Special Proceedings – Case Digests human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as
1. Secretary of National Defense vs. Raymond
Manalo & Reynaldo Manalo
The Secretary of National Defense, et al. vs. Manalo
G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
FACTS:
The brothers Raymond and Reynald Manalo, farmers
from Bulacan were abducted, detained in various
locations, tortured by Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they
were members and supporters of the New People’s
Army (NPA). After eighteen (18) months of restrained
liberty, torture, and other dehumanizing acts, were able
to escape. Ten days after their escape, they filed a
Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to prevent
military officers and agents from depriving them of their
right to liberty and other basic rights. Existing petition
was treated as Amparo petition. The Supreme Court
granted the Writ of Amparo and ordered the Court of
Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the
petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not statements from the victims is
sufficient for amparo petitions.
2. Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is
necessary to invoke the right to security of a person
RULING:
1. Yes. Much of the information and evidence of the
ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the
veracity of their account will depend on their credibility
and candidness in their written and oral statements.
Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence
such as physical evidence left by the torture they
suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places
where they were detained.
2. Yes. Covered by the privilege of the writ, respondents
must meet the threshold requirement that their right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an
unlawful act or omission. The right to security of person
is “freedom from fear.” In The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) states that “a world in which
the highest aspiration of the common people.”
Moreover, the right to security of person is a guarantee
of protection of one’s rights by the government. As the
government is the chief guarantor of order and security,
the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty
and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights
especially when they are under threat.
2. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R.
Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O.
Esmeralda vs. Magtanggol B. Gatdula
G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013
FACTS:
Against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima,
Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director
Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of
Investigation.  Respondent wanted petitioners to cease
and desist from framing up Gatdula for the fake ambush
incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder
against Gatdula in relation to the alleged ambush
incident.  RTC JUDGE PAMPILO: Instead of deciding on
whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued
summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.
He also set the case for hearing to determine whether a
temporary protection order may be issued.  During that
hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a
Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases
 RTC ORDER: Judge said that since no writ has been
issued, return is not the required pleading but answer.
The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply
suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the
Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus
required an Answer. Judge Pampilo proceeded to
conduct a hearing on the main case. Even without a
Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their
respective memoranda within five (5) working days
RTC DECISION: granting the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed
for, namely: temporary protection, production and
inspection orders in relation to the evidence and reports
involving an on-going investigation of the attempted
assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. RTC
denied herein petitioners’ MR. Petitioners thus came
to the SC assailing the RTC "Decision" dated 20 March
2012 through a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With
Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via
Rule 45.
ISSUE
Whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 is the proper remedy in the present case?
HELD
No. the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the
writ of Amparo is not the judgment or final order
contemplated under Rule 45. Hence, a Petition for
Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy
at this time. The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012
assailed by the petitioners could not be the judgment or
final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is clear from the tenor
of the dispositive portion of the "Decision" which merely
directs the issuance and service of the Writ of Amparo.
The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as
suggested by the fact that temporary protection,
production and inspection orders were given together
with the decision. The temporary protection, production
and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be
granted by the court upon filing of the petition but
before final judgment is rendered. The confusion of the
parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the
RTC  First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was
inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the
responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of
Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is
contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a
speedy remedy  Under Section 25 of the same rule [on
the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said
rule. It is clear from this rule that this type of summary
procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-
boggling how this rule could possibly apply to
proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court
limited the application of summary procedure to certain
civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special
proceeding.  second was the holding of a hearing on the
main case prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing
of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have
been properly joined.  third irregularity: it required a
memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer)
of De Lima, et al.  The fourth irregularity was in the
"Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. "Accordingly this
court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim
reliefs prayed for by the petitioner."  Court directed
Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48)
hours from his receipt of this Resolution whether the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of
the petition and its attached affidavits.
RATIO WHAT IS A WRIT OF AMPARO?
It is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard
the right of the people to life, liberty and security as
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. The Rule on the Writ
of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme
Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It
aims to address concerns such as, among others,
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Due
to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies,
the procedure was devised to afford swift but decisive
relief.
HOW IS IT AVAILED OF
1. It is initiated through a petition to be filed in a Regional
Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the
Supreme Court.
2. The judge or justice then makes an "immediate"
evaluationof the facts as alleged in the petition and the
affidavits submitted "with the attendant circumstances
detailed".
3. After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the
Writ of Amparo or immediately dismiss the case.
Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting
affidavits do not show that the petitioner's right to life,
liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained
of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of
the writ itself sets in motion presumptive judicial
protection for the petitioner.
4. The court compels the respondents to appear before
a court of law to show whether the grounds for more
permanent protection and interim reliefs are necessary.
5. The respondents are required to file a Return after the
issuance of the writ through the clerk of court. The
Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition.
Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside
from identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are
also required to detail the actions they had taken to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved
party.
6. There will be a summary hearing only after the Return presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should
is filed to determine the merits of the petition and detail the required acts from the respondents that will
whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the
not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte. threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.

7. After the hearing, the court will render the judgment 3. Spouses Nerio and Soledad Pador adn Rey
within ten (10) days from the time the petition is Pador vs.Barangay Captain Bernabe Arcayan,
submitted for decision. If the allegations are proven with et al.
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege
G.R. No. 183460 March 12, 2013
of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate. The judgment should contain detailed No Digest
measures which the judge views as essential for the
continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the
Resolution2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17,
case.  These measures must be detailed enough so that
Cebu City, in Spec. Proc. No. 16061-CEB. The RTC
the judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions
Resolution denied the Petition for a Writ of Amparo filed
taken by the respondents.  It is this judgment that could
by petitioner-spouses Nerio and Soledad Pador and Rey
be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. 
Pador against respondents - Barangay Captain Bernabe
After the measures have served their purpose, the
Arcayan, Barangay Tanod Chief Romeo Pador, and
judgment will be satisfied.  In Amparo cases, judgment
Barangay Tanods Alberto Alivio, Carmela Revales,
is satisfied when: (1) the threats to the petitioner’s life,
Roberto Alimorin, Winelo Arcayan, Christopher Alivio
liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the
and Bienvenido Arcayan.
court that renders the judgment; and (2) through
consolidation should a subsequent case be filed – either On 22 March 2008, petitioners filed with the RTC a
criminal or civil.  Until the full satisfaction of the Verified Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo.3
judgment, the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows
Petitioners alleged that in February 2008, rumors
vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of
circulated that petitioner Nerio Pador was a marijuana
constitutional rights. IF THE RESPONDENTS ARE
planter in Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City.4 On 17 March
PUBLIC OFFICIALS OF EMPLOYEES hey are also
2008, respondents Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and
required to state the actions they had taken to: (i) verify
Roberto Alimorin raided their ampalaya farm to search
the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and
for marijuana plants, but found none.5 After the raid,
preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance
petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador received invitation
of the person identified in the petition; (iii) identify
letters for a conference from respondent Barangay
witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death
Captain Arcayan.6 They referred the invitation letters to
or disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner,
their counsel, who advised them not to attend and,
location, and time of death or disappearance as well as
instead, send a letter-reply to Barangay Captain
any pattern or practice that may have brought about the
Arcayan. When the latter received the letter-reply, he
death or disappearance; and (vi) bring the suspected
allegedly read its contents, got one copy, and refused to
offenders before a competent court. Clearly these
sign a receipt of the document.7 Petitioners then
matters are important to the judge so that s/he can
concluded that the conduct of the raid, the sending of
calibrate the means and methods that will be required to
the invitation letters, the refusal of respondent
further the protections, if any, that will be due to the
barangay captain to receive their letter-reply – as well as
petitioner.
the possibility of more harassment cases, false
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO VS THE WRIT OF accusations, and possible violence from respondents –
AMPARO gravely threatened their right to life, liberty and security
and necessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo.8
PRIVILEGE: includes availment of the entire procedure
outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of After examining the contents of the petition and the
Amparo. WRIT: After examining the petition and its affidavits attached to it, the RTC issued the Writ and
attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence directed respondents to make a verified return.9
In compliance with the RTC’s directive, respondents
filed their Verified Return and/or Comment.10 In their
counter-statement of facts, they alleged that on 16
March 2008, respondent Winelo Arcayan received a
report regarding the alleged existence of a marijuana
plantation in a place called Sitio Gining in Barangay
Tabunan.11 He then referred the matter to Barangay
Tanod Chief Romeo Pador and Barangay Captain
Arcayan, who commenced to organize a patrol.12
On the morning of 17 March 2008, while the barangay
tanods were having a final briefing, Carmelo Revales left
the place to take his breakfast.13 While he was taking his
breakfast, Nerio Pador, who was riding a motorcycle,
stopped and accused the former of uprooting the
marijuana plants.14 Carmelo denied any knowledge
about the incident, and Nerio thereafter threatened to
have him killed. Carmelo promptly reported this threat
to the other barangay tanods.15
Respondents recounted that, notwithstanding Nerio’s
actions, they proceeded to patrol the area.16 When they
passed by the house of Nerio, he angrily uttered in
Cebuano, "If I will be informed who reported the matter
to the police, I will attack the informant." Carmelo then
asked him, "Who reported to you?" Nerio replied, "I will
tell you later once I will be captured by police authorities.
All of us will be dead this afternoon. I want a shoot
out!"17
Respondents thereafter commenced their patrol of a
place owned by a certain David Quintana, but their
rounds yielded a negative result.18
Later that evening, while respondent Alberto Alivio was
passing by the house of Nerio, the latter threatened to
kill him, saying, "I want to kill now!"19 Alberto then
asked him, "Who reported to you so that the truth will
come out?" Nerio then punched the door of his house
and said, "I will tell you later when I will be captured by
the police authorities!" Alberto then left the place and
reported the matter to respondent Barangay Captain
Arcayan.20
In response to the reports, Barangay Captain Arcayan
stated that he ordered his secretary to prepare invitation
letters for petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador, as the
allegations of threats and intimidation made by Nerio
against some of the barangay tanods were serious.
Barangay Captain Arcayan explained that he no longer
signed a copy of petitioners’ letter-reply, as he had
already been given a copy of it.21
The RTC then heard the Petition. On 3 July 2008, it
issued the assailed Resolution22 finding that
petitioners’ claims were based merely on hearsay,
speculations, surmises and conjectures, and that
respondents had sufficiently explained the reason
behind the issuance of the letters of invitation. It
thereafter proceeded to deny petitioners the privilege of
the writ of amparo.23
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the RTC, petitioners filed
the instant Petition for Review24 before this Court,
ascribing grave and serious error on the part of the trial
court.25
The Court’s Ruling
We uphold the RTC’s Resolution and deny the instant
Petition.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo26 provides
for the grounds that may be relied upon in a petition
therefor, as follows:
SEC. 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
Thus, to be entitled to the privilege of the writ,
petitioners must prove by substantial evidence27 that
their rights to life, liberty and security are being violated
or threatened by an unlawful act or omission.
A closer look at the instant Petition shows that it is
anchored on the following allegations: first, that
respondents conducted a raid on the property of
petitioner based on information that the latter were
cultivators of marijuana; second, that respondent
barangay captain sent them invitation letters without
stating the purpose of the invitation; third, that
respondent barangay captain refused to receive
petitioners’ letter-reply; and fourth, that petitioners
anticipate the possibility of more harassment cases,
false accusations, and potential violence from
respondents.
All these allegations are insufficient bases for a grant of
the privilege of the writ.
On the first allegation, we find that the supposed raid on
petitioners’ ampalaya farm was sufficiently
controverted by respondents.
Respondents alleged, and the trial court found, that a
roving patrol was conducted, not on the ampalaya farm
of Nerio Pador, but on an area locally called Sitio Gining,
which was beside the lot possessed by David
Quintana.28
Assuming, however, that respondents had in fact
entered the ampalaya farm, petitioner Rey Pador
himself admitted that they had done so with his
permission, as stated in his affidavit:
5. Around 8:00 a.m., I saw Tabunan barangay tanod
Roberto Alimorin. I greeted him good morning. He told
me that there are reports that marijuana plants were
grown at our ampalaya farm and that there is already a
raid.
6. Being innocent and nothing to hide, I allowed Mr.
Alimorin to search the ampalaya farm for marijuana
plants.29
Finally, even assuming that the entry was done without
petitioners’ permission, we cannot grant the privilege of
the writ of amparo based upon a trespass on their
ampalaya farm. Granting that the intrusion occurred, it
was merely a violation of petitioners’ property rights. In
Tapuz v. Del Rosario,30 we ruled that the writ of amparo
does not envisage the protection of concerns that are
purely property or commercial in nature, as follows:
The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life,
liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing
Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What
it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall
issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.31 x x x.
(Emphasis in the original)
We therefore rule that the alleged intrusion upon
petitioners’ ampalaya farm is an insufficient ground to
grant the privilege of the writ of amparo.
On petitioners’ second and third allegations, we find
that the barangay captain’s act of sending invitation
letters to petitioners and failure to sign the receiving
copy of their letter-reply did not violate or threaten their
constitutional right to life, liberty or security. The
records show that Barangay Captain Arcayan
sufficiently explained the factual basis for his actions.
Moreover, the records are bereft of any evidence that
petitioners were coerced to attend the conference
through the use of force or intimidation. On the
contrary, they had full freedom to refuse to attend the
conference, as they have in fact done in this
case.1âwphi1
The fourth allegation of petitioner – that, following
these events, they can anticipate more harassment
cases, false accusations and possible violence from
respondents – is baseless, unfounded, and grounded
merely on pure speculations and conjectures. As such,
this allegation does not warrant the consideration of this
Court.
On a final note, we reiterate that the privilege of the writ
of amparo is an extraordinary remedy adopted to
address the special concerns of extra-legal killings and
enforced disappearances. "Accordingly, the remedy
ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the
ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and
undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo
petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure
amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations."32
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
for Review is DENIED. The 3 July 2008 Resolution of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu City, in Spec. Proc.
No. 16061-CEB is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
4. Daniel Masangka y Tapuz, et al. vs. Hon.
Judge Elmo del Rosario, et al.
G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008
FACTS:
Private respondents, Sps. Sanson filed a complaint for
forcible entry and damages with prayer for issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against
petitioners, Tapuz et. al. and other John Does totaling to
120 persons before Aklan MCTC.
Private respondents alleged that they are the (1)
registered owner of the disputed land; and (2) prior
possessors, when Tapuz et. al., armed with bolos and
carrying suspected firearms together with unidentified
persons, entered the disputed land by force and
intimidation without their permission and build thereon
a nipa and bamboo structure.
Petitioners, in their answer, denied the material
allegations and essentially claimed that they are the (1)
actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on
the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders;
and (3) private respondents’ certificate of title to the
disputed land is spurious, asked for the dismissal of the
complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
MCTC decided in private respondents’ favor, finding
prior possession through the construction of perimeter
fence in 1993.
Such was appealed by petitioners to RTC.
On appeal, Judge Marin granted private respondents’
motion for issuance of writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction upon posting of a bond but the writ
authorizing the immediate implementation of the
MCTC decision was actually issued by public respondent
Judge Del Rosario after private respondents had
complied with the imposed condition. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration, while private respondents
filed a motion for demolition.
Public respondent judge denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration to defer enforcement of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Meanwhile, petitioners opposed the motion for
demolition, but public respondent judge nevertheless,
issued a special order – a Writ of Demolition to be
implemented within 15 days after the Sheriff’s notice to
the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their houses to
allow private respondents to effectively take actual
possession of the land.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent
Mandatory Injunction and the Order of Demolition
before the CA.
Meanwhile, Sheriff issued a Notice to Vacate and for
Demolition; hence, petitioners filed before SC a petition
for Certiorari with prayer for Writs of Amparo and
Habeas Data.
ISSUE:
Whether petition for Certiorari with Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data, is proper?
HELD:
No. While Certiorari is dismissible on the grounds of (1)
filed out of time; (2) forum-shopping; and (3) substantive
deficiencies, the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data
cannot be granted on the following grounds:
(1) On the Writ of Amparo – what is not is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither it is a writ that shall be issued on
amorphous and uncertain grounds.
In this case, what is involved is a property issues rooted
from physical possession disputed by the parties. No
issues relating to life or liberty can hardly be discerned
except to the extent that the occurrence of the past
violence has been alleged. Right to security, on the other
hand, is alleged only to the extent of threats and
harassment implied from the presence of “armed men
bare to the waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of
weapons, however, none of the supporting affidavits
compellingly show that the threat to the right to life,
liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or
continuing.
(2) On the Writ of Habeas Data – there are no concrete
allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the
right to privacy related to the petitioner’s right to life,
liberty and security.
In this case, petitioners failed to allege, much less,
demonstrate, any need for information under the
control of the police authorities other than those already
set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or
justification for the issuance of the writ, based on
insufficiency of efforts made to secure information has
not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance
of the Writ of Habeas Data is nothing more than a
“fishing expedition” that the SC, in drafting the Rule on
Habeas Data, had in mind in defining what the purpose
of a writ of habeas data is not.
FACTS:
1. The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the
Aklan MCTC a complaint for forcible entry and damages
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the petitioners and other
John Does numbering about 120.
2. The private respondents alleged in their complaint
that: (1) they are the registered owners of the disputed
land; (2) they were the disputed land’s prior possessors
when the petitioners – armed with bolos and carrying
suspected firearms and together with unidentified
persons – entered the disputed land by force and
intimidation, without the private respondents’
permission and against the objections of the private
respondents’ security men, and built thereon a nipa and
bamboo structure.
3. In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material
allegations and essentially claimed that: (1) they are the
actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on
the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders;
and (3) the private respondents’ certificate of title to the
disputed property is spurious. They asked for the
dismissal of the complaint and interposed a
counterclaim for damages.
4. The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision
in the private respondents’ favor, finding prior
possession through the construction of perimeter fence
in 1993.
5. The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC.
6. On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private
respondents’ motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction upon posting of a
bond. The writ – authorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision – was actually
issued by respondent Judge del Rosario after the private
respondents had complied with the imposed condition.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the
writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a
motion for demolition.
7. The respondent Judge subsequently denied the
petitioners’ MR and to Defer Enforcement of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
8. Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for
demolition. The respondent Judge nevertheless issued
via a Special Order a writ of demolition to be
implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff’s written
notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their
house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively
take actual possession of the land.
9. The petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review
of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of
Demolition in CA.
10. Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to
Vacate and for Demolition. Hence, the present petition
for certiorari with writs of amparo and habeas data.
ISSUE:
W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and
habeas data is proper
HELD:
No. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a
writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance
and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of
amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with
respect to content and substance.
Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to
the petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the
assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. Based on
the same material antecedents, we find too that the
petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate
misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very
least, of forum shopping. In sum, the petition for
certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal
deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping
rule, for having been filed out of time, and for
substantive deficiencies.
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was
originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary
rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available
and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those
available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands – requires that every
petition for the issuance of the Writ must be supported
by justifying allegations of fact.
On the whole, what is clear from these statements –
both sworn and unsworn – is the overriding involvement
of property issues as the petition traces its roots to
questions of physical possession of the property
disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to
the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned
except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence
has been alleged. The right to security, on the other
hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of “armed men
bare to the waist” and the alleged pointing and firing of
weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits
compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life,
liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is
continuing.
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ
of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering
the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no
concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation
of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty
or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much
less demonstrated, any need for information under the
control of police authorities other than those it has
already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or
justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the
insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure
information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more
than the “fishing expedition” that this Court – in the
course of drafting the Rule on habeas data – had in mind
in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is
not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
PETITION DENIED.
5. P/Supt. Felixberto Castillo, Police Officers
Romeo Bagtas, et al. vs. Dr. Amanda T. Cruz,
Nixon T. Cruz and Ferdinand T. Cruz
G.R. No. 182165 November 25, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with
her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a
parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the
property), refused to vacate the property, despite
demands by the lessor Provincial Government of
Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for
local projects.
Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their
rights over the property. The pertinent case among the
filed cases was the issuance by the MTC an alias Writ of
Demolition in favor of the Province. Respondents filed a
motion for TRO in the RTC, which was granted.
However, the demolition was already implemented
before the TRO issuance.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent
Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City
Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by
Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to
“protect, secure and maintain the possession of the
property,” entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over
the property, however. Insisting that the RTC Order of
Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from
repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the
latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for
direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light
threats.
Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and
Habeas Data.
ISSUE:
WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property
rights; and, WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper
when there is a criminal case already filed.
HELD:
On the 1st issue:
Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas
Data provides that the coverage of the writs is limited to
the protection of rights to life, liberty and security, and
the writs cover not only actual but also threats of
unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches: “As
the Amparo Rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and
“enforced disappearances.” Tapuz v. Del Rosario also
teaches: “What it is not is a writ to protect concerns that
are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ
that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds.”
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs,
respondents must meet the threshold requirement that
their right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently,
the present controversy arose out of a property dispute
between the Provincial Government and respondents.
Absent any considerable nexus between the acts
complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life,
liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the
propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property.
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not
show any actual violation, imminent or continuing
threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations
of petitioners will not suffice to prove entitlement to the
remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or
detention was present. In fact, respondents were even
able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.
On the 2nd issue:
Respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo
and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal
proceedings against them had commenced after they
were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against
in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings
conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by
respondents during trial and not before a petition for
writs of amparo and habeas data.
6. Manila Electric Company, Alexander S. Deyto
and Ruben A. Sapitula vs. Rosario Gopez Lim
G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010
FACTS:
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim,
an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO), learned of an anonymous letter that was
posted at the door of the Metering Office of the
Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan
Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing
respondent. The letter reads:
“Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG
MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG
PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA
BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO,
LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB…”
By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of
MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing, directed the
transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in
Muntinlupa as “A/F OTMS Clerk,” in light of the receipt
of “… reports that there were accusations and threats
directed against [her] from unknown individuals and
which could possibly compromise [her] safety and
security.”
Respondent questions the propriety of MERALCO’s
action in a letter as “highly suspicious…” and being
“punitive”, but the latter never responded. Respondent
filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bulacan. Additionally, respondent prayed for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the
MERALCO Alabang Sector.
The trial court granted the prayers of respondent
including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
directing petitioners to desist from implementing
respondent’s transfer until such time that petitioners
comply with the disclosures required.
ISSUES:
[1] Whether the RTC lacked jurisdiction to over the
case and cannot restrain MERALCO’s prerogative as
employer to transfer the place of work of its
employees.
[2] Is the issuance of the writ outside the parameters
expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data?
HELD:
[1] YES.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect
by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce
one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy,
thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a
person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse
in this age of information technology. It bears reiteration
that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived
as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its
intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights
to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently
from those provided under prevailing Rules.
[W]rits of …habeas data will NOT issue to protect
purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are
vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property
right under the context of the due process clause of the
Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations
on the real reasons for her transfer – a legitimate
concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s
employment – are what prompted her to adopt the
extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over
such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiters.
[2] YES.
There is no showing from the facts presented that
petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful
violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the
right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’
refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly
received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts
to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and
accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-
quoted portion of her letter as “highly suspicious,
doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.” And
she even suspects that her transfer to another place of
work “betray[s] the real intent of management]” and
could be a “punitive move.” Her posture unwittingly
concedes that the issue is labor-related.
FACTS:
A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in
bulacan denouncing Lim, an administrative clerk. She
was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to
concerns over her safety. She complained under the
premise that the transfer was a denial of her due
process. She wrote a letter stating that:
“It appears that the veracity of these accusations and
threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just
mere jokes if they existed at all.” She added, “instead of
the management supposedly extending favor to me, the
net result and effect of management action would be a
punitive one.” She asked for deferment thereafter. Since
the company didn’t respond, she filed for a writ of
habeas data in the Bulacan RTC due to meralco’s
omission of provding her with details about the report of
the letter. To her, this constituted a violation of her
liberty and security. She asked for disclosure of the data
and measures for keeping the confidentiality of the
data.
Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with
the NLRC and that the petition wasn’t in order.
Trial court ruled in her favor.
In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies
to entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved
party’s person, family or home
ISSUE: Is Habeas Data the right remedy for Lim?
HELD: No, petition dismissed
Ratio:
“Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party”
It’s a forum for enforcing one’s right to the truth. Like
amparo, habeas data was a response to killings and
enforced disappearances.
Castillo v Cruz- and habeas data will NOT issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions
therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment is a property right in the due process
clause. Lim was concerned with her employment, one
that can be solved in the NLRC.
There was no violation of respondent’s right to privacy.
Respondent even said that the letters were mere jokes
and even conceded the fact that the issue was labor
related due to references to “real intent of
management”.
7. Edgardo Navia, et al. vs. Virginia Pardico, for and
in behalf and in representation of Benhur V. Pardico
G.R. No. 184467 June 19, 2012
FACTS:
A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian
Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore. The
arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique
Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were
then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to
investigate, she saw two uniformed guards
disembarking from the vehicle. One of them
immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son
Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong
and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the
security office of Asian Land because a complaint was
lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps
in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and
Ben were in the office of the security department of
Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her
husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of
Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of
Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the
petitioners. The trial court issued the challenged
Decision granting the petition. Petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.
Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the
amparo petition. They contend that the writ of amparo
is available only in cases where the factual and legal
bases of the violation or threatened violation of the
aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are
clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench,
Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the
petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state with
some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or
omission of the petitioners constituting a violation of or
a threat to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And
second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence Virginia
adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a
hand in his alleged disappearance. On the other hand,
the entries in the logbook which bear the signatures of
Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners
released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m.
Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred in issuing
the writ and in holding them responsible for Bens
disappearance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is
proper?
HELD: RTCs decision is reversed and set aside.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: writ of amparo
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo
was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its
purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief
“to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.”
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights recognizes every human beings inherent
right to life, while Article 9 thereof ordains that everyone
has the right to liberty and security. The right to life must
be protected by law while the right to liberty and
security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided
by and in accordance with law. This overarching
command against deprivation of life, liberty and security
without due process of law is also embodied in our
fundamental law.
The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this Court defined enforced
disappearances. The Court in that case applied the
generally accepted principles of international law and
adopted the International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances definition
of enforced disappearances, as “the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place
such a person outside the protection of the law.”
From the statutory definition of enforced
disappearance, thus, we can derive the following
elements that constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any
form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political
organizations refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove
subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective
writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the
persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It
must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence
that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate
or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the
intention of removing them from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the
petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving
by substantial evidence the indispensable element of
government participation.
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of
disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise
essential to establish that such disappearance was
carried out with the direct or indirect authorization,
support or acquiescence of the government. This
indispensable element of State participation is not
present in this case. The petition does not contain any
allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence
presented tend to show that the government or any of
its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact,
none of its agents, officials, or employees were
impleaded or implicated in Virginia’s amparo petition
whether as responsible or accountable persons.51 Thus,
in the absence of an allegation or proof that the
government or its agents had a hand in Bens
disappearance or that they failed to exercise
extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the
Court will definitely not hold the government or its
agents either as responsible or accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual
or entity. But even if the person sought to be held
accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a
private individual or entity, still, government
involvement in the disappearance remains an
indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere
security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy.
Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land,
is a private entity. They do not work for the government
and nothing has been presented that would link or
connect them to some covert police, military or
governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall
within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA
No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some
governmental involvement. This hallmark of State
participation differentiates an enforced disappearance
case from an ordinary case of a missing person.
DISMISSED
8. Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr., chief, Philippine
National Police (PNP), et al. vs. Mary Jean B. Tagitis,
herein represented by Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla, Jr.
attorney-in-fact
G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009
FACTS:
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for
the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for
the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with
Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis
arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October
31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They
immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis
asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return
trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong
returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer
around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to
buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left
his room key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis
and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-
based secretary who did not know of Tagitis’
whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong
to simply wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad
Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies
and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB,
reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police
Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a
sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the
circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary
Jean Tagitis filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
(petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact,
Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.The petition was directed against
Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine
National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief,
Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr.
Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional
Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief,
Anti-Terror Task Force Comet.
Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached
some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos
branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought
help from some of their friends in the military who could
help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband.
All of her efforts did not produce any positive results
except the information from persons in the military who
do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the
hands of the uniformed men. According to reliable
information she received, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the
custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically
with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against
his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and
connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups
particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.
She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station
in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, seeking their help
to find her husband, but was told of an intriguing tale by
the police that her husband was not missing but was
with another woman having good time somewhere,
which is a clear indication of the refusal of the PNP to
help and provide police assistance in locating her
missing husband.
Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the
different police headquarters namely Police
Headquarters in Cotabato City, Davao City, Zamboanga
City and eventually in the National Headquarters in
Camp Crame in Quezon City but her efforts produced no
positive results. These trips exhausted all of her
resources which pressed her to ask for financial help
from friends and relatives.
She has exhausted all administrative avenues and
remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances,
she has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to
protect and get the release of her husband, Engr.
Morced Tagitis, from the illegal clutches of his captors,
their intelligence operatives and the like which are in
total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional
rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA
immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for
hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners
to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours
from service of the writ.
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of
January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any
involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged
abduction. They argued that the allegations of the
petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause
of action against them; were baseless, or at best
speculative; and were merely based on hearsay
evidence. In addition, they all claimed that they
exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active
measures to investigate, search and locate Tagitis and to
apprehend the persons responsible for his
disappearance.
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming
that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced
disappearance" under the United Nations (UN)
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances. The CA held that "raw
reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the
intelligence world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col.
Kasim’s subsequent and belated retraction of his
statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was
involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and
unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police
theories painting the disappearance as "intentional" on
the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the
law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any
trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student of
the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to
complain that he or she did not get his or her stipend.
The CA also found no basis for the police theory that
Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his
second wife," on the basis of the respondent’s testimony
that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives
under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at
all when the latter divorced his first wife in order to
marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out
kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the
ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis’
disappearance, since the respondent, the police and the
military noted that there was no acknowledgement of
Tagitis’ abduction or demand for payment of ransom –
the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended
the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and
directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP
Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen.
Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr.
Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary
diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and
security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide
monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same
time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then
respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano
and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was
PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider
the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its
Resolution of April 9, 2008.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo
should be extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
RULING:
The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified
as an enforced disappearance, thus the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo applies.
Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as
"the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such a person
outside the protection of the law." Under this definition,
the elements that constitute enforced disappearance
are essentially fourfold:
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization, support
or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention,
or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the
protection of the law.
There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim
actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only
shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House
after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and
was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed
conclusion, however, from all concerned – the
petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and even the police
authorities – is that Tagistis disappeared under
mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and
verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the
portions the petitioners cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how
such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the
names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the
manner and conduct of the investigation, together with
any report;(e) The actions and recourses taken by the
petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section
5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in
any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course
state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action,
omitting the evidentiary details.76 In an Amparo
petition, however, this requirement must be read in light
of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which
addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may
not be able to describe with certainty how the victim
exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap,
abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is
detained, because these information may purposely be
hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the
level of specificity, detail and precision that the
petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo
Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial
concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings
while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test
in reading the petition should be to determine whether
it contains the details available to the petitioner under
the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action
showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty
and security through State or private party action. The
petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather
than in terms of its isolated component parts, to
determine if the required elements – namely, of the
disappearance, the State or private action, and the
actual or threatened violations of the rights to life,
liberty or security – are present.
The properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s
knowledge about Tagitis’ disappearance, the
participation by agents of the State in this
disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis
or to provide sufficient information about his
whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right
to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any
failure in its statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this
defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by
Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary
nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate
the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule
incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits,
with the annotation that these can be used as the
affiant’s direct testimony. This requirement, however,
should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily
leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly
followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has
substantially complied with the requirement by
submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the
facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn
statement that an affidavit represents is essentially
fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required
affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her
witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA
hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008
to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition.
Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising
from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s
Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of
December 7, 1941. The Third Reich’s Night and Fog
Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in
occupied territories "endangering German security";
they were transported secretly to Germany where they
disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the
desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited
government officials from providing information about
the fate of these targeted persons.
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally
fall within the first two categories, and 855 cases were
recorded during the period of martial law from 1972 until
1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132
surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former
President Corazon C. Aquino’s term, 820 people were
reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases
were documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing,
108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The number
of enforced disappearances dropped during former
President Fidel V. Ramos’ term when only 87 cases were
reported, while the three-year term of former President
Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases.
KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization,
reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that
there were a total of 193 victims of enforced
disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M.
Arroyo’s administration. The Commission on Human
Rights’ records show a total of 636 verified cases of
enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this
number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62
were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined
status.Currently, the United Nations Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance reports 619
outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary
disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007
to November 30, 2008.
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall
cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof."We note that although the writ
specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this
concept is neither defined nor penalized in this
jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court
Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal
that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered
providing an elemental definition of the concept of
enforced disappearance:

Justice Puno stated that, “as the law now stands, extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this
jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the
component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these
killings and enforced disappearances and are now
penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special
laws.”
Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as
such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide
can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in
addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules,
can set the procedural standards and thereby directly
compel the public authorities to act on actual or
threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state
the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference
– even if only procedurally – in a situation when the very
same investigating public authorities may have had a
hand in the threatened or actual violations of
constitutional rights.
The burden for the public authorities to discharge in
these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo,
is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at
disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain
of indirect contempt from this Court when
governmental efforts are less than what the individual
situations require. The second is to address the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved
and his or her liberty and security restored. In these
senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are
continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the
extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully
addressed by the complete determination of the fate
and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of
the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her
liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the
commencement of criminal action against the guilty
parties.
During the International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (in Paris,
France on February 6, 2007, "enforced disappearance" is
considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any
other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the
State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such a person
outside the protection of the law.
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is deemed
to have the force of domestic law.
The right to security of person in this third sense is a
corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full
respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of
the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional
guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they
are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The
duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious
manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of
an Enforced Disappearance
The unique evidentiary difficulties presented by
enforced disappearance cases; these difficulties form
part of the setting that the implementation of the
Amparo Rule shall encounter. These difficulties largely
arise because the State itself – the party whose
involvement is alleged – investigates enforced
disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions
show that the evidentiary difficulties are generally
threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the
identities of the direct perpetrators. In addition, there
are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these
witnesses are usually afraid to speak out publicly or to
testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own
lives.
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence
of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central
piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State
authorities deliberately deny that the enforced
disappearance ever occurred. "Deniability" is central to
the policy of enforced disappearances, as the absence of
any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the
application of legal standards ensuring the victim’s
human rights.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial
relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an
action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the
consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the
Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28
of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness is
expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay
rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay
testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act
of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal
proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the
right of cross-examination by the adverse party.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col.
Kasim’s disclosure, made in an unguarded moment,
unequivocally point to some government complicity in
the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded
denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but
point to this conclusion. For why would the government
and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if
the intent had not been to deny what they already knew
of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and
thorough investigation that at least credibly determined
the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government’s cap
under the circumstances of the disappearance? From
this perspective, the evidence and developments,
particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a
concrete case of enforced disappearance that the
Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN
Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, evidence at
hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact
of the enforced disappearance and government
complicity, under a background of consistent and
unfounded government denials and haphazard
handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed
Tagitis outside the protection of the law – a situation
that will subsist unless this Court acts.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials
and members were the ones who were remiss in their
duties when the government completely failed to
exercise the extral.'
To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case
back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at
the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG
investigations and actions, and the validation of their
results through hearings the CA may deem appropriate
to conduct.
9. In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of
Amparo and the Writ of Habeas Data in Favor of
Melissa C. Roxas Case Digest
Melissa C. Roxas vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.
G. R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010
FACTS:
Roxas is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in
the United States, she is enrolled in an exposure
program to the Philippines with the group Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan- United States of America
(BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. During the
course of her immersion, Roxas toured various provinces
and towns in Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she
volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac in
conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a
future medical mission.
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, Roxas and her
companions, Carabeo amd Jandoc, decided to rest in the
house of Mr. Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay
Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac. At around 1:30 in the
afternoon, however, Roxas, her companions and Mr.
Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone
banging at the front door and a voice demanding that
they open-up. Suddenly 15 heavily armed men forcibly
opened the door, banged inside, tied and blindfolded
Roxas and her companions, Carabeo and Jandoc, then
dragged them inside a van parked outside the house.
The armed men were all in civilian clothes and were
wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.
After about an hour of travelling, the van stopped.
Roxas, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to alight. After
she was informed that she was detained for being a
member of the Communist Party of the Philippines –
New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), Roxas was separated
from her companions and was escorted to a room which
she believed is a jail cell from the sound of the metal
doors. From there she could hear the sounds of gunfire,
the noise of planes taking off and landing and some
construction bustle. Roxas inferred that she was taken
to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva
Ecija.
On May 25, 2009, Roxas was finally released and
returned to her uncle’s house in Quezon City. Before
being release, the abductors gave her a cellphone with a
sim card, a slip of paper cantaining an email address with
password, a plastic bag containing biscuits and books,
the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes.
She was also sternly warned not to report the incident to
the group Karapatan or else something bad will happen
to her and her family. Sometime after her release, Roxas
continued to receive calls from one of her abductors via
the cellular phone given to her. Out of apprehension that
she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety
of her family, Roxas threw away the cellphone.
Roxas fied a petition for writ of amparo and writ of
habeas data.
The Court of Appeals granted her petition for writ of
amparo and writ of habeas data. However, the appellate
court absolved the respondents from the petition. Her
prayer for the return of her personal belongings and for
the inspection order and production order were denied.
Roxas invokes he doctrine of command responsibility to
implicate the high-ranking civilian and military
authorities.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the principle of command
responsibility shall apply in writ of amparo?
2. Whether or not the respondents are liable in her
abduction and torture?
3. Whether or not her prayer for the return of her
personal belongings be granted?
4. Whether or not her prayer for inspection order
be granted?
5. Whether or not the grant of writ of habeas data
is proper?
RULING:
1. It must be stated at the outset that the use by
the petitioner of the doctrine of command
responsibility as the justification in impleading the
public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally
inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of
command responsibility is a rule of substantive law
that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot
be a proper legal basis to implead a party-
respondent in an amparo petition. According to Fr.
Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest
terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for
crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their
control in international wars or domestic conflict." In
this sense, command responsibility is properly a
form of criminal complicity. Since the application of
command responsibility presupposes an imputation
of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-
blown criminal or administrative case rather than in
a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason
lies in the nature of the writ itself: The writ of
amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing
judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial
measures and directives that may be crafted by the
court, in order to address specific violations or
threats of violation of the constitutional rights to
life, liberty or security. While the principal objective
of its proceedings is the initial determination of
whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal
killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ
does not, by so doing, fix liability for such
disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may
be criminal, civil or administrative under the
applicable substantive law. It must be clarified,
however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility in an amparo proceeding
does not, by any measure, preclude impleading
military or police commanders on the ground that
the complained acts in the petition were committed
with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which
case, commanders may be impleaded—not actually
on the basis of command responsibility—but rather
on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability.
2. The totality of the evidence presented by the
petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion
that her abductors were military or police personnel
and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay. First.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be
accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of
military involvement depends largely on the
availability or non-availability of other pieces of
evidence that has the potential of directly proving
the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must
be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence
based on patterns and similarity, because the
former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the
true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An
amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and
hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and
directly ascertain. In the case at bench, petitioner
was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits,
the cartographic sketches of several of her
abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the
mind of the Court, these cartographic sketches have
the undeniable potential of giving the greatest
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of
petitioner’s abductors. Unfortunately for the
petitioner, this potential has not been realized in
view of the fact that the faces described in such
sketches remain unidentified, much less have been
shown to be that of any military or police personnel.
Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be
part of either the military or the police chain of
command. Second. The claim of the petitioner that
she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not
adequately established by her mere estimate of the
time it took to reach the place where she was
detained and by the sounds that she heard while
thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court are not inclined to take the estimate and
observations of the petitioner as accurate on its
face—not only because they were made mostly
while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the
fact that she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines,
whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the
travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful.
With nothing else but obscure observations to
support it, petitioner’s claim that she was taken to
Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
3. In an order directing the public respondents to
return the personal belongings of the petitioner is
already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement
of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that
can only be granted once the liability of the public
respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive
proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of
liability are not determinable in a mere summary
amparo proceeding. But perhaps the more
fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the
petitioner, lies with the fact that a person’s right to
be restituted of his property is already subsumed
under the general rubric of property rights—which
are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.
Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, which defines the
scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the
protection of property rights.
4. The prayer of Roxas for the grant of the
inspection order is equivalent to sanctioning a
"fishing expedition," which was never intended by
the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of
inspection order. An inspection order is an interim
relief designed to give support or strengthen the
claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order
to aid the court before making a decision. A basic
requirement before an amparo court may grant an
inspection order is that the place to be inspected is
reasonably determinable from the allegations of the
party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule
does not require that the place to be inspected be
identified with clarity and precision, it is,
nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an
inspection order that the supporting allegations of a
party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima
facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner
failed to do. Since the very estimates and
observations of the petitioner are not strong enough
to make out a prima facie case that she was detained
in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military
camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order
cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in
themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
5. The writ of habeas data was conceptualized
as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy,
most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals. The writ operates to protect a person’s
right to control information regarding himself,
particularly in the instances where such information
is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends. Needless to state, an
 indispensable requirement before the privilege of
the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by
substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim. This, in the case at bench, the
petitioner failed to do. The main problem behind the
ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually
no evidence on record that shows that any of the
public respondents had violated or threatened the
right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by
the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that
would have violated or threatened the right to
privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of
investigations and other reports about the
petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA, was not
adequately proven—considering that the origin of
such records were virtually unexplained and its
existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate
court from the video and photograph released by
Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press
conference. No evidence on record even shows that
any of the public respondents had access to such
video or photograph. In view of the above
considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals
enjoining the public respondents from "distributing
or causing the distribution to the public any records
in whatever form, reports, documents or similar
papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with
the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal
basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to
refrain from distributing something that, in the first
place, it was not proven to have.
10. Rodolfo Noel Lozada, Jr., et al. vs. Pres. Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo, et al.
G.R. Nos. 184379-80 April 24, 2012
FACTS:
The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption
scandal precipitated by a transaction between the
Philippine government, represented by the National
Broadband Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation, a
Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications
equipment. Former NEDA Secretary Neri sought the
services of Lozada as an unofficial consultant in the ZTE-
NBN deal. The latter avers that during the course of his
engagement, he discovered several anomalies in the
said transaction involving certain public officials. These
events impelled the Senate of the Philippines Blue
Ribbon Committee to conduct an investigation thereon,
for which it issued a subpoena directing Lozada to
appear and testify on 30 January 2008.
Lozada did not appear at the Blue Ribbon Committee.
DENR Sec. Atienza announced that Lozada was in an
official trip to London. Because of this, Senate issued an
order (1) citing Lozada in contempt; (2) ordering his
arrest and detention; (3) directing the sergeant-at-arms
to implement such order and make a return.
Lozada asked Sec. Atienza if he can go back to the
Philippines. Upon approval, he informed his family that
he would be arriving in Manila, Feb 5 at 4 pm.
In his petition, Lozada claims that upon disembarking,
several men held his arms and took his bag. He allegedly
insisted on joining his family but realized that it would be
wiser to go with the men when he heard them say in
their handheld radio ‘[H]wag kayong dumaan diyan sir
nandyan ang mga taga senado.’
Lozada asked to go to the comfort room and while
there, called his brother, Arturo and informed him of his
situation. He observed that there were several cars
tailing their car. Sec. Atienza called him and assured him
that he was with government people and that Sec.
Atienza would confer with ES and Ma’m. Lozada
surmised them to be ES Ermita and the President. He
was also told to pacify his wife, Violeta, who was making
public statements asking for her husband’s return. Along
the way, the men asked Lozada to draft an antedated
letter requesting police protection. Lozada asked to be
brought to his home in Pasig, but was refused due to
security risks. They stopped at Outback restaurant to
meet with Atty. Antonio Bautista and Col. Mascarinas,
Lozada claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks of
an affidavit. He was then brought to LSGH per his
request. He observed that policemen, purportedly
restraining his liberty and threatening the security of his,
his family and the LS brothers, guarded the perimeter of
LSGH.
On Feb 6, Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada
to the office of Atty. Bautista to finalize and sign an
affidavit. On the same day his wife petitioned for Habeas
Corpus and his brother petitioned for a Writ of Amparo
with the Supreme Court, and prayed for the issuance of
(a) the writ of amparo; (b) a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO); and (c) Inspection and Production Orders as
regards documents related to the authority ordering
custody over Lozada, as well as any other document that
would show responsibility for his alleged abduction.
Lozada alleged that he was made to sign a letter
requesting police protection. On 7 February 2008,
Lozada decided to hold a press conference and contact
the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, who served the warrant
of arrest on him. He claimed that after his press
conference and testimony in the Senate, he and his
family were since then harassed, stalked and
threatened.
Respondents: Lozada had knowledge and control of
what happened from the time of his arrival, he
voluntarily entrusted himself to their company and was
never deprived of his liberty and that since Feb 8, Lozada
has been in the custody of the Senate.
CA’s decisions:
1. Habeas Corpus case moot.
2. Denied issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and
Presentation of Hostile Witnesses and Adverse Parties –
irrelevant to Amparo Case, to require them to testify
would be a fishing expedition.
3. Dropped Pres. Arroyo as a respondent because she
enjoys immunity from suit as president.
4. Dismissed Writ of Amparo. – Petitioners unable to
prove through substantial evidence that respondents
violated Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security.
ISSUE:
Whether circumstances are adequately alleged and
proven by petitioner Lozada to entitle him to the
protection of the writ of amparo? NO.
ratio
Definition: Writ of Amparo (court’s lecture)
The writ of amparo is an independent and summary
remedy that provides rapid judicial relief to protect the
people’s right to life, liberty and security. Having been
originally intended as a response to the alarming cases
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in
the country, it serves both preventive and curative roles
to address the said human rights violations. It is
preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity
in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in
that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent
investigation and action.
As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or
to threats thereof. Considering that this remedy is
aimed at addressing these serious violations of or
threats to the right to life, liberty and security, it cannot
be issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds, or in
cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no
longer imminent or continuing. Instead, it must be
granted judiciously so as not to dilute the extraordinary
and remedial character of the writ, thus: The privilege of
the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of
persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the
quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ
conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response
to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be
resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought
by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the
indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes
less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and
protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations.
Writ of Amparo Denied
In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or
security has already ceased, it is necessary for the
petitioner in an amparo action to prove the existence of
a continuing threat.
In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced
by petitioners failed to meet the threshold of substantial
evidence. Sifting through all the evidence and
allegations presented, the crux of the case boils down to
assessing the veracity and credibility of the parties’
diverging claims as to what actually transpired on 5-6
February 2008. In this regard, this Court is in agreement
with the factual findings of the CA to the extent that
Lozada was not illegally deprived of his liberty from the
point when he disembarked from the aircraft up to the
time he was led to the departure area of the airport, as
he voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of
respondents.
He was able to go to the men’s bathroom and call his
brother
He was avoiding the people from the Office of the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, detour appears to explain
why they did not get out at the arrival area, where
[Lozada] could have passed through immigration so that
his passport could be properly stamped
No evidence on record that Lozada struggled or made
an outcry for help
He testified that nobody held, shouted, or was hostile to
him
He knew and agreed with the plan that he would be
fetched at the airport because at that time, it was his
decision not to testify before the Senate
it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been
illegally restrained, so much so that his right to liberty
and security had been violated, the acts that manifested
this restraint had already ceased and has consequently
rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ ofamparo
moot.
The supposed announcement of General Razon over the
radio that [Lozada] was in the custody of the PNP can
neither be construed as a threat to [Lozada’s] life, liberty
and security. Certainly, no person in his right mind would
make that kind of media announcement if his intent was
indeed to threaten somebody’s life, liberty and security
Presence of armed men riding in motorcycle passing
outside the LSGH premises where he and his family are
staying and by alleged threats of armed men around him
at places where he went to. Again, these alleged threats
were not proven by any evidence at all, as having
originated from any of the respondents
Installation of the surveillance camera at the De La Salle
and at St. Scholastica as indirect threat to his right to
life, liberty and security. He claims that these are spy
cameras. However, save for [Lozada’s] self-serving
claim, he simply failed to prove that they were installed
or ordered installed by the respondents for the purpose
of threatening his right to life, liberty and security
No evidence on record that the bomb threats were made
by the respondents or done upon their instigation.
He did not ascertain from the Bureau of Immigration
whether his name was actually in the official watch list
of the Bureau
[Lozada] himself testified that he does not know
whether the respondents or any of the respondents
ordered the filing of these ‘frivolous’ cases against him.
In any event, said purported cases are to be determined
based on their own merits and are clearly beyond the
realm of the instant amparo petition filed against the
respondents
The failure to establish that the public official observed
extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does
not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the
amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from
establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence
(Yano v. Sanchez)
Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an
amparo petition should a criminal action have, in the
meanwhile, been commenced.
Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when the
criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo,
the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal
action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern
the disposition of the relief under the Rule.
In Rubrico v. Arroyo the Court interprets the above
sections as follows: (1) the consolidation of the probe
and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with the
investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB;
and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint
of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats
to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be
furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that
body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of
OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given
easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if
any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as
complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be
allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal
complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be fully
effective.
APPLIED: if the Complaint filed before the DOJ had
already progressed into a criminal case, then the latter
action can more adequately dispose of the allegations
made by petitioners. After all, one of the ultimate
objectives of the writ of amparo as a curative remedy is
to facilitate the subsequent punishment of perpetrators.
On the other hand, if there is no actual criminal case
lodged before the courts, then the denial of the Petition
is without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
administrative, civil or criminal case, if applicable,
against those individuals whom Lozada deems to have
unduly restrained his liberty.
No basis for interim reliefs since writ of amparo denied
In Yano v. Sanchez, this court declined to grant the
prayer for the issuance of a TPO, as well as Inspection
and Production Orders, upon a finding that the
implicated public officials were not accountable for the
disappearance subject of that case. Analogously, it
would be incongruous to grant herein petitioners’ prayer
for a TPO and Inspection and Production Orders and at
the same time rule that there no longer exists any
imminent or continuing threat to Lozada’s right to life,
liberty and security. Thus, there is no basis on which a
prayer for the issuance of these interim reliefs can be
anchored.
Denial of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum
proper - for a subpoena to issue, it must first appear that
the person or documents sought to be presented are
prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the
controversy
CA correctly denied petitioners’ Motion for the Issuance
of Subpoena Ad Testificandum on the ground that the
testimonies of the witnesses sought to be presented
during trial were prima facie irrelevant to the issues of
the case. The court has repeatedly reminded the parties,
in the course of the proceedings, that the instant
Amparo Petition does not involve the investigation of
the ZTE-NBN contract.
President Arroyo was not proven to be involved in the
alleged violation of life, liberty and security of Lozada
President Arroyo’s term as president has ended,
therefore she no longer enjoys immunity, but an
examination of Petitioner’s evidence reveals their failure
to sufficiently establish any unlawful act or omission on
her part that violated, or threatened with violation, the
right to life, liberty and security of Lozada. Except for the
bare claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza mentioned a certain
“Ma’[a]m,” whom Lozada speculated to have referred to
her, and (b) Sec. Defensor told Lozada that “the
President was ‘hurting’ from all the media frenzy,” there
is nothing in the records that would sufficiently establish
the link of former President Arroyo to the events that
transpired on 5-6 February 2010, as well as to the
subsequent threats that Lozada and his family
purportedly received.
11. Rev. Father Robert P. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals,
et al.
G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner, Rev. Reyes was among those arrested in the
Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on
November 2007 and together with fifty (50) others,
they were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest
proceedings. On December 2007, a Hold Departure
Order List was issued ordering the Immigration to
include the name of petitioner and 49 others for the
alleged crime of Rebellion, in the interest of national
security and public safety.
Petitioner’s counsel wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting
the lifting of HDO, in view of the dismissal of his client’s
criminal case on rebellion. That, the DOJ Secretary has
not acted on their request, petitioner then next
recourse was for the availment of the writ of amparo
because of his alleged continued restraint of right to
travel.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated
or threatened with violation by the issuance of the
HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the
writ of amparo.
HELD:
No. The right to travel refers to the right to move from
one place to another. Here, the restriction on
petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the
pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not
unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his
right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the
extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right
to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no
readily available legal recourse or remedy.
The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. Where, as in this
case, there is no clear showing that the right to life,
liberty or security of the petitioner is immediately in
danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is
continuing. Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely
speculative.
Petition is dismissed.
WRIT OF AMPARO DEFINITION: Is a remedy available
to any person whose right to life, liberty,or security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
FACTS:
Petitioner and 49 others were arrested in the Manila
Peninsula Hotel Seige and were charged of the crime of
rebellion under the Revised Penal Code. DILG issued
Hold Departure Order in the interest of national security
and public safety.
On December 13, 2007, RTC issued an order dismissing
the charge for Rebellion against the petitioner and 17
others for lack of probable cause. That petitioners and
other accused civilians were arrested because they
ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given
to them to come out from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and
submit themselves to the police authorities.
Counsel for petitioner file thru the DOJ for the lifting of
the HDO since despite the dismissal of the crime of
rebellion, he was held by the BID officials at NAIA as his
name is included in the Hold Departure List. This
happens every time he left for abroad.
Writ of Amparo was filed on the ground that the
respondents violated the petitioner’s constitutional
right to travel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s right to liberty has been
violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of
the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the
privilege of the writ of amparo.
HELD:
No. The writ is a remedy for any person whose wright to
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private person or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearance or threats thereof.
Liberty has been defined as the right to exist and the
right to be free form arbitrary restraint or servitude. The
term cannot be dwarfed from arbitrary into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the
citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to
enjoy the facilities he has been endowed by his Creator.
Security is the freedom of persons from fear, freedom
from threat.
In the case at bar, the restriction on petitioner;s right to
travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal
case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has
also failed to establish that his right to travel was
impaired in the manner and to the extent that it
AMOUNTED to a serious violation of his right to life,
liberty and security for which there exists no readily
available legal recourse or remedy.
12. Olmstead v. United States
Brief Fact Summary. The conversations of various
individuals involved in illegal liquor sales were tapped.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. “A standard which would forbid
the reception of evidence, if obtained by other than nice
ethical conduct by government officials, would make
society suffer and give criminals greater immunity than
has been known heretofore. In the absence of
controlling legislation by Congress, those who realize
the difficulties in bringing offenders to justice may well
deem it wise that the exclusion of evidence should be
confined to cases where rights under the Constitution
would be violated by admitting it.”
FACTS. Various individuals were convicted of liquor
related crimes, including conspiracy. The operation
grossed a substantial amount of money. The leading
conspirator and the general manager of the business
was one of the Petitioners, Olmstead (the “Petitioner”).
The main office of the business was in Seattle and there
were three telephones in the office, each on a different
line. There were also telephones in an office the
Petitioner had in his own home, at the home of his
associates and various other places in Seattle. A lot of
communication occurred between Seattle and
Vancouver, British Columbia.
“The information which led to the discovery of the
conspiracy and its nature and extent was largely
obtained by intercepting messages on the telephones of
the conspirators by four federal prohibition officers.
Small wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone
wires from the residences of four of the [suspects] and
those leading from the chief office. The insertions were
made without trespass upon any property of the
defendants. They were made in the basement of the
large office building. The taps from house lines were
made in the streets near the houses.”
Various conversations were taped and testified to by
government witnesses.
ISSUE.
“[W]hether the use of evidence of private telephone
conversations between the defendants and others,
intercepted by means of wire tapping, amounted to a
violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments[?]
”HELD. “The [Fourth] amendment does not forbid what
was done here. There was no searching. There was no
seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the
sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the
houses or offices of the defendants. By the invention of
the telephone 50 years ago, and its application for the
purpose of extending communications, one can talk
with another at a far distant place. The language of the
amendment cannot be extended and expanded to
include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world
from the defendant’s house or office. The intervening
wires are not part of his house or office, any more than
are the highways along which they are stretched.”
“Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of
telephone messages by making them, when
intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal
trials, by direct legislation, and thus depart from the
common law of evidence. But the courts may not adopt
such a policy by attributing an enlarged and unusual
meaning to the Fourth Amendment. The reasonable
view is that one who installs in his house a telephone
instrument with connecting wires intends to project his
voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond
his house, and messages while passing over them, are
not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Here those who intercepted the projected voices were
not in the house of either party to the conversation.”
“Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many
federal decisions brought to our attention hold the
Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a
defendant, unless there has been an official search and
seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or his
tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of
his house ”or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a
seizure. [The court thought], therefore, that the wire
tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search or
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.Additionally, “[t]he common-law rule is
that the admissibility of evidence is not affected by the
illegality of the means by which it was obtained.”
“A standard which would forbid the reception of
evidence, if obtained by other than nice ethical conduct
by government officials, would make society suffer and
give criminals greater immunity than has been known
heretofore. In the absence of controlling legislation by
Congress, those who realize the difficulties in bringing
offenders to justice may well deem it wise that the
exclusion of evidence should be confined to cases where
rights under the Constitution would be violated by
admitting it.”
Dissent. Justice Holmes filed a dissenting opinion and
argued “that apart from the Constitution the
government ought not to use evidence obtained and
only obtainable by a criminal act. There is no body of
precedents by which we are bound, and which confines
us to logical deduction from established rules. Therefore
[the Court] must consider the two objects of desire both
of which [the Court] cannot have and make up our minds
which to choose. It is desirable that criminals should be
detected, and to that end that all available evidence
should be used. It also is desirable that the government
should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when
they are the means by which the evidence is to be
obtained. If it pays its officers for having got evidence by
crime I do not see why it may not as well pay them for
getting it in the same way, and I can attach no
importance to protestations of disapproval if it
knowingly accepts and pays and announces that in
future it will pay for the fruits
. [The Court has] to choose, and for my part I think it a
less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part.”
Dissent. Justice Brandeis filed a dissenting opinion and
argued “[a]pplying to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
the established rule of construction, the defendants’
objections to the evidence obtained by wire tapping
must, in my opinion, be sustained. It is, of course,
immaterial where the physical connection with the
telephone wires leading into the defendants’ premises
was made. And it is also immaterial that the intrusion
was in aid of law enforcement. Experience should teach
us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding.”
“When the government, having full knowledge, sought,
through the Department of Justice, to avail itself of the
fruits of these acts in order to accomplish its own ends,
it assumed moral responsibility for the officers’ crimes
and if this court should permit the government, by
means of its officers’ crimes, to effect its purpose of
punishing the defendants, there would seem to be
present all the elements of a ratification. If so, the
government itself would become a lawbreaker.”
Discussion. This is an interesting case, demonstrating
how the Supreme Court thinks in certain situations a
bright line rule will not cover every situation.
13. Griswold (Estelle T. Griswold) v. Connecticut
FACTS
In 1879, Connecticut passed a law that banned the use of
any drug, medical device, or other instrument in
furthering contraception. A gynecologist at the Yale
School of Medicine, C. Lee Buxton, opened a birth
control clinic in New Haven in conjunction with Estelle
Griswold, who was the head of Planned Parenthood in
Connecticut. They were arrested and convicted of
violating the law, and their convictions were affirmed by
higher state courts. Their plan was to use the clinic to
challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the
Fourteenth Amendment before the Supreme Court.
QUESTION
Does the Constitution protect the right of marital
privacy against state restrictions on a couple's ability
to be counseled in the use of contraceptives?
A right to privacy can be inferred from several
amendments in the Bill of Rights, and this right prevents
states from making the use of contraception by married
couples illegal.
In a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Douglas, the Court
ruled that the Constitution did in fact protect the right of
marital privacy against state restrictions on
contraception. While the Court explained that the
Constitution does not explicitly protect a general right to
privacy, the various guarantees within the Bill of Rights
create penumbras, or zones, that establish a right to
privacy. Together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth
Amendments create the right to privacy in marital
relations. The Connecticut statute conflicted with the
exercise of this right and was therefore held null and
void.
Justice Goldberg, joined by Justices Warren and
Brennan, concurred. Rather than finding that the right
to privacy was contained in imaginary penumbras,
Goldberg located it in the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Justice Harlan concurred, arguing that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right
to privacy.
Justice White concurred, arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment was the proper basis for the decision.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented.
Unpersuaded by the loose reasoning of the majority,
Black felt that there was no way to infer that the
Constitution contained a right to privacy. He also
dismissed the views of the concurrences that it could be
found in the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Black, filed a separate
dissenting opinion. Stewart argued that despite his
personal view that the law was "uncommonly silly," he
felt that the Court had no choice but to find it
constitutional.
14. Roe (Jane Roe) v. Wade (Henry Wade)
FACTS
Roe, a Texas resident, sought to terminate her
pregnancy by abortion. Texas law prohibited abortions
except to save the pregnant woman's life. After granting
certiorari, the Court heard arguments twice. The first
time, Roe's attorney -- Sarah Weddington -- could not
locate the constitutional hook of her argument for
Justice Potter Stewart. Her opponent -- Jay Floyd --
misfired from the start. Weddington sharpened her
constitutional argument in the second round. Her new
opponent -- Robert Flowers -- came under strong
questioning from Justices Potter Stewart and Thurgood
Marshall.
QUESTION
Does the Constitution embrace a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy by abortion?
CONCLUSION
The Court held that a woman's right to an abortion fell
within the right to privacy (recognized in Griswold v.
Connecticut) protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision gave a woman total autonomy over the
pregnancy during the first trimester and defined
different levels of state interest for the second and third
trimesters. As a result, the laws of 46 states were
affected by the Court's ruling.
Learn more about the Supreme Court and abortion law
in Body Politic, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.
Roe v. Wade was a landmark 1973 Supreme
Court decision that established a woman’s legal right to
an abortion.
The Court ruled, in a 7-2 decision, that a woman’s right
to choose an abortion was protected by the privacy
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. The legal precedent for the decision
was rooted in the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,
which established the right to privacy involving medical
procedures.
Despite opponents’ characterization of the decision, it
was not the first time that abortion became a legal
procedure in the United States. In fact, for most of the
country’s first 100 years, abortion as we know it today
was not only not a criminal offense, it was also not
considered immoral.
In the 1700s and early 1800s, the word “abortion”
referred only to the termination of a pregnancy after
“quickening,” the time when the fetus first began to
make noticeable movements. The induced ending of a
pregnancy before this point did not even have a name–
but not because it was uncommon. Women in the 1700s
often took drugs to end their unwanted pregnancies.
In 1827, though, Illinois passed a law that made the use
of abortion drugs punishable by up to three years’
imprisonment. Although other states followed the
Illinois example, advertising for “Female Monthly Pills,”
as they were known, was still common through the
middle of the 19th century.
Abortion itself only became a serious criminal offense in
the period between 1860 and 1880. And the
criminalization of abortion did not result from moral
outrage. The roots of the new law came from the newly
established physicians’ trade organization,
the American Medical Association. Doctors decided that
abortion practitioners were unwanted competition and
went about eliminating that competition.
The Catholic Church, which had long accepted
terminating pregnancies before quickening, joined the
doctors in condemning the practice.
By the turn of the century, all states had laws against
abortion, but for the most part they were rarely enforced
and women with money had no problem terminating
pregnancies if they wished. It wasn’t until the late 1930s
that abortion laws were enforced. Subsequent
crackdowns led to a reform movement that succeeded
in lifting abortion restrictions in California and New
York even before the Supreme Court decision in Roe v.
Wade.
The fight over whether to criminalize abortion has
grown increasingly fierce in recent years, but opinion
polls suggest that most Americans prefer that women
be able to have abortions in the early stages of
pregnancy, free of any government interference.
15. Jesus P. Morfe vs. Amelito R. Mutuc, et al.
G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968
FACTS :
The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960
(RA No. 3019)
Every public officer within 30 days after its approval or
after his assumption of office “and within the month of
January of every year thereafter”, as well as upon
termination of his position, shall prepare and file with
the head of the office to which he belongs, “a true
detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of his
income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar year”.
Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the
periodical submission “within the month of January of
every other year thereafter” of their sworn statement of
assets and liabilities (SAL) is violative of due process as
an oppressive exercise of police power and as an
unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy
implicit on the ban against unreasonable search and
seizure construed together with the prohibition against
self-incrimination.
Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:
Acceptance of public position = voluntary assumption of
obligation
Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring
the interest of general welfare in honest and clean public
service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of police
power.
CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds
the permissible limit of the police power and is thus
offensive to the due process clause
ISSUE/s:
Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public
officers is: 1. An oppressive exercise of police power; 2.
Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of the
right to privacy implicit in the ban against unreasonable
search and seizure construed together with the
prohibition against self-incrimination; 3. An insult to the
personal integrity and official dignity of public officials.
RULING: Decision reversed.
Ratio:
Presumption of validity
Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a
reasonable requirement for employment so a public
officer can make of record his assets and liabilities upon
assumption of office. Plaintiff did not present evidence
to rebut the presumption of validity.
“If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental
acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
liberty curtailed affects the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.”
(Ermita-Malate Hotel v. Mayor of Manila)
Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by
the Due Process Clause
“inherent and plenary power in the state which enables
it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society” (Justice Malcolm)
The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and
things within the limits of its domain (Justice Taney,
going beyond curtailment of rights)
Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the
extension of police power to regulatory action affecting
persons in public or private life can invoke the protection
of due process.
It has been held that due process may be relied upon by
public official to protect the security of tenure which in a
limited sense is analogous to property. Therefore he
could also use due process to strike down what he
considers as an infringement of his liberty.
Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is
allowable as long as due process is observed.
The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS.
Test: Official action must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression.
“It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to
ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public
service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call
of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and
oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public
officials and employees to file such sworn statement of
assets and liabilities every two years after having done
so upon assuming office…There was therefore no
unconstitutional exercise of police power.”
Right to privacy
Right to be let alone
“It cannot be said that the challenged statutory
provision calls for disclosure of information which
infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be
denied that the rational relationship such a requirement
possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very
far in precluding assent to an objection of such
character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue
of position he holds, is bereft of constitutional
protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him
to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and
liabilities, including the statement of the amounts of
personal and family expenses, and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar
year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what
otherwise would be a private sphere.”
Unreasonable Search and Seizure
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure does not give freedom from
testimonial compulsion.
Right against self-incrimination
We are not aware of any constitutional provision
designed to protect a man’s conduct from judicial
inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.
Insult to personal integrity and official dignity
Only congressional power or competence, not the
wisdom of the action taken, mey be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid.
16. Blas F. Ople vs. Ruben D. Torres, et al.
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
FACTS:
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on
December 12, 1996 for the Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. It was
published in four newspapers of general circulation on
January. Petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, on the grounds that:
1. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,
2. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected
zone of privacy.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as
enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
HELD:
The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The
right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself,
it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
The Court prescind from the premise that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to
show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308
is predicated on two considerations:
1. the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with
the facility to conveniently transact business with basic
service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and ;
2. the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking
basic services.
It is debatable whether the interests are compelling
enough to warrant the issuance of the said order. The
broadness, vagueness, and overbreadth of A.O. No. 308
which if implemented will put our people’s right to
privacy in clear and present danger. In the case at bar,
the threat comes from which by issuing A.O. No. 308
pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving
information about themselves on the pretext that it will
facilitate delivery of basic services.
Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.
17. Rhonda Ave S. Vivares and Sps. Margarita and
David Suzara vs.St. Theresa's College, Mylene Rheza
T. Escudero and John Does
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
FACTS:
In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St.
Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several
pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and
Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.
Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said
photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero,
through her students, viewed and downloaded said
pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s
Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s
handbook and banned them from “marching” in their
graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary
restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining
the school from barring the students in the graduation
ceremonies, STC still barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and
the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the
writ of habeas data against the school. They argued,
among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook
accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a
reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus,
cannot be used and reproduced without their consent.
Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital
copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them
to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the
children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as
the copying of information, data, and digital images
happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and
deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the
subject data and have such data be declared illegally
obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is
proper.
HELD:
YES, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court
ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of
even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced
disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC
even if it is not an entity engaged in the business of
“gathering, collecting, or storing data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party”.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can
be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would
suggest that the habeas data protection shall be
available only against abuses of a person or entity
engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and
collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking
Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking
site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the user
makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a
reasonable expectation of privacy (right to
informational privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must
be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the
students concerned made use of such privacy tools.
Evidence would show that that their post (status) on
Facebook were published as “Public”.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who
can view a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile page):
(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can
view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends
and their friends can view the photo;
(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view
the photo;
(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular
friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the
user.
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have
some privacy, then he must choose any setting other
than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did
set the posts subject of this case so much so that only
five people can see them (as they claim), then how come
most of their classmates were able to view them. This
fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their
classmates who informed and showed their teacher,
Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that
Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook
hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy
on the pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The
manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot
be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates
of the students who showed the picture to their teacher
and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures,
merely delivered them to the proper school authority
and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their
students according to the standards of the school (to
which the students and their parents agreed to in the
first place because of the fact that they enrolled their
children there).