G.R. No.

175578 August 11, 2010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ZENAIDA GUINTO-ALDANA, Respondent

FACTS:

Respondents filed an application for registration of title over 2 pieces of land, professing themselves to be
co-owners of these lots having acquired them by succession from their predecessors. That until the time
of the application, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse,
exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in the concept of an owner and that they had
consistently declared the property in their name for purposes of real estate taxation. In support of their
application, respondents submitted to the court the pertinent tax declarations, together with the receipts of
payment thereof. Petitioner opposed the application for the reason that the tax declaration submitted to
the court did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition in good faith or of
prior possession in the concept of an owner.

The trial court denied the application for failure of the applicants to comply with the requirements of
Presidential Decree No. 1529. However, this was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have occupied and possessed the property openly, continuously,
exclusively and notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership? – YES

RULING:
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in
cases for application of original registration of land is a mandatory requirement. The reason for this rule is
to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion
thereof already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be
overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. The failure to comply with this
requirement is fatal to petitioner’s application for registration.

However, that while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the original
tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of Lands, blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide
sufficient identification.

In the case at bar, we find that the submission of the blueprint of Plan together with the technical
description of the property, operates as substantial compliance with the legal requirement of ascertaining
the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 applied for registration.

ISSUE OF POSSESSION

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and,
the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together
with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to
highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as
a party would naturally exercise over his own property .

Respondents’ possession through their predecessors-in-interest dates back to as early as 1937 when the
property had already been declared for taxation by respondent’s father. Respondents could have
produced more proof of this kind had it not been for the fact that, the relevant portions of the tax records
on file with the Provincial Assessor had been burned when its office was razed by fire in 1997. With the
tax assessments there came next tax payments. Respondents’ receipts for tax expenditures were
likewise in the records and in these documents the predecessors of respondents were the named owners
of the property. Tax declarations and realty tax payment are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are a good indication of possession in the concept of an owner. No one in
his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. Indeed, respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the concept of an
owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without interference and opposition from the government or from
any private individual. Itself makes their right thereto unquestionably settled and hence, deserving of
protection under the law.

The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere
and honest desire to obtain title to the property. It also announces his adverse claim against the state and
all other parties who may be in conflict with his interest. More importantly, it signifies an unfeigned
intention to contribute to government revenues—an act that strengthens one’s bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 30, 2006 Decision and the November 20, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500, are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 188715 April 6, 2011

RODOLFO N. REGALA, Petitioner

vs.
FEDERICO P. CARIN, Respondent

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent are adjacent neighbors at Spirig Street, BF Resort Village, Las Piñas
City. When petitioner decided to renovate his one story residence by constructing a second floor, he
under the guise of merely building an extension to his residence, approached respondent sometime in
May 1998 for permission to bore a hole through a perimeter wall shared by both their respective
properties, to which respondent verbally consented on condition that petitioner would clean the area
affected by the work.

Petitioner’s real intention was to build a second floor, in fact with a terrace atop the dividing wall. In the
course of the construction of the second floor, respondent and his wife Marietta suffered from the dust
and dirt which fell on their property. As petitioner failed to address the problem to respondent’s
satisfaction, respondent filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the City Engineer and Building Official of
Las Piñas City. No satisfactory agreement was reached at the barangay conciliation proceedings.
Respondent filed on March 1999 a complaint for damages against petitioner before the RTC of Las Piñas
City.

Respondent alleged that petitioner demolished the whole length of the wall from top to bottom into five
parts for the purpose of constructing a second floor with terrace; and that debris and dust piled up on
respondent’s property ruining his garden and forcing him to, among other things, shut some of the
windows of his house. Respondent thus prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages.

The RTC decided in favor of respondent whom it awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees plus costs of suit. On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision but
modified the award of moral and exemplary damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of moral and exemplary damages is proper? – NO

RULING:
The trial court’s award of moral and exemplary damages, as affirmed by the appellate court, was
premised on the damage and suffering sustained by respondent arising from quasi-delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code.

However, in prayers for moral damages, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule. Moral
damages are not meant to be punitive but are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person. To be entitled to such an award, the
claimant must satisfactorily prove that he has suffered damages and that the injury causing it has sprung
from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Moreover,the damages must be
shown to be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish the
factual basis of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant.

In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the presentation of 1) evidence of besmirched reputation or
physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; 2) a culpable act or omission
factually established; 3) proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of
the damages sustained by the claimant; and 4) the proof that the act is predicated on any of the instances
expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.

In the present case, respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the injuries he
sustained were the proximate effect of petitioner’s act or omission. It bears noting that petitioner was
engaged in the lawful exercise of his property rights to introduce renovations to his abode. While he
initially did not have a building permit and may have misrepresented his real intent when he initially
sought respondent’s consent, the lack of the permit was inconsequential since it only rendered petitioner
liable to administrative sanctions or penalties.

Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. [27] While the Court
harbors no doubt that the incidents which gave rise to this dispute have brought anxiety and anguish to
respondent, it is unconvinced that the damage inflicted upon respondent’s property was malicious or
willful, an element crucial to merit an award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 26, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
VACATED. The Court orders petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P25,000 as nominal damages.

G.R. No. 106646 June 30, 1993

JAIME LEDESMA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:

On August 21, 1980, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation filed Case No. 38287 against petitioner to
enforce the terms of Trust Receipt Agreement No. 7389 executed by them on April 1, 1974 but which
petitioner had failed to comply with. As summons could not be served on the latter, said case was
dismissed without prejudice on March 3, 1981.

On December 2, 1988, private respondent bank instituted Civil Case No. 88-2572 in the RTC of Makati,
against petitioner on the same cause of action and subject matter.
Petitioner's MTD on the ground of prescription was denied and judgment was rendered in favor of private
respondent by the court a quo ordering petitioner to pay private respondent P168,00.00 from December
2, 1988 until full payment of the obligation. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
subsequently, MR was denied.

Petitioner's petition for review on certiorari of the said judgment was denied in the Court’s resolution,
hence its present motion for reconsideration, dated May 5, 1993. Contending that the second action filed
by private respondent bank had already prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action filed by the bank had already prescribed? – NO

RULING:

Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the prescription of an action, involving in the present case the
10-year prescriptive period for filing an action on a written contract under Article 1144(1) of the
Code, is interrupted by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor,
and (c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. The effects of the last two instances
have already been decided by this Court, the rationale wherein should necessarily apply to the first.

The matter of the interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of a written extrajudicial demand by the
creditor was decided in Overseas Bank of Manila vs. Geraldez, et al.:

The interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means that the
said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand. That is the correct
meaning of interruption as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling of the prescriptive
period. A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts
anew the prescriptive period.

The interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of a written acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor was dealt with in Philippine National Railways vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.,
thus:

Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the "prescription of actions is interrupted" inter
alia, "when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor." This simply
means that the period of prescription, when interrupted by such a written acknowledgment,
begins to run anew; and whatever time of limitation might have already elapsed from the accrual
of the cause of action is thereby negated and rendered inefficacious. The effect of the
interruption spoken of in Article 1155 is to renew the obligation, to make prescription run again
from the date of the interruption

Petitioner insists that in case of the filing of an action, the prescriptive period is merely tolled and
continues to run again, with only the balance of the remaining period available for the filing of another
action. This postulation would result in an absurdity wherein Article 1155 would be interpreted in two
different ways, i.e., the prescriptive period is interrupted in case of an extrajudicial demand and a written
acknowledgment of a debt, but it is merely tolled where an action is filed in court.

The correct interpretations of Article 1155 of the Civil Code are reflected in and furnished by the
doctrinal pronouncements in Overseas Bank of Manila and Philippine National Railways
Company, not only because they are later in point of time but because the issue is squarely resolved in a
decisive and logical manner therein. Petitioner's submission would result in a bifurcated interpretation of
Article 1155, aside from the irrational conclusion that a judicial action itself cannot produce the same
result on the prescriptive period as a mere extrajudicial demand or an acknowledgment of the debt.
Accordingly, petitioner having failed to adduce any cogent reason or substantial argument to warrant a
reconsideration of our resolution of March 24, 1993, the present motion is hereby DENIED with FINALITY.