David v.

Arroyo
GR No. 171396; May 3, 2006

FACTS:
President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case covers the seven consolidated
petitions for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of PP1017 and General Order No. 5 implementing the former. it
is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion and that
respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions are
actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional

HELD:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees.
legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI categorically states that
“the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives”. To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and,
therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to “laws”, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain
laws such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts, and the
like. She can only order the military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertaining to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.

COLUMBIA PICTURES V CA

FACTS:
A search warrant was issued pursuant to information received that private respondent violated Presidential
Decree No. 49 (Protection of Intellectual Property). The trial court granted private petitioner’ motion to
quash said search warrant for being a general warrant, applying the 20th Century Fox decision. The
quashal was affirmed by the respondent Court.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the 20th Century Fox decision is applicable to the motion to quash the search warrant.

RULING:
NO. The 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the quashal of
the search warrant. Judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally
passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view
is adopted, and more so there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and
should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.

PEOPLE vs. LIBNAO | G.R. No. 136860 | Jan 20, 2003

PUNO, J.:

FACTS: This is a case finding appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga guilty of violating Art. II,
Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
The intelligence operatives of the PNP stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on
suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a
companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks.
On Oct. 20, 1996, at about 1AM, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female
passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the herein appellant and her co-accused. In front of them was a
black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the
officers invited them to Kabayan Center No.2. Upon reaching the center, P03 Ferrer fetched Brgy. Captain Pascual to
witness the opening of the black bag. As soon as the brgy. Captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence
of the appellant, her co-accused and personnel of the center. Found inside were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic
bags and covered with newspaper.

The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Lab in Pampanga. Forensic Chemist Babu conducted a lab
exam on them and concluded that the articles were marijuana. For their part, both accused denied the accusation
against them.

Libnao argued that her arrest was unlawful, capitalizes on the absence of a warrant for her arrest. She also takes the
issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when police officers interrogated her. She claimed that she was
not duly informed of her right to remain silent and to have competent counsel of her choice. Hence, she argues that the
confession or admission obtained therein should be considered inadmissible in evidence against her.

ISSUE: Whether both the accused can be convicted based on the prosecutions evidence.

HELD: YES. The above contentions deserve scant attention. The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft
of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for 3 months
in the area. The surveillance yielded information that once a month, appellant and her co-accused Nunga transport
drugs in big bulks. It is also clear that at the time Libnao was apprehended, she was committing offense. She was
making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the ROC,
one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is
caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto.
Appellant also faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object and documentary evidence of
the prosecution despite the latter’s failure to formally offer them. She argues that absent any formal offer, they must be
deemed inadmissible.

The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they have been
properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case.
All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly identified, presented and marked as exhibits in
court, including the bricks of marijuana. Even without their formal offer; therefore, the prosecution can still establish
the case because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded. Furthermore,
appellant’s counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits.

Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants defense of denial and alibi cannot
stand. The defense of denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be
concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
It has to be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.

The appeal is DENIED.

Rizal Alih et. al., vs Castro

Facts:
A group of more than 200 Philippine marines and home defense forces raided the compound occupied by
the petitioners (Rizal Alih et. al.) is search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. The people
inside the compound resisted the invasion and a crossfire between the Philippine marines and the
petitioner occurred, resulting in number of casualties. The petitioners surrendered the next morning and 16
occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection.
The military also inventoried and confiscated several M16 rifles, M14 rifle, rifle grenades and rounds of
ammunition.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order.
Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence
against them, and to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing being violative of
their right against self-incrimination. Petitioner argued that the arms and ammunition were taken without a
search warrant as required by law under Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution, and it be declared inadmissible in
relation to Sec 4 (2) of the 1973 Constitution.

Respondent justified their act on the ground that they were acting under superior orders and that the
measures was necessary due to the aggravation of peace and order problem in their place.

Issue:
Whether or not the confiscated items shall be considered admissible.

Whether or not the finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-test is protected by the constitutional right
against self-incrimination.

Ruling:
No, superior orders cannot countermand the Constitution. There is no excuse for the constitutional
shortcuts done by the military. Also, the aggravation of peace and order problem in their place does not
excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure (Art
III Sec. 2, 1973 Philippine Constitution).

The arrest does not fall also under the warrantless arrest provided for by Rule 113 Sec. 5 of the Rules of
Court. Therefore, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in
evidence in any proceedings against petitioners.

With respect to the finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing, the acts are not covered by the
protection against self-incrimination, for it only applies to testimonial compulsion.

People vs. Aminnudin G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988 163 SCRA 402 (1988)

Facts: Accused was arrested shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 The PC officers who were
in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana
leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated
from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana
leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. However, and it is
Aminnudin’s claim that he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly
found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights.
Issue: Whether the accused was caught in flagrante delicto hence justifies the warrantless arrest

Held: No, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had
just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under the Rules of Court. The present case
presented no such urgency. It is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained
a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was
known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of
a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own
authority that a “search warrant was not necessary.” In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just
done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana
that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his
arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a
judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. While this is not to
say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying, that fact
alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and
he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict
him.

People vs. Tudtud

GR 144037 September 23, 2003

FACTS: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report
from a “civilian asset” named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud.
Solier related that his neighbours have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the
proliferation of marijuana in their area. Relating to the report, the police conducted surveillance in Solier’s
neighbourhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered information and leared that Tudtud was involved
in illegal drugs. According to his neighbours, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana.

Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of
marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as big bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At around 4:00 pm that same day,
a team of policemen posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await. Tudtud’s arrival. All
wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 pm, 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton marked
“King Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men
fit Tudtud’s description. The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the
suspects and identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received
information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtud’s description
denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud then said “it
was alright” and let them see the box which contained bundles of dried fish, one wrapped in a plastic bag and another
in newspapers. When the bundles were unwrapped, there contained marijuana leaves.

The police arrested Tudtud and his comapanion. They were charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs before
the RTC of Davao City which convicted the accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tudtud’s implied acquiescence (Tudtud’s statement of “it’s alright”) is considered a waiver.
RULING: NO. The right against unreasonable searched and seizures is secured by Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Constitution.
Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under
coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. Consequently,appellants lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to
a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.
As the search of appellant’s box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the
marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay
testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of appellants cannot be sustained.

Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures if the following requisites are
present:

1. It must appear that the rights exist;

2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers
introduced themselves as such and requested appellant that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly
containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself.

Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a person failed to object to a search
does not amount to permission thereto.

Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED. Appellants Noel Tudtud y Paypa and Dindo
Bolong y Naret are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

VICENTE P. LADLAD vs. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO

G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 172074-76 & 175013 June 1, 2007

FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin petitioners'
prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and prosecution of petitioners' cases.

Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24
February 2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency," police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on 25
February 2006, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon City.
An inquest was held and Beltran was later charged with rebellion before the RTC. Beltran moved for a
judicial determination of probable cause. The trial court affirmed the existence of probable cause.

ISSUE: Is there probable cause to charge Beltran with rebellion?

HELD: No. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed —

By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance
to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any
body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

The elements of the offense are:

1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either —

(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:

(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or

(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or

(a) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or

partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in
furtherance of a political end. The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of
Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents. The bulk of the documents consists
of affidavits, some of which were sworn before a notary public, executed by members of the military and
some civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel Escala (Escala), dated 20 February
2006, and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006, none of the affidavits mentions Beltran. In
his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran and other
individuals on board a vehicle which entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and that
after the passengers alighted, they were met by another individual. For his part, Cachuela stated that he
was a former member of the CPP and that (1) he attended the CPP's "10th Plenum" in 1992 where he saw
Beltran; (2) he took part in criminal activities; and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used were
purchased partly from contributions by Congressional members, like Beltran, who represent party-list
groups affiliated with the CPP.

The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an armed
public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was in Bucal,
Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he was present during the 1992
CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining,
or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged
that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran's alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not
automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.

In his Comment to Beltran's petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes' affidavit, dated 25 February
2006, as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided details in his
statement regarding meetings with Beltran and the other petitioners attended in 2005 and 2006 in which
plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were allegedly discussed, among others. However,
what the allegations in Fuentes' affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion,
punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in
meetings to discuss, among others, plans to bring down a government is a mere preparatory step to
commit the acts constituting Rebellion under Article 134. Even the prosecution acknowledged this, since
the felony charged in the Information against Beltran in the criminal case is Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion and not Rebellion. The Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and others conspired
to form a "tactical alliance" to commit Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found
probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the evidence before it.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELLY SARAP y ARCANGELES and ROGER
AMAR y MATEO, accused.
MELLY SARAP y ARCANGELES, accused-appellant.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 7, finding
accused-appellant Melly Sarap yArcangeles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing her to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.
The Information charged accused-appellant of sale of prohibited drugs, committed as follows:

That on or about the 4th day of March, 1996, in the afternoon, in Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Banga, Province
of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and helping each other, without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver, distribute and transport prohibited drugs consisting of nine hundred (900) grams of Marijuana
leaves, otherwise known as Indian Hemp to the intended buyers Joysie R. Duran, Jonalyn R. Duran and Pepe
Casabuena, who were apprehended two (2) days ago by the police authorities, said prohibited drugs were confiscated
from the possession and control of the accused.[2]

Upon arraignment on March 25, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.[3] Trial on the merits
thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses. Their testimonies can be synthesized into the following
narration of events:
Armed with a search warrant,[4] SPO4 Gelacio R. Guarino, Chief of Police of Banga, Aklan together
with PO2 Jhanny Navida, raided the house of Conrado Ricaforte at Rizal Street, Poblacion, Banga, Aklan
on March 2, 1996, relative to the reported sale of marijuana by its occupants, Jonalyn Duran, Joysie Duran
and Pepe Casabuena. The three were apprehended for illegal possession of marijuana and were detained
at the Banga Police Station.[5] In the course of their investigation, the police learned that a
certain Melly from Capiz and one Rogerwere the suppliers of marijuana and that they will be back on March
4, 1996.
On March 4, 1996, Janet Iguiz,[6] caretaker of the house of Conrado Ricaforte informed Guarino that
there were two strangers looking for the Duran sisters.
Accordingly, Guarino and Navida recorded the report in the police blotter[7] and proceeded to the house
of Conrado Ricaforte, which is more or less three hundred meters away from the police station. When they
arrived there, Guarino saw a woman, who turned out to be accused-appellant Melly Sarap, walking in the
alley near the house. Accused-appellant saw Guarino and Navida in police uniform and immediately threw
away her black canvass bag, which her companion Roger Amar picked up. Guarino blocked Saraps path
and grabbed from her the green plastic bag she was holding. Upon inspection, the plastic bag was found to
contain two blocks of marijuana fruiting tops.[8]
In the meantime, Navida pursued Amar and arrested him.[9]
The marijuana confiscated from Sarap was brought to the Iloilo Headquarters for laboratory
examination.[10] The chemical analysis conducted by forensic chemist Angela Baldevieso revealed that the
substance was indeed marijuana or Indian hemp and weighed approximately 900 grams as per Physical
Science Report No. D-01296.[11] Consequently, the above-quoted information was filed against Sarap and
Amar.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, denied the accusation against her. She narrated that she
delivered dried fish to her sister, Susanne Ricablanca, after which she went to the comfort room of the
dress shop fronting Banga Public Market to relieve herself. On her way to the dress shop, she met Amar
and entrusted to him her black bag. Thereafter, a woman approached and told her that there were
policemen waiting for her outside. The policemen forced her to board a jeep and brought her to the office of
Chief of Police Guarino at the municipal hall. Guarino poked a gun at her and pulled her hair. He also
asked her to remove her pants and shirt. A certain PO3 Pedro Jerry Icay asked her to remove her bra and
when she refused, he pulled her bra because he was looking for marijuana on accused-appellants person.
Sarap asserted that the policemen did not get any marijuana from her.
Accused-appellants testimony was corroborated by her co-accused Roger Amar, her sister Susanne
Ricablanca and Leandro Braca, a pedicab driver.
On October 2, 1997, the trial court rendered the appealed decision. The dispositive portion of which
states:

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, accused Roger Amar is hereby ACQUITTED. The Court finds
accused Melly Sarap GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, as
amended and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to a fine of P500,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Considering that accused Melly Sarap is a detention prisoner, she shall
be credited of her sentence with the full time during which she has undergone preventive imprisonment having agreed
in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.

The two (2) blocks of dried marijuana fruiting tops are hereby confiscated in favor of the government. The Court
orders the immediate release of Roger Amar from detention unless there are other lawful reasons for his continued
confinement.

SO ORDERED.[12]
 Hence, this appeal with the accused-appellant raising the following assignment of errors:
I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND
ARREST ILLEGAL;
II. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING FAVORABLY THE DEFENSE OF
ALIBI AS A GROUND FOR THE ACQUITTAL OF THE HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT
INSPITE OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE WHICH IS
INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HER FAVOR;
III. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING AS A GROUND FOR THE
ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HER DEFENSE THAT THE TRANSPARENT
PLASTIC BAGS WAS NOT POSSESSED NOR OWNED BY HER, DESPITE POSITIVE AND
CONVINCING PROOF ADJ[U]CED IN SUPPORT THEREOF;
IV. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE HEREIN ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.[13]
A search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a warrant validly issued by a
judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. [14] Articles which are the product of
unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence, pursuant to Article III, Section 3 (2) of
the Constitution.[15] Warrantless searches and seizures may be made without a warrant in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) search of a moving motor vehicle, (3) search in violation
of custom laws, (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view, (5) when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures,[16] (6) stop and frisk[17] and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances.[18] These instances, however do not dispense with the requisite of probable cause before a
warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. In warrantless search cases, probable cause
must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is
about to be committed.[19]
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court held that: (1) the police officers are presumed to have
regularly performed their duties, in the absence of proof of ill or improper motive on their part to falsely
impute a serious crime against Sarap; and (2) the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses have
more weight compared to Saraps negative testimony. It also relied heavily on the testimonies of Chief of
Police Guarino that in view of the urgency of the case, they proceeded immediately to the house of
Conrado Ricaforte to pursue Sarap and Amar. It concluded that the warrantless arrest was lawful
considering that Sarap had committed or was actually committing a crime when arrested. It ruled that the
search incident to the said arrest is sanctioned under the Rules[20] and evidence obtained therefrom is
admissible.
We are not convinced. The Banga Police Officers were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest.
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it. xxx

In the instant case, Sarap cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit
one nor had she just committed a crime. She was merely walking in the alley near the house of Conrado
Ricaforte. It was only when Janet Iguiz led Sarap downstairs and identified her as Melly that she was
singled out as the suspect. Guarino would not have apprehended Sarap were it not for Janet Iguizs
identification. Moreover, the evidence on record clearly illustrated that it was only after Janet Iguiz pointed
to Sarap as Melly that Guarino suspected that the bag she was holding contained marijuana.
The Banga Police could have secured a search warrant when Jonalyn Duran disclosed during the
investigation that a certain Melly of Capiz and one Roger would be back on March 4, 1996. The persons
intended to be searched had been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also
sufficiently ascertained to be March 4, 1996, although it was uncertain whether Melly would arrive. Melly
turned out to be accused-appellant[21] and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The above particulars
would have provided sufficient grounds to secure a search warrant, instead, the police only acted when the
caretaker of the house of Conrado Ricaforte informed them that there were strangers looking for Jonalyn
and Joysie Duran. Hence, they cannot now dispense with the requirement of a search warrant on the basis
of urgency in effecting it, considering that they had twenty-four hours to do so. The apprehending officers
had prior knowledge of Saraps alleged activities. Verily, there was no excuse for the Banga Police not to
secure a search warrant.
Hence, the Banga Police could not effect a warrantless search and seizure since there was no
probable cause and Sarap was not lawfully arrested. The law requires that the search must be incidental to
a lawful arrest in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal.
It is true that we adhere to the time honored-doctrine that the trial courts assessment of credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is accorded great weight and may even be deemed conclusive and binding
on the appellate court.[22] In innumerable instances, however, we interfered with the judgment of the trial
court when there appeared facts or circumstances of weight and influence which the trial court may have
overlooked and, if taken into consideration, could have a significant effect on the outcome of the case.[23]
Contrary to the finding of the trial court, the instant case did not come within the purview of the plain
view doctrine. In order for the doctrine to apply, the following conditions must be present: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.[24]
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest, the search of Saraps bag was
also not justified as seizure of evidence in plain view under the fourth exception. The marijuana fruiting tops
contained in the green plastic bag carried by Sarap were not clearly visible. Chief of Police Guarino,
testified, thus:
Q So that when you saw Melly Sarap, she was just doing nothing in the alley?
A She was walking, about to approach me.
Q So that, when you saw her approaching you, you grabbed her bag?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why did you do that?
A Because I suspected that transparent plastic bag has a marijuana.
Q You were not certain that the woman you were able to apprehend was Melly Sarap?
A I did not know that it was she.
Q And you are not certain that the content of the bag was marijuana?
A I suspected that there was marijuana and shabu inside the bag, I found out that there was tawas
and other personal belongings.
Q So your answer to my question is no. You are not certain?
A I am not certain.[25]
The above testimony negates the conclusion of the trial court that the marijuana fruiting tops were
inadvertently discovered. More importantly, the marijuana fruiting tops were also not apparent and in plain
view as shown by the fact that Chief of Police Guarino still had to grab Saraps bag to ascertain its contents.
Without the illegally seized prohibited drug, the appellants conviction cannot stand. There is simply no
sufficient evidence to convict her.That the search disclosed marijuana fruiting tops in appellants
possession, and thus confirmed the police officers initial information and suspicion, did not cure its patent
illegality. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the
evidence yielded by the search for being a fruit of a poisonous tree.
All told, the guilt of the accused-appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt measured by the
required moral certainty of conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to
overcome the presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would be better to set free
ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he
did not commit.[26] Moreover, as Justice Holmes declared: I think it is a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.[27]
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan,
Branch 7, finding accused-appellant Melly Sarap y Arcangeles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Melly Sarap y Arcangeles is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. The
Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women is directed to cause the immediate release of
accused-appellant unless lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of the date of her
release, or the ground for her continued confinement, within ten days from notice.