165. Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, GR 23144, Jan. 14,
1926, 48 Phil. 601
FACTS: Rufina Dizon, who was married to Vicente Galang
and by whom she had a son named Francisco, inherited from
her parents the three parcels of land described in the
complaint. On October 4, 1904, Rufina Dizon and her son
Francisco inherited from her the said three parcels of land.
Francisco Galang died on December 8, 1904, and his father
Vicente Galang, by operation of law, inherited from him the
said land. In accordance with article 811 of the Civil Code
these three parcels of land are considered as reservable
property although they do not appear as such in the registry
of deeds. In 1913, Vicente Galang sold the first two parcels to
Juan Medina and in 1909 the third to Teodoro Jurado,
without informing them that they were reservable property.
The plaintiffs Pedro and Severino Dizon, brother and sister
of the deceased Rufina Dizon, being related to her within the
third degree, brought this action against Vicente Galang,
Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado. The complaint prays that
the sales of this land by Vicente Galang to Juan Medina and
Teodoro Jurado be ordered to return the said parcels of land;
that Vicente Galang be compelled to record in the registry of
deeds the reservable character of this land and to execute a
mortgage to secure its value.
ISSUE: Whether or not reservation by the widowed spouse
constitutes reserve troncal.
RULING: The ascendant who inherits from his descendant
any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who
are within the third degree and who belong to the line from
which said property came.
166. Rosales v. Rosales, GR L-40789, Feb. 27, 1987,
148 SCRA 69
FACTS: On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died
intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato
Rosales and their two children Magna Rosales Acebes
and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario,
predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox
Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein
petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes instituted
the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased. The trial court ordered that Fortunato, Magna,
Macikequerox and Antonio be entitled each to ¼ share in the
estate of decedent. Irenea, on the other hand, insisted
in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving
spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased,
claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her
mother-in-law.
RULING: No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are
classified into two groups, namely, those who inherit by their
own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which
states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of
her mother-in-law. The law has already meticulously
enumerated the intestate heirs of a decedent. The Court held
that Irenea misinterpreted the provision of Article 887
because the provision refers to the estate of the deceased
spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory
heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Therefore, the surviving spouse is considered a third person
as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
167. ABELLANA DE BACAYO V. FERRARIS DE
BORROMEO G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965
FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was declared presumptively dead
for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her
estate among her heirs. She left properties in Cebu
City, consisting of one-third share in the estate of her aunt,
Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less.
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving
direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived
only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de
Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent’s
father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia,
Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her
nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia’s only
brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceasedher.
These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate
heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia
Ferraris.
ISSUE: WON a decedent’s uncles and aunts may succeed ab
intestato while nephews and nieces of the decedent survive
and are willing and qualified to succeed.
RULING: No. in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of
the de cujus exclude all other collaterals from the succession.
This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and
1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Art. 1009,
the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles,
cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. The last of the
relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate succession
are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters
or children of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited
to relatives within the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely
say there is hardly any affection to merit the succession of
collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond the
fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, for
successional purposes. Article 1009 does not state any order
of preference. However, this article should be understood in
connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives
exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in
equal parts, there being no right of representation. They
succeed without distinction of lines or preference among
them on account of the whole blood relationship.
168. BICOMONG V. ALMANZA
GR L-37365, Nov. 29, 1977, 80 SCRA 421
FACTS: Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas
on June 8, 1859. Of this marriage there were born three
children namely: Perpetua Bagsic, Igmedia Bagsic, and
Ignacio Bagsic. Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her
husband Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra
Glorioso. Of this second marriage were born two children,
Felipa Bagsic and Maura Bagsic. Simeon Bagsic died
sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died. Ignacio
Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 leaving the plaintiff Francisca
Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August
19, 1944 survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria
Tolentino and Petra Tolentino. Perpetua Bagsic died on July
1, 1945 . Surviving her are her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio
Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and
Gervacio Bicomong. Of the children of the second marriage,
Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as
her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other
daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter
Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit
was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving
behind her husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese
and her father Geronimo Almanza. The subject matter of the
complaint concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura
Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land
which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra
Glorioso. Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on
December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of
Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia
Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic,
in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City
against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio
Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the
properties left by Maura Bagsic. The trial court rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs. From the aforesaid decision of the trial
court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute defendant for
Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
other defendant, Engracio Manese, did not appeal and
execution was issued with respect to the parcels of land in his
possession. The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the
case have been duly established in the trial court and that the
only issue left for determination is a purely legal question
involving the correct application of the law and
jurisprudence on the matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to their
shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
HELD: Yes. We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006
and 1008 of the New Civil Code are applicable to the
admitted facts of the case at bar. It appearing that Maura
Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and
all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded
by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of
her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her
brother and two (2) sisters of half-blood in accordance with
the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code. By virtue of
said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are
entitled to inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs.
Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986,
this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not
inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless
concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased. Under
the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification
as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or
paternal line and without preference as to whether their
relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the
sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude
the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in
their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in
relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code , which
provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a
share double that of the nephews and nieces of half-blood.
169. ISABEL DE LA PUERTA vs. CA and CARMELITA
DE LA PUERTA
FACTS: Dominga Revuelta died with a will leaving her
properties to her three surviving children, namely, Alfredo,
Vicente and Isabel, petitioner herein. Isabel was given the
free portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed
executrix of the will.
The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was
opposed by her brothers, who averred that their mother was
already senile at the time of the execution of the will and did
not fully comprehend its meaning. Notwithstanding, Isabel
was appointed special administratrix by the probate
court. Alfredo subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone
oppositor.
Later, Vicente filed with the CFI of Quezon a petition to adopt
Carmelita, private respondent herein. After hearing, the
petition was granted. However, the decision was appealed by
Isabel to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the
appeal, Vicente died, prompting her to move for the
dismissal of the case.
Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate
proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a
monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of
Vicente de la Puerta. The probate court granted the motion,
declaring that it was satisfied from the evidence at hand that
Carmelita was a natural child of Vicente and was entitled to
the amounts claimed for her support. On appeal, the order of
the lower court was affirmed by the respondent court. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: WON adopted child Carmelita, through
representation, can claims support and successional rights to
the estate of her alleged grandmother Dominga.
RULING: NO. According to Art. 970 of the Civil Code,
representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of
which the representative is raised to the place and the degree
of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the
latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
In the case at bar, Vicente did not predecease his mother and
that Carmelita is a spurious child. It is settled that in
testamentary succession, the right of representation can take
place only in the following cases: first, when the person
represented predeceased the testator; second, when the
person represented is incapacitated; and third, when the
person represented is disinherited.
Not having predeceased Dominga, her son Vicente had the
right to inherit from her directly or in his own right. No right
of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by
Carmelita upon her father's death, which came after his own
mother's death. Furthermore, as a spurious child of Vicente,
Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because
of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier
between the legitimate and illegitimate families.
Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be
barred from inheriting from Dominga for there would be no
natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no
legal ties to bind them either.
If the adopting parent should die before the adopted
child, the latter cannot represent the former in the
inheritance from the parents or ascendants of the
adopter. The adopted child is not related to the
deceased in that case, because the filiation created
by fiction of law is exclusively between the adopter
and the adopted. By adoption, the adopters can
make for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus
make one for their kindred. (page 286 of Atty.
Claridades’ book)
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of
Vicente, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her
father but not to the estate of Dominga. Her claims for
support and inheritance should therefore be filed in the
proceedings for the settlement of her own father's estate and
cannot be considered in the probate of Dominga's Will.
170. DIAZ V. IAC
FACTS: Trial Court declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the
sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows —
who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero —
her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin (respondent) or her
grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the issue here is whether
oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father
Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti
Vda, de Santero.
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate
child. On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein)
are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
ISSUE: WON ILLEGITIMATE CHILD CAN INHERIT
SUCCESSION AB INTESTATO FROM THE LEGITIMATE
CHILDRED
HELD: NO. Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a
barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and
the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother
of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of
Art. 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism
and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in
turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable
evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment. Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their
father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the
intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under
Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
171. G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978
TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the
Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS,
AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L.
CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG,
SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO
NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.
FACTS: Teodoro R. Yangco died His will was
probated.Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his
death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R.
Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel
Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L.
Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and
(4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother
Jose Corpus. Juanita died.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and
Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her
union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five
children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the
aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.
Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her
supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his
complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing
perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void
under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949
partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate
should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or
was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate
child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, appellant
Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the
supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as
a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a
legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.
ISSUE: Whether or not legitimate child can succeed the
estate of an illegitimate child
HELD: NO. Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil
Code, “if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child
should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged,
the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall
succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and
are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In
default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated
children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and
sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate
brothers and sisters”. Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco’shalf
brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no
right to succeed to his estate under the rules of in-testacy.
Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was
held that the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot
succeed her illegitimate child. x xx By reason of that same
rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in
the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent.
172. Cacho vs. Udan 13 SCRA 693 , April 30, 1965
FACTS: Silvina G Udan single and a resident of San
Marcelino, Zambales, died leaving a purported will naming
her illegitimate son Francisco G Udan and Wencela Cacho,
as her sole heirs. When Wencesla Cacho filed a petition to
probate said Will, the legitimate brother of the testatrix
named Rustico G Udan initially filed an opposition to the
probate but eventually withdraw said opposition when
Francisco G Udan, one of the named heir appeared.
However, Francisco G Udan died, and so John G. Udan and
Rustico G. Udan, both legitimate brothers of the testatrix
Silvina G. Udan, filed their respective oppositions on the
ground that the will was not attested and executed as
required by law, that the testatrix was incapacitated to
execute it and that it was procured by fraud or undue
influence. The trial court held that issued an Order
disallowing these two oppositions for lack of interest in the
estate and directing the Fiscal to study the advisability of
filing escheat proceedings. Both brother filed appeal however
the court held that the brothers were not, for at the time of
her death Silvina's illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her
heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers.
ISSUE: Whether or not John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan,
both legitimate brothers of the testatrix Silvina G. Udan may
claim from the estat of the sister Silvina G. Udan.
HELD: No. The death of the illegitimate son Francisco two
years after his mother's demise does not transfer the rights
to the legitimate brothers of the testatrix. Article 992 of the
Civil Code provides that an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child. The rights acquired by Francisco are only transmitted
by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who
are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason that, as
correctly decided by the court below, the legitimate relatives
of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child.
173. (a.) G.R. No. L-3339 March 26, 1908
ROSA LLORENTE, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
CEFERINO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., defendants-
appellees.
FACTS: Martina Avalle widow of Llorente, had 4 legitimate
children and executed a will dated 31 December 1900,
naming Jacinta one of her legitimate children also held as
one of her sole and general heirs. However, Jacinta died prior
her mother leaving several legitimate children and a natural
daughter named Rosa Llorente herein petitioner. The
petitioner wanted to become a party in the proceedings for
the probate of the will of Martina. But the legitimate children
of Jacinta, objected for petitioner be a party thereto. CFI of
Cebu ruled in favor of the former. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the hereditary portion of Jacinta Llorente
Rodriguez from the will of Martina Avelle Llorente should
also pass to her natural daughter as representative, herein
petitioner?
HELD: NO. The court agrees with the findings of CFI Cebu.
The court finds that the petitioner might and should inherit
from her natural mother, if Jacinta survived her mother she
would have inherited from her, and in what she inherited
from her mother, the natural daughter, petitioner may
inherit and have participated, in conjunction with legitimate
children, from the day in which the succession became
operative. In relation with 758 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which reads:
When a devise or a legacy is made to a child or other relation
to the testator, and the devisee or legatee dies before the
testator, leaving issue ..., such issue shall take the estate so
given as the devisee or legatee would have done, if he had
survived the testator, unless a different disposition is
required by law.
However, the doctrine site in this case held by the Supreme
Court of Spain in 1903, according to the same a natural child
has not the right to represent his natural father or mother in
the succession to the legitimate ascendants of the latter.
From the fact that a natural son has the right to inherit from
the father or mother who acknowledged him, conjointly with
the other legitimate children of either of them, it does not
follow that he has the right to represent either of them in the
succession to their legitimate ascendants; his right is direct
and immediate in relation to the father or mother who
acknowledged him, but it cannot be indirect by representing
them in the succession to their ascendants to whom he is not
related in any manner, because he does not appear among
the legitimate family of which said ascendants are the head.
Therefore, petitioner’s right to inherit from her natural
grandmother, representing her natural mother, is quite
another thing. Such right is not recognized by the law in
force.
173. (b) [G.R. No. 36654. February 27, 1933.]
VICTOR ALLARDE ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.
VALENTIN ABAYA ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
FACTS: Bibiano Abaya and Juliana Rebullido were husband
and wife which blessed with 2 children named Adriano and
Cornelia. Petitioner, Victor herein married Inocencia Abaya,
the natural daughter of Adriano Abaya who died a bachelor
in 1889.
Inocencia, live with her grandmother, Juliana who died in
1909 when his father died. The subject of the complaint is an
80 parcel of land located in Ilocos Sur. When Juliana died
the said property was inherited by her daughter Cornelia
which managed by its husband Dionisio Abaya. The
defendants in herein case that they are the sole and exclusive
owners of said real property.
ISSUE: 1. WON, Inocencia was acknowledge by Adriano
Abaya as her natural daughter?
2.WON, Incocencia the wife of one of the petitioners is
entitled to inherit from her natural grandmother by
representation?
HELD: 1. YES. The fact of her acknowledgment as a natural
child must therefore be determined by the law in force not
only at the time of the birth of the alleged natural child, but
also of the alleged acknowledgment by her alleged father and
of the latter’s death, which is Law 11 of the Laws of Toro,
reading as follows:
"And for the purpose of avoiding doubt as to who are natural
children, we order and decree that natural children are those,
who, at the time of their birth or conception were of fathers
who could have married their mothers properly and justly
and without dispensation; provided that the father
acknowledged such issue as his child, although he would not
have had the woman with whom he had had such relations in
his house, or any other one. We decree that the child having
the qualifications above mentioned is a natural child."
According to the foregoing legal provisions, two requisites
must be present in order that a child may be considered
natural: (1) that at the time of its birth, the father
acknowledging it must have had capacity to contract
marriage without dispensation; and (2) that it be
acknowledged by the father as his own child. The fact that a
father has written to his mother so that she would send for
his daughter from Manila to Candon is sufficient proof of
acknowledgment of such daughter under the Law of Toro
and died as a bachelor which mean he can marry without
dispensation.
2. NO. She's only entitled to the 1/6 share of the said
property. In the case of Centeno v. Centeno
Articles 843 and 941 specifically provide that the portion
corresponding to natural children in the hereditary estate of
the parents who acknowledged them, is transmitted upon the
death of these children to their legitimate or natural
descendants. The latter’s right, however, to represent their
natural father in the hereditary estate of their grandfather is
not admitted, because they are not called by law to
participate in their grandfather’s estate. Although she is an
acknowledged natural child of Adriano Abaya, has no right
to inherit from her grandmother Juliana Rebullido by
representation.
Acknowledged natural children born before the Civil Code
went into effect, of parents who died while the former law
was in force without leaving any legitimate descendants or
ascendants, are only entitled to inherit one-sixth of the estate
of such parents (Mijares v. Nery, 3 Phil., 195); and that
acknowledged natural children, born before or after the Civil
Code went into effect, have no right to inherit by
representation of their natural parents.
174. G.R. No. L-12397 April 2, 1918
FLORENCIA ANURAN, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANA
AQUINO and RUFINA ORTIZ, administratrices of
the intestate estate of Quiteria Ortiz, defendants.
ANA AQUINO, appellant.
FACTS: Ambrosio Aquino was married to Florencia Anuran
without any children. When the former died intestate,
leaving no heirs other his widowed and Ana Aquino, a
daughter of his deceased sister. The issue in this case arises
when Ana Aquino and Norberto Capiña then appointed
administrator fraudulently procured the entry of an order in
the administration proceedings dated March 12, 1912,
authorizing and approving the delivery by the administrator
of all property of the estate to the former an alleged sole heir,
without notice to the widow.
The widow, did not discover that this order had been entered
until about the 14th day of February, 1914 when she promptly
entered her appearance in the administration proceedings
and moved that the order be set aside, and that she be
declared the sole heir of the deceased, who, as she alleged,
had died without leaving either ascendants, or descendants,
or collateral relatives entitled to share in the estate. However,
he court declined to entertain this motion on the ground that
the alleged fraudulent order had been entered more than six
months prior to the date of the motion. Thereafter the widow
promptly instituted this separate action declaring the order
null and void. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether, Ana Aquino as the natural daughter of the
deceased sister has the right to inherit from the said estate?
HELD: NO. The court affirmed the previous judgment on
the grounds that Articles 943 and 952 of the Civil Code
provides that:
A natural or legitimized child has no right to succeed ab
intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit from the natural or legitimated child.
In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews,
children, whether of the whole blood or not, of the same
surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce,
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Also, the court stated that in such case wherein motion
therefore not having been submitted during the six months'
period, the court had no jurisdiction to grant relief from the
order upon a motion in the original proceedings as
prescribed in Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A
motion submitted more than "six months after the order was
taken, the court may still act upon and render judgment and
such orders may be vacated or set aside on the grounds of
fraud. As it will vitiate a judgment, and a court of equity may
declare it a nullity. Equity has so great an abhorrence of fraud
that it will set aside its own decrees if founded thereupon.
175. Leonardo v.CA
G.R. No. L-51263 February 28, 1983
FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate on July 12, 1942 and
was survived by two daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles
and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter,
Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died
in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in 1949 without any
issue. On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano
Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo,
filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money
and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking
judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of
the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in
the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private
respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties
left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint,
partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and
(3) to have an accounting of all the income derived from said
properties from the time defendants took possession thereof
until said accounting shall have been made, delivering to him
his share therein with legal interest. Answering the
complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles
asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties
and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who
cannot succeed by right of representation. For his part, the
other defendant, private respondent James
Bracewell, claimed that said properties are now his by virtue
of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had
subsequently executed in his favor. These properties were
allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque,
Inc. sometime in September 1963.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, as the great grandson of
Francisca Reyes, has legal right to inherit by representation.
RULING: No. Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of
Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation,
claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca
Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of
Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact
that when he was born on September 13, 1938,
his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married,
and what is more, his alleged father’s first marriage was still
subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child
who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father, like
the deceasedFrancisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the
Philippines.)
176. Rosales vs Rosales
FACTS: It appears from the record of the case that on
February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu
City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband
Fortunato T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna
Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio
Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the
herein petitioner. The estate of the deceased has an
estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00).
Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales,
son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir
of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox
Rosales.
ISSUE: First — is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate
heir of her mother-in-law?
Second — are the Orders of the trial court which excluded
the widow from getting a share of the estate in question
final as against the said widow?
RULING: The answer to the first question is in the
negative. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2)
groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and
those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated,
an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as
in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in
Article 981 of the same law. We find it unnecessary to rule
the second question posed by the petitioner.
177. In the Matter of the Instestate Estate of Pedro
Santillon, Claro SANTILLON, petitioner-
appellant,vs. Perfecta MIRANDA, Benito MIRANDA
and Rosario CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965
FACTS: Pedro Santillon died without testament leaving his
wife, Perfecta Miranda and one son, Claro.
Four years after Pedro’s death, Claro filed a petition for
letters of administration which
was opposed by his mother and spouses Benito Miranda
and Rosario Corrales. The court appointed commissioners
to draft a project of partition and distribution of all
properties of Pedro. Claro then filed a motion to declare
share of heirs and to resolve conflicting claims of the parties
invoking Art.892 of the New Civil Code insisting that after
deducting ½ from the conjugal properties (conjugal share
of Perfecta), the remaining ½ must be divided as follows:
¼ for her and ¾ for him. On the other hand, Perfecta
claimed besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under
Art. 996 of the NCC to another ½ of the remaining half.
After due notice and hearing, the court held that Perfecta is
entitled to ½ shares and the remaining ½ share for Claro
after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the
conjugal properties. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: The manner of division of share of the estate of an
intestate decedent when the only survivors are the spouse
and one legitimate child.
RULING: Intestate proceedings in the New Civil Code’s
chapter on legal or intestate succession, the only article
applicable is Art. 996. Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a
logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article
834 of the Spanish Civil Code form which Art. 996 was taken,
contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the
first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate
children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or
widower survives with only one child(exception), Art. 996
omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby
indicating the legislator’s desire to promulgate just one
general rule applicable to both situations. Surviving spouse
concurring with a legitimate child entitled to one-half of
theintestate estate. When an intestacy occurs, a surviving
spouse concurring with only onelegitimate child of the
deceased is entitled to one-half of the estate of thedeceased
spouse under Art. 996 of the Civil Code.
178.
179. Carlos vs Sandoval
Facts: Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died
intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory
heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his
estate to Teofilo. Eventually, the first three parcels of land
were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo. Parcel
No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. Teofilo died
intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos.
5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondents. Petitioner
commenced an action against respondent with the following
causes of action: a) declaration of nullity of marriage; b)
status of a child; c) recovery of property; d) reconveyance;
and e) sum of money and damages. Petitioner asserted that
the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of
the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that
his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive
father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II. Respondent denied
the material averments of petitioner complaint. Respondents
contended that the dearth regarding the requisite marriage
license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to Teofilo.
Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate
child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
Issue: Whether or not the brother of one of the spouse has
a right to succeed to the estate.
Ruling: Yes. A brother is not among those considered as
compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as
a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir,
he still has a right to succeed to the estate. The records
reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had
no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally
and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son
of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate
of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow
pursuant to Art. 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes
petitioner a real – party – interest to seek the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with
respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be
void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
183. ALVIAR VS ALVIAR
Facts: Clemente Alviar, the original plaintiff herein, and
Belen Alviar were legitimate children of Florentino Alviar
and Bibiana Carillo. Sometime after the latter’s death,
Florentino Alviar married Flora Erasga, who begot him five
(5) children.
These six (6) brothers and sisters executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition adjudicating to Clemente Alviar the
two (2) parcels of agricultural land in Calamba, Laguna, and
to the five (5) half brothers and sisters of the deceased the
residential lot in Pasay City. In pursuance of said deed, the
parties took possession of their respective shares.
Over five (5) years later, Clemente Alviar
commenced the present action, against his half brother and
sisters and his step-mother to annul the deed of extrajudicial
partition as well as to recover the possession thereof and the
title thereto, upon the ground that, acting in bad faiths and
conspiring, confederating and conniving with each other, as
well as "taking advantage of plaintiff’s lack of education,
illiteracy and ignorance, and knowing full well that" the
"children by second marriage of Florentino Alviar had no
rights, participation and interest over" the three (3) lots left
by Belen Alviar, the defendants had "misled" the plaintiff
"into signing" said deed.
Issue: Whether the half brothers and sisters are he
excluded from the succession to her estate.
Ruling: "ART. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full
blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half
blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of
the latter." lThese provisions, particularly the last, leave no
room for doubt that brothers and sisters of full blood do not
exclude those of half blood, for, otherwise, there would be
no occasion for the concurrence of both classes and the
application of said Art. 1006.
More important that this, however, is the fact that
Clemente Alviar had entered into a contract with his half
brothers and sisters for the extrajudicial partition of the
properties of the deceased Belen Alviar and that there is
nothing in the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties to
warrant the annulment of rescission of said agreement. The
validity thereof thus being indubitable, there is absolutely no
reason why the same should be disturbed.
184. ABELLANO - BACAYO vs. FERRARIS –
BORROMEO
Facts: More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the
last time Melodia Ferraris was known to be alive, she was
declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her
succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of
one-third (1/3) share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa
Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was
adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the
same court. The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving
direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived
only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de
Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father,
Anacleto Ferraris; and by her four nephews and nieces, all
surnamed Ferraris, , who were the children of Melodia's
only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-
deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs
claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to
participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
Issue: Whether who should inherit the intestate estate of a
deceased person when he or she is survived only by
collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a
brother who predeceased him or her.
Held: Under article 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the
other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the
succession. Article 1009 does not state any order of
preference. However, this article should be understood in
connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives
exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in
equal parts, there being no right of representation. They
succeed without distinction of lines or preference among
them on account of the whole blood relationship. We,
therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of
succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed
ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent
survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.