Philconsa vs.

GPH
Facts:
Petitioners Philippine Constitution Association (Philconsa) contend that the provisions of
the CAB and the FAB violate the Constitution and existing laws. They argue that the conduct of
the peace process was defective since the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)
Peace Panel negotiated only with the MILF and not with the other rebel groups. Hence,
respondents violated Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 in giving unwarranted
advantages to the MILF. Petitioners further argue that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion when they “committed to cause the amendment of the Constitution and existing laws to
conform to the FAB and CAB.”

Ruling
The issue is not ripe for adjudication due to non-enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law
 For a cause to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had then
been accomplished or performed by either branch of government before a court may
interfere, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury
to himself as a result of the challenged action. Petitioner must show that he has sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of.
Congress may or may not accept the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law as it is worded. There is
therefore no guarantee that Congress will enact the Bangsamoro Basic Law. Congress has the sole
discretion whether or not to pass the Bangsamoro Basic Law, as proposed by the Bangsamoro
Transition Commission
 It is not the CAB or the FAB that will establish the Bangsamoro but the Bangsamoro Basic
Law enacted by Congress and ratified in plebiscite in according with the Constitution.
The power of judicial review comes into play only after the passage of a bill, and not before.
Unless enacted into law, any proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law pending in Congress is not
subject for judicial review.
Clearly, the question on the constitutionality of the CAB and the FAB, without the implementing
Bangsamoro Basic Law, is premature and not ripe for adjudication. Until a Bangsamoro Basic
Law is passed by Congress, it is clear that there is no actual case or controversy that requires the
Court to exercise its power of judicial review over a co-equal branch of government.
DOF vs. Dela Cruz

Issue:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed by respondents
Ruling:
The CSC has jurisdiction over all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters. The CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. The rule
is that disciplinary cases and cases involving personnel actions, including “appointment through
certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion,
and separation,” are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC. This rule is embodied in Section
1, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other
Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules).

Department of Foreign Affairs vs. BCA International Corporation (Deliberative Process

Privilege)
Facts:
The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) awarded the Machine-Readable Passport and
Visa Project (MRP/V Project) to BCA International Corporation (BCA), a domestic corporation.
During the implementation of the MRP/V Project, DFA sought to terminate the Build-Operate-
Transfer Agreement (BOT Agreement). However, BCA opposed the termination and filed a
Request for Arbitration.
The ad hoc arbitral tribunal approved BCA’s request to apply in court for the issuance of
subpoena. BCA filed before the RTC a Petition for Assistance in Taking Evidence pursuant to the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 (RA
9285). BCA sought the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum for
particular witnesses and documents in relation to the MRP/V Project.
DFA alleged that the presentation of the witnesses and documents was prohibited by law
and protected by the deliberative process privilege.
The RTC ruled in favor of BCA. The court cited Chavez v. Public Estates Authority which
held that acts, transactions or decisions are privileged only before a definite proposition is reached
by the agency and since DFA already made a definite proposition and entered into a contract,
DFA’s acts, transactions or decisions were no longer privileged.
The RTC issued the subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum. DFA filed a
motion to quash the subpoenas. The RTC denied the motion and held that the same was actually a
motion for reconsideration, which is prohibited under Rule 9.9 of the Special Rules of Court on
Alternative Dispute Resolution (Special ADR Rules). The RTC also ruled that the motion became
moot with the appearance of the witnesses during the arbitration hearings.
Hence, DFA filed this petition with an urgent prayer for preliminary injunction.
Ruling:

Deliberative Process Privilege

Deliberative process privilege is one kind of privileged information, which is within
the exceptions of the constitutional right to information.
Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, there is nothing in our Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
ruling which states that once a “definite proposition” is reached by an agency, the privileged
character of a document no longer exists. On the other hand, we hold that before a “definite
proposition” is reached by an agency, there are no “official acts, transactions, or decisions” yet
which can be accessed by the public under the right to information. Only when there is an official
recommendation can a “definite proposition” arise and, accordingly, the public’s right to
information attaches. However, this right to information has certain limitation and does not cover
privileged information to protect the independence of decision-making by the government.
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority expressly mandates that “privilege information” should
be outside the scope of the constitutional right to information, just like military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. In these exceptional cases,
even the occurrence of a “definite proposition” will not give rise to the public’s right to
information.
The privilege character of the information does not end when an agency has adopted a
definite proposition or when a contract has been perfected or consummated; otherwise, the purpose
of the privilege will be defeated.
The deliberative process privilege applies if its purpose is served, that is, “to protect
the frank exchange of ideas and opinions critical to the government’s decision [-] making
process where disclosure would discourage such discussion in the future.” In Gwich ‘in
Steering Comm. v. Office of the Governor, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that communications
have not lost the privilege even when the decision that the documents preceded is finally made.
The Supreme Court of Alaska held that “the question is not whether the decision has been
implemented, or whether sufficient time has passed, but whether disclosure of these preliminary
proposals could harm the agency’s future decision [-] making by chilling either the submission of
such proposals or their forthright consideration.”
Traditionally, U.S. courts have established two fundamental requirements, both of which
must be met, for the deliberative process privilege to be invoked. First, the communication
must be predecisional, i.e., “antecedent to the adoption of an agency policy.” Second, the
communication must be deliberative, i.e., “a direct part of the deliberative process in that it
makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters.” It must reflect
the “give-and-take of the consultative process.”

The deliberative process privilege can be invoked in arbitration proceedings under RA 9285
 Under RA 9285, orders of an arbitral tribunal are appealable to the courts. If an official is
compelled to testify before an arbitral tribunal and the order of an arbitral tribunal is appealed to
the courts, such official can be inhibited by fear of later being subject to public criticism,
preventing such official from making candid discussions within his or her agency. The decision of
the court is widely published, including details involving the privileged information. This
disclosure of privileged information can inhibit a public official from expressing his or her candid
opinion. Future quality of deliberative process can be impaired by undue exposure of the decision-
making process of public scrutiny after the court decision is made. Accordingly, a proceeding in
the arbitral tribunal does not prevent the possibility of the purpose of the privilege being defeated,
if it is not allowed to be invoked.

The BOT Agreement does not provide for the waiver of the deliberative process privilege by
DFA
DFA did not waive the privilege in arbitration proceedings under the Agreement. Section
20.02 of the Agreement merely allows, with the consent of the other party, disclosure by a party
to a court arbitrator or administrative tribunal of the contents of the “Amended BOT Agreement
or any information relating to the negotiations concerning the operations, contracts, commercial
or financial arrangements or affairs of the other parties hereto.” There is no express waiver of
information forming part of DFA’s predecisional deliberative or decision-making process. Section
20.02 does not state that a party to the arbitration is compelled to disclose to the tribunal privileged
information in such party’s possession.
On the other hand, Section 20.03 merely allows a party, if it chooses, without the consent
of the other party, to disclose to the tribunal privileged information. Section 20.03 merely states
that “the restrictions imposed in Section 20.02,” referring to the “consent of the other party,” shall
not apply to a disclosure of privileged information by a party in possession of a privileged
information. This is completely different from compelling a party to disclose privileged
information in its possession against its own will.
Rights cannot be waived if it is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. There is a public policy
involved in a claim of deliberative process privilege – “the policy of open, frank discussion
between subordinates and chief concerning administrative action.” Thus, the deliberative process
privilege cannot be waived. The deliberative process privilege is closely related to the
presidential communications privilege and protects the public disclosure of information that
can compromise the quality of agency decisions.

Remand to RTC to determine if evidence sought to be produced is covered by the deliberative

process privilege
As a qualified privilege, the burden falls upon the government agency asserting the
deliberative process privilege to prove that the information in question satisfies both requirements
– predecisional and deliberative. The agency bears the burden of establishing the character of the
decision, the deliberative process involved, and the role played by the documents in the course of
that process. It may be overcome upon a showing that the discoverant’s interests in disclosure of
the materials outweigh the government’s interests in their confidentiality. “The determination of
need must be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis,” and the “factors relevant to this
balancing include: the relevance of the evidence, whether there is reason to believe the documents
may shed light on government misconduct, whether the information sought is available from other
sources and can be obtained without compromising the government’s deliberative processes, and
the importance of the material to the discoverant’s case.”
In the present case, considering that the RTC erred in applying the ruling in Chavez v.
Public Estates Authority, and both BCA’s and DFA’s assertions of subpoena of evidence and the
deliberative process privilege are broad and lack specificity, we will not be able to determine
whether the evidence sought to be produced is covered by the deliberative process privilege. It is
necessary to consider the circumstances surrounding the demand for the evidence to determine
whether or not its production is injurious to the consultative functions of government that the
privilege of non-disclosure protects.

Maquiling vs. COMELEC

Ruling:

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. However, this
legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the
foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a
foreign citizenship.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath. It requires absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divest of all civil and political rights
granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is
nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino
citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
The Court agreed with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using foreign passport
does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado
represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. Such reversion to dual
citizenship status effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Dual Citizenship (by naturalization)

Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired
through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual
citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere
filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship.
Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship
in order to qualify as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on November 30, 2009, Arnado was a dual
citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified
to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code,
he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified
not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010
elections.

Citizenship Requirement for Elective Public Office

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any
act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right to suffrage, those
who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship
to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to
the Republic and to no other. The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual
citizens from running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person
who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a
foreign citizen, to hold any public office.