Newark Memorial High School Moot Court

Case Prompt Spring 2018

P.C. vs. State of Olympus

Scrava School of Health Sciences and Engineering is a public high school located in the
state of Olympus with a student body of approximately 2,500 students. Over the past few years,
an increasingly alarming number of students at Scrava have been caught engaging in marijuana
use and sale on campus. In 2012, Principal Lyons instituted a number of preventive measures to
counteract this trend, and additionally began cracking down on drug possession on campus.
Students began seeing more and more sweeps by school administrators with trained drug-sniffing
dogs, as well as regular bookbag checks.
As a result, drug use on campus sharply decreased on the whole. Unfortunately, there
were several students who responded in the opposite manner, turning to more clever means to
hide drugs on campus and conduct illicit transactions. To facilitate their efforts, these students
formed a Facebook group, which in total accumulated about 30 members.
In the Facebook group, students made posts offering to either buy or sell illicit
substances, which were most commonly marijuana. The group was created and maintained as a
secret group, meaning that the existence of the group, its membership, and its contents were
private to its members, and the only way to gain access to the group was by invitation from an
existing member.
On October 24th, 2012, Principal Lyons received an anonymous tip that Peter Cruman, a current
junior at Scrava, had posted in the Facebook group that he would be conducting a few sales on
campus after school that day. The school resource officer (SRO) pulled Cruman out of class and
escorted him to the administrative office to be questioned by the principal regarding his planned
drug deals. Prior to receiving the anonymous tip, the existence of the group was not known to
school administrators, and aside from Principal Lyons, none of the other school administrators
maintained active Facebook accounts.
Initially, Cruman denied both involvement with the Facebook group and plans to conduct
drug deals on that day. When the principal requested that he log onto his Facebook account on
the principal’s computer, Cruman refused to do so. However, after two and a half hours of
questioning, Cruman finally acquiesced to the principal’s persistent requests and logged in using
a nearby computer, thus allowing the principal to see the contents of his profile and his posts.
Once logged in, Principal Lyons found the Facebook group, where he saw the
incriminating posts indicated by the anonymous tip. Cruman then admitted to dealing drugs, and
hand-wrote and signed a confession which was turned over to the school. Cruman also led both
the Principal and the SRO to a location on school grounds outside the building where he had
hidden marijuana. The school later referred the case to law enforcement, and Cruman was
formally charged.
The SRO did not assist Principal Lyons in questioning Cruman, nor did the Vice Principal
or any other school official. At no point did Cruman attempt to leave the principal’s office. In
addition, Cruman’s parents were not called until after his questioning and subsequent confession.
 During his trial, Cruman moved to have both his confession and the evidence acquired
from the Facebook group suppressed. Cruman argued that his statements under questioning and
subsequent confession were inadmissible as a violation of the self-incrimination clause of the
Fifth Amendment because he was not read his Miranda rights by the principal. Additionally,
Cruman argued that his online posts were found as the result of an unlawful search, and were
thus invalid under the exclusionary principle. Nonetheless, the court allowed the admission of all
of the above as evidence, and Cruman was convicted and sentenced.

Upon appeal, both the Olympus State Court of Appeals and Supreme Court upheld this
ruling. Cruman finally appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted
certiorari.

Issues
i. Whether Cruman’s Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful search and seizure were
violated when the principal compelled him to relinquish access to his Facebook account.
ii. Whether Cruman’s Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination were violated
when the principal questioned him and procured his confession.
Cases
Students may use the following cases, and no others, in their arguments:
- 367 U.S. 643 (1961) – Mapp v. Ohio
- 385 U.S. 293 (1966) – Hoffa v. United States
- 469 U.S. 325 (1985) – New Jersey v. T.L.O.
- 425 F.Supp.2d 622 (2006) – Klump v. Nazareth Area School District
- 557 U.S. 364 (2009) – Safford Unified School District v. Redding
- 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 858 (2009) – Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc
- 631 F.3d 266 (2010) – United States v. Warshak
- 2010 WL 4394059 (2010) – J.W. v. Desoto County School District
- 384 U.S. 436 (1966) – Miranda v. Arizona
- 387 U.S. 1 (1967) – In re Gault
- 597 N.E.2d 1363 (1992) – Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Snyder
- 284 N.J.Super 654 (1995) – State of New Jersey v. Biancamano
- 948 P.2d 166 (1997) – State of Idaho v. Doe
- 541 U.S. 652 (2004) – Yarborough v. Alvarado
- 612 S.E.2d 804 (2005) – Dillard v. State of Georgia
- 245 S.W.3d 356 (2006) – R.D.S. v. State of Tennessee
- 564 U.S. ___ (2011) – J.D.B. v. North Carolina
Appendix I
Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Fifth Amendment
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

Appendix II
Facebook Description of Levels of Group Security:
Secret: Only members see the group, who’s in it, and what members post.
Closed: Anyone can see the group and who’s in it. Only members see posts.
Open (public): Anyone can see the group, who’s in it, and what members post.
 Newark Memorial High School Moot Court
Case Prompt Spring 2018

A Fair Future vs. Bristol Public Schools

Bristol is a North Carolina city of 218,000 with nearly equal black and white populations.
Bristol has had a vibrant African-American population throughout its history, and in the 1920s
the city was home to the so-called “black Wall Street,” where a number of prominent African
American-owned businesses were headquartered.
Despite this history, Bristol’s socioeconomic indicators are starkly drawn along
demographic lines. Black families primarily live in West Bristol, which is 68% black, and white
families primarily live in East Bristol, which is 73% white. The average income in East Bristol is
nearly twice that in West Bristol; the median adult level of education in East Bristol is a
Bachelor’s degree, while the median level in West Bristol is less than a high school diploma; and
the average life expectancy is six years longer in East Bristol than in West Bristol.
Bristol has no history of legal segregation in its 45 public schools. However, Bristol
Public Schools (BPS) decided in 2004 to change the system by which it assigned students to a
given public school. Previously, the school district had drawn borders around each of its public
schools, ensuring that most students attended the school nearest their homes. This was true for all
students except those with nontraditional needs; BPS provided free busing to bring
developmentally or severely physically disabled students to one of the two schools in the city
equipped for special needs education.
Under the 2004 system, which is still in place, students are assigned to schools based on a
formula that considers their family income, preferred school choice, and neighborhood. The
formula requires that the median, 25th percentile, and 75th percentile family income in each
school be within $15,000 of the city of Bristol’s median, 25th percentile, and 75th percentile
family income.
This policy was not applied to students who were already in a Bristol public school in
2004. Since the policy was adopted, however, each student preparing to enter Bristol public
schools for the first time must list his or her top three school choices. The BPS formula considers
every student’s preferences and family income to assign school placement in the most desirable
way possible; that is, the formula attempts to assign students to their first choice school, then
their second, then their third, in each case provided that assigning the student to a given school
would provide the requisite income distribution. When a student cannot be assigned to any of his
or her top three choices while maintaining the appropriate range of family incomes in all schools,
that student may be assigned to the closest school not among his top three choices that provides
the appropriate income distribution. Students are bused, free of charge, to the assigned school
when it is not within a reasonable walking distance of a student’s home.
The preamble to the 2004 BPS policy recognizes the “disparities in resources and
opportunities on the basis of socioeconomic status” and “the importance of diversity and equal
opportunity, which are cornerstones of our educational mission.” The policy, which passed the
Bristol School Board 6-3, makes no mention whatsoever of race.
 However, the President of the School Board, a supporter of the policy, stated during
deliberations, “we need to do something to integrate our schools... which are increasingly
becoming black schools and white schools.” Another member of the Board, a lawyer by training,
voted against a previous proposal that would require relatively equal racial distributions in each
school. She explained her vote by saying, “if we adopt this policy, we’ll be in the courts within
three years... if racial integration is our goal, we need a more clever scheme that will pass
constitutional muster.” This Board member then proposed the policy that is now in place.
In 2007, the children of three white couples from East Bristol, all of whose family
incomes were above the city’s 75th percentile, were assigned to schools in West Bristol that were
not among their top three choices. These schools, though in West Bristol, were close to the
students’ homes, and by assigning the students to these schools the required income distribution
was achieved. These couples formed the group “A Fair Future” to lobby BPS, hoping for a return
to the school assignment system in place before 2004.
When BPS refused to change the system, A Fair Future sued BPS, alleging that the intent
of the assignment system was to use race in allocating students to schools, thus requiring strict
scrutiny, and that no compelling government interest was advanced by this race-based system.
BPS, the respondent in this case, claimed that it did not have a racial intent, as evidenced by the
facial neutrality of the policy in question, and so the rational basis test (rather than strict scrutiny)
was appropriate. It argued, further, that its system would meet even the requirements of strict
scrutiny, as the benefits of diversity of income—which meant diversity of race, parents’
education, life experiences, and the like—represented a compelling state interest.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Bristol Public Schools. After
reviewing the ruling of the Fourth Circuit, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
2008.

Issues
i. What is the appropriate level of scrutiny in this case?
ii. Are the interests the BPS policy promotes and the means it uses to achieve them
sufficient for the level of scrutiny?
Cases
Students may use the following cases (and no others) in their arguments:
- Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
- Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977)
- Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. ___
(2007)
- Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
- Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
- Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)
- Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
 Newark Memorial High School Moot Court
Case Prompt Spring 2018

Grey and the Gun Rights Association v. State of Olympus

Given heightened concerns over gun safety sweeping the nation in the wake of several
high profile incidents, the legislature of Olympia recently passed a law repealing open-carry gun
policies currently in place throughout the state. The law will go into effect November 30th, 2013.
In response, on September 19th, 2013, protesters gathered to object the passing of the law. The
organizers, the Gun Rights Association, successfully garnered a permit, from the proper
government authorities, granting a three-day demonstration in front of the state capital building.
Many of the people involved planned to openly carry firearms, an action covered by the permit.
All weapons were required to be empty, however, this was not strictly enforced. The
demonstration was also closely monitored and recorded from surrounding buildings by local law
enforcement.
During the first day of the protest, officials monitoring the crowd noted that the
assemblers were restless. Outside beverages were allowed into the vicinity; as a result, alcohol
was present. A policeman noticed one particularly loud individual who possessed an AK-47 and
approached him, asking for identification. The man, out of displeasure, proceeded to yell
inflammatory statements into the crowd, such as "Look at this guy trying to control our right to
be here and protect our gun rights!" The man’s intentions were unclear, but he may have been
hoping to provoke a large-scale reaction from the assembly. The crowd, in response, began
shaking and pointing their firearms to the sky while chanting “We want to shoot. We want to
shoot.” The law enforcement officials warned the rally organizers; however, the protesters paid
little heed. Wary of further escalation, the police force ended the rally and any further
demonstration.
While the participants were leaving, however, an officer recognized a recently released
convict, Matthew Grey sitting in the bed of the truck that was co-owned by him and a friend,
Chuck Clark. Grey and his associates had parked alongside the site of the disbanded protest.
Some still had weapons that were used as part of the demonstration in their hands.
Under federal law, it is illegal for anyone who has been convicted of a felony to be in
possession of any firearm or ammunition. Grey has four prior felony convictions for robbery, two
prior felony convictions for armed criminal action, a prior felony conviction for tampering and a
prior felony conviction for attempted burglary. The officer had been aware of these convictions.
The officer asked Grey if he had ownership over any firearms, which he may have used during
the demonstration, knowing that Grey was not allowed to possess them due to his status as a
felon. One of Grey’s friends suggested that he remain silent. Grey, choosing to follow his friend’s
advice, did not reply to the officer.
The officer then proceeded to ask if he could look inside of the truck that the group was
standing around. Grey continued following his friend’s advice and did not answer. The officer
persisted until Chuck Clark, the man who co-owned the vehicle with Grey, decided that he did
not want to trouble the officer and actually gave the officer the permission to inspect the truck.
The inspection yielded firearms that were found to be Grey’s.
Following the disbanding of the demonstration, the rally organizers brought a suit in
court claiming that the officers were not justified in ending the rally and had thus violated the
First Amendment right to assemble. The organizers argued that the crowd had not been violent in
its talk but was simply demonstrating the right to bear arms and to speak freely, as allowed by
the permit. Further, the organizers alleged that, given a few minutes, the rowdy individual would
have been removed. The state argued that its law enforcement officers had acted in the best
interests of public safety to prevent the potential violence which was being incited by the loud
individual in the crowd. The court ruled in favor of the state, denying that a violation of the right
to assembly had been present.
During trial, Matthew Grey argued that he had not given the officer permission to search
the vehicle for weapons, and that the officer did not have enough basis to have proceeded with
such a search. Further, Grey alleged that the officer had coerced Chuck Clark into allowing the
search because Clark feared negative police attention. The state alleged that the Chuck Clark
granted all permission necessary to conduct a search and that no coercion had been present. The
court, however, ruled in favor of the state on all premises and convicted and sentenced Grey.
Both the rally organizers and Grey appealed their decision to the Olympus State Court of
Appeals and the Olympus Supreme Court, where the ruling of the lower courts were upheld.
Finally, both the organizers and Grey appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which
granted certiorari. Due to the interrelated nature of the two cases, they were combined for
arguments to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Issues:
i. Whether the law enforcement official’s decision to disband a permitted demonstration
violated the right to assembly protected under the First Amendment.
ii. Whether the search on Matthew Grey’s vehicle was a violation of his Fourth
Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure.
Cases:
Students may use the following cases, and no others, in their arguments.
- 415 U.S. 164 (1974) - Matlock v. United States
- 547 U.S. 103 (2006) - Georgia v. Randolph
- 367 U.S. 643 (1961) - Mapp v Ohio
- 497 U.S. 177 (1990) - Illinois v Rodriguez
- 412 U.S. 118 (1973) - Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
- 255 U.S. 313 (1921) - Amos v. United States
- 394 U.S. 731 (1969) - Frazier v. Cupp
- 403 U.S. 443 (1971) - Coolidge v. New Hampshire
- 372 U.S. 229 (1963) - Edwards v. South Carolina
- 394 U.S. 111 (1969) - Gregory v Chicago
- 299 U.S. 353 (1937) - De Jong v Oregon
- 379 U.S. 536 (1965) - Cox v Louisiana
- 432 U.S. 43 (1977) - National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie
 - 340 US 315 (1951) – Feiner v. New York
- 315 U.S. 568 (1942) – Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire

Appendix I
First Amendment
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.

Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

18 U.S.C. Section 922 (g)

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person - (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; (2) who is a fugitive
from justice; (3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)); (4) who has
been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution;
(5) who, being an alien - (A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or (B) except
as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted to the United States under a
nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26))); (6) who has been discharged from the Armed
Forces under dishonorable conditions; (7) who, having been a citizen of the United
States, has renounced his citizenship; (8) who is subject to a court order that - (A) was
issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such
person had an opportunity to participate; (B) restrains such person from harassing,
stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate
partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in
reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and (C)(i) includes a finding that
such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or
child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to
cause bodily injury; or (9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence, to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in
or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.