CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
VICENTE VASQUEZ, RULING:
JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL,
INC.,respondents.
FACTS:
At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez (son of respondents
Vicente and Luisa Vasquez), was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña
Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a
rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a
Student's Permit to Drive at the time.
Benjamin ABAD was a manager of petitioner CASTILEX Industrial Corporation,
registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. ABAD drove
the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña
rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his
route to General Maxilom St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of ABAD
collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. ABAD
brought Vasquez to CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL where he died.
A Criminal Case was filed against ABAD but which was subsequently dismissed for
failure to prosecute. An action for damages was then commenced by respondents
against ABAD and petitioner CASTILEX
Trial court ruled in favor of private respondents and ordered ABAD and to pay jointly
and solidarily respondents
Petitioner CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and petitioner
CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not
solidary" with the former.
Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the
negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in
business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing
and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead,
the fourth paragraph should apply
- SC: Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The
phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry"
found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not
necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be
liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his
assigned task
o DISTINCTION between 4th and 5th paragraph of Art 2180 of CC:
 Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to
owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and
the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not
engaged in any business or industry.
 The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees
committed either in the service of the branches or on the
occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph
encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the
scope of their assigned task.
 The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer
coverage and acts included.
 Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is
engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they
were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even
though committed neither in the service of the branches nor
on the occasion of their functions
o Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in
any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed
by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks
 But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee
relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold
the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the
scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was
committed
Whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD
was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks.
- ABAD: testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a company-
issued vehicle, registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving
the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends
after having done overtime work for the petitioner.
- TC and CA: that the driving by a manager of a company-issued
vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the
time and circumstances.
- SC: do not agree with TC and CA. The mere fact that ABAD was using a
service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to
charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle
unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or
scope of his employment.
- American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by
the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle:
o It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in
going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning
to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his
employment in the absence of evidence of some special business
benefit to the employer
o In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily
a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his
services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special
benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the
services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is
not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses
his employer's motor vehicle
o In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily
a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his
services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special
benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the
services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is
not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses
his employer's motor vehicle
o However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting
within the scope of his employment in going to or from work
in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his
negligence where at the time of the accident, the employee
has left the direct route to his work or back home and is
pursuing a personal errand of his own.
o An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for
the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is
generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of
the vehicle during the period of permissive use
o Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the
vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return
trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has
been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the
employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation
of the vehicle during the return trip
- In the case, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the
petitioner's office. After, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña,
7km away from petitioner's place of business. A witness for the private
respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmeña is a
"lively place" even at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and Back
Street were still open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover,
prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the place.
- At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with
friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in
question occurred
- ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a
personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in
a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August
1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day
had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His
being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven
for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no
connection to petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his
duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for
personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks
attached to his position
- Since no evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions
entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service
vehicle. Thus, petitioner is relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988
SEPTEMBER 27, 2018
FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora (victim) died after being mortally hit by a gun fired by his
classmate in the auditorium of Colegio de San Jose Recoletos (CSJR). Both the victim
and the offender were graduating 17-year-old students. The crime happened 3 days
before graduation ceremony. The student was convicted of homicide through
reckless imprudence.
Additionally, the victim’s parents filed a civil action for damages under Art. 2180 of
the New Civil Code against the school, its principal, dean, physics teacher, the
offender, two other students, and their parents.
The respondent Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
and absolved ALL defendants on the grounds that:
2180 of the New Civil Code is not applicable to CSJR because it is not a school of
arts and trades but an academic institution.
The semester had already ended, thus the students were no longer in the custody of
the school.
There was no clear identification of the fatal gun
The defendants exercised the necessary diligence in preventing injury.
ISSUES:
Is Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code applicable to establishments which are technically
not schools of arts and trades? – YES.
Were the students considered under the custody of the defendants at the time of
the crime? – YES.
Are the defendants liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code? – NO.
RULING:
None of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by their students against the
victim student.
RATIO:
Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code should apply to all schools, academic and non-
academic.
The general rule is that all teachers shall be held liable for the acts of their students.
The exception to the rule is where the school is technical in nature, it is the head
thereof who should be held responsible. There is no substantial distinction between
the academic and non-academic schools in so far as torts committed by their
students are concerned. The reasons for disparity in liability of teachers and heads
are no longer material at present BUT Art. 2180 remains unchanged and must be
interpreted according to its clear legislative intent until further amendment
The students are considered to be at the custody of the school authorities at the
time of the crime.
Custody is not co-terminous with the semester. The student shall be considered to
be in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and
influence of the school and within its premises. As long as the student is in school
fora legitimate student purpose, legitimate exercise of student rights and
privileges, the responsibility of the school authorities continues
Custody does not connote actual and physical control, but refers more to
the influence on the child and the discipline instilled in him. Art. 2180 of
the New Civil Code directly imposes liability on the teacher or the head is
technical school and not on the school itself. If any, the school may be
held to answer for acts of the teachers or heads and may be allowed to
exculpate liability by proof of exercise of diligence The same provision
treats parents more favorably than teachers. Unlike parents who are only
liable for children until they turn 18 years old, teachers are held
answerable by law for acts of students regardless of their age.
Nevertheless, there is leniency in assessing liability of teachers especially
in cases where students involved are no longer minors
None of the defendants may be held liable for damages.
As to the principal and the dean, they only exercise general authority since
they were not teachers-in-charge. The Dean of boys could have been held
liable in view of the undisputed evidence on his confiscation of an
unlicensed gun from one of the students, which he returned without any
disciplinary measures. However, there’s no proof of the identity of the gun
used against the victim.
As to the Physics teacher, his absence during the time of the crime is not
considered negligence because he was not required to be in school at the
time. The Teacher-in-charge of the erring student was not identified.
As to the school, it may not be held liable under Art. 2180 of the New Civil
Code.
 education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF skills to pursue higher education or a profession. This includes ensuring the safety of
APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA, and the students while in the school premises. On the other hand, the student covenants
ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
February 4, 1992 regulations.

FACTS: Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student,
Business Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the schools academic PSBA is therefore held liable for his death.
community, while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This incident
prompted his parents to file a suit against PSBA and its corporate officers for Petition denied.
damages due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no
cause of action against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover
academic institutions. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for
reconsideration was likewise dismissed, and was affirmed by the appellate court.
Hence, the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.

RULING: Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation
between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really
govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or
tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression
has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when
there obtains a contract.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in
in loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or
inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable
for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material
situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of
Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made
liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a

contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound
to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an
Federico Ylarde and Adelaida Doronio v. Edgardo Aquino, Mauro Soriano, and CA
1988 / Gancayco [Negligence > Standard of conduct > Children]
Facts
Soriano is the school principal; Aquino and Banez were teachers in this school.
Novelito Ylarde is a student [deceased] & Federico is his father.
Gabaldon Primary School, an academic school, was littered with several huge
concrete blocks [around one ton each] which were remnants of an old school shop
which was destroyed in WWII. Banez [teacher] realized that these stones were huge
hazards so he started burying them, and he was able to bury 10 blocks by himself. A
fellow teacher Aquino decided to help, so he gathered 18 students and ordered them
to dig a hole where a 1-ton stone could be buried. The following day, he called 4 of
these students to continue digging. When the hole was 1m 40cm deep, Aquino alone
continued digging while the students remained inside the pit, throwing out loose soil.
They got out of the hole when the depth was right. Aquino left the children to level
the loose soil around the hole because he went to see Banez (who was 30 meters
away) to get a key to the school workroom to get rope. He allegedly told the
children not to touch the stone.
After Aquino left, 3/4 kids jumped inside the pit, Ylarde included. The remaining
kid jumped on top of the block, causing it to slide downwards. 2 were able to get
out but Ylarde wasn’t able to do so, and so the block pinned him to the wall in a
standing position. He sustained injuries and three days later, Ylarde died. His
parents filed a suit for damages against Aquino and Soriano [principal], but the RTC
dismissed the complaint for the following reasons:
Digging done is in line with Work Education subject
Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person
Ylarde’s death was due to his own reckless imprudence
CA affirmed RTC. Petitioners base their action against Aquino [teacher] on NCC 2176
for his alleged negligence that caused Ylarde’s death, while the action against the
principal was based on NCC 2180.
Issue and Holding
WON both can be held liable for damages. NO, ONLY AQUINO [TEACHER] IS
LIABLE.
Ratio
The principal cannot be held liable because he is a head of an academic school, not
a school of arts and trade. SC cited Amadora v. CA wherein it was held NCC 2180
says that in an academic school, it is only the teacher who should be answerable for
torts committed by their students, and in a school of arts and trades, it is only the
school head who can be held liable. [LegMeth lesson: reddendo singula singulis —
“refers only to the last”]. Also, as admitted by Aquino himself, the principal did not
give any instruction regarding the digging.
Now, here’s the twist: Aquino can be held liable under NCC 2180 as the teacher-
in-charge. HOWEVER, petitioners base Aquino’s alleged liability on NCC 2176.
Therefore, the question is WON there were acts and omissions on Aquino’s part
amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal relation to Ylarde’s death,
and the answer is YES. Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe
situation created by Aquino. He acted with fault and gross negligence when he:
Failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his
pupils to make an excavation near a 1 ton concrete stone which he knew to be a
hazardous task
Required the children to remain inside the pit even after they finished digging,
knowing that the block was nearby
Ordered them to level the soil when it was apparent that the stone was on the brink
of falling
Went to a place where he would not be able to check on the students’ safety
Left the children close to the excavation, an attractive nuisance
It’s totally ridiculous how the lower court found Aquino to have exercised utmost
diligence of a very cautious person. The simple warning “not to touch the stone” is
of no use, considering the age of these children. He should have made sure that the
children are protected from all harm while they are in his company, since he stands
in loco parentis to his students.
Also ridiculous is the claim that the digging work is part of Work Education. For
one, Aquino himself said that the principal made no instructions requiring what
students were to do. Also, it’s not in the lesson plan, since Aquino decided all by
himself to help Banez. Also, this activity should not be placed alongside relatively
lighter (!) activities such as school gardening, tree planting [which could be
legitimately part of the Work Education subject] because these do not expose the
children to such risk!
SC does not agree with lower court that the injuries which led to Ylarde’s death
were caused by his own reckless imprudence. The degree of care required to be
exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself.
A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct
should be judged according to the average conduct of persons his age and
experience. (Left by themselves and tired from the strenuous digging, it was natural
that they would play around. Also note that it was not only Ylarde who jumped into
the hole.) Hence, Ylarde cannot be charged with reckless imprudence.
AMADORA et al vs. CA et al
FACTS: Alfredo Amadora was shot by a gun fired by his classmate Daffon while in
the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos Auditorium at a date after the semester ended.
He was there to submit a graduation requirement in Physics.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . Additionally, the herein
petitioners, as the victim’s parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180
of the CC against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school
principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two
other students, through their respective parents.
The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CFI of Cebu
held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs, representing death
compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, MD, ED
and AF.
On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the
defendants were completely absolved. Hence this petition for certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
In its decision the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the
school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended.
ISSUE: how should Art. 2180 be applied in this case
HELD: the petition is DENIED. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of
boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
previously defined. Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable
under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as
well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach
to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision.
This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the
head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general
rule.
As stated in the dissent of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the Exconde Case, under Art. 2180,
he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts
and trades in particular. The modifying clause “of establishments of arts and trades”
should apply only to “heads” and not “teachers.”
But of course, as long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the
liability imposed by Article 2180, as stated in its last paragraph.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only
when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending
student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if his child is
still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student
under him regardless of the student’s age
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed
to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on
the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for
the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of
respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it
had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.The school can show that it
exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate
supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its
rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or
the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-
extensive with the period when the student is actually undergoing studies during the
school term, as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted by the
petitioners themselves?
This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the
semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and
excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of registration,
and in the case of graduating students, the period before the commencement
exercises [During such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary
authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from
observance of its rules.]In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the
school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and
within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing
with the students. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a
vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly
faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades,
because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the
expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their
enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract of
their heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its
present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear
and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges in the
situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.

As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of
a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even
in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than
relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying
the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and
subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article
2180.

NOTES:

The reason for the disparity [distinction of who should be responsible for students
between academic and arts and trades schools] can be traced to the fact that
historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over
his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades
were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally
and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. By contrast,
the head of the academic school was not as involved with his students and exercised

AGAPITO FUELLAS v. ELPIDIO CADANO, GR No. L-14409, 1961-10-31
Facts:
For serious physical injuries sustained by Pepito Cadano, son of plaintiff.
Elpidio Cadano, two separate actions were instituted, Civil Case... for damages
against Agapito Fuellas, father of the minor Rico Fuellas, who... caused the injuries,
and Criminal Case... against Rico Fuellas... for serious physical injuries. They were
tried jointly.
a judgment of conviction in the criminal case was rendered, finding Rico Fuellas
guilty of the offense... charged.
same court rendered judgment in the civil case making Agapito Fuellas, liable under
Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code for P9,600.00
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant appellant
Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years’ old
They were classmates... while Pepito was studying his lessons, Rico took the pencil
of one Ernesto Cabanok and surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito.
When Ernesto asked Rico to return the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same,
an act which angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the...
floor.
a teacher, separated Rico and Pepito and told them to go home.
When Pepito had just gone down of the school- house, he was met by Rico, still in
angry mood. Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito...
extended his hand to Rico. Instead of accepting the proffer to shake hands, Rico
held Pepito by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and pushed
him to the ground. Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under his body,
whereupon, Rico rode on his left... side. While Rico was in such position, Pepito
suddenly cried out "My arm is broken."
Issues:
appellate court erred in holding him liable for damages for the deliberate... criminal
act of his minor son.
Ruling:
The above-mentioned provisions of the Civil Code state:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the... provisions of this Chapter." (Article 2176).
"The obligations imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible."
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of
which provides: 'The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for damages caused by the minor children who lived in their company.'
To hold that this... provision does not apply to the instant case because it only
covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise
from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where
mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may... stand subsidiarily liable for
the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is
caused with criminal intent.
Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the
evidence submitted therein by both parties, independently of the criminal case. And
as responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in
the present case was... instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability, arising from fault or negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and
having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to
the minor's criminal responsibility is of no... moment.
TAMARGO vs. CA et al G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
damages was filed with the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur by petitioners, parents of
Jennifer, against respondent spouses, Adelberto’s natural parents with whom he was
living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a
criminal information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against
Adelberto, who was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground
that he bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident the spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor
Adelberto before the then CFI of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted
after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer
In their Answer, respondent spouses, Adelberto’s natural parents, claimed that not
they, but rather the adopting parents were indispensable parties to the action since
parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed.
The trial court ruled against the adopting parents, who filed an MR which was later
denied for being filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioners went to the CA on
a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court’s decision. The CA
dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal. Hence
this petition for review
ISSUE: Who should be responsible for the tortuous act of the minor Adelberto, his
natural parents or adopting parents?
HELD: Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the
CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners’ complaint filed before the trial
court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further
proceedings
Natural parents.
It is not disputed that Adelberto’s voluntary act of shooting Jennifer with an air rifle
gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil
Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor
child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
The natural parent spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8
which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the Department of
Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the evidence submitted
before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for,
and educate the child, that the trial custody period has been completed, and that the
best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption
shall be entered, which shall be effective he date the original petition was filed. The
decree shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known.
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in
relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the adopter is reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the
the spouse of the surviving natural parent; reglementary period for appeal.

xxx xxx xxx Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of
the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits.
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of
the time the Petition for adoption was filed.

The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of
parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the
parents and the minor child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the
parents exercise supervision and control.

Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines insisted upon the requisite that the
child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in the actual custody of the parents
sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly
liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively
lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act
that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since
they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the
child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would
be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of
vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on
the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

NOTES:

(On why this petition was accepted by the SC) In view, however, of the nature of
the issue raised in the instant petition, and in order that substantial justice may be
served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to
prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been
seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for