provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729,
which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a
heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may
be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use. 187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law.
It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the
agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the
Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of
contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the
case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine
devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested,
evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal
contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices,
injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National
Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that
the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription,
there are those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether
abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not
only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive
use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God
in the transmission of Human life."188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes
on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs. 189

2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer

Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for
a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the
conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner
who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious
objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs. 190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited,
because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive
health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a
patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object,
such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation
of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also
not recognize.191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to
another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They
add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and
1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with
abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon
the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required. 192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive
health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an
unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may
be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the
public.193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom
because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the
people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice
and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible
parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom. 194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and
responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals
to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. 195 As the assailed law
dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners
claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their
beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point out
that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health
services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health
guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of
their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an
assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will. 199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively
going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the
RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that
the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire
citizenry.201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand,
who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has
the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the
concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's
religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others. 202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration,
location and impact.203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation
providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to
reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without
intervention of the State.204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable
to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand
of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of
contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.

The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic,
cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has
allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced
minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed
fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance
and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and
establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop
our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means
that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of
morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions
contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of
religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the
church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot
meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one
religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they
are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the
above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any
other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious
congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit
of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29
(2), of the 1987 Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29.

xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned
to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against
other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups." 206 Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the
outside manifestations of one's belief and faith. 208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship
of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits
of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or
purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid,
even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83
S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and
effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless
the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S.
Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to
promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause
prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the
two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence
individual religious beliefs and practices.210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is
comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of
belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre
and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal
standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. 212

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper
regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the
public welfare."213

Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent
neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor) 214 where it was stated "that
benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying
the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may
be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by
the legislature or the courts."217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper. 218Underlying the
compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be
subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free
Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it.
Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced
that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The
Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability
may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case
also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona
rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case
of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not
surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in
one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the
Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and
law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the
"grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as
explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and
present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate
effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent
neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct
arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of
human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others
delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether
immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right
to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most
inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free
Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised
upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a
just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a
colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the
fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do
otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In
determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to
the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on
Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to
protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining
supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's
participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." 220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm
where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of
religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete
with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his
free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2,
Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the
foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including
effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the
FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying
marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family
planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions.
[Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire
with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in
accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their
religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights
instruments. [Section 3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-
based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and
development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized.
[Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family
and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of
children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account
psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.
[Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control
program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of
any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line
between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that
are God's.221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in
line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24
thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person
seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling
state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In
this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the
RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an
important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no
less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As
in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into
obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet
under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs
are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at
the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes
pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot,
in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets
the offensive act by indirect participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs
to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter
what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. 223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of
choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any
degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion. 224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the
State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods
to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong
view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to
act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v.
NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, 225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the
provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor
ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether
the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty." 227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to
assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they
fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be
struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to
Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance
of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary 228 it was stressed:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently
affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to
allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." 10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set
consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless,
when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly
chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious
beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head
nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally
protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be
considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally
apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the
freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off
even if one acquires employment in the government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind
must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral
discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent
aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and
petition, and freedom of association.229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is
violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between
the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.

Justice Mendoza:

I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with
provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with
qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?

Congressman Lagman:

Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the
provisions.

Justice Mendoza:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health
professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives,
among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH
Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled
health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the
constitutional right to the religious belief?

Congressman Lagman:

Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were
able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to
render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve
the objectives of the law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the
establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not
to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same
silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to
refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:

What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health
legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the
State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients. 231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious
objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. 232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according
to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from
acting according to one's belief.233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of
the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a
future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or
supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon
those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive
health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious
freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could
limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any
government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral
by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the
respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating
the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who
may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who
is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional
freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected.
Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population
Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of
women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health
services and programs for women, in fact, reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a
comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life
cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for
comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to
found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of
women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary right
and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological
conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided with
comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance
towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle
activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate,
timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in
government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral character
and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and
strengthening of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen
maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x." 235 He, however, failed to
substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate
dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the
proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they
could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind
conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare
service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their
religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency
procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a
medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave
danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are
objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency." 237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to
save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:

Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of
the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to
bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is
morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is
medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are
observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor
would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally
valuable.238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to
even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a
medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds
the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares
that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a
seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family
planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those
who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information
given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on
matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by
intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather
than promote its solidarity and total development. 240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one
article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;

The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck
the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making
process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor
daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of
lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing
the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very
nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately
related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of
the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the
same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is
equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse
who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge
between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the
sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution.241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of
them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of
their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and
shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private
right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart
their destiny together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for
Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the
joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law
states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide
whether to undergo reproductive health procedure. 242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention
would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy
was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to
privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 245 where Justice
William O. Douglas wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is
an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the
ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it
recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy." 246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That
minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if
she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population
growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents.
The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that
their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:

The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right
of parents is superior to that of the State. 248 [Emphases supplied]

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of
the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment
of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of
the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the
State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family
and society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child,
whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state
substitution of their parental authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with
respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation
between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health
procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned,
the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in
the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child.
After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the
unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and
maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this
situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to
exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the
information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that
of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be
denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and
in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of
their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate
to protect and strengthen the family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle
of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach
reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students. 250 Citing
various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the
prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the
acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity
among the youth.251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the
adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus,
considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of
the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more
importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that
is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. 252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth.
Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also
for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and
violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and
emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and
development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law
itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes
among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather
than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed
in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be
said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent
that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit. 254

While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive
health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious
beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be
held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further
results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from
rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are
also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health
procedures under Section 23(a)(2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the
same time fails to define "incorrect information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must
not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule
that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be
made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and
devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis,
treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or
other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3)
public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone
training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in
the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines
promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service
provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive
health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier
discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of
information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For
ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a
full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules;
inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the
truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. 258 Used
together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public
as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health
care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical
practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the
programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and
safety. The public deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates
against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use .
They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the
poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles 259 and definition of terms260 of the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program
imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, 261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection.
Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process,
as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause,
however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes
of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences
do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute
symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The
mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially
distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of
the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct
necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health
development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor
to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility
issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the
poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction
abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon
couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the
duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that
what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to
promote basic reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend
public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the
other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions,
particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health
care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to
involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will. 262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor
analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving
pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the
accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power
and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal
profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very
lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress 263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of
professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to
regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether. 264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. 265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals
that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service.
Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they
wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or
threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a
prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but
rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are
exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive
health service, pro bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL). 266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such
services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of
terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and
shall have the following functions, powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend
standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate
authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters,
distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the
FDA;

"x x x

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to
ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-
consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused
or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not registered
with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may
be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death,
serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or
grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the
issuance of the appropriate authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry
out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines
available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to
the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by
permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH
Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal,
non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The
philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, 267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to
local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the
duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the
duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national
agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and
effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-
funded projects, facilities, programs and services. 268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities,
programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this
Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency
for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. 269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. 270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers, 273 it will be the national
government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national
government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to
implement like the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is
nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the
LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government
upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The
RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act
of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous
region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the
petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be
characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After
all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now
stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional
governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be
restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general
concern or common interest.275

11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, 276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize
it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by
man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or
ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws
are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the
philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or
present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In
Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to
examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to
be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable. 279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any
shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and
making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe,
non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies.
As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of
what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its
beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such,
everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside
each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the
problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not
the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as
long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries,
which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their
young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human
capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because
we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an
ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when
our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman. 280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the
penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-
interference in the wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by
the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies
adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise
from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in
the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of
interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's
function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by
the lawmaking body.281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely
unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the
reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed
legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method
should be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency
or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible;
and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning
without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby
LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-
GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed
GARCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total
population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ. 1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives
as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her 2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the
pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW)
reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence
and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and
live-in partners."3

Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004. 4

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC)
perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child. 5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and
the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay
officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local government
officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection and
due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

The Factual Antecedents

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a
verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to
be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. 7

Private respondent's claims

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her senior. They
have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private
respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old. 8

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the other
hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his
wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up
law, and even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed
upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at
one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed. 9

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who
is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in
2004. He even boasted to the household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private
respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the bank. 10

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In one of
their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and
hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner
sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he
blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When private respondent decided
to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even
the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would
beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent. 11

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, while
at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled
the house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time
petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been
undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications. 12

When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the bank
manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and told private
respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family
home, that private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and
has not sired a child with her. 13

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children from her and
deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would
not get a single centavo.14

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the President of three
corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he and
private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private
respondent merely draws a monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation.
Household expenses amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent through the use
of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for utilities. 15

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys
unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations. 16 After private
respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all
the businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting of the
businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos. 17

Action of the RTC of Bacolod City

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and her children
exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO 18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted
hereunder:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home within 24 hours from receipt of
the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal
dwelling; this order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic
Act No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the
conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.

After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the
conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.

The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger that the
Respondent will attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.

b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and driver from a distance of 1,000
meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.

c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through
other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers,
letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.

d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine National
Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses.
He should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house for them, and educational and
medical expenses.

f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.

g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received from all the corporations from 1
January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to
the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the
Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.

h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and considering the financial resources
of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to
put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.

On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended TPO, 20 effective for thirty (30)
days, which included the following additional provisions:

i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which
they are using in Negros Occidental.

j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex
van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.

k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.

l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support
could be finally resolved.

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule,
and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private
respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the
amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.

Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved 22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following modifications prayed for
by private respondent:

a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie and her children to
Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;

b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove Respondent from the
conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot
return until 48 hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove
things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other things in the
conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.

d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three
petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be
declared in indirect contempt of Court;

e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon presentation of proof of payment of such
expenses.23

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and
committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed another application 24 for the
issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no
longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the
children. A writ of replevin was served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms
that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard. 25

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which
incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed
their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened her. 26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently
filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a
complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This came about after private respondent,
armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a
housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola. 27

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of violence against the
offended party;

2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with the
offended party, either directly or indirectly;

3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J.
Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo
Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household
helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are
temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the
schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees
directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;

4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from
August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00;

6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;

7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991
and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle
which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;

8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real
properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal partnership of
gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2,"
including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;

9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY
PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited
properties to any person, entity or corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix
her signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged
in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.

In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave
petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified.
Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to
modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order 31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of
said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated
August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:

xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued on
August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty
(30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to private
respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility." 33

Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for prohibition
(CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of
the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order 36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the
TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed 36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise
the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve
the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity

of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a
collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the Resolution 37 dated August 14, 2007,
petitioner is now before us alleging that –

The Issues

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE LAW.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY,
UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT
THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.

V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS. 38

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle
the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by
petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 40

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the
Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality." 41

We disagree.

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under
R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of domestic violence against women and children. 42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court
designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities
identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial
Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the
latter law, viz:

SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the
offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was
committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general
original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. 44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the
constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine
what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law." 46The Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all
RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA 48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts
should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final
judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads in part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the
earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had
jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of
procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer. 49 Thus:

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It
must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of
action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint
are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is
defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. 50 A cross-claim,
on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. 51Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. 52As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De
Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim
or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the right of private
respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by petitioner
who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262
is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the
same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be
supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing
to determine legal issues, among others, viz:

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an order
containing the following:

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;

(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and

(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible, within
the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M.
No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew
the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the
extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private
respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily
running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction
and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if
he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by
the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the
amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal
course in an expeditious and summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a
judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement, 55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only
for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same
enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct
prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member
of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a
prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which
exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears
stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of
violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of
first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of
constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment 59 to the instant
Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.

Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well
be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the
remedies under the law.60

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723, 61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the
sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a
"synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-
Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"63 – providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation"
but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse, 64 nonetheless, it was
eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the
deliberations:

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns
and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well as other
members of the household, including children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address
domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female
partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of
observation?

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate
Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by
women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective
measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the family. 65

xxx

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families
which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather
than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.

Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that
there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic environment.

As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity to file a case against
their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include
even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already
difficult situation for women, Mr. President.

I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this
Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an
unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities
especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior
to the Filipino woman.

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because the family members
have been included in this proposed measure since the other members of the family other than women are also possible
victims of violence. While women are most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on
women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children are almost
always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to other family
members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the
special needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.

I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may use this
law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are established
procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and
whimsically entertain baseless complaints.

Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the basic social
institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I believe we have an
obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family members,
particularly children.

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a critical input arrived at
after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr.
President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.

Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the "men and
children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed
amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure
now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.

I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an amendment
to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.

xxxx

Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?

xxxx

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.

The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the amendment.
As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga
lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this
particular measure.

So, if I may propose an amendment –

The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors.
The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their
fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that. It will enhance and
hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.

SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS

Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.

Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.

The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as amended, is
approved.66

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. 67 Hence, we dare not
venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and
abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this
proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be
perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the
principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of
any law.68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union69 is instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of
the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every
man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees
equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It
does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is
to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall
hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims
of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of
true equality."70

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's
Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to
think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's
companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power
over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of
controlling women to retain power.71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the
Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a
manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and
discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against
women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with
men."72

Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based violence and developments in
advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules
last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a family was accorded
the right to use force on members of the family under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule of men. Women were seen
in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women
whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.

The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property
right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male
dominated structure of society.

English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in
his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and
through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common
law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their
thumb.

In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment
ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing violence to women.

The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the
Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his
wife:

The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her
about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to
the same protection of the law that the husband can invoke for himself.

As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated it.
These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they
demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was
joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to
own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.

The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in
transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:

In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of severe assaults by their
male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during
the past year. The [American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the nature of
these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who
do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is conducted.
According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double
the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."

Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-
partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by
their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover,
child abuse is often present as well.

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological
abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also common.

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior
alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part because
they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation
statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of
female homicide victims are killed by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United States Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly
adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the
UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on
the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself
established a Commission on the Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's movements. No less than Section
14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention
on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262,
entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

victims of violence.

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women and children show that
–

x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903).
And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he
total number of women in especially difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here
are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more
than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's
intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners. 73

Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence against women across an
eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW
categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:

Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

Reported 200 200 200 200 200 200

2010 2011
Cases 4 5 6 7 8 9

Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832

Incestuous
38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Rape

Attempted
194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Rape

Acts of
Lasciviousne 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
ss

Physical 3,55 2,33 1,89 1,50 1,30 1,49

2,018 1,588
Injuries 3 5 2 5 7 8

Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
Harassment

1,26 2,38 3,59 5,28

RA 9262 218 924 9,974 9,021
9 7 9 5

Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213

 Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15

Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128

RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62

Abduction
/Kidnapping 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
29

Unjust
90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Vexation

6,27 5,37 4,88 5,72 6,90 9,48 15,10 12,94

Total
1 4 1 9 5 5 4 8

*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)

On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines
because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to report the situation.
In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times,
compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women constituted
89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence. 75Statistics in Canada show that spousal
violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent).
Men, who experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their
spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a
spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional abuse. 76

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same
cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.

In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and
deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets,
plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its
application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not utilized, but
similarly pass through the same streets.

The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that
also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional,
compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace to the health of the community." 77 The mere fact that the
legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every
classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby
rendered invalid.78

C. Gender bias and prejudices

From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are often treated
differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now
Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid
exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the
widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence,
subjecting them to "double victimization" – first at the hands of the offender and then of the legal system. 79

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs
in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the
complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be
withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence." 80

Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.

In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He
used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262,
calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate
relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of
absconding with the contested property. 81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As
emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting
discrimination through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against men. 82Petitioner's
contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men"
law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate
measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women." 84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that
"(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the
development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges." 85

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed
against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees
full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women
and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with
the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the
Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently,
the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003. 86 This Convention mandates
that State parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law 87 and shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of
men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. 89 It is,
thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing

conditions only, and apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is
not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and
sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing
the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim
such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological
abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not
limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business
or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in
Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal,
community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.

It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has exposed
the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination
of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse
removes the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.

There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts
enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts.
They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application. 91 Yet, petitioner insists92that phrases like
"depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common
money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every
quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions.93

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined
above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses
Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the
latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting
her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.

R.A. 9262 is not violative of the

due process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due
process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to
respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a
matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened." 95

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further
harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 96

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of
violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to
prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables
the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction
by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support." 97

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner 98 thereby
undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC
if further violence is to be prevented," 99 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and
hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order
is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is
about to recur.100

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not
only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition. 101

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of
preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could
be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, 102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may
already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing
were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, 103among which is protection of
women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately
given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order
that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are
initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent. 104

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon
the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the
preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice. 105

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued. 106

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges
imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family,
property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of
what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard"
does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 107

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the
TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the
modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26,
2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose
not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the
renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued
renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to
complain that he was denied due process of law.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the
victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her
conjugal home.108

The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:

SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

xxxx

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the
residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights
are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement
agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort
him from the residence;
xxxx

Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only
temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no
property rights are violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as
petitioner seems to suggest?

The non-referral of a VAWC case

to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the
law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution."109

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The
reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and
Family Violence as follows:110

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection.
Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about
the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue
of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of
protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom
the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials.

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is placed
upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of
power to barangay officials to issue protection orders. 111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the
protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5
(a) and (b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to
the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If
the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that
the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days.
Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy
of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 112 On the other hand,
executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due observance." 113

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her
child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances,"
and to "maintain public order in the barangay." 114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to
apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private
rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers." 115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong
Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her
children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted
by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies
are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain
objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and
other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.

Conclusion

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in
the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. 116 In the instant case,
however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious
of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against domestic violence shows
that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not
again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but will be its fulfillment." 118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014

Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner,
vs.
Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO,Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and Section
191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo 2 seeking to set aside the August 17, 2010 3 and September 6, 20104Orders of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City, in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604. The RTC had dismissed petitioner’s
petition for the issuance ofa writ of amparo which petitioner filed in order for her to regain parental authority and custody
of Julian Yusay Caram (Baby Julian), her biological child, from the respondent officers of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD). The factual antecedents as gleaned from the records follow:

Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III
(Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant,
Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of
her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun
and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family ina potentially embarrassing situation for having a second
illegitimate son.5

On July 26, 2009, Christina gavebirth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial MedicalCenter, Marikina City. 6Sun and
Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian
by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment 7 to the DSWD.

On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died 8 without knowing about the birth of his son. Thereafter,
during the wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelino’s family that she and the deceased had a son that she gave up for
adoption due to financial distress and initial embarrassment. Marcelino’s family was taken aback by the revelation and
sympathized with Christina. After the emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the baby. 9 On
November 27, 2009, the DSWD, through Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral issued a certificate 10declaring Baby Julian as "Legally
Available for Adoption." A local matching conference was held on January 27, 2010 and on February 5, 2010, Baby Julian
was "matched" with the spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses) of the Kaisahang Bahay Foundation.
Supervised trial custody then commenced. 11

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWDasking for the
suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She alsosaid she wanted her family back together. 12

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a Memorandum 13 to DSWD Assistant
Secretary Vilma B. Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had
attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which
terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. The said Memorandum was noted
by respondent Atty. Sally D. Escutin, Director IV of the Legal Service, DSWD.

On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelino’s brother, sent a letter to Atty. Escutin informing her that a DNA
testing was scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the University of the Philippines. 14

On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera sent a letter 15 to Noel Constantino stating that it would not allow Baby Julian
to undergo DNA testing. Assistant Secretary Cabrera informed Noel Constantino that the procedures followed relative to
the certification on the availability of the child for adoption and the child’s subsequent placement to prospective adoptive
parents were proper, and that the DSWD was no longer in the position to stop the adoption process. Assistant Secretary
Cabrera further stated that should Christina wish to reacquire her parental authority over Baby Julian or halt the adoption
process, she may bring the matter to the regular courts as the reglementary period for her to regain her parental rights had
already lapsed under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523. 16

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition 17 for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of Quezon City seeking to
obtain custody of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant Secretary Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia C.
Yangco, all of the DSWD.
In her petition, Christina accused respondents of "blackmailing" her into surrendering custody of her childto the DSWD
utilizing what she claims to be an invalid certificate of availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used as basis to
misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had been complied with.

Christina argued that by making these misrepresentations, the respondents had acted beyond the scope of their legal
authority thereby causing the enforced disappearance of the said child and depriving her of her custodial rights and
parental authority over him.

On the basis of the said petition,the RTC, Branch 106 of Quezon City, through its Presiding Judge, the Honorable Angelene
Mary W. Quimpo-Sale, issued a Writ of Amparo18 on July 28, 2010 commanding the four respondents to produce the body
of Baby Julian at a hearing scheduled on August 4, 2010. Respondents were alsorequired to file their verified written return
to the writ pursuant to Section 919 of the Amparo Rule, within five working days from the service of the writ.

The respondents complied with the writ and filed their Return 20 on August 2, 2010 praying that the petition be denied for
being the improper remedy to avail of in a case relating toa biological parent’s custodial rights over her child.

On August 4, 2010, respondents appeared before the RTC but respondents did not bring the child, stating that threats of
kidnapping were made on the child and his caregivers. To give respondents another chance, the RTC reset the hearing to
August 5, 2010.

At the August 5, 2010 hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as representative of the
State and prayed that its lawyers be given time to file their memorandum or position paper in this case. In turn, the RTC
acknowledged the appearance of the OSG and allowed its representatives to actively participate in the arguments raised
during the said hearing. Relative to the matter of the parties submitting additional pleadings, Judge Sale narrowed the
issues to be discussed by providing for the following guidelines, thus:

To abbreviate the proceedings, in view of all the manifestations and counter-manifestations made by the counsels, the
court enjoined the parties to file their respective position papers on the following issues:

1. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction over the instant case;

2. Whether or not this petition isthe proper remedy based on the facts of the case and prayer in the petition; and

3. Whether or not the prayer in the petition should be granted and custody of the child be given to his biological mother.

The parties were given five (5) days from today to file their respective position papers based on these three main issues.
They may include other related issues they deem essential for the resolution of this case. Set this case for further hearing,
if necessary, on August 18, 2010 at 9:00 a.m. 21

In the same order, Judge Sale alsoacknowledged that the child subject of the case was brought before the court and the
petitioner was allowed to see him and take photographs of him.

On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate action in court. The RTC held that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child Baby
Julian.22 The RTC further stated that Christina should have filed a civil case for custody of her child as laid down in the
Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If there is
extreme urgency to secure custody of a minor who has been illegallydetained by another, a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus may be availed of, either as a principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the Rule on Custody of
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus inRelation to Custody of Minors. 23

On August 20, 2010, Christina filed a motion for reconsideration 24 arguing that since the RTC assumed jurisdiction of the
petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo, the latter is duty-bound to dispose the case on the merits. 25 The RTC,
however, deniedChristina’s motion for reconsideration on September 6, 2010 maintaining that the latter availed of the
wrong remedy and that the Supreme Court intended the writ of amparo to address the problem of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances.26

On September 28, 2010, Christina directly elevated the case before this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In
her petition, Christina prayed that the Court (1) set aside the August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the RTC, (2)
declare R.A. No. 9523 unconstitutional for being contrary to A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, 27 which was promulgated by the
Supreme Court, and for violating the doctrine of separation of powers, (3) declare the "enforced separation" between her
and Baby Julian as violative of her rights to life, liberty and security, and (4) grant her the privilege of availing the benefits
of a writ of amparo so she could be reunited with her son. 28

The only relevant issue presented before the Court worthy of attention is whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the
proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child. This Court will not belabor to discuss
Christina’s argumentsrelating to the supposedunconstitutionality or R.A. No. 9523 as Congress has the plenary power to
repeal, alter and modify existing laws29 and A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC functions only as a means to enforce the provisions of all
adoption and adoption-related statutes before the courts.

Now, in her petition, Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is being violated or threatened by the
respondent DSWD officers’ enforcement of an illegal Deed of Voluntary Commitment between her and Sun and Moon. She
claims thatshe had been "blackmailed" through the said Deed by the DSWD officers and Sun and Moon’s representatives
into surrendering her child thereby causing the "forced separation" of the said infant from his mother. Furthermore, she
also reiterates that the respondent DSWD officers acted beyond the scope of their authority when they deprived her of
Baby Julian’s custody.30

The Court rejects petitioner’s contentions and denies the petition.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparois a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful actor omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., 31 this Court held:

[T]he AmparoRule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances,"
its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced
disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groupsor private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.

This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-
Arroyo32 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in
Navia v. Pardico33 enumerated the elementsconstituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in
Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 985134 to wit:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State ora political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparopetition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal isto remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time.1âwphi1

In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced separation" from Baby Julian and
that their action amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her
position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a
copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum35 explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina
Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that
the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5,
2010.36 There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth
elements are missing.

Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up for adoption,
supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that
she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over
him.37 Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of
parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo
rule cannot be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a
public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty
and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 106, Quezon City in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to petitioner's right to avail of
proper legal remedies afforded to her by law and related rules.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
PEREZ, J.:

The privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special concerns of extra-legal
killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the
ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes
less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. [3]

For the consideration of the Court are three consolidated petitions assailing the Orders dated 28 January 2014, [4] 29
January 2014,[5]and 18 February 2014,[6] as well as the Resolution dated 14 March 2014,[7] all issued by respondent
Presiding Judge Paulino Gallegos (Judge Gallegos) of the Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47 in SP. PROC. No. 14-131282.

The records show that on 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of Seoul, Republic of
Korea sent a Notice[8] to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the location and deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku
(Ku) for arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Consequently, the Embassy of the
Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-Request[9] to petitioner, Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration
(BI), for the immediate arrest and deportation of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien.

Meanwhile, on 1 January 2014, Ku’s visa expired. [10]

On 3 January 2014, Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-Mangrobang charged Ku for being a risk to public interest
pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No. 2711.[11] This finding was approved by the BI Board of Commissioners which, on 16 January
2014, issued a Summary Deportation Order.[12]

On the same day, 16 January 2014, BI officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police District-Warrant and Subpoena
Section, arrested Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was detained. [13]

On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Ku’s passport. [14]

Also on 17 January 2014, Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies, docketed as SP
PROC. No. 14-131282.[15] On 22 January 2014, he also filed a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo.
[16]
Finding said supplemental petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Judge Gallegos, in an Order dated 22 January
2014, issued a Writ of Amparo.[17] On 24 January 2014, Ku filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO).[18] Judge Gallegos then set the hearing on the TPO on 27 January 2014 at 8:30 a.m., [19] while he set the hearing on
the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparoon 29 January 2014 at 8:30 a.m.[20]

In the afternoon of 27 January 2014, petitioner filed his Return of the Writ. [21] He was then notified that a hearing on the
TPO was held earlier in the morning and that the same was already submitted for resolution. [22] Petitioner then filed an
Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of TPO on 28 January 2014. [23]

On 28 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order granting the motion for issuance of TPO, entrusting Ku’s
custody to the Philippine National Red Cross and/or its Chairman CEO Richard Gordon, and directing the Philippine
National Police-Police Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to protect Ku and his immediate family. [24] On 29 January
2014, Judge Gallegos issued the second assailed Order directing the transfer of custody and protection of Ku to the PNP-
PSPG.[25] Petitioner challenged these orders before the Court via a Petition for Certiorari[26] docketed as G.R. No. 210759.

On 4 February 2014, the Court issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 210759 issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
enjoining the enforcement of the Orders dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and directing the BI to retain custody of Ku, as well
as requiring Ku to comment on the petition.[27] In issuing this resolution, the Court intimated the possibility of misuse by Ku
of the writ of amparo given that he was validly arrested and placed under the jurisdiction and custody of the BI; thus the
case cannot be categorized as one of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance. [28]

Owing to the Court’s Resolution dated 4 February 2014, in the hearing set on 11 February 2014 before the trial court,
petitioner verbally moved for the dismissal of the amparo petition.[29] On 18 February 2014, however, Judge Gallegos issued
the third assailed order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. [30] Thus, petitioner appealed the matter to the
Court via the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[31] docketed as G.R. No. 211403.

On 25 February 2014, Ku filed an appeal memorandum on his deportation order addressed to the Office of the President
(OP).[32]
On 14 March 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the assailed Resolution granting the privilege of the writ of amparo, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the privilege of the Writ of Amparo is hereby GRANTED. [Ku] is ordered immediately released from
[petitioner’s] custody without prejudice to the institution of the proper remedy to extradition. Moreover, the [petitioner]
and/or agents are ordered to cease and desist from further violating the right to liberty of [Ku] and the members of his
family by filing cases to legitimize his detention.[33]

Meanwhile, in the Resolution dated 18 March 2014 in G.R. No. 211403, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from
enforcing the Order dated 18 February 2014 and from further proceeding with the case. [34]

On 19 March 2014, the OP granted Ku provisional liberty only until 31 August 2014 or until his appeal was resolved,
whichever came first.[35] Ku then moved for the release of his passport before the RTC, which petitioner opposed and to
which he filed a counter-motion for the RTC to release said passport to the BI, given that such was one of the conditions for
the OP’s grant of provisional liberty to Ku. [36] In the Order dated 26 March 2014, however, Judge Gallegos merely noted
petitioner’s motion for being moot, considering that he already released Ku’s passport on 20 March 2014, upon the
personal request of Ku.[37]

Due to the complexities involved, petitioner filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 211590, essentially
assailing the Resolution dated 14 March 2014.

Condensing the various issues raised in these petitions, [38] we come to the central question of whether or not the privilege
of the writ of amparo was properly granted in the case at bar.

We rule in the negative.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)[39] provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

On 25 September 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule “in light of the prevalence of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.” It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded power to promulgate rules to
protect our people’s constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the
Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of
“extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or
to threats thereof. “Extralegal killings” are “killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings.” On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are “attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with
the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection
of law.”[40]

This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-
Arroyo[41] where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court
in Navia v. Pardico[42] enumerated the elements constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in
Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851, [43] to wit:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
(c)
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
(d)
period of time.[44]
As clarified in Navia, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9851, the Amparo Rule is now a procedural law anchored, not only on
the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what an ‘enforced or
involuntary disappearance’ is. Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s reference to enforced disappearances should be construed
to mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851. Meaning, in
probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9851. [45]

Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, we can readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not come under the
statutory definition of an enforced or involuntary disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but there
was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to give information on the
whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the BI had any intention to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a
prolonged time.

Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained by agents of the BI, that he was not read his rights under
the constitution and was not informed of the reason for his arrest, nor provided a copy of any document leading to his
arrest and detention,[46] the arresting officers are all consistent in testifying that, upon Ku’s arrest, they introduced
themselves as agents of the BI, presented to Ku the Warrant of Deportation, and informed him of his constitutional rights
as well as the expiration of his visa.[47]

More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts. Within the Bureau, Ku’s
arrest and the fact that he was in their custody was not obscured as, in fact, these were well-documented as evidenced by
the Return of Warrant of Deportation dated 20 January 2014 [48] and the After-Mission Report dated 17 January 2014.
[49]
More importantly, in the Return of the Writ, petitioner readily disclosed to the trial court that Ku was in the custody of
the BI pursuant to a Warrant of Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order. [50]

These documents and pleading show that there was never any intention on the part of the BI to remove Ku from the
protection of the law for a prolonged time. Besides, when Ku was arrested at 9:30 p.m. on 16 January 2014, and received at
the BI Detention Center at 11:30 p.m. also on 16 January 2014, [51] the following day or on 17 January 2014, Ku’s counsel
was immediately able to file his Entry of Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration before the BI, [52] thereby showing
that Ku’s legal rights were amply guarded and that he was never removed from the protection of the law.

Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain, among which is the right to life, liberty
and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent,
and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits, to wit:

SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. – The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the following:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name
(b)
is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
(c) or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
(d)
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and
(e)
the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.

Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of being detained for a long period of time without any
cause, and that he fears that the BI will fabricate criminal cases against him to hold him under detention. [53] According to
Ku, what he seeks to obtain in filing an amparo petition is the protection it will give to his person against the actions of
some government officials who will likely take advantage of their positions and use the power of the government at their
command. Ku adds that the longer he stays in confinement the more he is exposed to life-threatening situations and the
further the violation of his guaranteed rights. [54]
The allegations of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be noted that the Amparo Rule requires the parties to establish their
claims by substantial evidence.[55] Other than making unfounded claims, however, Ku was not able to present evidence that
he was exposed to “life-threatening situations” while confined at the BI Detention Center. On the contrary, the records
show that he is afforded visitorial rights and that he has access to his counsel.

Moreover, his primary fear, which prompted him to file the amparo petition, was that the BI would trump up charges
against him so as to justify his detention. The fact remains, however, that even before his arrest, deportation charges
against him were already duly filed and ruled upon by the BI.

As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was improper in this case as
Ku and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded
and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure
of details concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As Ku and his
whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the case at
bar.

It is to be additionally observed that Ku is guilty of forum shopping. Being the subject of a Warrant of Deportation and a
Summary Deportation Order, Ku’s proper recourse is with the BI and, thereafter, with the DOJ and the OP. [56] Ku knows this
and, in fact, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the BI and an Appeal before the OP. When Ku, however,
injudiciously filed a Petition and a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo, he committed forum
shopping by seeking a remedy which he had already solicited from another tribunal.

In Kiani v. BID,[57] where petitioner therein filed before the trial court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to have
the detention of her husband declared as illegal and to order the latter’s release, and where her husband filed before the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) an omnibus motion seeking to question the summary deportation order
issued against him, the Court held that petitioner indulged in forum shopping.

The Court clarified that under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the power to deport aliens is
vested in the President of the Philippines, subject to the requirements of due process. The Immigration Commissioner is
vested with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Thus, a
party aggrieved by a Deportation Order issued by the BOC is proscribed from assailing said Order in the RTC even via a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Conformably with ruling of the Court in Domingo v. Scheer, such party may file a
motion for the reconsideration thereof before the BOC. [58]

Citing Balite v. Court of Appeals,[59] the Court held that there is forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an
action in one court, which had already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals. While a
party may avail of the remedies prescribed by the Rules of Court, such party is not free to resort to them simultaneously or
at his/her pleasure or caprice. A party should not be allowed to present simultaneous remedies in two different forums, for
it degrades and wreaks havoc to the rule on orderly procedure. A party must follow the sequence and hierarchical order in
availing of such remedies and not resort to shortcuts in procedure or playing fast and loose with the said rules. Forum
shopping, an act of malpractice, is considered as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It is improper conduct
and degrades the administration of justice.

On a final note, the Court observes that Judge Gallegos knowingly disregarded the Court’s directives as regards this case.
The records show that the Court’s Resolution dated 4 February 2014, wherein we issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement
of the Orders dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and intimated the impropriety of the amparo petition, was received by the
RTC on 5 February 2014.[60] This should have alerted Judge Gallegos to proceed with caution and restraint in granting the
privilege of the writ of amparo. And yet, despite having knowledge of the Court’s pronouncements, Judge Gallegos
proceeded to grant the said privilege.

Also, the records show that the Court’s Resolution dated 18 March 2014, wherein we issued a TRO enjoining the
enforcement of the Order dated 18 February 2014 and enjoining the RTC from further proceeding with the case, was
received by the RTC on 20 March 2014 at 9:00 a.m. [61] Although by then, Judge Gallegos already issued the Resolution
dated 14 March 2014 which granted the privilege of the writ of amparo, his receipt of the Court’s Resolution dated 18
March 2014 should have forewarned him against releasing Ku’s passport. That he did so demonstrates his resistance and
unwillingness to follow the Court’s edicts.

It is well to note that a resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be
complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in
character, but also disrespect for the Court’s lawful order and directive. [62]
Judge Gallegos should know that judges must respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals, especially the Supreme
Court from which all other courts take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to be construed as a mere
request nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. [63]

In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. The exacting standards of conduct
demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When
the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute,
encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself. [64]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to:

GRANT the present petitions, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated 14 March 2014 of the Regional Trial
a)
Court which granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo;

DENY the privilege of the Writ of Amparo sought via the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo and the
b) Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Amparo in SP. PROC. No. 14-131282 before the Regional Trial of
Manila, Branch 47; and

DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to file the appropriate administrative charge/s against Judge Paulino Q.
c) Gallegos in accordance with the tenor of this Decision, and to forthwith submit to the Court its report and
recommendation thereon.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe,
and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., and Brion, JJ., on leave
Jardeleza, J., no part.