PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
NERIO GADDI y Issue: Whether or not the the testimony of Guzman should be inadmissible
CATUBAY, defendant-appellant.
 Facts
Nerio Gaddi y Catubay was charged with murder for the death of
one Augusto Esguerra y Navarro.
 After arraignment, wherein Gaddi pleaded not guilty, and trial
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City handed down a verdict of guilt for the crime
charged.
 On appeal, Gaddi questions the weight and testimony of Ernesto
Guzman.
 The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses before the court a
quo, namely: Ernesto Guzman, Pat, Arturo Angeles, Cpl. Rogello
Castillo, Pat. Jesus Patriarca and Dr. Gregorio C. Blanco. On the
other hand, the accused Gaddi was the sole witness presented for
the defense.
 At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 11, 1981, at
San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, Ernesto Guzman saw
appellant Nerio Gaddi and the victim Augusto Esguerra drinking
gin. In the morning of the following day, December 12, 1981,
appellant told Ernesto Guzman that he killed his drinking partner
Augusto Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet pit. Guzman
advised appellant to surrender to the police. After work, Guzman
went to the police and reported what appellant told him
 At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day,
December 12, 1981, Corporal Rogelio Castillo and Detective
Rodrigo Salamat arrested appellant at Manrey Subdivision,
Novaliches, Quezon City. Appellant told Corporal Castillo that he
killed the victim and where he buried the body. Later, Pat. Jesus
Patriarca arrived. Appellant himself led the policeman and
Barangay residents to where the body was in a toilet pit in the
backyard of Ernesto Guzman.
for being hearsay
Held: No. While a testimony of a witness regarding the statement made by
another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in
the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the
statement was made or the tenor of such statement
 Here, when Guzman testified that the appellant, who probably
was bothered by his conscience, admitted the killing to him, there
was no violation of the hearsay rule as Guzman was testifying to a
fact which he knows of his own personal knowledge; that is, be
was testifying to the fact that the appellant told him that he
stabbed Augusta Esguerra and not to the truth of the appellant's
statement.
 This Tribunal had previously declared that a confession
constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the
strong presumption that no person of normal mind would
deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by
truth and his conscience [People v. Salvador, G.R. No. L-77964,
July 26, 1988 citing People v. Castaneda; G.R. No. L-32625, August
31, 1979, 93 SCRA 59.]
 Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a crime can
be presented in evidence without violating the hearsay rule
[Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court] which only
prohibits a witness from testifying as to those facts which he
merely learned from other persons but not as to those facts which
he "knows of his own knowledge: that is, which are derived from
his own perception."
 Appellant's defense to the prosecution's charge rests on an
uncorroborated and purely oral evidence of alibi. It has been ruled
time and again that courts look upon the evidence of alibi with
suspicion [People v. Bondoc, 85 Phil. 545 (1950)] and always
receive it with caution [People v. Cinco, 67 Phil. 196 (1939);
 People v. de Guzman, 70 Phil. 23 (1940)] not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable but also because of its easy
fabrication [People v. Rafallo, 86 Phil. 22 (1950).] To overcome the
evidence of the prosecution, an alibi must satisfy the test of "full,
clear and satisfactory evidence"
Where the conviction of an accused is based merely on circumstantial
evidence, as in this case, it is essential for the validity of such conviction
that:
1) there be more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt
[Section 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, People v. Modesto, G.R.
No. L-25484, September 21, 1968, 25 SCRA 36; People v. Pajanustan, G.R.
No. L-38162, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 699.]
Although no general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which will suffice for any case, yet all that is
required is that the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the
same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and the accused-
appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
HOMICIDE, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
indemnify the heirs of Augusto Esguerra in the amount of P 30,000.00.
PEOPLE vs ESTENZO
FACTS:
 In a case "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Gregorio Ojoy,
accused", after the accused himself had testified in his defense,
his counsel manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he was
filing only their affidavits subject to cross-examination by the
prosecution on matters stated in the affidavits and on all other
matters pertinent and material to the case.
 Private prosecutor Atty. Amelia K. del Rosario, one of the
petitioners here, objected to the proposed procedure
 Respondent Judge gave his conformity and issued the questioned
Order.
 Contending that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
because the aforesaid Orders violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires that the testimony
of the witness should be given orally in open court, and there is
no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge erred in sustaining the
manifestation of the defense counsel in filing only affidavits of his
subsequent witnesses.
HELD: Yes. Petition Granted.
RATIO: Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised
Rules of Court clearly require that the testimony of a witness shall be given
orally in open court. The afore-cited Sections 1 and 2 provide:
SEC 1. Testimony to be given in open court. — The
testimony of witnesses shall be given orally in open
court and under oath or affirmation.
 SEC. 2. Testimony in superior courts to be reduced to
writing.- In superior courts the testimony of each witness
shall be taken in shorthand or stenotype, the name,
residence, and occupation of the witness being stated,
and all questions put to the witness and his answers
thereto being included. If a question put is objected to
and the objection is ruled on, the nature of the objection
and the ground on which it was sustained or overruled
must be stated, or if a witness declines to answer a
question put, the fact and the proceedings taken thereon
shall be entered in the record. A transcript of the record
made by the official stenographer or stenotypist and
certified as correct by him shall be prima facie a correct
statement of such testimony and proceedings.
 The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear
and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the
opportunity of cross-examination.
 "The opponent", demands confrontation, for the purpose of
cross-examination which cannot be had except by the direct and
personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers."
 Another advantage is that it enables the judge as the trier of facts
"to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness
deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect
is produced upon the witness.
 It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have
a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which
may confirm or detract from the weight of his
testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will
reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his
deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character.
 Thus, Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rule requires that in
determining the superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved, the court, aside from the other factors therein
enumerated, may consider the "witness manner of testifying"
which can only be done if the witness gives his testimony orally
in open court". If a trial judge prepares his opinion immediately
after the conclusion of the trial, with the evidence and his
impressions of the witnesses fresh in his mind, it is obvious that
he is much more likely to reach a correct result than if he simply
reviews the evidence from a typewritten transcript, without
having had the opportunity to see, hear and observe the actions
and utterances of the witnesses.
 Rules governing the examination of witnesses are intended to
protect the rights of litigants and to secure orderly dispatch of
the business of the courts. Under the rules, only questions
directed to the eliciting of testimony which, under the general
rules of evidence, is relevant to, and competent to prove, the
issue of the case, may be propounded to the witness. A witness
can testify only on those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge. Thus, on direct examination, leading questions are
not allowed, except or, preliminary matters, or when there is
difficult in getting direct and intelligible answer from the witness
who is ignorant, a child of tender years, or feebleminded, or a
deaf mute. It is obvious that such purpose may be subverted, and
the orderly dispatch of the business of the courts thwarted if trial
judges are allowed, as in the case at bar, to adopt any procedure
in the presentation of evidence other than what is specifically
authorized by the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is
hereby granted and the order of respondent Judge, dated July 30,
1975, in Criminal Case No. 2891 is hereby set aside, and the temporary
restraining order issued on August 22, 1975 is hereby made
permanent
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN BRIOSO and
MARIANO TAEZA, defendants-appellants.
[G.R. No. L-28482. January 30, 1971.]
REYES, J.B.L., J p:
Nature of the case:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Abra, in its
Criminal Case No. 626, finding the two appellants Juan Brioso and Mariano
Taeza guilty of murder, and sentencing each to suffer life imprisonment
and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Silvino Daria in the sum
of P6,000.00 but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
Facts:
An information filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated 16 January 1967 charged
the two accused, Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza, with the crime of murder
Silvino Daria and his wife Susana Tumalip were in their house on December
23 1966. Daria was making rope while Tumalip was applying candle wax to
a flat iron. Cecilia Bernal, their niece and neighbour, was alarmed by the
barking of dogs. When she peeped through a crack in the wall of her
house, she saw appellants Juan Brioso and Mario Taeza walking in the
direction of the spouses’ house with Brioso carrying a long gun and Taeza,
a short weapon. She testified that she saw appellants point the gun at the
bamboo wall of the house and fired two shots. Tumalip testified that right
after Daria was shot, she rushed to his side and he told her it was Brioso
and Taeza who shot him. He died one hour later. After a few days, Tumalip
and Bernal executed affidavits naming herein appellants as the killers.
For their defense, Brioso’s alibi was that during that day, he was with his
cousin, Flores, milling sugar the entire day. Flores was presented to
corroborate Brioso’s alibi, but their testimonies varied. Taeza’s alibi, was
that he was playing his guitar at the clinic with Antonio, son of the
deceased, along with some other companions, around the time the
shooting happened. This was corroborated by the affidavit of Antonio. It
must be noted, however, that Antonio’s affidavit did not contain the seal
of the Fiscal’s office. Neither was he presented as a witness during trial.
The trial court convicted the appellants for the murder of Daria.
Issue:
1. WON the court was correct in relying on the testimonies of Bernal
and Tumalip.
2. WON the court was correct in not admitting the affidavit of
Antonio for being hearsay.
Ruling:
1. Yes. We find no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal on
the material points. She stated that she did not see Mariano
Taeza carry a gun when both the accused passed by. But this
brief observation does not necessarily mean that he was not
actually armed or carrying a gun on his person. The fact that he
did was proved when both the said accused were seen pointing
their respective gun at the victim and each subsequently fired
once at him, Taeza using a short weapon
The testimony of Bernal was corroborated by the declaration of the
victim himself, who told his wife that it was Brioso and Taeza who shot
him. The declaration is admissible under the rule on ante-mortem
statements. Judging from the nature and extent Daria’s wounds, he
must have realized the seriousness of his condition, and it can be
safely inferred that he made such statements under the consciousness
of an impending death.
It is noteworthy that the trial judge observed witness Bernal closely,
warning her several times not to exaggerate, yet in the decision gave
her full credence, being obviously satisfied of her
truthfulness.lâwphî1.ñèt The general rule, based on logic and
experience, is that the findings of the judge who tried the case and
heard the witnesses are not disturbed on appeal, unless there are
substantial facts and circumstances which have been overlooked and
which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the
case,2 which in this case have not been shown to exist.
2. Yes. Antonio’s affidavit was properly rejected as hearsay
evidence. The said affidavit was neveridentified by the supposed
affiant and there was no opportunity for prosecution to cross-
-examine him because he was not presented during trial. As
stated in the case of People v. Mariquina affidavits are generally
rejected in a judicial proceedings as hearsay, unless the affidavits
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
For this reason, and for the further reason that the adverse party
is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants,
affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as
hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness
stand to testify thereon. In view hereof, We find Exhibit "2" of no
probative value, and that the lower court did not err when it
rejected the same. In this connection, it is markworthy that the
prosecuting attorney stated in open court that Antonio Daria had
also executed another affidavit (Exhibit "D") in the Fiscal's office
"to the effect that he went to the office of defense counsel, ......
and there affixed his thumbmark on a statement that was never
read to him."
Be that as it may, not one of the other persons who, Mariano
Taeza claimed, were with him in the barrio clinic (Narciso Valera
and Jose Cabais) was produced in court to support his alibi.
Mariano Taeza's testimony, therefore, remains uncorroborated.
It has been repeatedly held that in the face of direct
evidence, alibi is necessarily a weak defense and becomes more
so if uncorroborated. 5 It is worse if the alibi could have been
corroborated by other persons mentioned by the accused but
they are not presented.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the sentence under appeal is affirmed, with the
sole modification that the amount of the indemnity is increased to
P12,000.00.
Bachrach v CIR (1978)
Muñoz-Palma, J.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Bachrach Motor Co., then known as Rural Transit had a
pending labor dispute with its employees before the CIR.
 During the pendency of the case, petitioner filed a “Petition for
Authority to discharge driver Maximo Jacob from the service”,
alleging that said driver violated the Motor Vehicle Law resulting
to damage to property and injuries to third parties.
 In an Answer and Counter-Petition filed by the employees’
association in behalf of Jacob, the allegations were denied and it
was averred that the cause of the accident was a mechanical
defect
 The petition was heard during which petitioner only presented
one witness, Mr. Joseph Kaplin. Mr. Kaplin was set to appear
again for cross-examination but failed to do as he already left for
abroad.
 The employees’ association filed a motion praying that the
testimony be stricken from the records and that the petition to
 dismiss Jacob be denied and that he be reinstated with
backwages.
 The CIR granted the motion and dismissed the company’s petition
and ordered Jacob’s reinstatement.
ISSUES + RULING:
WoN the CIR erred in striking out Kaplin’s testimony. NO.
 The Court cited a number of cases in upholding the CIR’s decision.
 In Savory Luncheonette v Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino:
o The right of a party to confront and cross-examine
opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or
civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative
tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is fundamental right
which is part of due process.
 In Ortigas Jr. v Lufthansa German Airlnes:
o when cross- examination is not and cannot be done or
completed due to causes attributable to the party
offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is
thereby rendered incompetent.
o The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his
adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no
less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The
express recognition of such right of the accused in the
Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties
in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an
indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the
fundamental law. . . . Until such cross-examination has
been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be
considered as complete and may not, therefore, be
allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by
the court in deciding the case.
 Petitioner contends that it was ready to present another witness,
Mrs. Silva, to identify several documents but did not proceed to
do so since the respondent’s counsel Atty. Santiago manifested to
admitting the signatures of Mr. Kaplin on the documents.
o Santiago merely admitted the signature but not the
contents of the documents. The opposing party was
hence still entitled to cross-examine Kaplin on the
matters of the documents. (case vague as to the content
of the documents)
o Without Kaplin’s testimony, evaluation of the documents
for “whatever they may be worth” cannot be had
o When Atty. Santiago admitted that the signature
appearing in Exhibits "1" to "8-F" was that of witness
Kaplin, the counsel of petitioner then, Atty. Joven Enrile,
should have inquired if the party was admitting likewise
the veracity of the contents of the documents; not
having done so, petitioner must now suffer the
consequences.
o Exhibits "1" to "8-F" were admitted by respondent court
only for "whatever they may be worth." Evaluating them,
however, it did not consider said documents, and rightly
so, as competent proof of the truthfulness of their
contents without the supporting testimony of witness
Kaplin.
o As stated in the order under review "(N)o other witness
was presented by respondent company (now petitioner)
to testify on the intrinsic value of those exhibits";
consequently, they are hearsay.
o Inasmuch as the testimony of Joseph Kaplin is stricken off
the record and the contents of Exhibits "1" to "8-F" are
hearsay, and there is no other evidence which
substantiates the charges against Maximo Jacob, the
dismissal of the company's petition to discharge Jacob
from its service is in order.
Other matters:

 Considering that the CIR denied Bachrach’s petition to dismiss

Jacob, the lifting of his suspension and his reinstatement with
backwages is a necessary consequence
 The relief could be granted without need of evidence; the burden
of proof was with the company to justify the suspension and
eventual termination of Jacob which they failed to discharge

DISPOSITION: CIR affirmed with modifications as to the payment of

backwages.