Crisolo Jiwana Ricka C.

BSBA MM 1-2

SUBJECT MATTER:

LAGMAN VS. MEDIALDEA

G.R. NO. 231658
FACTS:
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216,
declaring Martial Law in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May 25, the president submitted a
written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as
required by the Constitution). The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the
Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the report, the Maute group is an
affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City (and
might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing
rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.
LAGMAN PETITION Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C.
Alejano, Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed this petition to
assail the President’s declaration of Martial Law. Its main contention is that, the
president’s declaration has no sufficient and factual basis – arguing that acts of
terrorism are not equated with rebellion or invasion. Lagman also contends that the
seeming affiliation with ISIS is only mere propaganda, designed to create an
appearance of capability for the Maute group. The petition also cited several facts in the
president’s report which was refuted by several media networks and news articles
because they turned out to be false or untrue. Among these was the report about the
attack on Amai Pakpak Hospital, the ransack of the Landbank of the Philippines, and
the burning of several schools.

ISSUES:
WON the petition is reviewable by the court under Section 18, Article VII. WON
the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or
separately. WON the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of
graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely (1) calling out
powers, (2) suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (3) declaration
of martial law. WON there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
HELD:
1.) YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and declaration of martial law is that the petitioner
should be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer.
2.) YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically
grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
This is completely independent from Congress’ duty to review.
3.) NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the
President’s decision pertaining to which extraordinary power should he use to avail in a
given set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the
exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at
least initially, lies with the President.
4.) YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the President
prior to or at the time of the declaration.
SUBJECT MATTER:

DATU ZALDY UY. AMPATUAN VS. HON RONALDO PUNO

G.R. NO. 190259
FACTS:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women,
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the
Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may
be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence” in the named places. Under AO 273, she also delegated to the DILG
the supervision of the ARMM.
The petitioners claimed that the President’s issuances encroached the ARMM’s
autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid exercise of emergency powers, and that the
President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the
Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents
occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be declared unconstitutional.
The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to deprive the ARMM of its
autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places. It is pursuant to her “calling
out” power as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need to exercise this
power rests solely on her wisdom.
The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG
Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The delegation was necessary to facilitate
the investigation of the mass killings

ISSUE:

WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called
out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
 WON there is factual basis on the calling out of the Armed Forces.

HELD:
 NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of
emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any
law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers.
 The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in
such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She
did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
 Yes. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for
the President’s exercise of the above power, unless it is shown that such
determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord
respect to the President’s judgment.
SUBJECT MATTER:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vs. ELISEAYLAGAN

G.R. No. L-38443, November 25, 1933

FACTS
Elisea Ylagan was charged with physical injuries in the justice of the peace court.
The provincial fiscal filed an information charging her with serious physical
injuries. The defendant pleaded not guilty. The private prosecutor, with
the concurrence of the deputy provincial fiscal, moved for the dismissal of the case,
which was granted by the court. Eleven days later, the acting provincial fiscal filed
another information in the same justice of the peace court, charging the same defendant
with the same offense of serious physical injuries. The defendant entered a plea of
double jeopardy, based on section 28 of the ode of criminal procedure
"
. The court sustained the plea and dismissed the case. Thus, the appeal from the
government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal
of the case constitutes a waiver of constitutional right against double jeopardy.
HELD:
NO. It seems clear that under the sec. 28, defendant in a criminal prosecution is in
legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the following conditions' (") %n a court of com
petent jurisdiction* (2) upon a valid complaint or information*
(+) after he has been arraigned* and after he has pleaded to the complaint of
information. Thus, the court is in the opinion that the appellee has been once in
jeopardy for the offense for which she is now prosecuted. %n United States vs.
valentine, this court held that there is no jeopardy until the investigation of the charges
has actually been commenced by the calling of a witness* however, this should be
abandoned. There is no provision or principle of law jeopardy. /all that the law re0uires
is that the accused has been brought to trial 1in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined.1hence, issue is properly joined after
the accused has entered a plea of not guilty. The mere calling of a witness would not
add a particle to the danger, annoyance, andve3ation suffered by the accused, after
going through the process of being arrested, subjected to a preliminary investigation,
arraigned, and re0uired to plead and stand trial. The rule against double jeopardy
protects the accused not against the peril of second punishment, but against being
again tried for the same offense. The court ruled in one case that, 43 3 3 The accused
would never be free from the cruel and constant menace of a never-ending charge,
which the malice of the complaining witness might hold indefinitely suspended over his
head, were it not that the judiciary is e3clusively empowered to authori5e, by an
e3press order to that effect, the repetition of a complaint or information once dismissed
in the cases in which the law re0uires that this be done. &much is, in our opinion, the
fundamental reason of the article of the law to which we refer. The accused, after being
notified of the order rest dismissing the complaint may, as the case may be, either rest
assured that he will not be further molested, or prepare himself for the presentation
of a new complaint. %n either case, the order gives him full information as to what he
may hope or fear, and prevents his reasonable hopes from being dissipated as the
result of an e0uivocal and indefinite legal situation. To this much, at least, one who has
been molested, possibly unjustly, by prosecution on a criminal charge, is entitled.1The
court ruled that the mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal
of the case does not constitute a consent within the meaning of section 28 of the code