MAGO V.

PENALOSA FERNO
Rodolfo Mago filed an administrative case against Judge Penalosa-Ferno for grave
ignorance of the law. In his complaint, Mago stated that he received a complaint against
him for Grave Threats, so he was subpoenaed to a preliminary investigation. During the
PI, it was the stenographer who examined him. He also allowed the the witnesses to
read/study the [written] question[s] to be propounded to them and to write their answers
[thereto]. Whether or not the judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. A personal
examination of the complainant in a criminal case and his witness/es was required. Thus,
under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court before its amendment, the
investigating fiscal was required to certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record,
an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses.

LIM, SR. V. JUDGE FELIX

The fiscal filed four information for murder against petitioners in Masbate. The Supreme
Court ordered the transfer of venue to Makati to avoid miscarriage of justice. Petitioners
asked the court at Makati to order the transmittal of records of the preliminary
investigation to enable it to determine if there was probable cause for their arrest. The
court denied the motion and issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners. Whether or not a
judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's
certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

HELD:
If a judge relies solely on the certification of the prosecutor when the records are not
before him, he has not personally determined the existence of probable cause. The
determination was made by the prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been
satisfied. The judge does not have to personally examine the witnesses. However, there
should be a report and necessary documents supporting the certification of the prosecutor.
All these should be before the judge. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to
make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly
have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification.

WEBB V. DE LEON

The NBI filed with the DOJ a letter of complaint charging Hubert Webb, et al with the
crime of rape with homicide. During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented
evidence such as a sworn statement from witness Jessica Alfaro, former housemaids of
the Webb and Vizconde families (victim) and Lolita Birrer, a former paramour of suspect
Gerardo Biong. The DOJ panel issued a resolution finding probable cause to hold the
respondents for trial and recommended the filing of an information to the proper court.
RTC Judge de Leon issued a warrant of arrest before the case was raffled to Judge
Tolentino who again issued new warrants of arrest. Whether or not the judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrants of arrest without conducting
the required preliminary examination.

HELD:
A judge need not conduct a personal searching examination of witnesses before issuing a
warrant of arrest; the DOJ report and the counter-affidavits of the petitioners are
sufficient for the personal analysis of the judge of evidence for probable cause. In the
case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two (2)
sworn statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita
Birrer as well as the counter-affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking
recital and analysis of the parties' evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both
judges that there is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again,
we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a
de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence.

ALVAREZ V. CFI OF TAYABAS

The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice,
presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David an affidavit alleging that according to
reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house books, documents, receipts, lists,
chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender
charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. He did not swear to the truth of
his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by
him from a reliable person.

The CFI judge issued a search warrant to the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury
Board against the petitioner. The warrant was issued based on statements which the
applicant had no personal knowledge of and did not swear to. The warrant described the
things to be searched as books, documents, and other papers related to money-lending
activities.

HELD:
The judge issued the warrant on the basis of hearsay information because the warrant was
based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the
facts of probable cause. Also the affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis
for determining whether probable cause exists and whether the warrant should be issued,
must contain a particular description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to
be seized. These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly complied with but where,
by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not
required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could
issue.
STONEHILL V. DIOKNO
__
42 Search warrants were issued by respondent judges against the corporations and its
officers for unspecified violations of the Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Law,
and the Internal Revenue Coded. The petitioners questions the validity of said warrants
and the admissibility of the papers(ranging from financial papers to cigar wrappers).
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the
offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended
to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Whether or not the search warrants are
valid and if the evidence procured pursuant thereto are admissible.

HELD: General warrants

No, it is impossible for the judges to determine probable cause without a specified
offense. No specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible
for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for
the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it
is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws.

The warrants are hence illegal for the issuance of such is not supported by the
requirement of probable cause. Hence, the evidence acquired cannot be used against the
petitioners. However, only those warrants issued against the petitioners are invalid and
only those evidence acquired in the residence of the petitioners shall be inadmissible
because the corporations has a distinct personality from that of the corporation, hence the
officers cannot exercise the rights personal to the latter. Moncado doctrine is reversed.

PAPA V. MAGO
22 SCRA 857

The Manila Police Department conducted a surveillance at the gate of the customs zone.
They intercepted two trucks with misdeclared and undervalued items upon the order of
Papa who was chief of MPD and duly deputized agent of the Customs. This was based
on reliable information that the contents of the truck were underdeclared and
uunderstated, in violation of the Tarrifs and Customs Code.
The person claiming ownership of the articles filed an action to recover the articles. Filed
an mandamus suit to return the items, alleging that the MPD seized the goods without a
search warrant.

HELD:
The Chief of Police was deputized in WRITING by the Customs Commissioner and
therefore could effect searches and seizures and arrests for purposes of the enforcement
of the custom and tariff law. It was his duty to make seizure of any cargo, articles or
other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine
imposed under the customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box,
trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to
suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. The
Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to
effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance.
This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit,
made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in
question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make
the interception of the cargo.

CRUZ v. PEOPLE

Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently traveled,

"coming back and forth taking a vessel." At around 12:00 noon of May 11, 2007, Dela
Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While buying a
ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. It took him around 15 minutes
to purchase a ticket. Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed
his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for inspection. The operator of the x-ray machine
saw firearms inside Dela Cruz's bag.
Flores, the x-ray machine operator-on-duty, saw the impression of what appeared to be
three (3) firearms inside Dela Cruz's bag. Upon seeing the suspected firearms, she called
the attention of port personnel Igot who was the baggage inspector then. Igot asked Dela
Cruz whether he was the owner of the bag. Dela Cruz answered Igot in the affirmative
and consented to Igot's manual inspection of the bag. In the Information, Dela Cruz was
charged with violation of Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms.
Subsequently, another Information was filed charging him with the violation of
Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881.
Dela Cruz argues that there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless search. In
petitioner's case, it may well be said that, with the circumstances attending the search of
his luggage, he had no actual intention to relinquish his right against warrantless searches.

HELD: Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in port security procedures.

The port personnel's actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the
safety of travelers and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already
submitted himself and his belongings to inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray
scanning machine. The presentation of petitioner's bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary.
Petitioner had the choice of whether to present the bag or not. He had the option not to
travel if he did not want his bag scanned or inspected.
Caught in fragranted. X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of
probable cause that a crime is being or has been committed are part of reasonable security
regulations to safeguard the passengers passing through ports or terminals. Probable
cause is reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the
offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.

ANIAG, JR. VS. COMELEC

237 SCRA 424

In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on 11 May
1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 2323
otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban." Subsequently, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning,
using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot
checkpoints. Aniag had his driver, Arellano, return his firearms to Congress due to the
gun ban. On the road, Arellano was stopped at a checkpoint and ordered to open the
trunk where the guns were found. He was detained and inquest proceeded. Questions the
validity of the search

HELD:
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an
appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a
lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the
seizure of evidence in plain view, as well as the search conducted at police or military
checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless
search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched
nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely
limited to a visual search.

The guns found in the trunk are inadmissible as evidence. The manner of the search does
not justify the absence of the search warrant, because there was no evidence to show that
Arellano could trigger the policemen’s suspicion. Neither is the search incident to a
lawful arrest. The items were not in plain view, or within Arellano’s reach, but were in
the trunk of the car, packed in gun cases. The allowed visual observation at checkpoints
does not include a thorough search inside the car without prior reason to assume probable
cause that the driver may be guilty of a crime.

PEOPLE V. ESCAÑO
323 SCRA 754

Accused-appellants Virgilio Usana and Jerry Lopez, together with Julian Escano, were
charged with violation of Section 4 Article 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended. Escano and Usana were charged also with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition in violation of PD1866.
On April 5,1995 and during the COMELEC gun ban some law enforcers were manning a
checkpoint at the corner of Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway. At
about past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car. PO3 Suba saw a long firearm on the
lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was later identified as Virgilio Usana,
They asked the driver, identified Escano, to open the door. PO3 Suba seized the long
firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escano, upon the order of the police,
park along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. the other passengers were searched for more weapons.
The search yielded a 45-caliber firearm, which they seized, from Escano.
The three were brought to the police station. SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the
vehicle so he requested Escano to open the trunk, to which he agreed. They noticed a blue
bag inside it, which they asked Escano to open. Upon examination, it was found positive
for hashish. The NAPOLCOM issued a certification to the effect that Escano was not a
licensed/registered firearm holder. Usana, however, according to the same certification is
a licensed/registered holder of a pistol Colt .45 caliber.
Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in question was conducted.
They contend that the checkpoint manned by elements of the Makati Police should have
been announced. They also complain of its having been conducted in an arbitrary and
discriminatory manner.
HELD:
The SC has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those, which are warranted by
the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists, are
allowed. Admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’
right to “free passage” without interruption, “ but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it
involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle’s occupants are
required to answer a brief question of two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched,
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot
be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. In fact,
these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
The checkpoint herein conducted was pursuance of the gun ban by the COMELEC. The
COMELEC would be hard to put implement the ban of if its deputized agents were
limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would defeat the purpose for which the ban
was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they
only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs.
The SC said that checkpoints need not be announced, as the accused invoked. Not only
would it be impractical, it would forearm those who intend to violate the ban.
As to the trunk, consented.

PEOPLE V. CANTON
SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing
passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When she passed through the metal detector booth,
a beeping sound was emitted. Consequently, Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the
National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on
duty at that time, called her attention, saying Excuse me ma’am, can I search you? Upon
frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene inserted
her hand under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the package several times and noticed that
the package contained what felt like rice granules. When Mylene passed her hand, she
felt similar packages in front of SUSANs genital area and thighs. She asked SUSAN to
bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said: Money, money only. Mylene
forthwith reported the matter to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her supervisor on duty.

HELD:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public such as in airport security checks.

A peace officer or a private person may without warrant arrest a person when 
the
person to be arrested is:
  Actually committing or attempting to commit an offense; 

 An Offense has just been committed and he has probably cause to 
believe
based on personal knowledge of the facts or circumstances that 
the person to be
arrested has committed it; 
 Person to be arrested is an escaped prisoner 


In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security procedure,
which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235. The search conducted on her
resulted in the discovery and recovery of the packages. Such search was legal because
the airport security personnel and police officers had knowledge of the crime being
committed given the circumstances

CAMARA VS. MUNICIPAL COURT

387 US 523

An Inspector of the SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT entered an

apartment 
building to make a routine annual inspection for violations of the city’s
HOUSING CODE . The inspector was informed that the Camara was using part of his
leasehold as a personal 
residence. The inspector confronted Camara and demanded to
inspect the premises as residential use 
was prohibited on the ground floor of the
building. Camara did not allow the inspector to enter because there was no search warrant.
Camara 
also received a Summons, ordering him to appear at the District Attorney’s
Office, but he did 
not comply. 2 other inspectors attempted to gain access to his
apartment a few weeks later and were 
again refused because there was no search
warrant 


A Complaint was filed against Camara for violation of Section 503 of the HOUSING
CODE or 
the right of authorized inspectors to enter buildings Camara contended that
the HOUSING CODE violated his rights, as it allowed Inspectors to 
enter his private
dwelling without a warrant and probable cause 


The US SC held that the effect of such a regulatory scheme is to leave the occupant
subject 
to the discretion of the official in the field, which is precisely the discretion to
invade private property

HELD:
The court declared the said provision unconstitutional since it upheld the right of a person
to be secure in his/her home over that of the regulatory powers of the City. A search of
private property without proper consent is “unreasonable unless it has been authorized by
a valid warrant.” When a persons right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of
search must be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government
enforcement agent. The court in other cases ruled in favor of warrantless inspections of
private premises in extraordinary circumstances like locating and abating public
nuisances, etc.
In this case, when the inspector demanded entry, the occupant has no way of knowing:

 Whether enforcement of the municipal code requires inspection of his premises



 The lawful limits of the inspector’s power to search 

 Whether the inspector is acting under proper authorization 


The US SC also held that the decision to inspect an area was based upon a legislative or

administrative assessment of broad factors, which is not a suitable substitute for

individualized review by a Judge 


The US SC further held that fire, health, and housing code programs could still achieve
their 
goals within the confines of a valid search warrant 
In other words, obtaining a
valid warrant will not frustrate the legitimate governmental purpose

The court cannot agree that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures at stake
in these inspection cases are merely “peripheral” and it does not take the form of criminal
prosecution. The court points out that like most regulatory laws, fire, health and housing
codes are enforced by criminal processes where a discovery of a violation by the
inspector leads to a criminal complaint. The court recognizes the importance of housing
code regulation but it cannot see why it cannot be done within the safeguards of acquiring
a valid search warrant.

PADILLA VS CA
269 SCRA 402

This case started from a hit and run incident. A witness, Manarang, then told the police
about the incident wherein the latter successfully chased and blocked the vehicle. When
Padilla was asked to raise his hands they saw a gun tucked on the left side of his waist.
They also saw a baby armalite lying at the front of the driver’s seat. Padilla wasn’t able
to produce any permit for his firearms. They arrested Padilla due to the hit and run
incident and illegal possession of firearms. Padilla arfues that the arrest and search were
invalid because

HELD:
To arrest without a warrant requires that a) the person to be arrested after he has
committed or while he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least
attempting to commit an offense; b) in the presence of the arresting officer or private
person. Both elements are present here. The offense was committed in the presence of
Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest the Padilla. Presence does not only
require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he hears the disturbance
created thereby and proceeds at once at the scene. Here there was personal knowledge.
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified as he
had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable
lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. The policemen saw for
themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate number, and the
dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting police officer's
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's

Arrest of officer in this case was valid since they have more than mere reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal
activity. He had personal knowledge of the facts and not just relying on information of
witness. Moreover, Padilla was caught in flagrante delicto with possession of unlicensed
firearms. It was in plain view. Police did not require further search and the evidence was
inadvertently discovered where the arresting officer had the right to be where he was.

GO VS. CA
206 SCRA 138

While driving, Go nearly collided w/ Maguan who was driving in the opposite direction
on a one-way street. Go shot Maguan and sped away but his plate number was identified
by the security guard who, upon being shown a sketch of the perpetrator, confirmed that
it matched the appearance of Go. The police launched a manhunt. Six days after the
shooting, Go showed up at the Station and inquired as to what was going on; he was
accompanied by 2 lawyers. Immediately he was arrested.

W/N

There is no valid warrantless arrest if the crime had not “just been committed.” In
this case, it was 6 days ago. None of the arresting officers had personal knowledge of the
circumstances of the offense. Warrantless arrest must immediately follow the
commission of the crime.

Murder is not a continuing crime that would justify the warrantless arrest anytime.

HELD:
Invalid warrantless arrest. The information did not constitute “personal knowledge.”

BURGOS v. PEOPLE
Ruben Burgos was convicted by the Davao del Sur RTC for Illegal Possession of
Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. He was arrested while plowing his field. The
Philippine Constabulary did not have a warrant. They based their operation on the sole
testimony of Cesar Masamlok who allegedly was coerced by accused to join the NPA
using his gun.
The arrest of the accused without a warrant cannot be justified on the ground that he has
committed an offense. For such to be valid, the officer making the arrest must have
personal knowledge of the commission of the crime. The offense must be committed in
his presence. The arresting officer had no personal knowledge in this case.
Also, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested committed a crime. A crime must actually have been committed. In this case,
the law enforcers merely suspected that the accused had committed a crime. Since the
arrest is unlawful, nothing discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The search which
transpired is also illegal. Neither can the mere failure of the accused to object the search
constitute a waiver. There are requisites to be followed to constitute a waiver.

SC ruled that the arrest and subsequent search was illegal because it did not fall under the
warrantless arrests covered by Rule 113, Sec. 6. Personal knowledge on the part of the
arresting officer is important. Applying the Stonehill doctrine, the evidence was
inadmissible. Burgos was merely plowing his field. Burgos was thus acquitted.

PEOPLE V. MARTI
193 SCRA 57

Appellant asked a forwarder to ship four packages abroad. Before delivering them to the
Bureau of Posts, the forwarder inspected the packages and discovered that they contained
marijuana leaves. He reported the matter to the NBI and brought a sample for
examination. Agents of the NBI went to the office of the forwarder, The forwarder took
out the marijuana leaves and turned them over to the agents of the NBI. Appellant argued
that the marijuana leaves should not have been admitted in evidence, as they had been
illegally seized.

HELD:
The evidence was discovered and obtained by a private person acting in a private
capacity without intervention of the authorities. The constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures was intended to be a restraint upon the government
and its agents and not upon private individuals. Since the marijuana leaves came into the
possession of the government without its violation of the right of the appellant against
unreasonable searches and seizures, they are admissible in evidence. The mere presence
of the agents of the NBI did not convert the search effected by the forwarder into a
warrantless search in violation of the Constitution.
LUZ v. PEOPLE
PO3 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a motorcycle without
a helmet and so he flagged him down. He invited the accused to come inside their sub-
station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the sub-
station to where he is assigned as a traffic enforcer. The accused violated a municipal
ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor
vehicle. While the officers were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on reaching
something from his jacket. He was alerted and told the accused to take out the contents of
his jacket’s pocket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. The accused obliged, slowly
put out the contents of his jacket’s pocket which included two plastic sachets of suspected
shabu.
The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs as the substances
are positive of methampethamine hydrochloride. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs
Decision.
Upon a petition for reiew on certiorari, petitioner claims that there was no lawful search
and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was
a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged
with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims
that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.

Yes, there was no valid arrest. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. There being no valid
arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for
dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the
drivers license of the latter. At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his
citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. rior to the issuance
of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very
corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their
inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

MALACAT v. PEOPLE

“fast eyes / no genuine belief” In response to a bomb threat, Rodolfo Yu of the WPD
and other officers stationed themselves near the Mercury Drugstore in Plaza Miranda
where they observed 2 groups of “Muslim-looking” men who were acting suspiciously
and with “eyes moving very fast.” As the officers approached the said groups, they ran
but were apprehended and a search of their persons yielded a hand grenade and a .38 cal
pistol. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade. They were charged w/ illegal
possession of explosives. The trial court sustained the search.

The alleged perpetrators were not in flagrante delicto when they were arrested and
searched. The allegation that they had “eyes moving very fast” was very doubtful
and could not have justified the existence of probable cause. Hence, since the arrest
was invalid, any search made incidental thereto, is likewise illegal. While probable
cause is not necessary to stop-and –frisk, mere suspicion will likewise not validate it.
A genuine reason must exist to warrant a belief that the person has weapons
concealed. Nothing in the accused’s behavior then would warrant such suspicion.

Pollo is a supervising personnel specialist of the CSC and the OIC of “Mamamayan
Muna Hindi Mamaya Na” program of the CSC. A confidential letter was then later on
sent to the CSC Chairman from a certain Alan San Pedro. It questions if it is alright for a
CSC employee to be a lawyer of an accused go vernment employee having a pending
case in the CSC itself. The chairperson then made a team of 4 IT professionals to make
an investigation and back up all the files in the computers in the Mamamayan Muna
Program and the legal division. Contents were found to be draft pleadings in connection
with administrative case in the CSC and other tribunals

Issue: WON the search conducted and the copying of personal files w/o knowledge and
consent of Pollo is a transgression on his right to privac

. Is there reasonable expectation of privacy?

2. Is the search and the copying of contents reasonable in its inception and scope?
In answering these questions, circumstances such as the relationship of P ollo to the item
seized , the fact of WON the item is in his immediate control then, and WON Pollo took
actions to maintain his privacy need be considered .
For the expectation of privacy, the court held in the negative as there was no allegation
that he ha s a separate enclosed office where other employees cannot access , neither did
he allege that there was even a password . On the contrary, he even admitted that he
would often allow other employees to use his computer. Further, the CSC has a policy
saying th at employees could not expect privacy in anything they create, store and receive
in their computers as the CSC may monitor the same.
As to the question of WON the search conducted was reasonable, the court held in the
positive saying that such was merely conducted in connection with the investigation of a
work - related misconduct as prompted by the letter.

OSG v.