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Goni v. CA
September 23,1986
Fernan, J.
sai
SUMMARY: Villanueva wanted to buy the 3 haciendas
owned by TABACLERA but since he had no sufficient
funds, he offered the haciendas to Villegas with Vicente as
guarantor. The amount realized from this transaction was
still not enough so he entered into a promise to sell 3 lots
of one of the haciendas with Vicente. Subsequently, 2 of
the 3 lots (lot nos 4 and 13) were subject of a lease to
Vicente for 5 years. When Villanueva died, the inventory
included the 3 lots in question. Vicente instituted an action
for recovery of property and damages against heirs and
Goni, the administrator. TC and CA ruled in favor of
Vicente. SC reversed this ruling stating that Vicente should
surrender the lots to the heirs and pay corresponding
annual rent for the fields.
DOCTRINE: Disqualification by reason of interest is
anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known
as the Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man
Statute.
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving party
and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of
equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It
is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when
death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order
to remove from the surviving party the temptation to
falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against
the deceased. But in this case, such provision is
inapplicable since such protection was effectively waived
when counsel for petitioners cross-examined Vicente. "A
waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the
representative of the estate or when counsel for the
representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters
occurring during deceased's lifetime
FACTS:
Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (TABACLERA)
owned 3 haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and
Dulce Nombre de Maria in Bais, Negros Occidental.
Praxedes Villanueva wanted to but the haciendas but did
not have sufficient funds to pay the price so, with the
consent of TABACLERA, he offered the haciendas to
Santiago Villegas, later substituted by Joaquin Villegas.
Gaspar Vicente stood as the guarantor in a document
“Escritura de Taspaso de Cuenta” since TABLACLERA did
not agree to the transaction without a guaranty.
The amount realized from the transaction between
Villegas and Villanueva was not enough so Villanueva
contracted or promised to sell fields no. 3, 4, 13 of Hacienda
Dulce Nombre for P13,807 to Vicente. The amount of
P12,460.24 was the amount debited from Vicente since it
was the amount needed to complete the purchase price.
Villanueva was able to raise funders by selling a property in
Ayungon Negros Occidental so he went to Vicente to rescind
the contract/promise to sell but since the amount was
already debited, this was not possible. They agreed that lots
4 and 13 would be leased to Vincent for 5 years starting
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1950-1951 at annual rental of 15% of the gross income,
rent to be deducted from money advanced by Vicente.
In 1949, TABACLERA executed formal deed of sale of the
3 haciendas in favor of Villanueva, including fields 3,4,and
13 which were registered in the latter’s name. These fields
were mortgaged to the Rehailitation and Finance
Corporation later transferred to PNB for total indebtedness
of P334,400. Meanwhile, fields 3 and 13 were delivered to
Vicente. Villanueva additionally executed a “Documento de
la Venta Definitive” in favor of Villegas covering Lot 314 of
Hacienda Sarria.
In 1951, Villanueva died. Included in the inventory for
intestate proceedings were fields nos. 3 and 4 (listed as lot
257 of inventory) and 13 (listed as lot no. 723). Vicente
instituted an action for recovery of property and damages
against Goni in his capacity as administrator of the estate.
Vicente sought to recover field no. 3 by virtue of the
contract/promise to sell. Gonie filed an answer with
counterclaim for accounting of the produce of fields 4 and
13 and surrender thereof at the end of the 5 th crop year in
1955 plus moral damages, atty. fees. Vicente filed an
amended complaint to include a prayer for damages
representing produce of field no. 3 until delivery thereof to
him. He later amended to include as parties-defendants
heirs of Villanueva.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts agreeing on
the costs of production and produce of the 3 fields. There
were two witnesses for Vicente: Vicente himself who
testified on the facts occurring before the death of
Villanueva and Epifanio Equio a clerk of TABACLERA
Agency I Bais Sugar Central. Defendants on the other hand
presented GOni who testified on the alleged verbal lease
agreement.
TC judgment in favor of Vicente, that the heirs should
deliver filed no. 3 to the former and to execute a formal
deed of sale covering the 3 fields. It ordered the heirs to pay
Vicente actual or compensatory damages P81,204 which
was 15% of the total gross income of field 3 for crop years
1950-51 to 1958-59. Both parties appealed
CA affirmed TC decision with modification on the amount of
damages which should be total net income from filed 3
from 1950-51 until the field is delivered to Vicente.
ISSUES AND RULING:
1.(RELEVANT) WON Gaspar Vicente may testify on
matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva
which constitutes a claim or demand upon his estate in
violation of Rule 130 Sec. 20 paragraph A—YES!
Under ordinary circumstances, Vicente would be
disqualified by reason of interest from testifying as to any
matter of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva, such
disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule
130, commonly known as the Survivorship Disqualification
Rule or Dead Man Statute.
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the
temptation to give false testimony in regard to the
transaction in question on the part of the surviving party
and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of
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equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It
is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when
death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to
remove from the surviving party the temptation to
falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the
deceased. This case remains within the ambit of the
protection because the defendants-heirs are properly the
"representatives" of the deceased, not only because they
succeeded to the decedent's right by descent or operation
of law, but more importantly because they are so placed in
litigation that they are called on to defend which they have
obtained from the deceased and make the defense which
the deceased might have made if living, or to establish a
claim which deceased might have been interested to
establish, if living.
Such protection, however, was effectively waived when
counsel for petitioners cross-examined Vicente. "A waiver
occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the
representative of the estate or when counsel for the
representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters
occurring during deceased's lifetime. Also, the heirs
presented a counterclaim against Vicente. When Vicente
thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as
plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as
defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender
of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the
counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to
matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva,
said action not having been brought against, but by the
estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person.
Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse
party is competent to testify to transactions or
communications with the deceased or incompetent person
which were made with an agent of such person in cases in
which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But
the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to
those transactions or communications which were had with
the agent. The contract/promise to sell under
consideration was signed by petitioner Gonñ i as attorney-in-
fact of Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances
surrounding the execution of such contract and therefore
could either confirm or deny any allegations made by
Vicente with respect to said contract. The inequality or
injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130,
where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to
either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because
death has permanently sealed the former's lips, does not
actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that Gonñ i
could and did not negate the binding effect of the
contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the
existence of the said contract/promise to sell, Gonñ i testified
that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal
contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda
Dulce Nombre de Maria
2. WON the written promise to sell was novated into a
verbal agreement of lease during the lifetime of
Villanueva- YES!
Novation takes place when the object or principal condition
of an obligation is changed or altered. "Novation is never
presumed. It must be established that the old and the new
contracts are incompatible in all points, or that the will to
novate appear by express agreement of the parties or in
acts of equivalent import.
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The novation of the written contract/promise to sell into a
verbal agreement of lease was clearly and convincingly
proven not only by the testimony of petitioner Gonñ i, but
likewise by the acts and conduct of the parties subsequent
to the execution of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, after
the milling season of crop year 1949-50, only fields nos. 4
and 13 were delivered to Vicente. Fields nos. 3, 4 and 13
were subsequently registered in Villanueva's name and
mortgaged with the RFC. Villanueva likewise executed a
deed of sale covering Hacienda Sarria in favor of Joaquin
Villegas. All these were known to Vicente, yet he did not
take any steps toward protecting his claim over fields nos.
3, 4 and 13 either by demanding during the lifetime of
Villanueva that the latter execute a similar document in his
favor, or causing notice of his adverse claim to be annotated
on the certificate of title of said lots. If it were true that he
made demands on Villanueva for the surrender of field no.
3 as well as the execution of the corresponding deed of sale,
he should have, upon refusal of the latter to do so,
immediately or within a reasonable time thereafter,
instituted an action for recovery, or caused his adverse
claim to be annotated on the certificate of title. Considering
that field no. 3, containing an area of 3 hectares, 75 ares and
60 centares, is the biggest among the 3 lots, an ordinary
prudent man would have taken these steps if he honestly
believed he had any right thereto. Vicente did neither. In
fact such inaction persisted even during the pendency of
the intestate proceedings wherein he could have readily
intervened to seek exclusion of fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 from
the inventory of properties.
The explanation of Vicente that there were small sugar cane
growing on field 3 may be plausible explanation why he
could not take immediate possession, but it certainly could
not explain why it took him 4 years before instituting an
action in court.
TC and CA believed more in the promise to sell than the
lease agreement simply because the former had been
reduced to writing, while the latter was merely verbal. It
must be observed, though, that the contract/promise to sell
was signed by petitioner Gonñ i as attorney-in-fact of
Villanueva, an indication that final arrangements were
made by Gonñ i in the absence of Villanueva. It was therefore
natural for Vicente to have demanded that the agreement
be in writing to erase any doubt of its binding effect upon
Villanueva. On the other hand, the verbal lease agreement
was negotiated by and between Villanueva and Vicente.
Being close friends and relatives it can be safely assumed
that they did not find it necessary to reduce the same into
writing. Also, it was stated by the CA that Goni, as a sugar
planter had full knowledge as to annual income of lots 4
and 13 and since there was the amount of P12460.25 to be
liquidated, Gonie never deemed it wise to demand a yearly
accounting. It was only after the expiration of the 5 year
lease that Goni demanded accounting of the production of
the 2 lots leased to Vicente. It is the custom among the
sugar planters in the locality that the Lessee usually
demands an advance amount to cover the rental for the
period of the lease, and the demand of an accounting will be
only made after the expiration of the lease period. It was
adduced during the trial that the amount of P12,460.75 was
considered as an advance rental of the 2 lots which was
leased to Vicente lots nos. 4 and 13; so there was no
necessity on the part of to make a yearly demand for an
accounting for the total production of 2 parcels leased. Goni
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and Heirs having clearly and sufficiently shown that the
contract/promise to sell was subsequently novated into a
verbal lease agreement, it follows that they are entitled to a
favorable decision on their counterclaim.
DISPOSITIVE: judicial administrator of the estate of private
respondent Gaspar Vicente and/or his successors-in-
interest are hereby ordered to: a) surrender possession of
fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria
to petitioners; b) render an accounting of the produce of
said fields for the period beginning crop-year 1950-51 until
complete possession thereof shall have been delivered to
petitioners; and c) to pay the corresponding annual rent for
the said fields in an amount equivalent to 15% of the gross
produce of said fields, for the periods beginning crop-year
1950-51 until said fields shall have been surrendered to
petitioners, deducting from the amount due petitioners the
sum of P12,460.24 advanced by private respondent Gaspar
Vicente.
United States vs. Antipolo [G.R. No. L-13109. March 6,
1918.]
TOPIC: Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication
FACTS:
• Antipolo was charged with the Murder of Fortunato
Dinal. Trial Court convicted him of Homicide.
• The Trial Judge refused to permit Susana Ezpeleta,
the widow of the man whom the Antipolo is accused of
having murdered, to testify as a witness on behalf of the
defense concerning certain alleged dying declarations.
o She was asked: "On what occasion did your husband
die?"
• The fiscal objected on the following ground: "I object
to the testimony of this witness. She has just testified that
she is the widow of the deceased, Fortunato Dinal, and that
being so I believe that she is not competent to testify under
the Rules of Procedure in either civil or criminal cases,
unless it be with the consent of her husband, and as he is
dead and cannot grant that permission, it follows that this
witness is disqualified from testifying in this case in which
her husband is the injured party."
• Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness was
competent, arguing that the disqualification which the fiscal
evidently had in mind relates only to cases in which a
husband or wife of one of the parties to a proceeding is
called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution of a
criminal case are the Government and the accused; that,
furthermore, the marriage of Dinal to the witness having
been dissolved by the death of her husband, she is no
longer his wife, and therefore not subject to any
disqualification arising from the status of marriage.
o The testimony is further insisted as it is sufficient at
this time to say some of them would be both material and
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relevant, to such a degree that if proven to the satisfaction
of the court, they might have lead to the acquittal of the
accused, as they purported to relate to the dying
declarations of the deceased, concerning the cause of his
death, the general purport being that his injuries were due
to a fall and not to the acts imputed to the accused.
ISSUE: W/N Susana Ezpeleta, widow of the victim, should
be allowed to testify – YES
• According to Greenleaf, the rationale for the rule that
neither the husband nor the wife can testify for or against
the other in a proceeding is to secure domestic happiness
by placing the protecting seal of the law upon all
confidential communications between husband and wife;
and whatever has come to the knowledge of either by
means of the hallowed confidence which that relation
inspires, cannot be afterwards divulged in testimony even
through the other party be no longer living.
o This case DOES NOT fall with the text of the statute
or the reason upon which it is based.
o The purpose of the rule is to protect accused
persons against statements made in the confidence
engendered by the marital relation, and to relieve the
husband or wife to whom such confidential
communications might have been made from the obligation
of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse.
• Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a
result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement
regarding the manner in which he received those injuries,
the communication so made is in no sense confidential. On
the contrary, such a communication is made for the express
purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the
declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the
cause of his death.
• The rule relates only to cases when one the spouses
is a party to the case. The word “afterwards” refers as to
when a marriage has been dissolved otherwise than by the
death of one of the spouses — as, for instance, by decree of
annulment or divorce.
• The declarations of a deceased person while in
anticipation of certain impending death, concerning the
circumstances leading up to the death, are admissible in a
prosecution of the person charged with killing the
declarant.
PEOPLE v. CARLOS
March 6, 1943|Ostrand, J. | Marital Communications
Digester: Yee, Jenine
SUMMARY: Defendant killed Dr. Sityar. The trial court
convicted defendant of murder because of a letter written
by the wife to the defendant. The letter was illegally seized
(no search warrant) by the police and shows that the wife
feared that the defendant would result to physical violence
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in dealing with Dr. Sityar. The defendant argues that the
letter is inadmissible as evidence and, in the absence of
premeditation, should consequently be guilty of homicide
only. The Court ruled that the letter was not privileged but
excluded the letter in evidence because it was pure hearsay.
DOCTRINE: If documents were obtained from the
addressee by voluntary delivery, they are privileged; but if
they were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without
the addressee's consent, the privilege should cease.
The testimony of a third person as to a conversation
between husband and wife is admissible.
FACTS:
• It appears from the evidence that the victim of the
alleged murder, Dr. Pablo G. Sityar, performed a surgical
operation upon the defendant's wife for appendicitis and
certain other ailments. After her release from the hospital
she was required to go several times to the clinic of Doctor
Sityar, for the purpose of dressing the wounds caused by
the operation. On these occasions she was accompanied by
her husband, the defendant.
• The defendant states that on one of the visits, Doctor
Sityar sent him out on an errand to buy some medicine, and
that while defendant was absent on this errand Doctor
Sityar outraged the wife. The defendant further states that
his wife informed him of the outrage shortly after leaving
the clinic. Notwithstanding this it nevertheless appears that
he again went there on March 28th to consult the deceased
about some lung trouble from which he, the defendant, was
suffering.. He was given some medical treatment and
appears to have made at least one more visit to the clinic
without revealing any special resentment.
• On May 12, 1924, the defendant, suffering from
some stomach trouble, entered the Philippine General
Hospital where he remained until May 18, 1924, and where
he was under the care of two other physicians. While in the
hospital her received a letter (Exhibit 5) from Doctor Sityar
asking the immediate settlement of the account for the
professional services rendered his wife. Shortly after his
release from the hospital the defendant sought an interview
with Doctor Sityar and went to the latter's office several
times without finding him in. On one of these occasions he
was asked by an employee of the office, the nurse Cabanñ era,
if he had come to settle his account, to which the defendant
answered that he did not believe he owed the doctor
anything.
• In the afternoon of May 26th the defendant again
went to the office of the deceased and found him there
alone. According to the evidence of the prosecution, the
defendant then, without any preliminary quarrel between
the two, attacked the deceased with a fan-knife and stabbed
him twice. The deceased made an effort to escape but the
defendant pursued him and overtaking him in the hall
outside the office, inflicted another wound upon him and as
a consequence if the three wounds he died within a few
minutes.
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• The defendants made his escape but surrendered
himself in the evening of the following day.
• TRIAL COURT: Murder because committed with
premeditation. Took into consideration, Exhibit L, a letter
written to the defendant by his wife and siezed by the
police in searching his effects on the day of his arrest. It is
dated May 25, 1924, two days before the commission of the
crime and shows that the writer feared that the defendant
contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with
the deceased.
RULING: The sentence appealed from is therefore modified
by reducing the penalty to fourteen years, eight months and
one day of reclusion temporal, with the corresponding
accessory penalties and with the costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
Whether defendant is guilty of murder or homicide—
HOMICIDE.
[SUB-ISSUE] Whether the letter is inadmissible as evidence
—YES.
• DEFENDANT: The letter was a privileged
communication and therefore not admissible in evidence.
• COURT: The numerical weight of authority is,
however, to the effect that where a privileged
communication from one spouse to another comes into the
hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without
collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of
the spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the
communication, if otherwise competent, becomes
admissible Such is the view of the majority of this court.
• Professor Wigmore states the rule as follows: For
documents of communication coming into the possession of
a third person, a distinction should obtain, analogous to
that already indicated for a client's communications (ante,
par. 2325, 2326); i. e., if they were obtained from the
addressee by voluntary delivery, they should still be
privileged (for otherwise the privilege could by collusion be
practically nullified for written communications); but if
they were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without
the addressee's consent, the privilege should cease
o The letter in question was obtained through a search
for which no warrant appears to have been issued.
• DEFENDANT: documents obtained by illegal
searches of the defendant's effects are not admissible in
evidence in a criminal case. In discussing this point we can
do not better than to quote Professor Wigmore:
• COURT: In Weeks vs. United States, which reverted
to the original doctrine of Boyd v. United States, but with a
condition, viz., that the illegality of the search and seizure
should first have been directly litigated and established by a
motion, made before trial, for the return of the things
seized; so that, after such a motion, and then only, the
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illegality would be noticed in the main trial and the
evidence thus obtained would be excluded
o Here the illegality of the search and seizure was not
"directly litigated and established by a motion, made before
trial, for the return of the things seized."
• COURT: The letter Exhibit L must, however, be
excluded for reasons not discussed in the briefs. The letter
was written by the wife of the defendant and if she had
testified at the trial the letter might have been admissible to
impeach her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-
stand and the letter was therefore not offered for that
purpose. If the defendant either by answer or otherwise
had indicated his assent to the statements contained in the
letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the
case here; the fact that he had the letter in his possession is
no indication of acquiescence or assent on his part. The
letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its
admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of
the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with the
witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to
cross-examine them. In this respect there can be no
difference between an ordinary communication and one
originally privileged.
Conversations between husband and wife
• The question is radically different from that of the
admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a
conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the
witness. Testimony of that character is admissible on the
ground that it relates to a conversation in which both
spouses took part and on the further ground that where the
defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made
to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies
assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained
in an unanswered letter.
• The Attorney-General in support of the contrary
view quotes Wigmore, as follows:
• . . . Express communication is always a proper mode
of evidencing knowledge or belief. Communication to a
husband or wife is always receivable to show probable
knowledge by the other (except where they are living apart
or are not in good terms), because, while it is not certain
that the one will tell the other, and while the probability is
less upon some subjects than upon others, still there is
always some probability, — which is all that can be fairly
asked for admissibility
• This may possibly be good law, though Wigmore
cites no authority in support of his assertion, but as far as
we can see it has little or nothing to do with the present
case.
• The prosecution maintains that the crime was
committed with alevosia. This contention is based
principally on the fact that one of the wounds received by
the deceased showed a downward direction indicating that
the deceased was sitting down when the wound was
inflicted. We do not think this fact is sufficient proof. The
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direction of the wound would depend largely upon the
manner in which the knife was held.
• For the reasons stated we find the defendant guilty
of simple homicide, without aggravating or extenuating
circumstances.
Whether defendant acted in self-defense—No.
• DEFENDANT: He went to Doctor Sityar's office to
protest against the amount of the fee charged by the doctor
and, in any event, to ask for an extension of the time of
payment; that during the conversation upon that subject
the deceased insulted him by telling him that inasmuch as
he could not pay the amount demanded he could send his
wife to the office as she was the one treated, and that she
could then talk the matter over with the decease; that this
statement was made in such an insolent and contemptuous
manner that the defendant became greatly incensed and
remembering the outrage committed upon his wife, he
assumed a threatening attitude and challenged the
deceased to go downstairs with him and there settle the
matter; that the deceased thereupon took a pocket-knife
from the center drawer of his desk and attacked the
defendant, endeavoring to force him out of the office; that
the defendant, making use of his knowledge of fencing,
succeeded in taking the knife away from the deceased and
blinded by fury stabbed him first in the right side of the
breast and then in the epigastric region, and fearing that the
deceased might secure some other weapon or receive
assistance from the people in the adjoining room, he again
stabbed him, this time in the back.
• COURT: The defendant's testimony as to the struggle
described is in conflict with the evidence presented by the
prosecution.
• COURT: But assuming that it is true, it is very evident
that it fails to establish a case of self-defense and that, in
reality, the only question here to be determined is whether
the defendant is guilty of murder or of simple homicide.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan 262 SCRA 124 (1996)
G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996
G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN
and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Keyword: ACCRA, Coco levy fund
Topic: Privileged communication, Attorney-Client Privilege
Ponente” KAPUNAN, J.
EMERGENCY:
The matters raised in the present case are an offshoot of the
institution of the PCGG against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as
one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in
the several corporations in PCGG Case No. 33, entitled
“Republic of the Philippines vs Eduardo Cojuangco, et al.”
Petitioners in this case are all partners in ACCRA
Regala, Angara, Cruz, Concepcion,
Vinluan, Lazatin, Escueta and Hayudini (hereinafter ACCRA
LAWYERS). Likewise, private respondent ROCO is also a
partner in ACCRA.
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ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients,
which included, among others, the organization and
acquisition of business associations and/or organizations,
with the correlative and incidental services where its
members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders.
The complaint in PCGG Case No. 0033 alleged that the
ACCRA LAWYERS and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired
with each other in setting up through the use of coconut
levy funds the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM
and others and that through insidious means and
machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment
arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of
approximately fifteen million shares representing
roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31
March 1987.
The PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA lawyers
that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to the subscription payment;
hence, ACCRA LAWYERS acted as dummies, nominees
and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others, to be
used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth
through government concessions, etc., which acts constitute
gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant
breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the
Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
On August 20, 1991, PCGG filed a “Motion to Admit Third
Amended Complaint” which EXCLUDED private
respondent ROCO from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33
as party-defendant, whereas ACCRA LAWYERS still were
included still asdefendants.
ACCRA LAWYERS subsequently filed their
Comment/Opposition with Counter-Motion that
respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to
them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded
private respondent ROCO.
PCGG in its comment agreed to exclude the ACCRA
LAWYERS on the ff conditions: (a) the disclosure of the
identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the
submission of the deeds of assignments ACCRA LAWYERS
executed in favor of its clients covering their respective
shareholdings.
SANDIGANBAYAN RULING: DENIED the exclusion of ACCRA
LAWYERS in PCGG Case No. 33 for their refusal to comply
with the conditions required by respondent
PCGG.
ACCRA LAWYERS argue they are prohibited from revealing
the identity of their principal under their sworn mandate
and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all
times the confidentiality of information obtained during
such lawyer-client relationship.
ISSUE: WON the lawyer’s fiduciary duty (uberrimei
fidei) may be asserted in refusing to disclose the
identity of clients (name of ACCRA LAWYERS' clients)
under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the
instant case? YES, may refuse on the basis of fiduciary
duty!
The GENERAL RULE in our jurisdiction (as well as in the
US) is that a lawyer may NOT invoke the privilege and
refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE:
(1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate that
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client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s
advice.
(2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability,
his identity is privileged.
(3) Where the government’s lawyers have no case against
an attorney’s client unless, by revealing the client’s name,
the said name would furnish the only link that would form
the chain of testimony necessary to
convict an individual of a crime, the client’s name is
privileged.
Other situations which could qualify as exceptions to
the general rule:
(a)Content of any client communication to a lawyer
relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which
the client seeks legal assistance.
(b) Where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has
been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential, since such revelation would
otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to
the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the
privilege when the client’s name itself has
an independent significance, such that disclosure
would then reveal client confidences. In the case at bar,
the instant case falls under at least two exceptionsto
the general rule. (KP: Exception 1 & 3 above)
People of the Philippines vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 115439-41, July 16, 1997
FACTS: The case involves a prominent politician in Mindanao,
respondent Ceferino Paredes, Jr., who was formerly the Provincial
Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor, and Congressman.
During his stint, Paredes applied for and was granted a free patent
over a vast tract of land. However, it was cancelled because
apparently, it has already been designated and reserved as a school
site. The court found that Paredes had obtained title thereto through
fraudulent misrepresentations in his application, and somebody came
forward and filed a case of perjury against him. However, the same
was dismissed on the ground of prescription. Then again, another
case was filed against him for violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) for using his former position as Provincial
Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to
favorably act on his application for patent. In all these cases,
Paredes was represented by respondent Atty. Sansaet, a practicing
attorney.
Paredes, as defense, contends that he has already been charged
under the same set of facts and the same evidence where such
complaint (perjury case where he was already arraigned) has
already been dismissed. Hence, double jeopardy has already
attached. In support hereof, Paredes presented court records and
transcripts as proof of his arraignment in the perjury case.
However, the documents were found to be falsified, in conspiracy
with Paredes’ counsel and the clerk of court where the perjury case
was filed. One Teofilo Gelacio claims that no notice of arraignment
was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. Hence,
another case was filed for falsification of judicial records. It was then
that respondent Sansaet offered to testify as a state witness against
his client Paredes, claiming that the latter contrived and induced him
to have the graft case dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy
by having him and co-respondent prepare and falsify the subject
documents.
But the Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground of
attorney-client privilege since the lawyer could not testify against his
own client. In view of such relationship, confidential matters must
have been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his
lawyer, in his professional capacity, and therefore privileged.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of respondent Sansaet, as
proposed state witness, is barred by attorney-client privilege.
HELD: No. There is no privileged communication rule to talk about.
The privilege applies only if the information was relayed by the client
to the lawyer respecting a past crime. The reckoning point is when
the communication was given, not when the lawyer was made to
testify.
The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases as the facts
thereof and the actuations of both respondents therein constitute an
exception to the rule.
It may be correctly assumed that there was a confidential
communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with the
criminal cases since the latter served as his counsel therein. The
privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made
by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information
communicated by other means. IOW, including physical acts. The
acts and words of the parties, therefore, during the period when the
documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since
Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed
him to witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and
confidence.
However, the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is
not included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to
respect. It is true that by now, insofar as the falsifications are
concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But
for the privilege to apply, the period to be considered is the date
when the privileged communication was made by the client to the
attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with
respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. IOW, if
the client seeks his lawyer’s advice with respect to a crime which he
has already committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
confessional seal which the privilege declares cannot be broken by
the attorney without the client’s consent. The same privileged
confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime a
client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes
of which he seeks the lawyer’s advice.
Here, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state
witness are the communications made to him by physical acts and/or
accompanying words of Paredes at the time he and Honrada were
about to falsify the documents. Clearly, therefore, the confidential
communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes
of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet
been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy
with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made
for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside
the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
It is well settled that communication between a lawyer and his
client, to be privileged, must be for a lawful purpose or in
furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose
prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, the prosecution of the
honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under
the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney
by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a
conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney
under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the
interest of justice.
To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime
which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the
objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst
travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble
profession of law.
Mercado v. Vitriolo (Short title)
AC # 5108 | May 26, 2005
Petitioner: Rosa F. Mercado
Respondent: Att. Julito D. Vitriolo
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(Rule 130, Section 24b)
FACTS
1. Mercado filed a complaint against Atty. Vitriolo, seeking his
disbarment for maliciously instituting a case for falsification of public
document against her based on confidential information gained
from their attorney-client relationship.
2. Mercado's husband filed a civil case for annulment of their marriage
with RTC which was dismissed.
3. Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, then counsel of Mercado, died so Atty.
Vitriolo entered his appearance as collaborating counsel.
4. It also appears that Atty. Vitriolo filed a criminal action against
Mercado for falsification of public document for false entries in the
Certificates of Live Birth of her children.
5. Mercado denied using any other name than Rosa F. Mercado and
insisted that she has gotten married only once.
6. Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint disclosed confidential
facts and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then
handled by the lawyer as her counsel so that the lawyer is guilty of
breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship.
7. Atty. Vitriolo maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint does
not violate the rule on privileged communication between attorney
and client because the bases are the two certificates of live birth
which are public documents and in no way connected with the
confidence taken during his engagement as counsel.
8. The IBP Board of Governors approved the report finding the lawyer
guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year.
9. Upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and recommendation,
Mercado wrote CJ Davide a letter of desistance however, the court
said that the letter imparting forgiveness is inconsequential in
disbarment proceedings.
ISSUE/S
1. W/N Atty. Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client.
RULING & RATIO
1. No.
1. In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him
special powers of trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly
personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The relation is of
such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by
necessity and public interest.
2. On the rule on attorney-client privilege. the factors essential to
establish the existence of the privilege. (1) There exists an
attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the
client made the communication. (2) The client made the
communication in confidence. (3) The legal advice must be
sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
3. Applying all these rules to the case at bar, the evidence on record
fails to substantiate complainants allegations.
4. Mercado did not even specify the alleged communication in
confidence disclosed. All her claims were couched in general terms
and lacked specificity.
5. She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for
falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint
disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled
by the lawyer but did not spell out these facts which will determine
the merit of her complaint.
6. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the
existence of facts which the complainant must prove.
7. Indeed, Mercado failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without
any testimony as to the specific confidential information allegedly
divulged without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to
determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged
communication.
8. Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a
breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney
and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client
privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed
upon the party asserting the privilege.
DISPOSITION
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
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