Republic of the Philippines were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the
SUPREME COURT opposite direction, followed by another which tried to
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988
HEDY GAN y YU, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Pacis, Baluyot, Reyes & De Leon for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioner Hedy Gan was convicted of the crime of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence in
Criminal Case No. 10201 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXII presided
by Judge Federico C. Alikpala. She was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum and two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum and was made to indemnify the heirs of
the victim the sum of P12,000.00 without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs. On appeal, the trial court's decision was modified and petitioner was
convicted only of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. Still unsatisfied with the decision of the
Court of Appeals,1 petitioner has come to this Court for a complete reversal of the judgment
below.
The facts of the case as found by the appellate court are as follows:
In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 o'clock, the
accused Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along
North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While in front of
house no. 694 of North Bay Boulevard, there were two
vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one side of
the road, one following the other about two to three
meters from each other. As the car driven by the
accused approached the place where the two vehicles
overtake and bypass the one in front of it and thereby
encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused.
To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle,
the defendant swerved to the right and as a
consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota Crown
Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the
boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the
rear of the parked jeepney. The force of the impact
caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the
rear of the parts truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was
injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front,
the jeep suffered damages on its rear and front paints,
and the truck sustained scratches at the wooden
portion of its rear. The body of the old man who was
later Identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately
brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but was
(pronounced) dead on arrival.2
An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed
against petitioner in view of the above incident. She entered a plea of
not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for trial.
Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was granted a re-investigation by
the City Fiscal, as a result of which the trial fiscal moved for the
dismissal of the case against petitioner during the resumption of
hearing on September 7, 1972. The grounds cited therefor were lack
of interest on the part of the complaining witness to prosecute the
case as evidenced by an affidavit of desistance submitted to the trial
court and lack of eyewitness to sustain the charge.
The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was never resolved. The
Court instead ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. After
the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
On December 22, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the of- offense charged.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 14472-
CR. On May 3, 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, as modified, the accused Hedy Gan is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide thru simple imprudence and, pursuant to
paragraph 2, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
she is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of
three (3) months and eleven (11) days of arresto
mayor and to indemnify the heirs of Isidoro Casino in
the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (Pl2,000.00)
without, however, any subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 3
Petitioner now appeals to this Court on the following assignments of
errors:
I negligence." 6
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that when the
petitioner saw a car travelling directly towards her, she
should have stepped on the brakes immediately or in
swerving her vehicle to the right should have also
stepped on the brakes or lessened her speed, to avoid
the death of a pedestrian.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner
of the crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging the petitioner
liable to indemnify the deceased in the sum of
P12,000.00.4
We reverse.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing
an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of
another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as
a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so,
the law imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against its
mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. 5
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule.
"Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not
guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide.
The appellate court in finding the petitioner guilty said:
The accused should have stepped on the brakes when
she saw the car going in the opposite direction followed
by another which overtook the first by passing towards
its left. She should not only have swerved the car she
was driving to the right but should have also tried to
stop or lessen her speed so that she would not bump
into the pedestrian who was crossing at the time but
also the jeepney which was then parked along the
street. 7
The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem
reasonable were it not for the fact that such suggestion did not take
into account the amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the
situation she was in. For it is undeniable that the suggested course
of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to analyze the
situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the different
courses of action would result in the least possible harm to herself
and to others.
rational thinking but only enough time to heed the very powerfull
instinct of self-preservation.
Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was
driving her car within the legal limits. We therefore rule that the
"emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full force to the case
at bar and consequently absolve petitioner from any criminal
negligence in connection with the incident under consideration.

Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented by the
prosecution with respect to the relative distances of petitioner to the
parked jeepney and the oncoming overtaking vehicle that would tend
to prove that petitioner did have sufficient time to reflect on the
consequences of her instant decision to swerve her car to the light
without stepping on her brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by
the prosecution on this point is the petitioner's statement to the
police 8 stating::
We further set aside the award of damages to the heirs of the victim,
who by executing a release of the claim due them, had effectively
and clearly waived their right thereto.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting petitioner
HEDY GAN y YU of the crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence.
She is no longer liable for the P12,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by
the appellate court to the heirs of the victim.

And masasabi ko lang ho umiwas ho ako sa isang SO ORDERED.

sasakyan na biglang nagovertake sa sasakyan na
aking kasalubong kung kaya ay aking kinabig sa kanan Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
ang akin kotse subalit siya naman biglangpagtawid ng
tao o victim at hindi ko na ho naiwasan at ako ay wala Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
ng magawa . Iyan ho ang buong pangyayari nang
nasabing aksidente.9 (Emphasis supplied)

The prosecution having presented this exhibit as its own evidence,

we cannot but deem its veracity to have been admitted by it. Thus,
under the circumstances narrated by petitioner, we find that the
appellate court is asking too much from a mere mortal like the
petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best
judgment to extricate herself from a difficult and dangerous situation
caused by the driver of the overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly
could not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under
normal conditions. 10 The danger confronting petitioner was real and
imminent, threatening her very existence. She had no opportunity for
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25366 March 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE BUAN, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Felipe C. Magat and Amado D. Dyoco for accused-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
Direct appeal by the accused from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, in its Criminal Case No. 5243 (for serious physical
injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence), overruling a
motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.
Stripped to essentials, the case arose in this wise:
The accused was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca
Company on July 23, 1962, along the MacArthur Highway in the
municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan. Allegedly because of his negligence —
and recklessness, the vehicle driven by him struck and collided with the
passenger jeep of Sergio Lumidao, damaging said jeep and causing it to
turn turtle, and injuring its passengers. Six of the latter suffered slight
physical injuries requiring medical attendance for 5 to 9 days: three other
riders came out with serious bodily injuries that needed medical attention
for 30 to 45 days; while the jeep was damaged to the extent of P1,395.00.
A charge was filed against the accused-appellant, one for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Guiguinto, for which he was tried and acquitted on December 16,
1963. Prior to this acquittal, however, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed
in the Court of First Instance the information in the case now before us, for
serious physical injuries, and damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Admittedly, both charges referred to the same highway
collision.
When the accused was arraigned in the Court of First Instance, his
counsel moved to quash the charges on the ground that he had already
been acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the Peace Court. The
prosecution opposed the motion and the Court denied the motion quash.
Unable to secure reconsideration, the accused appealed to this Court.
Sole issue before us, therefore, is whether the second case placed
the appellant twice in jeopardy for the same offense, and is barred by the
previous acquittal.
We agree with the appellant that the Court below erred in not
dismissing the information for "serious physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence," in view of the appellant's previous
acquittal by the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, for the
same imprudence.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless
act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different
crimes and prosecutions. This has been the constant ruling of the Spanish
Supreme Court, and is also that of this Court in its most recent decisions
on the matter.
Thus, in People vs. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, where as the
result of the same vehicular accident one man died, two persons were
seriously injured while another three suffered only slight physical injuries,
we ruled that the acquittal on a charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, was a bar to another prosecution for homicide
through reckless imprudence. In People vs. Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954,
the ruling was that the dismissal by the Municipal Court of a charge of
reckless driving barred a second information of damage to property through
reckless imprudence based on the same negligent act of the accused.
In People vs, Belga, 100 Phil. 996, dismissal of an information for physical
injuries through needless imprudence as a result of a collision between two
automobiles was declared, to block two other prosecutions, one for
damage to property through reckless imprudence and another for multiple
physical injuries arising from the same collision. The same doctrine was
reasserted in Yap vs. Lutero, et al., L-12669, April 30, 1959. In none of the
cases cited did the Supreme Court regard as material that the various
offenses charged for the same occurrence were triable in Courts of
differing category, or that the complainants were not the individuals.
As for the Spanish jurisprudence, Cuello Calon, in his Derecho
Penal (12th Ed.), Vol. I, p. 439, has this to say:
1äwphï1.ñët
Aun cuando de un solo hecho imprudente se originen males
diversos, como el hecho culposo es uno solo, existe un solo delito
de imprudencia. Esta es jurisprudencia constante del Tribunal
Supremo. De acuerdo con esta doctrinael automovilista imprudente
que atropella y causa lesiones a dos personas y ademas daños, no
respondera de dos delitos de lesiones y uno de daños por
imprudencia, sino de un solo delito culposo.
The said author cites in support of the text the following decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain (footnotes 2 and 3).
8 octubre 1887, 18 octubre 1927.
Si con el hecho imprudente se causa la muerte de una
persona y ademas se ocasionan daños, existe un solo hecho
punible, pues uno solo fue el acto, aun cuando deben apreciarse
dos enorden a la responsabilidad civil, 14 diciembre 1931 si a
consecuencia de un solo acto imprudente se produjeron tres
delitos, dos de homicidio y uno de daños, como todos son
consecuencia de un solo acto culposo, no cabe penarlos por
separado, 2 abril 1932.
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the
accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing
of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and
rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. Diaz, supra:
... The prosecution's contention might be true. But neither
was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant
for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously
cleared by the inferior court.
In view of the foregoing, we must perforce rule that the exoneration
of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal)
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance
of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of
one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan is directed to quash and dismiss the charge in
its Criminal Case No. 5243. No costs. So ordered.
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46934 April 15, 1988
ALFREDO CUYOS y TULOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NICOLAS P. GARCIA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, San
Fernando, Pampanga and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
De la Cruz, De Loso and Sison Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos, in this Petition for certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction seeks to set aside
the Order dated 9 September 1977 issued by respondent Municipal Court Judge Nicolas P. Garcia in Criminal
Case No. 77-1848 (entitled " People of the Philippines, plaintiff vs. Alfredo Cuyos y Tulor, accused") denying
petitioner's Motion to Transfer said case to the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga for trial on the merits.
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, with homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage
to property, through reckless imprudence. Petitioner was driver of a cargo truck
which had collided with a Volkswagen automobile in a vehicular accident which
resulted in the death of one (1) person and physical injuries to four (4) other
people. The Amended Complaint against petitioner read as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of June 1977, at about 6:10 P.M.,
at the MacArthur Highway, barrio San Isidro, San Fernando,
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and
person in charge of a truck bearing plate No. V 139 T Filipinos
1977, willfully and unlawfully drive and operate the same in a
negligent, imprudent and careless manner, and without due
regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations, and without taking
the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and
damage to property, causing by such negligence, imprudence
and carelessness, the said truck driven and operated by him
bumped and hit a Volkswagen car bearing plate no. E 604
Filipinos 1977, then driven by Antonio M. Concepcion, as a
result of which one of the occupants of the said car, Victoriana
Miranda Concepcion died in the said accident, and the other
occupants namely: Antonio Concepcion, Rhinna Lin Capili,
Renee Ann Capili and Lourdes Concepcion sustained serious
physical injuries, and the said car suffered damages in the
amount of P18,000.00, belonging to Antonio Concepcion, to
the damage and prejudice of the offended parties.
Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment. After arraignment,
respondent Judge set the case for trial on 12,14 and 16 September 1977.
Before trial could commence, however, petitioner filed on 6 September 1977 a
" Motion to Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance for Trial" , alleging
lack of jurisdiction over the case on the part of the Municipal Court. Petitioner's
argument was that the amended criminal complaint alleged that the
Volkswagen car involved in the accident had suffered damages amounting to
P18,000.00, and that under paragraph 3, Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, the crime with which he was charged would carry a fine in an amount
ranging from the amount of the damage to three (3) times the value of the
damage alleged (i.e. 3 x P18,000.00 or P54,000.00). Petitioner urged in his
Motion that because under Section 87 (e) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
amended (Republic Act No. 296 as amended), the respondent Municipal Court
of the Provincial Capital of Pampanga, had jurisdiction only over offenses
punishable by a fine not exceeding P6,000.00, the case had to be transferred
to the Court of First Instance. On the same date, petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion to Postpone the trial of the case relying on the same grounds set out in
his Motion to Transfer the Case to the Court of First Instance.
After a joint hearing of the two (2) Motions filed by petitioner, the respondent
Municipal judge issued an order dated 9 September 1977 denying the Motion
to transfer the Case to the Court of First Instance and set the trial of the case
for 5 October 1977. A verbal Motion for Reconsideration by petitioner was
denied.
Hence the present Petition for Certiorari, assailing the jurisdiction of the
respondent court to try the criminal case against petitioner on the merits.
By a Resolution dated 26 September 1977, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the respondent Municipal Court from proceeding
with Criminal Case No. 77-1848.
The sole issue raised in this Petition is whether or not the respondent
Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the criminal
case against petitioner.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated 27 October 1977, agreed with
and adopted the position taken by petitioner that respondent Municipal Court
has no jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. 77-1848. The Court agrees with the
Solicitor General.
Criminal Case No. 77-1848 involves a complex crime of homicide, multiple
serious physical injuries and damage to property, resulting from reckless
imprudence. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, in a prosecution for
a complex crime constituted by two (2) or more grave or less grave felonies,
the penalty for the most serious crime is to be imposed, the same to be applied
in its maximum period. In the present case, one might, as respondent
Municipal Judge did, look only at the acts which constitute the offenses
comprising the complex crime here involved. One is likely to do so through
eyes which are culturally conditioned and so is likely to assume, as did
respondent Municipal Judge, that the most serious offense of which petitioner
is accused is homicide through reckless imprudence. Under paragraph 2,
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable upon petitioner,
should he be found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence, would
be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions contained in this Article shall not be applicable:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of
the automobile law, the death of a person shall be caused, in
which case the defendants shall be punished
by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
xxx xxx xxx
At the time of the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioner before the
Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, such Municipal Court in the
capital of the Province of Pampanga had jurisdiction to impose a penalty of
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine not exceeding P6,000. 00 or
both. The applicable provision was the fourth paragraph of Article 87 (c) of
Republic Act No. 296 as amended which provided as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces
and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court
of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense
committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the
penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional
or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not
exceeding six thousand pesos or both, and in the absence of
the district judge, shall have like jurisdiction within the province
as the Court of First Instance to hear applications for bail.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if the basic assumption made earlier as to the relative gravity of
homicide through reckless imprudence and damage to property through
reckless imprudence were correct, the respondent Municipal Judge would
have to be vested with jurisdiction over the criminal charges against petitioner.
As a technical legal proposition, however, the relative seriousness of offenses
is determined by the seriousness of the penalties attached by the law to the
several offenses. It was noted earlier that the imposable penalty in case of
homicide through reckless imprudence is prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, i.e., a correctional penalty in the scale of penalties set
up in Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon the other hand, the penalty
for damage to property through reckless imprudence is provided for in the third
paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code which reads as follows:
When the execution of the Act covered by this Article shall
have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
 equal to the value of paid damages to three-times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than P25.00.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 26 of the same Code, a fine may be an afflictive penalty (i.e., if it
exceeds P6,000.00) or a correctional penalty (i.e., if it is P200.00 or more but
does not exceed P6,000.00). The offense so penalized with a fine may be a
grave felony (i.e. if the imposable fine is afflictive in nature) or a less grave
felony (i.e., if the imposable fine is merely correctional). 1 In the instant case,
the maximum fine which may be imposed upon petitioner is P54,000.00 (3 x
P18,000.00), obviously an afflictive penalty and hence, in the scheme of the
Revised Penal Code, more serious than the penalty imposable for homicide
through reckless imprudence.
In complex crimes, it is not uncommon that one constitutive offense carries
with it an afflictive penalty while the other or other constitutive offenses carry
with them only a correctional or even a light penalty. Jurisdiction over the
whole complex crime must logically be lodged with the trial court having
jurisdiction to impose the maximum and most serious penalty imposable on an
offense forming part of the complex crime. A complex crime must be
prosecuted integrally, as it were, and not split into its component offenses and
the latter made the subject of multiple informations possibly brought in different
courts. This is the thrust of our case law on the matter.
In Angeles, etc., et al, v. Jose, et al., 2 the Court had occasion to deal with a
criminal information against one Domingo Mejia before the Court of First
Instance of Manila, charging him with the crime of damage to property in the
sum of P654.22 and with less serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, committed, in one single act. There, the respondent Court of First
Instance dismissed the criminal information upon the ground that the penalty
prescribed by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code was only arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods which was within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Municipal Court. The prosecution then invited attention to the fact that the
fine which could be imposed by the respondent court on account of the
damage to property through reckless imprudence was a sum ranging from
P654.22 to P1,962.66 (P654.22 x 3) which amount was beyond the jurisdiction
of a Municipal Court to impose as fine. In setting aside the order of dismissal
by the respondent Court of First Instance and remanding the case to the trial
court further proceedings, the Supreme Court said:
[The third paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code]
simply means that if there is only damage to property the
amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also
physical injuries there, should be an additional penalty for the
latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the
physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, for
both the injuries and the damage committed were caused by
one single act of the defendant and constitute what may be
called a complex crime of physical injuries and damage to
property. It is clear that the fine fixed by law in this case is
beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court and within that of
the court of first instance. 3(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in Angeles, we held that the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance
of the case must be determined, not by the penalty for the physical injuries
charged but by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from
reckless imprudence. Damage to property through reckless imprudence need
not be a lighter offense than less serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Because the maximum fine (P1,962.66) imposable upon the
accused in the Angeles case was beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Court of Manila to impose, the criminal case fell within the jurisdiction of the
respondent Court of First Instance of Manila.
People v. Villanueva 4 followed the rule set out in Angeles. In Villanueva, the
accused was charged before the Justice of Peace Court of Batangas,
Batangas with the crime of serious and less serious physical injuries, with
damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00, through reckless imprudence.
The Justice of Peace Court subsequently declared itself without jurisdiction to
try the case and forwarded the same to the Court of First Instance. The latter
court then declared itself similarly without jurisdiction over the complex crime
charged in the information, upon the ground that the penalty for the graver
offense of physical injuries through reckless imprudence was only arresto
mayor in its, maximum and medium periods which penalty, even if applied in
its maximum degree (in view of the complex -nature of the crime), would
remain within the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace Court. Upon appeal by the
prosecution, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held that
the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the complex crime there
involved:
We find the appeal well taken, for this case comes squarely
under the rule laid down by us in Angeles, et al. v. ,rose, et
al. [96 Phil. 151 (1954)],, wherein we held that.—
xxx xxx xxx
 Consider that it is the court of first instance that would
undoubtedly have jurisdiction if the only offense that resulted
from appellant's imprudence were the damage to property in
the amount of P2,636.00, it would be absurd to hold that for the
graver offense of serious and less serious physical injuries
combined with damage to property through reckless
imprudence, jurisdiction would lie in the justice of the peace
court. The presumption is against absurdity, and it is the duty of
the courts to interpret the law in such a way as to avoid absurd
results. Our system of apportionment of criminal jurisdictions
among the various trial courts proceeds on the basic theory
that crimes cognizable by the Courts of First Instance are more
serious than those triable injustice of the peace or municipal
courts.
Moreover, we cannot discard the possibility that the
prosecution may not be able to prove all the supposed offenses
constituting the complex crime charge. Were we to hold that it
is the justice of the Peace court that has jurisdiction in this
case, if later the prosecution should fail to prove the physical
injuries aspect of the case and establish only the damage to
property in the amount of P2,636.00, the inferior court would
find itself without jurisdiction to impose the fine for the damage
to property committed, since such fine can not be less than the
amount of the damage. Again, it is to avoid this further
absurdity that we must hold that the jurisdiction lies in the court
of first instance in this case. 5
The applicable rule on the allocation of jurisdiction between an inferior court on
the one hand and the Regional Trial Court on the other, in respect of complex
crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries
and damage to property, was summarized by Mr. Justice Barrera in People v.
Malabanan: 6
It is true that, following the ruling of this Court in the case of
Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-6382, March 30,1954
(40 O.G. 18 supp.), in imposing the corresponding penalty, to
the quasi-offense of reckless imprudence resulting in physical
injuries and damage to property, Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code should be applied. However, there may be cases,
as the one at bar, where the imposable penalty for the physical
injuries charged would come within the jurisdiction of the
municipal or justice of the peace court while the fine, for the
damage to property, would fall on the Court of First
Instance. As the information cannot be split into two, one for
damages and another for the physical injuries, the jurisdiction
of the court to take cognizance of the case must be determined
not by the corresponding penalty for the physical injuries
charged but by the fine imposable for the damage to property
resulting from the reckless imprudence. 7 (Emphasis supplied)
It remains only to point out that under B.P. Blg. 129, the law presently in effect,
we would have to reach the same result: i.e., that the criminal case against
petitioner falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Under Section
32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment of not exceeding four (4) years and two (2)
months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both
such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they should have exclusive original jurisdiction
where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand
pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the maximum fine imposable in the present case is P54,000.00, and the
maximum imprisonment imposable (for the homicide through reckless
imprudence) is six (6) years, clearly, the criminal charge involved falls outside
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court and consequently within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the respondent Municipal Court of 9 September
1977 is hereby SET ASIDE as null and void and the Temporary Restraining
Order issued by this Court on 26 September 1977 is hereby made
PERMANENT. Because the proceedings before the respondent Municipal
Court are null and void, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga will have to file a
new information against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando,
Pampanga. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 195671 January 21, 2015
ROGELIO J. GONZAGA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated
September 18, 2009 and the Resolution3dated January 26, 2011 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00427-MIN, which affirmed the
Decision4dated July 31, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon, Branch 10 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 9832-99, finding petitioner
Rogelio J. Gonzaga (Rogelio) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
At around 6 o'clock in the morning of June 25, 1997, Dionesio Inguito, Sr.
(Dionesio, Sr.) was driving his motorcycle along Brgy. Kiara, Don Carlos,
Bukidnon towards Brgy. Bocboc5 of the same municipality, to bring his two (2)
minor children, Dionesio Inguito, Jr. (Dionesio, Jr.) and Cherry
Inguito6 (Cherry), to school.7 While they were ascending the curving road going
to Bocboc on their proper lane on the right side of the road, a Toyota Land
Cruiser (Land Cruiser)driven by Rogelio was swiftly descending the same lane
from the opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his motorcycle to
signal the Land Cruiser to return to its proper lane but the Land Cruiser
remained.8 In order to avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve to the left,
but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same direction and
collided head-on with the motorcycle.9
As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his 2 children were thrown off the
motorcycle. Dionesio, Sr. was pinned beneath the Land Cruiser,10 while Cherry
and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the hood of the Land Cruiser and fell on the
side of the road,11 causing injuries to their legs. Siblings Rolf, Cherry,12 and
Jenny Ann Aquino, who were traversing the same road aboard their own
motorcycle, stopped to help and placed the victims together13 on the rightmost
side of the road facing Brgy. Bocboc,14 while Rogelio remained inside the Land
Cruiser.15
Rolf left the scene of the incident to seek further assistance, leaving his two (2)
sisters to cater to the victims.16Eventually, he chanced upon Kagawad Nerio
Dadivas (Kgd. Dadivas), who had just opened his store, and informed the latter
of the vehicular accident. After reporting the incident to the police and getting
his vehicle, Kgd. Dadivas proceeded to the site and loaded the victims to his
vehicle with Rolf’s assistance.17 Meanwhile, Rolf went to Brgy. Kawilihan to
inform Dionesio, Sr.’s wife, Clemencia Inguito (Clemencia), of what had
transpired.18 Thereafter, the victims were brought to the Emergency Hospital of
Maramag where they were treated.19 Operations were performed on the legs of
Dionesio, Jr. and Dionesio, Sr., but the latter eventually expired. Cherry’s leg
was placed in a cast and she was confined in the hospital, together with
Dionesio, Jr., for more than one (1) month, or until July 26, 1997.20 All the
expenses were shouldered by Clemencia.21
In view of the foregoing mishap, the provincial prosecutor filed an
Information22 charging Rogelio for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide
with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property "with the
aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot to the injured
party such help that was in his hands to give"23 before the RTC. Upon
arraignment,24 Rogelio entered a plea of not guilty.25
In his defense, Rogelio claimed that he was driving the Land Cruiser on his
proper lane along the descending curving road towards the direction of
Kalilangan, Bukidnon, when, from a distance of about 70 meters away, he saw
the motorcycles driven by Dionesio, Sr. and Rolf racing towards the curve from
the opposite direction.26 Dionesio, Sr. was driving his motorcycle in a zigzag
manner on the Land Cruiser’s lane while Rolf was on his proper
lane.27Undecided which side of the road to take to avoid collision, Rogelio
stopped the Land Cruiser but the motorcycle of Dionesio, Sr., nonetheless,
bumped into it.28 As a result of the impact, Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were
thrown over the roof and the hood of the Land Cruiser, respectively, and fell on
the side of the road, while Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle were pinned
beneath the land Cruiser.29 With the use of a jack handle and the assistance of
two (2) persons, i.e., Jose Bacus and Reynaldo Quidato, who arrived at the
scene, he was able to retrieve both Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle from
beneath the Land Cruiser. Thereafter, they loaded the victims on board the
Land Cruiser so they may be brought tothe hospital, but the vehicle turned out
to have defective brakes, so he asked other persons to secure another vehicle
instead.30
The RTC Proceedings
In a Decision31 dated July 31, 2006 (July 31, 2006 Decision), the RTC found
Rogelio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide withDouble Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property punishable under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC.32
It held that Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was
the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and
serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Considering further that
Rogelio failed to offer any help to the victims,33 the RTC sentenced him to
suffer a higher indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months of
prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor medium, as maximum, and ordered him to pay the following
civil liabilities: (a) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages for the death of Dionesio, Sr.;
(b) ₱30,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by the
family; (c) ₱200,000.00 for the medical expenses incurred; (d) ₱25,000.00 for
the expenses incurred during the wake and the burial; (e) ₱30,000.00 for the
damaged motorcycle; (f) ₱60,000.00 for the loss of earning capacity; and (g)
₱30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.34
Rogelio filed a motion for reconsideration35 which was partly granted in a
Resolution36 dated February 22, 2007, reducing the penalty to four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum, with the same civil liabilities. The
RTC reconsidered its opinion regarding Rogelio’s claim of having extended aid
to the victims, concluding that the jack handle that was used to get the body of
Dionesio, Sr. beneath the Land Cruiser could have been his in the absence of
showing who owned the same.37 Aggrieved, Rogelio appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision38 dated September 18, 2009, however, the CA reinstated the
RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision, thereby imposing on Rogelio the original
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum, to eight(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
medium, as maximum, and the same civil liabilities,39 hence, this petition. The
Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
upheld Rogelio’s conviction in accordance with the RTC’s July 31, 2006
Decision.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 36540 of the RPC, consists in
voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle,
it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such
negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. To constitute the
offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere
negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard
of the consequences is required.41 Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the
safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held
to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another,
either with knowledgeof serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge
of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is
the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the
consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an
act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law,
without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be
considered likewise at fault.42
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelio’s act of
driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the
collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to
Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a
curve sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound
and descending towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going.
Indeed, the very fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of
imprudent behavior. As a motorist, Rogelio was bound to exercise ordinary
care in such affair by driving at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with
the conditions encountered, as this would enable him to keep the vehicle under
control and avoid injury to others using the highway.43 Moreover, it is
elementary in traffic school that a driver slows down before negotiating a curve
as it may be reasonably anticipated that another vehicle may appear from the
opposite direction at any moment. Hence, excessive speed, combined with
other circumstances such as the occurrence of the accident on or near a
curve, as in this case, constitutes negligence.44 Consequently, the Court finds
that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the
wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the incident
happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, aswell as civilly accountable
for the material damages resulting therefrom. Nonetheless, while the CA and
the RTC concurred that the proximate cause of the collision was Rogelio’s
reckless driving, the CA Decision made no mention as to the presence or
absence of the limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC,
which imposes the penalty next higher in degreeupon the offender who "fails to
lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to
give." Based on case law, the obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent
on the means in the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of
assistance that he/she, at the time and place of the incident, is capable of
giving; and (b) requires adequate proof.45
It is well to point out that the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision found that Rogelio
failed to offer any help to the victims46and, thus, imposed on him the penalty
next higher in degree.However, upon Rogelio’s motion, the RTC reconsidered
its earlier conclusion, holding that the jack handle that was used to get the
body of Dionesio,Sr. beneath the Land Cruiser could have been his in the
absence of showing who owned the same and, accordingly, reduced the
penalty.47 Nothing was said on this point by the CA which affirmed
Rogelio’sconviction based on the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision.
The Court has perused the records and found contradictory testimonies
presented by the prosecution and the defense on this matter. Considering
1âwphi1
however, that Cherry herself admitted that the victims were first loaded on the
Land Cruiser before they were transferred to Kgd. Dadivas’s vehicle,48 the
Court is inclined to sustain Rogelio’s claim that he tried to extend help to the
victims, but when hestarted the engine with the intention to go to the hospital,
he discovered that the vehicle had no brakes.49 Hence, in imposing the proper
penalty on the accused, the qualifying circumstance under the last paragraph
of Article 365 of the RPC should not be considered.
Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense of Reckless Imprudence Resulting
to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property
under Article 365 in relation to Article 26350 of the RPC, a complex crime.
Article 48 of the RPC provides that when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime, in this case,
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.
Under Article 365 of the RPC, when reckless imprudence in the use of a motor
vehicle results in the death of a person, as in this case, the accused shall be
punished with the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,51 the minimum of said penalty
should be taken from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two
(2) years and four (4) months. Consequently, the Court finds a need to modify
the penalty to be imposed on Rogelio and thus, sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum,
as minimum, to six years of prision correccional in its maximum, as maximum.
As a final note, the Court clarifies that the order for the payment of "moral
damages" in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for the death of Dionesio, Sr. should
be, properly speaking, denominated as one for the payment of "civil indemnity"
as they were not awarded under the parameters of the Civil Code relevant
thereto,52 but was one "given without need of proof other than the fact of death
as a result of the crime and proof of [the accused’s] responsibility for it."53 This
is a palpable legal error which the Court should correct if only for terminological
propriety. With the private complainant not herein impleaded, the rest of the
RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision with respect to the civil liabilities awarded should
remain undisturbed. Note that, in line with existing jurisprudence, interest atthe
rate of six percent (6) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded
from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.54
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 18,
2009 and the Resolution dated January 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 00427-MIN, finding petitioner Rogelio J. Gonzaga guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under
Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code are hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
 (a) Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years of prision correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to six (6)
years of prision correccional in its maximum, as maximum; and

(b) The award of ₱50,000.00 for the death of Dionesio Inguito, Sr. in
favor of his heirs is denominated as "civil indemnity," instead of"moral
damages."

(c) All monetary awards for damages shall bear interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until
fully paid.

SO ORDERED.