Cases For Second Meeting

G.R. No. 86939. August 2, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

SANTOS DUCAY and EDGARDO DUCAY,
accused. SANTOS DUCAY, accused-
appellant.
Evidence; Latin Maxims; Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus not a mandatory rule.—Nor can we
subscribe to the proposition that since the trial court did not give credit to Edwin and Lina’s
testimonies that they positively identified Edgardo, it should, pursuant to the maxim “falsus in
uno, falsus in omnibus” likewise disregard their testimonies as against the appellant and
accordingly acquit him. In People vs. Dasig, this Court stated that the maxim is not a mandatory
rule of evidence, but rather a permissible inference that the court may or may not draw. In
People vs. Pacada, we stated that the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts and
disbelieved as to others. And in People vs. Osias, we ruled that: “It is perfectly reasonable to
believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to
other facts. And it has been aptly said that even when witnesses are found to have deliberately
falsified in some material particulars, it is not required that the whole of their uncorroborated
testimony be rejected but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited. The
primordial consideration is that
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Ducay
the witness was present at the scene of the crime and that he positively identified [the accused] as
one of the perpetrators of the crime charged xxx.” Professor Wigmore gives the following
enlightening commentary: “It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself worthless;—
first, in point of validity, because in one form it merely contains in loose fashion a kernel of truth
which no one needs to be told, and in the others it is absolutely false as a maxim of life; and
secondly, in point of utility, because it merely tells the jury what they may do in any event, not
what they must do or must not do, and therefore it is a superfluous form of words. It is also in
practice pernicious, first, because there is frequently a misunderstanding of its proper force, and
secondly, because it has become in the hands of many counsel a mere instrument for obtaining
new trials upon points wholly unimportant in themselves.”
Same; “Suppression of evidence” not applicable where evidence is available to both prosecution
and defense.—The defense imputes suppression of evidence upon the prosecution in not
presenting Erwin Labos as its witness. It is settled that suppression of evidence is inapplicable in
a case where the evidence is at the disposal of both the prosecution and the defense. Besides, the
prosecution had no cogent reason for presenting Erwin since there is no showing that he was in
the house when the incident occurred. On the other hand, the defense needed his testimony for if,
indeed, he should affirm his supplemental statement, he may somehow enhance the theory of the
defense.
Same; Res Gestae as exception to hearsay rule; Must refer to incident in question, not to prior
statement.—We do not likewise agree with the appellant that Erwin’s alleged statement to
Edgardo Ducay: “Kuya pasensiya ka na, naturo kita noon una, hindi naman ikaw,” uttered
immediately after he made his supplemental statement, is a part of the res gestae and thus an
exception to the hearsay rule. The rule on spontaneous statements as part of the res gestae is
stated in Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: statements made by a person while a
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. x x x.” There are three
requisites for the admission of spontaneous statements as evidence of the res gestae: 1) that the
principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; 2) that the statements were made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The rationale for the
exception lies in the fact that a statement made under the stress of an exciting event or condition
tends to ensure that the statement is spontaneous and, therefore, trustworthy; and the likely
VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 3

People vs. Ducay
proximity in time between the event or condition and the statement minimizes the possibility of a
memory problem. Erwin’s alleged statement to Edgardo Ducay does not refer to the incident in
question but rather to his prior statement (not the supplemental statement) implicating Edgardo
Ducay. Furthermore, the alleged “contemporaneous” statement was made two days after the
shooting incident. In no way can it be said that Erwin was under the stress of an exciting event or
condition.
Criminal Procedure; Motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence; Result of
paraffin test not newly discovered evidence; Negative findings not conclusive that appellant did
not fire gun.—In his second assigned error, the appellant faults the trial court for denying his
motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence consisting of Chemistry Report
No. 0-1630-86 of the PC Crime Laboratory Service, the result of the paraffin test conducted on
Santos Ducay on 13 October 1986 or the day after the incident in question, which allegedly
shows that “both hands of the [appellant] gave NEGATIVE result to the test for gunpowder
residue (nitrates).” One of the grounds for a new trial mentioned in Section 2, Rule 121 of the
Rules of Court is the discovery of new and material evidence. The requisites therefor which must
concur are: (1) that the evidence was discovered after the trial; (2) that such evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
and (3) that such evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and
is of such weight that, if admitted, it will probably change the judgment. In the present case, the
appellant was subjected to a paraffin test the day after the crime was committed. Certainly, he
knew that the findings of such test would be forthcoming. He should have asked for the result of
the test to find out if it is exculpatory, in which case he could have presented it during the
hearing of his application for bail or, at the latest, during the trial on the merits. In any event, the
chemistry report cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence since it was already existing
even before the trial commenced and could have been easily produced in court by compulsory
process. The appellant either did not exercise reasonable diligence for its production or simply
forgot about it. Forgotten evidence is, of course, not a ground for a new trial. Moreover, the
result of the paraffin test conducted on the appellant is not conclusive evidence that he did not
fire a gun. It is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet be negative for the presence of nitrates,
as when he wore gloves or washed his hands afterwards. The trial court, therefore, correctly
denied the motion for new trial.

People vs. Ducay
Criminal Law; Complex Crimes; No complex crime of double murder and multiple frustrated
murder where victims died from several shots; Information; Multiplicity of charges; Failure to
object constitutes waiver of defect.—The trial court correctly ruled that there was no complex
crime “considering that the trigger of the gun used in committing the acts complained of was
pressed in several instances and not in one single act.” It is settled that when various victims
expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. However, the trial
court erred when it ruled that “(i)t cannot, however, impose the corresponding penalty for the
crime committed against each victim because the information to which the accused pleaded is
only one crime of double murder and multiple frustrated murder.” The information in this case,
although denominated as one for a complex crime, clearly charges the accused with five different
criminal acts. It states “the above-named accused, with intent to kill Pacita Labos, Manuel Labos,
Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos, and Ma. Cristina Labos, x x x did then and there x x x attack,
assault and shoot with a 45 caliber [pistol] and shotgun they were then provided the said Pacita
Labos, Manuel Labos, Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Ma. Cristina Labos, x x x.” The
appellant and his co-accused did not move to quash the information on the ground of multiplicity
of charges. At no other time thereafter did they object thereto. They therefore waived such defect
and the trial court thus validly rendered judgment against them for as many crimes as were
alleged and proven.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Valmonte Law Office for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Santos Ducay and Edgardo Ducay, father and son, were charged with the complex crime of
double murder and multiple frustrated murder in an Information1 filed on 16 October 1986 with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, allegedly committed as follows:
_______________
1
Original Records (OR), 1-2.
VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 5

People vs. Ducay
“that on or about the 12th day of October, 1986, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill Pacita Labos, Manuel Labos, Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and
Ma. Cristina Labos, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of
superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and shoot with a .45 caliber [pistol] and shotgun
they were then provided the said Pacita Labos, Manuel Labos, Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos
and Maria Cristina Labos, hitting them on their body, thereby causing them serious physical
injuries which directly caused the death of Pacita Labos and Manuel Labos; thereby, also, with
respect to Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Maria Cristina Labos performing all the acts of
execution which ordinarily would have produced the crime of murder but which nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of a cause independent of their will, that is, the timely and able medical
attendance rendered to said Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Maria Cristina Labos which
prevented their death.”
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7792-V-6 before Branch 172 of said court. Upon
arraignment, both accused entered a plea not guilty.2 In due course, the trial on the merits
proceeded.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Edwin Labos, Lina Labos, Sgt. Ponciano
Casile, Dr. Rodolfo Lizondra, Dr. Tahil Mindalano and Dr. Leo Arthur Camagay.3 On the other
hand, the witnesses presented by the defense were accused Santos Ducay and Edgardo Ducay,
Ruben Ampuan, Mario Abad and Cristino Mariano.
Prosecution witness Lina Labos testified that at about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 October
1986, she was sleeping in the sala at the second floor of the house together with her husband,
Manuel Labos, and their six-month old daughter, Ma. Cristina Labos, when she was awakened
by the pounding of the door on
_______________
2
TSN, 24 November 1986, 2.
3
Lina Labos, Edwin Labos, Sgt. Casile and Dr. Lizondra were presented during the hearing on
the application for bail. Their testimonies were considered reproduced for the trial on the merits.
Edwin Labos was recalled as a rebuttal witness.

People vs. Ducay
the first floor leading to the sala. Moments later, Santos Ducay and his son, Edgardo Ducay,
appeared in the sala. Santos was carrying a long firearm while Edgardo held a caliber .45 pistol.
The two started firing at Manuel, who was already standing albeit half asleep. Then they shot her
mother-in-law, Pacita Labos. Both Manuel and Pacita were killed. The accused also shot her,
Ma. Cristina, and Edwin Labos, her brother-in-law, who was then coming out of the bedroom.
She was hit in the stomach and gall bladder while Ma. Cristina was hit in the right leg, left thigh
and abdomen. The accused then turned their backs and one of them uttered “Ubos ang lahi.” She
was able to identify the two accused, who are her former neighbors, because of the fluorescent
light in the sala. After the accused had left, the police came and brought the wounded to the Jose
Reyes Memorial Medical Center.4
Edwin Labos testified that on 24 December 1985 his brother Manuel Labos and Santos Ducay
quarreled and stabbed each other; however, Santos Ducay did not file any charges against
Manuel who gave the former P200.00 for medical expenses.5 He also corroborated the testimony
of his sister-in-law. He heard the banging of the door and several gunshots, then he went out of
his room and saw his brother Manuel already sprawled dead on the floor. He saw both accused
shoot his sister-in-law and his niece.6 Edgardo then fired at him, hitting him in the right thigh,
while Santos shot his mother.7 He was later treated at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center
where he spent P13,299.53 (Exhibits “Q” to “Q-165”). They paid P13,200.00 to Popular
Memorial Chapels and P9,060.00 to Holy Cross Memorial Chapel for the interment of his
mother and brother.8
Sgt. Ponciano Casile, a police investigator of the Valenzuela Police Station, testified that he was
ordered to investigate the incident. In the course of his investigation, he learned that the
assailants were Santos Ducay and a yet unidentified man who, upon Lina Ducay’s sworn
statement given two days later, was
_______________
4
TSN, 24 November 1986, 4-9.
5
TSN, 23 January 1987, 5.
6
TSN, 19 December 1986, 6-8.
7
TSN, 23 January 1987, op cit, 3.
8
TSN, 19 August 1987, 5-6.
VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 7

People vs. Ducay
identified as Santos Ducay’s son, Edgardo.9
Dr. Rodolfo Lizondra, Supervising Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), testified on the postmortem examinations he conducted on the cadavers of Pacita and
Manuel Labos, the results of which are embodied in two autopsy reports (Exhibits “K” and
“M”).10 He determined the cause of death of Pacita as “hemorrhage, secondary to shotgun
wounds of the chest, abdomen and left arm,” and that of Manuel as “hemorrhage, secondary to
gunshot wounds of the head and chest.” Dr. Tahil Mindalano testified regarding the injuries
sustained by Lina and Ma. Cristina Labos and the medical assistance rendered to them,11 while
Dr. Arthur Leo Macasiano Camagay testified about the injuries sustained by Edwin Labos.12 Drs.
Mindalano and Camagay declared that without the medical attendance given to Lina, Ma.
Cristina and Edwin Labos, said persons would have died because of the nature of the injuries
sustained by them.13
Per the Medico-Legal Certificates issued, Lina Labos sustained three gunshot wounds on her
“left umbilical,” “left buttocks,” and “lateral D/3rd left thigh.” The point of exit of the last
wound was at the “anterior middle 3rd left thigh,” thereby “penetrating the liver by 1.5 cm. thru
and thru, perforating the duodenum by 1 cm. thru and thru, perforating jejunom by 0.5 cm.
lacerating the pancreas by 2 cm. transecting muscular branch aorta (abdominal)” (Exhibit “A”).
Edwin Labos sustained a gunshot wound at the “middle 3rd anterior surface thigh, right” with no
point of exit resulting in “Gustilo-Anderson type III open fracture comminuted M/3rd femur,
right,” (Exhibit “V”) and Ma. Cristina Labos sustained three gunshot wounds located at “lateral
aspect D/3rd thigh right,” “antero-medial aspect M/3rd thigh, left” and “periumbilcal right”
(Exhibit “B”).
Both accused testified that they were in their house at Area 4, Valenzuela at the time of the
incident in question. At about 6:00 o’clock in the morning, they were roused from their sleep by
a
_______________
9
TSN, 27 February 1987, 11-14.
10
TSN, 18 March 1987, 4-9.
11
TSN, 14 October 1987, 2-5.
12
Id., 7-8.
13
TSN, 14 October 1987, 4; 7.

People vs. Ducay
friend, Martin Gabukan, who informed them that Santos was a suspect in the shooting of the
Labos family.14 Gabukan told Santos not to worry because “many people heard that [the accused]
were really not the one.”15 Santos was arrested on 14 October 1986 in Balagtas, Bulacan16 while
he was looking for a lawyer, while Edgardo was taken into custody by the police while he was
attending to his father in the police headquarters.17
Cristino Mariano, a neighbor of the Ducays, testified that at about 6:00 o’clock in the morning of
12 October 1986, Santos Ducay came and said that he (Santos) was a suspect in the shooting
incident in question.18 The following day, he brought Santos to the Barangay Captain, Pio
Angeles, who entered in the barangay blotter (Exhibit “6”) Santos’ profession of innocence of
the crime he was suspected of. On cross-examination, Cristino stated that the distance between
Area 4, where he and the Ducays are residing, and the house of the Laboses at Area 6 (also
referred to as Area 11) is about one kilometer.19
Ruben Ampuan, a neighbor of the Laboses, testified that at the time of the incident and while he
was still lying down, he heard gunshots. He stood up, opened the window and saw two men
leaving the house of the Laboses. He stated that they were not the accused in this case.20
Mario Abad Allegado testified that he was at the “tambakan” which is about thirty meters from
the scene of the crime when he heard several gunshots. As he headed for home, he met two
persons in front of the lamp post near the house of the Eugenios heading towards Maysan Road.
One of them, a tall, thin fellow, with curly hair and mestizo features, was carrying a firearm,
while the other, whose face he did not see,21 was shorter. He believed that both persons were the
assailants.22 He declared
________________
14
TSN, 10 February 1988, 6; TSN, 29 February 1988, 4.
15
TSN, 29 February 1988, 6.
16
TSN, 29 February 1988, 10-11.
17
TSN, 10 February 1988, 10-12.
18
TSN, 9 November 1987, 5; 10.
19
Id., 4.
20
TSN, 20 November 1987, 6-8.
21
22
VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 9

People vs. Ducay
that they were not the accused whom he knows very well being his former neighbors.23 Upon
reaching home, he heard a commotion from the house of the Laboses. He went inside the
Laboses’ house and saw the wounded family members. He asked Edwin and Lina Labos whether
they recognized their assailants and both answered that they did not.24
Capt. Carlos Tiquia, Chief Investigator of the Valenzuela Police Station, who was presented as
the only defense witness during the hearing for the application for bail and whose testimony was
adopted in the trial on the merits, declared that he proceeded to the crime scene after receiving a
report on the incident from the investigator assigned to the case. When he and the investigator
returned to the office, his investigator took down the statements of the witnesses, one of whom
was Erwin Labos and whose statement was taken down at 4:00 o’clock in the morning of 14
October 1986. However, he believed that Erwin was not telling the truth so that he personally
talked to him, and at 6:00 a.m., Erwin executed a supplemental statement (Exhibit “4”) in the
presence of several people including his brother Renato Labos. This time, Erwin described one
of the alleged assailants as tall, with curly hair and mestizo features. On the basis of such a
description, Tiquia made a request for a cartographic sketch to the PC Crime Laboratory.25
On 29 April 1988, the trial court promulgated its judgment finding Santos Ducay guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged but acquitting Edgardo Ducay on ground of reasonable
doubt.26 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“In view of the foregoing, the Court finds guilty beyond reasonable doubt Santos Ducay of the
complex crime of double murder and multiple frustrated murder as charged.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death is equivalent to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day to death, the minimum being 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years, the
medium being reclusion perpetua and maximum, death.
_______________
23
TSN, 11 December 1987, op cit, 6-7.
24
Id., 5-10.
25
TSN, 3 June 1987, 4-5; 8-9; 12-13.
26
OR, 305-318; Rollo, 30-43. Per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong.
10

People vs. Ducay
The Court could have meted the death sentence on Santos Ducay but is prevented from doing so
by the New Constitution. Santos Ducay is, therefore, hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment
for life, reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty provided by law, and all
the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Pacita Labos in the
sum of P30,000.00 and the heirs of Manuel Labos P30,000.00; to indemnify the victims Edwin
Labos in the sum of P13,299.53 as reimbursement of medical expenses, and the sum of
P4,500.00 as lost earnings for the period from October 12, 1986 to July 1987; to indemnify Lina
Labos and Ma. Cristina Labos in the total sum of P10,000.00 as reimbursement of medical
expenses; and to pay the costs of suit.
The Court finds Edgardo Ducay not guilty of the crime charged on ground of reasonable doubt
and is hereby acquitted. The Jail Warden of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, is hereby ordered to
release Edgardo Ducay from detention unless held for any other lawful cause.”27
In convicting Santos Ducay, the trial court said:
“The Court never doubts the participation of Santos Ducay not only on the basis of the positive
identification made by surviving victims, Lina and Edwin Labos, the motive Santos Ducay had
to avenge the assault done on him by Manuel Labos, but also because his positive identification
sweeps aside altogether his defense—that of alibi—a very weak defense in the light of the
overwhelming evidence against him.
xxx
From the evidence thus adduced the Court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that it was
Santos Ducay who was one of the persons who conspired with another in killing the victims,
Manuel Labos, Pacita Labos, and in trying to kill Lina Labos, Maria Cristina Labos and Edwin
Labos, but was frustrated. The evidence of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and
treachery, were clearly shown by the prosecution when it proved convincingly to the Court that
considering the time of the attack, 5:00 at dawn, evident premeditation is clear especially if the
testimony of Edwin Labos will be considered that months previous to this attack, Santos Ducay
had a quarrel with one of the victims shot to death. There was abuse of superior strength and
treachery because the victims were asleep at the time of the attack and were therefore unprepared
and unarmed for the attack. They had no chance whatsoever to fight back, the six months baby
Ma. Cristina Labos especially.”28
_______________
27
OR, 318; Rollo. 43.
28
OR, 315-317.
11
VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 11

People vs. Ducay
The trial court expressed the view that two murders and three frustrated murders were
committed, or that there are as many crimes as there are victims in this case because “the trigger
of the gun used in committing the acts complained of was pressed in several instances and not in
one single act.” However, it did not impose the corresponding penalties therefor “because the
information to which the accused pleaded is only one crime of double murder and multiple
frustrated murder.”29
On 13 May 1988, Santos Ducay filed a Partial Motion For Reconsideration And/Or New Trial.30
He sought the admission of the alleged result of a paraffin test conducted on him on 13 October
1986, or a day after the incident, which shows that he was found negative for powder burns. For
lack of merit, the trial court denied the motion in its Order of 24 May 1988.31
Santos Ducay, hereinafter referred to as the Appellant, then filed on 7 June 1988 a Notice of
Appeal.32
In his “Brief for the Defense” filed on 24 September 1992,33 the appellant raises the following
assignment of errors:
1. “1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS ‘POSITIVE’

PROSECUTION WITNESSES EDWIN LABOS AND LINA LABOS’
IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED; HENCE, IT ERRED WHEN IT REJECTED
ACCUSED’S DEFENSE OF ALIBI.
2. 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSED’S PARTIAL
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR NEW TRIAL FOR THE
ADMISSION OF THE PARAFFIN EXAMINATION ON ACCUSED A DAY
AFTER THE INCIDENT FINDING HIM NEGATIVE OF POWER (sic)
BURNS.
3. 3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVINCTING THE ACCUSED.”
In the first assigned error, the appellant attacks the credibility of prosecution witnesses Lina and
Edwin Labos and alleges that their identification of the appellant is vague and highly dubious. To
buttress this claim, he refers this Court to his testimony that
_______________
29
OR, 318.
30
Id., 329-347.
31
Id., 351-352.
32
Id., 356.
33
Rollo, 86-125.
12

People vs. Ducay
a neighbor by the name of Martin Gabukan told him that while the victims were in the hospital,
he (Martin) overheard Edwin Labos say that he did not really see the appellant and Edgardo
Ducay; that Edwin only happened to mention the name of the appellant when he was asked by
the police about their enemies in their place. The appellant then concludes that the crime was
imputed upon him not because he was seen at the scene of the crime but because of the motive
alleged, namely, that he and Manuel Labos had an altercation on 24 December 1985. As to Lina
Labos, the appellant maintains that she gave her statement only on 14 October 1986 or two days
after the occurrence of the incident; she thus had sufficient time to concoct a story and implicate
the appellant and Edgardo after she had talked with her brother-in-law, Edwin, and her father-in-
law, Jesus Labos.
The appellant further claims that since the trial court did not believe Lina and Edwin’s
testimonies that they positively identified Edgardo Ducay, then following the maxim “falsus et
(sic) uno, falsus et (sic) omnibus,”34 it should not have also believed their testimony as regards
the appellant. He also faults the trial court for rejecting the supplementary statement (Exhibit
“4”) of Erwin Labos, brother of Edwin Labos, and Erwin’s “contemporaneous” statement to
Edgardo Ducay: “Kuya pasensiya ka na, naturo kita noon una, Hindi naman ikaw,” allegedly
absolving the accused and pointing to a tall, mestizo and curly-haired man as one of the
assailants, which statement was allegedly confirmed by Sgt. Casile and Capt. Tiquia and made as
the basis of the cartographic sketch by the PC Crime Laboratory. According to the appellant,
these declarations of Erwin are declarations against interest and are part of the res gestae.
Finally, the appellant asserts that the evidence for the prosecution is weak because no
disinterested witness was presented despite the fact that the incident occurred in a thickly
populated area. He also contends that the prosecution suppressed evidence by failing to present
Erwin Labos as a witness.
These claims are without merit.
A careful evaluation of the records and the evidence adduced
_______________
Should be falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, i.e., false in one thing, false in everything. (Black’s
34
Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 543).
13
VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 13

People vs. Ducay
by the prosecution discloses that the appellant had been positively identified by Lina and Edwin
Labos. In his sworn statement (Exhibit “H”) executed barely four hours after the incident and
while he was still in the emergency room of the hospital, Edwin explicitly declared that the
appellant was one of the assailants. This sworn statement was spontaneously given at the time he
was hovering between life and death. He had no opportunity then to contrive or fabricate a story.
The appellant is the only one identified therein by Edwin. Thus:
‘x x x
“TANONGBakit ka narito ngayon sa loob ng Dr. Jose Reyes Hospital, Emergency Room,
Manila?
SAGOT Binaril po ako.
T Sino ang bumaril sa iyo?
S Ang Kasama ni Santos Ducay po nakatira sa Area-4, Family Compound, Karuhatan,
Val. M.M..
T Kilala mo ba ang bumaril sa iyo na kasama ni Santos?
S Kung makikita ko muli.
xxx
T Paano mo nasabi na kasama ni Santos Ducay ang bumaril sa iyo?
S Nakita ko po si Santos Ducay na ang hawak niya shotgun at siya ang bumaril sa
kuya ko, Manuel, nanay ko, Pacita, Ate ko, Lina at bata na si Maria Cristina.
T Dati mo bang kilala si Santos Ducay?
S Opo.
T Paano mo siya nakilala?
S Dati po siyang (Santos) kapitbahay namin at lumipat sa Area 4 Family Compound,
Karuhatan, Val., M.M.”35
In court, Edwin unhesitatingly pointed to the appellant as one of the assailants.36
Lina Labos also identified the appellant as one of the malefactors both in her handwritten sworn
statement, Exhibit “E,”37 executed on 14 October 1986 or two days after the incident, and in her
court testimony.38 That her statement was executed two
_______________
35
Exhibit “H,” Folder of Exhibits, 8.
36
TSN, 23 January 1987, 3-4.
37
Folder of Exhibits, 5.
38
TSN, 24 November 1986, 5.
14

People vs. Ducay
days after the incident does not perforce affect her credibility. With the three gunshot wounds
she sustained and the thought of the death of her husband and mother-in-law and the serious
injuries of her daughter and brother-in-law, it would be too much to expect from her that
physical and emotional fortitude to forthwith give her statement as what Edwin did. Delay or
vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of a
witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained.39 In any case, the speculation that she could have
contrived her testimony after having talked with her father-in-law and brother-in-law is wholly
unsupported by evidence.
We agree with the appellee that the alleged statements made by Martin Gabukan to the appellant,
which the latter related in court, is hearsay and has little, if any, probative value. Counsel for the
appellant knew, or ought to have known, that this was so. Yet, the defense did not present Martin
as a witness.
Nor can we subscribe to the proposition that since the trial court did not give credit to Edwin and
Lina’s testimonies that they positively identified Edgardo, it should, pursuant to the maxim
“falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,” likewise disregard their testimonies as against the appellant
and accordingly acquit him. In People vs. Dasig,40 this Court stated that the maxim is not a
mandatory rule of evidence, but rather a permissible inference that the court may or may not
draw. In People vs. Pacada,41 we stated that the testimony of a witness can be believed as to
some facts and disbelieved as to others. And in People vs. Osias,42 we ruled that:
“It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and
disbelieve it with respect to other facts. And it has been aptly said that even when witnesses are
found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, it is not required that the whole
of their uncorroborated testimony be rejected but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief
may be credited.
_______________
39
People vs. Obngayan, 55 SCRA 465 [1974]; People vs. Roxas, 73 SCRA 583 [1976]; People
vs. Elizaga, 73 SCRA 524 [1976].
40
93 Phil. 618 [1953].
41
142 SCRA 427 [1986].
42
199 SCRA 574 [1991].
15
VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 15

People vs. Ducay
The primordial consideration is that the witness was present at the scene of the crime and that he
positively identified [the accused] as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged x x x.”
Professor Wigmore gives the following enlightening commentary:

“It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself worthless—first, in point of validity,
because in one form it merely contains in loose fashion a kernel of truth which no one needs to
be told, and in the others it is absolutely false as a maxim of life; and secondly, in point of utility,
because it merely tells the jury what they may do in any event, not what they must do or must not
do, and therefore it is a superfluous form of words. It is also in practice pernicious, first, because
there is frequently a misunderstanding of its proper force, and secondly, because it has become in
the hands of many counsel a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points wholly
unimportant in themselves.”43
The trial court did not err in rejecting the supplementary statement (Exhibit “4”) of Erwin Labos,
brother of Edwin Labos, and his alleged contemporaneous statement to Edgardo Ducay. Erwin
Labos was not called by the defense as its witness—even as a hostile one. Whatever declaration
he made to any party, either written or oral, is thus hearsay. The prosecution seasonably objected
to the admission of Exhibit “4.”44 Besides, as noted by the prosecution, this document is not
under oath while his first statement implicating the appellant is duly subscribed and sworn to.
The defense should have presented Erwin as a witness if indeed it was convinced that Exhibit
“4” expresses the truth. There is no showing that this could not have been done because Erwin
was not available. His brother, Edwin, testified that Erwin was staying with his father in
Escolta.45 This information should have been utilized by the defense to have compulsory process
issued to bring Erwin to court.
Instead, the defense imputes suppression of evidence upon the
_______________
43
WIGMORE, J.H., Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 3rd ed., Section 1008.
44
TSN, 18 March 1988, 4.
45
TSN, 14 March 1988, 19-20.
16

People vs. Ducay
prosecution in not presenting Erwin Labos as its witness. It is settled that suppression of
evidence is inapplicable in a case where the evidence is at the disposal of both the prosecution
and the defense.46 Besides, the prosecution had no cogent reason for presenting Erwin since there
is no showing that he was in the house when the incident occurred. On the other hand, the
defense needed his testimony for if, indeed, he should affirm his supplemental statement, he may
somehow enhance the theory of the defense.
We do not likewise agree with the appellant that Erwin’s alleged statement to Edgardo Ducay:
“Kuya pasensiya ka na, naturo kita noon una, hindi naman ikaw,” uttered immediately after he
made his supplemental statement, is a part of the res gestae and thus an exception to the hearsay
rule.
The rule on spontaneous statements as part of the res gestae is stated in Section 42, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court: “statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given
in evidence as part of the res gestae. x x x.” There are three requisites for the admission of
spontaneous statements as evidence of the res gestae: 1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be
a startling occurrence; 2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and 3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.47 The rationale for the exception lies in the fact that a statement made
under the stress of an exciting event or condition tends to ensure that the statement is
spontaneous and, therefore, trustworthy; and the likely proximity in time between the event or
condition and the statement minimizes the possibility of a memory problem.48 Erwin’s alleged
statement to Edgardo Ducay does not refer to the incident in question but rather to his prior
statement (not the supplemental statement) implicating Edgardo Ducay.
_______________
46
People vs. Morado, 4 SCRA 292 [1962]; People vs. Fernandez, 209 SCRA 1 [1992].
People vs. Ricaplaza, 23 SCRA 374 [1968]; Ilocos Norte Electric Co. vs. Court of Appeals,
47
179 SCRA 5 [1989]; People vs. Sanchez, 213 SCRA 70 [1992].
48
See WIGMORE, J.H., op. cit., note 43, Section 1747.
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People vs. Ducay
Furthermore, the alleged “contemporaneous” statement was made two days after the shooting
incident. In no way can it be said that Erwin was under the stress of an exciting event or
condition.
Nor do we find merit in the appellant’s argument that the prosecution’s evidence is weak because
unlike the defense, it did not present any disinterested witness. He suggests that since the place
where the incident happened is thickly populated, there were many people who saw the gunmen
and who could have pointed to the accused if they were the ones who committed the crime
considering that they were familiar to the residents of the area. In the first place, it was not
shown that at the time the incident occurred, many people were already awake and were able to
see the gunmen. In the second place, assuming that it was so shown, the determination of who
should be utilized as witnesses by the prosecution is addressed to the sound discretion of the
prosecutor handling the case.49 That the prosecutor did not present any disinterested witness does
not lessen the strength of the prosecution’s case, which is anchored on the testimonies of Edwin
and Lina Labos, who were themselves eyewitnesses and victims of the crime.
In the ultimate analysis, the first assigned error involves the credibility of witnesses. It is settled
that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb
the findings of the trial court considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.50 We find no reason to depart from this rule in this
case.
In his second assigned error, the appellant faults the trial court for denying his motion for new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence consisting of Chemistry Report No. 0-1630-86
of the PC Crime Laboratory Service, the result of the paraffin test conducted on Santos Ducay on
13 October 1986 or the day after the incident in question, which allegedly shows that “both
_______________
49
People vs. Collantes, 208 SCRA 853 [1992].
50
People vs. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535 [1991]; People vs. Simon, 209 SCRA 148 [1992].
18

People vs. Ducay
hands of the [appellant] gave NEGATIVE result to the test for gunpowder residue (nitrates).”51
One of the grounds for a new trial mentioned in Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court is the
discovery of new and material evidence. The requisites therefor which must concur are: (1) that
the evidence was discovered after the trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (3) that
such evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such
weight that, if admitted, it will probably change the judgment.52 In the present case, the appellant
was subjected to a paraffin test the day after the crime was committed. Certainly, he knew that
the findings of such test would be forthcoming. He should have asked for the result of the test to
find out if it is exculpatory, in which case he could have presented it during the hearing of his
application for bail or, at the latest, during the trial on the merits. In any event, the chemistry
report cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence since it was already existing even
before the trial commenced and could have been easily produced in court by compulsory
process. The appellant either did not exercise reasonable diligence for its production or simply
forgot about it. Forgotten evidence is, of course, not a ground for a new trial.53 Moreover, the
result of the paraffin test conducted on the appellant is not conclusive evidence that he did not
fire a gun.54 It is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet be negative for the presence of
nitrates, as when he wore gloves or washed his hands afterwards.55 The trial court, therefore,
correctly denied the motion for new trial.
The testimonies of the witnesses and the nature of the wounds
_______________
51
OR, 349.
People vs. de la Cruz, 207 SCRA 632 [1992], citing MORAN, Comments on the Rules of
52
Court, vol. 4, 1980 ed., 340-341, See also, Reyes vs. People, 71 Phil. 598 [1941].
53
People vs. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398 [1948].
54
People vs. Pama, G.R. Nos. 90297-98, 11 December 1992.
55
People vs. Roallos, 113 SCRA 584 [1982]; People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642 [1991].
19
VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 19

People vs. Ducay
suffered by the victims show that there were two different firearms used by two assailants, one of
whom is the appellant. The crimes committed were not caused by a single act nor were any of
the crimes committed as a necessary means of committing the others. In this case, there are as
many crimes committed as there are victims. The trial court correctly ruled that there was no
complex crime “considering that the trigger of the gun used in committing the acts complained
of was pressed in several instances and not in one single act.” It is settled that when various
victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.56 However,
the trial court erred when it ruled that “(i)t cannot, however, impose the corresponding penalty
for the crime committed against each victim because the information to which the accused
pleaded is only one crime of double murder and multiple frustrated murder.” The information in
this case, although denominated as one for a complex crime, clearly charges the accused with
five different criminal acts. It states: “the above-named accused, with intent to kill Pacita Labos,
Manuel Labos, Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos, and Ma. Cristina Labos, x x x did then and
there x x x attack, assault and shoot with a .45 caliber [pistol] and shotgun they were then
provided the said Pacita Labos, Manuel Labos, Lina Labos-Mojica, Edwin Labos and Ma.
Cristina Labos, x x x.” The appellant and his co-accused did not move to quash the information
on the ground of multiplicity of charges. At no other time thereafter did they object thereto. They
therefore waived such defect57 and the trial court thus validly rendered judgment against them for
as many crimes as were alleged and proven.58
The crimes committed by the appellant and his companion, which were proven beyond
reasonable doubt are: (1) two counts of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery
since the attack on the victims was so sudden and at a time when the victims were barely awake,
thus giving them no chance whatsoever to defend themselves; and (2) three counts of frustrated
_______________
People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748 [1967]; People vs. Boniao, G.R. No. 100800, 27 January
56
1993.
57
Section 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court.
58
Id.
20

People vs. Ducay
murder. Conspiracy59 between the assailants was duly proven. Together they came to the house
of the victims, simultaneously attacked them, and then, together again, they fled. Before fleeing,
one of them even exclaimed “Ubos ang lahi.” These acts sufficiently established a common plan
or design to commit the crimes charged and a concerted action to effectively pursue it. Hence,
the act of one is the act of all.60
We do not, however, agree with the trial court that evident premeditation was sufficiently
established. Although Manuel Labos stabbed the appellant on 24 December 1985, there is
paucity of evidence as to when the latter determined to kill the former and any member of his
family and as to acts manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination.61 Nevertheless,
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling which was proved without objection from the defense
should be appreciated against the appellant since the victims were attacked and shot inside their
own dwelling. The assailants displayed greater perversity in their deliberate invasion of the home
of the Laboses.62
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder is punishable by reclusion
temporal maximum to death. The maximum of the penalty should be imposed in view of the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling which is not offset by any mitigating
circumstance. However, the imposition of the death penalty is prohibited by the Constitution;63
hence, the proper imposable penalty would be reclusion perpetua. The penalty for the crime of
frustrated murder is the penalty
_______________
59
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it, (Article 8, Revised Penal Code).
60
People vs. Alonzo, 73 SCRA 483 [1976]; People vs. Pascual, 204 SCRA 618 [1991].
61
These are two of the three requisites of evident premeditation. The third requisite is that there
must be a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. (People vs. Narit, 197 SCRA 334 [1991]); People vs.
Barba, 203 SCRA 436 [1991]; People vs. Buka, 205 SCRA 567 [1992]).
62
People vs. Ampo-an, 187 SCRA 173 [1990].
63
Section 19(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution.
21
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People vs. Ducay
next lower in degree than that prescribed for murder,64 that is, prision mayor maximum to
reclusion temporal medium.65
The appellant is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the frustrated
murder cases. Thus, he may be sentenced in each of the three frustrated murder cases to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium
as maximum.
ACCORDINGLY, the challenged judgment of Branch 172 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. 7792-V-6 is AFFIRMED subject to the
modifications herein indicated. As modified, appellant Santos Ducay is convicted of (a) two
crimes of murder for the death of Pacita Labos and Manuel Labos and is accordingly sentenced
to reclusion perpetua for each death, with the indemnity in each crime increased from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 in conformance with the current policy of this Court; and (b) three
crimes of frustrated murder committed on Lina Labos, Ma. Cristina Labos and Edwin Labos, and
is hereby sentenced in each crime to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor medium as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (18) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Challenged judgment affirmed with modification.
Note.—Failure to make timely objection to information charging several offenses constitutes

waiver of said defect (People vs. Peralta, 193 SCRA 9).
People vs. Costales
G.R. Nos. 141154-56. January 15, 2002.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. FERNANDO “Ando”
COSTALES and FERNANDO RAMIREZ
(atlarge), accused. FERNANDO “Ando”
COSTALES, accused-appellant.
Witnesses; Consistency and uniformity in the testimonies of witnesses may be irregular at first
blush, if there is failure to take into account some
_______________
*
EN BANC.
270

People vs. Costales
factors which account for the “near flawless” statements of the prosecution witnesses.—
Concededly, the prosecution witnesses gave almost uniform observations on how the malefactors
carried out their detestable crimes, i.e., the identity of the assailants, that Miguel was strangled
by both intruders and almost simultaneously shot on the head, that one of them sprayed a
chemical on the other occupants of the house and after a split second fired at Crispina. Such
consistency and uniformity may be irregular at first blush, but accused-appellant failed to take
into account the following factors which account for the “near flawless” statements of the
prosecution witnesses: (a) the one-room shanty was very small with no substantial obstruction to
impede the vision of the occupants; (b) the room was lighted by a kerosene lamp sufficient
enough for the occupants to recognize accused-appellant and his cohort, especially so since the
assailants were prominent and venerated leaders of their church; and, (c) at the time of the
incident the Marcelo spouses and their children were lying very near each other because of the
very limited space of their shanty such that every perceived action could be seen, felt, or at least
sensed, by all of them.
Same; Television sets powered by Motolite battery is a common practice in unenergized
“barrios.”—Neither should we ascribe importance, as the accused-appellant seems to suggest, to
an apparent “inconsistency” by witness Jessie Molina when she mentioned that the unwanted
intrusion occurred shortly after she turned off the television set, contrary to her earlier claim that
barangay Capas was without electricity. Jessie Molina dispelled this obscurity when she clarified
that the television set was powered by Motolite battery which is in fact a common practice in
unenergized “barrios,” as the trial court would put it, and Sitio Raniag, Barangay Capas did not
still have electricity at that time.
Same; The straightforward and consistent narration of facts by three (3) prosecution witnesses,
especially by one who is a victim herself, immensely fortifies the conclusion that accused is guilty
as charged.—Clearly, the straightforward and consistent narration of facts, as the trial court
observed, by the three (3) prosecution witnesses, especially Crispina Marcelo, a victim herself,
immensely fortifies the conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty as charged. Moreover, no
impure motive on their part has been established by the defense to sully their truthfulness and
erode their credibility.
Criminal Law; Murder; Illegal Possession of Firearms; Aggravating Circumstances; RA 8294,

which took effect 7 July 1997, amended the PD 1866 and now considers the use of unlicensed
firearm as a special aggravating circumstance in murder and homicide, and not as a separate
of-
271
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People vs. Costales
fense.—Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm
under PD 1866 was committed, RA 8294, which took effect 7 July 1997, amended the decree
and now considers the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance in murder
and homicide, and not as a separate offense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the absence of any allegation in the Information that the accused
committed murder with the use of unlicensed firearm, the same cannot be appreciated in
imposing the proper penalty.—As it should be, possession and use of firearm without license
should aggravate the crimes of murder and frustrated murder as herein charged but, fortunately
for accused-appellant, Secs. 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took
effect 1 December 2000, now require the qualifying as well as aggravating circumstances to be
expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information, otherwise the same will not be
considered by the court even if proved during the trial. Withal, in the absence of any allegation in
the Information in Crim. Case No. T-2057 that accused-appellant committed murder with the use
of unlicensed firearm, the same cannot be appreciated in imposing the proper penalty.
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Treachery has been established where the
evidence showed that the accused and his confederate swiftly and unexpectedly barged into the
victim’s residence in the middle of the night, shot the victim to death as well as his wife who
almost lost her life, and sprayed a substance which temporarily blinded the other occupants of
the house.—While we yield to the trial court’s finding of treachery, we take exception to its view
that evident premeditation and nighttime also aggravated the offenses. Without doubt, treachery
has been established by the prosecution evidence which showed that accused-appellant Fernando
Costales and his confederate Fernando Ramirez swiftly and unexpectedly barged into the
Marcelo residence in the middle of the night, shot Miguel Marcelo to death as well as his wife
Crispina who almost lost her life, and sprayed a substance which temporarily blinded the other
occupants of the house. The suddenness of the attack gave the victims no opportunity whatsoever
to resist or parry the assault thereby ensuring the accomplishment of their dastardly deed without
risk to themselves. Since the attack on the victims was synchronal, sudden and unexpected,
treachery must be properly appreciated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Nighttime; Evident Premeditation; The aggravating circumstance of
nighttime is absorbed by treachery, while evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in the
absence of proof of the planning and preparation to kill or when the plan was conceived.—We
272

People vs. Costales
cannot however give our assent to the view that nighttime and evident premeditation
accompanied the commission of the crimes. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime is
absorbed by treachery, while evident pre-meditation cannot be appreciated in the absence of
proof of the planning and preparation to kill or when the plan was conceived.
Same; Same; Damages; Award of damages is dictated, not by the agreement of the parties,
worse, “in a manner that suits them best,” but by the mandate of law and jurisprudence.—We
observe that the trial court awarded P250,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased on the justification
that the same had been stipulated upon by the parties. This is patently wrong. Award of damages
is dictated, not by the agreement of the parties; worse, “in a manner that suits them best,” but by
the mandate of law and jurisprudence. Accordingly in conformity with established law and
jurisprudence, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral
damages should be awarded to the heirs of the victim.
Same; Attempted Murder; Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would
be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful, hence, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as
attempted, not frustrated murder.—We call to mind People v. De La Cruz where this Court ruled
that the crime committed for the shooting of the victim was attempted murder and not frustrated
murder for the reason that “his injuries, though no doubt serious, were not proved fatal such that
without timely medical intervention, they would have caused his death.” In fact, as early as
People v. Zaragosa, we enunciated the doctrine that where there is nothing in the evidence to
show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is
doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed
by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated murder.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Br. 51.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
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People vs. Costales
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Traditionally, religious fervor nourishes love, respect and concern for one another among
brethren; it was not so however in the case of one whose adherence to his faith became the
harbinger of his tragic end, sending his wife hanging by the thread of death, and worse, the
crimes were perpetrated apparently by their brethren professing to be “denizens of the temple.”
Accused Fernando “Ando” Costales and Fernando Ramirez, the latter being still at large, stood
charged with the murder of Miguel Marcelo and the frustrated murder of Crispina Marcelo. As
the perpetrators were found to be in unlawful possession of firearms they were also charged with
violation of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294.
Since accused Fernando Ramirez remained at large, only accused Fernando “Ando” Costales
was arraigned and tried.
For violation of Sec. 1, PD 1866, as amended (Crim. Case No. T-2054), accused Fernando
“Ando” Costales was found guilty and sentenced1 to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay a
fine of P30,000.
For the murder of Miguel Marcelo (Crim. Case No. T-2057), accused Fernando “Ando” Costales
was found guilty and meted the ultimate penalty of death.
For the frustrated murder of Crispina Marcelo (Crim. Case No. T-2056) he was found guilty only
of attempted murder and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. Additionally, he
was ordered “to pay the heirs of the two (2) victims P250,000.00 in damages to be shared by and
among them in a manner that suits them best.”
Sitio Raniag, Barangay Capas, was a placid but forlorn barrio in Pangasinan where the spouses
Miguel and Crispina Marcelo resided in a small one-room shanty with concrete flooring and
cogon
_______________
1
Decision penned by Judge Ulysses Raciles Butuyan, RTC-Br. 51, Tayug, Pangasinan.
274

People vs. Costales
roofing. Although their married daughters Donabel, Jessie and Erlinda already had their own
houses they would spend the night with them every once in a while. And so it was on the night of
27 November 1997.
Jessie Molina recalled that at around 11:30 o’clock in the evening of 27 November 1997, she and
her sisters Donabel and Erlinda together with their parents Miguel and Crispina had taken their
own corners of their small house to prepare for the night. Miguel laid in a folding bed beside the
door while the others occupied a bamboo bed with the exception of Jessie who for want of
available space settled instead on the concrete floor. Jessie and Erlinda had just watched tv when
two (2) persons suddenly barged into their house passing through the door kept ajar by sacks of
palay and strangled her father Miguel. Jessie readily recognized the two (2) intruders because the
entire room was illuminated by a nightlamp which the family kept burning overnight.
Jessie narrated that Fernando “Ando” Costales, one of the assailants, poked a gun at the head of
her father and shot him once in cold blood. Thereafter the other assailant Fernando Ramirez
sprayed on their faces what she described as “something hot and pungent,” and with his firearm
pumped a bullet on her mother’s chest.
Erlinda Marcelo was also awakened when the two (2) accused suddenly entered their house and
strangled their father after which Fernando Costales shot him point blank in the head. According
to Erlinda, when tear gas was sprayed by Ramirez, she ducked and almost simultaneously she
heard a gunshot towards the direction of her mother. When she opened her eyes, she saw her
mother Crispina clutching her breast, reeling from the blow and collapsing on the floor in a heap.
In her testimony Crispina herself confirmed that Ramirez shot her once on the right chest which
caused her to bleed and lose consciousness.
Both Jessie and Erlinda affirmed that they were familiar with the two (2) accused because, like
the rest of the family, they were members of the “Baro a Cristiano” also known as Lamplighter,
of which Fernando “Ando” Costales and Fernando Ramirez were the high priests in their
respective areas. According to Jessie, her parents decided to quit the brotherhood because
Ramirez warned
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People vs. Costales
them not to sever their ties with the sect if they did not want any harm to befall them. In fact,
according to her, a month earlier Ramirez even threatened her sister Erlinda with bodily harm.
Like her sister, Erlinda stated that their family distanced themselves from the congregation when
Ramirez threatened her father. According to her, on 16 November 1997, Miguel tried to fetch her
from the house of Ramirez but Miguel relented only after Ramirez threatened her with a bolo.
Her father tried to get her when he learned that Ramirez was molesting her every time his wife
was away. She however did not report this matter immediately to the authorities because she
feared for her life.
Dr. Alex E. Trinidad, Rural Health Physician of Umingan, Pangasinan, after conducting an
autopsy on the body of Miguel Marcelo reported: (a) The gunshot wound penetrating the left
lobe of the liver of deceased Miguel Marcelo was fatal; (b) Considering the trajectory of the
gunshot wound, the assailant was probably pointing slightly downward; (c) The cause of death of
the deceased was internal hemorrhage arising from the gunshot wound; and, (d) Considering the
wound of the victim, he could have survived for a few minutes after he was shot.
To show that he could not have been a party to the crimes charged, accused Fernando Costales
gave a detailed account of his activities by retracing his steps from late afternoon of 27
November 1997 until dawn of the following day. He narrated that at 5:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of 27 November he was irrigating his land in Barangay Libeg, then proceeded to a
nearby chapel to pray. At past 7:00 o’clock in the evening, he went to see a certain Isidro who
was irrigating his own land with the use of his (Fernando’s) water pump. That being done he
went back home.
A couple of hours later, in the company of his wife and children, he returned to the mission
house to attend another religious service. At past 9:00 o’clock that same evening he dropped by
Isidro’s farmland to verify if the latter had finished irrigating. He went back home at around
11:00 o’clock to sleep and was awakened by Isidro at about 11:45 o’clock only to inform him
that he (Isidro) was through. When Isidro left, Fernando went back to sleep only to be roused
again by Gregorio Baguio who also wanted to borrow his water pump. With his sleep disrupted,
he decided around midnight
276

People vs. Costales
to visit as he did the nearby mission house to pray. Shortly after, he resumed his sleep but woke
up again at 4:00 o’clock in the morning to see if Baguio had already finished watering his farm.
Defense witnesses Isidro Costales and Gregorio Baguio corroborated the claim of Fernando
Costales that he could not have perpetrated the crimes as he was with them all the time they were
irrigating their farms. Likewise, Elvie Costales, wife of accused Fernando Costales, presented an
“attendance notebook,” purportedly prepared by her, showing that her husband, who was the
chapter’s religious leader, was worshipping in the Barangay Libeg chapel from 4:45 to 4:47
o’clock and from 5:30 to 5:37 o’clock at daybreak,2 from 7:22 to 8:00 o’clock after sunset,3 and
from 12:10 to 12:15 o’clock midnight4 of 27 November 1997, although he would periodically
leave the prayer meeting to check if Isidro had already finished watering his farm so that Baguio
could also use the pump.
But the trial court viewed the alibi of the defense with askance and assigned full credit to the
declarations of the prosecution witnesses.
In disbelieving the veracity of the “attendance notebook,” the court a quo opined that Exh. “2”
could have been more impressive had it borne the confirming signatures or thumbmarks of the
“Baro a Cristiano” faithful, including their leader Fernando Costales, or had Exhs. “2-B” and “2-
C” been corroborated on the witness stand by a less interested member, or had the church
secretary who allegedly kept record of attendance been some member other than Mrs. Costales
or the nearest of kin.5
The court below also virtually jettisoned the testimonies of Isidro Costales and Gregorio Baguio
when it said that “they had every reason to come to the rescue of the accused Costales, their
admittedly common nephew.” Further, it pointed out that the accused and his witnesses issued
contradictory and irreconcilable statements when, on one hand Isidro testified that before
midnight
_______________
2
Exh. “2-A”.
3
Exhibit “2-C”.
4
Exh. “2-B”.
5
Rollo, p. 49.
277
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People vs. Costales
of 27 November 1997 he went to the house of his nephew Fernando Costales to inform him that
the irrigation of his farm was already through; on the other hand, Baguio claimed that at around
11:00 o’clock that night he roused the accused who thereafter went to operate the pump and
stayed put beside it until Baguio’s farm was completely irrigated at 4:00 o’clock the next
morning.
The above statements, the court a quo observed, did not jibe with those made by the accused that
his uncle Isidro woke him up at around 11:45 o’clock in the evening and told him that the
irrigation of his farm was finished, after which he returned to bed and when he awakened at past
4:00 o’clock the following morning, he met Baguio who told him that he too was through
irrigating.
In contrast, the trial court saw no dark motives behind the respective testimonies of Crispina
Marcelo and her two (2) daughters. The Costaleses and the Marcelos used to be members of the
same religious sect and accused “Ando” Costales even stood as a sponsor at the wedding of
Jessie Marcelo, and again when Crispina’s brother got married. In short, the Marcelos could not
have mistaken “Ando” Costales and Fernando Ramirez for other felons.
In this automatic review, accused Fernando Costales takes exception to the findings of the trial
court and thus seeks reversal of his convictions on the ground that it erred: (a) in according
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses although the same are perforated with
material inconsistencies and bias; (b) in not giving weight to the defense of alibi despite the
weakness of the prosecution evidence; (c) in convicting him of violation of Sec. 1, PD 1866, as
amended, since the same was absorbed in the crime of murder; (d) in finding that the crime was
attended by conspiracy despite the fact that no aggravating circumstance was established beyond
reasonable doubt; and, (e) in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
in his favor.
The first and second assigned errors will be discussed jointly since they are interrelated.
Accused-appellant argues that the seemingly flawless and unwavering testimonies of the three
(3) key prosecution witnesses on
278
People vs. Costales
the assault of the Marcelo household are obviously biased that they invite suspicion and
disbelief.
Concededly, the prosecution witnesses gave almost uniform observations on how the malefactors
carried out their detestable crimes, i.e., the identity of the assailants, that Miguel was strangled
by both intruders and almost simultaneously shot on the head, that one of them sprayed a
chemical on the other occupants of the house and after a split second fired at Crispina. Such
consistency and uniformity may be irregular at first blush, but accused-appellant failed to take
into account the following factors which account for the “near flawless” statements of the
prosecution witnesses: (a) the one-room shanty was very small with no substantial obstruction to
impede the vision of the occupants; (b) the room was lighted by a kerosene lamp sufficient
enough for the occupants to recognize accused-appellant and his cohort, especially so since the
assailants were prominent and venerated leaders of their church; and, (c) at the time of the
incident the Marcelo spouses and their children were lying very near each other because of the
very limited space of their shanty such that every perceived action could be seen, felt, or at least
sensed, by all of them.
Accused-appellant is seeing ghosts where there is none. Contrary to his submission, it would be
highly irregular indeed if the prosecution witnesses failed to observe the events that transpired on
that fateful night of 27 November 1997 and their statements did not dovetail, at least on material
points, despite very favorable conditions for a fairly accurate observation.
Neither should we ascribe importance, as the accused-appellant seems to suggest, to an apparent

“inconsistency” by witness Jessie Molina when she mentioned that the unwanted intrusion
occurred shortly after she turned off the television set, contrary to her earlier claim that barangay
Capas was without electricity. Jessie Molina dispelled this obscurity when she clarified that the
television set was powered by Motolite battery which is in fact a common practice in
unenergized “barrios,” as the trial court would put it,6 and Sitio Raniag, Barangay Capas did not
still have electricity at that time.
_______________
6
TSN, 17 November 1998, p. 30.
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People vs. Costales
Clearly, the straightforward and consistent narration of facts, as the trial court observed, by the
three (3) prosecution witnesses, especially Crispina Marcelo, a victim herself, immensely
fortifies the conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty as charged. Moreover, no impure motive
on their part has been established by the defense to sully their truthfulness and erode their
credibility.
Accused-appellant cannot insist on his alibi, especially so since he and his co-accused were
positively identified by the prosecution witnesses. More so when it is undisputed that the
proximity of their place to the scene of the crimes did not preclude the possibility that they were
in fact present at the time of their commission.
On the third issue, accused-appellant decries the Decision of the court a quo in qualifying the
crimes of murder and attempted murder with illegal possession of firearm and at the same time
convicting him for violation of PD 1866, as amended.
We agree. Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of
firearm under PD 1866 was committed, RA 8294, which took effect 7 July 1997, amended the
decree and now considers the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance in
murder and homicide, and not as a separate offense.7
As it should be, possession and use of firearm without license should aggravate the crimes of
murder and frustrated murder as herein charged but, fortunately for accused-appellant, Secs. 8
and 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect 1 December 2000, now
require the qualifying as well as aggravating circumstances to be expressly and specifically
alleged in the complaint or information, otherwise the same will not be considered by the court
even if proved during the trial. Withal, in the absence of any allegation in the Information in
Crim. Case No. T-2057 that accused-appellant committed murder with the use of unlicensed
firearm, the same cannot be appreciated in imposing the proper penalty.
_______________
7
People v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 109279-80, 18 January 1999, 301 SCRA 66; People v. Lumilan,
G.R. No. 102706, 25 January 2000, 323 SCRA 170, citing People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191,
232 (1996).
280

People vs. Costales
Moving now to the modifying circumstances raised under the fourth assigned error, accused-
appellant points out that the trial court grievously erred in appreciating unlicensed firearm,
evident premeditation and nighttime which were alleged in the Informations in Crim. Case No.
T-2056 for frustrated murder and Crim. Case No. T-2057 for murder.
While we yield to the trial court’s finding of treachery, we take exception to its view that evident
premeditation and nighttime also aggravated the offenses. Without doubt, treachery has been
established by the prosecution evidence which showed that accused-appellant Fernando Costales
and his confederate Fernando Ramirez swiftly and unexpectedly barged into the Marcelo
residence in the middle of the night, shot Miguel Marcelo to death as well as his wife Crispina
who almost lost her life, and sprayed a substance which temporarily blinded the other occupants
of the house. The suddenness of the attack gave the victims no opportunity whatsoever to resist
or parry the assault thereby ensuring the accomplishment of their dastardly deed without risk to
themselves. Since the attack on the victims was synchronal, sudden and unexpected, treachery
must be properly appreciated.
We cannot however give our assent to the view that nighttime and evident premeditation
accompanied the commission of the crimes. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime is
absorbed by treachery,8 while evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in the absence of
proof of the planning and preparation to kill or when the plan was conceived.9
The convergence of the wills of the two (2) executioners amply justifies the imputation that they
acted in concert and in unity in their unlawful objective when in the stillness of the night they
both crashed into the Marcelo residence, strangulated the victim Miguel, then one of them shot
him in the head while the other sprayed tear gas on the other members of the family obviously to
disable them, and thereafter pumped a bullet at the horrified Crispina. This series of actions
betrays a concerted design and
_______________
8
People v. Abitona, G.R. Nos. 96943-45, 20 January 1995, 240 5CRA 335, People v. Broncano,
G.R. No. 104870, 22 August 1996, 260 SCRA 724.
9
People v. Tampon, G.R. No. 105583, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 115.
281
VOL. 373, JANUARY 15, 2002 281

People vs. Costales
concurrence of sentiments to cause mayhem and murder. Accordingly, conspiracy was properly
appreciated by the trial court.
Neither can we sympathize with accused-appellant’s misplaced sentiment that he had been
denied the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. As found by the trial court, his
alleged surrender was made too late, and in a place too distant from the crime site as well as his
place of residence.10
We observe that the trial court awarded P250,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased on the
justification that the same had been stipulated upon by the parties. This is patently wrong. Award
of damages is dictated, not by the agreement of the parties; worse, “in a manner that suits them
best,”11 but by the mandate of law and jurisprudence. Accordingly in conformity with established
law and jurisprudence, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as
moral damages should be awarded to the heirs of the victim.
Pursuant to Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659, the penalty for murder
is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no modifying circumstances found in Crim. Case No.
T-2057, and applying par. 2 of Art. 63 of the Code, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed.
In Crim. Case No. T-2056, accused-appellant was charged by the trial court with frustrated
murder but was convicted only for attempted murder. In its Decision, the trial court explained
that the failure of the prosecution to present a medical certificate or competent testimonial
evidence showing that Crispina would have died from her wound without medical intervention,
justified the accused’s conviction for attempted murder only.
_______________
As evidenced by a certification (Exh. “8”) By the PNP Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando, La
10
Union, showing that accused-appellant surrendered to one SPO2 Maximiano R. Peralta on 9 June
1998, or roughly six (6) months after the issuance of warrants for his arrest on 4 December 1997.
11
Rollo, p. 56.
282

People vs. Costales
We call to mind People v. De La Cruz12 where this Court ruled that the crime committed for the
shooting of the victim was attempted murder and not frustrated murder for the reason that “his
injuries, though no doubt serious, were not proved fatal such that without timely medical
intervention, they would have caused his death.” In fact, as early as People v. Zaragosa,13 we
enunciated the doctrine that where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would
be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as
attempted, not frustrated murder.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision finding accused-appellant Fernando “Ando” Costales
guilty of murder and attempted murder is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION: In
Crim. Case No. T-2057, the crime of murder not being considered to have been attended by any
generic mitigating or aggravating circumstances, accused-appellant Fernando “Ando” Costales is
sentenced to suffer only the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In Crim. Case No. T-2056, the crime
of attempted murder not likewise considered to have been attended by any generic mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, accused-appellant Fernando “Ando” Costales is accordingly
sentenced in addition to his penalty imposed in Crim. Case No. T-2057 herein before mentioned,
to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional medium as minimum, to eight (8) years and six (6) months of prision mayor
minimum as maximum;
Accused-appellant Fernando “Ando” Costales is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
Miguel Marcelo P50,000.00 as death indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.
_______________
12
G.R. Nos. 109619-23, 26 June 1998, 291 SCRA 164.
13
58 O.G. 4519.
283
VOL. 373, JANUARY 15, 2002 283

People vs. Gonzales, Jr.
Judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.—In treachery, the mode of attack must be planned and must not spring from the
unexpected turn of events. (People vs. Marquita, 327 SCRA 41 [2000])
Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or as conclusively as the killing
itself. (People vs. Albao, 327 SCRA 123 [2000])
VOL. 322, JANUARY 19, 2000 393
People vs. Villar
G.R. No. 127572. January 19, 2000.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. SALVADOR VILLAR, accused-
appellant.
Criminal Law; Witnesses; Affidavits; Not all kinds of inconsistency of a witness render the
witness’ testimony unworthy of credence—verily, inconsistencies in minor details reinforce
rather than weaken credibility; Discrepancy between the witnesses’ testimony in court and the
affidavits they had previously signed, as to minor details regarding the commission of the crime,
do not constitute sufficient ground to impeach the credibility of said witnesses, where on
material and important points their declarations are consistent.—It may well be pointed out that
not all kinds of inconsistency of a witness render the witness’ testimony unworthy of credence.
Verily, inconsistencies in minor details reinforce rather than weaken credibility (People vs. Del
Prado, 110 Phil. 1034 [1960]), and such inconsistencies do not materially impair the credibility
of the witness (People vs. Modelo, 35 SCRA 639 [1970]). Under the circumstances of the case at
bar, the Court finds the materiality of the exact time the crime was committed as a minor detail
and not of great significance. The more important consideration is that the declarations of the
victim both in her sworn statement before the investigating police officer and in her testimony in
court, are consistent on the basic matters constituting the elements of the crime charged. Besides,
this Court has already ruled that discrepancy between the witnesses’ testimony in court and the
affidavits they had previously signed, as to minor details regarding the commission of the crime,
do not constitute sufficient ground to impeach the credibility of said witnesses, where on
material and important points their declarations are consistent (People vs. Valera, 5 SCRA 910
[1962]).
Same; Same; Rape; The Court cannot impose the burden of exactness in the victim’s recollection
of her harrowing experience more so where the victim was an innocent and tender 9-year old
lass when she was first raped, and it is all the more understandable that the victim may have
been confused as to the exact details of each and every rape incident, considering that she
claimed she had been sexually ravished for more than 100 times in a span of one whole year.—
________________
*
EN BANC.
394
People vs. Villar
The Court cannot impose the burden of exactness in the victim’s recollection of her harrowing
experience more so in the present case where the victim was an innocent and tender 9-year old
lass when she was first raped. It is all the more understandable that the victim in the present case
may have been confused as to the exact details of each and every rape incident, considering that
she claimed she had been sexually ravished for more than 100 times in a span of one whole year.
It is in fact expected that such a victim would rather wish and even purposely forget the
abhorrent memories of every single occasion. This being the case, it would be exacting too much
should the Court demand a very accurate, detailed, and flawless account of the two occasions
now subject of her charges out of the 100 occasions of forcible intercourse. In People vs. Sagucio
(277 SCRA 183 [1997]), where this Court faced the same issue of alleged inconsistencies in the
victim’s narration, we held that errorless testimony cannot be expected especially when a witness
is recounting details of a harrowing experience. A court cannot expect a rape victim to remember
every detail of the appalling outrage.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Burden of Proof; The fundamental rule is that upon him who
alleges rests the burden of proof.—We find no competent evidence showing that the victim
exhibited no unusual behavior during the one-year period that she was being sexually abused by
accused-appellant. The lack of concrete evidence of any unusual behavior on record does not
prove that there was in fact no such unusual behavior. If accused-appellant wanted the court to
consider such an allegation, it was incumbent upon him to prove the same with competent
evidence. The fundamental rule is that upon him who alleges rests the burden of proof. He
cannot simply rely on the lack of evidence showing the contrary.
Same; Same; Same; There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion.—We likewise
find no merit in accused-appellant’s contention that it was improbable that nobody witnessed the
rapes despite the fact that there were five of them sleeping inside the same room where the
offenses were allegedly committed. This argument is not new in this jurisdiction. In fact, in
People vs. Sangil (276 SCRA 532 [1997]), we noted that: . . . the commission of rape was
concededly “improbable but not impossible . . . In People vs. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of
the interesting fact that among poor couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation
does not seem a problem despite the presence of other persons
395
VOL. 322, JANUARY 19, 2000 395

People vs. Villar
around them. Considering the cramped space and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps
have gotten used to quick and less disturbing modes of sexual congresses which elude the
attention of family members; otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible
to copulate with them around even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the
family members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while the sexual assault is being
committed. One may also suppose that growing children sleep more soundly than grown-ups and
are not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in the night. There is no merit in
appellant’s contention that there can be no rape in a room where other people are present. There
is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that “lust is
no respecter of time and place,” and rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of places.
Same; Qualified Rape; Informations; Right to be Informed; Guardians; The death penalty
cannot be imposed where the special qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not duly
alleged in the information.—There may be ample evidence on record to show that accused-
appellant qualified as a guardian of the victim the way the lawmakers intended the word to be
understood, but the Court reserves its ruling on the issue considering that this special qualifying
circumstance of being a guardian was not duly alleged in the information. The Court cannot
affirm the death sentence imposed by the trial court anchored upon the above-cited provision of
the Death Penalty Law.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Br.
52.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:
This Court is once again called upon to discharge the most awesome power in the criminal
justice system, where, by way of automatic review, it is mandated to determine whether or
396

People vs. Villar
not the extreme penalty of death per Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, more commonly
referred to as the Death Penalty Law, was correctly imposed by the trial court, in this case by
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region, stationed at Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan for the heinous crime of statutory rape committed by a de facto guardian against
his 10-year old ward.
Accused-appellant was charged in two separate Informations pertinently reading as follows:

Criminal Case No. 11874
That on or about the 19th of January, 1994, at Barangay Bucana, Municipality of El Nido,
Province of Palawan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused with lewd design and by means of force, intimidation, did then and there willfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mary Ann Ramos, a child below 12 years old,
against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
***
Criminal Case No. 11875
That sometime in the month of January, 1993 at Barangay Bucana, Municipality of El Nido,
Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused with lewd design and by means of force, intimidation, did then and there willfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mary Ann Ramos, a child below 12 years old,
against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
(p. 10, Rollo.)
The narration of facts by the trial court, supported as it is by the evidentiary record, is hereby
adopted, to wit:
Mary Ann Ramos is the eldest child of the spouses Danilo Ramos and Josefina Recasa who were
joined in wedlock in Masbate, on January 15, 1982. Shortly thereafter, the spouses transferred
residence to El Nido, Palawan, where in barangay Bucana of the same town, Mary Ann was born
to said spouses on April 7, 1983.
397
VOL. 322, JANUARY 19, 2000 397

People vs. Villar
From Masbate, Danilo Ramos and Josefina Recasa-Ramos came to Palawan with several others,
among whom were the accused Salvador Villar and his nephew identified only by his surname
Ranilo. On getting to El Nido, Palawan, the group all stayed in one house. After a while,
however, Salvador Villar built a house of his own in the island sitio of Lalutaya, barangay
Bucana, El Nido, Palawan, and the spouses Danilo and Josefina Ramos lived with him in the
same house. Being more advanced in age than them, and though still a bachelor, Salvador Villar
had been regarded by the spouses as elder member of their family.
Mary Ann Ramos became of school age in 1989. The island-sitio of Lalutaya where the Ramoses
and other migrants from Masbate settled some years back, however, was yet without a school.
The school nearest to the island-sitio is located in barangay Bucana, El Nido, Palawan. It was
that school were Mary Ann Ramos and other children of school ages from sitio Lalutaya go to.
To provide the school children from sitio Lalutaya with a place to stay in during school days, the
Ramoses and Salvador Villa built a house where they were to live in barangay Bucana, El Nido,
Palawan. Recognizing the need for someone to look after the welfare of the children and attend
to their meals and all household needs, their parents engaged the services of Salvador Villar to
act as their caretaker and some kind of a guardian.
In that capacity Salvador Villar conducts the school children on a banca from sitio Lalutaya to
barangay Bucana late in the afternoon of every Sunday. He stays with the children in barangay
Bucana attending to the preparation of their meals and other household chores during school
days. He conducts them back to sitio Lalutaya after dismissal from classes in the afternoon of
every Friday.
The accused consistently acted as caretaker and guardian of Mary Ann Ramos from the time she
was enrolled in Grade I. By the start of school year 1993-1994, though, he had under his care in
barangay Bucana, not only Mary Ann but four (4) others, namely; Mae Ramos, a younger sister
of Mary Ann; Liezl Ranilo, and the brothers Ernie and Rene Maltos, all cousins of the Ramos
sisters. For some time all went well in the manner Salvador performed his duties as guardian of
the school children, until the happening of the incident which provided the basis for the
institution of the instant twin indictments.
The building serving some kind of a dormitory for Mary Ann and the four (4) other school
children with her is a structure of light
398

People vs. Villar
materials with a floor area measuring about 18 feet long and 16 feet wide. The walls are made of
sawali, or wooden buho (reed), and with roof of nipa shingles. Its floor, built about three (3) feet
above the ground, is made of bamboo slats.
The house they were living is so structured that it could be said to have two (2) rooms. One room
serves as bedroom while on one side of the other is the place for the kitchen, and section for the
dining room. Mary Ann and the two other girls sleep side by side on mats spread on the floor in
the bedroom while the boys, Ernie and Rene Maltos, also sleep beside each other on another side
of the room close to the kitchen. Salvador Villar, on the other hand, sleeps on a bed close to the
two boys.
Roughly 10:00 o’clock, one evening about the middle of January, 1993, and while all the four (4)
other children with her were already asleep, Mary Ann noticed Salvador Villar approached her
and with a knife poked at her chest, undressed her. Even as she struggled to prevent him from
undressing her he also took off her panty and made her lie down. She attempted to shout but he
covered her mouth with his hand. Then he laid on top of her and thereupon forcibly inserted his
male organ in her female genitalia. With his penis inside her private organ he executed repeated
pumping motions. The entry of his male organ into her reproductive organ, and his execution of
the pumping motions, caused her intense pain which made her momentary loss of consciousness.
When shortly after she regained consciousness, she felt pain in her female organ. Realizing that
her organ had been bleeding she became frightened. Just then, Salvador Villar warned her not to
tell anyone what happened or he will kill her. (TSN, Roselyn N. Teologo, February 9, 1995, pp.
9-14.) Because of fear instilled in her by that threat she refrained from telling anyone about what
the accused did to her.
That was not to be the last time the accused forcibly imposed his sexual gratification on the
complainant.
For a period of about a year thereafter the accused repeatedly had forcible carnal knowledge of
the complainant at intervals of more or less three days, or about ten (10) times a month. He raped
her so many times, about a hundred (100) times, that she was unable to recall the precise dates of
each assault on her. Aside from the first occasion which she recalled to have taken place one
evening about the middle of January, 1993, the only other occasion which took place also in the
house they were staying in barangay Bucana,
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People vs. Villar
El Nido, Palawan, was in the evening of January 19, 1994. (TSN, Roselyn N. Teologo, June 9,
1995, pp. 14-23)
In the evening of January 19, 1994, the accused again forcibly had carnal knowledge of the
complainant. About 10:00 o’clock that evening, and after all the other school children with Mary
Ann have already been asleep, the accused approached her and for nth time forcibly undressed
her. Thereafter, he laid on top of her and inserted his male organ into hers. With his penis inside
her female organ he executed pumping motions even as she struggled to free herself from him.
With his weight over her body and with a knife poked on her she was unable to extricate herself.
Occasioned by the fear instilled in her by the threat to her life by the accused, the repeated sexual
assaults on the complainant by the said accused would not have been disclosed to her parents
were it not for another unusual incident which may have some bearing to the successive
commission of the offenses herein charged.
As usual, on January 20, 1994, a Thursday, Salvador Villar cooked their supper, and at
dinnertime set the table for their meals. They ate their supper at about 6:30 o’clock in the
evening, as usual. Salvador Villar partook of the meal with them and the children noticed that he
was already drunk at the time. After having been through eating, the children, as usual, cleared
the table and washed the dishes. Thereafter, Salvador Villar left and some time later the children
went to bed, without Salvador Villar having been back.
After the children have been asleep for some time they were awakened when Salvador Villar
came. On getting up the house, Salvador Villar drank water first then threw the water container
out on the window. Afterwards, he went inside the room where the children have been sleeping
and in a drunken mode shouted: “Nasan na Kayo, mga putang ina kayo!” On seeing him with a
drawn bolo on hand the children, overcame with fright, rose from bed, jumped out through the
window and proceeded together to, and took refuge in, the house of one Minda Mentos. Ms.
Mentos welcomed them and made them get up her house. After a while Salvador Villar came,
fetching them, but they did not go back with him. Instead, they spent the night in the house of
Minda Mentos to whom they related why they jumped out through the window.
The children returned to their place of abode the following morning of January 21, 1994.
Salvador Villar prepared their breakfast that morning which they partook with him. When asked
while eating why he chased them the night before, the accused told them that he was drunk and
did not know what he was doing.
400

People vs. Villar
Soon after Mary Ann Ramos was sexually abused by Salvador Villar, she related to her 9-year
old cousin, Liezl Ranilo, what the accused did to her. But Liezl likewise refrained from
disclosing it to their parents because she was likewise afraid of the threat by the accused. It was
that incident which made the children jump out of the window which led to the disclosure by
Mary Ann of the sexual abuse on her by the accused.
As was the habit, after dismissal from their classes late in the afternoon of Friday, January 21,
1994, the children proceeded home on a banca to their parents in sitio Lalutaya, barangay El
Nido, Palawan. Thru Liezl Ranilo, the mother of Mary Ann Ramos learned about the incident
which made them jump out through the window. Thereupon, her mother asked Mary Ann why
they jumped out through the window and she related why, including what Salvador Villar had
been doing to her. Her mother spanked her. But the following morning they proceeded to the
town hall of El Nido and filed a complaint for rape against Salvador Villar. (TSN, Roselyn N.
Teologo, 9 February, 1995, pp. 16-17)
Aside from filing a complaint, Mary Ann, accompanied by her mother, also submitted for
physical/medical examination by a physician on January 27, 1994. Dr. Nestor A. Reyes of the
District hospital of Taytay, Palawan, conducted that examination and issued Medico Legal
Certificate, marked Exhibit “C,” the full text of which follows:
“Patient Mary Ann Ramos, 10 years old

residing at barangay Bucana, El
Nido, Palawan
“Place of incident: Inside the room (Residential)
“Date of incident: From January 1993 to January
19, 1994
“Time of incident: Nighttime
“Place of treatment: Taytay District Hospital, Taytay,
Palawan
“Date of treatment: January 27, 1994
“Time of treatment: 3:30 PM
FINDINGS:
1. 1. Breast undeveloped
2. 2. Absence of pubic hair
3. 3. Hymen with old healed lacerations at 6, 8, 9 and 12 o’clock
4. 4. Vagina admits 1 finger easily.
401
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People vs. Villar
REMARKS:
“-had possible
-sexual intercourse”
(pp. 18-24, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant imputes two errors upon the trial court for convicting him of two counts of
rape, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF TWO COUNTS OF RAPE (IN JANUARY 1993 AND
ON JANUARY 19, 1994) DESPITE THE IMPROBABLE AND INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 11874 AND SENTENCING HIM TO DEATH PURSUANT TO
SECTION 11 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659 AMENDING ARTICLE 336 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE.
In his brief, accused-appellant resolutely questions the factual findings of the trial court
concerning the credibility of the victim. For instance, accused-appellant cites the inconsistency
between the victim’s declaration in her sworn statement and her direct testimony in court as to
the exact time when she was first raped by accused-appellant in 1993.
The argument fails to persuade us.
It may well be pointed out that not all kinds of inconsistency of a witness render the witness’
testimony unworthy of credence. Verily, inconsistencies in minor details reinforce rather than
weaken credibility (People vs. Del Prado, 110 Phil. 1034 [1960]), and such inconsistencies do
not materially impair the credibility of the witness (People vs. Modelo, 35 SCRA 639 [1970]).
Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the Court finds the materiality of the exact time the
crime
402

People vs. Villar
was committed as a minor detail and not of great significance. The more important consideration
is that the declarations of the victim both in her sworn statement before the investigating police
officer and in her testimony in court, are consistent on the basic matters constituting the elements
of the crime charged. Besides, this Court has already ruled that discrepancy between the
witnesses’ testimony in court and the affidavits they had previously signed, as to minor details
regarding the commission of the crime, do not constitute sufficient ground to impeach the
credibility of said witnesses, where on material and important points their declarations are
consistent (People vs. Valera, 5 SCRA 910 [1962]).
Furthermore, the Court cannot impose the burden of exactness in the victim’s recollection of her
harrowing experience more so in the present case where the victim was an innocent and tender 9-
year old lass when she was first raped. It is all the more understandable that the victim in the
present case may have been confused as to the exact details of each and every rape incident,
considering that she claimed she had been sexually ravished for more than 100 times in a span of
one whole year. It is in fact expected that such a victim would rather wish and even purposely
forget the abhorrent memories of every single occasion. This being the case, it would be exacting
too much should the Court demand a very accurate, detailed, and flawless account of the two
occasions now subject of her charges out of the 100 occasions of forcible intercourse. In People
vs. Sagucio (277 SCRA 183 [1997]), where this Court faced the same issue of alleged
inconsistencies in the victim’s narration, we held that errorless testimony cannot be expected
especially when a witness is recounting details of a harrowing experience. A court cannot expect
a rape victim to remember every detail of the appalling outrage.
Accused-appellant also contends that the victim’s testimony is unworthy of credence because of
the inherent improbability of her testimony that nobody in their house learned of the repeated
abuse that had been going which may be noticed from any unusual behavior on her part and in
spite of the fact
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People vs. Villar
that there were five individuals sleeping side by side on the floor.
The argument does not have much weight.
We find no competent evidence showing that the victim exhibited no unusual behavior during
the one-year period that she was being sexually abused by accused-appellant. The lack of
concrete evidence of any unusual behavior on record does not prove that there was in fact no
such unusual behavior. If accused-appellant wanted the court to consider such an allegation, it
was incumbent upon him to prove the same with competent evidence. The fundamental rule is
that upon him who alleges rests the burden of proof. He cannot simply rely on the lack of
evidence showing the contrary.
We likewise find no merit in accused-appellant’s contention that it was improbable that nobody
witnessed the rapes despite the fact that there were five of them sleeping inside the same room
where the offenses were allegedly committed. This argument is not new in this jurisdiction. In
fact, in People vs. Sangil (276 SCRA 532 [1997]), we noted that:
. . . the commission of rape was concededly “improbable but not impossible . . .
In People vs. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor couples
with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem a problem despite the
presence of other persons around them. Considering the cramped space and meager room for
privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to quick and less disturbing modes of sexual
congresses which elude the attention of family members; otherwise, under the circumstances, it
would be almost impossible to copulate with them around even when asleep. It is also not
impossible nor incredible for the family members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened
while the sexual assault is being committed. One may also suppose that growing children sleep
more soundly than grown-ups and are not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in
the night. There is no merit in appellant’s contention that there can be no rape in a room where
other people are present. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. We have
repeatedly declared that
404

People vs. Villar
“lust is no respecter of time and place,” and rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of
places.
(pp. 539-540)
Finally, accused-appellant claims that the death penalty cannot be imposed upon him under the
provisions of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 which pertinently provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim.
He posits that he was not a guardian of the victim. He argues that he was a mere employee of the
victim’s parents, spouses Danilo and Josefina Ramos, charged with the duty of looking after the
needs of their children Mary Ann and May Ramos, and likewise given the task of conducting
them by banca from Barangay Bucana to Sitio Lalutaya and vice-versa to attend school. He
further contends that he cannot be said to have the power, control or authority over the person of
Mary Ann Ramos which a guardian should have, because it is still her parents who exercise the
same over her. He insists that he served as a mere companion of the children while they attended
their classes.
There may be ample evidence on record to show that accused-appellant qualified as a guardian
of the victim the way the lawmakers intended the word to be understood, but the Court reserves
its ruling on the issue considering that this special qualifying circumstance of being a guardian
was not duly alleged in the information.
The Court cannot affirm the death sentence imposed by the trial court anchored upon the above-
cited provision of the Death Penalty Law.
In People vs. Dela Cuesta (G.R. No. 126134, March 2, 1999), we held:
405
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People vs. Villar
The seven modes of committing rape introduced under R.A. 7659 and R.A. 4111 which warrant
the automatic imposition of death penalty partake of the nature of a qualifying circumstance
under the Revised Penal Code since it increases the penalty or rape to one degree. As such, this
qualifying circumstance, that the child is under eighteen (18) and the offender is a guardian,
should be alleged in the information to be appreciated as such.
(pp. 10-11)
Although the circumstances to qualify simple rape to the heinous crime of rape, namely: (a)
victim under 18 years old (the certificate of live birth—exhibit “A” was admitted by the
defense), and (b) the offender being a guardian, were duly proven in the present case, these
circumstance cannot considered for purposes of imposing the extreme penalty of death unless
these were alleged in the information. An examination of the two informations in the present
case reveals that only the qualifying circumstance that the child is under 12 was alleged. There
was no allegation that the offender was a guardian of the victim. To consider said circumstance
as qualifying, would constitute denial of the right of accused-appellant to due process and to be
informed of the charges against him. At best, such circumstance may only be treated as a generic
aggravating circumstance, which, in the case of simple statutory rape, however, is
inconsequential because the imposable penalty is the singular indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
For each the two counts of simple statutory rape, accused-appellant may be held civilly liable for
the amount of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity and an additional P50,000.00 as moral damages.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant for two counts of rape justified by
the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional
Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, stationed at Puerto Princesa City (a) in Criminal Case No.
11875 sentencing accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua, with civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in
favor of the victim, with an AD-
406

People vs. Villar
DITIONAL P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 11875 MODIFYING
the sentence to reclusion perpetua, also with civil indemnity of P50,000.00, and P50,000.00 as
moral damages in favor of the victim. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.—Inconsistency between two statements of a witness should be determined, not by resort

to individual words or phrases alone, but by the whole impression or effect of what has been said
or done. (People vs. Gabas, 233 SCRA 77 [1994])
A trivial inconsistency does not rock the pedestal upon which the complainant’s credibility
rests—it enhances credibility as it manifests spontaneity and lack of scheming. (People vs.
Cristobal, 252 SCRA 507 [1996])
The restrictive definition of a guardian, that of a legal or judicial guardian, should be used in
construing the term “guardian” for the purpose of imposing the death penalty under Republic Act
7659. (People vs. De la Cuesta, 304 SCRA 83 [1999])

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G.R. No. 86939. August 2, 1993.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 3

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Valmonte Law Office for accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 5

6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 7

identified as Santos Ducay’s son, Edgardo.9

8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 9

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VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 11

1. “1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS ‘POSITIVE’

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

These claims are without merit.

A careful evaluation of the records and the evidence adduced

Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 543).

VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 13

In court, Edwin unhesitatingly pointed to the appellant as one of the assailants.36

14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 15

Professor Wigmore gives the following enlightening commentary:

Instead, the defense imputes suppression of evidence upon the

16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

179 SCRA 5 [1989]; People vs. Sanchez, 213 SCRA 70 [1992].

VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 17

18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The testimonies of the witnesses and the nature of the wounds

VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 19

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VOL. 225, AUGUST 2, 1993 21

Cruz (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Challenged judgment affirmed with modification.

Note.—Failure to make timely objection to information charging several offenses constitutes

G.R. Nos. 141154-56. January 15, 2002.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Criminal Law; Murder; Illegal Possession of Firearms; Aggravating Circumstances; RA 8294,

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The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.

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Neither should we ascribe importance, as the accused-appellant seems to suggest, to an apparent

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VOL. 373, JANUARY 15, 2002 283

Judgment affirmed with modification.

G.R. No. 127572. January 19, 2000.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-