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Facts: FACTS: Gonzales-Flores was found guilty of illegal recruitment

In 1987, accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. recruited as seamen three different people at the same time and collecting
Wilfrey Mabalot, Danilo Ramirez, Leonardo Estanoco and money from them without the necessary license. The
Crisanto Collado to work as janitors in Saudi-Arabia. In complainants filed a complaint after they tried to follow-up their
connection with this, Manungas required the applicants the applications and nothing happened for three months and they
several amounts for medical, placement and other fees. The found out from the POEA that the accused wasn’t licensed. The
applicants failed to be deployed to Saudi however, and upon evidence consisted of the complainant’s testimonies and
verification with POEA, they found out that Manungas was not a testimonies of other witnesses. Accused now argues that the
licensed recruiter. Complainants filed complaints of Estafa and Court didn’t have enough evidence to convict her.
Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale against Fernando. Fernando
maintained that he was not illegally recruiting because he was ISSUE: W/N the Court had enough evidence to convict the
connected with a duly licensed recruitment agency, and that only accused.
because the job openings was subsequently awarded to another
recruitment agency that the applicants he recruited were not able HELD: The SC upholds the conviction. The elements of illegal
to leave for Saudi. recruitment in large scale are: (1) the accused engages in acts of
recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the accused has no
Issue: license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally
Whether or not Fernando was guilty of Illegal Recruitment on a or overseas; and (3) the accused commits the unlawful acts
Large Scale, given the circumstances. against three or more persons, individually or as a group. All the
conditions are present. The evidence shows that she could do
Ruling: something to get their applications approved. Accused contends
The Supreme Court ruled that Fernando, despite of his being that all she did was to refer the complaints but the Labor Code,
connected with a licensed recruitment agency, was still guilty of recruitment includes “referral” which is defined as the act of
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, because he performed passing along or forwarding an applicant for employment after
the acts of recruitment as defined in Article 13 of the Labor Code, initial interview of a selected application for employment or a
by himself. He was the one who recruited the applicants, and he selected employer, placement after initial interview of a selected
was the one who required of them the fees he collected himself. applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement
Illegal recruitment was also qualified because he recruited more officer, or bureau. Also she did more than just make referrals, she
than three persons. actively and directly enlisted complainants for employment
aboard, when promising jobs as seamen, and collected money.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., VS. is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.” The Court said
CABILES that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was
FACTS:Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of
a recruitment and placement agency. Respondent Joy Cabiles Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010. Ruling on the constitutional
was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a issue. In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for branch or office of the government may exercise its powers in any
Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the
that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality existence of any law that supports such exercise. The
control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter. Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent
Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was with it is a nullity. Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null
terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot
to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a
immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that from similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already
June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances
According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion. The Court
ticket to Manila. On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in
illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. LA Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal
dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor
affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission General have failed to show any compelling change in the
finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent. The
months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months
repatriation, and attorney’s fees for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section
7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act
ISSUE: Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
portion of her salary due to illegal dismissal. void.

HELD: YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month
equivalent of respondent’s salary should be increased to the
amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment
contract. In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that the clause “or for three
(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause
and substantive due process. A statute or provision which was
declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it
SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the
v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al. telefax message written by Wang to Sunace, that Sunace
continually communicated with the foreign "principal" (sic) and
FACTS: Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper therefore was aware of and had consented to the execution of the
deployed to Taiwan by Sunace International Management extension of the contract is misplaced. The message does not
Services (Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such employment provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract
was made with the assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund executed after the expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original
Wang. After the expiration of the contract, Montehermozo contract. That Sunace and the Taiwanese broker communicated
continued her employment with her Taiwanese employer for regarding Montehermozo’s allegedly withheld savings does not
another 2 years. necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension of the
When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a
complaint against Sunace, Wang, and her Taiwanese employer As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). She information given to Sunace that Montehermozo had taken
alleges that she was underpaid and was jailed for three months already her savings from her foreign employer and that no
in Taiwan. She further alleges that the 2-year extension of her deduction was made on her salary. It contains nothing about the
employment contract was with the consent and knowledge of extension or Sunace’s consent thereto.
Sunace. Sunace, on the other hand, denied all the allegations.
Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21,
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found 2000, it is safe to assume that it was sent to enlighten Sunace
Sunace liable thereof. The National Labor Relations Commission who had been directed, by Summons issued on February 15,
and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision. Hence, 2000, to appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory
the filing of this appeal. conference following Montehermozo’s filing of the complaint on
February 14, 2000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozo’s
employment was made with the knowledge and consent of Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of
Sunace its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of such
an extension as obviously, the act of its principal extending
HELD: There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship [Montehermozo’s] employment contract necessarily bound it, it
when after the termination of the original employment contract, too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of imputed
the foreign principal directly negotiated with the employee and knowledge.
entered into a new and separate employment contract.
The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the
Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous agent, Sunace, to the principal, employer, not the other way
communication was with the Taiwanese broker Wang, not with around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot,
the foreign employer. therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES,
consented to be bound under the 2-year employment contract INC.
extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its
"owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents
Montehermozo’s claims arising from the 2-year employment Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,
extension. As the New Civil Code provides, Contracts take effect under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months,
only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of month. On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to
law. Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an accept a downgraded employment contract upon the assurance
implied revocation of its agency relationship with its foreign and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer
principal when, after the termination of the original employment by the end of April 1998.
contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with
Montehermozo and entered into a new and separate employment Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano
contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code states that Chief Officer.
the agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the
business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was
persons. repatriated to the Philippines, serving only two months and 7
days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-
three days.

Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA),

the dismissal was declared illegal.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the

provision of RA 8042.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time

he questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.


1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article

III of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;

2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than
of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article one year; and
XIII on labor as a protected sector.
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period
HELD: employment;

On the first issue. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and
burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
The answer is in the negative. Petitioner’s claim that the subject
clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of
term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs
receive is not tenable. to equal protection.

The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the
ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section
enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring
respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they
may be employed.

On the second issue.

The answer is in the affirmative.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing

constitutional provisions translate to economic security and

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral,

for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals
that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an
invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-
à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;

Bernardo vs NLRC hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were
beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts
Facts: show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of
Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who were hired on their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them
various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far East Bank unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a
uniformly worded agreement called ‘Employment Contract for In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that
Handicapped Workers. Subsequently, they are dismissed. a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms
and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person.
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:
employees, because their task as money sorters and counters
was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. “Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.—No disabled
They further allege that their contracts served merely to preclude person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable
the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to
regular employees. the same terms and conditions of employment and the same
compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners allowances as a qualified able bodied person.”
were hired only as “special workers and should not in any way be
considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank.”[12] The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons
Rather, they were “special” workers under Article 80 of the Labor necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit of
Code. Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of
qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by Article
Issue: WON petitioners have become regular employees. 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:

Held: “ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions

of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment
that they shall be trained for a period of one month, after which shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been
the employer shall determine whether or not they should be engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
allowed to finish the 6-month term of the contract. Furthermore, desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, x x x”
the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and
reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, “The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular
the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term. employment is the reasonable connection between the particular
activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is
of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the the employer. The connection can be determined by considering
renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme
of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the NITTO ENTERPRISES VS NLRC
employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even G.R. No.114337, Sept. 29, 1995
if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the
law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as FACTS:
sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that 1. Nitto Enterprises engaged in the sale of glass and aluminium
activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered products, hired Robert Capili as an apprentice machinist under
regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such an apprenticeship agreement for 6 months with a daily wage rate
activity exists.” which was 75% of the applicable min. wage.
2. On Aug 2, as he was handling a piece of which he was working
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total on, it accidentally hit and injured the lef of an office sec who was
of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts of 37 of treated at a nearby hospital. On the same day, after office hours,
them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the he entered a workshop withinthe office premises and not his work
renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the station. He operated one of the power press machines without
hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were authority andin the process, injured his left thumb. Nitto Ent spent
beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts over P1K to cover his medications.
show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of 3. The next day, he was asked to resign in s letter done in Pilipino
their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them which, in essence, mentioned that he had not received any order
unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them. to operate the tool –just as he had no experience- and that it was
his own decision that led tothe accident upon the secretary and
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is to him. The hospital incurred expenses as well. He was salary
necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. good for 9days until the suture is removed and he will also receive
With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these his 6-day salary from July 30 until August 4.
tasks for more than six months. 4. Capili signed and executed a Quitclaim and Release in favour
of Nitto in consideration of the sum of P1,912.79.3 days after, he
Petition granted. formally filed before the NLRC for illegal dismissal and payment
of other monetary benefits.LABOR ARBITER HELD: valid
termination due to gross negligence resulting in the injury upon
himself and toothers and acted without authority.Capili went to
NLRC. NLRC HELD: Reversal of the order and ordered the
reinstatement because he was a regular employee. Nitto went to
court seeking the annulment of the NLRC decision because they
alleged that althoughthere was no approval of the Apprenticeship
Agreement with DOLE but it was enforced the day it was signed.



HELD: Nitto Ent. Did not comply with the requirements of the law ISSUES:
(Art. 61) which mandated that apprenticeship agreements 1) WHETHER OR NOT THE APPRENTICESHIP
entered into by the employer and the apprentice shall be entered AGREEMENT WAS VALID AND BINDINGBETWEEN
only in accordance with the apprenticeship program DULY THE PARTIES
EMPLOYMENT. Therefore,prior approval is a sine qua non-an DISMISSED BY THE PETITIONER
indispensable requisite0 before an apprenticeship program can
be validly entered into. The act of filing with the DOLE is merely
a preliminary step towards its final approval and it will notgive rise HELD:
to an employer-apprentice relations. The agreement then had no 1)The Court held that the apprenticeship agreement which Palad
force and effect. signed was not valid andbinding because it was executed more
than two months before the TESDA approvedpetitioners
apprenticeship program.The Court cited Nitto Enterprises v.
National Labor Relations Commission, where it was heldthat an
CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION, vs COURT OF apprenticeship program should first be approved by the DOLE
APPEALS and before an apprenticemay be hired, otherwise the person hired will
be considered a regular employee. It ismandated that
Facts: On 15 July 1997, Century Canning Corporation (petitioner) apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and
hired Gloria C. Palad (Palad) as fish cleaner at petitioners tuna apprentice shall beentered only in accordance with the
and sardines factory. Palad signed on 17 July 1997 an apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor
apprenticeship agreement with petitioner. Palad received an and Employment. Prior approval by the Department of Labor and
apprentice allowance of P138.75 daily. On 25 July 1997, Employment of theproposed apprenticeship program is,
petitioner submitted its apprenticeship program for approval to therefore, a condition sine qua non before anapprenticeship
the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority agreement can be validly entered into. The Labor Code defines
(TESDA) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). an apprenticeas a worker who is covered by a written
On 26 September 1997, the TESDA approved petitioners apprenticeship agreement with an employer.Since Palad is not
apprenticeship program. According to petitioner, a performance considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement
evaluation was conducted on 15 November 1997, where wasenforced before the TESDAs approval of petitioners
petitioner gave Palad a rating of N.I. or needs improvement since apprenticeship program, Palad is deemeda regular employee
she scored only 27.75% based on a 100% performance indicator. performing the job of a fish cleaner. Clearly, the job of a fish
Furthermore, according to the performance evaluation, Palad cleaner isnecessary in petitioners business as a tuna and
incurred numerous tardiness and absences. As a consequence, sardines factory. Under Article 280 of theLabor Code, an
petitioner issued a termination notice dated 22 November 1997 employment is deemed regular where the employee has been
to Palad, informing her of her termination effective at the close of engaged toperform activities which are usually necessary or
business hours of 28 November 1997. Palad then filed a desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
complaint for illegal d ismissal, underpayment of wages, and non-
payment of pro-rated 13th month pay for the year 1997. 2) Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employer may
terminate the services of an employee for justcauses or for
authorized causes. under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code, the
employer must send theemployee who is about to be terminated,
a written notice stating the causes for termination and mustgive
the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
Thus, to constitute valid dismissal from employment, two
requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a just
orauthorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an
opportunity to be heard and to defendhimself.Palad was not
accorded due process. Even if petitioner did conduct a
performance evaluation on Palad,petitioner failed to warn Palad
of her alleged poor performance. In fact, Palad denies any
knowledgeof the performance evaluation conducted and of the
result thereof. Petitioner likewise admits thatPalad did not receive
the notice of termination because Palad allegedly stopped
reporting for work.The records are bereft of evidence to show that
petitioner ever gave Palad the opportunity to explainand defend
herself. Clearly, the two requisites for a valid dismissal are lacking
in this case.