22. Sison v.
People, 250 SCRA 58 (1995) Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by
Doctrine: Photographs, when presented in evidence, must be
identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as
to the circumstances under which they were produced. The photographer,
however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has
taken. They can be identified by the photographer or by any other
competent witnesses who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.
Facts: On July 27, 1986, in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA
Revolution, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by
theMarcos loyalists. Despite being denied a permit, 3000 of them gathered
at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta andstarted an impromptu singing
contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in between. When the
authorities arrived andno permit could be produced, they were told to
disperse.
One of the leaders, Atty. Oliver Lozano, turned to his group and said
“Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators,” and a commotion
ensued. They eventually fled, and later, some ofthem converged at the
Chinese garden of Luneta. Another commotion ensued and the loyalists
started attacking persons inyellow, the color of the “Coryistas,” one of
which was Salcedo. He was chased, boxed, kicked and mauled.
One Ranulfo Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them,
but several accused came forward and resumed mauling
Salcedodespite his pleas for mercy. He died upon arrival at the Philippine
General Hospital of “hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic.”
The mauling was witnessed by many and the press took pictures and a video
of the event which became front-page news the following day. Cory
instructed the Western Police district to investigate on it and Brigadier
General Alfredo Lim offered a P10,000 reward for persons who could give
information which could help arrest the killers. Sumilang and Banculo
cooperated with the Police and several persons including the accused were
investigated.
Informations for murder were filed and these cases were consolidated.
The prosecution presented 12 witnesses including Sumilang and Banculo. In
support of their testimonies, the prosecution also presented documentary
evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the indicent and various
photos.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the
mauling. Either they were not there (since they were not in the
Photographs) or that they were there and were in the photos because they
were just watching or trying to stop the maulers. Sison however said that
he was not there and was in fact waiting for his photos to be developed ( he
was a commercial photographer) and was afflicted with hernia which
impaired his mobility.
The RTC found Sison, Pacadar, Tan, de los Santos and Tamayo guilty as
principals in the crime of murder qualified with treachery. Starlet Annie
Ferrer was convicted as an accomplice. The court acquitted the others.
On appeal, CA acquitted Starlet Annie Ferrer and increased the penalty
of the rest of the accused except Tamayo. The Ca found them guilty of
murder qualified by abuse of superior strength (penalty increased to RP).
Hence auto review before the SC (for those sentenced to RP)
Issue: Were the photographs of the incident presented properly given
evidentiary weight despite lack of proper identification by their respective
photographers?
Held: Yes. Photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by
the photographer as to its production and testified as to th e
circumstances under which they were produced. The value of
this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or
reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its
accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The
photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the
pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful
representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either
by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent
witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as
to its accuracy.
any other competent witnesses who can testify to its exactness and
accuracy.
In this case, the counsel for two of the accused used the same
photographs to prove that his clients were not in any of the p ictu res
a n d th e refo re c ou ld n ot h a ve p a rti cip a t ed i n th e m a u lin g of
th e v ict im . W h en th e p r os ec u tion u s ed th e photographs to
cross-examine all the accused, no objection was made by the defense,
not until Atty. Lazaro interposed at the third hearing a continuing
objection to their admissibility.
The SC ruled that the use of the photographs by the atty for the appellants
is an admission of the exactness and accuracy of such. That the photos were
faithful representations of the mauling inciden twas affirmed when
appellants de los santos, Pacadar and Tan identified themselves in the
pictures and explained their presence in said pictures
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179710
Appellee,
Present:
CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
ALDRIN BERDADERO y
ARMAMENTO, Promulgated:
Appellant. June 29, 2010
x---------------------------------------------------------------------
-----x
DECIS ION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Strict compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 regarding the custody
and disposition of evidence against the accused may be excused under justifiable
grounds. If the justifiable reason could no longer be determined due to the defenses
failure to raise it in issue during trial, it is of vital importance to establish that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved since these
would be determinative of whether the accused is guilty or not.[1]
Factual Antecedents
On March 28, 2003, an Information[2] was filed against appellant Aldrin Berdadero y
Armamento (appellant) for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 12861. The accusatory allegations of the Information
read:
That on or about March 25, 2003, at around 2:40 oclock in
the afternoon at Arrieta Subdivision (Brgy. 20), Batangas City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell, dispense or deliver 0.04 gram of shabu, [also] known as
methamphetamine hydrochloride a dangerous drug, which
is a clear violation of the above-cited law.
Contrary to Law.
On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. In the trial that ensued, the prosecution and the defense presented different
accounts of the events that transpired prior to and during the appellants arrest.
The Version of the Prosecution
The Investigation Section of the Batangas City Police Station received a report from an
informant that the appellant was selling shabu. Thus, PO3 Danilo F. Balmes (PO3
Balmes) and PO2 Edwalberto M. Villas (PO2 Villas) organized a buy-bust operation and
designated the informant as the poseur-buyer.
Thereafter, the two police officers and the informant went to the target area and
parked the van they were using in front of appellants house. After alighting from the
vehicle, the informant talked to the appellant. A few minutes later, the appellant went
inside his house. When he returned, he handed to the informant two plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance in exchange for the marked money. The
informant then gave the pre-arranged signal that the sale was consummated.
The police officers who were observing the transaction from inside the van
apprehended the appellant and recovered the marked money from him. They
apprised the appellant of his constitutional rights before taking him to
the barangay hall to record the entrapment operation and the evidence seized from
the appellant in the blotter. The informant turned over the plastic sachets to PO3
Balmes. They then proceeded to the police station.
Upon their arrival, the buy-bust operation and the items confiscated from the
appellant were recorded in the police blotter. The desk officer, PO1 Arnold delos Reyes
(PO1 Delos Reyes), prepared the complaint sheet while PO3 Balmes placed markings
on the plastic sachets. The first sachet was marked DFB-1 with the date 3-25-03, while
the second sachet was marked DFB-2 with the same date. The sachets were then
submitted for laboratory examination, which tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
The Version of the Defense
The appellant claimed that he was a victim of frame-up. He testified that at
around 2:40 in the afternoon of March 25, 2003, two men came to his house and
introduced themselves as locksmiths. His mother allowed them to enter and showed
them the defective keys. After a while, the men left, but they returned 10 minutes
later, kicked the door open and handcuffed him. He asked why he was being arrested
but no explanation was forthcoming. He was instead brought to the police station.
The appellant denied that illicit drugs were recovered from him and that the two men
who arrested him were PO3 Balmes and PO2 Villas.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 10, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 4, rendered its
Decision[3] convicting the appellant. The dispositive portion reads:
Wherefore, finding the evidence of the Prosecution
satisfying that degree of moral certainty, accused Aldrin
Berdadero y Armamento is found Guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of having violated Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 as set forth in the information filed in
this case. He is therefore sentenced to pay a fine
of P500,000.00 and to undergo life imprisonment pursuant
to law. He is however, credited with his preventive
imprisonment if he is entitled to any.
The specimens subject of chemistry Report No. D-634-03
(Exhibit C) made by Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas
is confiscated and directed to be proceeded against pursuant
to law.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA). However, in its
Decision[5] promulgated on July 3, 2007, the CA denied the appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court.
Issues
Thus, this appeal with the following assignment of errors:
I photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.
II
ASSUMING, THAT THE VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION IS
CORRECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE
CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[6]
The appellant insists that no buy-bust operation ever transpired and that his arrest was
unlawful. He also contends that the prosecution failed to prove that the alleged buy-
bust operation complied with Section 21 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules since
the police authorities neither inventoried nor photographed the seized drugs and
marked money in his presence or that of his counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice. The appellant likewise assails the authority of PO3
Balmes and PO2 Villas to conduct the alleged buy-bust operation for failure of the
prosecution to prove that they were deputized by the PDEA as required under Section
81 of RA 9165. And even assuming that there was faithful compliance with the
mandates of RA 9165, the appellant argues that the poseur-buyers testimony became
material and indispensable due to his denial of having committed the prohibited act
of selling the dangerous drug. Thus, it is the appellants conclusion that the seizure and
custody over the seized drugs is void.
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
The elements necessary to establish a case for illegal sale of shabu are: (1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in a prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in
evidence.[7]
The prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the essential elements of the
illegal sale of shabu. The appellant was positively identified by police officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation as the seller of the shabu presented in the
case. PO3 Balmes and PO2 Villas testified that their confidential informant acted as the
buyer of the shabu from the appellant. It was likewise established that the sale actually
occurred and that two sachets of shabu were sold for the price of P500.00. The
marked money used in the buy-bust operation was duly adduced in
evidence. The shabu sold by the appellant was also positively and categorically
identified during trial.
Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.[8] The trial court in this case, as
affirmed by the CA, held that the testimonies of PO3 Balmes and PO2 Villas were
unequivocal, straightforward, and consistent in material respects with each other and
with other testimonies and physical evidence. We find no cogent reason to overturn
said findings.
The appellants defense of frame-up must fail. We have previously ruled
that frame-up is a banal defense of those accused in drug-related cases that is viewed
with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, frame-up is an allegation that can easily be
concocted. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing
evidence, which the appellant failed to do.[9] There was no proof proffered to overturn
the presumption that the arresting police officers regularly performed their
duties. The appellant also did not prove that the prosecution witnesses were
maliciously motivated, which would put their credibility in doubt. Moreover, the
failure to present the appellants mother to testify and corroborate his defense of
frame-up renders the same as self-serving thus unworthy of any weight in evidence.
The appellants contention that the buy-bust operation failed to comply with Section
21 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules fails to impress. Paragraph 1 of Section 21,
Article II of said law outlines the procedure to be followed in the custody and handling
of the seized drugs. Thus:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized
and/or Surrendered Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instrument/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. x x
x
(1) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
xxxx
This provision is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, viz.:
(a) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
 photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody over
the said items.
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted
the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant
to said guidelines, is not fatal. Indeed, the implementing rules that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody over said
items.
Notably, the defense did not raise this issue during trial. Be that as it may, we explained
in People v. Del Monte[10] that what is of vital importance is the preservation of the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The existence of the
dangerous drug is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
crime and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Thus, it is
essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. The
chain of custody requirement performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary
doubts as to the identity of the evidence are removed.[11]
To be admissible, the prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into possession of the
police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition up
to the time it was offered in evidence.[12]
Here, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses convincingly show that the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal substance was properly
preserved. PO3 Balmes marked the sachets containing shabu with his initials and the
date of the appellants arrest.[13] PO2 Villas confirmed that PO3 Balmes marked the
same sachets of shabu sold by the appellant. PO1 Delos Reyes entered the arrest in
the police blotter[14] then referred the appellant and the evidence to the Investigation
Division.[15] PO3 Sergio del Mundo (PO3 Del Mundo) received the appellant and the
evidence from PO1 Delos Reyes and prepared the request for laboratory tests on the
specimens.[16] PO2 Villas brought the specimens and said letter request to the crime
laboratory[17]and waited for the results.[18] Insp. Donna Villa P. Huelgas conducted the
laboratory examination on the same specimens still bearing the markings of PO3
Balmes,[19] and which examination yielded positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.[20] The results were given to PO2 Villas, who turned
over the same to PO3 Del Mundo.[21]
It is thus evident that the identity of the corpus delicti has been properly preserved and
established by the prosecution. The appellant in this case has the burden to show that
the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity
in the handling of exhibits of public officers and a presumption that public officers
properly discharge their duties.[22] The appellant was unable to discharge such burden.
The appellants next argument that the evidence against him was obtained in violation
of Section 86 of RA 9165 because the buy-bust operation was made without any
involvement of the PDEA also fails to impress. This provision reads:
SEC. 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All
Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory
Provisions. The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the Narcotics
Division of the NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction
Unit are hereby abolished; however they shall continue with
the performance of their task as detail service with the PDEA,
subject to screening, until such time that the organizational
structure of the Agency is fully operational and the number
of graduates of the PDEA Academy is sufficient to do the task
themselves: Provided, That such personnel who are affected
shall have the option of either being integrated into the PDEA
or remain with their original mother agencies and shall,
thereafter, be immediately reassigned to other units therein
by the head of such agencies. Such personnel who are
transferred, absorbed and integrated in the PDEA shall be
extended appointments to positions similar in rank, salary,
and other emoluments and privileges granted to their
respective positions in their original mother agencies.
The transfer, absorption and integration of the different
offices and units provided for in this Section shall take effect
within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this
Act: Provided, That personnel absorbed and on detail service
shall be given until five (5) years to finally decide to join the
PDEA.
Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the
investigative powers of the NBI and the PNP on all other
crimes as provided for in their respective organic
laws: Provided, however, That when the investigation being
conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force
is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act,
the PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the
task force shall immediately transfer the same to the
PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of
Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on
all drug related matters.
A perusal of the foregoing provision shows that it is silent as to the consequences of
failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the authority of the PDEA prior to
conducting a buy-bust operation, in the same way that the IRR is likewise silent on the
matter. However, by no stretch of imagination could this silence be interpreted as a
legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or
evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.[23]
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will
result from a particular construction, or great public interests would be endangered or
sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction must be avoided, or the court
ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law,
unless required by clear and unequivocal words.[24]
As we see it, Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the lead agency
in the investigations and prosecutions of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law
enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA as
long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter. Moreover, the
same provision states that PDEA, serving as the implementing arm of the Dangerous
Drugs Board shall be responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of all
the provisions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical as provided in the Act. It is only appropriate that drugs cases being handled
by other law enforcement authorities be transferred or referred to the PDEA as the
lead agency in the campaign against the menace of dangerous drugs. Section 86 is
more of an administrative provision. By having a centralized law enforcement
body, i.e., the PDEA, the Dangerous Drugs Board can enhance the efficacy of the law
against dangerous drugs. To be sure, Section 86(a) of the IRR emphasizes this point by
providing:
Section 86. x x x
(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other
Agencies The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the
enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other
law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-
drug operations in support of the PDEA x x x. Provided,
finally, that nothing in the IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI,
other law enforcement personnel and the personnel of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful
arrests and seizures in consonance with the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
It is therefore clear that PO3 Balmes and PO2 Villas possessed and acted with authority
to conduct the buy-bust operation, making the same valid.
The appellants final contention that the failure to present the poseur-buyer is fatal and
entitles him to an acquittal, again fails to impress. The non-presentation of the poseur-
buyer is fatal only if there is no other eyewitness to the illicit transaction.[25] The
testimonies of PO3 Balmes and PO2 Villas sufficiently established that the appellant is
guilty of selling a dangerous drug. Their referral to the shabu handed by the appellant
to the poseur-buyer as something merely indicates that at the time of the sale, they
could only presume that the specimen sold by the appellant was shabu since they
were conducting a buy-bust operation. They still had to submit the specimen to the
crime laboratory for testing which later tested positive for shabu. Thus, the fact that
the poseur-buyer was not presented does not weaken the evidence for the
prosecution.
For the illegal sale of shabu, and there being no modifying circumstance alleged in the
Information, the trial court, as sustained by the CA, correctly imposed the penalty of
life imprisonment in accordance with Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code and a fine
of P500,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 01774 sustaining in all respects the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 4, convicting appellant Aldrin
Berdadero y Armamento for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of P500,000.00 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
24. People v. Prajes and Mala, G.R. No. 206770, April 2, 2014
FACTS:
-Prajes and Mala, the accused-appellants were accused of violating Section
5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
-According to the prosecution, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
in Cebu City received reports that theaccused-appellants were engaged in
the sale of illegal drugs. Following surveillance operations conducted
during the last week of August 2002, a buy-bust operation was organized
by the NBI for September 4, 2002.5
-The accused-appellants denied the charge against them. Prajes claimed
that at about 4:00 p.m. on September 4, 2002, he was sleeping at his
house in Kinasang-an when a neighbor, Renante Paradero (Paradero),
woke him up to informhim that some persons were looking for him.
-For Mala’s defense, witness Magdalena Abarquez claimed that at around
4:00 p.m. on September 4, 2002, she saw Mala enter the house of Prajes.
When he tried to leave the house, he was prevented by someone who was
inside the house. Sabayton was called on the witness stand by the defense
as a hostile witness.
-The RTC Ruling On June 29, 2004, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 15,
rendered a Decision16 finding the accused-appellants guilty for violation of
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentencing them to each suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay fine of P500,000.00.17
Dissatisfied with the trial court’s ruling, the accused-appellants appealed
tothe CA.
-The CA Ruling In a Decision18 dated May 30, 2012, the CA affirmed in toto
the decision of the RTC. The appellate court found no credence in the
denials that were posed by the accused-appellants. Instead, it found
credible the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the elements
of the crime of illegal sale of drugs, as well as its showing that there was
sufficient compliance by the NBI operatives with the rule on chain of
custody.
Issue: Whether or not there is proof beyond reasonable doubt?
Ruling:
On the issue of chain of custody, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that
"[t]he apprehending team having initial custody and control of the [seized]
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]"
In a line of cases, the Court has nonetheless explained that "while the chain
of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality itis not, ‘as it is almost always
impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.’" The limitation on chain of custody
is also recognized in the afore-quoted Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165’s IRR, as
it states that non-compliance with the rules’ requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. In resolving
drug cases, we then repeatedly emphasize that "what is essential is ‘the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused.’"23
On the issue of the subject drugs’ marking as part of the chain of custody
requirement, the accused-appellants point out that SI Tumalon and SI
Saavedra both named SI Saavedra as the one who marked the seized drugs,
but witnesses SA Minguez and Atty. Magno each testified that it was SI
Tumalon and the forensic chemist, respectively, who effected such marking.
The Court, however, agrees with the CA’s observation that although there
were conflicting accounts by the prosecution witnesses as to the person
who actually marked the seized drugs, the failure of SA Minguez and Atty.
Magno to identify the said person could be readily explained by the fact that
they had no actual participation in the evidence’s marking. As against their
conflicting statements, what were significant were the testimonies of SI
Tumalon and SI Saavedra, being the persons who actually seized, endorsed
and marked the evidence. Both agreed that following the accused-
appellants’ arrest, the seized packs of shabu were handed by SI Tumalon to
SI Saavedra, who was the one who placed the markings on the evidence,24
before the same were brought to the laboratory for examination. As aptly
explained by the appellate court:
SA Minguez may have incorrectly assumed that it was SI Tumalon, their
poseur-buyer, who made the markings on the packs of shabu that were
confiscated in the ensuing confusion. However, SI Tumalon himself testified
that he turned-over the drugs to SA Saavedra. Atty. Magno’s statement that
it was "maybe our Forensic Chemist" who made the markings on the three
packs is inconsequential when considered with the positive testimonies of
SI Tumalon and SA Saavedra. SA Minguez and Atty. Magno assumed
supporting roles. It was SI Tumalon who was in the thick of things so to
speak, as he was the poseur-buyer and he was the one who took the shabu
from accused-appellants and handed it to SA Saavedra for marking.
Moreover, SA Saavedra’s identification of his own handwriting puts any
doubt to rest.25 (Citations omitted)
The fact that the marking was performed by SA Saavedra only upon the buy-
bust team’s arrival at the NBI office did not adversely affect the
prosecution’s case against the accused-appellants. Given the situation at
the house where the accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto
and then arrested by the buy-bust team, the failure of SA Saavedra to mark
the seized drugs at the said site was justified. In his testimony before the
trial court, SA Minguez described that after the accused-appellants’ arrest,
their neighbors interfered and rallied for the accused-appellants, even
compelling members of the buy-bust team inside the house to seek the
immediate aid of their peers so that they could leave the premises.26
Even the failure of the prosecution to present a physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs did not render inadmissible the packs of
shabu that were seized from the accused-appellants, especially as we
consider that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs did not appear
to have been compromised. This was similar with the Court's ruling in
People v. Torres27 and Ambre v. People,28 wherein we affirmed the
conviction of the accused notwithstanding some deviations from the
required procedure on physical inventory and photographs of the seized
items.
As against the accused-appellants' denial, an inherently weak defense, the
evidence presented by the prosecution deserves credence. The following
elements of illegal sale of shabu were sufficiently established during the
trial: (a) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and
the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
for the thing.
25. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, V., SONNY SABDULA y AMANDA,
FACTS: The respondent here was charged with violation of Section 5, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 Allegedly, a confidential informant told the Central Police
District with respect to the illegal drug activities of one alias "Moneb" at a
squatter’s area in San Roque II, Quezon City. Due to this, they formed a buy
bust team composed of PO2 Centeno (the designated poseur-buyer), PO1
Fortea, PO2 Rolando Daduya, PO1 Victor Porte, PO1 Louise Escarlan and
PO1 Noel de Guzman. Around 7 of theevening on february 1, 2004, the
informant intoduced PO2 Ceteno as his kumapre and ask if he can sell to
them a drugs for200 pesos.
The respondent was able to produce a 0.10 gram of white crystalline
substance containing MethylamphetamineHydrochloride, a dangerous
drug. Thereafter he was arrested. The seized plastic sachet was given to
SPO2 Salinel who, in turn, handed it to PO3 Chantengco who made a request
for laboratory examination that PO3 Centeno brought, together with the
seized item to the Central Police District Crime Laboratory for analysis.
Per Chemistry Report No. D-140-2004 of Engr. Leonard Jabonillo (the
forensic chemist), the submitted specimen tested positive for the presence
of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
On the side of the respondent, he alleged that while he was riding a taxi, a
group of five men suddenly pointed a gun to him and he was forcibly taken
to the police. A certain person ask the sister of respondent to give 200,000
php for ransom. However, unable to produce, the respondent was
prosecuted.
RTC RULING: found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
sale of shabu, and sentenced him to suffer thepenalty of life imprisonment.
CA RULING: the CA affirmed the RTC decision.The CA held that the
prosecution successfully established all the elements of illegal sale of shabu:
PO2 Centeno, the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant as the
person who gave him shabu weighing 0.10 gram in exchange for P200.00.
The CA also ruled that the buy-bust team were presumed to have
performed their duties regularly. It added that the appellant failed to
impute improper motive on the part of the arresting officers. The CA further
held that the chain of custody over the seized plastic sachet were properly
established, even if the time of the actual marking of the seized item had
not been shown.
ISSUE: WON, the sachet drugs obtain by the police was properly marked,
thus making it admissible?
RULING: NO. A successful prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs requires
more than the perfunctory presentation of evidence establishing each
element of the crime, namely: the identities of the buyer and seller, the
transaction or sale of the illegal drug and the existence of the corpus delicti.
These exchanges further show that the apprehending team never
conducted an inventory nor did they photograph the confiscated item in the
presence of the appellant or his counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice, or an elective official either at the place of
seizure, or at the police station. The Joint Affidavit of the police did not also
mention any inventory conducted of any photograph taken. Corollarily,
there was no certificate of inventory or inventory receipt and photographs
of the seized drugs attached to the records.
In People v. Gonzales,23 the police failed to conduct an inventory and to
photograph the seized plastic sachet. In acquitting the accused based on
reasonable doubt, we explained that [t]he omission of the inventory and
photographing exposed another weakness of the evidence of guilt,
considering that the inventory and photographing — to be made in the
presence of the accused or his representative, or within the presence of any
representative from the media, Department of Justice or any elected
official, who must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of the inventory —
were really significant stages of the procedures outlined by the law and its
IRR.24
In the present case, the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs
allegedly seized from petitioner due to the failure of the police to mark,
inventory and photograph the seized plastic sachet effectively negated the
presumption of regularity. The procedural lapses by the police put in doubt
the identity and evidentiary value of the seized plastic sachet. Our ruling in
People v. Cantalejo28 on this point is particularly instructive:
As a general rule, the testimony of the police officers who apprehended the
accused is usually accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption
that they have performed their duties regularly. However, when the
performance of their duties is tainted with irregularities, such presumption
is effectively destroyed.
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot
by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
presumption of regularity is merely just that - a mere presumption
disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by evidence
cannot be regarded as binding truth.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NENITA GAMATA y VALDEZ, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 11, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04839 which affirmed the
Decision2 dated September 15, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 64 in Criminal Case Nos. 06-1344 to 1345 finding Nenita
Gamata y Valdez (accused-appellant) guilty in Criminal Case 'No. 06-1344
for violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
₱500,000.00.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 06-1344 to which the accused-
appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" contained the following accusations:
That on or about the 25TH day of July 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and deliver to another,
zero point zero three [0.03] gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
which is a dangerous drug, in exchange of Php.500.00 pesos.3 [sic]
Meanwhile, the information in Criminal Case No. 06-1345 indicted the
accused-appellant for illegal possession of 0.14 gram of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, an act punishable under Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165.4Considering, however, that the accused-appellant
was acquitted by the RTC of such criminal charge, the present discussion
shall concern only Criminal Case No. 06-1344.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Police Officer 2
Renie Aseboque (PO2 Aseboque), Noel Pulido (Pulido) and Juan Siborboro,
Jr., both operatives of the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC), and
Police Inspector May Andrea Bonifacio (P/Insp. Bonifacio), Forensic Chemist
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. Their declarations
depicted the following events:
On July 25, 2006, an information was received by Senior Inspector Joefel
Felongco Siason (S/Insp. Siason) of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operations Task Force (SAIDSOTF), Makati City, from a confidential asset of
the MADAC that rampant illegal drug peddling in Laperal Compound,
Barangay Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City was being carried out by the
accused-appellant, Jun Gamata (Jun), Toto Madera and Totoy Pajayjay.
Apparently, their names are also included in the watch list of the MADAC.
Forthwith, a team composed of SAIDSOTF police officers and MADAC
operatives was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation against the said
subjects. During the briefing,PO2 Aseboque was designated as the poseur-
buyer while the rest of the team members were assigned to be his back-up.
The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) under Pre-Coordination Sheet Control Number MMRO-
072506-0212 duly acknowledged to have been received by PO1 Nemencio
V. Domingo of the PDEA.5 One piece of a 500.00 bill was also marked for use
in the operation.6
At around 4:30 p.m., the team, together with the confidential informant,
proceeded to the subject area.1âwphi1 The team members positioned
themselves in spots where they can monitor the possible transaction.
Meanwhile, PO2 Aseboque and the informant walked towards Laperal
Compound and thereupon noticed a woman clad in white t-shirt and maong
pants. The informant identified her to PO2 Aseboque as the accused-
appellant.
The two of them then approached the accused-appellant whom PO2
Aseboque queried as to the whereabouts of Jun. In response, the accused-
appellant said that Jun was not around and that "kami nandito lang, bakit
kukuha ba kayo?" PO2 Aseboque comprehended her response as the street
language used in the dealing ofdangerous drugs and that she actually meant
that she was selling shabu if they wanted to buy one. PO2 Aseboque
repeated his query to which the accused-appellant replied, "Wag niyo ng
hintayin si Jun, ako meron." PO2 Aseboque took her response as a
confirmation that she was indeed selling shabu. He then asked her if she
had 500.00 worth of shabu. The accused-appellant took out one plastic
sachet from her right pocket and handed it over to PO2 Aseboque who in
turn examined its contents and thereafter handed the buy-bust money to
the accused-appellant. As she was placing the money inside her pocket, PO2
Aseboque made the pre-arranged signal to his buy-bust team mates by
lighting a cigarette.
Upon seeing MADAC operative Pulido rushing towards the scene, PO2
Aseboque held the accused-appellant and introduced himself as a police
officer. He directed her to empty the contents of her pockets but she
refused. This prompted PO2 Aseboque to order Pulido to dig into the
accused-appellant’s pockets. Pulido complied and discovered three more
pieces of transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
suspected as shabu along with the buy-bust money and 120.00 of the
accused-appellant’s personal money.
The accused-appellant was then informed of her constitutional rights while
the sachet she sold to PO2 Aseboque was immediately marked by the latter
with his initials "REA" while those recovered by Pulido were marked with
"REA-1", "REA-2", and "REA-3". At the crime scene, PO2 Aseboque also
prepared an Acknowledgment Receipt7which he and the arresting team
signed.
The accused-appellant and the seized evidence were subsequently brought
to the Makati SAIDSOTF office where they were turned over to PO2 Rafael
Castillo (PO2 Castillo) for investigation, interrogation and proper
disposition. At the same office, PO2 Aseboque executed an Affidavit of
Arrest8 and a Supplemental Affidavit.
Along with a Request for Laboratory Examination9 prepared by S/Insp.
Siason, Pulido brought the seized specimens to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
The same were received by a certain Relos, officer of the day, in the
presence of Crime Laboratory Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Bonifacio.
P/Insp. Bonifacio conducted the necessary tests on the subject specimens
and the results thereof yielded positive results for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. Thereafter, she tagged each item with tape
markings and reduced her findings in Physical Science Report Number D-
506-06S.10 She then turned over the specimens to the evidence custodian
from whom she later on retrieved them upon the instructions of the
prosecutor after the filing of criminal informations against the accused-
appellant.11
The defense refuted all of the above occurrences and claimed, through the
testimony of the accused-appellant, that at around 3:00 p.m. of July 25,
2006, she had just finished taking a bath when she heard someone banging
the door of her house in Laperal Compound. When she opened the door,
five armed men in civilian clothing greeted her and asked for Jun, her
brother-in-law. When she answered them that she did not know Jun’s
whereabouts, they began searching her house. Since Jun actually resides at
about five houses away from hers, the armed men were unable to locate
him at the accused-appellant’s house. They then handcuffed the accused-
appellant and loaded her in a van where she saw her neighbor, Alaw, and a
certain Jonalyn Silvano. The three of them were brought to the SAIDSOTF
office where the accused-appellant was shown items that will be used as
evidence against her.12
In a Decision13 dated September 15, 2010,the RTC sustained the
prosecution’s version and held that the pieces of evidence submitted
established the presence of the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
viz: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, object and consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Both
elements were found present in the poseur-buyer’s positive identification
of the accused-appellant as the person from whom he was able to purchase
₱500.00 worth of shabu.
The accused-appellant’s denial and alibi were rejected for being
unsubstantiated. Her imputations of frame-up to the police officers were
likewise found uncorroborated by convincing proof and thus overthrown by
the presumption of regularity attached to the performance of the police
officers’ official duties.
The RTC disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, [judgment] is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Finding the accused NENITA GAMATA y VALDEZ, GUILTY in
Criminal Case No. 06-1344 of the charge for violation of Section
5, Article II of RA 9165 and sentencing her to life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(Php500,000.00);
2. ACQUITTING the accused NENITA GAMATA y VALDEZ in
Criminal Case No. 06-1345 of the charge for violation of Section
11, Article II of RA 9165.
SO ORDERED.14 (Emphasis ours)
On appeal, the accused-appellant argued for her acquittal on the ground
that the identity of the drugs seized from her was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt because the prosecution failed to supply all the links in
the chain of their custody. She further pointed out the inconsistent
testimonial and documentary evidence on the markings placed on the
seized items. The accused-appellant also questioned the failure of the police
officers to comply with the procedure laid down in Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 particularly, the preparation of the inventory and taking of
photographs of the seized items.15
In a Decision16 dated May 11, 2012, the CA denied the appeal and concurred
with the findings and conclusions of the RTC that the identities of the buyer
and seller as well as the consummation of the sale of illegal drugs was
proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution through the
straightforward testimony of the poseur-buyer himself, PO2 Aseboque, as
believably corroborated by two other members of the buy-bust team and
by extensive documentary evidence. The CA rejected the accused-
appellant’s arguments and held that the same were disproved by the
evidence on record, thus:
Accused-appellant contends that while[PO2] Aseboque maintains that he
had custody of the items seized from her, Pulido testified that he was the
one who held the items recovered from accused-appellant. A careful
perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes, however, reveals that there
was actually no inconsistency as what Pulido testified to as the items that
was with him were the ones he recovered from the pocket of the accused-
appellant and not the one that was subject of the sale. x x x
xxxx
x x x [W]hen Pulido testified as to the seized items, he was referring to those
sachets that he was able to fish out of the pocket of accused-appellant and
he held on to the same as [PO2] Aseboque had his hands full trying to
restrain accused-appellant. x x x Pulido corroborated [PO2] Aseboque’s
statement that it was the latter who prepared the inventory of the items
seized from the accused-appellant. x x x
xxxx
It is noted that the four sachets were already marked with the initial of the
apprehending officer at the scene of the crime. The act was attested to by
the rest of the arresting team and the markings were reflected in the
acknowledgement report. Even if [PO2] Castillo failed to note in his spot
report that the items were marked with the initial of [PO2] Aseboque, it
could not be discounted that the items were the ones seized from the
person of accused-appellant because if the same were different, the items
that were turned over to the forensic chemist P/Insp. Bonifacio would not
have borne the initial of [PO2] Aseboque considering that from the hands WITNESS: She said: Kami nandito lang, bakit kukuha ba kayo?
of [PO2] Castillo, the seized items were personally handed by him to Relos,
who in turn gave the same to P/Insp. Bonifacio who was, likewise, present
PROS. PAGGAO: What did you understand by that?
when [PO2] Castillo handed the items to Relos. Moreover, [P/Insp.]
Bonifacio explained that there is actually no difference between the
marking "REA" and "R.E.A." x x x WITNESS: It is a street language that they are using with dangerous drugs,
so it is understood that we are going to buy shabu, sir.
xxxx
PROS. PAGGAO: What did you reply, if any?
In addition, an examination of the letter request (Request for Laboratory
Examination) shows that while the signatory mentioned that the item WITNESS: I asked her, "Si Jun wala ba?"
subject of the sale was marked as "REA", when he attached the sachet to
the request, the signatory made a handwritten reference to the attached PROS. PAGGAO: Any answer from the woman?
specimen as "R.E.A." To Our mind, the presence or absence of the
punctuation marks is of no moment as the request was precisely clear that
the items to be examined were the ones attached to the request WITNESS: She said, "Wag n’yo ng hintayin si Jun, ako meron."
itself.17 (Citation omitted)
PROS. PAGGAO: What did you do?
The CA also dismissed the accused-appellant’s contentions that the
statutory procedure for the inventory and photograph of the seized items WITNESS: I asked her if she has worth Five Hundred Pesos, sir.
was not observed. The CA held that the absence of a media representative
or an elected public official during the inventory was not material to
overturn a conviction as it did not pertain to the elements of the crime PROS. PAGGAO: What was her reply, if any?
charged. The CA further stressed that non-compliance with the inventory
and photograph requirements will not render void and invalid the seizure WITNESS: She told me that she has worth Five Hundred Pesos, sir.
and custody over the items.
PROS. PAGGAO: And, after that, what did you do, if any?
Accordingly, the decision disposed as follows:
WITNESS: She took one plastic sachet from her right pocket, sir.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED and the
appealed Decision dated September 15, 2010 rendered by the Regional Trial
PROS. PAGGAO: What did she do with that?
Court, Branch 64, Makati City, in Criminal Case No. 06-1344 for Violation of
Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED.
WITNESS: She handed that to me, sir.
18
SO ORDERED.
PROS. PAGGAO: And, upon receiving the sachet of shabu, what did you do?
The accused-appellant is now before the Court pleading for her acquittal
based on the same arguments raised in her Appellant’s Brief before the WITNESS: I checked it first if it has contents, sir.
CA.19
PROS. PAGGAO: After checking, what did you do?
Ruling of the Court
WITNESS: I then handed the buy bust money worth Five Hundred Pesos, sir.
The Court denies the appeal.
PROS. PAGGAO: And, after she received the Five Hundred Pesos, what
The arguments proffered in support of the accused-appellant’s plea for happened next?
acquittal has already been exhaustively traversed by the CA and based on
evidence on record, the Court finds no reversible error imputable to the WITNESS: While she is putting the buy bust money inside her pocket, I made
appellate court and the trial court in finding her guilty beyond reasonable the pre-arranged signal by lighting a cigarette, sir.
doubt of illegal sale of shabu defined and penalized under Section 5, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165.
xxxx

Illegal sale of prohibited drugs is consummated at the moment the buyer

receives the drug from the seller. In a buy-bust operation, the crime is
consummated when the police officer makes an offer to buy that is
accepted by the accused, and there is an ensuing exchange between them
involving the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the police officer.20 In order
to successfully prosecute the offense, proof beyond reasonable doubt of
two elements must be satisfied by the prosecution, viz: (a) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the identity of the object and the consideration of
the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the payment for the
thing.
PROS. PAGGAO: Now, you have been mentioning of Nenita against [sic]
whom you were able to buy shabu and the one you arrested, is she in the
courtroom?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
PROS. PAGGAO: Will you kindly step down and tap her shoulder? (The
witness tapped the right shoulder of a female person and that woman upon
being asked of her name answered: Nenita Gamata)21

As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, the presence of both requisites was
clearly established by the testimony of the poseur-buyer himself, PO2
Aseboque, who positively testified that the illegal sale took place when he
gave the ₱500.00 marked money to the accused-appellant in exchange for
the shabu, thus:
The CA was also correct in ruling that the failure of the arresting officers to
strictly comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
916522 mandating the procedure for the inventory and photograph of seized
illegal drugs did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drugs seized from
the accused-appellant. As held in People v. Cardenas:23

WITNESS [PO2 Aseboque]: After I asked her if where is Jun, she told me that
Jun is not around, sir. [N]on-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the
inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized,
will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule
PROS. PAGGAO: What did you do next? 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be
inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If
there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to
the evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will
bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due
to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue
therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of
admissibility—but of weight—evidentiary merit or probative value—to be
given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence
depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case.24 (Emphasis supplied)
This is especially true when the chain of custody of the corpus delicti or the
illegal drug itself was shown to be unbroken,25 as in this case. Testimonial
and documentary evidence show that the poseur-buyer, PO2 Aseboque,
marked the seized illegal drug at the crime scene with his initials "REA". At
the same place, he also prepared an Acknowledgment Receipt of the items
seized from the accused-appellant whose refusal to sign was duly noted in
the same document.26 The seized item was then immediately turned over
by PO2 Aseboque to SAIDSOTF investigating officer PO2 Castillo.27 On the
same day, PO2 Castillo brought the seized illegal drug, together with the
Request for Laboratory Examination,28 to the PNP Crime Laboratory where
it was received by a certain Relos in the presence of Forensic Chemist,
P/Insp. Bonifacio.29 In her Physical Science Report No. D-506-06S,30 the
contents of the seized item marked REA weighed 0.03 gram tested positive
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. After her examination,
P/Insp. Bonifacio turned over the seized item to the evidence custodian
from whom she later retrieved them upon the instructions of and for
submission to the prosecutor. On the witness stand, P/Insp. Bonifacio
categorically identified the specimen presented as evidence as the very
same specimen which she tested based on the marking she placed thereon:
"D-506-06S".31
Indeed, the following links in the chain of custody of the seized illegal drug
were duly accounted for, to wit: (1) the seizure and marking of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic
chemist to the court.32
The alleged discrepancy between the testimony of P02 Aseboque that he
placed the marking REA on the seized item, the forensic chemist's report
stating that the specimen was marked "R.E.A." and the absence of any such
, description in the Spot Report33 of P02 Castillo did not cause a gap in the
chain of custody. As exhaustively discussed by the CA, the identity and
integrity of the seized item was preserved because, despite lack of accurate
description in the Spot Report, P/Insp. Bonifacio testified that the item she
received for laboratory examination bore the markings "REA" placed by P02
Aseboque at the crime scene. It is for this same reason that the punctuation
marks after the letters R, E and A in her Physical Science Report No. D-506-
068 did not alter the identity and integrity of the actual specimen marked
as "REA." The specimen marked at the crime scene, turned over to P02
Castillo and then received by P/Insp. Bonifacio were one and the same.
Further, the failure of the evidence custodian to take the witness stand did
not weaken the case for the prosecution because P/Insp. Bonifacio was able
to positively identify that the evidence submitted in court was the very same
specimen which she subjected to laboratory examination and its contents
tested positive for shabu.34
In sum, the Court finds no reversible error in the conviction meted the
accused-appellant.1awp++i1 The penalty of life imprisonment and
₱500,000.00 fine imposed upon her were in accord with Section 5, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165.35
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED and the Decision
dated May 11, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04839 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v. GIL SALVIDAR Y GARLAN
REYES, J.:
For review[1] is the Decision[2] rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) on
October 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04989 affirming, albeit with
modification as to the wordings of one of the penalties imposed, the
Decision[3] dated April 11, 2011 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 120 in Criminal Case Nos. C-78532-33, convicting Gil
Salvidar y Garlan (accused-appellant) for violation of Sections 5[4] and
11,[5] Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.[6]
Factual Antecedents
The informations filed before the RTC against the accused-appellant
partially read as follows:
CRIM CASE NO. 78532
Violation of Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165
"That on or about the 12th day of November 2007 in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without authority of law, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO3 RAMON GALVEZ, who
posed, as buyer, ten (10) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each
containing dried MARIJUANA fruiting tops weighing 0.37 gram, 0.35 gram,
0.40 gram, 0.28 gram, 0.35 gram, 0.36 gram, 0.32 gram, 0.36 gram, 0.67
gram & 0.57 gram, a dangerous drug, without the corresponding license or
prescription therefore, knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to law."
CRIM CASE NO. 78533
Violation of Section 11, Art. II, RA 9165
"That on or about the 12th day of November 2007, in Caloocan City[,]
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control one (1) transparent plastic box containing dried MARIJUANA
fruiting tops weighing 29.01 grams, when subjected for laboratory
examination gave positive result to the tests of Marijuana, a dangerous
drug.
Contrary to law."[7]
During arraignment, the accused-appellant entered a "not guilty" plea.
Pre-trial then ensued. Since the two cases were filed against the same
accused and revolve around the same facts and evidence, they were
consolidated and tried jointly.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution offered the following as witnesses: (a) Police Officer 3
Ramon Galvez (PO3 Galvez), the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation
conducted against the accused-appellant; (b) PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2
Hipolito), likewise a member of the buy-bust operation; (c) Senior Police
Officer 1 Fernando Moran (SPO1 Moran), then the investigator-on-duty to
whom the accused-appellant and the seized evidence were turned over at
the police station; and (d) Police Chief Inspector Albert S. Arturo (PCI
Arturo), Forensic Chemical Officer of the Northern Police District Crime
Laboratory Office, Caloocan City, who conducted the examination on the
evidence seized from the accused-appellant.
PO3 Galvez testified that on November 12, 2007, he was ordered by their
chief to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reported illegal drug
selling activities in Don Antonio Street, Barangay 19, Caloocan City. A
confidential informant told the police that a certain "Keempee," who
would later on be identified as the herein accused-appellant, was
notoriously selling marijuana in the area. A buy-bust team was thereafter
formed. PO3 Galvez was designated as the poseur-buyer, PO3 Fernando
Modina (PO3 Modina) as team leader, and PO2 Hipolito as back-up
member. A hundred peso bill, marked with PO3 Galvez's initials, was
prepared. To send a signal to the other members of the buy-bust team of
the consummation of the transaction with the accused-appellant, PO3
Galvez was instructed to throw a lit cigarette.[8]
The buy-bust team proceeded to the target area. PO3 Galvez and the
informant saw the accused-appellant near the front door of his house,
stripping marijuana leaves. The rest of the team remained in the
perimeter. PO3 Galvez approached the house, uttered "Keempee, pakuha
nga ng damo, halagang isang daan," and gave the latter the P100.00
marked money. The accused-appellant then held ten (10) pieces of plastic,
which appeared to contain marijuana and white pieces of paper, placed
them inside a Marlboro pack, and handed them all to PO3 Galvez. When
PO3 Galvez threw a lit cigarette, PO2 Hipolito joined him in arresting the
accused-appellant, who was apprised of his constitutional rights. After a
further search, one transparent plastic box containing what likewise
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves, one plastic sachet with white
pieces of paper, and a few empty transparent plastic sachets were also
seized from the accused-appellant.[9]
PO3 Galvez marked the ten (10) plastic sachets with "GSG/RG 11/12/07"
representing his and the accused-appellant's initials and the date the
imprint was made. The rest of the items seized were marked with
"GSG/RH," the last two letters representing PO2 Hipolito's initials. The
accused-appellant and the seized items were thereafter taken to the
police station and turned over to SPO1 Moran, who prepared the letter
request for laboratory examination. The crime laboratory tested the seized
items and found the same to be marijuana.[10]
PO2 Hipolito corroborated PO3 Galvez's testimony about the conduct of a
buy-bust operation and the turnover of the accused-appellant and the
seized items to the investigator at the police station. Additionally, PO2
Hipolito stated that he held the accused-appellant while PO3 Galvez was
marking some of the seized items. The accused-appellant was turned over
to PO3 Modina upon the latter's arrival, while PO2 Hipolito marked the
rest of the seized items.[11]
The prosecution and the defense entered into stipulations and admissions
of facts anent:
SPO1 Moran's (1) having caused the buy-bust money to be
photographed; (2) receipt, while at the police station, of the person
of the accused-appellant and the items allegedly seized from him;
(3) preparation of the evidence acknowledgment receipt, affidavit
(a) of arrest of the police officers, and referral slip to the inquest
prosecutor; (4) preparation of a letter request for laboratory
examination of the seized items; and (5) receipt of the result of the
laboratory examination, which yielded positive
for marijuana;[12] and
PCI Arturo's (1) receipt of a letter request for laboratory
examination of ten (10) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing white pieces of paper and
(b) dried marijuana fruiting/flowering tops; (2) conduct of a laboratory
examination on the aforecited specimens; and (3) preparation of
Physical Science Report No. D-382-07 stating therein the result of
the laboratory examination.[13]
The testimonies of SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturo were thus dispensed with.
Version of the Defense
The defense, on its part, offered the testimonies of the accused-appellant
and his son, Guillar Salvidar (Guillar).
The accused-appellant claimed that contrary to the prosecution's
statements, he was instead arrested at around 4:00 p.m. of November 11,
2007. While playing a video game with Guillar, he stood up to get snacks
for the latter. Several men arrived, brought him to their vehicle, and
handcuffed him. He was subsequently asked to reveal the identities of big
time drug pushers in the area. The accused-appellant was unable to
comply with the order and was brought to the Sangandaan precinct. The
men, who seized the accused-appellant, turned out to be police officers.
PO3 Galvez and SPO1 Moran belonged to the group. They inquired from
him about his and his wife's employment. The men then asked him to
settle the case for P30,000.00. He told them that he did not have money.
When his wife arrived, she argued with the police officers. The officers got
angry and informed him that he would be indicted.[14]
Guillar corroborated the accused-appellant's testimony about the date of
the arrest and their whereabouts at that time. He added that three
policemen arrived. They dragged his father out of the video game shop
and the latter, in turn, resisted. Guillar cried while he chased his father
who was taken away, but the former's attempt was futile. Guillar went
home to inform his mother about the incident.[15]
Ruling of the RTC
On April 11, 2011, the RTC rendered a decision,[16] the dispositive portion
of which reads:
Premises considered, this court finds and so holds the accused
Gil Salvidar y Garlan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of [R.A. No. 9165], x x x and imposes upon him
the following:
(1) In Crim. Case No. C-78532, the penalty of Life Imprisonment and a fine
of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos ([P]500,000.00); and
(2) In Crim. Case No. C-78533, the penalty of Imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to Fourteen (14) years and a fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos ([P]300,000.00).
The drugs subject matter of these cases consisting of ten (10) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets each containing dried MARIJUANA fruiting tops
weighing 0.37 gram, 0.35 gram, 0.40 gram, 0.28 gram, 0.35 gram, 0.36
gram, 0.32 gram, 0.36 gram, 0.67 gram & 0.57 gram[,] as well as the one
(1) transparent plastic box containing dried MARIJUANA fruiting tops
weighing 29.01 grams[,] are hereby confiscated and forfeited in favor of
the government to be dealt with in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The RTC found the accused-appellant's defense of denial and claim of
attempted police extortion as bare, hence, unmeritorious. The trial court
declared that the testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team
deserve full faith and credit, unless it can be shown that they did not
properly perform their duties, or that they were inspired by ill motives.
The accused-appellant, in this case, did not personally know the policemen
and had no previous altercation with any of them, which could have
otherwise prompted the filing of fabricated charges against him. Besides,
the police officers could not have been oblivious of the fact that Section 29
of R.A. No. 9165 imposes the penalty of death upon persons found guilty
of planting dangerous drugs as evidence.[18]
Citing People v. Cueno[19] and People v. Rigodon,[20] the RTC emphasized
that only two basic elements must be present for the charge of illegal sale
of drugs to prosper, namely: (a) the determination of the identities of the
buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In the case at bar, PO3 Galvez
gave a detailed account of how the sale involving the accused-appellant
was consummated and his testimony was corroborated by PO2 Hipolito.
The seized items were also positively identified and the unbroken chain of
custody over the same was established.[21]
The Parties' Arguments Before the CA
and its Ruling
The accused-appellant challenged the above ruling before the CA claiming
that the prosecution's version of what transpired was highly incredible.
The members of the buy-bust team narrated that the accused-appellant
was packing and selling his illegal merchandise in public view. This,
however, is improbable and contrary to common experience.[22]
The accused-appellant also alleged that the prosecution failed to establish
an unbroken chain of custody over the evidence. There was no explicit
testimony that the specimens were marked in the presence of the
accused-appellant. There was likewise no proof that the items were
photographed and inventoried in the presence of a member of the media,
a Department of Justice (DOJ) representative, and an elective government
official.[23]

Further, not all who had custody of the specimens testified on the
condition of the same upon receipt and the precautions they took to
preserve their integrity. It is perplexing as well why SPO1 Moran delivered
the seized items twice to the crime laboratory at first to a certain PO1
Bolora at 9:40 p.m. of November 12, 2007, and subsequently to PCI Arturo
at 9:45 p.m. of the same date. While PO1 Bolora's custody over the seized
items merely lasted for a few minutes, still, he should have testified
because that short span of time was more than sufficient to destroy the
integrity of the evidence.[24]
Admittedly, there are exceptions to the strict implementation of the rules
and procedures mandated by R.A. No. 9165. However, the prosecution
should have, at the outset, recognized the procedural lapses and cite
justifiable grounds for the omissions, failing at which, a taint of doubt is
cast upon the presumption that official duties have been performed with
regularity.[25]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the appeal arguing that
drug pushers have become more daring in selling their wares without
regard for place and time.[26]
The prosecution had likewise proven beyond reasonable doubt that an
illegal sale of ten (10) plastic sachets containing marijuana was
consummated and the accused-appellant was the vendor. The same ten
(10) plastic sachets were seized from the accused-appellant, then later on,
identified and offered as evidence during the trial. PO3 Galvez and PO2
Hipolito had testified in detail about the conduct of the buy-bust
operation, including the markings done on the plastic sachets and
transparent box seized from the accused-appellant in the place where he
was arrested, and no irregularity can be ascribed as to the concerned
police officers' performance of duties.[27]
On October 31, 2012, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, Br. 120 in 1) Crim. Case No. C-78532 sentencing the
Accused-Appellant to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos(PhP500,000.00) is AFFIRMED; and, 2) Crim. Case
No. C-78533 is likewise AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION as to the
penalty imposed in that the Accused-Appellant is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Twelve(12) years and One(1) day, as minimum,
to Fourteen(14) years, as maximum. Costs against the Accused-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.[28]
In affirming the accused-appellant's conviction, the CA cited the following
grounds:
Settled is the rule that in the prosecution for illegal sale of drugs, it is
material to prove that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the evidence of corpus delicti. Said
otherwise, the essential elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs are: 1)the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another;
and 2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a prohibited drug.
In the instant case, PO3 Galvez'[s] testimony proves that the sale of illegal
drugs actually took place. x x x [T]he Accused-Appellant was caught in a
buy-bust operation freely and knowingly selling and delivering prohibited
drugs. x x x.
x x x The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the
Accused-Appellant committed the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. It was able to prove the following elements: 1)the accused is in
possession of an object identified as a prohibited drug; 2)such possession
is not authorized by law; and, 3)he freely and consciously possessed the
said drug.
The records manifestly show that, after the buy-bust team arrested the
Accused-Appellant, the procedural body search was conducted on his
person. The search led to the discovery of one(1) transparent plastic box
containing an undetermined amount of suspected dried marijuana leaves
(later weighed at 29.01 grams), which he freely possessed knowing the
same to be prohibited drugs. After the conduct of laboratory
examinations, the same yielded positive for marijuana. Further, he failed
to present any document authorizing him by law to possess the same. x x
x.
The Accused-Appellant's allegation that the prosecution failed to preserve
the integrity and prove the identity of the seized drugs, holds no water.
In all cases involving the handling and custody of dangerous drugs, the
police officers are guided by Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165. The language of the foregoing provision
shows that the failure of the police officers to strictly comply with it is not
fatal and does not render the evidence adduced against the Accused-
Appellant void and inadmissible. What is important is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
At bench, there was compliance with the said provision and the integrity
of the drugs confiscated from the Accused-Appellant remained intact. The
chain of custody of the seized drugs, later on determined to be marijuana,
was not shown to have been broken. The records show that, after PO3
Galvez bought ten(10) pieces of plastic sachets suspected of containing
marijuana, the Accused-Appellant was bodily searched and found to be in
possession of one(1) transparent plastic box containing an undetermined
amount of suspected dried marijuana leaves. Immediately thereafter, the
confiscated drugs were marked with the initials "GSG/RG 11/12/07" and
"GSG/RH" and inventoried at the place of arrest and in the presence of the
Accused-Appellant. PO3 Galvez and PO2 Hipolito then brought the
Accused-Appellant to the Sangandaan police station where the same were
turned over to SPO1 Moran. Thereafter, the latter prepared the Evidence
Acknowledgment Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory
examination of the seized substances for determination of the presence of
any dangerous drugs. PCI Arturo conducted the laboratory test and found
them positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
What is more, during the trial, PO3 Galvez and PO2 Hipolito were able to
positively identify all the plastic sachets containing marijuana with
markings "GSG/RG 11/12/07" and "GSG/RH" as the same ones that they
confiscated from the Accused-Appellant. x x x.
In comparison to the prosecution's evidence, all that the Accused-
Appellant could raise is the defense of denial. x x x The defense of denial in
drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the
presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular
performance of their official duties. Bare denial of the Accused-Appellant
cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the prosecution witness. x x
x.
The Accused-Appellant's allegation that the police officers were exacting
Thirty Thousand Pesos(PhP30,000.00) from him has no basis. Other than
his bare allegations, unsupported by concrete proof, We cannot give such
imputation a second look.[29] (Citations omitted)
The CA modified the wordings of the penalty imposed by the RTC on the
accused-appellant for violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165. The CA
emphasized that the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied.
Consequently, the proper penalty should be "expressed at a range whose
maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the special law,
and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed."[30]
Issues
The accused-appellant and the OSG both manifested that they no longer
intended to file supplemental briefs.[31]
Hence, the issues before this Court are the same ones raised before and
disposed of by the CA. Essentially then, the Court is once again asked to
determine whether or not: (a) the testimonies of the members of the buy-
bust team about the accused-appellant's illegal selling activities and
possession of marijuana while the latter was at the front door of his house
and within public view are credible; and (b) the prosecution had complied
with the procedural requirements mandated by Section 21[32] of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 as regards the
chain of custody over the evidence seized from the accused-appellant.
Ruling of the Court

The instant appeal lacks merit.
In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law, appellate courts
tend to rely heavily on the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, because the latter had the unique opportunity, denied to the
appellate courts, to observe the witnesses and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under direct and cross-examination. Hence, its
factual findings are accorded great respect, even finality, absent any
showing that certain facts of weight and substance bearing on the
elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied.[33]
In the instant appeal, the RTC and CA uniformly found that PO3 Galvez's
and PO2 Hipolito's testimonies anent the conduct of the buy-bust
operation were categorical, detailed, and credible.[34] Moreover, the
accused-appellant had not ascribed any ill motive against the two police
officers which could have otherwise induced them to fabricate the
charges.
As the first issue, the accused-appellant claimed that it was highly
improbable for him to peddle and possess marijuana right in front of his
house and within public view. This allegation fails to persuade especially in
the light of the court's observation that of late, drug pushers have turned
more daring and defiant in the conduct of their illegal activities.[35]
Anent the second issue, the Court finds the chain of custody over the
evidence seized from the accused-appellant as unbroken and that there
was sufficient compliance with Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165.
PO3 Galvez positively testified that he marked the ten (10) plastic sachets
containing marijuana and the pieces of white paper while still in the place
where the accused-appellant was arrested, and in the presence of the
latter.[36] PO2 Hipolito did the same relative to the plastic container
with marijuana likewise found in the accused-appellant's
possession.[37] When the members of the buy-bust team arrived in the
police station, they turned-over the person of the accused-appellant and
the items seized from him to SPO1 Moran, who in turn, prepared the
Evidence Acknowledgment Receipt and letter request for laboratory
examination.[38] Thereafter, PCI Arturo conducted the laboratory
examinations and found the specimens to be marijuana.[39] These were the
same items identified by the prosecution witnesses and presented to the
trial court as evidence.
The accused-appellant lamented that the evidence seized were not
photographed and inventoried in the presence of a member of the media,
a representative from the DOJ, and an elective government official. While
this factual allegation is admitted, the Court stresses that what Section 21
of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 requires is "substantial" and not necessarily
"perfect adherence,"[40] as long as it can be proven that the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved as the same would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[41]
The accused-appellant attempted to establish that there was a breach in
the chain of custody over the evidence seized from him by pointing out
that SPO1 Moran twice delivered the items to the crime laboratory at first
to a certain PO1 Bolora and later, to PCI Arturo.[42] The Court notes that
despite the foregoing allegation, the defense agreed with the prosecution
to dispense with the testimonies of SPO1 Moran and PCI Arturo. The
parties entered into stipulations and admissions of facts as regards the
participation of the aforementioned two. This is no less than an admission
on the part of the defense that there was nothing irregular in SPO1 Moran
and PCI Arturo's performance of their duties relative to preserving the
integrity of the evidence which fell in their custody. Had the accused-
appellant sincerely believed that there was indeed a breach in the chain of
custody over the seized items, he would have insisted on putting SPO1
Moran and PCI Arturo on the witness stand for cross-examination.
In sum, the Court finds the herein assailed decision affirming the RTC's
conviction of the accused-appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 as amply supported by both evidence and
jurisprudence. The Court agrees as well with the CA in its modification of
the wordings of the penalty imposed on the accused-appellant for
violation of the above-mentioned Section 11, as the same is mandated by
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04989 is AFFIRMED in toto.
G.R. No. 205610 July 30, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RAMONITO VILLARTA y RIVERA and ALLAN ARMENTA y
CABILES, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated 20 July 2012 in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04953 affirming the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) Joint
Decision3 dated 26 October 2010 in Criminal Case Nos. 14948-D, 14949-D,
14950-D, 14951-D and 14952-D, convicting herein appellant Ramonita
Villarta y Rivera alias Monet (Villarta) for Violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,'' and herein appellant Allan
Armenta yCabiles alias Ambo (Armenta) for Violation of Section 11 of the
same law.
Appellant Villarta was charged in three (3) separate Informations,4 all
dated 24 April 2006, for Violation of Sections 5 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs), 11 (Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and 15 (Illegal Use of
Dangerous Drugs), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the accusatory
portions of which read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14948-D
On or about [20 April 2006] in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the [herein appellant Villarta], not being lawfully
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell, deliver and give away to [Police Officer 2 (PO2) Ronald R. Caparas], a
police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline substance, which was found
positive to the test for ephedrine, a dangerous drug, in violation of the
said law.5 (Emphasis supplied).
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14949-D
On or about [20 April 2006] in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the [appellant Villarta], not being lawfully authorized to
possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one
(1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of white
crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for ephedrine, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.6 (Emphasis supplied).
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14950-D
On or about [20 April 2006] in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the [appellant Villarta], not being lawfully authorized by
law to use any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly use, smoke and ingest into his body a methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, and, that this is the first offense of the
[appellant Villarta] under Section 15, of the abovecited law, who after a
confirmatory urine test, was found positive to the test for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the
above-cited law.7 (Emphasis supplied).
Appellant Armenta was charged in two (2) separate Informations,8 all
dated 24 April 2006, for Violation of Sections 11 and 15, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, the accusatory portions of which read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14951-D
On or about [20 April 2006] in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [the herein appellant Armenta], not being lawfully
authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody
and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03
gram of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test
for ephedrine, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.9 (Emphasis
supplied).
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14952-D
On or about [20 April 2006] in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the [appellant Armenta], not being lawfully authorized
by law to use any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly use, smoke and ingest into his body a THC-metabolites, a
dangerous drug, and, that this is the first offense of the [appellant
Armenta] under Section 15, of the above-cited law, who after a
confirmatory urine test, was found positive tothe test for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the
above-cited law.10 (Emphasis supplied).
Upon arraignment,11 both appellants pleaded NOT GUILTY to the
respective charges against them. Thereafter, joint trial on the merits
ensued.
The prosecution presented PO2 Ronald R. Caparas (PO2 Caparas), who
acted as the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation conducted against
appellant Villarta;12 PO2 Jesus Cambronero (PO2 Cambronero), who acted
as the immediate back-up of PO2 Caparas;13 and Police Senior Inspector
Sandra Decena Go (P/Sr. Insp. Go), the forensic chemical officer who
conducted physical, chemical and confirmatory tests on the items seized
from the appellants.14The testimony, however, of the other prosecution
witness PO1 Allan Mapula (PO1 Mapula) was dispensed with per
stipulation of the parties that: (1) he is the investigating officer in these
cases; and (2) he was the one who prepared the Affidavit of Arrest of PO2
Caparas and the Request for Laboratory Examination, aswell as the
Request for Drug Test.15
On the side of the defense, both appellants were presented to contradict
all the allegations of the prosecution.16
The respective versions of the prosecution and the defense, as accurately
summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On 19 April 2006 at around 9:30 o’clock in the evening, PO2 [Caparas] was
at the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF)
office in Pasig City. A confidential informant arrived and spoke with Police
Inspector Ronaldo Pamor [P/Insp. Pamor]. The informant gave the tip that
a certain MONET was selling shabualong Urbano Velasco Avenue,
Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City. As a result, [P/Insp. Pamor] conducted a short
briefing attended by [Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1)] Baltazar, PO2
Camb[r]onero, PO2 Monte, [Police Officer 1 (PO1)] Caridad, PO1 Mapula
and PO2 Caparas. [P/Insp.] Pamor instructed PO1 Mapula to prepare a pre-
operational report17 to be submitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), and directed PO1 Caparas to act as the poseur-buyer while
PO2 Camb[r]onera was to serve as his back-up.
In preparation for their operation, PO2 Caparas marked two pieces of the
One-Hundred Peso (₱100.00) bill with his initials "RRC" on the lower right
portion. Tout de suite, the team, together with the confidential informant
proceeded to Velasco Avenue. There, they went inside an alley located at
the Cupa Compound. However, they learned from the two persons
standing along the alley that MONET had already left. [P/Insp.] Pamor
instructed the informant to inform them whenever MONET would return.
The following day, at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, the confidential
informant called and tolda member of the SAID-SOTF that MONET was
already in the target place.Subsequently, the buy-bust team met with the
former at the market terminal. PO2 Caparas and the informant again
proceeded to Velasco Avenue. When they reached Cupa Compound, the
latter secretly told PO2 Caparas that MONET was standing at the alley.
They approached MONET. The informant then told him: "Pare iiscore to"
referring to PO2 Caparas. He told MONET that he would buy ₱200.00
worth of shabuafter which, he handed MONET the money. At this point, a
male person arrived and asked MONET: "Pare, meron pa ba?" MONET
retorted: "Dalawang piraso na lang ito." The male person then gave
MONET ₱100.00. Immediately thereafter, MONET handed one sachet to
PO2 Caparas and the other one to the male person. PO2 Caparas
examined the sachet and gave the pre-arranged signal by wearing his cap.
He then introduced himself as a police officer, and arrested MONET who
was identified as [herein appellant] Ramonito Villarta [y Rivera]. When the
other members of the team arrived, PO2 Caparas told PO2 Camb[r]oner[o]
thatthe other male person was also possessing shabu. In a bit, he was also
apprehended and identified later on as [herein appellant] Allan Armenta [y
Cabiles] @ AMBO. PO2 Caparas recovered from MONET the marked
money and one plastic sachet while PO2 Camb[r]onero recovered from
AMBO the other plastic sachet. Both PO2 Caparas and PO2 Camb[r]onero
marked the items they had seized.
At the police station, PO1 Mapula prepared the requests for drug test and
laboratory examination. Thereafter, the seized items were brought to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory. Forensic Chemical Officer
[P/Sr. Insp. Go] received the above-mentioned requests and conducted
laboratory tests on the subject specimens. The seized drugs gave positive
result for ephedrine, a dangerous drug. Likewise, the drug tests showed
that the respective urine samples of MONET and AMBO were positive for
methamphetamine and THC metabolites, both of which are dangerous
drugs.
The defense proffered a divergent version of the facts.
Both MONET and AMBO denied the charges. MONET asseverated that
between 3:00 o’clock and 4:00 o’clock inthe afternoon of 19 April 2006, he
was resting in the room he was renting. Suddenly, four armed male
persons entered looking for a certain "Jay Jay." When he replied that he
did not know such person, he was brought and detained in Pariancillo. It
was there where he first met AMBO.
On the other hand, AMBO maintained that between 1:00 o’clock and 2:00
o’clock in the afternoon on evendate while waiting for a tricycle in front of
the 7-11 Store, three armed persons approached him. One of them placed
his arm around his shoulder, the other one handcuffed him, while the third
called for a tricycle. Subsequently, he was brought to the Pariancillo
Headquarters. When heasked why he was arrested, the aforesaid men did
not answer him. At the headquarters, he was frisked since they were
looking for a cellular phone which he had allegedly snatched. When
nothing was found with him, he was mauled and forced to confess where
he brought the phone. It was there where he got to know MONET.18
On 26 October 2010, the RTC, after considering the testimonies of both
parties, rendered its Joint Decision,the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 14948-D, this Court finds the [herein
appellant] Ramonito Villarta yRivera aliasMonet, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs of 2002, and he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of
₱500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency;
2) In Criminal Case No. 14949-D and Criminal Case No. 14951-D,
this Court finds the [appellants] Ramonito Villarta yRivera
aliasMonetand Allan Armenta yCabiles alias Ambo,
guiltybeyond reasonable of the crime of Violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs of 2002 and they are each
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
₱300,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and
3) Criminal Case No. 14950-D and Criminal Case No. 14952-Dfor
Violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs of 2002 against
[appellants] Ramonito Villarta y Rivera alias Monetand Allan
Armenta y Cabiles aliasAmbo are ordered DISMISSED.
In the meantime, the Branch Clerk ofCourt is directed to transmit the
dangerous drugs, "ephedrine," subject of these cases to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency for its disposition in accordance with
law.19 (Emphasis supplied).
The RTC elucidated that the prosecution has sufficiently established all the
elements for a successful prosecution of illegal sale of prohibited drugs,
which is in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. PO2
Caparas, who acted as the poseur-buyer, specifically stated that appellant
Villarta sold tohim one-heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
0.02 gram of white crystalline substance worth ₱200.00. It was seized and
later on found positive to the test for ephedrine, a dangerous drug. Their
transaction was proven bythe actual exchange of the marked money
consisting of two ₱100.00-pesobills, and the drug sold. PO2 Caparas
positively identified appellant Villarta as the seller of the said oneheat
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance,
which was later on confirmed as ephedrine, a dangerous drug, by P/Sr.
Insp. Go, the Forensic Chemist, who performed laboratory examination on
all the seized items.20
As for the charge of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, which is in
violation of Section 11, Article II ofRepublic Act No. 9165, against both
appellants, the RTC also found that all the elements thereof were
completely satisfied. When the appellants werearrested by PO2 Caparas
and PO2 Cambronero, they were both found in possession of
dangerousdrugs. Both of them could not present any proof orjustification
that they were fully authorized by law to possess the same. Having been
caught in flagrante delicto, there is prima facieevidence of animus
possidendior intent to possess.21
In dismissing the charge of illegal use of dangerous drugs in violation of
Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, against both appellants, the
RTC applied the provisoof the afore-stated Section 15. The RTC, thus, held
that when a person is found tohave possessed and used dangerous drugs
at the same time, Section 15 shall not be applicable in which case the
provisions of Section 11 shall apply.22
The RTC likewise held that despite the non-compliance with the
requirements of physical inventory and photograph of the seized items,
the integrity and evidentiary value of the same were properly preserved
because the chain of custody appears not to havebeen broken. Thus, in its
entirety, there was substantial compliance with the law.23
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Joint Decision dated 26
October 2010.24
Hence, the present appeal raising the same assignment of errors in their
Appellants’ Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, towit: (a) the trial court
gravely erred in pronouncing the guilt of the [appellants] despite the
obvious non-compliance with the requirements for the proper custody of
seized dangerous drugs under Republic Act No. 9165; and (b) the trial
court gravely erred in pronouncing the guilt of the [appellants]
notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to preserve the integrity
and evidentiary value of the allegedly seized dangerous drugs.25
This Court sustains appellants’ conviction.
Essentially, the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid
reasons since the trial court is in a better position to examine the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.26 This rule finds aneven more
stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of
Appeals27 as in this case.
After a careful perusal of the records, this Court finds no compelling
reason to deviate from the lower courts’ findings that, indeed, the
appellants’ guilt on the respective charges against them were sufficiently
proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like ephedrinein
this case, the following elementsmust be sufficiently proved to sustain a
conviction therefor: (1) the identity of the buyer, as well as the seller, the
object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor.What is material is proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
dangerous drugs seized as evidence. The commission of the offense of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires merely the consummation of the
selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the
drug from the seller. Settled is the rule that as long as the police officer
went through the operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted by
appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former; the crime is
considered consummated by the delivery of the goods.28
In the present case, this Court totallyagrees with the lower courts that the
aforesaid elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were adequately and
satisfactorily established by the prosecution.
To note, appellant Villarta, who was caught in flagrante delicto, was
positively identified by PO2 Caparas, who acted as the poseur-buyer, as
the same person who sold the one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.02 gram of white crystalline substance, later confirmed as
ephedrine, for a consideration of ₱200.00.The said one heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet of ephedrinewas presented in court, which PO2
Caparas identified to be the same object sold to him by appellant Villarta.
Moreover, the same bears the markings RRV/RRC 04-20-06, which he had
written at the scene of the crime. "RRV" represents the initials of appellant
Villarta while "RRC" represents the initials of PO2 Caparas. The marking
"04-20-06" represents the date the said drug was seized. PO2 Caparas
similarly identified in court the recovered marked money from appellant
Villarta consisting of two ₱100.00-peso bills in the total amount of ₱200.00
with markings "RRC" on the lower right portion thereof.29
Likewise, the testimony of PO2 Caparasclearly established in detail how his
transaction with appellant Villarta happened starting from the moment
their informant introduced him to appellant Villarta as someone interested
in buying his stuff, up to the time he handed to appellant Villarta two
₱100.00 peso bills marked money amounting to ₱200.00and, in turn,
appellant Villarta handed him the one heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet of ephedrinethus consummating the sale transaction between
them. PO2 Caparas caused the one-heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
of ephedrineto be examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. The item
weighing 0.02 gram was tested positive for ephedrineas evidenced by
Chemistry Report No. D-355-0630 prepared by P/Sr. Insp. Go, Forensic
Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon
City.31
From the foregoing, it is already beyond question that appellant Villarta’s
guilt for illegal sale of ephedrine, a dangerous drug, in violation of Section
5, Article II of RepublicAct No. 9165 was proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.
With respect to the prosecution ofillegal possession of dangerous drugs,
the following facts must be proved: (a) the accused was in possession of
dangerous drugs, (b) such possession was not authorized by law, and (c)
the accused was freely and consciouslyaware of being in possession of
dangerous drugs.32
In the case under consideration, this Court also conforms to the lower
courts’ findings that all the elementsof illegal possession of dangerous
drugs were adequately proven by the prosecution.
It bears emphasis that when the sale transaction between PO2 Caparas
and appellant Villarta was on-going, another male person, who was later
on identified to be appellant Armenta, came in and also bought one-heat
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline
substance later on confirmed to be ephedrine, a dangerous drug. Upon the
consummation of the sale transaction,between PO2 Caparas and appellant
Villarta, the former gave the pre-arranged signal by wearing his cap. PO2
Caparas then introduced himself as the police officer and arrested
appellant Villarta. PO2 Caparas then recovered from appellant Villarta the
marked money and another one-heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance later on confirmed as
ephedrine, a dangerous drug. When the immediate back-up officer, PO2
Cambronero, arrived, PO2 Caparas informed him that appellant Armenta
was in possession of one-heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
0.03 gram of white crystalline substance,which the latter just bought from
appellant Villarta. Thus, appellant Armenta was also apprehended and PO2
Cambronero recovered from him one heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance confirmed to be
ephedrine, a dangerous drug.33 Clearly, both appellants were found in
possession of dangerous drugs. As observed by the RTC, which the Court
of Appeals affirmed, both appellants could not present any proof or
justification that they were fully authorized by law to possess the same.
Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is prima facieevidence of
animus possidendior intent to possess.
Now, going to the issue raised by the appellants on the failure of the
prosecution to comply with Section 21,Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
this Court similarly affirms the findings of both lower courts that such
failure will not render the appellants’ arrestillegal or the items
seized/confiscated from them inadmissible.
In People v. Ventura,34 this Court held that:
The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under
Section 21, paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as follows:
(1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall,immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.1âwphi1
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9165, which implements said provision, stipulates:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall,immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: x
x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items.
Under the same proviso, non-compliance with the stipulated procedure,
under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over saiditems, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers.
Clearly, the purpose of the procedure outlined in the implementing rules is
centered on the preservationof the integrityand evidentiary valueof the
seized items.35 (Emphasis supplied). The chain of custody requirement
performs the function of ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are preserved, so much so that unnecessary doubts as
to the identity of the evidence are removed. To be admissible, the
prosecution must show by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into
possession of the police officers and until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition up to the time it was offered in evidence.36
In the case at bench, after PO2 Caparas seized and confiscated the one
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of ephedrine,
which was the subject of the sale transaction, as well as the one heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of ephedrine,
which was recovered from appellant Villarta after he was arrested and
ordered to empty his pocket, and the marked money used in the buy-bust
operation, the former immediately marked the seized drugs atthe place of
arrest. He put the markings RRV/RRC 04-20-06 on the seizeddrug subject
of the sale and the markings RRV/RRC on the seized drug recovered from
appellant Villarta. PO2 Cambronero, the immediate back-up of PO2
Caparas, also recovered from appellant Armenta one-heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram of ephedrine. PO2
Cambronero, who was then beside PO2 Caparas, similarly marked the
seized drug from appellant Armenta at the place of arrest. They then
brought the appellants, together with the seized items at their station.
Where PO1 Mapula, the investigating officer, prepared the Request for
Laboratory Examination,37 the Request for Drug Test38 and the Affidavit of
Arrest of PO2 Caparas.39Thereafter, PO2 Caparas personally brought all the
seized items to the crime laboratory for examination. The seized items
were examined by P/Sr. Insp. Go and they all yielded positive results for
ephedrine, a dangerous drug. When the seized items were offered in
court, they were all properly identified by the prosecution witnesses.
These facts persuasively proved that the three plastic sachets of ephedrine
presented in court were the same items seized from the appellants during
the buy-bust operation.The integrity and evidentiary value thereof were
duly preserved.
It has been judicially settled that in buy-bust operations, the testimony of
the police officers who apprehended the accused is usually accorded full
faith and credit because of the presumption that they have performed
their duties regularly. This presumption is overturned only if there is clear
and convincing evidence that they were not properly performing their
duty or that they were inspired by improper motive.40 In this case, there
was none.
In comparison to the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, all that
the appellants could muster is the defense of denial and frame-up. Denial
or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed with disfavor for it can just as
easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most
prosecutions for violation of DangerousDrugs Act. The defense of frameup
or denial in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of
the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular
performance of their official duties.41 In the present case, the bare denial
of the appellants cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the
prosecution witnesses.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated 20
July 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04953 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206366 August 13, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO BALAQUIOT y BALDERAMA, Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
At bench is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 dated 29 August 2012 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04595. In the said decision,
the appellate court affirmed the conviction of herein appellant Eduardo B.
Balaquit for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts are as follows:
On 11 June 2008, appellant was arrested during a buy bust operation
performed by officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camiling,
Tarlac. He was thereafter charged with the offense of illegal sale of shabu
under an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tarlac.3 The Information reads:
That on June 11, 2008 at on or about 10 AM at Bobon 1st , in the
Municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there
willfully and feloniously sell to one another one (1) heat sealed plastic
sachet containing 0.049 grams of met[h]amphetamine hydrochloride
commonly known as "shabu", a dangerous drug, without being authorized
by law.
Appellant was arraigned on 26 August 2008 and entered a plea of not
guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented, among others, the following
object evidence:
1. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
0.049 grams of white crystalline substance.The plastic sachet is
dated "11 June 2008" and marked with "JSE-EBB,"4 and
1. On the date and time of the supposed buy-bust, he was in a
day care center where he bought some sopasfor his children.
On his way home, he encountered two (2) men aboard a
motorcycle. 2. One of the two (2) men aboard the motorcycle
alighted and drew a gun at him. At that point, SPO1 Daraman
arrived and introduced himself and the one pointing a gun at
him as policemen.

2. Chemistry Report D-184-085

3. Afterwards, SPO1 Daraman and other police officers led him
to an alley. One of the police officers twisted his arms. At the
The foregoing object evidence weresupplemented by the testimonies of alley, he was forced to sign a report. Later, the barangay
Police Officer Jay Espiritu (PO3 Espiritu), Special Police Officer Noli captain also arrived and signed the same report.
Daraman (SPO1 Daraman) and police chemist Jebie Timario (Mr. Timario).
4. He was then brought to the Camiling PNP station where he
PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman were the police officers who conducted was detained.
the buy-bust operation that led tothe arrest of the appellant. Their
testimonies recounted the following events:6
Exequil corroborated the denial of his brother. He recounted that he saw
the appellant, arm-twisted and all, being led to an alley by police officers.10
1. On 11 June 2008, PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman engaged in
a buy-bust operation against appellantafter receiving
On 24 June 2010, the RTC rendered a decision11 finding appellant guilty
confirmation from the Chief Intelligence Officer(CIO) of the
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal sale of shabuunder
Camiling PNP that the former was involved in the peddling of
Section 512 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. In doing
shabu. The confirmation from the CIO came at the heels of a
so, the RTC gave full faith and credenceto the version of the prosecution as
week-long surveillance on the appellant conducted by the
established by the testimonies of PO3 Espiritu, SPO1 Daraman and Mr.
Camiling PNP.
Timario. Accordingly, the RTC sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.
2. As the designated poseur-buyer of the operation, PO3
Espiritu met with the appellant outside the latter’s residence at
Aggrieved, appellant appealedthe RTC decision to the CA.
Bobon 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. SPO1 Daraman,on the other hand,
hid behind a tree about ten (10) to twenty(20) meters from
where PO3 Espiritu and appellant were standing. On 29 August 2012, the CA rendered a decision affirming the RTC. Hence,
this appeal.
3. PO3 Espiritu was able to negotiate and successfully purchase
from the appellant one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic In this appeal, appellant claims that the RTC and the CA erred in giving full
sachet. In exchange, PO3 Espiritu handed to the appellant a faith and credence to the version of the prosecution. To support his claim,
previously marked ₱500 bill. After the transaction, PO3 Espiritu he cites three (3) circumstances:
proceeded to arrest appellant. SPO1 Daraman, who was able to
witness the exchange, emerged from his hiding place and aided
1. The prosecution never presented as a witness the CIO of the
in the arrest of the appellant.
Camiling PNP.

4. PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman retrieved from appellant the

marked ₱500 bill. They then proceeded to call the barangay
officials of the place to witness the inventory of the plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance and the marked
money. Photographs of the plastic sachet, the marked bill and
of the appellant were also taken.
5. PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman brought the appellant and
the recovered items to the Camiling PNP station. The plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance were then dated
"11 June 2008" and marked with "JSE-EBB"—the initials of both
PO3 Espiritu and the appellant. 6. On 12 June 2008, PO3
Espiritu and SPO1 forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory the
plastic sachet, now dated "11 June 2008" and marked "JSE-
EBB," along with a request for laboratory examination.
In his testimony, PO3 Espiritu also identified the plastic sachet dated "11
June 2008" and marked with "JSE-EBB" presented by the prosecution as
the very one he retrieved from the appellant during the buy-bust.7
Mr. Timario, on the other hand, isa police chemist for the Camiling PNP
and the one who conducted laboratory examination on the contents of the
plastic sachet dated "11 June 2008" and marked "JSE-EBB." He is also the
signatory of Chemistry Report D-184-08. Mr. Timario testified that per
Chemistry Report D-184-08, hewas able to confirm that the contents of
the plastic sachet dated "11 June 2008" and marked "JSE-EBB" are positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.8
The defense, for its part, relied on the testimonies of the appellant and his
brother, Exequil Balaquit (Exequil).
In substance, appellantdenied being caught, in flagrante, selling shabuand
claimed that he was merely a victim of a police frame-up. He professed the
following version of events:9
2. The Camiling PNP never coordinated with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
3. The representation by the prosecution that the appellant
was under surveillance prior to the buy-bust is not believable. If
it were true, then the Camiling PNP could have just applied for
a search warrant against the appellant.
These circumstances, the appellant believes, destroy the credibility of the
prosecution story that the Camiling PNP really undertook a genuine
buybust operation and also lend trustworthiness to his own version that
he was merely a victim of a frame-up.
At any rate, the appellant adds thathis acquittal for the two charges is in
order because the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the
offense charged. Appellant claims that the identity of the shabuthat was
presented by the prosecution in evidence issuspect in view of the failure
by PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman to mark the plastic sachet they
allegedly retrieved during the buy-bust immediately thereat as required by
Section 2113 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Appellant points out that PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman, by their own
testimonies, admitted to marking such plastic sachetonly after bringing the
same to the police station.
OUR RULING
We deny the appeal.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving full faith and
credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
We find no error on the part of the RTC and the CA in sustaining the
prosecution’s version of events. The circumstances cited by the appellant
does not at all destroy its credibility:
First. The non-presentation as a witness of the CIO of the Camiling PNP
does not discount that a legitimate buy-bust operation was undertaken in
this case. The conduct of the buy-bust operation was already adequately
established by the testimonies of PO3 Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman who
were the very participants of such operation. Indeed, the testimony of the
CIO would, at most, merely corroborate the testimonies of PO3 Espiritu
and SPO1 Daraman.
Second. The appellant’s qualm regarding the absence of coordination
between the Camiling PNP and the PDEA is also immaterial. In People v.
Roa,14 this Court ruled that prior coordination with the PDEA is not a
condition sine qua nonfor the validity of every entrapment operation
conducted by police authorities:
In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable
requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation.
While it is true that Section 8615 of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the
National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to
maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters,"
the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA’s participation a condition
sine qua nonfor every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a
form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 11316 of the
Rules of the Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort to in
apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the
PDEA.17 A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination
with the PDEA.
Third. The assertion that the Camiling PNP could have just applied for a
search warrant instead of conducting a buy-bust operation is irrelevant to
the issue of whether a legitimate buy-bust operation was, in fact,
undertaken. The decision whether to apply for a search warrant or to
conduct instead a buy-bust operation on any given case is a matter
rightfully addressed to the sound discretion of the police officers.
Certainly, police officers have the right to choose which legal means or
processes are best suited, given the circumstances, in accomplishing the
task they are called upon to perform.
Verily, appellant is left with only his denial to fend off the serious
accusations against him. Such denial, by itself, however, cannot overcome
the weight traditionally accorded toaffirmative testimonies by police
officers with unsullied credibility.18 The RTC and the CAwere, therefore,
correct in giving full faith and credit to the open court narrations of PO3
Espiritu and SPO1 Daraman.
Corpus delicti of the offense proven beyond reasonable doubt
We also find that the corpus delictiof the offense was adequately proven
in this case.
A review of the evidence on recordwill show that the prosecution was able
to establish an unbroken chain of custody over the shabuthat it claims as
having been sold by the appellant:
1. PO3 Espiritu testified that he was able to buy ₱500.00 worth
of shabuinside a transparent plastic sachet from appellant,
which he brought to the Camiling PNP station.19
2. Upon arrival at the station, PO3 Espiritu Espiritu testified that
he dated the plastic sachet "11 June 2008" a marked it with
"JSE-EBB." Afterwards, a request for laboratory examination
was prepared.20
3. The next day, plastic sachet dated "11 June 2008" and
marked "JSE-EBB" was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory along
with the request for laboratory examination.21
4. At the PNP Crime Laboratory, Mr. Timario conducted
examination on the contents of the plastic sachet dated "11
June 2008" and marked "JSE-EBB" that yielded positive results
for shabu.22
5. Afterwards, the shabuwas retrieved for purposes of the
trial.23
Evidently, the prosecution was able to account for each and every link in
the chain of custody over the shabu, from the moment it was retrieved
during the buy-bust operation up to the time it was presented before the
court as proof of the corpus delicti.
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the failure by PO3 Espiritu and SPO1
Daraman to mark the seized shabuimmediately at the place where the
buy-bust was conducted will notautomatically impair the integrity of the
chain of custody so established. Strictly speaking, marking the seized
contraband at the nearest police station,rather than at the place where
the buy-bust operation was conducted, is not even a violation of the
procedure set forth in Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.1âwphi1 Thus, in People v. Resurreccion,24 this Court
explained:
Accused-appellant broaches the view that SA Isidoro’s failure to mark the
confiscated shabuimmediately after seizure creates a reasonable doubt as
to the drug’s identity. People v. Sanchez,25 however, explains that RA 9165
does not specify a time frame for "immediate marking," or where said
marking should be done:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not
expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in
warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station
rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the enter the chain and
are eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done ( 1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.
To be able to create a first link in the chain of custody, then, what is
required is that the marking be made in the presence of the accused and
upon immediate confiscation. "Immediate confiscation" has no exact
definition. Thus, in People v. Gum-Oyen,26 testimony that included the
marking of the seized items at the police station and in the presence of the
accused was sufficient in showing compliance with the rules on chain of
custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even
marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.
(Emphasis supplied)
Verily, We are satisfied that the corpus delicti of the offense in this case
was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The
Decision dated 29 August 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 04595 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE V EDWIN CABRERA
Facts: After receiving information from residents of Sitio Galaxy, Tangke,
Talisay, Cebu and a report from a confidential assetof the illegal drug
activities of appellant, police officers conducted a buy-bust operation
against appellant. At about 4:30 p.m., poseur-buyer, together with the
confidential asset, approached appellant who was standing outside his
house. PO1 Palconitgave appellant two marked P50.00 bills, while the
latter handed to him two plastic sachets containing white
crystallinesubstance. Thereupon, PO1 Palconit made the pr e-arr anged
signal by touching his head with his right hand. His back-ups thenrushed to
the scene and simultaneously therewith PO1 Palconit arrested the
appellant. He then put the markings "EC" on thetwo plastic sachets and
brought the same to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
for forensic
examination. The chemistry report from the PNP Crime Laboratory
laterrevealed that the white crystalline substance with a totalweight of
0.11 gram inside the two plastic sachets marked with "EC" tested positive
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
Issue: Whether or not there is compliance with Section 21 of
the implementing rules of RA 9165’
Ruling: With regard to the non-compliance by the police officers
with Section 21 of the Implementing Rules of RA 9165 as alleged by
appellant in his Supplemental Brief, particularly the lack of physical
inventory of the seized specimen and the non-taking of photograph
thereof, the Court notes that appellant raised the same only in this appeal.
The records of the case is bereft of any showing that appellant objected
before the RTC regarding the seizure and safekeeping of the shabu seized
from him on account of the failure of the police officers to maintain an
unbroken chain of custody of the said drugs.
The only time that appellant questioned the chain of custody was before
theCA but not on the ground of lack of physical inventory or non-taking of
photograph, but on the alleged gap between the time of confiscation of
the specimen and the time of its submission to the PNP Crime Laboratory.
But even then, it was already too late in the day for appellant to do so.
Appellant should have raised the said issue before the trial court. In similar
cases, the Court brushed aside the accused's belated contention that the
illegal drugs confiscated from his person were inadmissible because the
arresting officers failed to comply with Section 21 of RA 9165. "Whatever
justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers from literally complying
with Section 21 will remain unknown, because [appellant] did not question
during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him.
Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when
a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in
the form of an objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the
question for the first time on appeal.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BRIAN MERCADO y SARMIENTO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04942 affirming the Decision2 in Criminal Case
Nos. C-77992 and C-77993 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 120 of Caloocan City. The RTC Decision found accused-appellant
Brian Mercado y Sarmiento (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002."
The Facts
The accused-appellant was charged of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in two (2) Informations, both dated 31 July
2007, which respectively read as follows:
Crim. Case No. 77992 (For violation of Section 5, R.A. No. 9165)
That on or about the 27th day of July, 2007 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell and deliver to PO3 RAMON GALVEZ, who posed, as
buyer, a plastic sachet containing METHYLAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.02 gram, a dangerous drug, without
corresponding license or prescription therefore, knowing the same to be
such.3
Crim. Case No. 77993 (For violation of Section 11, R.A. No. 9165)
That on or about the 27th day of July, 2007 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control Two
(2) sachets containing METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu)
weighing 0.02 gram & 0.02 gram, respectively, when subjected for
laboratory examination gave positive result to the tests of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.4
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to said
charges.5 Trial thereafter proceeded.
Based on the evidence presented and on the stipulations and admitted
facts entered into by the parties, the summary of factual findings is stated
as follows:
The Version of the Prosecution
[A]t around 10:00 a.m. on July 27, 2007, acting on a tip from a confidential
informant that accused-appellant was selling shabu, the Station Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operation Unit (SAID-SOU) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) organized a buy-bust operation [with] SPO2 Wilfredo Quillan as
team leader, PO3 [Ramon] Galvez as poseur- buyer, and SPO1 [Fernando]
Moran, PO2 Eugene Amaro, PO2 Celso Santos and PO3 Jose Martirez as
members. After SPO2 Quillan briefed the buy-bust team, a pre-operation
report was prepared. PO3 Galvez was provided with two (2) one hundred-
peso bills which he marked on the right portion with his initials "RG". Then,
the team and the informant boarded a passenger jeepney and proceeded
to Phase 3-D, Camarin, Caloocan City. When the informant pointed to
accused-appellant, PO3 Galvez approached him and said, "[p]’re, pa-iskor
naman", offering to buy P200.00 worth of shabu. He then handed the buy-
bust money and accused-appellant brought out from his pocket three (3)
pieces of plastic sachets, chose one (1) sachet and gave it to PO3 Galvez.
As the sale was already consummated, PO3 Galvez introduced himself as a
police officer, arrested accused-appellant, and gave the pre-arranged
signal to his companions by scratching his nape. When SPO1 Moran rushed
in, PO3 Galvez marked the plastic sachet with "BMS/RG" and told SPO1
Moran about the remaining two (2) plastic sachets in accused-appellant’s
pocket. SPO1 Moran then frisked him and confiscated the items which he
marked as "BMS/FM-1" and "BMS/FM-2". Thereafter, they brought
accused- appellant and the confiscated items to the SAID-SOU office in
Samson Road, Caloocan City, and turned them over to the investigator,
PO2 [Randulfo] Hipolito, who prepared the corresponding evidence
acknowledgment receipt and request for laboratory examination.
Qualitative examination conducted on the confiscated three (3) heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance,
each weighing 0.02 gram, yielded positive for methylampethamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.6
The Version of the Defense
On July 26, 2007, at around 9:30 to 10:00 in the evening, accused-
appellant returned the jeepney he was driving to the garage of Phase 3-B,
Camarin, Caloocan City. He was walking home when a jeepney with police
officers on board suddenly stopped in front of him. PO3 Galvez asked
accused-appellant where he came from. He answered that he just came
from driving his jeepney showing the police officers his driver’s license.
Accused-appellant was then forced to ride in the jeepney where he saw
eight (8) persons in handcuffs. He was brought to the police station and
was told to produce ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) in exchange for his
liberty, otherwise, a case would be filed against him. Unable to produce
the money, accused-appellant faced the present charges.7
The Ruling of the RTC
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision8 finding the
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections
5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The dispositive portion of which is
hereunder quoted, to wit:
Premises considered, this court finds and so holds that:
(1) The accused Brian Mercado y Sarmiento GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and
imposes upon him the following:
(a)In Crim. Case No. C-77992, the penalty of Life Imprisonment and a fine
of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00); and
(b)In Crim. Case No. C-77993, the penalty of Imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to Fourteen (14) years and a fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).1âwphi1

The drugs subject matter of these cases are hereby confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance with
law.9
The trial court concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution
sufficiently satisfied the quantum required for accused- appellant’s
conviction. It declared that the fact of sale was sufficiently established
upon showing the complete detailed manner of negotiation of said sale,
exchange of consideration, and handing of the subject of the sale. The
court a quo ruled that, as long as the police officer went through the
operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted by the accused-appellant,
and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former, the crime is considered
consummated by the delivery of goods.10 Likewise, the testimonies of the
police officers who participated in the buy-bust operation appear credible
and reliable since absence of any showing of ill-motive on their part to
concoct trumped charges, they enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties.11 On the other hand, the denial of the
accused- appellant and his mere allegation of extortion were found to be
unsubstantiated by any convincing and credible evidence. Hence, being
considered as negative, weak, and self-serving evidence, accused-
appellant’s bare denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the
prosecution’s witnesses and the physical evidence which supported said
judgment of conviction.12
The Ruling of the CA
On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision in
convicting the accused-appellant. It ruled that failure to comply with
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 will not render the arrest of the accused illegal,
nor will it result to the inadmissibility in evidence against the accused of
the illegal drugs seized in the course of the entrapment operation. What is
of utmost relevance is the preservation of the integrity and maintenance
of the evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal drugs, for in the end, the
same shall necessarily be the thrust that shall determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The prosecution therefore must simply show
that the seized item recovered from appellant was the same item
presented in court and found to be an illegal/prohibited drug. These were
all established and proven beyond reasonable doubt in the instant case.13
Accordingly, the prosecution was able to sufficiently bear out the statutory
elements of the crime of illegal sale and illegal possession of such drugs
committed by accused-appellant. The disposal on appeal reads:
It is well-settled that objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desire the court to reject
the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Thus, as
the trial was already concluded, [w]e can no longer turn back to find out
the justifiable grounds for the omission of the legal requisites.
In any case, the procedural lapse did not render accused- appellant’s
arrest illegal or the evidence adduced inadmissible. If there is non-
compliance with Section 21, the issue is not of admissibility, but of weight
– evidentiary merit or probative value – to be given the evidence. After a
scrutiny of the records, [w]e find the evidence adduced more than
sufficient to prove the charges against accused-appellant. Therefore,
considering that no circumstance exists to put the trial court’s findings in
error, [w]e apply the time-honored precept that findings of the trial courts
which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded
respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and
speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from
such findings.
FOR THESE REASONS, [w]e DENY the appeal and AFFIRM the assailed
February 23, 2011 Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court,
Branch 120.14
Moreover, the appellate court emphasized that, during trial, accused-
appellant neither suggested that there were lapses in the safekeeping of
the suspected drugs that could affect their integrity and evidentiary value
nor objected to their admissibility. Accused-appellant was then precluded
from raising such issue which must be timely raised during trial.15
Upon elevation of this case before this Court, the Office of the Solicitor
General manifested that it will no longer file its supplemental brief and,
instead, will adopt all the arguments in its brief filed before the CA.16 On
the other hand, accused-appellant raised the issue that the court a quo
gravely erred in convicting him notwithstanding the police operatives’
patent non-compliance with the strict and mandatory requirements of R.A.
No. 9165.
The Issue
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the evidence of
the prosecution was sufficient to convict the accused of the alleged sale
and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, in violation
of Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of R.A. No. 9165.
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
The Court finds no valid reason to depart from the time-honored doctrine
that where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, and in this case their
testimonies as well, the findings of the trial court are not to be disturbed
unless the consideration of certain facts of substance and value, which
have been plainly overlooked, might affect the result of the case.17
Upon perusal of the records of the case, we see no reason to reverse or
modify the findings of the RTC on the credibility of the testimony of
prosecution’s witnesses, more so in the present case, in which its findings
were affirmed by the CA. It is worthy to mention that, in addition to the
legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty,
the court a quo was in the best position to weigh the evidence presented
during trial and ascertain the credibility of the police officers who testified
as to the conduct of the buy-bust operation and in preserving the integrity
of the seized illegal drug.
This Court has consistently ruled that for the successful prosecution of
offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the
buyer and seller, the object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor.18 In other words, there is a need to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused actually sold and
delivered a prohibited drug to another, and that the former indeed knew
that what he had sold and delivered to the latter was a prohibited drug.19
To reiterate, what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, plus the presentation in court of corpus delicti as evidence.20 On
the other hand, we have adhered to the time-honored principle that for
illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs under Section 11 of the
same law, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.21
Undoubtedly, the prosecution had indeed established that there was a
buy-bust operation22 showing that accused-appellant sold and delivered
the shabu for value to PO3 Ramon Galvez (PO3 Galvez), the poseur-buyer.
PO3 Galvez himself testified that there was an actual exchange of the
marked-money and the prohibited drug. Likewise, accused-appellant was
fully aware that what he was selling was illegal and prohibited considering
that when PO3 Galvez told him, "pre, pa-iskor naman," the former
immediately answered, "magkano?," then when the poseur-buyer replied,
"dos lang," it resulted to the production of three (3) pieces of plastic
sachets from accused-appellant’s pocket. Thereafter, the corpus delicti or
the subject drug was seized, marked, and subsequently identified as a
prohibited drug. Note that there was nothing in the records showing that
he had authority to possess them. Jurisprudence had pronounced
repeatedly that mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.23 Above all,
accused-appellant likewise failed to present contrary evidence to rebut his
possession of the shabu. Taken collectively, the illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs by accused-appellant were indeed
established beyond reasonable doubt.
By way of emphasis, in cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the
prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless
there is evidence to the contrary.24 In this regard, the defense failed to
show any ill motive or odious intent on the part of the police operatives to
impute such a serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life and liberty
of an innocent person, such as in the case of accused-appellant. As a
matter of fact, aside from accused-appellant’s mere denial and alleged
extortion against him, no evidence was ever presented to prove the
truthfulness of the same. Incidentally, if these were simply trumped-up
charges against him, it remains a question why no administrative charges
were brought against the police officers. Moreover, in weighing the
testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses vis-à-vis that of the defense, it
is a well-settled rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial court’s evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.25
To reiterate, in the absence of any showing that substantial or relevant
facts bearing on the elements of the crime have been misapplied or
overlooked, this Court can only accord full credence to such factual
assessment of the trial court which had the distinct advantage of
observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses during the trial.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely charge an accused of such a grave
offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of
witnesses shall prevail over his/her bare allegation.26
Furthermore, this Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody
rule,27 a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.
This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received
and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity
for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.28
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug
confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance
offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be established with
unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt.29
Alongside these rulings are our pronouncements, just as consistent, that
failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory
of seized drugs does not render an arrest of the accused illegal or the
items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is essential is "the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused."30 Thus:
From the point of view of jurisprudence, we are not beating any new path
by holding that the failure to undertake the required photography and
immediate marking of seized items may be excused by the unique
circumstances of a case. In People v. Resurreccion, we already stated that
"marking upon immediate confiscation" does not exclude the possibility
that marking can be at the police station or office of the apprehending
team. In the cases of People v. Rusiana, People v. Hernandez, and People
v. Gum-Oyen, the apprehending team marked the confiscated items at the
police station and not at the place of seizure. Nevertheless, we sustained
the conviction because the evidence showed that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items seized had been preserved. To reiterate
what we have held in past cases, we are not always looking for the strict
step-by-step adherence to the procedural requirements; what is important
is to ensure the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as these would determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. We succinctly explained this in People v. Del Monte when we
held:
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law,
particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the
drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in
evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law
or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or
rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the
evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will
[be] accorded it by the courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that
will bring about the non- admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized
drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of
admissibility, but of weight
— evidentiary merit or probative value — to be given the evidence. The
weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the
circumstances obtaining in each case.31 (Emphases supplied and citations
omitted)
From the testimonies of the police officers in the case at bench, the
prosecution established that they had custody of the drug seized from the
accused from the moment he was arrested, during the time he was
transported to the police station, and up to the time the drug was
submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. The same witnesses
also identified the seized drug with certainty when this was presented in
court. With regard to the handling of the seized drugs, there are no
conflicting testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on
the integrity thereof as evidence presented and scrutinized in court. It is
therefore safe to conclude that, to the unprejudiced mind, the testimonies
show without a doubt that the evidence seized from the accused-appellant
at the time of the buy-bust operation was the same one tested,
introduced, and testified to in court. This fact was further bolstered by the
stipulations entered into between the parties as to the testimony of
Forensic Chemical Officer of the Northern Police District Crime Laboratory
Office, Caloocan City, Police Chief Inspector Albert S. Arturo.32 In other
words, there is no question as to the integrity of the evidence against
accused-appellant.
Accordingly, we hereby affirm the position taken by the CA when it
expounded on the matter:
It is well-settled that objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject
the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Thus, as
the trial was already concluded, [w]e can no longer turn back to find out
the justifiable grounds for the omission of the legal requisites.
In any case, the procedural lapse did not render accused- appellant’s
arrest illegal or the evidence adduced inadmissible. If there is non-
compliance with Section 21, the issue is not of admissibility, but of weight
– evidentiary merit or probative value – to be given the evidence. After
scrutiny of the records, [w]e find the evidence adduced more than
sufficient to prove the charges against accused-appellant. Therefore,
considering that no circumstance exists to put the trial court’s findings in
error, [w]e apply the time-honored precept that findings of the trial courts
which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded
respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehensions of facts and
speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from
such findings.33
Again, although this Court finds that the police officers did not strictly
comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
such noncompliance did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drug
seized from the accused-appellant, because the chain of custody of the
evidence was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the case.
As correctly found by the appellate court:
The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-
bust operation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court. A circumspect study of the evidence
movements reveal the integrity and the evidentiary value of the suspected
drugs were safeguarded. PO3 Galvez and SPO1 Moran testified that they
marked the suspected drugs with "BMS/RG", "BMS/FM-1" and "BMS/FM-
2" in the presence of accused-appellant immediately upon confiscation.
Then, they brought accused-appellant and the confiscated items to their
office, entrusting custody to investigator PO2 Hipolito. Contrary to
accused-appellant’s claim, there is no hiatus in the third and fourth link in
the chain of custody. The defense admitted that, upon receipt of the
items, PO2 Hipolito prepared the corresponding evidence
acknowledgment receipt and request for laboratory examination. The
request for laboratory examination, which the prosecution offered as part
of its documentary evidence, bears a stamp stating PO2 Hipolito was the
one who delivered the marked confiscated items to PNP Crime Laboratory,
with forensic chemist PSI Arturo as the receiving officer. PSI Arturo then
conducted the examination which yielded positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. When the prosecution
presented the marked plastic sachets in court, PO3 Galvez and SPO1
Moran positively identified them as those recovered from accused-
appellant in the buy-bust operation. Considering that every link was
adequately established by the prosecution, the chain of custody was
unbroken.34
In fine, considering the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution,
the denial and allegation of extortion of the accused-appellant fails. Courts
generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the facility with
which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence
that is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more
credibility than the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who testify
clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the
crime committed.35 Consequently, we find no cogent reason to disturb
the decisions of the RTC and the CA. Accused-appellant Bryan Mercado y
Sarmiento is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA- G.R. CR HC No.
04942 dated 26 September 2012, is AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174673
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Rules of procedure are not ends in themselves. The object of these rules is
to assist and facilitate a trial court's function to be able to receive all the
evidence of the parties, and evaluate their admissibility and probative
value in the context of the issues presented by the parties' pleadings in
order to arrive at a conclusion as to the facts that transpired. Having been
able to establish the facts, the trial court will then be able to apply the law
and determine whether a complainant is deserving of the reliefs prayed
for in the pleading.
Dismissal on the basis of a very strict interpretation of procedural rules
without a clear demonstration of the injury to a substantive right of the
defendant weighed against 19 years of litigation actively participated in by
both parties should not be encouraged.
There is likewise serious reversible error, even grave abuse of discretion,
when the Sandiganbayan dismisses a case on demurrer to evidence
without a full statement of its evaluation of the evidence presented and
offered and the interpretation of the relevant law. After all, dismissal on
the basis of demurrer to evidence is similar to a judgment. It is a final
order ruling on the merits of a case.
This is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions dated May 25, 20062 and September 13, 2006.3 The
Sandiganbayan deemed petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) to
have waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence4 and granted the
Motion to Dismiss of respondents Spouses Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa
Gimenez (Gimenez Spouses) based on demurrer to evidence.5
The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), instituted a Complaint6 for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting,
Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses before the
Sandiganbayan.7 "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten wealth . . .
acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses] as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos[.]"8
During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to
the positions held, business interests, income, and pertinent transactions
of the Gimenez Spouses.9 The Republic presented the testimonies of Atty.
Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and
of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development
Department of PCGG.10 Witnesses testified on the bank accounts and
businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses.11
On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall Danilo
R.V. Daniel’s testimony.12 The Republic then manifested that it was "no
longer presenting further evidence."13 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 "to file its formal offer
of evidence."14
On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30)
days or until April 28, 2006, within which to file [its] formal offer of
evidence."15 This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a
Resolution of the same date.16
On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until
May 13, 2006 within which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence.17 This
Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated May 8,
2006.18 Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by the
Republic.
In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan
noted that the Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence
notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of 75 days from the
date it terminated its presentation of evidence.19 Thus, it declared that the
Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.20
The first assailed Resolution provides:
It appearing that the plaintiff has long terminated the presentation of its
evidence on February 27, 2006, and it appearing further that it failed or
otherwise neglected to file its written formal offer of evidence for an
unreasonable period of time consisting of 75 days (i.e., 30 days original
period plus two extension periods totaling 45 days), the filing of said
written formal offer of evidence is hereby deemed WAIVED.
WHEREFORE, the reception of the defendants’ evidence shall proceed on
June 22 and 23, 2006, both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning as
previously scheduled.21
Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated
May 30, 2006.22 He argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as
there was no evidence to support its cause of action.23 Fe Roa Gimenez
filed a Motion to Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of failure to
prosecute.24 Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio
Gimenez’s demurrer to evidence.25
Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June
15, 2006, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first
assailed Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of
Evidence.26 The pertinent portions of the Republic’s offer of documentary
exhibits attached to the Motion are summarized as follows:
Exhibits A to G and series consist of the Income Tax Returns, Certificate of
Income Tax Withheld On Compensation, Statement of Tax Withheld At
Source, Schedule of Interest Income, Royalties and Withholding Tax,
Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Net Worth of Ignacio B. Gimenez from
1980-1986 proving his legitimate income during said period. Exhibits H -
J and series refer to the Deeds of Sale and Transfer Certificates of Title
proving that spouses Gimenezes acquired several real properties.
Exhibits K and series (K-1-K-4) pertain to Checking Statements Summary
issued by the Bankers Trust Company (BTC) proving that Fe Roa Gimenez
maintained a current account under Account Number 34-714-415 with
BTC. Exhibits L and series (L1-L-114) are several BTC checks, proving that
from June 1982 to April 1984, Fe Roa Gimenez issued several checks
against her BTC Current Account No. 34-714-415 payable to some
individuals and entities such as Erlinda Oledan, Vilma Bautista, The
Waldorf Towers, Cartier, Gliceria Tantoco, Bulgari, Hammer Galleries and
Renato Balestra, involving substantial amount of money in US
Dollars. Exhibits M and series (M1-M-25) are several The Chase
Manhattan Bank (TCMB) checks drawn against the account of Fe Roa
Gimenez under Account Number 021000021, proving that she issued
several checks drawn against her TCMB account, payable to individuals
and entities such as Gliceria Tantoco, Vilma Bautista and The Waldorf
Towers, involving substantial sums in US Dollars. Exhibit N is the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), New York Branch Office Charge Ticket No. FT 56880
dated December 9, 1982 in the amount of US$30,000.00 for Fe Roa
Gimenez proving that she received said enormous amount from the PNB,
New York Branch Office, with clearance from the Central Bank, which
amount was charged against PNB Manila. Exhibit N-1 is the PNB New York
Branch Advice to Payee No. FT 56535 dated November 12, 1982 in the
amount of US$10,990.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez proving her receipt of such
amount as remitted from California Overseas Bank, Los Angeles. Exhibits O
and series (O1-O-8) refer to several Advices made by Bankers Trust AG
Zurich-Geneve Bank in Switzerland to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez proving
that she maintained a current account with said bank under Account
Number 107094.50 and that from July 30, 1984 to August 30, 1984, she
placed a substantial amount on time deposit in several banks, namely,
Hypobank, Luzemburg, Luxemburg, Societe Generale, Paris and Bank of
Nova Scotia, London.
Exhibit P is the Certification dated March 19, 2002 issued by Director
Florino O. Ibanez of the Office of the President proving that Fe Roa
Gimenez, from January 1, 1966 to April 1, 1986, worked with the Office of
the President under different positions, the last of which as Presidential
Staff Director with a salary of P87,072.00 per annum.
Exhibit Q and series (Q-1-Q-18) is the Affirmation of Ralph Shapiro filed
with the United States Court of Appeals in the case entitled, "The Republic
of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et al." which discussed certain
acts of Fe Roa Gimenez and Vilma Bautista, among others, in relation to
the funds of the Marcoses.
Exhibits R and S and series (R-1, R-9; S-1-S-10) refer to the Certificate of
Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed Education,
Inc., the Amended Articles of Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed Education,
Inc., the Treasurer’s Affidavit executed by Ignacio Gimenez and the
Director’s Certificate executed by Roberto B. Olanday, Ignacio Gimenez
and Roberto Coyuto, Jr. proving Ignacio Gimenez and Roberto Olanday’s
interests in GEl Guaranteed Education, Inc.
Exhibits T and series (T-1-T-8) are the Advices made by the Bankers Trust
AG Zurich-Geneve Bank in Switzerland to Ignacio Gimenez proving that he
maintained a current account with said bank under Account Number
101045.50 and that from March to June, 1984, he placed a substantial
amount on time deposit in several banks, namely, Credit Lyonnais,
Brussels, Societe Generale, Paris, Credit Commercial De France, Paris and
Bank of Nova Scotia, London.
Exhibits U and V and series (U-1-U-5; V1-V-18) consist of the Affidavit
dated April 25, 1986 and the Declaration dated June 23, 1987 including the
attachments, of Oscar Carino, Vice-President and Manager of the PNB New
York Branch, narrating in detail how the funds of the PNB New York Branch
were disbursed outside regular banking business upon the instructions of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos using Fe Roa
Gimenez and others as conduit.
Exhibits W and series (W-1-W-4) are the Debit memos from the PNB to Fe
Roa Gimenez while Exhibits X and X-1 are the Acknowledgments of said
respondent, proving that she received substantial amounts of money
which were coursed through the PNB to be used by the Marcos spouses
for state visits and foreign trips.
Exhibit Y and series (Y-1-Y-2) is the Letter dated August 25, 1986 of Juan C.
Gatmaitan, Assistant Chief Legal Counsel of PNB to Charles G. LaBella,
Assistant United States Attorney regarding the ongoing investigation of
irregular transactions at the PNB, New York Branch proving that PNB
cooperated with the United States government in connection with the
investigation on the irregular transactions of Oscar Carino at PNB New
York Branch.
Exhibit Z is the service record of Fe Roa Gimenez issued by Florino O.
Ibanez of the Office of the President which proves that she worked with
the Office of the President from 1966-1986 holding different positions, the
last of which was Presidential Staff Director.1âwphi1
Exhibits AA and series (AA-1 –AA-2) are the several Traders Royal Bank
checks drawn against Account No. 74-702836-9 under the account name
of Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that she issued said checks payable to
individuals and entities involving substantial amount of money.
Exhibits BB and CC and series (BB-1–BB-17; CC-1-CC-3) are the several
Transfer of Funds Advice from Traders Royal Bank Statements of Account
of Fe Roa Gimenez, proving that she maintained a current account under
Account No. 74-7028369 at Traders Royal Bank.
Exhibits HH and series (HH-1-HH-3) are the Certification dated October 3,
2002 of Lamberto R. Barbin, Officer-in-Charge, Malacanang Records Office,
that the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of spouses Marcoses for the
years 1965 up to 1986 are not among the records on file in said Office
except 1965, 1967 and 1969; the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of
December 31, 1969 and December 31, 1967 of former President Ferdinand
Marcos; and the Sworn Statement of Financial Condition, Assets, Income
and Liabilities as of December 31, 1965 of former President Ferdinand
Marcos. These documentary exhibits prove the assets and liabilities of
former President Marcos for the years 1965,1967 and 1969.
Exhibit II and series is [sic] the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of
December 31,1969 submitted by Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that her
assets on that period amounted only to P39,500.00.
Exhibit KK is the Table of Contents of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the
Sandiganbayan entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Ignacio B. Gimenez
and Fe Roa Gimenez, et. al.", including its Annexes which prove the assets
and liabilities of spouses Gimenezes.
Exhibits KK-1 up to KK-12 are several transfer certificates of title and tax
declarations in the names of spouses Gimenezes, proving their acquisition
of several real properties.
Exhibits KK-15, KK-18, KK-20 up to KK-27, KK-30, KK-32 up to KK-38 and
KK-40 are the General Information Sheet, Certificate of Filing of Amended
Articles of Incorporation, and Amended Articles of Incorporation of various
corporations. These prove the corporations in which Ignacio B. Gimenez
has substantial interests.
Exhibits KK-41 up to KK-44 are the Writs and Letters of Sequestration
issued by the PCGG which prove that the shares of stocks of Ignacio
Gimenez in Ignacio B. Gimenez, Securities, Inc. and the real properties
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 137638, 132807, 126693 and
126694 located in San Fabian, Pangasinan, were sequestered by the PCGG.
Exhibit KK-45 is the Memorandum dated August 1, 1988 of Atty. Ralph S.
Lee and Alexander M. Berces, Team Supervisor and Investiogator, [sic]
respectively, of IRD, PCGG, proving that the PCGG conducted an
investigation on New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction
Corporation, and OTO Construction and Development Corporation in
relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O. Olanday.
Exhibits KK-48, KK-49 and KK-50 are certain Lis Pendens from the PCGG
addressed to the concerned Register of Deeds informing that the real
properties mentioned therein had been sequestered and are the subject
of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan.
Exhibits KK-51, KK-51-A, KK-52 and KK-52-A are the Letter and Writ of
Sequestration issued by the PCGG on Allied Banking Corporation and
Guaranteed Education Inc. pursuant to its mandate to go after ill-gotten
wealth.
Exhibits NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 refer to the Memorandum To All
Commercial Banks dated March 14, 1986 issued by then Central Bank
Governor Jose B. Fernandez and the Letter dated March 13, 1986 of Mary
Concepcion Bautista, PCGG Commissioner addressed to then Central Bank
Governor Fernandez requesting that names be added to the earlier
request of PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga to instruct all commercial banks
not to allow any withdrawal or transfer of funds from the market
placements under the names of said persons, to include spouses
Gimenezes, without authority from PCGG.
Exhibits KK and series, NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 which prove the various
real properties, business interests and bank accounts owned by spouses
Gimenezes were part of the testimony of Atty. Tereso Javier.
Exhibit RR and series (RR-1-RR-23) are the Affidavit dated July 24, 1987 of
Dominador Pangilinan, Acting President and President of Trader’s Royal
Bank, and the attached Recapitulation, Status of Banker’s Acceptances,
Status of Funds and Savings Account Ledger wherein he mentioned that
Malacanang maintained trust accounts at Trader’s Royal Bank, the balance
of which is approximately 150-175 million Pesos, and that he was informed
by Mr. Rivera that the funds were given to him (Rivera) by Fe Roa Gimenez
for deposit to said accounts.
Exhibits SS and series (SS-1-SS-29) are the Affidavit dated July 23, 1987 of
Apolinario K. Medina, Executive Vice President of Traders Royal Bank and
attachments, which include Recapitulation, Status of Funds, and Messages
from Traders Royal Bank Manila to various foreign banks. In his Affidavit,
Medina divulged certain numbered confidential trust accounts maintained
by Malacanang with the Trader’s Royal Bank. He further stated that the
deposits were so substantial that he suspected that they had been made
by President Marcos or his family.
Exhibit TT and series (TT-1-TT-3) is [sic] the Memorandum dated July 19,
2005 of Danilo R.V. Daniel, then Director of the Research and
Development Department of PCGG regarding the investigation conducted
on the ill-gotten wealth of spouses Gimenezes, the subject matter of Civil
Case No. [0]007. He revealed that during the investigation on the ill-gotten
wealth of spouses Gimenezes, it was found out that from 1977 to 1982,
several withdrawals, in the total amount of P75,090,306.42 were made
from Trust Account No. 128 (A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B. Gimenez, I.B.
Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez.
Exhibits RR, SS, TT and their series prove that spouses Gimenez
maintained bank accounts of substantial amounts and gained control of
various corporations.1âwphi1 These are also being offered as part of the
testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel.27 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)
In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the
Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and
granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to Dismiss.28 According to the
Sandiganbayan:
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the
higher ends of substantial justice militate against dismissal of cases purely
on technical grounds, the circumstances of this case show that the ends of
justice will not be served if this Court allows the wanton disregard of the
Rules of Court and of the Court’s orders. Rules of procedure are designed
for the proper and prompt disposition of cases. . . .
The reasons invoked by the plaintiff to justify its failure to timely file the
formal offer of evidence fail to persuade this Court. The missing exhibits
mentioned by the plaintiff’s counsel appear to be the same missing
documents since 2004, or almost two (2) years ago. The plaintiff had more
than ample time to locate them for its purpose. . . . Since they remain
missing after lapse of the period indicated by the Court, there is no reason
why the search for these documents should delay the filing of the formal
offer of evidence.
[Petitioner’s] counsel . . . admits that faced with other pressing matters, he
lost track of the time. We cannot just turn a blind eye on the negligence of
the parties and in their failure to observe the orders of this Court. The
carelessness of [petitioner’s] counsel in keeping track of the deadlines is
an unacceptable reason for the Court to set aside its Order and relax the
observance of the period set for filing the formal offer of
evidence.29 (Citation omitted)
The Sandiganbayan also found that the Republic failed to prosecute its
case for an unreasonable length of time and to comply with the court’s
rules.30 The court also noted that the documentary evidence presented by
the Republic consisted mostly of certified true copies.31 However, the
persons who certified the documents as copies of the original were not
presented.32 Hence, the evidence lacked probative value.33 The dispositive
portion of the assailed Resolution reads:
ACCORDINGLY, there being no valid and cogent justification shown by the
plaintiff for the Court to Grant its Motion for Reconsideration and admit its
Formal Offer of Evidence, the plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and to
Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence is DENIED. The Motion to
Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence filed by the defendant Ignacio B.
Gimenez and adopted by defendant Fe Roa Gimenez is GRANTED. The
case is then DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.34 (Emphasis in the original)
The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 3,
2006 before this court.35
The Gimenez Spouses were required to comment on the Petition.36 This
court noted the separate Comments37 filed by the Gimenez Spouses.38 The
Republic responded to the Comments through a Consolidated
Reply39 dated June 22, 2007.
In the Resolution40 dated August 29, 2007, this court required the parties
to submit their memoranda.41
On February 18, 2008, this court resolved to require the parties to "move
in the premises[.]"42
On March 2, 2012, the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to Re-open
Proceedings, to File and Admit Attached Supplement to the Petition for
Certiorari.43 In this Supplement, the Republic argued that the second
assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006 was void for failing to state
the facts and the law on which it was based.44This Motion was granted,
and the Gimenez Spouses were required to file their Comment on the
Supplement to the Petition.45 Thereafter, the Republic filed its Reply.46
Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Rejoinder47 dated December 19, 2012 which was
expunged by this court in a Resolution48dated January 23, 2013. Ignacio
Gimenez’s Motion for Leave to File and Admit Attached Rejoinder49 was
denied.50
The Republic raised the following issues:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in dismissing the case in
the light of the allegations in the Complaint which were substantiated by
overwhelming evidence presented vis-a-vis the material admissions of
spouses Gimenezes as their answer failed to specifically deny that they
were dummies of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and that they
acquired illegal wealth grossly disproportionate to their lawful income in a
manner prohibited under the Constitution and Anti-Graft Statutes.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner’s
Motion to Admit Formal Offer of Evidence on the basis of mere
technicalities, depriving petitioner of its right to due process.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in making a sweeping
pronouncement that petitioner’s evidence do not bear any probative
value.51
The issues for consideration of this court are:
First, whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari was the proper remedy
to assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions; and
Second, whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner
Republic of the Philippines waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence
and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez’s
Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.
We grant the Petition.
I
Respondent Ignacio Gimenez pictures petitioner as being confused as to
the proper mode of review of the Sandiganbayan Resolutions. According
to him, petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion.52 Hence, petitioner should have filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 and not a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.53 Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any error, and
petitioner has to show that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction.54
Observance of the proper procedure before courts, especially before the
Sandiganbayan, cannot be stressed enough. Due process is enshrined in
the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights.55 "Due process [in criminal
cases] guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the
contrary is proved[.]"56 "Mere suspicion of guilt should not sway
judgment."57
To determine whether a petition for review is the proper remedy to assail
the Sandiganbayan Resolutions, we review the nature of actions for
reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages.
Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages
for ill-gotten wealth are also called civil forfeiture proceedings.
Republic Act No. 137958 provides for the procedure by which forfeiture
proceedings may be instituted against public officers or employees who
"[have] acquired during his [or her] incumbency an amount of property
which is manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary as such public
officer or employee and to his [or her] other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property, [which] property shall be presumed
prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired."59
This court has already settled the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over civil
forfeiture cases:
. . . violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the
forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to a penalty.60
In Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,61 this court re-affirmed the doctrine
that forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 are civil in
nature.62 Civil forfeiture proceedings were also differentiated from plunder
cases:
. . . a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate
and different from a plunder case. . . . In a prosecution for plunder, what is
sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in
furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. . . . On the other hand,
all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence,
under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondent’s properties to his
legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said
properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable
nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed
from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent
public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.63(Citation
omitted)
To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings
under Republic Act No. 1379 is the same with other civil cases —
preponderance of evidence.64
When a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence is dismissed, the
dismissal is equivalent to an acquittal.65
As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an
acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.66
Hence, the Republic may only assail an acquittal through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court:
Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting
an accused’s demurrer to evidence may be done via the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.67 (Citation omitted)
In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner
correctly filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Section 1 of the Rule provides the mode of appeal from
judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.— A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
II
Petitioner argues that substantial justice requires doing away with the
procedural technicalities.68 Loss of vital documentary proof warranted
extensions to file the Formal Offer of Evidence.69 Honest efforts to locate
several missing documents resulted in petitioner’s inability to file the
pleading within the period granted by the Sandiganbayan.70
Respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner cannot fault the
Sandiganbayan for its incompetence during trial.71 Even if the evidence
were formally offered within the prescribed period, PCGG’s evidence still
had no probative value.72 It is solely petitioner’s fault "that the persons
who certified to the photocopies of the originals were not presented to
testify[.]"73 It is also misleading to argue that the pieces of documentary
evidence presented are public documents.74 "The documents are not
public in the sense that these are official issuances of the Philippine
government."75 "The bulk consists mainly of notarized, private documents
that have simply been certified true and faithful."76
According to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez, petitioner tries to excuse its
non-filing of the Formal Offer of Evidence within the prescribed period by
raising its efforts to locate the 66 missing documents.77 However, the issue
of the missing documents was laid to rest during the hearing on November
16, 2004.78 The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until March 2005 to
produce the documents; otherwise, these would be excluded.79 The
testimonies of the witnesses related to the missing documents would also
be expunged from the case records.80
Moreover, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that "[t]he Sandiganbayan
did not err when it ruled that the great bulk of the documentary evidence
offered by the PCGG have no probative value."81 Aside from the 66 missing
documents it failed to present, almost all of petitioner’s pieces of
documentary evidence were mere photocopies.82The few that were
certified true copies were not testified on by the persons who certified
these documents.83
Our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of
evidence. Testimonial evidence is offered "at the time [a] witness is called
to testify."84 Documentary and object evidence, on the other hand, are
offered "after the presentation of a party’s testimonial evidence."85 Offer
of documentary or object evidence is generally done orally unless
permission is given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence.86
More importantly, the Rules specifically provides that evidence must be
formally offered to be considered by the court. Evidence not offered is
excluded in the determination of the case.87 "Failure to make a formal
offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to
submit it."88
Rule 132, Section 34 provides:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.— The court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified.
The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional
guarantee of due process. Parties must be given the opportunity to review
the evidence submitted against them and take the necessary actions to
secure their case.89 Hence, any document or object that was marked for
identification is not evidence unless it was "formally offered and the
opposing counsel [was] given an opportunity to object to it or cross-
examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it."90
This court explained further the reason for the rule:
The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered." A formal offer is necessary because
judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its
function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for
which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this
allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not
be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial
court.91 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
To consider a party’s evidence which was not formally offered during trial
would deprive the other party of due process. Evidence not formally
offered has no probative value and must be excluded by the court.92
Petitioner’s failure to file its written Formal Offer of Evidence of the
numerous documentary evidence presented within the prescribed period
is a non-issue. In its first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the
Sandiganbayan declared that petitioner waived the filing of its Formal
Offer of Evidence when it failed to file the pleading on May 13, 2006, the
deadline based on the extended period granted by the court. Petitioner
was granted several extensions of time by the Sandiganbayan totalling 75
days from the date petitioner terminated its presentation of evidence.
Notably, this 75-day period included the original 30-day period.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit
Attached Formal Offer of Evidence, and the Formal Offer of Evidence.
In resolving petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit
Attached Formal Offer of Evidence, the Sandiganbayan found the
carelessness of petitioner’s counsel unacceptable. According to the
Sandiganbayan, it could not countenance the non-observance of the
court’s orders.
This court has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover
the assets and properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his wife Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, their close
relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or
nominees.93 Hence, this court has adopted a liberal approach regarding
technical rules of procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten
wealth:
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has
seen fit to set aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay
or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases
resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the
Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or
perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost
two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and
reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases
on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition,
accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought
out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally
determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying
technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.94 (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)
To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit,
belatedly. Petitioner hurdled 19 years of trial before the Sandiganbayan to
present its evidence as shown in its extensive Formal Offer of Evidence. As
petitioner argues:
Undeniable from the records of the case is that petitioner was vigorous in
prosecuting the case. The most tedious and crucial stage of the litigation
and presentation of evidence has been accomplished. Petitioner
completed its presentation of evidence proving the ill-gotten nature and
character of the funds and assets sought to be recovered in the present
case. It presented vital testimonial and documentary evidence consisting
of voluminous record proving the gross disparity of the subject funds to
spouses Gimenezes’ combined declared income which must be
reconveyed to the Republic for being acquired in blatant violation of the
Constitution and the Anti-Graft statutes.95
This court is not unmindful of the difficulty in gathering voluminous
documentary evidence in cases of forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth acquired
throughout the years. It is never easy to prosecute corruption and take
back what rightfully belongs to the government and the people of the
Republic.
This is not the first time that this court relaxed the rule on formal offer of
evidence.
Tan v. Lim96 arose from two civil Complaints: one for injunction and
another for legal redemption, which were heard jointly before the trial
court.97 The defendant did not file a Formal Offer of Evidence in the
injunction case98 and merely adopted the evidence offered in the legal
redemption case.99 The trial court held that the defendant’s failure to file
his Formal Offer of Evidence in the injunction case rendered the plaintiff’s
evidence therein as uncontroverted.100 The Court of Appeals reversed the
Decision and was affirmed by this court.101 This court ruled that while the
trial court’s reasoning in its Decision was technically sound, a liberal
interpretation was more appropriate and in line with substantial justice:
It may be true that Section 34, Rule 132 of the rules directs the court to
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered and that under
Section 35, documentary evidence is offered after presentation of
testimonial evidence. However, a liberal interpretation of these Rules
would have convinced the trial court that a separate formal offer of
evidence in Civil Case No. 6518 was superfluous because not only was an
offer of evidence made in Civil Case No. 6521 that was being jointly heard
by the trial court, counsel for Jose Renato Lim had already declared he was
adopting these evidences for Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court itself
stated that it would freely utilize in one case evidence adduced in the
other only to later abandon this posture. Jose Renato Lim testified in Civil
Case No. 6518. The trial court should have at least considered his
testimony since at the time it was made, the rules provided that
testimonial evidence is deemed offered at the time the witness is called to
testify. Rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid, technical
case as they are devised chiefly to secure and not defeat substantial
justice.
....
The logic of the Court of Appeals is highly persuasive. Indeed, apparently,
the trial court was being overly technical about the nonsubmission of Jose
Renato Lim’s formal offer of evidence. This posture not only goes against
Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure decreeing a liberal
construction of the rules to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive
litigation but ignores the consistent rulings of the Court against utilizing
the rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice. Despite the intervening
years, the language of the Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-
General, still remains relevant:
"x x x. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is
to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing
itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed
as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a
means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are
made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one
and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes
incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave
criticism."102 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Furthermore, "subsequent and substantial compliance . . . may call for the
relaxation of the rules of procedure."103
Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the
number of delays petitioner incurred in submitting its Formal Offer of
Evidence and the state’s policy on recovering ill-gotten wealth, this court is
of the belief that it is but only just that the Rules be relaxed and petitioner
be allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of Evidence. The
Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions should be reversed.
III
According to petitioner, the Sandiganbayan erred when it granted the
demurrer to evidence filed by respondents and dismissed the case despite
a "prima facie foundation [based on the pleadings and documents on
record] that spouses Gimenezes amassed enormous wealth grossly
disproportionate to their lawful income or declared lawful assets."104
Similarly, the Complaint alleged specific acts committed by respondent
Ignacio Gimenez:
[T]aking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and connection,
by himself and/or in unlawful concert and active collaboration with former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos for the purpose of
mutually enriching themselves and preventing the disclosure and recovery
of assets illegally obtained: (a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in several
corporations such as, the Allied Banking Corporation, Acoje Mining
Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi National Resources, Philippine
Oversees, Inc. and Pioneer Natural Resources; (b) unlawfully obtained,
through corporations organized by them such as the New City Builders,
Inc. (NCBI), multi-million peso contracts with the government buildings,
such as the University of Life Sports Complex and Dining Hall as well as
projects of the National Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements,
GSIS, and Maharlika Livelihood, to the gross and manifest disadvantage of
the Government and the Filipino people; and (c) in furtherance of the
above stated illegal purposes, organized several establishments engaged in
food, mining and other businesses such as the Transnational Construction
Corporation, Total Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro Control Technology
Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T Development Corporation, RBO
Agro Forestry Farm Development Corporation, Bathala Coal Mining
Corporation, Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal Mining
Corporation, GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., and I.B. Gimenez Securities,
Inc.105
Despite the specific allegations in the Complaint, petitioner contends that
respondents merely gave general denials to the allegations in the
Complaint.106 "[N]o specific denial [was] made on the material allegations
[in] the [C]omplaint."107
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the Sandiganbayan was
correct in granting the Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.
Respondent Ignacio Gimenez claims that petitioner cannot be excused
from filing its Formal Offer of Evidence considering the numerous
extensions given by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner had all the resources
and time to gather, collate, and secure the necessary evidence to build its
case.108 Petitioner’s presentation of evidence took 19 years to complete,
and yet it failed to submit the necessary documents and pleading.109
Similarly, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez argues that petitioner was negligent
in failing to comply with the Sandiganbayan’s orders considering the
inordinate amount of time given to petitioner to present evidence, which
resulted in only five witnesses in 19 years.110
To determine the propriety of granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
based on Demurrer to Evidence, we review the nature of demurrer.
Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.— After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If
the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
In Oropesa v. Oropesa111 where this court affirmed the dismissal of the
case on demurrer to evidence due to petitioner’s non-submission of the
Formal Offer of Evidence,112 demurrer to evidence was defined as:
. . . "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue." We have
also held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment on the
merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his
part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that
he is not entitled to the relief sought."113 (Citations omitted)
This court has laid down the guidelines in resolving a demurrer to
evidence:
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law,
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence
together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be
drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a
demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is
likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the
plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably
inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the
material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an
allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the
plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.114
Furthermore, this court already clarified what the trial court determines
when acting on a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence:
What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to
evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts
and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that
which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such
as capacity to sue. . . .115 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Petitioner, in its Supplement to the Petition, argued that the testimonial
evidence it had presented and offered during trial warranted
consideration and analysis.116 The Sandiganbayan erroneously excluded
these testimonies in determining whether to grant the motion to dismiss
or not, hence:
. . . even assuming that the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s formal offer
of evidence, petitioner still had testimonial evidence in its favor which
should [have] been considered. It behoved then upon the Sandiganbayan
to discuss or include in its discussion, at the very least, an analysis of
petitioner’s testimonial evidence.117
With our ruling reversing the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions on petitioner’s
Formal Offer of Evidence, what should be determined now by the
Sandiganbayan is whether petitioner’s evidence is sufficient to entitle it to
the relief it seeks after the Sandiganbayan rested its case. Petitioner is
required to establish preponderance of evidence.
In the second assailed Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted
respondents’ Motion to Dismiss based on the lack of Formal Offer of
Evidence of petitioner. At the same time, it observed that the pieces of
documentary evidence presented by petitioner were mostly certified true
copies of the original. In passing upon the probative value of petitioner’s
evidence, the Sandiganbayan held:
On another note, the evidence presented by the plaintiff consisted mainly
of certified true copies of the original. These certified copies of
documentary evidence presented by the plaintiff were not testified on by
the person who certified them to be photocopies of the original. Hence,
these evidence do not appear to have significant substantial probative
value.118
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for making "a general and sweeping
statement that the evidence presented by petitioner lacked probative
value for the reason that they are mainly certified true copies which had
not been testified on by the person who certified [them]."119 Thus, its right
to due process was violated when the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner’s
documentary evidence in the same Resolution which dismissed the case.120
Petitioner argues that: a) respondents unqualifiedly admitted the identity
and authenticity of the documentary evidence presented by
petitioner;121 and b) the documents it presented were public documents,
and there was no need for the identification and authentication of the
original documentary exhibits.122 Petitioner relies on the Sandiganbayan
Order123 dated August 6, 2002. The Order reads:
Considering the manifestation of Atty. Reno Gonzales, counsel for
plaintiff/PCGG, that the defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, through counsel, is
willing to stipulate that the documents to be presented and identified by
the witness are in her custody as Records Officer of the PCGG, the parties
agreed to dispense with the testimony of Ma. Lourdes Magno.
WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, the continuation of the presentation of
plaintiff’s evidence is set on October 9 and 10, 2002, both at 8:30 o’clock
[sic] in the morning.
SO ORDERED.124 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to
the PCGG’s functions prescribed under Executive Order No. 1, Section
3(b),125 and form part of the official records of the PCGG:126 "Certifications
as to the various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez, her
salaries and compensation during her stint as a public officer, the BIR
Income Tax Returns and Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing the
declared income of spouses Gimenezes; the Articles of Incorporation of
various corporations showing spouses Gimenezes’ interests on various
corporations; and several transactions involving huge amounts of money
which prove that they acted as conduit in the disbursement of government
funds."127
On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner’s
documents are not "official issuances of the Philippine
government."128 They are mostly notarized private
documents.129 Petitioner’s evidence has no probative value; hence, a
dismissal on demurrer to evidence is only proper.130 Respondent Fe Roa
Gimenez claims that the Sandiganbayan did not err in holding that the
majority of petitioner’s documentary evidence has no probative value,
considering that most of these documents are only photocopies.131
The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves
better treatment.
For instance, the nature and classification of the documents should have
been ruled upon. Save for certain cases, the original document must be
presented during trial when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of
the document.132 This is the Best Evidence Rule provided under Rule 130,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.— When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office.
In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may
be presented133 as provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of the same Rule:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.— When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. —
If the document is in the custody or under the control of adverse party, he
must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss. (5a)
SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.—
When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
In Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano,134 citing Estrada v. Hon. Desierto,135 this
court clarified the applicability of the Best Evidence Rule:
As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only
when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document. The
scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus —
But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule
applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually
executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence
is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any
other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for
accounting for the original.
Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is
offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the
fact of execution of the documents is allowed (Hernaez, et al. vs. McGrath,
etc., et al., 91 Phil[.] 565). x x x
In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court had occasion to rule that —
It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only [a] copy of the
Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6,
2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence
rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:
"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s
discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide
dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be
served by requiring production.
"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been
abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily no real dispute
arised [sic]. This measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves
universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy
may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an
opportunity to inspect it."
This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and
weighed in evidence the photocopies and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs,
and letters submitted by the petitioners to establish the existence of
respondent’s loans. The terms or contents of these documents were never
the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It was respondent’s position
that the PNs in the first set (with the exception of PN No. 34534) never
existed, while the PNs in the second set (again, excluding PN No. 34534)
were merely executed to cover simulated loan transactions. As for the
MCs representing the proceeds of the loans, the respondent either denied
receipt of certain MCs or admitted receipt of the other MCs but for
another purpose. Respondent further admitted the letters she wrote
personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank
acknowledging the loans, except that she claimed that these letters were
just meant to keep up the ruse of the simulated loans. Thus, respondent
questioned the documents as to their existence or execution, or when the
former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the documents were
executed, matters which are, undoubtedly, external to the documents, and
which had nothing to do with the contents thereof.
Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply
to the evidence presented by petitioners regarding the existence of
respondent’s loans, it should be borne in mind that the rule admits of the
following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of
Court[.]136 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts,
documents are classified as either public or private. Rule 132, Section 19 of
the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents.— For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last
wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.
The same Rule provides for the effect of public documents as evidence and
the manner of proof for public documents:
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.— Documents consisting of entries
in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which
gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
SEC. 24. Proof of official record.— The record of public documents referred
to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office.
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.— Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if
he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
....
SEC. 27. Public record of a private document.— An authorized public record
of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy
thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate
certificate that such officer has the custody.
....
SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents.— Every instrument duly
acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved. (Emphasis supplied)
Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents,
this court pronounced:
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the
documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by
virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been
acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a
competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because
it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any
other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without
the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which
some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official
or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed
by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed
by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in
court.137 (Emphasis supplied)
The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section
19 of the Rules of Court is material with regard to the fact the evidence
proves. In Philippine Trust Company v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,138 this
court ruled that:
. . . not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated:
"Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer"
include those specified as public documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132
of the Rules of Court and the acknowledgement, affirmation or oath, or
jurat portion of public documents under Section 19(c). Hence, under
Section 23, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave
rise to their execution (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories . . . is
proof that Philtrust had been served with Written Interrogatories), and of
the date of the latter (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories is proof
that the same was executed on October 12, 1992, the date stated
thereon), but is not prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Additionally, under Section 30 of the same Rule, the acknowledgement in
notarized documents is prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to
Interrogatories is prima facie proof that petitioner executed the same).
The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties
attending the execution of the different kinds of public instruments. Official
duties are disputably presumed to have been regularly performed. As
regards affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories which are required
to be sworn to by the person making them, the only portion thereof
executed by the person authorized to take oaths is the jurat. The
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed therefore
applies only to the latter portion, wherein the notary public merely attests
that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on the
date mentioned thereon. Thus, even though affidavits are notarized
documents, we have ruled that affidavits, being self-serving, must be
received with caution.139 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corporation,140 this court discussed the
difference between mere copies of audited financial statements submitted
to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and certified true copies of audited financial
statements obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which are public
documents under Rule 132, Section 19(c) of the Revised Rules of Evidence:
The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited
financial statements of SMMC. Financial statements (which include the
balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flow) show the
fiscal condition of a particular entity within a specified period. The
financial statements prepared by external auditors who are certified public
accountants (like those presented by petitioner) are audited financial
statements. Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as [a]
general rule, private documents. However, once financial statements are
filed with a government office pursuant to a provision of law, they become
public documents.
Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its
admissibility as evidence. Public documents are admissible in evidence
even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. On the
other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they
are properly authenticated. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as
evidence were mere copies of the audited financial statements submitted
to the BIR and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies presented were
certified true copies of audited financial statements obtained or secured
from the BIR or the SEC which under Section 19(c), Rule 132 would have
been public documents. Thus, the statements presented were private
documents. Consequently, authentication was a precondition to their
admissibility in evidence.
During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a
document presented as evidence is genuine and has been duly executed
or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by
mistake or under duress. In this case, petitioner merely presented a
memorandum attesting to the increase in the corporation’s monthly
market revenue, prepared by a member of his management team. While
there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes competent evidence to
establish the authenticity of a private document, the best proof available
must be presented. The best proof available, in this instance, would have
been the testimony of a representative of SMMC’s external auditor who
prepared the audited financial statements. Inasmuch as there was none,
the audited financial statements were never authenticated.141 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc,142 this court held that mere
collection of documents by the PCGG does not make such documents
public documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course
of its investigations does not make them per se public records referred to
in the quoted rule.
Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno,
who testified that these public and private documents had been gathered
by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the
Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses. However, given the purposes for which these documents were
submitted, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to their
contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to
them, they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses can testify only
to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived
from their own perception. Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she
obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the
documents themselves.
Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits
or Memoranda submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while
affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are
acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as
hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally
prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own
language in writing the affiant’s statements, parts of which may thus be
either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants.
For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless
the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon.143(Citations omitted)
Notably, the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by
petitioner was cursory. Its main reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss
on Demurrer to Evidence was that there was no evidence to consider due
to petitioner’s failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off the
totality of evidence on which petitioner built its case.
Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this
court finds it clear from the second assailed Resolution that the
Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence presented by
petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring
petitioner’s testimonial evidence without any basis or justification.
Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner’s
witnesses.
Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that
tended to establish a presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten
wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s incumbency as public officer
and which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion to her
and her husband’s salaries and to their other lawful income or properties.
Petitioner presented five (5) witnesses, two (2) of which were Atty. Tereso
Javier and Director Danilo R.V. Daniel, both from the PCGG:
Petitioner presented as witnesses Atty. Tereso Javier, then Head of the
Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and Danilo R.V. Daniel, then
Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG, who
testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned and/ or under the
control of spouses Gimenezes.144
Several exhibits excluded by the Sandiganbayan were offered as part of
petitioner’s testimonial evidence:
1) Exhibit "KK"145 was offered "for the purpose of proving the
assets or properties of the spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe
Roa Gimenez, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."146
2) Exhibits "KK-1" to "KK-12"147 inclusive of sub-markings, were
offered "for the purpose of proving the real properties acquired
by the spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, and as
part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."148
3) Exhibits "KK-15," "KK-18," "KK-20," "KK-27," "KK-30," "KK-32"
to "KK-38" and "KK-40"149 were offered "for the purpose of
proving the corporations in which Ignacio B. Gimenez has
interest, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."150
4) Exhibit "KK-45"151 was offered "for the purpose of proving
that the PCGG conducted an investigation of New City Builders,
Inc., Transnational Construction Corporation, and OTO
Construction and Development Corporation in relation to
Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O. Olanday, and as part of the
testimony of Tereso Javier."152
5) Exhibits "KK-48" to "KK-50"153 were offered "for the purpose
of proving that the PCGG formally filed notices of lis pendens
with the Registers of Deeds of Taytay, Rizal, Lucena City,
Quezon and San Fabian, Pangasinan over the properties
mentioned in said notices in connection with Civil Case No.
[0]007 pending with the Sandiganbayan, and as part of the
testimony of Tereso Javier."154
6) Exhibits "KK-51" to "KK-52"155 and their sub-markings were
offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG sequestered
the shares of stock in Allied Banking Corporation and
Guaranteed Education, Inc. as stated in the said writ/letter of
sequestration, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."156
7) Exhibits "NN" to "QQ"157 and their sub-markings were
offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG formally
requested the Central Bank to freeze the bank accounts of the
spouses Igancio [sic] B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez and that
the Central Bank, acting on said request, issued a memorandum
to all commercial banks relative thereto. They are also being
offered as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."158
8) Exhibits "RR" to "RR-23"159 were offered "for the purpose of
proving that Dominador Pangilinan, former Acting President
and President of Traders Royal Bank, executed an affidavit on
July 24, 1987 wherein he mentioned Malacanang trust accounts
maintained with the Traders Royal Bank the balance of which
was very high, approximately 150-175 million pesos, as
indicated in the monthly statements attached to his affidavit.
They are also being offered as part of the testimony of Danilo
R.V. Daniel."160
9) Exhibits "SS" to "SS-29"161 were offered "for the purpose of
proving that Apolinario K. Medina, Executive Vice President of
 Traders Royal Bank, executed an Affidavit on July 23, 1987
wherein he mentioned about certain numbered (confidential)
trust accounts maintained with the Traders Royal Bank, the
deposits to which ‘were so substantial in amount that (he)
suspected that they had been made by President Marcos or his
family. They are also being offered as part of the testimony of
Danilo R.V. Daniel."162
10) Exhibits "TT" to "TT-3"163 were offered "for the purpose of
proving that Director Danilo R.V. Daniel of the Research and
Development Department of the PCGG conducted an
investigation on the ill-gotten wealth of the spouses Ignacio
and Fe Roa Gimenez and found that from 1977 to 1982, the
total sum of P75,090,306.42 was withdrawn from the account
No. 128 (A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B Gimenez, I.B. Gimenez
Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez. They are also being offered as
part of the testimony of Director Danilo R.V. Daniel."164
The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a
demurrer to evidence which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
evidence.
The difference between the admissibility of evidence and the
determination of its probative weight is canonical.165
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the
circumstance (or evidence) is to [be] considered at all. On the other hand,
the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it
proves an issue. Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as
such but its evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of the rules
on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter should be presented as
witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to
question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence,
failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect. As
earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value.166 (Citations omitted)
The Sandiganbayan should have considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine,
et al.167 where this court held that it is better to admit and consider
evidence for determination of its probative value than to outright reject it
based on very rigid and technical grounds.168
Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the
rules of evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be of
doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or
technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial
or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or
competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be
irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding
them or ignoring them.169(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state’s policy to recover
ill-gotten wealth. In case of doubt, courts should proceed with caution in
granting a motion to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence. An order
granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits.170 This is
because while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action,"171 it specifically "pertains to the merits of the
case."172
In Cabreza, Jr., et al. v. Cabreza,173 this court defined a judgment rendered
on the merits:
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed
facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections"; or when the
judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal
or merely technical point."174 (Citations omitted)
To reiterate, "[d]emurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits
of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his [or
her] part, as he [or she] would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence
shows that he [or she] is not entitled to the relief sought."175 The order of
dismissal must be clearly supported by facts and law since an order
granting demurrer is a judgment on the merits:
As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a
judgment on the merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision
clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is
based.176(Citation omitted)
To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally
offer documentary evidence essentially deprives one party of due process.
IV
Respondents did not fail to specifically deny material averments in the
Complaint.
Under Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the "defendant must
specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not
admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the
matters upon which he relies to support his denial."177 There are three
modes of specific denial provided for under the Rules:
1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the
truth of which the defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable,
setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to
support his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the
complaint as is true and material and denying only the remainder; (3) by
stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint,
which has the effect of a denial.178
In paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the PCGG, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, averred that:
14. Defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, by herself and/or in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue
advantage of her position, influence and connection and with grave abuse
of power and authority, in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of
assets illegally obtained:
(a) actively participated in the unlawful transfer of millions of
dollars of government funds into several accounts in her name
in foreign countries;
(b) disbursed such funds from her various personal accounts for
Defendants’ own use[,] benefit and enrichment;
(c) acted as conduit of the Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos in purchasing the New York properties,
particularly, the Crown Building, Herald Center, 40 Wall Street,
200 Wall Street, Lindenmere Estate and expensive works of
arts;179
In their Answer, respondents claimed that;
9. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the
allegations contained in paragraphs 14(a), 14(b) and 14(c), the truth being
that defendant Fe Roa never took advantage of her position or alleged
connection and influence to allegedly prevent disclosure and recovery of
alleged illegally obtained assets, in the manner alleged in said
paragraphs.180
Similarly, the PCGG made material allegations in paragraph 16 of the
Complaint:
16. Defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez, taking undue advantage of his
relationship, influence, and connection, by himself and/or in unlawful
concert and active collaboration with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos, for the purpose of mutually enriching themselves and
preventing the disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained, among
others:
(a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, in several
corporations such as, the Allied Banking Corporation, Acoje
Mining Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi National
Resources, Philippine Overseas, Inc. and Pioneer Natural
Resources;
(b) unlawfully obtained, through corporations organized by
them such as the the [sic] New City Builders, Inc. (NCBI),
multimillion peso contracts with the government for the
construction of government buildings, such as the University of
Life Sports Complex and Dining Hall as well as projects of the
National Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements, GSIS,
and Maharlika Livelihood, to the gross and manifest
disadvantage to Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
(c) in furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes,
organized several establishments engaged in food, mining and
other businesses such as the Transnational Construction
Corporation, Total Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro Control
Technology Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T
Development Corporation, RBO Agro Forestry Farm
Development Corporation, Bathala Coal Mining Corporation,
Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal Mining Corporation,
GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., and I.B. Gimenez Securities,
Inc.181
To which respondents specifically denied through the following paragraph:
11. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the
allegations contained in paragraphs 16, 16(a), 16(b) and 16(c) that
defendant Gimenez allegedly took advantage of his alleged relationship,
influence and connection, and that by himself or in alleged unlawful
concert with defendants Marcos and Imelda, for the alleged purpose of
enriching themselves and preventing the discovery of alleged illegally
obtained assets: (1) allegedly acted as dummy, nominee or agent of
defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) allegedly obtained multi-million peso
projects unlawfully; and (3) allegedly organized several establishments, the
truth being: (1) that defendant Gimenez never acted as dummy, nominee
or agent of defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) that defendant Gimen[e]z
never once obtained any contract unlawfully; and (3) that defendant
Gimenez is a legitimate businessman and organized business
establishments legally and as he saw fit, all in accordance with his own
plans and for his own purposes.182
In Aquintey v. Spouses Tibong,183 this court held that using "specifically" in
a general denial does not automatically convert that general denial to a
specific one.184 The denial in the answer must be so definite as to what is
admitted and what is denied:
A denial is not made specific simply because it is so qualified by the
defendant. A general denial does not become specific by the use of the
word "specifically." When matters of whether the defendant alleges
having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly
and necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge, an alleged "ignorance
or lack of information" will not be considered as a specific denial. Section
11, Rule 8 of the Rules also provides that material averments in the
complaint other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages
shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Thus, the answer
should be so definite and certain in its allegations that the pleader’s
adversary should not be left in doubt as to what is admitted, what is
denied, and what is covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form a
belief.185 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
However, the allegations in the pleadings "must be contextualized and
interpreted in relation to the rest of the statements in the
pleading."186 The denials in respondents’ Answer comply with the modes
provided for under the Rules. We have held that the purpose of requiring
specific denials from the defendant is to make the defendant disclose the
"matters alleged in the complaint which he [or she] succinctly intends to
disprove at the trial, together with the matter which he [or she] relied
upon to support the denial."187 The denials proffered by respondents
sufficiently disclosed the matters they wished to disprove and those they
would rely upon in making their denials.
To summarize, the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion to Dismiss
on demurrer to evidence. It erred in making a sweeping declaration on the
probative value of the documentary evidence offered by petitioner and in
excluding other evidence offered during trial without full evaluation based
on reasons grounded in law and/or jurisprudence.
V
The third part of Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "[i]f
the motion [to dismiss] is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed [the movant] shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence." As this court held:
[I]f a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal
is reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence. The movant who presents a demurrer to the plaintiff’s
evidence retains the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court
disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the
appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal
order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The
appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on
the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged
litigations.188 (Citations omitted)
This procedure, however, does not apply.
In this case, we principally nullify the assailed Resolutions that denied the
admission of the Formal Offer of Evidence. It only follows that the Order
granting demurrer should be denied. This is not the situation
contemplated in Rule 33, Section 1.189 Respondents were not able to even
comment on the Formal Offer of Evidence. Due process now requires that
we remand the case to the Sandiganbayan. Respondents may, at their
option and through proper motion, submit their Comment. The
Sandiganbayan should then rule on the admissibility of the documentary
and object evidence covered by the Formal Offer submitted by petitioner.
Respondents then may avail themselves of any remedy thereafter allowed
by the Rules.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated
May 25, 2006 and September 13, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division in Civil Case No. 0007 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
remanded to the. Sandiganbayan for further proceedings with due and
deliberate dispatch in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MYRNA GAYOSO Y ARGUELLES
G.R. No. 206590 March 27, 2017
DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS:
Based on the testimonies of SPO3 Victorino de Dios, SPO3
Rolando G. Salamida, PO2 Rex Isip, SPO4 Josefina Bandoy, P/Insp. Eleazar
Barber, Jr., PS/Insp. Benjamin Cruto, and the documentary exhibits, the
following facts emerged: PI Barber of the PNP Guiuan Police Station directed
SPO3 De Dios to conduct a surveillance on appellant after receiving several
reports that she was peddling prohibited drugs. Three weeks later, SPO3 De
Dios confirmed that appellant was indeed engaged in illegal drug activities.
PI Barber filed for and was issued a search warrant. However, prior to
implementing the search warrant, PI Barber decided to conduct a
"confirmatory test-buy" designating SPO3 De Dios as poseur-buyer and
giving him P200.00 marked money for the operation.
Appellant denied the charges against her. She claimed that on
March 24, 2004, somebody forcibly kicked the front door of her house and
tried to break it open. When she opened the door, PI Barber pushed her
 aside and told his companions to move quickly. They went directly to her
room; when PO2 Isip emerged therefrom seconds later, he was holding a
substance that looked like tawas. SPO3 De Dios and SPO3 Salamida went in
and out of her house. She maintained that the search warrant was shown
to her only after an hour and that the sachets of shabu were planted. She
argued that the police officers fabricated the charges against her since her
family had a quarrel with a police officer named Rizalina Cuantero regarding
the fence separating their houses

The RTC, in finding the appellant guilty, ruled that the evidence
sufficiently established the chain of custody of the sachets of shabu from
the time they were bought from appellant and/or seized from her house, to
its turnover to the PDEA and submission to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. The RTC rejected appellant's defense of denial and frame-up
in view of her positive identification by eyewitnesses as the criminal
offender. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling finding appellant guilty of
unauthorized sale and possession of shabu. The CA was not swayed by
appellant's contention that the "test-buy operation" amounted to
instigation since it is settled jurisprudence that a ''decoy solicitation" is not
tantamount to inducement or instigation.

ISSUE:

1. Whether a confirmatory test-buy solicitation constitutes instigation.

2. Whether the chain of custody was established.

RULING:

1. In inducement or instigation — the criminal intent originates in

the mind of the instigator and the accused is lured into the commission of
the offense charged in order to prosecute him. The instigator practically
induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and
himself becomes a co-principal. This is distinguished from entrapment
wherein ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of capturing the
lawbreaker in flagrante delicto.

The "test-buy" operation conducted by the police officers is not

prohibited by law. It does not amount to instigation. As in this case, the
solicitation of drugs from appellant by the poseur buyer merely furnishes
evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report
that appellant habitually deals with shabu. They designated a poseur buyer
to confirm the report by engaging in a drug transaction with appellant.
There was no proof that the poseur buyer induced appellant to sell illegal
drugs to him.

2. No. From the foregoing, it appears that no chain of custody was

established at all. What we have here are individual links with breaks in-
between which could not be seamlessly woven or tied together. The so-
called links in the chain of custody show that the seized shabu was not
handled properly starting from the actual seizure, to its turnover in the
police station and the PDEA, as well as its transfer to the crime laboratory
for examination. The Court therefore cannot conclude with moral certainty
that the shabu confiscated from appellant was the same as that presented
tor laboratory examination and then presented in court.

Aside from the failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken

chain of custody, another procedural lapse casts further uncertainty on the
identity and integrity of the subject shabu. This refers to the non-
compliance by the arresting officers with the most basic procedural
safeguards relative to the custody and disposition of the seized item under
Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165.

In this case, the apprehending team never conducted a physical

inventory of the seized items at the place where the search warrant was
served in the presence of a representative of the Department of Justice, nor
did it photograph the same in the presence of appellant after their initial
custody and control of said drug, and after immediately seizing and
confiscating the same. Neither was an explanation offered for such failure.