Aranes v.

Occiano
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.

Republic v. Orbecido
The court held that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Garcia-Recio v. Garcia
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it
is consistent with their respective national laws.

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to
the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like
any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our
law on evidence.

Tenebro v. Court of Appeals

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or
subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual's criminal liability for bigamy. We hold
that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not
retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines' penal laws are concerned. As such, an
individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable
for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

For clarification to moy2.

Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore,
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent
marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is
null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned.
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas.
Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license
before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to
note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into
the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.

Republic v. Nolasco
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife, who had been missing
for more than four years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted of: (1) Searching for her whenever his ship
docked in England; (2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and (3) Inquiring from their friends regarding
her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless. The Court ruled that the present spouse’s investigations were too sketchy
to form a basis that his wife was already dead and ruled that the pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had chosen
not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.

In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of his absent spouse, a British subject who left their home in the Philippines soon
after giving birth to their son while respondent was on board a vessel working as a seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought
the reversal of the ruling on the ground that respondent was not able to establish his “well-founded belief that the
absentee is already dead,” as required by Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling thereon, this Court recognized that this
provision imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil Code.

The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still alive; or that the
absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a “well-founded belief” that
the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As noted by the
Court in that case, the four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

Ninal v. Bayadog
The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the
Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license.

This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity - that is unbroken.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved
to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his
first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law.
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when
they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of
a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

Barcelona v. CA
The case of Santos v. CA defined psychological incapacity as mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

Further, Santos states that the law refers to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The psychological condition must exist at
the time of celebration of the marriage.

Subsequent to Santos and the case of Republic v. Molina, the Court adopted the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, where § 2, paragraph (d) states: The complete facts should
allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of
the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

The obvious effect of the new rules in providing that expert opinion need not be alleged is that there is no need to allege
the root cause of psychological incapacity, since only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are
competent to determine such root cause.

In the ruling in Molina, the court provided guidance in the interpretation and application of FC 36: …The root cause of
the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision …

Republic v. Quintero-Hamano
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.

The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically identified.

However, what is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Lolita showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He abandoned them a
month after his marriage to respondent. She sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the
Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.

The totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities.
Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind
of psychological illness. After Lolita testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented
showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.

Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s
case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an
expert witness. This respondent did not do.

Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance
of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that
Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage.

It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that
he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years and are without legal
impediment to marry each other; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and
that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation
does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that
they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a
long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for
exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the law transgressed
is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Terre v. Terre
YES. Under Art. 40, it says that, "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Even if the 1st marriage is void, there is
still a need for a summary proceeding declaring such marriage void ab initio. Thus, if a 2nd marriage is contracted
without first securing the declaration of nullity with regard to the 1st marriage, then the 2nd marriage is also void. Plus,
bigamy is also committed.

When the second marriage (Respondent and Helina )was entered into, respondent's prior marriage with complainant
was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior
marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the
prevailing case law of this court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract
a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.

Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result
will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must
be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and
criminal in character.

Jimenez v. Canizares
Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established because from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. A physical
examination in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be a
witness against herself. Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of
potency. The lone testimony of the husband is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as
husband and wife.

Republic v. Manalo
It was held that under the second requisite it should be the foreigner spouse who initiated the divorce proceeding. If it
was the Filipino spouse who filed the case for divorce, the decree would not be recognized as valid in the Philippines.
Consequently, under Philippine laws, the Filipino spouse remained married to his or her foreigner spouse and
incapacitated to contract marriage. Recently, however, the Supreme abandoned that view in Republic v. Manalo.

Dissenting Opinions