Art.

8 - Conspiracy (12 cases) that in conspiracy, direct proof of a previous

People v. Larranaga G.R. No. 138875-75, 3 February agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. xxx
2004
 Facts: it may be shown by the conduct of the accused
before, during, and after the commission of the
Appellants Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman
crime.
Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel
Larrañaga, et al.’s actions showed that they
Balansag, Davidson Rusia, and brothers James
have the same objective to kidnap and detain the
Anthony and James Andrew Uy were charged with
Chiong sisters. Rowen and Josman grabbed Marijoy
kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the RTC
and Jacqueline from the vicinity of Ayala Center.
of Cebu City.
Larrañaga, James Andrew and James Anthony who
According to the state witness Rusia and as
were riding a red car served as back-up of Rowen
corroborated by other prosecution witnesses, he
and Josman. Together in a convoy, they proceeded
met Rowen and Josman and told him to ride with
to Fuente Osmeña to hire a van, and thereafter, to
them in a white car. Following them were Larrañaga,
the safehouse of the "Jozman Aznar Group" in
James Anthony and James Andrew who were in a
Guadalupe, Cebu where they initially molested
red car. Josman stopped the white car in front of the
Marijoy and Jacqueline. They headed to the South
waiting shed where the sisters Marijoy and
Bus Terminal where they hired the white van driven
Jacqueline Chiong were standing and forced them to
by Alberto, with Ariel as the conductor. Except for
ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen
James Andrew who drove the white car, Larrañaga,
handcuffed them jointly. After stopping by a
et al. boarded the white van where they held
safehouse, the group thereafter headed to a bus
Marijoy and Jacqueline captive. In the van, James
terminal where they met Alberto Caño and Ariel
Anthony taped their mouths and Rowen handcuffed
Balansag, and hired the white van driven by the
them together. They drank and had a pot session at
former. They traveled towards south of Cebu City,
Tanawan. They encircled Jacqueline and ordered
leaving the red car at the terminal. Along the way
her to dance, pushing her and ripping her clothes in
they bought barbecue and Tanduay Rhum. After
the process. Meanwhile, Larrañaga raped Marijoy,
parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank
followed by Rowen, James Anthony, Alberto, and
and had a pot session. Later, Larrañaga, et al. pulled
Ariel. On other hand, Josman and James Andrew
Jacqueline out of the van and made her dance as
raped Jacqueline. Upon Josman's order, Rowen and
they encircled her, ripping her clothes in the
Ariel led Marijoy to the cliff and pushed her. After
process. Meanwhile as instructed by Josman,
leaving Tan-awan, they taunted Jacqueline to run
Larrañaga started to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle,
for her life. And when Rusia got off from the van
followed by Rowen, James Anthony, Alberto and
near Ayala Center, Larrañaga, et al. jointly headed
Ariel. Thereafter they raped Jaqueline. Then,
back to Cebu City.
Josman intructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy
Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and
to the cliff and push her into the ravine. Jacqueline
Alberto that they were not part of the "conspiracy"
was pulled out of the van and thrown to the ground.
as they were merely present during the
She tried to run towards the road but was caught by
perpetration of the crimes charged but not
Larrañaga, et al., who brought her inside the van
participants therein, is bereft of merit. To hold an
and beat her until she passed out.
accused guilty as co-principal by reason of
The RTC convicted them of kidnapping and
conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed
serious illegal detention.
an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
Issue: Whether there was conspiracy.
complicity. There must be intentional participation
Ruling: RTC Decision AFFIRMED WITH
in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of
MODIFICATION.
 From the evidence of the the common design and purpose. Responsibility of a
prosecution, there is no doubt that Larrañaga, et al. conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment
conspired in the commission of the crimes charged. of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to
Their concerted actions point to their joint purpose collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing
and community of intent. Well settled is the rule out of the purpose intended. As shown by the
evidence for the prosecution, Rowen, Ariel and
Alberto were not merely present at the scene of the
crime. Indeed, Larrañaga, et al., except James
Anthony who was 16 years old when the crimes
charged were committed, share the same degree of
responsibility for their criminal acts [end].
People v. Garchitorena
Direct proof is not necessary for one to become a
conspirator because conspiracy can be proven from
the acts done or performed prior, during or
subsequent to the commission of the crime.
Facts:
An information for murder was filed in the
RTC of Binan against Garchitorena, Garcia and
Pamplona for the death of Mauro Biay.
Witness Dulce Biay was selling balut one
evening. Her brother Mauro, also a balut vendor,
was about seven arm’s length away from her when
he was called by accused Jessie Garcia. When Mauro
approached Jessie, the latter twisted the hand of
her brother behind his back and Jessie’s
companions- accused Garchitorena and Pamplona –
began stabbing her brother Mauro repeatedly with
a shiny bladed instrument. Joey was at the right side
of the victim and was strangling Mauro from behind.
Mauro was struggling to free himself while being
stabbed by the three (3) accused until her brother
slumped face down on the ground. Arnold then
instructed his two co-accused to run away.
Pamplona denied the charge against him,
claiming that he was seated on a bench when
Garchitorena came along and stabbed Mauro.
Garcia claimed that conspiracy was not proven and
at the time of the incident he was on a bus on his
way home from work. Garchitorena claimed
insanity, alleging that he was using drugs and shabu
for 2 years prior to the incident.
The RTC convicted them of murder, and the
CA affirmed the conviction.
Issue: Whether conspiracy was not proven.
Ruling: Appeal DENIED.
 Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for
conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused prior to, during or subsequent to the
incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose ,
interest concert of action or community of interest.
Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by each of
the conspirators for the act of one of them is deemed
the act of all.
In this case, conspiracy was shown because
Garchitorena, et al. were together in performing the
concerted acts in pursuit of their common objective
. Garcia grabbed the victim’s hands and twisted his
arms; in turn, Pamplona, together with
Garchitorena, strangled him and straddled him on
the ground, then stabbed him. The victim was trying
to free himself from them, but they were too strong.
All means through which the victim could escape
were blocked by them until he fell to the ground and
expired. Garchitorena, et al.s’ prior act of waiting for
the victim outside affirms the existence of
conspiracy, for it speaks of a common design and
purpose.
The aggravating circumstance of superior
strength should be appreciated against
Garchitorena, et al.. In the case at bar, the victim
certainly could not defend himself in any way. The
accused-appellants, armed with a deadly weapon,
immobilized the victim and stabbed him
successively using the same deadly weapon.
All told, the trial court correctly convicted
Garchitorena, et al. of murder, considering the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength [end].
People v. Carandang
Facts:
Three informations for 2 counts of murder
and 1 count of frustrated murder were filed in the
RTC of QC against Carandang, Milan & Chua, for the
killing of PO2 Alonzo, SPO2 Red, and for the injuries
inflicted against SPO1 Montecalvo.
Milan’s sister informed the police of a drug
deal which would take place in their house. The
police, including the victims Alonzo, Red and
Montecalvo, surrounded the house. They met at the
back door near Milan’s room. Seeing the door of
Milan’s room was open, the police tried to enter.
When they announced their identities as policemen,
Milan suddenly shut the door.
Alonzo and Red pushed the door open,
causing it to fall and propelling the two inside the
room. Alonzo shouted “walang gagalaw”.
Suddenly, gunshots rang, hitting Alonzo and Red
who fell one after the other. Montecalvo was still
aiming at the assailants when Carandang shot and
hit him, causing the former to fall. Another
policeman heard Chua instruct Milan: “sugurin mo
na”. Milan lunged at Montecalvo but the latter was
able to shoot and hit Milan. Montecalvo was then
pulled out of the house by another policeman.
The policemen Alonzo and Red were found
dead inside the house. They died due to gunshot
wounds.
Carandang, et al. claimed that they were just
playing card games at Milan’s house when armed
men suddenly barged in and fired their weapons.
Further, paraffin tests on Chua yielded a negative
result, while Carandang’s tests showed a positive
result. Milan refused to undergo tests as he was
injured at the time.
The RTC ruled that they acted in conspiracy
in the commission of crimes charged, and found
them guilty of 2 counts of murder and 1 count of
frustrated murder. The CA affirmed with
modification the conviction. Hence, Milan and Chua
appealed to the SC.
Issue: Whether conspiracy was not proven due to
lack of direct evidence.
Ruling: Appeal DENIED.
 To summarize, Milan's
and Chua's arguments focus on the lack of direct
evidence showing that they conspired with
Carandang during the latter's act of shooting the
three victims. However, as we have held in People v.
Sumalpong, conspiracy may also be proven by other
means: xxx Proof of concerted action before, during
and after the crime, which demonstrates their unity
of design and objective, is sufficient.
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan
and Chua conspired with Carandang was established
by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims
(Milan's closing the door when the police officers
introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to wait
in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chua's
directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and
Milan's following such instruction). Contrary to the
suppositions of appellants, these facts are not
meant to prove that Chua is a principal by
inducement, or that Milan's act of attacking SPO1
Montecalvo was what made him a principal by
direct participation. Instead, these facts are
convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of
purpose in the minds of the three. As
coconspirators, all three are considered principals
by direct participation.
Neither can the rapid turn of events be
considered to negate a finding of conspiracy. Unlike
evident premeditation, there is no requirement for
conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient period
of time to elapse to afford full opportunity for
meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises
on the very moment the plotters agree, expressly or
impliedly, to commit the subject felony.
People v. Dadao
Facts:
Appellants Dadao, Sulindao, Eddie
(deceased) and Alfemio Malgosi were charged with
Murder in the RTC of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, for
conspiring to kill Pionio Yacapin.
The prosecution alleged that the Malgosis
held firearms while Dadao and Sulindao had bolos,
and they shot to death Yacapin in the latter’s house.
The police found empty Garand shells at the scene
of the crime. On the other hand, Dadao et al. alleged
that paraffin tests yielded negative results for all
four of them. They also alleged that they were at
different places at the time of the shooting.
The RTC found them guilty of murder,
prompting them to appeal. During the pendency of
the appeal, Eddie died. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling.
Ruling: Appeal DENIED.
 With regard to Dadao,
et al.’s assertion that the negative result of the
paraffin tests that were conducted on their persons
should be considered as sufficient ground for
acquittal, we can only declare that such a statement
is misguided considering that it has been
established in jurisprudence that a paraffin test is
not conclusive proof that a person has not fired a
gun. It should also be noted that, according to the
prosecution, only Eddie and Alfemio Malogsi held
firearms which were used in the fatal shooting of
Pionio Yacapin while Marcelino Dadao and Antonio
Sulindao purportedly held bolos. Thus, it does not
come as a surprise that the latter two tested
negative for powder burns because they were never
accused of having fired any gun. Nevertheless, the
evidence on record has established that all four
accused shared a community of criminal design. By
their concerted action, it is evident that they
conspired with one another to murder Pionio
Yacapin and should each suffer the same criminal
liability attached to the aforementioned criminal act
regardless of who fired the weapon which delivered
the fatal wounds that ended the life of the victim.
In People v. Nelmida, we elaborated on the
principle of criminal conspiracy and its ramifications
in this manner:
There is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and then decide to commit
it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree,
expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and
forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established,
each and every one of the conspirators is made
criminally liable for the crime actually committed
by any one of them. In the absence of any direct
proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be
deduced from the mode and manner of the
commission of the offense or inferred from acts that
point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of interest. As such, it does
not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as
each of the actors incurs the same criminal liability,
because the act of one is the act of all (Citation and
emphasis omitted.)[end].
People v. Estanly Octa
Facts: An information was filed in the RTC of Manila,
charging Estanly Octa of kidnapping for ransom.
Johnny Corpus and Mike Adrian Batuigas
were kidnapped in Sampaloc, Manila. The
kidnappers demanded ransom money from
Johnny’s wife and Mike Adrian’s sister, Ana Marie
Corpuz initially for P 20 Million, but was reduced to
P 538,000.
Johnny Corpus and Mike Adrian Batuigas
were kidnapped in Sampaloc, Manila. The
kidnappers demanded ransom money from
Johnny’s wife and Mike Adrian’s sister, Ana Marie
Corpuz initially for P 20 Million, but was reduced to
P 538,000.
Five days after Johnny and Mike were
kidnapped, the kidnappers set up how the ransom
money would be delivered. Ana Marie was
instructed to go to the drop-off point where she
would see a man wearing a red cap, to which she
would deliver the money. Ana Marie saw the man,
who asked for the money. After contacting the
kidnappers, Ana Marie gave the money. A day later,
Johnny and Mike Adrian were released.
A month later, the police arrested Octa in
connection with another kidnap for ransom
incident. Ana Marie identified Octa from the police
line-up as the man who received the ransom money
from her. Consequently, this case was filed against
Octa.
Octa denied the kidnapping, claiming that at
the time of the kidnapping he was in Camarines
Norte. Moreover, he himself was kidnapped and
brought to Camp Crame, and tortured to admit the
charges filed against him.
The RTC found him guilty as charged, giving
credence to Ana Marie’s positive identification of
him as the man who received the ransom money,
and his the act of receiving ransom money was
sufficient evidence to establish Octa’s conspiratorial
act in the kidnapping for ransom of the victims. The
CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue: Whether the RTC erred in finding Octa a
conspirator of the crime charged.
Ruling: Appeal DENIED.
Octa also claims that he cannot be
considered as a conspirator to the kidnapping in the
absence of concrete proof that he actually
participated in the execution of the essential
elements of the crime by overt acts indispensable to
its accomplishment. His receipt of the ransom
money transpired only after the kidnapping had
been consummated and was not an essential
element of the crime.
We disagree.
On point is our dissertation in People v.
Bautista, to wit: “Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Where all the accused acted in concert at the time
of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by
such acts that they had the same purpose or
common design and were united in its execution,
conspiracy is sufficiently established. It must be
shown that all participants performed specific acts
with such closeness and coordination as to indicate
a common purpose or design to commit the felony.
Evidently, to hold an accused guilty as a co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be The RTC convicted Feliciano, et al. of murder
shown to have performed an overt act in and attempted murder, and acquitted the other co-
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There accused, holding that Feliciano, et al. were positively
must be intentional participation in the transaction identified by witnesses as the attackers.
with a view to the furtherance of the common The CA affirmed the RTC ruling, but modified
design and purpose. their criminal liabilities.
Taking these facts in conjunction with the Issue: Whether Feliciano, et al. are not liable for
testimony of Dexter, who testified that accused- attempted murder for some of the victims.
appellant was the one who received the ransom
money x x x then the commonality of purpose of the Ruling: Appeal DENIED.
 In the decision of the
acts of accused-appellant together with the other
trial court, all of the accused- appellants were found
accused can no longer be denied. Such acts have the
guilty of the murder of Venturina and the attempted
common design or purpose to commit the felony of
murder of Natalicio, Mangrobang, Jr. Lachica,
kidnapping for ransom.
Fortes, and Gaston, Jr. The appellate court,
Thus, accused-appellants’ argument that he
however, modified their liabilities and found that
is a mere accomplice must fail. He is liable as a
the Feliciano, et al. were guilty of attempted
principal for being a co-conspirator in the crime of
murder only against Natalicio and Fortes, and not
Kidnapping for Ransom.”
against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.
Moreover, the CA is correct in its
It is the appellate court’s reasoning that
observation that at the time Octa received the
because Lachica and Mangrobang “were no longer
ransom money, the crime of kidnapping was still
chased by the attackers,” it concluded that
continuing, since both victims were still being
Feliciano, et al. “voluntary desisted from pursuing
illegally detained by the kidnappers. While his them and from inflicting harm to them, which shows
receipt of the ransom money was not a material that they did not have the intent to do more than to
element of the crime, it was nevertheless part of
make them suffer pain by slightly injuring them.” It
the grand plan and was in fact the main reason for
also pointed out that the wound inflicted on Gaston
kidnapping the victims. Ransom is money, price or
“was too shallow to have been done with an intent
consideration paid or demanded for the redemption
to kill.” Thus, it concluded that the Feliciano, et al.
of a captured person or persons; or payment that
would have been guilty only of slight physical
releases from captivity. Without ransom money, the
injuries.
freedom of the detained victims cannot be achieved
This is erroneous.
[end].
It should be remembered that the trial court found
that there was conspiracy among Feliciano, et al.
People v. Feliciano
and the appellate court sustained this finding.
Facts:
Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching
Seven members of the Sigma Rho fraternity
liability to all of the accused, regardless of their
were eating lunch in UP Diliman when they were
degree of participation, thus:
suddenly attacked by several masked men who Once an express or implied conspiracy is
were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes. Some
proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-
sustained injuries which required hospitalization,
principals regardless of the extent and character of
but one of them-Venturina-died due to traumatic
their respective active participation in the
head injuries.
commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in
Informations for murder for Venturina’s
furtherance of the conspiracy because in
death, as well as the attempted murder and
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
frustrated murder of some Sigma Rho members
xxx it is impossible to graduate the separate liability
were filed in the RTC of QC against several members
of each conspirator without taking into
of Scintilla Juris fraternity, namely Feliciano, Alvir,
consideration the close and inseparable relation of
Soliva, Zingapan (appellants Feliciano, et al.) and
each of them with the criminal act, for the
several others.
commission of which they all acted by common
agreement. The crime must therefore in view of the
solidarity of the act and intent which existed
between the accused, be regarded as the act of the
band or party created by them, and they are all
equally responsible.
Verily, the moment it is established that the
malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective
liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not
speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
degree of participation of each of the perpetrators
present at the scene of the crime.
The liabilities of the Feliciano, et al. in this
case arose from a single incident wherein the
accused- appellants were armed with baseball bats
and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the highest
amount of damage possible to the victims. Some
were able to run away and take cover, but the
others would fall prey at the hands of their
attackers. The intent to kill was already present at
the moment of attack and that intent was shared by
Feliciano, et al. alike when the presence of
conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial
to distinguish between the seriousness of the
injuries suffered by the victims to determine the
respective liabilities of their attackers. What is
relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a
result of that intent to kill and whether there are
qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances
that can be appreciated.
The appellate court, therefore, erred in
finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight
physical injuries. It would be illogical to presume
that despite the swiftness and suddenness of the
attack, the attackers intended to kill only Venturina,
Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure
Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent
to kill was evident from the moment Feliciano, et
al. took their first swing, all of them were liable for
that intent to kill.
For this reason, the accused-appellants
should be liable for the murder of Venturina and
the attempted murder of Natalicio, Mangrobang,
Jr., Lachica, Fortes, and Gaston, Jr [end].
People v. Morilla
Facts:
Javier Morilla, Willie Yang, Ruel Dequilla and
Mayor of Mun. of Panulikan, Quezon Ronnie Mitra,
were charged with the crime of transportation of
illegal drugs in the RTC of QC.
A Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra and an
ambulance driven by Morilla were travelling
together when they were intercepted at a
checkpoint in Real, Quezon. The police discovered
that they were carrying sacs of shabu, weighing a
total of 503 kgs
Mitra and Morilla claimed that they did not
know that the contents of the sacks were shabu.
Mitra was merely requested to carry the sacs, while
Morilla thought the contents were wooden tiles and
electronic spare parts.
The RTC convicted Morilla and Mitra,
dismissing the two’s defenses. The RTC’s ruling of
conviction was based on the testimony of the
accused. The Starex was able to pass by the
checkpoint but the ambulance was stopped. Morilla
clamed he was with Mayor Mitra in an attempt to
persuade the police to let him pass. When the latter
discovered shabu, they chased Mayor Mitra, who
got caught. The police also discovered shabu inside
the Starex. Yang and Dequila were acquitted, as
their mere presence as passengers were inadequate
to prove that they were also conspirators of Mitra
and Morilla.
The CA upheld the RTC’s finding of
conspiracy, holding that there was singularity of
intent to transport sacs of shabu when Morilla
agreed to drive the ambulance together with Mitra
who drove the lead vehicle.
Issue: Whether conspiracy to transport shabu was
proven.
Ruling:
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving
the ambulance on the date he was apprehended is
not sufficient to prove that he was part of a
syndicated group involved in the illegal
transportation of dangerous drugs. This argument is
misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the
parties actually came together and agreed in
express terms to enter into and pursue a common
design. The assent of the minds may be and, from
the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof
of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
indicate that they are parts of some complete
whole. In this case, the totality of the factual
circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla
conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to
transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles
loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were
on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was
able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the
police operatives. When it was Morilla’s turn to pass
through the checkpoint, he was requested to open
the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white
granules scattered on the floor, the police officers
requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he
was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra,
he would not have told the police officers that he
was with the mayor.
His insistence that he was without any
knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he just
obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior
Mayor Mitra in driving the said vehicle likewise
bears no merit.
Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught
in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting the
dangerous drugs on board their vehicles.
“Transport” as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act
means “to carry or convey from one place to
another.” It was well established during trial that
Morilla was driving the ambulance following the
lead of Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van
going to Manila. The very act of transporting
methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum
prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under
a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks
containing dangerous drugs need not be
accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or
knowledge [end].
People v. Bokingco
Facts: Appellants Michael Bokingco and Reynante
Col were charged with murder before the RTC of
Angeles City for the death of Noli Payson.
Noli owned a pawnshop which formed a part
of his house. He also maintained 2 rows of
apartment units at the back of his house. His brother
in law Vitalico, Noli’s was leasing one of the
apartment units. Around 1 AM Vitalico heard
commotions in Aparment 3, one of the other units.
He peered inside and saw Bokingco hitting
something on the floor. Bokingco saw Vitalico and
attacked him. Vitalico was hit but was later able to
push Bokingco away, who was later subdued.
Vitalico returned to his house, where he was
informed that Noli was found dead in Apt. 3.
At the time of the incident Elsa, Noli’s wife,
heard banging sounds and his husband’s moans. She
went downstairs from their room, but before
reaching the kitchen she was attacked by Col, who
then instructed her to open the pawnshop vault.
Elsa told him that she did not have the combination
lock, so Col dragged her towards the back door.
Before they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco
open the door and tell Col “tara, patay na siya”. Col
immediately freed her and ran away with Bokingco.
The RTC convicted Bokingco and Col with
murder. The CA affirmed the conviction, finding that
they are conspirators in the commission of the
crime.
Issue: Whether Col is guilty as a co-conspirator.
Ruling: Appeal GRANTED. Col is ACQUITTED due to
reasonable doubt.
 In order to convict Col as a
principal by direct participation in the case before
us, it is necessary that conspiracy between him and
Bokingco be proved. Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement to commit an
unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of
the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of
the accused evincing a joint or common purpose
and design, concerted action, and community of
interest. Unity of purpose and unity in the
execution of the unlawful objective are essential to
establish the existence of conspiracy.
As a rule, conspiracy must be established
with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself
and must be shown as clearly as the commission of
the crime.
The finding of conspiracy was premised on
Elsa's testimony that Bokingco and Col fled together
after killing her husband and the extrajudicial
confession of Bokingco.
The finding of conspiracy was premised on
Elsa's testimony that Bokingco and Col fled together
after killing her husband and the extrajudicial
confession of Bokingco.
 Nobody witnessed the commencement of
the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment where
Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he
was at Elsa's house and allegedly ordering her to
open the pawnshop vault.
Nobody witnessed the commencement of
the attack. Col was not seen at the apartment where
Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco. In fact, he
was at Elsa's house and allegedly ordering her to
open the pawnshop vault.
Based on these acts alone, it cannot be
logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in
killing Pasion. At the most, Col's actuations can be
equated to attempted robbery, which was actually
the initial information filed against Bokingco and Col
before it was amended, on motion of the
prosecution, for murder.
Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call
out to Col that Pasion had been killed and that they
had to leave the place. This does not prove that
they acted in concert towards the consummation
of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were
two crimes committed simultaneously and they
were united in their efforts to escape from the
crimes they separately committed.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose
that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had already killed
Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were
not coordinated because while Bokingco was killing
Pasion because of his pent-up anger, Col was
attempting to rob the pawnshop [end].
People v. Castillo
Facts: Appellants Elizabeth Castillo and Evangeline
Padayhag, as well as Wenceslao, were charged with
kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a 5-year
old boy, Rocky Cebrero.
Castillo was once a househelper at the
Cebrero household, and one of her tasks was to take
care of the Sps. Castillo’s son, Rocky. One day
Castillo called Padayhag, telling her that her
boyfriend was sick. Castillo fetched Padayhag, but
they did not visit Padayhag’s boyfriend. Instead,
they went to a playground. Then, Castillo instructed
Padayhag to fetch Rocky from his house, telling
Padayhag that she missed the boy.
Padayhag fetched Rocky as instructed, and
brought the boy to Castillo. The three eventually
went to the house of Castillo’s sister, Wenceslao.
Afterwards, Padayhag left Wenceslao’s house.
Castillo on the other hand called Rocky’s father and
demanded ransom in exchange for Rocky’s release.
The RTC of Parañaque convicted Castillo and
Padayhag of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention.
Issue: Whether Castillo and Padayhag conspired to
kidnap Rocky for ransom
Ruling: RTC decision AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION: Padayhag is ACQUITTED.
 Our
review of the evidence on record shows that the
prosecution failed to prove Padayhag’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Padayhag’s sole involvement in this entire
episode is her act of fetching Rocky and bringing him
to where Castillo was waiting for them. Padayhag
then went strolling with the two, went to the house
of Castillo’s sister together with Castillo and Rocky,
and then later left the house. From this fact alone,
the prosecution would have us rule that Padayhag
acted in conspiracy with Castillo. The prosecution
contends that without Padayhag’s help, Castillo
could not have abducted Rocky.
We are not persuaded. There must be
positive and conclusive evidence that Padayhag
acted in concert with Castillo to commit the same
criminal act. To hold an accused guilty as a
coprincipal by conspiracy, there must be a sufficient
and unbroken chain of events that directly and
definitely links the accused to the commission of the
crime without any space for baseless suppositions
or frenzied theories to filter through. Indeed,
conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the
commission of the crime itself.
Conspiracy is established by the presence of two
factors:
1) singularityofintent;and
 2) unity in execution of
an unlawful
objective.
 The two must concur.
Performance of an act that contributes to
the goal of another is not enough. The act must be
motivated by the same unlawful intent. Neither
joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient
indicium of conspiracy, unless proved to have been
motivated by a common design.
Padayhag’s act of fetching Rocky is not
conclusive proof of her complicity with Castillo’s
plan, a plan Padayhag did not even know. Both
appellants testified that Padayhag met Castillo only
because Castillo told Padayhag that Padayhag’s
boyfriend was sick. It was precisely on the pretext
that they were to visit Padayhag’s boyfriend that the
two met. When they met, Padayhag realized that
Castillo had deceived her. xxx Padayhag’s confusion
in the way she answered the questions propounded
to her only highlights the fact that she was not
aware of Castillo’s plans and was vulnerable to the
latter’s manipulation. It is clear that she acted with
the full belief that Castillo was doing nothing wrong.
Whatever moved her to do what Castillo asked of
her is up for speculation. What matters is that her
motivation in fetching Rocky was not to kidnap the
boy. To impose criminal liability, the law requires
that there be intentional participation in the
criminal act, not the unwitting cooperation of a
deceived individual.
The failure to prove Padayhag’s involvement
as a conspirator reveals how tenuous the evidence
is linking her to the crime. Padayhag’s culpability
hinges on how her act of fetching Rocky and bringing
him to Castillo formed part of a concerted effort to
kidnap the child. The act of fetching the boy, by
itself, does not constitute a criminal offense. By
itself, it is not even sufficient to make her an
accomplice. For a person to be considered an
accomplice there must be a community of design,
that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal,
the co-accused concurs with the latter. Mere
commission of an act which aids the perpetrator is
not enough.
There was therefore a need for clear and
convincing proof that this single act was committed
to kidnap the child. The prosecution failed to prove
this. Padayhag explained that Castillo coaxed her
into fetching Rocky through another deception and
by playing on her feelings of sympathy and
friendship [end].
Fernan v. People; Conspiracy; Infamous 86M
Highway Scam
Facts:
COA Regional Director solicited for the
authentication and report on the sub-allotment
advises issued to highway engineering districts in
Cebu particularly Cebu City, Cebu 1st, Cebu 2nd and
Mandaue City Highway Engineering Districts.
Apparently, the two sets of LAA’s were received by
the districts. One set consists of regular LAA’s in
authenticated and normally processed manner
while the other set consists of fake LAA’s all of these
were approved for the Finance Officer by Chief
Accountant Rolando Mangubat. Mangubat,
however, had no authority to approve them
because he had already been detailed to the MPH
Central Office. It was found out that the practice of
using fake LAA’s had been going on for years.
Four of the accused hatched an ingenious
plan to siphon off large sums of money from the
government coffers using fake LAA’s, vouchers and
other documents to conceal the traces.
The anti-graft court has found the case has
merit and that Fernan Jr. and Expedito Torrevilas
along with the other accused guilty as co-principals
in the crime of Estafa through falsification of Public
Documents as defined and penalized in Articles 318
and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal code, and there being no modifying
circumstances in attendance, sentenced each of
them to imprisonment and payment of the
penalties.
Issue:
Whether or not the honourable
sandiiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners as
co-conspirators despite the prosecution’s failure to
specifically prove beyond reasonable doubt the
facts and circumstances that would implicate them
as co-conspirators and justify their conviction.
Ruling:
No. The Sandigan Bayan has accurately ruled
on conviction of the petitioners as co-conspirators
in spite of the prosecution’s failure to prove such.
The court explained why direct proof of prior
agreement is not necessary: “Secrecy and
concealment are essential features of a successful
conspiracy. It may be inferred from the conduct of
the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had
acted with a common purpose and design.
Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or
more persons aimed their acts toward the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were in fact,
connected and cooperative, which indicates
closeness of personal association and concurrence
of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as a co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, he must have
shown to have performed a concerted act to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose.
GMA v. People; Bersamin
The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for
certiorari separately filed by former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts
Manager Benigno B. Aguas.
FACTS:
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged
in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and
Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other officials
of PCSO and Commission on Audit whose charges
were later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after
their respective demurrers to evidence were
granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes who were at
large) for conspiracy to commit plunder, as defined
by, and penalized under Section 2 (b) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
The information reads: That during the
period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto xxx accused Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the
Philippines xxx Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget
and Accounts Manager, all public officers
committing the offense in relation to their respective
offices and taking undue advantage of their
respective official positions, authority, relationships,
connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and
confederating with one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or
total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by
raiding the public treasury].
Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas
separately filed their respective petitions for
bail which were denied by the Sandiganbayan on
the ground that the evidence of guilt against them
was strong.
After the Prosecution rested its case,
accused GMA and Aguas then separately filed their
demurrers to evidence asserting that the
Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder
against them. The same were denied by the
Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient
evidence to show that they had conspired to
commit plunder. After the respective motions for
reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were
likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they filed
their respective petitions for certiorari.
ISSUES:
Procedural:
1. Whether or not the special civil action for
certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the
demurrers to evidence.
Substantive:
1. Whether or not the State
sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy
among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte ;
2. Whether or not the State sufficiently
established all the elements of the crime of plunder:
(a) Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating
or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of
not less than P50,000,000.00? (b) Was the predicate
act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the
information proved by the Prosecution?
RULING:
Re procedural issue:
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not
proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued
by the trial court because of the availability of
another remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that “the order denying the
motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be
reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before
judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to this
action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to
evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory
order that did not terminate the proceedings, and
the proper recourse of the demurring accused was
to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they
may then appeal the conviction, and assign the
denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed,
it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of
certiorari may issue should not be limited, because
to do so “x x x would be to destroy its
comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the
discretion of the court that authority is not wanting
to show that certiorari is more discretionary than
either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of
our superintending control over other courts, we
are to be guided by all the circumstances of each
particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’
So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary
to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial
justice.”
The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of
procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the
convenience of one side. This is because the Court
has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down
grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it
is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the
interlocutory character and effect of the denial of
the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the
accused could avail themselves of the remedy of
certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
Re first substantive issue: The Prosecution did not
properly allege and prove the existence of
conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information suggests that
what the Prosecution sought to show was an
implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of
the accused on the basis of their collective actions
prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It
is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that
the conspiracy among all of the accused was by
express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a
chain conspiracy.
We are not unmindful of the holding in
Estrada v. Sandiganabayan [G.R. No. 148965,
February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 556] to the effect
that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient
if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with
the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or
synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude,
etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts
constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a
person of common understanding would know what
is being conveyed, and with such precision as would
enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We
are not talking about the sufficiency of the
information as to the allegation of conspiracy,
however, but rather the identification of the main
plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No.
7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such
identification of the main plunderer was not only
necessary because the law required such
identification, but also because it was essential in
safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be
properly informed of the charges they were being
made answerable for. The main purpose of
requiring the various elements of the crime charged
to be set out in the information is to enable all the
accused to suitably prepare their defense because
they are presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constituted the offense
charged.
Despite the silence of the information on
who the main plunderer or the mastermind was, the
Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its
resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the
mastermind despite the absence of the specific
allegation in the information to that effect. Even
worse, there was no evidence that substantiated
such sweeping generalization.
In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly
allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the
cause of the State against the petitioners for
violating the rights of each accused to be informed
of the charges against each of them.
Re second substantive issues:
(a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or
acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least Php50 Million
was adduced against GMA and Aguas.
The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment,
accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
valued at not less than Php50,000,000.00. The
failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to
the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
As regards the element that the public
officer must have amassed, accumulated or
acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at least
P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no
evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or
even Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any
amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial
or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution
showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs
[Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had
been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
(b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate
act of raiding the public treasury (under Section 2
(b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)
To discern the proper import of the phrase
raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the
accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion,
misuse or malversation of public funds [See Sec. 1(d)
of RA 7080]. This process is conformable with the
maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by
which the correct construction of a particular word
or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings may be made by
considering the company of the words in which the
word or phrase is found or with which it is
associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is
always used in association with other words or
phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be
modified or restricted by the latter. To convert
connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s
property as if it were one’s own; to misappropriate
means to own, to take something for one’s own
benefit; misuse means “a good, substance, privilege,
or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as
intended;” and malversation occurs when “any
public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property,
shall appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds, or property,
wholly or partially.” The common thread that binds
all the four terms together is that the public officer
used the property taken. Considering that raids on
the public treasury is in the company of the four
other terms that require the use of the property
taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury
similarly requires such use of the property taken.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
contending that the mere accumulation and
gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on
the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of
noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury
requires the raider to use the property taken
impliedly for his personal benefit.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail
to show where the money went but, more
importantly, that GMA and Aguas had
personally benefited from the same. Hence, the
Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids
on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the
petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the
resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-
0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and
September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners’
respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the
petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and
BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence;
ORDERS the immediate release from detention of
said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on
costs of suit.
Go-Tan v. Tan; The principle of conspiracy may be
applied to RA 9262
Facts:
Petitioner Sharica Go-Tan filed in the RTC of
QC a petition with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
spouse Steven and her parents-in-law, respondents
spouses Perfecto and Juanita Tan. Go-Tan alleged
that Steven in conspiracy with his parents conspired
to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses
against her, in violation of Sec. 5, RA 9262. The RTC
granted the prayer and issued the TPO.
The Sps. Tan opposed the issuance,
contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over
them on the grounds that, as parents in law, they
were not covered by RA 9262. The RTC agreed and
dismissed the case against the Sps. Tan.
Issue: Whether the principle of conspiracy may be
applied to violations of RA 9262.
Ruling: Petition GRANTED.
 While [Sec. 3 of RA
9262 which defines violence against women and
children] provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does
not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly
provides for the suppletory application of the RPC.
Hence, legal principles developed from the
Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary
capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such
as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on
a particular matter.
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC
provides that the RPC shall be supplementary to
special penal laws, unless the latter should specially
provide the contrary. With more reason, therefore,
the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC
may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262
because of the express provision of Section 47 that
the RPC shall be supplementary to said law.
Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by
their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be
applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or
action in concert to achieve a criminal design is
shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary,
since all the conspirators are principals.
It must be further noted that Section 5 of
R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of
violence against women and their children may be
committed by an offender through another. Xxx In
addition, the protection order that may be issued
for the purpose of preventing further acts of
violence against the woman or her child may include
individuals other than the offending husband [end].

ART. 11 - JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
VELASQUEZ (Not Vasquez) V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
An accused who pleads a justifying
circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code1 admits to the commission of acts, which
would otherwise engender criminal liability.
However, he asserts that he is justified in
committing the acts. In the process of proving a
justifying circumstance, the accused risks admitting
the imputed acts, which may justify the existence of
an offense were it not for the exculpating facts.
Conviction follows if the evidence for the accused
fails to prove the existence of justifying
circumstances.
Petitioners Nicolas Velasquez, Victor
Velasquez, Felix Caballeda, Jojo del Mundo, Sonny
Boy Velasquez, and Ampong Ocumen, were charged
with attempted Murder under Art. 248, in relation
to Art. 6 against Jesus del Mundo.
At about 10pm, on May 24, 2003, while Jesus
and his wife caught Ampong and Nora having sex in
their nipa hut. This caused Jesus to shout invectives
at the couple, causing them to scamper away. Jesus
then went to the house of Ampong’s aunt, but since
no one was there, he decided to turn back.
However, he was blocked by Ampong and the other
accused. Petitioner Nicolas hit the left side of Jesus’s
forehead with a stone. Victor, hit the left eyebrow
with a stone. Felix above Jesus’s ear. Sonny struck
Jesus with a bamboo stock at the back; and Ampong
with a punch on Jesus’s left cheek. Jesus was able to
get up and stagger back home.
Jesus was issued a medico-legal certificate
by Dr. Jose de Guzman, and was advised that he
would require 4-6 weeks of medical attention, and
also to undergo surgery. However, Jesus could not
afford the surgery.
The Defense counter that on the evening of
May 24, 2003, it was a drunk Jesus who was stoning
and hacking at Victor’s door. This cause the
Defendants to counter Jesus’s attacks which led to
his injuries.
RTC ruled as follows:
Nicolas Velasquez, Victor Velasquez, Felix Caballeda
- GUILTY of Attempted Murder
Sonny Boy Velasquez - GUILTY of less serious
physical injuries
Jojo del Mundo - ACQUITTED
Ampong Ocumen- ARCHIVED; at large
CA MODIFIED RTC
Petitioners and Caballeda are liable only for Less
Serious Physical Injuries; 1) no intent to kill; despite
their number and strength, Jesus was still alive; 2)
the injuries inflicted were non-fatal
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45; invoked the 1st and 2nd Justifying
Circumstances under Art. 11
ISSUE: W/N Art. 11 applies; W/N they acted in self-
defense/defense of Mercedes, Nicolas’s wife, and
Victor’s mother (Art. 11, 1&2)
RULING: NO
A person invoking self-defense (or defense
of a relative) admits to having inflicted harm upon
another person - a potential criminal act under Title
Eight (Crimes Against Persons) of the Revised Penal
Code. However, he or she makes the additional,
defensive contention that even as he or she may
have inflicted harm, he or she nevertheless incurred
no criminal liability as the looming danger upon his
or her own person (or that of his or her relative)
justified the infliction of protective harm to the
aggressor. The accused's admission enables the
prosecution to dispense with discharging its burden
of proving that the accused performed acts, which
would otherwise be the basis of criminal liability. All
that remains to be established is whether the
accused were justified in acting as he or she did.
To successfully invoke self-defense, an
accused must establish: "(1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person resorting to self-defense."
Defense of a relative under Article 11 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code requires the same first two (2)
requisites as self-defense and, in lieu of the third "in
case the provocation was given by the person
attacked, that the one making the defense had no
part therein."
In this case, Petitioners failed to proved that
their actions fall under Art. 11, pars. 1 & 2.
Petitioners offered nothing more than a self-
serving, uncorroborated claim that Jesus appeared
out of nowhere to go berserk in the vicinity of their
homes. They failed to present independent and
credible proof to back up their assertions. The
Regional Trial Court noted that it was highly dubious
that Jesus would go all the way to petitioners'
residences (7 of them) to initiate an attack for no
apparent reason.
As the Regional Trial Court noted,
“The Court takes judicial notice of (the) big
difference in the physical built of the private
complainant and accused Victor Velasquez, Sonny
Boy Velasquez, Felix Caballeda and Jojo del Mundo,
private complainant is shorter in height and of
smaller built than all the accused.”
The accused could have easily held Jesus,
who was heavily drunk, as claimed by them, and
disarmed him, without need of hitting him.
Assuming that Jesus was indeed the initial
aggressor, the beating dealt to him was in excess of
what would have sufficed to neutralize him, thus the
means employed to repel the alleged aggression
were not reasonably necessary.
As a last resort, the Petitioner’s contest of
Jesus’s lone witness, Maria Teresita, on the ground
that she is not credible cannot be given
consideration.
Petitioners’ invocation of justifying
circumstances relieved the prosecution of its
burden of proving the acts constitutive of the
offense charged. An accused who pleads a JC under
Art. 11, admits to the commission of acts, which
would otherwise engender criminal liability,
however, he asserts that he is justified in
committing the acts.
PEOPLE V. REGALARIO
The moment the inceptive unlawful aggression
cease[s] to exist, the person defending himself
must not kill or wound the aggressor. Retaliation is
not a justifying circumstance.
The offended party or the victim, Rolando shot
allegedly the barangay official Ramon. Ramon hit
the back of the head of Roland with a night stick and
continued hitting him so he would not gain balance.
When the accused hit the victim whatever inceptive
unlawful aggression has been started by the victim,
it has already ceased to exist. Therefore, the accused
has no more right to wound or kill the victim.
Facts:
Accused-appellants Ramon, Marciano,
Sotero, Bienvenido and Noel Regalario-relatives by
affinity and barangay officials of Natasan, Albay-
were originally charged before the RTC of Ligao,
Albay with homicide for the death of Rolando
Sevilla. The DOJ, however, filed an amended
Information charging them with murder.
The prosecution alleged that one night
during a dance and singing contest in the barangay,
Rolando and Poblete were enjoying the festivities
when kagawad Sotero approached them. Despite
Rolando and Poblete’s efforts to avoid trouble, a
commotion ensued. Eventually, it came to a point
where the Regalarios beat Rolando with their night
sticks until he slumped to the ground face down.
The barangay captain Marciano ordered the others
to kill Rolando and to tie him up. Rolando died due
to severe blood loss due to a stab wound and
multiple lacerated wounds.
The defense depicted a different story.
Ramon tried to investigate a commotion during the
festivities Rolando suddenly fired a shot at him,
hitting his left shoulder. Instinctively, Ramon struck
at Rolando with his night stick at the back of his
head. The blow caused Rolando to reel backward.
To prevent him from regaining balance, Ramon
continued to strike Rolando. The latter lost his
footing and fell down. At this juncture Sotero
arrived and tried to stop Ramon from hitting
Rolando, but lunged at Rolando upon knowing that
he still had the gun. Later, the other Regalarios
arrived. They were able to knock the gun out of
Rolando’s hand. Bienvenido arrived after the fact
and arrested Ronaldo. In lieu of handcuffs, he just
tied the hands and feet of Rolando.
The RTC ruled out Ramon’s claim of self-
defense and held that there was conspiracy and
abuse of superior strength in the killing of Rolando.
All the Regalarios were convicted of murder. The CA
affirmed the RTC.
Issue: Whether Ramon acted in self-defense when
allegedly struck at Rolando despite the latter’s
retreat.
 danger or risk to life and limb, the necessity for the
Ruling: Appeal DENIED.
 We begin our person invoking self-defense to attack his adversary
ceases. If he persists in attacking his adversary, he
evaluation with accused-appellant Ramon
can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of
Regalario's claim of self-defense. Both the CA and
self-defense. Self-defense does not justify the
the trial court gave no credence to this theory of
unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is
self-defense.
retreating from the fray.
When self-defense is invoked by an accused
Ramon's claim of self-defense is further
charged with murder or homicide he necessarily
belied by the presence of two (2) stab wounds on
owns up to the killing but may escape criminal
the neck, four (4) lacerated wounds on the head, as
liability by proving that it was justified and that he
well as multiple abrasions and contusions on
incurred no criminal liability therefor. Hence, the
different parts of the victim's body, as shown in the
three (3) elements of self-defense, namely: (a)
Medico- Legal Report. xxx Indeed, even if it were
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
true that the victim fired a gun at Ramon, the
reasonable necessity of the means employed to
number, nature and severity of the injuries suffered
prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of
by the victim indicated that the force used against
sufficient provocation on the part of the person
him by Ramon and his co-accused was not only to
defending himself, must be proved by clear and
disarm the victim or prevent him from doing harm
convincing evidence. However, without unlawful
to others.[end].
aggression, there can be no self-defense, either
complete or incomplete.
PEOPLE V. ALFREDO DULIN
Ramon contends that the victim Rolando
Facts:
Sevilla committed an act of unlawful aggression with
One night, accused-appellant Alfredo Dulin,
no provocation on his [Ramon's] part. Ramon
with Jun Danao, was accompanying Nicanor and
testified that he was trying to investigate a
Raymund to the highway to get a tricycle ride, when
commotion when, without warning, Rolando
he was attacked by the cousin of his mother,
emerged from the group, thrust and fired his gun at
Francisco Batulan. Batulan stabbed Dulin on the
him, hitting him in the left shoulder. To disable
right side of his body and on the left side. Dulin and
Rolando from firing more shots, Ramon struck the
Batulan grappled for the weapon until Dulin was
victim's head at the back with his nightstick, causing
able to wrest it from Batulan. Dulin ran towards the
the victim to reel backward and lean on the bamboo
second level of Francisco and Carolina Danao’s
fence. He continued hitting Rolando to prevent the
house. Batulan pursued Dulin, and while inside,
latter from regaining his balance and, as he pressed
both of them grappled for control of the weapon
on farther, the victim retreated backward.
again. Dulin, who was now in control of the weapon,
By Ramon's own account, after he was shot,
stabbed Batulan several times. The latter died due
he hit the victim at the back of the latter's head and
to massive blood loss caused by 12 stab wounds.
he continued hitting the victim who retreated
Dulin was charged with murder before the
backward. From that moment, the inceptive
RTC of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Dulin raised
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased
incomplete self-defense, but the RTC convicted him
to exist and the continuation of the offensive stance
as charged. The CA affirmed the conviction.
of Ramon put him in the place of an aggressor.
Issue: Whether the lower courts erred in not
There was clearly no longer any danger, but still
appreciating the presence of self-defense or
Ramon went beyond the call of self-preservation.
incomplete self-defense.
In People v. Cajurao, we held that the settled
rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful
Ruling: Appeal PARTIALLY GRANTED There was no
aggression ceases, the defender no longer has the
right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. self-defense
 The CA observed that
Retaliation is not a justifying circumstance. Upon although Batulan had initiated the attack against
the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the Dulin the unlawful aggression from Batulan
effectively ceased once Dulin had wrested the
weapon from the latter.
We uphold the finding and holding of the CA.
Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor against Dulin,
ceased to be the aggressor as soon as Dulin had
dispossessed him of the weapon. Even if Batulan
still went after Dulin despite the latter going inside
the house of Danao, where they again grappled for
control of the weapon, the grappling for the
weapon did not amount to aggression from
Batulan for it was still Dulin who held control of the
weapon at that point. Whatever Dulin did
thereafter – like stabbing Batulan with the weapon
– constituted retaliation against Batulan. In this
regard, retaliation was not the same as self-
defense. In retaliation, the aggression that the
victim started already ceased when the accused
attacked him, but in selfdefense, the aggression was
still continuing when the accused injured the
aggressor. As such, there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of Batulan to justify his fatal
stabbing by Dulin.
Still, Dulin vigorously insists that the initial
aggression employed by Batulan did not cease
because the latter followed him into Danao’s house
with the singular purpose of ending his life; and that
there was no gap in the aggression initiated by
Batulan.
The insistence is unwarranted. Dulin
admitted having successfully disarmed Batulan and
then running away from him. With the aggression
by Batulan having thereby ceased, he did not
anymore pose any imminent threat against Dulin.
Hence, Batulan was not committing any aggression
when Dulin fatally stabbed him. It is notable, too,
that the results of the medico-legal examination
indicating Batulan to have sustained twelve stab
wounds confirmed the cessation of the attack by
Batulan. The numerosity and nature of the wounds
inflicted by the accused reflected his determination
to kill Batulan, and the fact that he was not
defending himself.
Incomplete self-defense was not proved
Pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense reduces the penalty by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law. For this
purpose, the accused must prove the existence of
the majority of the elements for self-defense, but
unlawful aggression, being an indispensable
element, must be present. Either or both of the
other requisites may be absent xxx.
Dulin posits that the totality of
circumstances indicated that his acts constituted
incomplete self- defense, and must be appreciated
as a privileged mitigating circumstance. Dulin’s
position is untenable. Like in complete self-defense,
Dulin should prove the elements of incomplete self-
defense by first credibly establishing that the victim
had committed unlawful aggression against him.
With Batulan’s aggression having already ceased
from the moment that Dulin divested Batulan of the
weapon, there would not be any incomplete self-
defense. Moreover, as borne out by his stabbing of
Batulan several times, Dulin did not act in order to
defend himself or to repel any attack, but instead to
inflict injury on Batulan.
[NOTE: The SC held that the lower courts erred in
appreciating the attendance of treachery, as the
stabbing by Dulin did not take Batulan by surprise.
Dulin was convicted only for homicide].
PEOPLE V. FONTANILLA
Facts:
An information was filed before the RTC of
La Union, charging the accused-appellant Alfonso
Fontanilla of murder. The prosecution alleged that
one evening the victim Jose Olais was walking along
the road when suddenly Fontanilla struck him in the
head with a piece of wood. Olais fell face down to
the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head
with a piece of stone. The latter stopped only when
the sons-in-law of Olais shouted at him, causing
Fontanilla to run away. Olais was rushed to the
hospital but was declared dead on arrival.
On the other hand, Fontanilla declared self-
defense. He said that on the night of the incident
Fontanilla was standing on the road near his house
when Olais, who appeared to be drunk, boxed him
in the stomach. Despite talking to Olais nicely, the
latter continued attacking Fontanilla; thus Fontanilla
was forced to hit Olais in the head with a stone.
The RTC rejected Fontanilla’s claim of self-
defense and declared him guilty as charged. The CA
affirmed the conviction, as he was unable to
establish unlawful aggression.
Issue: Whether the RTC and CA erred in ignoring
Fontanilla’s claim of self-defense.

Ruling: CA Decision AFFIRMED.
 Fontanilla
pleaded self-defense. In order for self- defense to be
appreciated, he had to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable
element of self-defense, for if no unlawful
aggression attributed to the victim is established,
self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to
repel. The character of the element of unlawful
aggression is aptly explained as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful
aggression, there can be no justified killing in
defense of oneself. The test for the presence of
unlawful aggression under the circumstances is
whether the aggression from the victim put in real
peril the life or personal safety of the person
defending himself; the peril must not be an
imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the
accused must establish the concurrence of three
elements of unlawful aggression, namely:
(a) there must be a physical or material attack or
assault;
(b)the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least,
imminent; and
(c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds:
 (a) actual or
material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent
unlawful aggression.
Actual or material unlawful aggression means an
attack with physical force or with a weapon, an
offensive act that positively determines the intent
of the aggressor to cause the injury.
Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack
that is impending or at the point of happening; it
must not consist in a mere threatening attitude,
nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be
offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening
a knife and making a motion as if to attack).
Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere
threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing
his right hand to his hip where a revolver was
holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance,
or like aiming to throw a pot.
By invoking self-defense, however,
Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that
caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an
accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide
admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the
deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying
circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability.
Having thus admitted being the author of the death
of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of
proving the justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court, and he would be held
criminally liable unless he established self-defense
by sufficient and satisfactory proof. xxx
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A
review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not
commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and,
two, Fontanilla's act of hitting the victim's head with
a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not
proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable
response to the victim's fistic attack and kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla,
the latter would have sustained some injury from
the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury
of any kind or gravity was found on the person of
Fontanilla when he presented himself to the
hospital; hence, the attending physician of the
hospital did not issue any medical certificate to him.
Nor was any medication applied to him. In contrast,
the physician who examined the cadaver of Olais
testified that Olais had been hit on the head more
than once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied,
for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location
and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais
revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to
prevent or repel an attack from Olais. The Court
considers to be significant that the gravity of the
wounds manifested the determined effort of the
accused to kill his victim, not just to defend
himself.[end]
JOSUE V. PEOPLE
Facts: Petitioner Ramon Josue was charged with
frustrated homicide before the RTC of Manila.
The prosecution alleged that one evening, a
barangay tanod named Armando Macario was
buying medicine when he was approached by Josue,
while the latter was shouting to ask why Macario
painted the latter’s vehicle. Macario denied the
accusation, but Josue still pointed his gun and shot
at Macario, who was hit in the elbow and fingers.
The unarmed Macario tried to run, but Josue still
fired at him, causing a gunshot wound at Macario’s
back. The latter was brought to hospital for
treatment, where the doctor confirmed that the
injuries were fatal if not medically attended to.
Josue claimed that he merely acted in self-
defense. He caught Macario and some of his cohorts
stealing the battery of his jeepney. When Josue
sought the attention of Macario’s group, the latter
pulled a gun and tried to shoot Josue, but the gun
jammed. Josue then got his gun and fired at
Macario.
The RTC found Josue guilty of frustrated
homicide, and the CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue: Whether Josue is not guilty due to self-
defense.
Ruling: Petition DENIED.
 In the present case,
particularly significant to this element of “unlawful
aggression” is the trial court’s finding that Macario
was unarmed at the time of the shooting, while
Josue then carried with him a .45 caliber pistol.
According to prosecution witness Villanueva, it was
even Josue who confronted the victim, who was
then only buying medicine from a sari-sari store.
Granting that the victim tried to steal Josue’s car
battery, such did not equate to a danger in his life or
personal safety. At one point during the fight,
Macario even tried to run away from his assailant,
yet Josue continued to chase the victim and, using
his .45 caliber pistol, fired at him and caused the
mortal wound on his chest. Contrary to Josue’s
defense, there then appeared to be no “real danger
to his life or personal safety,” for no unlawful
aggression, which would have otherwise justified
him in inflicting the gunshot wounds for his defense,
emanated from Macario’s end.
The weapon used and the number of
gunshots fired by Josue, in relation to the nature and
location of the victim’s wounds, further negate the
claim of self-defense. For a claim of self-defense to
prosper, the means employed by the person
claiming the defense must be commensurate to the
nature and extent of the attack sought to be
averted, and must be rationally necessary to
prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.
Considering Josue’s use of a deadly weapon when
his victim was unarmed, and his clear intention to
cause a fatal wound by still firing his gun at the
victim who had attempted to flee after already
sustaining two gunshot wounds, it is evident that
the Josue did not act merely in self-defense, but was
an aggressor who actually intended to kill his victim.
[end]
TOLEDO V. PEOPLE; No accidental self-defense
There is no accidental self-defense, as SD is
inconsistent with accident. Because in self-defense it
is direct and positive overt act in the name of self-
preservation. It is direct and positive. It cannot be
done out of accident.
Facts:
On his way home one late afternoon,
accused Toledo saw his nephew, Ricky Guarte
drinking along with his friends Famero, Fosana and
Cortes. They were drinking inside the house of
Ricky’s parents. Toledo requested the group to
refrain from making noise. Then he went inside his
house and slept. Later that evening Ricky and his
friends, who were sleeping in the Guarte’s house,
heard stones being hurled at the roof. Ricky got up
and saw that it was Toledo who was stoning the
hose. Ricky went to his uncle’s house and asked why
he was stoning their house. Without warning,
Toledo stabbed Ricky in the abdomen with a bolo.
He was rushed to the hospital but died due to
massive blood loss.
Toledo asserts that while on his way home
he ordered Ricky’s group not to make loud noises,
and they obliged. He then went inside his house
(w/c was 5M away) and slept. Later, he was awoken
by the loud noises made by Ricky’s group. Ricky,
who was inebriated, was incensed and pulled a
balisong, pushed Toledo’s door and threatened to
stab the latter. Toledo took his bolo and pushed the
door with all his might and then pointed the bolo at
Ricky. The bolo accidentally hit Ricky in the stomach.
Toledo was charged with homicide before
the RTC of Romblon, which convicted him and Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the
disregarded his claim that the bolo accidentally hit victim, however, his act is in accordance with law so
Ricky in the stomach. Toledo appealed to the CA, much so that the accused is deemed not to have
invoking Art. 12, Par. 4; in that the stabbing was an transgressed the law and is free from both criminal
accident. The CA denied the appeal, holding that and civil liabilities.
Toledo failed to prove that he acted in self- defense. On the other hand, the basis of exempting
Issue: Whether Toledo was able to prove self- circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised
defense when his bolo accidentally hit Ricky. Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence,
freedom of action, or intent, or the absence of
Ruling: Petition DENIED.
 The petitioner negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of
the exemption in Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
testified that his bolo hit the victim accidentally. He
Revised Penal Code is lackofnegligenceandintent.
asserted in the RTC and in the CA that he is exempt
Theaccuseddoes not commit either an intentional or
from criminal liability for the death of the victim
culpable felony. The accused commits a crime but
under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
there is no criminal liability because of the complete
Code.
absence of any of the conditions which constitute
However, the petitioner changed gear, so to
free will or voluntariness of the act. An accident is a
speak, and now alleges that he acted in self-defense
fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an
when he stabbed the victim. As such, he contends,
event happening wholly or partly through human
he is not criminally liable under Article 11,
agency, an event which under the circumstances is
paragraph 1 xxx. He avers that he was able to prove
unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it
the essential elements of complete self-defense;
happens [end]
however he also claims that his bolo accidentally hit
the stomach of the victim.
DELA CRUZ V. PEOPLE
It is a matter of law that when a party adopts
Facts:
a particular theory and the case is tried and decided
One afternoon, petitioner Dela Cruz went
upon that theory in the court below, he will not be
into Sykes Asia, the workplace of the victim Jeffrey
permitted to change his theory on appeal. Thecase
Gonzales. As Dela Cruz approached Jeffrey from the
will be reviewed and decided on that theory and not
back, he was already pointing a gun at the back of
approached and resolved from a different point of
Jeffrey’s head. At the last second, the latter
view. To permit a party to change his theory on
managed to deflect Dela Cruz’s hand, and they
appeal will be unfair to the adverse party.
struggled for the possession of the gun. Dela Cruz
It is an aberration for the petitioner to
won the struggle and remained in possession of the
invoke the two defenses at the same time because
gun, while Jeffrey held up a fire extinguisher. Dela
the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical.
Cruz pulled the trigger 4 times, the last finally
There is no such defense as accidental self- defense
discharging a round which hit and killed Jeffrey.
in the realm of criminal law.
Dela Cruz, on the other hand, alleged that he
Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1
went to Sykes to fetch his wife Darlene. As she was
of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a
not on her table, Dela Cruz approached Jeffery and
deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to
asked for her whereabouts. Jeffrey’s response
prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of another
shocked and appalled Dela Cruz. Later, the former
with the use of reasonable means. The
cursed the latter. Then, Jeffrey picked up a gun and
accusedhasfreedomofaction. Heisawareof the
aimed at Dela Cruz’s face. He pulled the trigger but
consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is
the gun did not fire. Dela Cruz grappled with Jeffrey
based on necessity which is the supreme and
for the possession of the gun. While doing so, the
irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and
gun clicked for 2 to 3 times, but the gun did not fire.
of the law. From necessity, and limited by it,
Dela Cruz won the struggle and tried to run
proceeds the right of self-defense. The right begins
away, but Jeffrey blocked his path, shouted for the
when necessity does, and ends where it ends.[12]
guards, and tried to smash Dela Cruz’s head with a
fire extinguisher. The latter parried the attack while to the extent that the object of his attack was no
still holding the gun, and the gun accidentally fired, longer in peril, there was no more unlawful
and the bullet hit Jeffrey’s forehead. aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on
Dela Cruz was charged with homicide, and the part of the offender.[20] Undoubtedly,
the RTC Makati found Dela Cruz guilty of the same. petitioner went beyond the call of self- preservation
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC. when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious
Issue: Whether Dela Cruz acted in self-defense. and fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when the allegedly
unlawful aggression had already ceased.
Ruling: Petition DENIED.
 The Court finds that More, a review of the testimony of the
prosecution witness, Pelaez, will show that if there
Dela Cruz’s defense is sorely wanting. Hence, his
was unlawful aggression in the instant case, the
petition must be denied.
same rather emanated from petitioner.
First. The evidence on record does not
Petitioner's contention that Jeffrey's
support petitioner's contention that unlawful
unlawful aggression was continuous and imminent
aggression was employed by the deceased-victim,
is, therefore, devoid of merit.
Jeffrey, against him.
Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of
is indubitably absent in the instant case, the severe
self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden,
wounds inflicted by petitioner upon Jeffrey was
unexpected or imminent danger — not merely
unwarranted and, therefore, cannot be considered
threatening and intimidating action. There is
a justifying circumstance under pertinent laws and
aggression, only when the one attacked faces real
jurisprudence.
and immediate threat to his life. The peril sought to
Second. Even assuming that the unlawful
be avoided must be imminent and actual, not
aggression emanated from the deceased victim,
merely speculative.
Jeffrey, the means employed by petitioner was not
In the case at bar, other than petitioner's
reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent
testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to
of the alleged attack, which he sought to avert.
show that Jeffrey condescendingly responded to
If petitioner had honestly believed that
petitioner's questions or initiated the confrontation
Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should have just
before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a
run, despite any obstruction, considering that he
gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but
was already in possession of the gun. He could have
failed — an assault which may have caused
also immediately sought help from the people
petitioner to fear for his life.
around him, specifically the guard stationed at the
Even assuming arguendo that the gun
floor where the shooting incident happened. In fact,
originated from Jeffrey and an altercation
he could have reported the incident to the
transpired, and therefore, danger may have in fact
authorities as soon as he had opportunity to do so,
existed, the imminence of that danger had already
if it was indeed an accident or a cry of self-
ceased the moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by
preservation. Yet, petitioner never did any of that.
wresting the gun from the latter. After petitioner
We find it highly specious for petitioner to go
had successfully seized it, there was no longer any
through the process of tussling and hassling with
unlawful aggression to speak of that would have
Jeffrey, and in the end, shooting the latter on the
necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly
forehead, not only once, but four times, the last
observed by the RTC, petitioner had every
shot finally killing him, if he had no intention to hurt
opportunity to run away from the scene and seek
Jeffrey. [end]
help but refused to do so.
Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has
GUEVARRA V. PEOPLE
begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-
Facts: Rodolfo Guevarra and his son Joey were
defense has no right to kill or even wound the
charged with frustrated homicide and homicides
former aggressor. To be sure, when the present
under two informations.
victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action
The prosecution alleged that the victims
(and brothers) Erwin and David Ordoñez and Vingua
were passing the Guevarras’ compound in Alicia,
Isabela when Joey stabbed David with a bolo. Erwin,
who was walking ahead of his companions,
approached the scene, but was met by Rodolfo who
then hacked him. The Guevarras then dragged Erwin
into their compound and continued hacking Erwin.
David and Erwin became unconscious and were
brought to the hospital. David died.
The defense alleged that Erwin, David and
Vingua forced their way into the Guevarra
compound and threw stones at Rodolfo’s tricycle
and house. Rodolfo went down the silung of his
house and shouted at the three to stop. Erwin and
David attacked the Guevarras, and as a response
Rodolfo reached for his bolo and hacked and
stabbed Erwin and David until the latter fell to the
ground.
The RTC of Cauayan City, Isabela found the
Guevarras guilty, holding that they failed to prove
unlawful aggression on the part of the victims. The
CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in failing to appreciate
the presence of self-defense.
Ruling: Petition DENIED.
 By invoking self-
defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the
commission of the acts for which they were
charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven,
would have exculpated them. With this admission,
the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to
show that the killing and frustrated killing of David
and Erwin, respectively, were attended by the
following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victims; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the persons resorting to self-defense.
Of all the burdens the petitioners carried,
the most important of all is the element of unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical
assault, or at least threat to inflict real imminent
injury, upon. person [sic]. The element of unlawful
aggression must be proven first in order for self-
defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
unless the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-
defense.
As the RTC and the CA did, we find the
absence of the element of unlawful aggression on
the part of the victims. As the prosecution fully
established, Erwin and David were just passing by
the petitioners’ compound on the night of
November 8, 2000 when David was suddenly
attacked by Joey while Erwin was attacked by
Rodolfo. The attack actually took place outside, not
inside, the petitioners’ compound, as evidenced by
the way the petitioners’ gate was destroyed. The
manner by which the wooden gate post was broken
coincided with Erwin’s testimony that his brother
David, who was then clinging onto the gate, was
dragged into the petitioners’ compound. These
circumstances, coupled with the nature and number
of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show
that the petitioners did not act in self-defense in
killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners
were, in fact, the real aggressors. [end]
PEOPLE V. SEVILLANO
Facts:
The victim Pablo Maddauin was seated on a
long bench and chatted with Palavorin and Cardona
when they saw accused-appellant Sevillano,
approach them. Sevillano appeared to be drunk.
Without warning, Sevillano stabbed Pablo in the
chest several times. Pablo was brought to the
hospital but died on the same day.
Sevillano claimed self-defense, averring that
when he went to the vacant lot where Pablo and his
friends were staying, Pablo tried to stab him but
missed his target. Sevillano and Pablo grappled for
the knife, but Pablo was accidentally stabbed.
The RTC Manila found Sevillano guilty of
murder, and the CA affirmed RTC.
Issue: Whether Sevillano acted in self-defense.
Ruling: Appeal DENIED.
 By invoking self-
defense, Sevillano in effect, admits to having
inflicted the stab wounds which killed the victim.
The burden was, therefore, shifted on him to prove
that the killing was done in self-defense.
Sevillano’s version that it was the victim who
was armed with a knife and threatened to stab him
was found by the lower court to be untenable. We
agree with the lower court’s conclusion. Assuming
arguendo that there was indeed unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, the imminence
of that danger had already ceased the moment
Sevillano was able to wrestle the knife from him.
Thus, there was no longer any unlawful aggression
to speak of that would justify the need for him to
kill the victim or the former aggressor. This Court
has ruled that if an accused still persists in attacking
his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying
circumstance of self- defense. The fact that the
victim suffered many stab wounds in the body that
caused his demise, and the nature and location of
the wound also belies and negates the claim of self-
defense. It demonstrates a criminal mind resolved
to end the life of the victim. [end]
PEOPLE V. GENOSA
Facts:
Marivic and Ben Genosa were a married
couple with 2 children.
On November 15, 1995, Arturo Basobas
heard Marivic Genosa tell her husband, “I won’t
hesitate to kill you,” to which Ben replied, “Why kill
me when I am innocent?” That was the last time
Arturo saw Ben alive, and since then, the Genosa’s
house appeared uninhabited.
On November 16, their neighbor, Erlinda
Paderog, saw Marivic exiting the house with her 2
kids, each one carrying a bag. They then tode a bus
to Ormoc City.
On November 18, 1995, Steban Matiga,
another neighbor, tried to investigate a foul odor
emanating from the locked house. He found Ben’s
lifeless body wrapped in a bed sheet inside upon
destroying the padlock with a saw.
Marivic Genosa admitted that she attacked
and wounded her husband which ultimately led to
his death. According to the appellant, she did not
provoke her husband when she got home that night
and it was her husband who began the provocation.
The appellant said she was frightened that her
husband would hurt her and she wanted to make
sure she would deliver her baby safely.
The appellant testified that during her
marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least
five times, but that Ben would always follow her and
they would reconcile. The appellant said that the
reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards
her that night was because he was crazy about his
recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant, after
being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to
be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The
appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the
killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the
crime of parricide, with the aggravating
circumstance of treachery, for the husband was
attacked while asleep.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.
(2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.
Ruling:
For the first issue, the SC held that the
defense failed to establish all the elements of self-
defense arising from battered woman syndrome, to
wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence
must be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and her
intimated partner; (b) The final acute battering
episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered person’s mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer
and an honest belief that she needed to use force in
order to save her life, and; (c) At the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable – not
necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to
the accused based on the history of violence
perpetuated by the former against the latter.
For the second issue, the SC ruled out
treachery as an aggravating circumstance because
the quarrel or argument that preceded the killing
must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s
aggression.