EMERITA MUÑOZ v ATTY. VICTORIANO R. YABUT, JR.

and SAMUEL GO CHAN

FACTS:

Spouses Yee and Emilia Ching formerly owned the subject house and lot. As consideration
for the valuable services rendered by Muñoz(sister), Yee transferred the property by virtue of Deed
of Absolute Sale. However, in the Deed, Muñoz purportedly sold the subject property to her
sister, Emilia M. Ching. Emilia sold the property to spouses Go. Muñoz registered her adverse
claim, and filed a complaint for the annulment of the deeds of absolute sale. RTC, by virtue of writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, ordered the sheriff to put the spouses Go in possession of the
subject property. Muñoz’s adverse claim and notice of lis pendens were also cancelled due to
alleged final judgment in favor of the spouses Go.

Meanwhile, Sps Go obtained a loan(₱500,000.00) from BPI and mortgaged the subject
property. Sps Go defaulted on the payment causing the BPI to foreclose the mortgage. BPI sold
the property to SPS Chan. The spouses Chan also obtained a loan from and mortgaged the subject
property.

RTC ruled in favor of Munoz due to forged signature. CA affirmed the decision. After 2
months, a writ of execution was issued. Sps Chan filed an Urgent Motion to Stop Execution
assserting their ownership and possession of the subject property on the basis of a clean title
registered in their names. RTC denied the motion. The writ was enforced and the possession of
the property was returned to Munoz.

G.R. No. 142676

Muñoz instituted a Complaint for Forcible Entry alleging that she had been in actual and
physical possession of the subject property; that Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, along with 20
other men, some of whom were armed, ousted Muñoz of possession of the subject property.

Go and Atty. Yabut averred that the Turn-Over of Possession and Receipt of Possession is
a falsified document. They further asserted that they were not bound by the execution of the final
judgment RTC (earlier judgment) as they were not parties to the said case.

MeTC dismissed the complaint for forcible entry.

Muñoz posits that the final judgment and writ of execution bind not only Emilia M. Ching
and the spouses Go, but also their successors-in-interest, assigns, or persons acting on their behalf,
namely, BPI Family and spouses Chan. The spouses Chan cannot be deemed innocent purchasers
for value of the property since the cancellation of the adverse claim and notice of lis pendens on
the spouses Go’s TCT No. 258977 is completely null and void.

ISSUE:

RULING:
 1

Civil Case is an action for reconveyance of real property. An action for reconveyance is an action
in personam available to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens
system in another’s name.

Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to participate in Civil
Case, the final judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The effect of
the said judgment cannot be extended to BPI Family and the spouses Chan by simply issuing an
alias writ of execution against them. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only
against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest
in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution issued pursuant thereto.

The fact that the titles to the subject property of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go were
already declared null and void ab initio by final judgment is not enough, for it does not
automatically make the subsequent titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan correspondingly null
and void ab initio.

A forcible entry case, is governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The
purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases without regard to technical rules. Pursuant to this objective, the Rule
prohibits petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary
delays and to expedite the disposition of cases.59

The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the MeTC directing that Muñoz be
placed in possession of the subject property during the course of Civil Case is an interlocutory
order. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut assailed the said order via a petition for certiorari.

The petition for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut is clearly covered by the
said prohibition, thus, it should have been dismissed outright by the RTC. While the circumstances
involved in Muñoz’s forcible entry case against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut are admittedly
very peculiar, these are insufficient to except the petition for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and
Atty. Yabut from the prohibition. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules
applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Nonetheless, even though the peculiar circumstances extant herein do not justify the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286, they do require limiting pro hac vice the reliefs the MeTC may
accord to Muñoz in the event that she is able to successfully prove forcible entry. Taking into
account that the final judgment (earlier case) does not extend to the spouses Chan, who were not
impleaded as parties to the said case – the MeTC is precluded from granting to Muñoz relief,
whether preliminary or final, that will give her possession of the subject property. Otherwise, we
will be perpetuating the wrongful execution of the final judgment.
 GLICERIO AGUSTIN (Deceased) as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Susana
Agustin v LAUREANO BACALAN and the PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CEBU

FACTS:

Bacalan is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in a building owned by the late Susana
Agustin. Due to nonpayment of rentals despite repeated demands an action to eject him was filed.

In his answer, Bacalan included a counter-claim alleging that the present action was devoid
of merits because notwithstanding the knowledge that he has no rental in arrears, Agustin filed the
present action merely to annoy, vex, embarrass and inconvenience the defendant.

The City Court of Cebu subsequently rendered judgment dismissing the counterclaim. RTC
ruled in favor of Bacalan. The judgment became final and executory.

Agustin filed a complaint for the declaration of the nullity of the above-cited decision. She
contended that that moral damages may not properly be awarded in ejectment cases, the only
recoverable damages therein being the reasonable compensation for use and occupancy of the
premises and the legal measure of damages being the fair rental value of the property. Bacalan
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Agustin has no cause of action.

ISSUE: W/N the grant of moral damages must be upheld?

RULING:

YES. Agustin loses sight of the fact that the money judgment was awarded the defendant-
appellee in the concept of a counterclaim. A defending party may set up a claim for money or any
other relief which he may have against the opposing party in a counterclaim (Section 6, Rule 6,
Revised Rules of Court). And the court may, if warranted, grant actual, moral, or exemplary
damages as prayed for. The grant of moral damages, in the case at bar, as a counterclaim, and not
as damages for the unlawful detention of property must be upheld. However, the amount thereof
is another matter.

ISSUE: W/N CFI may, in an appeal, award the defendant-appellee's counterclaim in an amount
exceeding or beyond the jurisdiction of the court of origin.?

RULING:

The rule is that a counterclaim not presented in the inferior court cannot be entertained in
the Court of First Instance on apppeal. Thus, Bacalan’s counterclaim beyond P10,000.00, the
jurisdictional amount of the city Court of Cebu, should be treated as having been deemed waived.
It is as though it has never been brought before trial court. It may not be entertained on appeal.
The amount of judgment, therefore, obtained by the defendant-appellee on appeal, cannot exceed
the jurisdiction of the court in which the action began. Since the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate
court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same by its decisions or otherwise.

The nullity of the excess portion of the decision in question, however, is not such as to
affect the conclusions reached by the court in the main case for ejectment.

LOURDES SUITES (Crown Hotel Management Corporation) v NOEMI BINARO

FACTS:

Lourdes Suites is the owner and operator of a hotel. It executed 2 contracts with Noemi
Binaro for room accommodations for two groups of students. Binarao was able to pay the total
contract price. However, Lourdes Suites claimed that there was an unpaid balance for damages to
the furniture, a lost key and excess guests.

After Binaro refused to pay, Lourdes Suites filed a Statement of Claim5 for collection of
sum ofmoney.

Binaro, in her answer, alleged that she is not obliged to pay the claimed amount because
Lourdes Suites billed the charges twice.

METC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. This was affirmed by RTC.

Lourdes Suites argued a complaint cannot be dismissed with prejudice based onlack of
cause of action because: (1) this ground is not expressly provided for under the Rules on Small
Claims Cases;16 and (2) if there was a failure to prove a cause of action the only available remedy
would be a demurrer filed bythe defendant.

ISSUE: W/N the present complaint should be dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action?

RULING:

YES. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION and LACK

OF CAUSE OF ACTION:

Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground
for dismissal under Rule 16 ofthe Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause [of] action
refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged inthe pleading.
The remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is
to demur to the evidence.

In civil cases, courts must determine if the plaintiff was able to prove his case by a
preponderance of evidence.
 The basis of MTC in dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action is the failure of
Lourdes to preponderantly establish its claim against the Binaro by clear and convincing evidence.
Hence, public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
Complaint for lack of cause of action, as he referred to the evidence presented and not to the
allegations in the Complaint.

DANTE M. PASCUAL, represented by REYMEL R. SAGARIO v MARILOU M.

PASCUAL

FACTS:

Dante Pascual, resident of USA, appointed Sagario as his attorney-in-fact by SPA. Pursuant
to the SPA, Sagario filed complaint for Annulment of TCT in the name of Marilou Pascual and
Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance with Damages.2

Marilou filed a Motion to Dismiss: 1) non-compliance with the requirement of the Local
Government Code,referring the dispute to the barangay court before the case was filed in court; 2)
Being a real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact is therefore obliged to bring this case first before
the Barangay Court (Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "Where the action is allowed
to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the
beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest.)

Dante argues that since he, not his attorney-in-fact Sagario, is the real party in interest, and
since he actually resides abroad, the lupon would have no jurisdiction to pass upon the dispute
involving real property.

Marilou argues that attorney-in-fact Sagario is a resident of the same barangay as that of
hers which brings the matter under the jurisdiction of the lupon.

ISSUE: W/N the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of failure to refer the matter to
lupon?

RULING:

NO. To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the
attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would abrogate the meaning of
a "real party in interest" as defined in Section 2 of Rule 314 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis a
vis Section 3 of the same Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and misunderstood by
respondent.

In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an actual resident of
the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction
over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in
court.
 V-GENT, INC vs. MORNING STAR TRAVEL and TOURS, INC

FACTS:

V-Gent, Inc. (V-Gent) bought 26 two-way plane tickets from Morning Star Travel and
Tours, Inc. V-Gent returned 15 unused tickets but Morning Star only refunded 6 tickets and
refused to refused to refund the remaining 9 ticekets. V-Gent filed a money claim.

In its answer, Morning Star argued that countered that tickets were bought on “buy one,
take one" promo. V-Gent was not entitled to a refund because the tickets were bought on the airline
company's "buy one, take one" promo. Hence, only 7 out of 15 tickets were refundable. Morning
Star also questioned V-Gent's personality to file the suit asserting that the passengers, in whose
names the tickets were issued, are the real parties-in-interest.

V-Gent, on the other hand, argued that the purchase order and receipt of payments were
under its name, and since it was them who purchased these plane tickets on behalf of the
passengers, the respondent voluntarily refunded to the former the value of six (6) unused return
tickets.

ISSUE: W/N V-Gent is a real party-in-interest with legal standing to institute the complaint?

RULING:

NO. Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest
- the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.8 In suits where an
agent represents a party, the principal is the real party-in-interest; an agent cannot file a suit in his
own name on behalf of the principal. However, an agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name
and without joining the principal when the following elements concur: (1) the agent acted in his
own name during the transaction; (2) the agent acted for the benefit of an undisclosed principal;
and (3) the transaction did not involve the property of the principal.

V-Gent purchased the plane tickets on behalf of the passengers acting as latter’s agent. In
the present case, only the · first element is present; the purchase order and the receipt were in the
name of V-Gent. However, the remaining elements are absent because: (1) V-Gent disclosed the
names of the passengers to Morning Star - in fact the tickets were in their names; and (2) the
transaction was paid using the passengers' money. Therefore, Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court cannot apply.