G.R. No.

191002 April 20, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO,Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191032

JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191057

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC

IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P.
MENDOZA, Petitioner,

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191149

JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent.
PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.; NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE’S LAWYERS; MARLOU B.
UBANO; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR CHAPTER, represented by its Immediate Past President, ATTY.
ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter in his own personal capacity as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER;
BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES,
JR.; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCE-MENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN
FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG
NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG
PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON;
NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE
PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN
MA. CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by YOLANDA QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA; BELLEZA ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA GANDIONCO-
OLEDAN; MA. VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA. ROMANA; LEONILA DE JESUS; and GUINEVERE DE LEON; AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, JR.; Intervenors.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191342

ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor-Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING (IBP Governor-Eastern Visayas),
Petitioners,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191420

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:
On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, holding:

WHEREFORE, the Court:

1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R. No.
191057 for being premature;

2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and

3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council:

(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;

(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;

(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and

(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of
nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.

Motions for Reconsideration

Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No. 191032), Amador Z. Tolentino and Roland B. Inting (G.R. No. 191342), and Philippine Bar Association (G.R.
No. 191420), as well as intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Davao del Sur (IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.); Christian Robert S. Lim; Peter Irving
Corvera; Bagong Alyansang Bayan and others (BAYAN, et al.); Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.; the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines
(WTLOP); Marlou B. Ubano; Mitchell John L. Boiser; and Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Bello, et al.), filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. Also filing a motion for reconsideration was Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., whose belated intervention was allowed.

We summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions for reconsideration, in the aforegiven order:

Soriano

1. The Court has not squarely ruled upon or addressed the issue of whether or not the power to designate the Chief Justice belonged to the
Supreme Court en banc.

2. The Mendoza petition should have been dismissed, because it sought a mere declaratory judgment and did not involve a justiciable controversy.

3. All Justices of the Court should participate in the next deliberations. The mere fact that the Chief Justice sits as ex officio head of the JBC should
not prevail over the more compelling state interest for him to participate as a Member of the Court.

Tolentino and Inting

1. A plain reading of Section 15, Article VII does not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial appointments from the express ban on midnight
appointments.

2. In excluding the Judiciary from the ban, the Court has made distinctions and has created exemptions when none exists.

3. The ban on midnight appointments is placed in Article VII, not in Article VIII, because it limits an executive, not a judicial, power.

4. Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is superfluous, and is powerless to vary the terms of the clear prohibition.

5. The Court has given too much credit to the position taken by Justice Regalado. Thereby, the Court has raised the Constitution to the level of a
venerated text whose intent can only be divined by its framers as to be outside the realm of understanding by the sovereign people that ratified it.

6. Valenzuela should not be reversed.

7. The petitioners, as taxpayers and lawyers, have the clear legal standing to question the illegal composition of the JBC.

Philippine Bar Association

1. The Court’s strained interpretation of the Constitution violates the basic principle that the Court should not formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than what is required by the precise facts of the case.

2. Considering that Section 15, Article VII is clear and straightforward, the only duty of the Court is to apply it. The provision expressly and clearly
provides a general limitation on the appointing power of the President in prohibiting the appointment of any person to any position in the
Government without any qualification and distinction.
3. The Court gravely erred in unilaterally ignoring the constitutional safeguard against midnight appointments.

4. The Constitution has installed two constitutional safeguards:- the prohibition against midnight appointments, and the creation of the JBC. It is not
within the authority of the Court to prefer one over the other, for the Court’s duty is to apply the safeguards as they are, not as the Court likes them
to be.

5. The Court has erred in failing to apply the basic principles of statutory construction in interpreting the Constitution.

6. The Court has erred in relying heavily on the title, chapter or section headings, despite precedents on statutory construction holding that such
headings carried very little weight.

7. The Constitution has provided a general rule on midnight appointments, and the only exception is that on temporary appointments to executive
positions.

8. The Court has erred in directing the JBC to resume the proceedings for the nomination of the candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno with a view to submitting the list of nominees for Chief Justice to President Arroyo on or before May 17,
2010. The Constitution grants the Court only the power of supervision over the JBC; hence, the Court cannot tell the JBC what to do, how to do it, or
when to do it, especially in the absence of a real and justiciable case assailing any specific action or inaction of the JBC.

9. The Court has engaged in rendering an advisory opinion and has indulged in speculations.

10. The constitutional ban on appointments being already in effect, the Court’s directing the JBC to comply with the decision constitutes a culpable
violation of the Constitution and the commission of an election offense.

11. The Court cannot reverse on the basis of a secondary authority a doctrine unanimously formulated by the Court en banc.

12. The practice has been for the most senior Justice to act as Chief Justice whenever the incumbent is indisposed. Thus, the appointment of the
successor Chief Justice is not urgently necessary.

13. The principal purpose for the ban on midnight appointments is to arrest any attempt to prolong the outgoing President’s powers by means of
proxies. The attempt of the incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice is undeniably intended to perpetuate her power beyond her term
of office.

IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.

1. Its language being unambiguous, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applies to appointments to the Judiciary. Hence, no cogent reason
exists to warrant the reversal of the Valenzuela pronouncement.

2. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides for presidential appointments to the Constitutional Commissions and the JBC with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments. Its phrase "other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution" is enough proof that the
limitation on the appointing power of the President extends to appointments to the Judiciary. Thus, Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 of Article
VII apply to all presidential appointments in the Executive and Judicial Branches of the Government.

3. There is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution abhorred the idea of an Acting Chief Justice in all cases.

Lim

1. There is no justiciable controversy that warrants the Court’s exercise of judicial review.

2. The election ban under Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Court and to other appointments to the Judiciary.

3. The creation of the JBC does not justify the removal of the safeguard under Section 15 of Article VII against midnight appointments in the
Judiciary.

Corvera

1. The Court’s exclusion of appointments to the Judiciary from the Constitutional ban on midnight appointments is based on an interpretation beyond
the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution.

2. The intent of the ban on midnight appointments is to cover appointments in both the Executive and Judicial Departments. The application of the
principle of verba legis (ordinary meaning) would have obviated dwelling on the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution.
If there is any ambiguity in Section 15, Article VII, the intent behind the provision, which is to prevent political partisanship in all branches of the
Government, should have controlled.

3. A plain reading is preferred to a contorted and strained interpretation based on compartmentalization and physical arrangement, especially
considering that the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.

4. Resort to the deliberations or to the personal interpretation of the framers of the Constitution should yield to the plain and unequivocal language of
the Constitution.

5. There is no sufficient reason for reversing Valenzuela, a ruling that is reasonable and in accord with the Constitution.
BAYAN, et al.

1. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a justiciable controversy. The issues it raised
were not yet ripe for adjudication, considering that the office of the Chief Justice was not yet vacant and that the JBC itself has yet to decide whether
or not to submit a list of nominees to the President.

2. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is more important and compelling than the opinion of Justice Regalado.

3. In ruling that Section 15, Article VII is in conflict with Section 4(1), Article VIII, the Court has violated the principle of ut magis valeat quam pereat
(which mandates that the Constitution should be interpreted as a whole, such that any conflicting provisions are to be harmonized as to fully give
effect to all). There is no conflict between the provisions; they complement each other.

4. The form and structure of the Constitution’s titles, chapters, sections, and draftsmanship carry little weight in statutory construction. The clear and
plain language of Section 15, Article VII precludes interpretation.

Tan, Jr.

1. The factual antecedents do not present an actual case or controversy. The clash of legal rights and interests in the present case are merely
anticipated. Even if it is anticipated with certainty, no actual vacancy in the position of the Chief Justice has yet occurred.

2. The ruling that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to a vacancy in the Court and the Judiciary runs in conflict with long standing principles and
doctrines of statutory construction. The provision admits only one exception, temporary appointments in the Executive Department. Thus, the Court
should not distinguish, because the law itself makes no distinction.

3. Valenzuela was erroneously reversed. The framers of the Constitution clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the members
of the Judiciary. Hence, giving more weight to the opinion of Justice Regalado to reverse the en banc decision in Valenzuela was unwarranted.

4. Section 15, Article VII is not incompatible with Section 4(1), Article VIII. The 90-day mandate to fill any vacancy lasts until August 15, 2010, or a
month and a half after the end of the ban. The next President has roughly the same time of 45 days as the incumbent President (i.e., 44 days) within
which to scrutinize and study the qualifications of the next Chief Justice. Thus, the JBC has more than enough opportunity to examine the nominees
without haste and political uncertainty.1avvphi1

5. When the constitutional ban is in place, the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII is suspended.

6. There is no basis to direct the JBC to submit the list of nominees on or before May 17, 2010. The directive to the JBC sanctions a culpable
violation of the Constitution and constitutes an election offense.

7. There is no pressing necessity for the appointment of a Chief Justice, because the Court sits en banc, even when it acts as the sole judge of all
contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the President and Vice-President. Fourteen other Members of the Court can validly
comprise the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

WTLOP

1. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees for Chief Justice to the President on or before May 17, 2010,
and to continue its proceedings for the nomination of the candidates, because it granted a relief not prayed for; imposed on the JBC a deadline not
provided by law or the Constitution; exercised control instead of mere supervision over the JBC; and lacked sufficient votes to reverse Valenzuela.

2. In interpreting Section 15, Article VII, the Court has ignored the basic principle of statutory construction to the effect that the literal meaning of the
law must be applied when it is clear and unambiguous; and that we should not distinguish where the law does not distinguish.

3. There is no urgency to appoint the next Chief Justice, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 already provides that the power and duties of the
office devolve on the most senior Associate Justice in case of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice.

Ubano

1. The language of Section 15, Article VII, being clear and unequivocal, needs no interpretation

2. The Constitution must be construed in its entirety, not by resort to the organization and arrangement of its provisions.

3. The opinion of Justice Regalado is irrelevant, because Section 15, Article VII and the pertinent records of the Constitutional Commission are clear
and unambiguous.

4. The Court has erred in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President by May 17, 2010 at the latest, because no specific law
requires the JBC to submit the list of nominees even before the vacancy has occurred.

Boiser

1. Under Section 15, Article VII, the only exemption from the ban on midnight appointments is the temporary appointment to an executive position.
The limitation is in keeping with the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to place a restriction on the power of the outgoing Chief Executive
to make appointments.
2. To exempt the appointment of the next Chief Justice from the ban on midnight appointments makes the appointee beholden to the outgoing Chief
Executive, and compromises the independence of the Chief Justice by having the outgoing President be continually influential.

3. The Court’s reversal of Valenzuela without stating the sufficient reason violates the principle of stare decisis.

Bello, et al.

1. Section 15, Article VII does not distinguish as to the type of appointments an outgoing President is prohibited from making within the prescribed
period. Plain textual reading and the records of the Constitutional Commission support the view that the ban on midnight appointments extends to
judicial appointments.

2. Supervision of the JBC by the Court involves oversight. The subordinate subject to oversight must first act not in accord with prescribed rules
before the act can be redone to conform to the prescribed rules.

3. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a justiciable controversy.

Pimentel

1. Any constitutional interpretative changes must be reasonable, rational, and conformable to the general intent of the Constitution as a limitation to
the powers of Government and as a bastion for the protection of the rights of the people. Thus, in harmonizing seemingly conflicting provisions of
the Constitution, the interpretation should always be one that protects the citizenry from an ever expanding grant of authority to its representatives.

2. The decision expands the constitutional powers of the President in a manner totally repugnant to republican constitutional democracy, and is
tantamount to a judicial amendment of the Constitution without proper authority.

Comments

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the JBC separately represent in their respective comments, thus:

OSG

1. The JBC may be compelled to submit to the President a short list of its nominees for the position of Chief Justice.

2. The incumbent President has the power to appoint the next Chief Justice.

3. Section 15, Article VII does not apply to the Judiciary.

4. The principles of constitutional construction favor the exemption of the Judiciary from the ban on midnight appointments.1awph!1

5. The Court has the duty to consider and resolve all issues raised by the parties as well as other related matters.

JBC

1. The consolidated petitions should have been dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has not yet decided at the time the petitions were filed
whether the incumbent President has the power to appoint the new Chief Justice, and because the JBC, having yet to interview the candidates, has
not submitted a short list to the President.

2. The statement in the decision that there is a doubt on whether a JBC short list is necessary for the President to appoint a Chief Justice should be
struck down as bereft of constitutional and legal basis. The statement undermines the independence of the JBC.

3. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the Court, but in accord with its constitutional mandate and its implementing rules and regulations.

For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC) submits his comment even if the OSG and the JBC were the only ones the Court
has required to do so. He states that the motions for reconsideration were directed at the administrative matter he initiated and which the Court
resolved. His comment asserts:

1. The grounds of the motions for reconsideration were already resolved by the decision and the separate opinion.

2. The administrative matter he brought invoked the Court’s power of supervision over the JBC as provided by Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, as distinguished from the Court’s adjudicatory power under Section 1, Article VIII. In the former, the requisites for judicial review are not
required, which was why Valenzuela was docketed as an administrative matter. Considering that the JBC itself has yet to take a position on when to
submit the short list to the proper appointing authority, it has effectively solicited the exercise by the Court of its power of supervision over the JBC.

3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII is to amend the Constitution.

4. The portions of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted in the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales, as well as in some of the
motions for reconsideration do not refer to either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but to Section 13, Article VII (on nepotism).

Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved
by the decision of March 17, 2010.

Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis.

First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or
abandoning Valenzuela.1

The contention has no basis.

Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that
are settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like
cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court
of competent authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts
may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down. 2

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce
obedience to them.3 In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate
authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best
lights.4

The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is
not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.5 The adherence to precedents is
strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament.6 But ours is not a
common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be
followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such
reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.

For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control,
the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the
innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.7

Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the
ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII.

The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either
Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII, a provision on nepotism. The records of the Constitutional
Commission show that Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might not appoint during his or her tenure. In the end, however,
Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any further complication,"8 such that the
final version of the second paragraph of Section 13, Article VII even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary, to wit:

Section 13. xxx

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus
or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the
Court either ignored or refused to apply many principles of statutory construction.

The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently contravening their avowed reliance on the principles of statutory
construction.

For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the ban on appointments to the Judiciary,
insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst.

Another instance is the movants’ unhesitating willingness to read into Section 4(1) and Section 9, both of Article VIII, the express applicability of the
ban under Section 15, Article VII during the period provided therein, despite the silence of said provisions thereon. Yet, construction cannot supply
the omission, for doing so would generally constitute an encroachment upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and
Section 9 should be left as they are, given that their meaning is clear and explicit, and no words can be interpolated in them. 9 Interpolation of words
is unnecessary, because the law is more than likely to fail to express the legislative intent with the interpolation. In other words, the addition of new
words may alter the thought intended to be conveyed. And, even where the meaning of the law is clear and sensible, either with or without the
omitted word or words, interpolation is improper, because the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the law itself.10

Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed:

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they
could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s
term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the purposes of any quarter.

Final Word

It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because all the Members of the present Court were
appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice.

The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair.

The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim to the contrary proceeds from malice
and condescension. Neither the outgoing President nor the present Members of the Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to
evolve as it has. None of the Members of the Court could have prevented the Members composing the Court when she assumed the Presidency
about a decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for their retirements were mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an imperative
duty under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from their occurrence. Her official duty she
must comply with. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of
the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.

SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this
demands special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the
drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent1 and the main sponsor2 of the proposed
Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative".3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional convention.4For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due
course to this petition.

On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a
"Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition)5 wherein Delfin asked
the COMELEC for an order

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and
local circulation;

3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at
the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative,6 a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system
intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted
in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be
established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories;
that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be
first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise
necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local
circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI,7 Section 4 of Article VII,8 and
Section 8 of Article X9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the
proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following
proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION?

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total
number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.

Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued
an Order 11(a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution
(including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of
general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.

At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and
representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law
Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.

After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five
days. 13

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special
civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such
law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which
petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation.
However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in
Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future
law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a
single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been
obviously left to a separate law.

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not
constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has
no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the
Constitution to pass the implementing law.

(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes
a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or
office has realigned funds for the purpose.

To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin
Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting
to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself.
Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice;
and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to
amend the Constitution.

On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment 15 on the petition. They argue therein that:

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED
BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.

2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF
RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND
HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST
OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE
PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY
BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS
RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO.
125416;

4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO
PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF
WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;

5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS
BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN
IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."

6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE
POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT."
(SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);

7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS
NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A
FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO
DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).

Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16 which starts off with an assertion that the instant petition is
a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996
was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put
the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as
follows:

(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution. The
absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.

(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.

(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the
COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of the Act.

(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific
provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.

As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC
can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund
requirements for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.

In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that:

(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms,
recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution
and defines the same as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative on the
Constitution.

(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in scope, that system of initiative is
deemed included in the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law
when he claimed that nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.

(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.

(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a revision thereof.

(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making
power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
vs. COMELEC.

On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the aforementioned Comments and the
Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is
the counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion
for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and
(d) set the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and
Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an
Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:

(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
S.J., 18 it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the
change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. 19 A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by
express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.

(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and local elective officials are based on the
philosophy of governance, "to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break
the concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy
and decision-making for the common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.

(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback
position that may be availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for
good performance. 20

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the people's initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the
contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per
legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification
of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the
appropriation of funds for such people's initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's
petition.

(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to
legislate the procedure for a people's initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress.
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid
delegation of power.

On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in

Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law is
a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon.
He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless,
he contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the
said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What
vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required number
of registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of the
COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the
determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.

On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.

The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the following arguments:

(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.

(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the initiative to amend the Constitution.

(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of signatures.

(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress or a constitutional convention. 22

On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as
the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in
Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated
Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three
days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said Petition in
Intervention.

At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light of the
allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to
include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and
Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering
the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution,"
would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates
for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and
(c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.

5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.

After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty days and requested
intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.

On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments in the main Petition. It further submits
that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or
refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of the House of Representatives relating to the
deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.

Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and
MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 24

As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.

For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.

THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN PETITION.

Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take
cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:

28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to
stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.

29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the
purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case
the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of the questioned
Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of
Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to
cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the
case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the
instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or
ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein.

It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not
supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may
likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28

A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of
issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.

II

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS,
UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than
once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:

Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which
bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.

Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative would remain entombed in
the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted
that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on
Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No.
332). 30 That section reads as follows:

Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:

(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or

(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section ___of the Constitution. 31

After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new formulation of the concept of initiative which it
denominated as Section 2; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate
given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter
of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon
petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.

This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. 32

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:

FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.

First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details in the provision on how to carry this out. Do we
understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to the legislature?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does not pass the necessary implementing law on this, this
will not operate?

MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with respect to the budget appropriations which would have
to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any
event, as envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the date of the ratification of this
Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed through the exercise of this initiative power would be after five years. It is
reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the National Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this
power.

FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature — the details on how this is to be carried out — is it possible that, in effect, what will be
presented to the people for ratification is the work of the legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?

MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a body could propose that amendment, maybe
individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to
the people for ratification through the process of an initiative.

xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest constituent power in the people to amend the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of the
Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the
sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?

MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that
therefore we require a great deal of circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.

MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a separate article in the constitution that would specifically
cover the process and the modes of amending the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.

MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again concede to the legislature the process or the
requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the Constitution by people's initiative?

MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into
this provision the mechanics that would adequately cover all the conceivable situations. 33

It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND — not to REVISE — the
Constitution; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee
members felt that this system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section
1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. 34

xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment.
Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?

MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and
should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.

MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of
revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee. 35

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted.
Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the following:

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into account the modifications submitted by the sponsor
himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of
the proposed Section 2 will now read as follows: "SECTION 2. — AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING
THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.

MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our completed
Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment. 36

The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative act which must
implement the exercise of the right. Thus:

MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative. .
.?

MR. DAVIDE. It can.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking another body to set the proposition in proper form.

MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular right would be subject to legislation, provided the
legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of the requirement.

MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for submission to the people, may be subject to legislation.

MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative
body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.

MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be legislated?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to — NOT REVISION of — the
Constitution. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the word
"revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?

MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can
only relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38

Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the
initiative on legislation. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a Constitution
would ordinarily require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would require a
higher number. Moreover, just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the National Assembly is required, the import
being that the process of amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a
law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the
Legislative because it would require another voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I
might present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on the National
Assembly on plenary sessions. 39

The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version, which the Commission approved by a vote of
31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE
BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE
YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE

FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July 1986. 41 Thereafter, upon his motion for
reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof,
the Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42

However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing "percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to
"therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.

The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not
self-executory.

Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private
respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.

There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act.
This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of
Article XVII then reading:

The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules"
means "the details on how [the right] is to be carried out." 46

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a
consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the
House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which dealt with the initiative and referendum
mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as
well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The
Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8
June 1989 by the Senate 50 and by the House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.

But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right?"

A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. The said section reads:

Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject,
in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this
Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).

The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which
exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as
to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not
accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can
only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."

The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a
statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or
in part." 52

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the
three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters
who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition
for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:

(c) The petition shall state the following:

c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;

c.2 the proposition;

c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;

c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of
the petition. (Emphasis supplied).

The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that
Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no
subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative
and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national
and local laws.

We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and
Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is
"national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if
what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous
regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section
3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:

Sec. 3. Definition of terms —

xxx xxx xxx

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;

a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).

Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 53

A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day
of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen
(15) days after certification and proclamation of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).

(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local governments; thus:

Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of
Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . . .

and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative
or referendum, which could be petitions for both national and local initiative and referendum.

Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision
therein applies to both national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:

Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved
pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.

Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum
on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;

(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;

(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; and

(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;

(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;

(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as a consequence thereof;

(d) The formulation of the proposition;

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;

(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;

(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit concerned as to whether the required number of
signatures have been obtained;

(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters for their approval, which must be within the
period specified therein;

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

(k) The limitations on local initiative; and

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the
word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in
Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by the
people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of
effectivity of the approved proposition.

There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a
humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the
COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The
recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation
of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is
valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. 62

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in
subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

III

COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the
COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and
which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.

IV

COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.

Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional
amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is
valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at
least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and
that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot
be deemed validly initiated.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing
is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to
prescribe the form of the petition; 63 (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered
voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify,
through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election. 66

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given
cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or
proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket
number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper,
which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is
an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for
initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given
flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the
implementation of the right of the people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide
sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as
against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.

.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as
complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN,
MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:p

The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. The
decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975) provides:

SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner,
succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished
by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion
of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (2nd paragraph is omitted.)

The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging
them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici which is similar to the other fifteen
informations, reads:
That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a
grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the pasture applicant Celestino de la
Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919, accused's entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offended party; did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and
has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle
from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)

Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello were the accused, were raffled
to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839, respectively).

Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated December 9, 1977 dismissing the five
informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the
entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that
under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.

Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy" the expression "with threat, and taking
advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered
and that the amended informations be admitted.

The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree does not include agricultural purposes because
its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class.

From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid of merit.

We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to
apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating
complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.

The preamble of the decree is quoted below:

WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of
National Defense, Public Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the
Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, "to remove an
illegal constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public
and private property." squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all over the country;

WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent class;

WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this illegal and nefarious practice.

It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and private property. It is complemented by Letter of
Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of public health, safety and peace and order.

On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic
Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands. That law
provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association to enter or occupy, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth,
any public agriculture land including such public lands as are granted to private individuals under the provision of the Public Land Act or any other
laws providing for the of public agriculture lands in the Philippines and are duly covered by the corresponding applications for the notwithstanding
standing the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government or for any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or force another to
commit such acts.

Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both such fine and
imprisonment in the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (See People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is
unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of
statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil.
615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187298 July 03, 2012

JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S. TULAWIE, HJI. MOH. YUSOP ISMI, JULHAJAN AWADI, and SPO1 SATTAL H. JADJULI, Petitioners,
vs.
GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu; GEN. JUANCHO SABAN, COL. EUGENIO CLEMEN PN, P/SUPT.
JULASIRIM KASIM and P/SUPT. BIENVENIDO G. LATAG, in their capacity as officers of the Phil. Marines and Phil. National Police,
respectively, Respondents.
DECISION

SERENO, J.:

On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial
Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.1 Andres Notter, a Swiss national and head of the ICRC in Zamboanga City, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and ICRC
delegate, and Marie Jean Lacaba, a Filipino engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when
inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).2 The leader of the alleged kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial
Jail. News reports linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.

On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine National Police (PNP), which then organized a parallel local group
known as the Local Crisis Committee.3 The local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee, convened under the leadership of
respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Its armed forces component was headed by respondents General Juancho
Saban, and his deputy, Colonel Eugenio Clemen. The PNP component was headed by respondent Police Superintendent Bienvenido G. Latag, the
Police Deputy Director for Operations of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).4

Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from different municipalities, who were
redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul.5 The organization of the CEF was embodied in a "Memorandum of Understanding" 6 entered into

between three parties: the provincial government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the Philippines, represented by Gen.
Saban; and the Philippine National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag. The Whereas clauses of the Memorandum alluded to the extraordinary
situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian supporters of the municipal mayors to offer their services in order that "the early and safe rescue of
the hostages may be achieved."7

This Memorandum, which was labeled ‘secret’ on its all pages, also outlined the responsibilities of each of the party signatories, as follows:

Responsibilities of the Provincial Government:

1) The Provincial Government shall source the funds and logistics needed for the activation of the CEF;

2) The Provincial Government shall identify the Local Government Units which shall participate in the operations and to propose them for the
approval of the parties to this agreement;

3) The Provincial Government shall ensure that there will be no unilateral action(s) by the CEF without the knowledge and approval by both parties.

Responsibilities of AFP/PNP/ TF ICRC (Task Force ICRC):

1) The AFP/PNP shall remain the authority as prescribed by law in military operations and law enforcement;

2) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the orderly deployment of the CEF in the performance of their assigned task(s);

3) The AFP/PNP shall ensure the safe movements of the CEF in identified areas of operation(s);

4) The AFP/PNP shall provide the necessary support and/or assistance as called for in the course of operation(s)/movements of the CEF.8

Meanwhile, Ronaldo Puno, then Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, announced to the media that government troops
had cornered some one hundred and twenty (120) Abu Sayyaf members along with the three (3) hostages.9 However, the ASG made

contact with the authorities and demanded that the military pull its troops back from the jungle area.10 The government troops yielded and went back
to their barracks; the Philippine Marines withdrew to their camp, while police and civilian forces pulled back from the terrorists’ stronghold by ten (10)
to fifteen (15) kilometers. Threatening that one of the hostages will be beheaded, the ASG further demanded the evacuation of the military camps
and bases in the different barangays in Jolo.11 The authorities were given no later than 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 31 March 2009 to comply. 12

On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of
Sulu.13 It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security

Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the
power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence.

In the same Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and
seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. The pertinent portion of the proclamation states:

NOW, THEREFORE, BY VIRTUE OF THE POWERS VESTED IN ME BY LAW, I, ABDUSAKUR MAHAIL TAN, GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE
OF SULU, DO HEREBY DECLARE A STATE OF EMERGENCY IN THE PROVINCE OF SULU, AND CALL ON THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CIVILIAN EMERGENCY FORCE TO IMPLEMENT
THE FOLLOWING:

1. The setting-up of checkpoints and chokepoints in the province;

2. The imposition of curfew for the entire province subject to such Guidelines as may be issued by proper authorities;
3. The conduct of General Search and Seizure including arrests in the pursuit of the kidnappers and their supporters; and

4. To conduct such other actions or police operations as may be necessary to ensure public safety.

DONE AT THE PROVINCIAL CAPITOL, PROVINCE OF SULU THIS

31STDAY OF MARCH 2009. Sgd. Abdusakur M. Tan Governor.14

On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report to respondent P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim. 15 Upon arriving at the police
station, he was booked, and interviewed about his relationship to Musin, Jaiton, and Julamin, who were all his deceased relatives. Upon admitting
that he was indeed related to the three, he was detained. After a few hours, former Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi, Hadji Hadjirul Bambra,
Abdugajir Hadjirul, as well as PO2 Marcial Hajan, SPO3 Muhilmi Ismula, Punong Barangay Alano Mohammad and jeepney driver Abduhadi
Sabdani, were also arrested.16 The affidavit17 of the apprehending officer alleged that they were suspected ASG supporters and were being arrested
under Proclamation 1-09. The following day, 2 April 2009, the hostage Mary Jane Lacaba was released by the ASG.

On 4 April 2009, the office of Governor Tan distributed to civic organizations, copies of the "Guidelines for the Implementation of Proclamation No. 1,
Series of 2009 Declaring a State of Emergency in the Province of Sulu."18These Guidelines suspended all Permits to Carry

Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFORs) issued by the Chief of the PNP, and allowed civilians to seek exemption from the gun ban only by
applying to the Office of the Governor and obtaining the appropriate identification cards. The said guidelines also allowed general searches and
seizures in designated checkpoints and chokepoints.

On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli, residents of
Patikul, Sulu, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 19 claiming that Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1
and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief
executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.20 Additionally, petitioners claim that the Provincial Governor is not authorized
by any law to create civilian armed forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private army.

In his Comment, Governor Tan contended that petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts when they filed the instant petition directly in
the court of last resort, even if both the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) possessed concurrent jurisdiction with the

Supreme Court under Rule 65.21 This is the only procedural defense raised by respondent Tan. Respondents Gen. Juancho Saban, Col. Eugenio
Clemen, P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim, and P/SUPT. Bienvenido Latag did not file their respective Comments.1âwphi1

On the substantive issues, respondents deny that Proclamation 1-09 was issued ultra vires, as Governor Tan allegedly acted pursuant to Sections
16 and 465 of the Local Government Code, which empowers the Provincial Governor to carry out emergency measures during calamities and
disasters, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or
sedition.22 Furthermore, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sulu authorized the declaration of a state of emergency as evidenced by Resolution No.
4, Series of 2009 issued on 31 March 2009 during its regular session.23

The threshold issue in the present case is whether or not Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government Code authorizes the
respondent governor to declare a state of emergency, and exercise the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09, specifically the conduct of
general searches and seizures. Subsumed herein is the secondary question of whether or not the provincial governor is similarly clothed with
authority to convene the CEF under the said provisions.

We grant the petition.

I. Transcendental public Importance warrants a relaxation of the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

We first dispose of respondents’ invocation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which allegedly prevents judicial review by this Court in the present
case, citing for this specific purpose, Montes v. Court of Appeals and Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco. 24 Simply put, the

doctrine provides that where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, it is in either of these courts
and not in the Supreme Court, that the specific action for the issuance of such writ must be sought unless special and important laws are clearly and
specifically set forth in the petition. The reason for this is that this Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to perform the functions
assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. It cannot be burdened with deciding cases in the first instance. 25

The said rule, however, is not without exception. In Chavez v. PEA-Amari,26 the Court stated:

PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies
generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case,
however, raises constitutional questions of transcendental importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual
issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case. 27

The instant case stems from a petition for certiorari and prohibition, over which the Supreme Court possesses original jurisdiction. 28 More crucially,
this case involves acts of a public official which pertain to restrictive custody, and is thus impressed with transcendental public importance that
would warrant the relaxation of the general rule. The Court would be remiss in its constitutional duties were it to dismiss the present petition solely
due to claims of judicial hierarchy.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,29 the Court highlighted the transcendental public importance involved in cases that concern restrictive custody,
because judicial review in these cases serves as "a manifestation of the crucial defense of civilians ‘in police power’ cases due to the diminution of
their basic liberties under the guise of a state of emergency."30 Otherwise, the importance of the high tribunal as the court of last resort would be put
to naught, considering the nature of "emergency" cases, wherein the proclamations and issuances are inherently short-lived. In finally disposing of
the claim that the issue had become moot and academic, the Court also cited transcendental public importance as an exception, stating:

Sa kabila ng pagiging akademiko na lamang ng mga isyu tungkol sa mahigpit na pangangalaga (restrictive custody) at pagmonitor ng galaw
(monitoring of movements) ng nagpepetisyon, dedesisyunan namin ito (a) dahil sa nangingibabaw na interes ng madla na nakapaloob dito,

(b) dahil sa posibilidad na maaaring maulit ang pangyayari at (c) dahil kailangang maturuan ang kapulisan tungkol dito.

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

…There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression,
of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the

Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench
and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly,
respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.

Evidently, the triple reasons We advanced at the start of Our ruling are justified under the foregoing exceptions. Every bad, unusual incident where
police officers figure in generates public interest and people watch what will be done or not done to them. Lack of disciplinary steps taken against
them erode public confidence in the police institution. As petitioners themselves assert, the restrictive custody of policemen under investigation is an
existing practice, hence, the issue is bound to crop up every now and then. The matter is capable of repetition or susceptible of recurrence. It better
be resolved now for the education and guidance of all concerned. 31 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the instant petition is given due course, impressed as it is with transcendental public importance.

II. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic

i. One executive, one commander-in-chief

As early as Villena v. Secretary of Interior,32 it has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the
President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President
and no one else.33 As emphasized by Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena:

With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the
projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution,
dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. 34

Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the
Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.

ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are exercised by one president

Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may
only be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to
which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The President’s Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of
Congress, as embodied in the second paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution:

Article 6, Sec 23(2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject
to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. 35

Article 7, Sec 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined
by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.36

The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Court’s authority to review the factual basis thereof. 37 By constitutional fiat, the
calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone. As noted in Villena,
"(t)here are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no
amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law x x x.38

Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 339 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII,

Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that
the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to
determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate
power is his.40 As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and
to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual.41

In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 42 the Court had occasion to rule that the calling-out powers belong solely to the President
as commander-in-chief:

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary
power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be
called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the
constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis.

There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. 43(Emphasis supplied)

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed
forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided
for their revocation and review without any qualification.44

That the power to call upon the armed forces is discretionary on the president is clear from the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission:

FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call
out such Armed Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he
can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.

When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review.
We are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser
power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and
broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic
civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.

x x x Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to
call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.45 (Emphasis Supplied)

In the more recent case of Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia, 46 the Court characterized these powers as exclusive to the President, precisely because they
are of exceptional import:

These distinctions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of
executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special
class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be
a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.47

In addition to being the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President also acts as the leader of the country’s police forces, under the
mandate of Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that, "The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the framing
of this provision, Fr. Bernas defended the retention of the word "control," employing the same rationale of singularity of the office of the president, as
the only Executive under the presidential form of government.48

Regarding the country’s police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: "The State shall establish and maintain one police force,
which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local
executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law."49
A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the police, 50 and may exercise control only in day-to-
day operations, viz:

Mr. Natividad: By experience, it is not advisable to provide either in our Constitution or by law full control of the police by the local chief executive
and local executives, the mayors. By our experience, this has spawned warlordism, bossism and sanctuaries for vices and abuses. If the national
government does not have a mechanism to supervise these 1,500 legally, technically separate police forces, plus 61 city police forces, fragmented
police system, we will have a lot of difficulty in presenting a modern professional police force. So that a certain amount of supervision and control will
have to be exercised by the national government.

For example, if a local government, a town cannot handle its peace and order problems or police problems, such as riots, conflagrations or
organized crime, the national government may come in, especially if requested by the local executives. Under that situation, if they come in under
such an extraordinary situation, they will be in control. But if the day-to-day business of police investigation of crime, crime prevention, activities,
traffic control, is all lodged in the mayors, and if they are in complete operational control of the day-to-day business of police service, what the
national government would control would be the administrative aspect.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. de los Reyes: so the operational control on a day-to-day basis, meaning, the usual duties being performed by the ordinary policemen, will be
under the supervision of the local executives?

Mr. Natividad: Yes, Madam President.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. de los Reyes: But in exceptional cases, even the operational control can be taken over by the National Police Commission?

Mr. Natividad: If the situation is beyond the capacity of the local governments. 51 (Emphases supplied)

Furthermore according to the framers, it is still the President who is authorized to exercise supervision and control over the police, through the
National Police Commission:

Mr. Rodrigo: Just a few questions. The President of the Philippines is the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces.

Mr. Natividad: Yes, Madam President.

Mr. Rodrigo: Since the national police is not integrated with the armed forces, I do not suppose they come under the Commander-in-Chief powers of
the President of the Philippines.

Mr. Natividad: They do, Madam President. By law, they are under the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines.

Mr. Rodrigo: Yes, but the President is not the Commander-in-Chief of the national police.

Mr. Natividad: He is the President.

Mr. Rodrigo: Yes, the Executive. But they do not come under that specific provision that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed
forces.

Mr. Natividad: No, not under the Commander-in-Chief provision.

Mr. Rodrigo: There are two other powers of the President. The

President has control over ministries, bureaus and offices, and supervision over local governments. Under which does the police fall, under control
or under supervision?

Mr. Natividad: Both, Madam President.

Mr. Rodrigo: Control and supervision.

Mr. Natividad: Yes, in fact, the National Police Commission is under the Office of the President. 52

In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the above provision it is clear that the framers never intended for local chief
executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over police units in their
jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day situations, as contemplated by the
Constitutional Commission. But as a civilian agency of the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is subject
to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control. 53

iii. The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President

Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the
assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police,
and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by
another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local
Government Code, as will be discussed subsequently.

Respondents, however, justify this stance by stating that nowhere in the seminal case of David v. Arroyo, which dealt squarely with the issue of the
declaration of a state of emergency, does it limit the said authority to the President alone. Respondents contend that the ruling in David expressly
limits the authority to declare a national emergency, a condition which covers the entire country, and does not include emergency situations in local
government units.54 This claim is belied by the clear intent of the framers that in all situations involving threats to security, such as lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, even in localized areas, it is still the President who possesses the sole authority to exercise calling-out powers. As reflected in
the Journal of the Constitutional Commission:

Thereafter, Mr. Padilla proposed on line 29 to insert the phrase OR PUBLIC DISORDER in lieu of "invasion or rebellion." Mr. Sumulong stated that
the committee could not accept the amendment because under the first section of Section 15, the President may call out and make use of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress not only lawless violence but even invasion or rebellion without declaring martial law. He observed that by
deleting "invasion or rebellion" and substituting PUBLIC DISORDER, the President would have to declare martial law before he can make use of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless invasion or rebellion.

Mr. Padilla, in reply thereto, stated that the first sentence contemplates a lighter situation where there is some lawless violence in a small portion of
the country or public disorder in another at which times, the armed forces can be called to prevent or suppress these incidents. He noted that the
Commander-in-Chief can do so in a minor degree but he can also exercise such powers should the situation worsen. The words "invasion or
rebellion" to be eliminated on line 14 are covered by the following sentence which provides for "invasion or rebellion." He maintained that the
proposed amendment does not mean that under such circumstances, the President cannot call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress the
same.55 (Emphasis supplied)

III. Section 465 of the Local

Government Code cannot be invoked to justify the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09

Respondent governor characterized the kidnapping of the three ICRC workers as a terroristic act, and used this incident to justify the exercise of the
powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09.56 He invokes Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government Code, which purportedly
allows the governor to carry out emergency measures and call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies for assistance. But a closer
look at the said proclamation shows that there is no provision in the Local Government Code nor in any law on which the broad and unwarranted
powers granted to the Governor may be based.

Petitioners cite the implementation of "General Search and Seizure including arrests in the pursuit of the kidnappers and their supporters,"57 as
being violative of the constitutional proscription on general search warrants and general seizures. Petitioners rightly assert that this alone would be
sufficient to render the proclamation void, as general searches and seizures are proscribed, for being violative of the rights enshrined in the Bill of
Rights, particularly:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 58

In fact, respondent governor has arrogated unto himself powers exceeding even the martial law powers of the President, because as the
Constitution itself declares, "A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ." 59

We find, and so hold, that there is nothing in the Local Government Code which justifies the acts sanctioned under the said Proclamation. Not even
Section 465 of the said Code, in relation to Section 16, which states:

Section 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions, and Compensation.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the province and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code, the provincial governor shall:

(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the provincial government, and in this connection,
shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(vii) Carry out such emergency measures as may be necessary during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities;

(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the province and the exercise of the appropriate corporate powers provided for
under Section 22 of this Code, implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services and activities of the province and, in addition to the
foregoing, shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(vi) Call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion or sedition or to apprehend
violators of the law when public interest so requires and the police forces of the component city or municipality where the disorder or violation is
happening are inadequate to cope with the situation or the violators.

Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as
well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation
and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
(Emphases supplied)

Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 above, as the said provision expressly refers to calamities and disasters,
whether man-made or natural. The governor, as local chief executive of the province, is certainly empowered to enact and implement emergency
measures during these occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in the case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster. Respondents
cannot find any legal mooring under this provision to justify their actions.

Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same provision is equally inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Armed Forces of the Philippines does not fall
under the category of a "national law enforcement agency," to which the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong.

Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend the Republic against all enemies, foreign and
domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the national territory. 60

Second, there was no evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police forces were inadequate to cope with the situation or apprehend
the violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse of the provincial governor was to ask the assistance of the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government, or such other authorized officials, for the assistance of national law enforcement agencies.

The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in the National Government, especially not the
prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of security and defense.

The intent behind the powers granted to local government units is fiscal, economic, and administrative in nature.1âwphi1The Code is concerned
only with powers that would make the delivery of basic services more effective to the constituents, 61 and should not be unduly stretched to confer
calling-out powers on local executives.

In the sponsorship remarks for Republic Act 7160, it was stated that the devolution of powers is a step towards the autonomy of local government
units (LGUs), and is actually an experiment whose success heavily relies on the power of taxation of the LGUs. The underpinnings of the Code can
be found in Section 5, Article II of the 1973 Constitution, which allowed LGUs to create their own sources of revenue. 62 During the interpellation
made by Mr. Tirol addressed to Mr. de Pedro, the latter emphasized that "Decentralization is an administrative concept and the process of shifting
and delegating power from a central point to subordinate levels to promote independence, responsibility, and quicker decision-making. … (I)t does
not involve any transfer of final authority from the national to field levels, nor diminution of central office powers and responsibilities. Certain
government agencies, including the police force, are exempted from the decentralization process because their functions are not inherent in local
government units."63

IV. Provincial governor is not authorized to convene CEF

Pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force, the organization of private citizen armies is proscribed. Section 24 of Article XVIII of the
Constitution mandates that:

Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled. All paramilitary forces including Civilian
Home Defense Forces (CHDF) not consistent with the citizen armed force established in this Constitution, shall be dissolved or, where appropriate,
converted into the regular force.

Additionally, Section 21of Article XI states that, "The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police
agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions
shall be the responsibility of the National Government."

Taken in conjunction with each other, it becomes clear that the Constitution does not authorize the organization of private armed groups similar to
the CEF convened by the respondent Governor. The framers of the Constitution were themselves wary of armed citizens’ groups, as shown in the
following proceedings:

MR. GARCIA: I think it is very clear that the problem we have here is a paramilitary force operating under the cloak, under the mantle of legality is
creating a lot of problems precisely by being able to operate as an independent private army for many regional warlords. And at the same time, this I
think has been the thrust, the intent of many of the discussions and objections to the paramilitary units and the armed groups.

MR. PADILLA: My proposal covers two parts: the private armies of political warlords and other armed torces not recognized by constituted authority
which shall be dismantled and dissolved. In my trips to the provinces, I heard of many abuses committed by the CHDF (Civilian Home Defense
Forces), specially in Escalante, Negros Occidental. But I do not know whether a particular CHDF is approved or authorized by competent authority.
If it is not authorized, then the CHDF will have to be dismantled. If some CHDFs, say in other provinces, are authorized by constituted authority, by
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Chief of Staff or the Minister of National Defense, if they are recognized and authorized, then they
will not be dismantled. But I cannot give a categorical answer to any specific CHDF unit, only the principle that if they are armed forces which are
not authorized, then they should be dismantled. 64 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, with the discussions in the Constitutional Commission as guide, the creation of the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) in the present case, is
also invalid.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Judgment is rendered commanding respondents to desist from further proceedings m
implementing Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, and its Implementing Guidelines. The said proclamation and guidelines are hereby declared
NULL and VOID for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 106724 February 9, 1994

THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, represented by its Acting Chairman, Cesar Sarino, Teodolo C.
Natividad, Vice-Chairman and Executive Officer, Brig. Gen. Virgilio H. David, Edgar Dula Torre, Guillermo P.
Enriquez, Commissioners, and Chief Supt. Levy D. Macasiano Director for Personnel, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable Judge Salvador de Guzman, Jr., Chief Supt. Norberto M. Lina, Chief Supt. Ricardo Trinidad, Jr., Sr.
Supt. Manuel Suarez, Supt. Justito B. Tagum, Sr. Supt. Tranquilino Aspiras, Sr., Supt. Ramon I. Navarro,
Sr. Supt. Ramon I. Navarro, Sr. Supt. Jose P. Suria, Sr. Supt. Agaton Abiera, Chief Insp. Bienvenido Torres,
and the National (ROTC) Alumni Association Inc. (NARRA), represented by its President Col. Benjamin
Gundran, and Director Hermogenes Peralta, Jr., respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.

Diosdado P. Peralta for respondent-intervenor.

BIDIN, J.:

The case at bar had its origin in the implementation of the compulsory retirement of PNP officers as mandated in Sec.
39, RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized
Department of the Interior and Local Government", which took effect on
January 2, 1991. Among others, RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system for PNP members. Section 39
thereof reads:

Sec. 39. Compulsory Retirement. — Compulsory retirement, for officer and non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of
age fifty-six (56); Provided, That, in case of any officer with the rank of chief superintendent, director or deputy director
general, the Commission may allow his retention in the service for an unextendible period of one (1) year.

Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement to private respondents who are all members of the
defunct Philippine Constabulary and have reached the age of fifty-six (56).

In response, private respondents filed a complaint on December 19, 1991 for declaratory relief with prayer for the
issuance of an ex parte restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as Civil Case No. 91-3498) before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142. In their complaint, respondents aver that the age of retirement set at fifty-six (56) by
Section 39 of RA 6975 cannot be applied to them since they are also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which provides:

Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within the transition period of four (4) years following the
effectivity of this Act, the following members of the INP shall be considered compulsorily retired:

a) Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first year of the effectivity of this Act.

b) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second year of the effectivity of this Act.

c) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year of the effectivity of this Act.

d) Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth year of the effectivity of this Act.

It is the submission of respondents that the term "INP" includes both the former members of the Philippine
Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP) by virtue
of
PD 765 in 1975.
On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year transition period provided in Section 89 applies only to
the local police forces who previously retire, compulsorily, at age sixty (60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire
Lieutenant or higher (Sec. 33, PD 1184); while the retirement age for the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56)
under the AFP law.

On December 23, 1991, respondent judge issued a restraining order followed by a writ of injunction on January 8,
1992 upon posting of a P100,000.00 bond by private respondents.

After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings, the case was submitted for resolution and on August 14,
1992, the respondent judge rendered the assailed decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby declares that the term "INP" in Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of
the present Philippine National Police, irrespective of the original status of the present members of the Philippine
National Police before its creation and establishment, and that Section 39 thereof shall become operative after the
lapse of the
four-year transition period.

The preliminary injunction issued is made permanent.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 29-30)

Petitioners filed the instant petition on October 8, 1992 seeking the reversal of the above judgment. On January 12,
1993, the Court resolved to treat the respondents' Comment as Answer and gave due course to the petition.

In ruling in favor of private respondents, respondent judge observed, among others, that:

It may have been the intention of Congress to refer to the local police forces as the "INP" but the PNP Law failed to
define who or what constituted the INP. The natural recourse of the court is to trace the source of the "INP" as courts
are permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents involved. There is nothing
extant in the statute books except that which was created and established under
PD 765 pursuant to the mandate of Article XV of the 1973 Constitution providing that the "State shall establish and
maintain an integrated national police force whose organization, administration and operation shall be provided by
law." Heretofore, INP was unknown. And the said law categorically declared the PC "as the principal component of the
Integrated National Police" (Sec. 5, PD 765).

The court was supplied by respondents (petitioners herein) with excerpts taken from the discussion amongst the
members of Congress concerning the particular provision of Section 89. The court is not persuaded by said
discussion; it was a simple matter for the members of the legislature to state precisely in clear and unequivocal terms
their meaning, such as "integrated police" as used in PD 765. Instead, they employed "INP", a generic term that
includes the PC as the principal component of the INP, supra. In failing to categorically restrict the application of
Section 89 as the members of legislature are said to have intended, it gave rise to the presumption that it has not
limited nor intended to limit the meaning of the word when the bill was finally passed into law. It is not difficult for the
court to also presume that in drafting the wording of the PNP Law, the legislators were aware of the historical
legislative origin of the "INP".

xxx xxx xxx

The court takes particular note of the fact that Section 89 is found in the Transitory Provisions of the law which do not
provide for any distinction between the former PC officers and those belonging to the civilian police forces. These
provision are specifically enacted to regulate the period covering the dissolution of the PC and the creation of the PNP,
a period that necessarily would be attended by imbalances and or confusion occasioned by the wholesale and mass
integration. In fact, the retirement payment scheme of the INP is still to be formulated, leaving the impression that
nothing is really settled until after the transition of four years has lapsed. Section 89 therefore prevails over Section 39
up to the year 1995 when the retirement age for the members of the PNP shall then be age 56; after the year 1995,
Section 39 shall then be the applicable law on retirement of PNP members. (Rollo, pp. 27-28; emphasis supplied)

Petitioners disagree and claim that the use of the term INP in Sec. 89 does not imply the same meaning contemplated
under PD 765 wherein it is provided:

Sec. 1. Constitution of the Integrated National Police. — There is hereby established and constituted the Integrated
National Police (INP) which shall be composed of the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus, and the integrated
police forces as established by Presidential Decrees
Nos. 421, 482, 531, 585 and 641, as components, under the Department of National Defense.
On the other hand, private respondents assert that being the nucleus of the Integrated National Police (INP) under PD
765, former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) should not be discriminated against from the coverage of
the term "INP" in Sec. 89, RA 6975. Clearly, it is argued, the term "INP" found in Section 89 of RA 6975 refers to the
INP in PD 765. Thus, where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.

Does the law, RA 6975, distinguish INP from the PC? Petitioners submit that it does and cite Sections 23 and 85 to
stress the point, viz.:

Sec. 23. Composition. — Subject to the limitations provided for in this Act, the Philippine National Police, hereinafter
referred to as the PNP, is hereby established, initially consisting of the members of the police forces who were
integrated into the Integrated National Police (INP) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 765, and the officers and
enlisted personnel of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). . .

xxx xxx xxx

The permanent civilian employees of the present PC, INP, Narcotics Command, CIS and the technical command of
the AFP assigned with the PC, including NAPOLCOM hearing officers holding regular items as such, shall be
absorbed by the Department as employees thereof, subject to existing laws and regulations.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 85. Phase of Implementation. — The implementation of this Act shall be undertaken in three (3) phases, to wit:

Phase I — Exercise of option by the uniformed members of the Philippine Constabulary, the PC elements assigned
with the Narcotics Command, CIS, and the personnel of the technical services of the AFP assigned with the PC to
include the regular CIS investigating agents and the operatives and agents of the NAPOLCOM Inspection,
Investigation and Intelligence Branch, and the personnel of the absorbed National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking
(NACAH) of the Department of National Defense, to be completed within six (6) months from the date of the effectivity
of this Act. At the end of this phase, all personnel from the INP, PC, technical Services, NACAH, and NAPOLCOM
Inspection, Investigation and Intelligence Branch shall have been covered by official orders assigning them to the PNP
...

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Any PC-INP officer or enlisted personnel may, within the twelve-month period from the effectivity of this Act, retire .
..

Phase III — . . . To accomplish the tasks of Phase III, the Commission shall create a Board of Officers composed of
the following: NAPOLCOM Commissioner as Chairman and one (1) representative each from the PC, INP, Civil
Service Commission and the Department of Budget and Management.

Section 86 of the same law further provides:

Sec. 86. Assumption by the PNP of Police Functions. — The PNP shall absorb the functions of the PC, the INP and
the Narcotics Command upon the effectivity of this Act.

From a careful perusal of the above provisions, it appears therefore that the use of the term INP is not synonymous
with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of the whole
Philippine National Police (PNP) for retirement purposes and not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from the
PC and it cannot be construed that "INP" as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.

And contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that the law failed to define who constitutes the INP, Sec. 90
of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus,

Sec. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. — Upon the effectivity of this Act, the present National Police
Commission and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall cease to exist. The Philippine
Constabulary, which is the nucleus of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall cease to be a major
service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated National Police, which is the civilian component of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police, shall cease to be the national police force and lieu thereof, a new
police force shall be established and constituted pursuant to this Act. (emphasis supplied)

It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature failed to define who the members of the INP are. In
this regard, it is of no moment that the legislature failed to categorically restrict the application of the transition period
in Sec. 89 specifically in favor of the local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity as the PC component of the
INP was already retirable at age fifty-six (56).

Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have belabored on the supposed dubious meaning of the
term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation, courts are not without recourse in determining the construction
of the statute with doubtful meaning for they may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body. In
case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted (De Villa v. Court of Appeals,
195 SCRA 722 [1991] citing Palanca v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]; Arenas v. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318
[1978]).

Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the law if it runs counter to the legislative intent (Yellow
Taxi and Pasay Transportation Workers' Association v. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab. Co., 80 Phil. 83 [1948]).

Examining the records of the Bicameral Conference Committee, we find that the legislature did intent to exclude the
members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar as the retirement age is concerned, thus:

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Well, it seems what people really want is one common rule, so if it is fifty-six, fifty-
six; of course, the PC wants sixty for everybody. Of course, it is not acceptable to us in the sense that we tied this up
really to the question of: If you are lax in allowing their (the PC) entry into the PNP, then tighten up the retirement. If
we will be strict in, like requiring examinations and other conditions for their original entry, then since we have sifted
out a certain amount of undesirables, then we can allow a longer retirement age. That was the rationale, that was the
tie-up. Since we are relaxing the entry, we should speed up . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). Exit.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA) . . . the retirement, the exit.

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). So let me get it very clear, Mr. Chairman. Fifty-six, let's say, that will not make
any adjustment in the PC because there (they) are (retirable at age) fifty-six.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Kaya nga, wala na silang masasabi.

THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). In the case of the Police, since they are retireable now at sixty, for the officers, it
will be
applicable to them on a one-year every year basis for a total period of four years transition. (Bicameral Conference
Committee on National Defense, March 12, 1990)

REP. GUTANG. On the first year of effectivity, the police will retire at 60 years.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Sixty.

REP. GUTANG. On the second year, 59.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Oo.

REP. GUTANG. On the third year, 58.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Fifty-eight. So 'yung 55, on the third year, 58, doon siya re-retire.

REP. GUTANG. Oo.

SEN. SAGUISAG. So kung 55, when the law becomes effective . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). He will retire at 58, doon siya aabot.

REP. UNICO. Pwede.

SEN. SAGUISAG. Dahil 'yon, may time to . . .

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Walang problema dito sa transition ng pulis, acceptable ito, eh.
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. COJUANGCO). Sa PC?

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). PC, walang mawawala sa kanila, 56 ang retirement age nilang talaga, eh. Kaya
ayaw ko
ngang dagdagan 'yung 56 nila at 'yon din ang sa Armed Forces, 56. (Ibid., May 22, 1990)

In applying the provisions of Sec. 89 in favor of the local police force as established in PD 765, the Court does not, in
any manner, give any
undue preferential treatment in favor of the other group. On the contrary, the Court is merely giving life to the real
intent of the legislators based on the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee that preceded the
enactment of RA 6975.

The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local
police force is clear. The question now is whether the classification is valid. The test for this is reasonableness such
that it must conform to the following requirements: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; (4) It must apply equally to all
members of the same class (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 [1939]).

The classification is based upon substantial distinctions. The PC, before the effectivity of the law (RA 6975), were
already retirable at age 56 while the local police force were retirable at 60, and governed by different laws
(P.D. 1184, Sec. 33 and Sec. 50). The distinction is relevant for the purpose of the statute, which is to enable the local
police force to plan for their retirement which would be earlier than usual because of the new law. Section 89 is merely
transitory, remedial in nature, and loses its force and effect once the four-year transitory period has elapsed. Finally, it
applies not only to some but to all local police officers.

It may be appropriate to state at this point that it seems absurd that a law will grant an extension to PC officers'
retirable age from 56 to 60 and then gradually lower it back to 56 without any cogent reason at all. Why should the
retirement age of PC officers be increased during the transitory period to the exclusion of other PC officers who would
retire at age 56 after such period? Such absurdity was never contemplated by the law and would defeat its purpose of
providing a uniform retirement age for PNP members.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of injunction issued on January 8, 1992 is hereby LIFTED and the
assailed decision of respondent judge is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED