Schroeder MSJ

Case: 1:17-cv-04663 Document #: 67 Filed: 01/31/19 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:1220
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DR. RONALD L. SCHROEDER, et al., ) Case No. 17 cv 04663

)
Plaintiffs, ) Hon. Frederick J. Kapala
v. )
BRYAN A. SCHNEIDER, in his official )
capacity as Secretary of the Illinois ) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
Department of Financial and Professional ) FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
)
Regulation, UNDER F.R.CIV.P. 56.
)
Defendants.
)
Plaintiffs, Donald Ronald L. Schroeder, 1st Way Pregnancy Support Services, and
Pregnancy Assistance South Suburbs, through counsel, hereby move this Honorable Court to
enter judgment in their favor on their First Amendment free speech and free exercise of religion
claims and grant them the relief they have requested in their verified complaint. In support of
this motion, the Plaintiffs rely upon the memorandum filed contemporaneously with it, together
with the exhibits attached thereto.
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of January, 2019.
/s/Thomas Olp
Thomas Brejcha
Thomas Olp
Thomas More Society
309 W. Washington, Suite 1250
Chicago, IL 60603
(312) 782-1680
tolp@thomasmoresociety.org
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1
Case: 1:17-cv-04663 Document #: 67 Filed: 01/31/19 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:1221
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on January 31, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing document
with the Clerk of this Court through the ECF system which will send notification of the filing to:
Lisa Madigan
Attorney General of Illinois
Sarah H. Newman
Michael T. Dierkes
Assistant Attorneys General
General Law Bureau
100 W. Randolph St., 13th Fl.
Chicago, Illinois 60601
312-814-6131/312-814-3672
lmadigan@atg.state.il.us
snewman@atg.state.il.us
mdierkes@atg.state.il.us
/s/Thomas Olp
One of the Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
2
Case: 1:17-cv-04663 Document #: 67-1 Filed: 01/31/19 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:1222


)
v. )
capacity as Secretary of the Illinois ) NOTICE OF MOTION
Department of Financial and Professional )
)
Regulation,
)
Defendants.
)
TO: All Counsel of Record
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on February 8, 2019 at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as
counsel may be heard, the Plaintiffs, Donald Ronald L. Schroeder, 1st Way Pregnancy Support
Services, and Pregnancy Assistance South Suburbs, through counsel, shall appear before the
Honorable Judge Frederick J. Kapala or any judge sitting in his stead in Courtroom 5300 of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, 327 S. Church St.,
Rockford, Illinois and shall present Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56, a copy of which is being filed and served concurrently with this Notice.
Date: January 31, 2019.
/s/Thomas Olp
Thomas Brejcha
Thomas Olp
Thomas More Society
Chicago, IL 60603
(312) 782-1680
1
Lisa Madigan
Sarah H. Newman
Michael T. Dierkes
General Law Bureau
312-814-6131/312-814-3672
/s/Thomas Olp
2


)
v. )
capacity as Secretary of the Illinois ) PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM
Department of Financial and Professional ) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
)
Regulation, FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
)
Defendants. UNDER FED.R.CIV.P. 56.
)
INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiffs’ mission, rooted in Christian belief, is to assist women in crisis pregnancies
to choose life for their unborn babies. Plaintiffs’ Christian beliefs prevent them from touting the
so-called benefits of the choice (abortion) they fervently hope their clients will eschew, and from
helping them to procure abortion, sterilization, or contraception. Yet Public Act 99-690 (“P.A.
99-690”) requires Plaintiffs to do just those things, on pain of discrimination, sanctions, and
liability.
P.A. 99-690 amends the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act, 745 ILCS 70/1 et
seq. to erode the protections it afforded persons of conscience. On its face as well as in purpose
and effects, P.A. 99-690 requires the very persons whose religious views prevent them from
suggesting certain legal treatment options (abortion, sterilization, and contraception) to facilitate
those options by discussing their putative “benefits,” and by helping clients find providers of
those procedures. P.A. 99-690 compels speech, and is content, viewpoint and speaker based. As
such it must satisfy strict scrutiny, a heavy burden which the State cannot meet. Accordingly,
the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Plaintiffs. Pregnancy Resource Centers (“PRCs”) are religiously motivated
organizations whose mission is to empower pregnant women to choose to carry their babies to
term rather than to abort them. The PRCs oppose, based on conscience, any facilitation of
abortion, sterilization, or contraception. They therefore oppose describing supposed “benefits”
of choosing those procedures or drugs, and oppose referring to (or providing information about)
providers of such procedures or drugs. See, Exhibit 1, Verified Complaint at ¶¶1, 14-16, 24, 28,
36-38; See also, Exhibit 2, Plaintiffs Rule 56.1 Short Statement of Undisputed Material Facts at
¶¶ 2-3; Exhibit 3, Schroeder Aff. (hereinafter “Schroeder Aff.”) at ¶¶6, 11-12, 16; Exhibit 4,
Cocks Aff. (hereinafter “Cocks Aff.”) ¶¶3, 10; Exhibit 5, Dilbeck Aff. (hereinafter “Dilbeck
Aff.”) at ¶¶2, 10-11.
The Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act (“IHRCA”). The IHRCA defines
health care broadly to include “any phase of patient care..including … testing, instructions,
counseling, referrals … or any other advice in connection with the use or procurement of
contraception … sterilization … or abortion … rendered by a physician[s] … nurse[s],
paraprofessionals, or a health care facility, intended for the physical, emotional, and mental
well-being of the person. See 745 ILCS 70/3(a). Physician means a person licensed to practice
under state law, and health care personnel means any “professional, paraprofessional or any
other person who assists in the furnishing of, healthcare services.” Id at 70/3(b)&(c). Health
care facility is defined to include any “location wherein healthcare services are provided to any
person….” Id at 70/3(d). As initially enacted, the IHRCA broadly protected entities and
2
individuals rendering health care as required by their conscientious convictions. See 745 ILCS
§70/4 & §§70/9 - 70/11.4 (prohibiting a wide range of discrimination and providing immunity).
Impact of P.A. 99-690. P.A. 99-690 amended IHRCA in a way that burdens healthcare
providers and subjects them to legal penalties because of their religious convictions. P.A. 99-690
imposes specific duties on those who have a conscience-based objection to facilitating certain
legal treatment options, in effect, forcing them to do so in order to gain protection of the IHRCA.
First, P.A. 99-690 imposes a legal duty to adopt a written protocol addressing access to care and
information, which includes providing medical advice to patients about the "risks and benefits”
of the legal treatment options at issue here i.e., abortion, contraception, and sterilization. 75 ILCS
70/6 & 70/6.1(1). Second, the PRC’s are required to provide referrals or information about
entities who provide abortion, sterilization, or contraception because they have a religious
objection to these procedures and drugs. 75 ILCS 70/6 & 70/6.1(2)&(3). Failure to comply with
these requirements strips the PRCs of protections provided by sections 4-11 of the IHRCA. 75
ILCS 60/6.1. Worse still, failure to comply with these statutory duties exposes them to
disciplinary sanctions and liability under the very law that once protected them. See 745 ILCS
§70/12. The State maintains the PRCs must comply with P.A. 99-690. See Ex. 2 at ¶4.
LAW AND ARGUMENT
The PRCs move for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) on their claims that
P.A. 99-690 violates their right to free speech and the free exercise of religion because there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The standard for summary judgment is well settled. “The burden of production imposed by Rule
56 requires the moving party to make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary
3
judgment.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986). As demonstrated above, the
PRCs have shown that by its terms as well as in its purpose and effects, P.A. 99-690 target
healthcare providers whose religious views prevent them from facilitating certain legal treatment
options and requires them to do just that. The State has no basis to deny that the PRCs cannot
facilitate abortion, sterilization, or contraception because of their sincerely held religious views;
in fact, the PRCs’ discovery responses show they consistently advise against, and refuse to refer
clients to individuals or entities that provide, those procedures or drugs. From this is follows that
P.A. 99-690 restricts the PRCs’ frees speech and free exercise rights, as explained further below.
The PRC’s showing that P.A. 99-690 restricts their rights requires the State to come
forward with “sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for
that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). As explained below, this
means that the State must show that it can satisfy strict scrutiny under the governing law, which
is the burden of proof it would bear at trial. See, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (noting summary
judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make the showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial.”); see also, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (noting that the standard for
granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for directed verdict under F.R.Civ.P. 50(a); C.f.
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006) (noting that
government bears the burden of proof on strict scrutiny during preliminary injunction
proceedings because it would bear that burden at trial).
In this regard, the State must prove that its effort to force the Plaintiffs to comply with
P.A. 99-690 withstands strict scrutiny. See, O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431 (noting that when strict
4
scrutiny applies the Court is required to look “beyond broadly formulated interests” and ask why
1
particular claimants cannot be exempted.”). Further, when applying heightened scrutiny under
the First Amendment, this Article III Court must exercise its independent judgment for the
“deference … due legislative findings … [does] not foreclose … independent judgment of the
facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law ….” Sable Communications of California, Inc. v.
F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989); see also, Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (noting
“[a]s in other First Amendment cases, the court is obligated to make an independent examination
of the whole record in order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden
intrusion on the field of free expression.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Finally,
the “quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative
judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.”
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391, 120 S.Ct. 897, 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000).
As demonstrated below, the State cannot produce the evidence needed to satisfy its burden of
proof, and therefore, the PRCs are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
1
In O Centro, supra, the Court applied strict scrutiny by virtue of the statutory requirement in the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, but the principle cited is a feature of strict scrutiny in general, where
the Supreme Court borrows across subject areas. See, e.g., Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564
U.S. 786, 805 (2011) (using Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993), a
free exercise case, to describe features of strict scrutiny analysis).
5
I. P.A. 99-690 VIOLATES THE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF THE PRCs.
P.A. 99-690 is a content, speaker, and viewpoint-based compelled speech requirement

that must withstand strict scrutiny. The State cannot make the showing required to satisfy that
standard.
A. P.A. 99-690 Must Satisfy Strict Scrutiny Because it Imposes a Content,

Speaker, and Viewpoint-Based Restriction on the PRC’s Speech.
In this case, the PRCs challenge P.A. 99-690 requirement that they “speak,” specifically,
that they: (1) provide medical advice (“risks” and “benefits”) about abortion, sterilization, or
contraception; and (2) refer or provide information about providers of abortion, sterilization, or
contraception. Application of P.A. 99-690 to the PRCs violates their right to speech because it
compels them, under pain of legal sanction, to deliver a government message they do not want to
deliver, and thereby “exacts a penalty on the basis of … content[.]” See Miami Herald Publ’g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57(1974) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The
reason is plain to see: “[m]andating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily
alters the content of the speech.” Riley v National Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988).
“[A] ll speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave unsaid.” Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986); see also, Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (noting “one important
manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide
‘what not to say””). Consequently, "'content-based burdens must satisfy the same rigorous
scrutiny as its content bans.” U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812
(2000). Because P.A. 99-690 dictates what the PRC’s must say, it compels speech.
6
Moreover, P.A. 99-690’s compelled speech requirement is speaker-based. The regulation
targets speakers who have a religious objection to certain legal treatment options and compels
only those speakers to speak a message contrary to their religious views. As the Supreme Court
recently noted, [b]ecause speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often
simply a means to control content, we have insisted that laws favoring some speakers over others
demand strict scrutiny when the legislature’s speaker preference reflects a content preference.”
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, __U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015).
Finally, P.A. 99-690 suffers from an additional and more damning defect: it constitutes
viewpoint-based discrimination because it forces the PRC’s to convey views they reject about
the supposed benefits of abortion, sterilization, and contraception. As the Supreme Court has
explained, “discriminating among viewpoints—or the regulations of speech based on the specific
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is a more blatant and egregious
form of content discrimination.” Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2230.
B. The State’s Application of P.A. 99-690 To The PRCS Cannot Withstand

Strict Scrutiny Analysis.
Because P.A. 99-690 is a content, speaker, and viewpoint-based regulation, the First
Amendment requires strict scrutiny of P.A. 99-690. This means the State must show that P.A.
99-690 and the distinctions it creates advance a compelling state interest. Reed, 135 S.Ct. at
2231 (noting town’s “burden to demonstrate” that “differentiation between…signs…furthers a
compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that end.”). The State “must
specifically identify an “actual problem” in need of solving, and the curtailment of free speech
must be actually necessary to the solution. That is a demanding standard. It is rare that a
regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.” Brown, 564 U.S. at
7
801. Significantly, a law that is underinclusive cannot satisfy this standard because a “law
cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order, and thus as justifying a
restriction on truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest
unprohibited …” Reed, 1 35 S.Ct. at 2232 (internal quotations and citations omitted)(underline

2
added).
The State must also meet the tailoring requirements of strict scrutiny. First, the means
advanced must be “narrowly tailored to that end.” Reed, 135 S.Ct. 2230 (internal quotations and
3
citations omitted). In this regard, an overinclusive law is not narrowly tailored. Second, the
government must use the “least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.”
Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2008). The critical issue here is whether the State can
inform its target audience with its message “without burdening a speaker with unwanted speech,”
because the “First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency.”
Nat’l Institute of Family and Life Advocates, 135 S.Ct. at 2376 (quotations and citations omitted)
The Supreme Court has consistently noted that “[u]nderinclusiveness raises serious doubts about
2
whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular
speaker or viewpoint.” National Institute of Family and Life Advocates,138 S.Ct. 2361, 2376; see also,
Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Com’n, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) (noting underinclusiveness of statute
undermined government’s interest); Simon & Schuster, Inv. v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 10, 111 (1991)(reasoning that under-inclusiveness of Son of Sam law showed the
interest advanced was hardly compelling); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989)(same); First
Nat. Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-795 (1978)(same); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43,
51 (1995)(same).
3
The Supreme Court has consistently reasoned that overinclusive laws are not narrowly tailored.
See, e.g, Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. at 803-804 (noting regulation of violent videogames
was not narrowly tailored because overinclusive); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121-122 (concluding
Son of Sam law was not narrowly tailored because “significantly overinclusive.”); Arkansas Writers’
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 232 (1987)(rejecting sales tax where exemption from tax was
overinclusive vis a vis state’s putative interest).
8
(noting State could inform target audience via government speech without burdening a speaker
4
with unwanted speech).
1. The State Cannot Show That Applying P.A. 99-690 To The PRCs Advances
A Compelling Interest.
The “Medical Advice” Requirement. The State of Illinois cannot show that the
compelled medical advice provisions of Section 6.1 and 6.(1) advance an actually existing
compelling interest. The State claims that P.A. 99-690 was necessary to prevent
religiously-inspired healthcare providers from keeping patients in ignorance of legal treatment
options that are inconsistent with the provider’s religious beliefs. This claim defies common
sense and the facts.
On its face, the State’s claim is insupportable as a matter of common sense. Information
about abortion and contraceptive drugs, devices, and procedures, and the entities that provide
them is so widely available it is common knowledge. Such information is readily accessed
through the telephone book, an internet search, or a call to any federal or state social service
agency. Consequently, the State cannot show that its regulation addresses a real, actually
existing problem, let alone a compelling one, and therefore it fails to satisfy the requirements of
5
First Amendment strict scrutiny at the outset of the inquiry.
4
S ee also, U.S. v. Alverez, __ U.S. __ , 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012)(noting government speech
about medal winners would address the problem created by false claims); Playboy Entertainment Group,
529 U.S. at 823 (finding government failed to prove the adequate notice of signal bleed and the option to
block would not address access to sexually explicit material by minors); Sable Communications, 492 U.S.
at 138-139 (concluding government could take a technological approach in order to prevent minors from
receiving indecent telephone communications, and therefore, total ban on indecent communications was
not the least restrictive means available to achieve government’s goal).
5
S ee, e.g. Brown, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (finding that government could not show a compelling
interest needed to regulate speech because it could not prove that violent video caused violent behavior in
minors); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 362 (rejecting government’s stated interest in shareholder protection
because there was little evidence abuse could not be corrected through shareholder democracy); see also,
9
Further, P.A. 99-0690's is underinclusive, a fatal flaw as shown above. Because P.A.
99-690 amends IHRCA, it applies only to those who object to its requirements by reason of
conscience. The law does not apply to anyone who fails to take the steps required by Sections 6
and 6.1(1) for reasons unrelated to conscience, e.g., because they believe the information is
widely available, do not want to be bothered, or disagree with the requirements for a reason
unconnected to conscience. Such underinclusive regulation belies the State’s claim that P.A.
99-690 advances a compelling interest.
The State’s argument is also unsupported by the facts. In response to discovery requests,
the State has not produced a single complaint to the Illinois Department of Financial and
Professional Regulation alleging that a healthcare professional failed to provide informed
consent because they did not discuss abortion, sterilization, or contraception owing to their
religious views. Put simply, there is no objective record of a problem in need of a solution.
Finally, the State cannot satisfy its burden of demonstrating an actually existing
compelling interest by relying on the legislative record. Here, the State relies on the hearsay of
one witness (Dr. Maura Quinlan), and testimony about one incident recited for the record with no
corroboration and without cross examination. This combination of hearsay and untested
assertions in the legislative record cannot possibly satisfy the State’s heavy burden given this
Court’s duty to conduct an independent review of the record—at least if strict scrutiny means
something more than accepting the ipse dixit. See, e.g., Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000)(noting government’s failed to prove that
signal-bleed of adult programming was a significant problem and striking down regulation on the grounds
that the “First Amendment requires a more careful assessment and characterization of an evil in order to
justify a regulation as sweeping as this.”); Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549 (reversing conviction under Stolen
Valor Act based on finding that the “[g]overnment points to no evidence to support its claim that the
public’s general perception of military awards is diluted by false claims such as those made by Alvarez.”).
10
Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, MD, 2016 WL 10893970 at *17
(U.S.D.C. D. Md (2016)(noting “[t]his testimony recounts stories from others and does not come
from personal knowledge, making it inadmissible hearsay.”); aff’d by Greater Baltimore Center
for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, MD, 879 F.3d 101 (4th
Cir. 2018); see also, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of the State of Florida, 848 F.3d 1293, 1302-03
(11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (noting that state enacted challenged law “based on these six
anecdotes”).
The Refer Or Provide Information Requirement. Taken together 6.1(1), 6.1(2), and
6.1(3) require the PRC’s to refer or give clients information about individuals or entities who
provide legal treatment options that the PRCs reject. The idea that this provision advances a
“compelling interest” is wholly untenable and defies common sense because anyone able to use a
phone book or the internet can obtain this information. Moreover, the law is underinclusive
because, as shown above, it does not regulate the countless healthcare professionals who may
decline to provide this information for other than conscience-based reasons. The State’s effort to
make the PRCs’ deliver its chosen viewpoint is blatantly unconstitutional because “if there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
2. The State Cannot Show That P.A. 99-690 Is A Narrowly Tailored Means To
Advance Its Supposed Interest.
The State cannot show that P.A. 99-690 is a “narrowly drawn regulation[] designed to
serve [the government’s] interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment
11
.” Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126 (brackets and italics supplied).

Freedoms…
Significantly, the State may not demonstrate narrow tailoring simply by equating the effect of the
statute with the state’s interest, for“this sort of circular defense can sidestep judicial review of
almost any statute because it makes all statutes look narrowly tailored.” Simon & Schuster, 502
U.S. at 120 (italics added). Thus, the State cannot show P.A. 99-690 is narrowly tailored simply
by asserting that only religiously-inspired caregivers fail to take the steps the law requires; the
State must prove that this is true in order to prove the law is narrowly tailored. It cannot.
The Medical Advice Requirement. The State claims that P.A. 99-690 was necessary to
prevent religiously-inspired healthcare providers from keeping patients in ignorance of legal
treatment options that are inconsistent with the provider’s religious beliefs. As an initial matter,
P.A. 99-690 is not narrowly drawn because it applies to legal treatment options, i.e. abortion,
sterilization, and contraception, whose existence and relevance are common knowledge. No
woman is ignorant of these options regardless of whether her doctor mentions them, but P.A.
99-690 still compels speech about them, demonstrating that it is not narrowly drawn.
In addition, P.A. 99-690 is not narrowly drawn because it is overinclusive, a damning
defect as shown above. By its terms, P.A. 99-690 compels healthcare providers to discuss legal
treatment options even if they have disclosed to clients that they do not offer such treatments
options and their clients have agreed to care subject to the limitation. It compels such speech
even when the healthcare provider knows that the patient is not interested in those treatment
options. It compels such speech even when the patient states that she does not wish to discuss
legal treatment options. It compels such speech even if the patient has indicated she finds the
options abhorrent or discussion of them offensive. It goes so far as to compel such speech even
12
when it is unrelated to the treatment offered by the healthcare professional, as the State’s effort
to defend the law’s application to PRCs (which do not provide primary care), makes plain to see.
None of these scenarios implicate the State’s purported interest in preventing
religiously-inspired healthcare providers from keeping patients in ignorance of legal treatment
options that are inconsistent with the provider’s religious beliefs. Yet P.A. 99-690 applies to
each of them showing it is not narrowly tailored but overinclusive and unconstitutional.
The Refer or Provide Information Requirement. Any claim that the requirements of
6.1(3) are narrowly tailored is ludicrous. The requirement applies to every client of the PRCs
although any one of them can find individuals who will provide the services at issue here using
the phonebook, internet, or a social service agency (state or federal). Blatant overinclusiveness
is the chief characteristic of this provision, which undermines any claim of narrow tailoring.
3. The State Cannot Show That P.A. 99-690 Is The Least Restrictive Means
Available To Advance Its Supposed Interest.
The State cannot show that P.A. 99-690 is the means to advance its goal that is least
restrictive of the PRC’s right to free speech. The cardinal principles governing this inquiry are:
When plaintiffs challenge a content-based speech restriction, the burden is on the

Government to prove that the proposed alternatives will not be as effective as the
challenged statute… The purpose of the test is to ensure that speech is restricted no further
than necessary to achieve the goal, for it is important to ensure that legitimate speech is
not chilled or punished. For that reason, the test does not begin with the status quo of
existing regulations, then ask whether the challenged restriction has some additional
ability to achieve [the state’s] legitimate interest. Any restriction on speech could be
justified under that analysis. Instead, the court should ask whether the challenged
regulation is the least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives.
Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 542 U.S. 656, 665-666 (2004) (quotations and citations omitted) (italics
added).
13
The State cannot meet its burden as to either Section 6.(1) or 6.3(3) requirements. The
State can provide information about these legal treatment options so via public advertisement
and use of public employees to share that message via social service and educational institutions.
The State’s choice to compel the PRCs to deliver its message is the means most restrictive of the
PRC’s free speech imaginable.
II. P.A. 99-690 VIOLATES THE FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS OF THE PRCs.
As explained above, P.A. 99-690 forces the PRCs to speak and act contrary to their
religious convictions or face legal penalties. Thus, it imposes a substantial burden upon the free
exercise of religion. See, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2777-79 (2016).
On its face as well as in its purpose and effects, P.A. 99-690 targets those whose religious views
prevent them from facilitating legal treatment options and imposes compelled speech
requirements upon them for that reason; but the law leaves untouched those who do not comply
with the requirements of P.A. 99-690 for reasons unrelated to conscience. Accordingly, P.A.
99-690 is neither religiously neutral nor generally applicable, and therefore, it must satisfy strict
scrutiny. See, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32
(1993) (strict scrutiny applies to laws that burden free exercise but are not religiously neutral and
generally applicable). As demonstrated above, P.A. 99-690 cannot satisfy strict scrutiny.
The State argues that P.A. 99-690 is religiously neutral and generally applicable but a
simple comparison with Section 9 of the IHRCA shows that is not so. Section 9 provides that
persons with religious objections are not relieved “from obligations under the law of providing
emergency medical care.” In this way, Section 9 limits IHRCA protection by referring to an
underlying and generally applicable duty.
14
In contrast, Section 6.1 specifies affirmative duties in detailed language. The detailed
provisions of Section 6.1 are necessary precisely because those duties do not arise under
generally applicable law, and therefore, could not be referenced generally as is done in Section 9.
This shows that P.A. 99-690 imposes special duties on those with religious objections rather than
limiting IHRCA protections with reference to an underlying legal duty that is religiously neutral
and generally applicable.
For this same reason, the State’s argument that P.A. 99-690 simply “cuts back” on special
privileges provided by IHRCA also fails. P.A. 99-690 amends IHRCA to impose special
affirmative duties on religious objectors, and requires the PRCs to yield their First Amendment
protection from laws that are not religiously neutral and generally applicable in order to receive
the benefit provided by IHRCA. See 745 ILCS 60/6.1. (conditioning IHRCA protections on
compliance with Section 6.1). This shows that the State’s effort to leverage the benefit created
by IHCRA to coerce compliance with P.A. 99-690 is really an unconstitutional condition. See,
e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbian, Inc. v. Comer, 137 U.S. 2012, 2022 (2017) (noting
government cannot condition even gratuitous benefit upon abandonment free exercise rights);
Agency for Intern. Development v. Alliance for Open Society Intern., Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 214
(2013) (noting government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutional protected freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit).
CONCLUSION
P.A. 99-690 restricts the PRCs free speech and free exercise rights but the law cannot
withstand strict scrutiny. Therefore, the PRCs respectfully request that this Court enter judgment
for them on these claims under F.R.Civ.P. 56(c), and grant them the relief they have requested.
15
/s/Thomas Olp
Thomas Brejcha
Thomas Olp
Thomas More Society
Chicago, IL 60603
(312) 782-1680
Lisa Madigan
Sarah H. Newman
Michael T. Dierkes
General Law Bureau
312-814-6131/312-814-3672
/s/Thomas Olp
16
EXHIBIT 1
Case:3:17-cv-03076-SEM-TSH
1:17-cv-04663 Document #:
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E-FILED
Thursday, 16 March, 2017 12:50:19 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATED DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DR. RONALD L. SCHROEDER, 1st WAY ) Case No.

PREGNANCY SUPPORT SERVICES, an )
Illinois not-for-profit corporation, and )
PREGNANCY AID SOUTH SUBURBS, an )
Illinois not-for-profit corporation, ) Hon.
)
)
Plaintiffs, )
v. )
BRUCE RAUNER, in his official capacity )
as Governor of Illinois; BRYAN A. ) COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND
SCHNEIDER, in his official capacity as ) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Secretary of the Illinois Department of )
Financial and Professional Regulation, )
THOMAS E. PRICE, in his official capacity )
as Secretary of Health and Human Services, )
and SEAN CAVANAUGH, in his official )
)
capacity as Acting Director, Centers for
)
Medicare and Medicaid Services, )
Defendants. )
Plaintiffs Doctor Ronald L. Schroeder, 1st Way Pregnancy Support Services, and
Pregnancy Aid Southwest Suburbs, through counsel, file this complaint against the Defendants,
BRUCE RAUNER, in his official capacity as Governor of Illinois, BRYAN A. SCHNEIDER, in
his official capacity as Secretary of the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional
Regulation, THOMAS E. PRICE, in his official capacity as Secretary of Health and Human
Services, and SEAN CAVANAUGH, in his official capacity as Acting Director, Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“Defendants”), and respectfully request that this Honorable
Court enter a judgment providing the relief requested herein.
NATURE OF THE CASE
1. Dr. Ronald L. Schroeder is a physician licensed in Illinois who provides medical care, pro
bono, to women who seek his assistance in connection with a pregnancy or possible pregnancy.
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1st Way Life Pregnancy Support Services and Pregnancy Aid South Suburbs are not-for-profit
corporations that provide, free of charge, limited medical services, counseling, and material
assistance to women confronted with crisis pregnancies. Plaintiffs have a sincere religious
objection to (1) providing women with information about the supposed benefits of abortion,
sterilization, or contraception; (2) counseling women to have abortions or to use contraceptive
drugs or devices, or sterilization; and (3) facilitating the procurement of any of these drugs,
devices, or procedures by referrals or other means, such as providing information about entities
or individuals who provide such drugs, devices, or procedures.
2. The Illinois Healthcare Right of Conscience Act, 745 ILCS 70/1 et seq. (IHRCA), as
amended by Public Act 99-690 (“P.A. 99-690”), became effective January 1, 2017. See Exhibit
One for P.A.99-0690 followed by the full IHRCA. The new law prevents the Plaintiffs from
providing healthcare and other assistance to individuals who seek help from them in the manner
required by their sincerely held religious convictions. P.A. 99-690 affirmatively requires
Plaintiffs to take the actions described above, which they cannot do without violating their
sincerely held religious convictions. As a result, the Plaintiffs confront an unacceptable
dilemma: They must either violate their sincerely held religious convictions in order to comply
with P.A. 99-690 or refuse to comply with the new law and subject themselves to discrimination,
sanctions, and exposure to liability under state law.
3. To try to resolve this dilemma Plaintiffs are filing this lawsuit to ask this Honorable
Court to find that P.A. 99-690 violates Plaintiffs' rights under the Constitution of the United
States and federal law.
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
4. Plaintiff Dr. Ronald L. Schroeder is a resident of Illinois and licensed physician.
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5. Plaintiff 1st Way Pregnancy Support Services is an Illinois not for profit corporation
doing business as 1st Way Life Center (“1st Way”).
6. Plaintiff Pregnancy Aid South Suburbs (“PASS”) is an Illinois not-for-profit
corporation.
7. Defendant Bruce Rauner, Governor of Illinois, is the chief executive officer of the State
of Illinois. As Governor he is ultimately responsible for the enforcement of the IHRCA, as
amended by P.A. 99-690, including its enforcement by other state officials such as Defendant
Schneider. He is sued in his official capacity.
8. Defendant Bryan A. Schneider is Director of the Illinois Department of Financial &
Professional Regulation, the agency primarily responsible for enforcing the IHRCA, as amended
by P.A. 99-690. He is sued in his official capacity.
9. Defendant Thomas E. Price is Secretary of the federal Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”). This agency makes grants of federal funds totaling hundreds of millions per
year to the State of Illinois in connection with a wide range of federal programs. He is sued in
his official capacity as an indispensable party under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19.
10. Defendant Sean Cavanaugh is the Acting Director of the federal Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (“CMS”), which administers grants to the State of Illinois relating to the
Medicaid, Medicare, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program. He is sued in his official
capacity as an indispensable party under Fed.R.Civ.P. 19.
11. This cases arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States giving the Court
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1361 and 42 U.S.C. §1983.
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12. The Court has authority to issue the requested declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§2201 & 2202, 42 U.S.C. §1983, and Fed.R.Civ.P.57. The Court has jurisdiction to award the
requested injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 65.
13. Venue lies in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because the state
defendants, sued in their official capacity, maintain their principal offices in this district and
division, and the Federal Defendants who are parties to the federal grants implicated in this
litigation exercise their authority in this district and division.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
14. Dr. Ronald L. Schroeder is a medical doctor licensed to practice in the State of Illinois.
He has practiced in the area of Obstetrics and Gynecology since 1973. In his twenty-five years
in private practice in obstetrics and gynecology he has treated a great number of expectant
mothers but he cannot recall even one occasion when a woman asked him about having an
abortion. Now he provides certain limited care, pro bono, to women who seek assistance
because they believe they are pregnant. He administers abdominal and transvaginal ultrasounds
and sometimes a physical examination to confirm the existence of pregnancy and to determine
the baby's gestation and due date. In connection with this medical treatment he discusses the
progress of the pregnancy and any risk factors. He displays ultrasound pictures of the unborn
baby. In his communication with the expectant mother he tries to be positive and to encourage
his patient to think of her pregnancy in a positive light. He does not raise the subject of abortion
since he does not believe abortion is medically necessary except in the most extreme cases, i.e.,
when a mother's life is in danger because of the pregnancy, a situation he never faced in his
many years of medical practice. He does not believe abortion otherwise presents benefits to a
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pregnant mother and so he would not, and could not, discuss abortion's "benefits" with her even
if she asked.
15. Dr. Schroeder believes that his approach is fully in accord with current medical
standards of care, at least before the IHRCA was amended this year by P.A. 99-690. In his
professional opinion a medical doctor practicing in Illinois prior to 2017 was never obligated to
discuss with a patient treatment options that the doctor does not believe, in his or her
independent and reasonable professional judgment, present benefits to the patient. He fears that
passage of P.A. 99-690 is intended to, and will, alter the medical standard of care by requiring
him to discuss so-called benefits of abortion even though he believes, in his sound professional
judgment, that abortion presents no such benefits and is in fact positively harmful to the mother
as well as fatal to the unborn child. In addition he opposes P.A. 99-690's requirement that he
make non-emergency transfers or referrals of patients for abortion and abortifacient products or
services upon request, and at a minimum to provide information about such services, when he is
opposed because of his sincerely held religious beliefs from doing so, and was never as a
medical doctor required to do so before passage of 99-690.
16. While he recognizes that a woman may legally choose abortion, or contraception
methods that are abortifacient, he believes, based on his Christian faith, that the decision to end
the life of an unborn human child through an abortion is a profoundly immoral one that he may
not morally participate in or further. It would be heartbreaking and immoral for him to speak to
a mother about killing her unborn baby. Referring for abortion, or giving out information about
abortion providers, is likewise morally impermissible for him.
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1ST WAY LIFE CENTER
17. 1 Way Life Center is a not-for-profit Illinois corporation founded 39 years ago to
st
provide emotional, material, and financial support to women who find themselves in a crisis
pregnancy. It seeks to provide an open and loving environment where women feel safe and
empowered. All of its services are provided free of charge, without discrimination, and in
confidence. Funding for its work comes solely from private donations through individuals,
churches, civic groups and businesses.
18. 1 Way Center and those who work with and through it (referred to collectively as “1
st st
Way”) firmly believe that pregnancy presents no problem so great as to warrant intentionally
destroying the innocent life in the mother's womb. 1 Way's mission is to encourage women who
st
seek its assistance to see that choosing life for their child is in their own and their child's best
interest. 1 Way supports that choice by providing pre- and post-natal assistance to the mother so
st
she can better care for her baby.
19. 1 Way Life Center provides certain limited medical services such as pregnancy testing
st
and limited ultrasound screening. These services are provided pro bono by licensed healthcare
professionals such as nurses and sonographers. 1 Way does not provide primary medical care.
st
Women seeking 1 Way's limited services (pregnancy test and ultrasound) are advised to seek
st
follow-up care through a licensed physician of their own choosing.
20. 1 Way also utilizes volunteers who are not licensed healthcare professionals but
st
ordinary, caring people who share publicly available information, personal opinions, and
personal and practical advice with clients. These discussions touch on the public debate about
the effects of abortion and contraception, but the prime focus of the discussion is on clients' own
private situations. Non-licensed volunteers do not dispense medical advice.
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21. 1 Way endeavors to support its clients during pregnancy and beyond, whatever abortion
st
decision the client makes. 1 Way's lay volunteers provide information individually and in
st
classes on proper prenatal care, gestational development, post-birth parenting, as well as life
skills, decision-making and maintaining healthy relationships. 1 Way also provides material
st
assistance such as maternity clothing, diapers, formula and baby food, and makes referrals for
employment, housing, childcare, medical care, education, professional counseling, legal
assistance, adoption, and sources of financial assistance. It also provides support for clients'
family members. If a client chooses abortion 1 Way offers post-abortive counseling, which
st
involves discussions and advice between lay staff who consider the individual situation and
voiced needs of the client. Lay staff do not hold themselves out as licensed healthcare providers
and do not provide medical advice.
22. Of 1 Way's clients sixty-seven per cent are single, sixty-two percent are unemployed,
st
sixty-one percent do not have a high school diploma, and the average age is twenty-four. Thirty
percent are Hispanic. In order to serve its clients effectively 1 Way emphasizes the importance
st
of education and encourages educational betterment as a pathway to a better job.
23. Over its 39 years 1 Way Life Center estimates it has helped over 12,000 expectant
st
mothers in its community to choose life for their babies.
24. 1 Way’s directors, officers, staff, and volunteers fulfill their mission based on Christian
st
principles which place a high value on human life from conception to death. As a result they
have a sincerely-held religious objection to speaking to their clients about supposed "benefits" of
abortion or abortifacient contraception. Because of their sincerely-held religious convictions and
their mission of helping women and girls through crisis pregnancies to the birth of their child, 1 st
Way cannot in good conscience provide women with information about supposed benefits of
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abortion or contraceptive drugs and devices. Nor can it provide its clients with referrals to, or
information about, individuals or entities that do provide these procedures or devices.
25. Information about contraception and abortion is readily available to anyone who wishes
to access it through various means such as the phone book, the internet, public health
departments, and advertisements. It is as easy for clients to obtain information about abortion
and contraception services as it was for them to find out about 1 Way and its services.
st
26. The medical director of 1 Way recently disassociated from it because he was not willing
st
to violate his conscience and is afraid of disciplinary sanctions under P.A. 99-690 if he does not
comply. 1 Way no longer is offering healthcare services to women. It provides non-medical

st
assistance but pending the outcome of this lawsuit no longer uses a limited ultrasound scan to
help women confirm their pregnancy, see their unborn child, and make a more informed choice
about the consequences of choosing an abortion.
27. 1 Way Life Center’s work is dependent upon the volunteers and the private donations it
st
receives. Volunteers and donors are motivated to support us because of its life-affirming
mission. Upon information and belief, if 1 Way is required to comply with the requirements of
st
P.A. 99-690 some of its volunteers will disassociate and some donors will cease to contribute.
Pregnancy Aid Southwest Suburbs (PASS)
28. PASS is a faith-based Christian ministry founded in 1983. PASS and those who work
with and through it for the purpose of achieving its mission (referred to collectively as “PASS”),
believe that all human life has intrinsic value because each person is created in the image and
likeness of God. The value of a human life is not measured by position or ability.
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29. PASS’s mission is to encourage and assist each pregnant woman to choose life for her
baby and to support the mother during her first two years of motherhood. PASS has operated for
34 years and during that time has served over 51,000 women.
30. Women who believe they are pregnant can obtain a pregnancy test and a first trimester
ultrasound at PASS, administered in accordance with state law. Healthcare services at PASS
(pregnancy tests and ultrasound) are performed by licensed professionals.
31. PASS does not provide primary care. Clients of PASS are informed about its limited
services and the need to seek the further assistance of a licensed physician.
32. PASS, through a free "Earn while you Learn" program, offers its clients pre-natal
education, basic finance, and parental management classes. The program is conducted by lay
volunteers who are not licensed healthcare professionals and who do not hold themselves out as
such when providing support to PASS' clients. Discussions between lay volunteers and clients
deal with important topics of public concern like abortion, but their primary focus is on clients'
personal situations. These are often intensely personal discussions in which clients describe
difficult situations and the lay volunteers offer emotional support and advice about how to cope.
33. The PASS program supports clients by assisting them with their baby’s needs from birth
to age two. These include diapers, wipes, car seats, and clothing. PASS receives these materials
via donations from businesses and local churches. The program helps clients to understand their
responsibilities to themselves, family, and baby, and assists them to meet them.
34. PASS also offers the IMPACT prevention program. IMPACT educators go into local
schools, churches, and community organizations to encourage and empower young people to be
purposeful about who they are, what their goals are, and how to achieve the self-control to
realize their goals. The centerpiece of this is education on abstinence from sexual activity until
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marriage. PASS has seen at first-hand that teaching and practicing abstinence until marriage
avoids much self-inflicted pain and stress among young mothers.
35. Information about abortion services is readily available in the Chicago area and its
surrounding suburbs via the Internet and in telephone directories, which are available at many
libraries, stores, bars, and other establishments, including government and medical. Less than
1000 yards from each of PASS’s offices, a person can walk into dozens of business and medical
establishments to ask for and look at a phone book or computer to choose an abortion and/or
contraception provider. It is simply unnecessary for anyone from PASS to provide any person
with such information.
36. PASS's ministry operates in accordance with Christian principles which it interprets to
hold that all human life is sacred and that abortion is immoral because it ends the life of an
innocent child and also harms the child's mother. PASS also believes that premarital sex is not
consistent with God's plan for sexuality and works harm on those who engage in it.
37. For this reason, PASS and its personnel may not, consistent with conscience, counsel
women to have an abortion procedure or discuss supposed “benefits” of abortion. PASS may not
counsel or provide information to clients about supposed “benefits” of contraception or
sterilization. PASS may not transfer or refer clients to providers of such procedures, devices or
drugs, or even to provide information about, or to identify via list or otherwise, such providers to
clients. PASS believes that to facilitate the procurement of any of these procedures, drugs or
devices is gravely immoral and sinful.
38. PASS is currently being forced to violate its sincerely held religious convictions because
it cannot risk the sanctions, liability, and discrimination to which it is exposed for non-
compliance, but it cannot abandon the women and other clients who come to it seeking help
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without neglecting its sincerely-held religious conviction that it should aid those most in need.
PASS has filed suit to end this intolerable and unnecessary dilemma.
THE IHRCA AS AMENDED BY P.A. 99-690
39. Prior to its amendment by P.A. 99-690, The Illinois Healthcare Right of Conscience Act,
745 ILCS 70/1 et seq. ("IHRCA"), protected Plaintiffs, and others similarly situated, from
discrimination, coercion, or imposition of liability for conscience-based refusals to participate in
certain medical services, notably abortion, contraception and sterilization. See, 745 ILCS 70/2 et
seq.
40. But with the amendment of the IHRCA effected by P.A. 99-690, the law now requires
the very physicians, healthcare personnel, and healthcare facilities who have conscience-based
objections to these treatment options to speak contrary to their consciences regarding the
treatment options. It does so by requiring conscientious objectors, and only them, to adopt so-
called “access to care” protocols that guarantee that patients are informed by someone at the
facility about the supposed benefits of abortion, sterilization, or use of contraceptive drugs or
devices, as well as the names and locations of providers of abortion, sterilization, or
contraception.
41. The upshot is that the IHRCA, as amended by P.A. 99-690, now forces the Plaintiffs to
engage in speech and actions they believe are immoral and contrary to their sincerely held
religious beliefs, under pain of state-imposed discrimination, sanctions, and liability.
42. P.A. 99-690's amendment of the IHRCA does not advance an actual, existing
governmental interest, let alone a substantial or compelling one. The reason is that the federal
government and State of Illinois, including their agencies and subdivisions, already spend
millions of dollars via a wide range of media to inform residents of Illinois about available
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abortion procedures, contraceptive drugs and devices, and sterilization. Private providers
likewise spend vast sums advertising these products and services to Illinois residents.
Information about contraceptive drugs and devices, sterilization, and abortion is readily available
to all Illinois residents via the internet, phone books, billboard and other advertisements, in
public libraries, and through contact with governmental agencies. The notion that an individual
cannot readily access information about contraceptive drugs and devices, sterilization, or
abortion and individuals or entities who provide these things is simply false. In view of the wide
availability of information about abortion, contraception and sterilization, P.A. 99-690's
requirement that conscientious objectors, and they alone, must affirmatively speak about these
products and procedures fails to advance any actual, existing governmental interest, let alone a
substantial or compelling one, as required by law.
43. Even assuming P.A. 99-690 amended the IHRCA in an effort to advance an actually
existing governmental interest, the statute is not narrowly tailored means to advance its stated
objective; it is in fact unconstitutionally overbroad. It compels Plaintiffs and others to discuss
legal treatment options when the Plaintiffs have specifically indicated they do do so and their
client has agreed to care subject to the limitations of services disclosed by Plaintiffs or other
healthcare providers. It compels Plaintiffs and others to discuss legal treatment options although
the healthcare provider knows in fact or has reason good reason to believe that the patient has no
interest in those legal treatment options. It compels Plaintiffs and others to discuss legal
treatment options with patients although the Plaintiffs or other healthcare providers knows in fact
or has good reason to believe that the patient will be offended or distressed by the discussion of
certain treatment options. It compels Plaintiffs and others to discuss legal treatment options
although the patient has indicated they are not interested in treatment options. It compels
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Plaintiffs to provide referrals for, or information about entities who provide abortion,
sterilization, and contraception, even though Plaintiffs cannot do so in good conscience and even
though this information is widely available from countless public and private sources.
44. In addition, P.A. 99-690 is not narrowly tailored and is in fact unconstitutionally
overbroad because it regulates and compels speech by private citizens who serve as staff or
volunteer counselors at the Plaintiffs, individuals who are not licensed healthcare professionals,
who do not hold themselves out as such to the public as licensed healthcare providers, and who
do not provide medical advice. These lay advocates discuss abortion (a matter of public
concern), and its implications for the women who come to Plaintiffs for help (a matter of private
concern). In addition, lay advocates discuss forms of assistance that may be available to women
both as a result of public social welfare programs and private charitable assistance that is
available a matter of public concern, and its implications for the women who come to the
Plaintiffs help, a matter of private concern. The discussions are between private citizens about
matters of public concern and deeply private matters that the government cannot regulate. But
P.A. 99-690 applies to, and regulates, these discussions which is advice intended for the
wellbeing of women who come to PASS for help.
45 Even assuming P.A. 99-690 amended the IHRCA to advance a legitimate state interest,
the statute is not the least restrictive means of securing the interest. The State has many ways of
disseminating information about abortion, contraception and sterilization. It could have tasked
its own employees or other public employees to disseminate the information via internet,
television, radio, and at public health facilities, schools and libraries. It could have required
healthcare providers themselves to disclose the legal treatment options they could not, for
conscience reasons, participate in. Requiring Plaintiffs to mouth its message contrary to their
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First Amendment rights not to speak, and to act as referral agents for providers of such
procedures and services, was simply unnecessary.
46 P.A. 99-690 changes standards governing healthcare providers covered by the IHRCA in
that prior to passage of the act physicians and healthcare providers were free to structure their
medical practice in a way that allowed them to avoid violating their conscientious convictions
provided they informed clients of the limitations on their practice and clients consented to care
subject to these limitations but P.A. 99-690 prevents physicians and healthcare providers from
from doing so at present.
that prior to passage of the act physicians and healthcare providers were free to refrain from
discussing certain legal treatment options when they knew or had reason to know that the patient
was not interested in those treatment options or would find discussion of those treatment options
offensive or distressing but P.A. 99-690 prevents physicians and healthcare providers from from
doing so at present.
that prior to passage of the act there was no state law that affirmatively required Plaintiffs,
physicians or healthcare personnel to perform the duties set forth in P.A. 99-690 6.1(3) but P.A.
99-690 now requires the Plaintiffs and other healthcare providers covered by the IHRCA to do so
now.
49. The State Defendants intend to enforce the provisions of P.A. 99-690 and have said so
on the record in judicial proceedings in both state and federal court. Their enforcement actions
will be under color of state law within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and state action
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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50. The federal government each year makes hundreds of millions of dollars of grants to the
State of Illinois through the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). The grants are
administered in large part by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services who are the
Federal Defendants in this lawsuit. The grants are made to further the public health and welfare.
51. The HHS grants to the State of Illinois are subject to the requirements of federal law
designed to protect the Plaintiffs’ rights of conscience including, 42 U.S.C. 238n, 42 U.S.C.
700a-7, and 114 P.L. 113, Title V, Section 507(d), as incorporated into 114 P.L. 223, Title III,
Division C, Section 101(a)(8). The Plaintiffs and healthcare professionals who work with them
as staff members or volunteers are entitled to the protections of these laws because Plaintiffs
provide healthcare in the plain meaning of the term.
52. P.A. 99-690 violates these federal laws for two reasons. First, it requires Plaintiffs to
provide information about the risks and benefits of abortion or sterilization: an essential and
integral part of providing these treatment options. Second, it requires Plaintiffs to refer to, or
provide information contact information for, individuals or entities that provide abortion,
contraception or sterilization, all of which amounts to providing a referral within the meaning of
these federal laws.
53. Plaintiffs allege that the State Defendants, by their enactment, defense, and enforcement
of P.A. 99-690, are in violation of 42 U.S.C. 238n, 42 U.S.C. 700a-7, and 114 P.L. 113, Title V,
Section 507(d), as incorporated into 114 P.L. 223, Title III, Division C, Section 101(a)(8), and
request as relief either a judicial order requiring the State of Illinois to comply with these laws, or
in the alternative, an order prohibiting the State of Illinois from accepting or being transferred
these federal funds. Because the relief requested directly affects the federal interest to be
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furthered by the contractual agreement between the state and federal defendants, the federal
defendants are indispensable parties.
54. The Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law
as a result of P.A. 99-690 because they will be deprived of the constitutional and statutory rights
referenced herein.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
Count 1
FIRST AMENDMENT: SPEECH
55. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the paragraphs above.
56. P.A. 99-690 violates the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by compelling the
Plaintiffs to speak about the supposed benefits of abortion, contraception, and sterilization, and
to make referrals to persons who will provide these drugs, devices, and procedures, or a list of
entities and individuals who provide these procedures, although Plaintiffs do not want to speak in
this way and cannot do so, consistent with their sincerely held religious convictions.
57. By exposing individuals and entities who do not comply with P.A. 99-690 to
discrimination, sanctions and liability, P.A. 99-690 discriminates against them based on the
content of their speech about, and viewpoint on, the supposed benefits of abortion procedures,
contraception drugs, devices, and procedures, and sterilization, and their opposition to giving
individuals information to procure such procedures, drugs, and devices. In doing so, P.A. 99-690
violates the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
58. Enforcement of the provisions of P.A. 99-690 by the State Defendants will violate the
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to free speech as well as other rights referenced herein.
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COUNT 2
FIRST AMENDMENT - OVERBREADTH
60. P.A. 99-690 is overbroad because it compels Plaintiffs and others to discuss legal
treatment options when the Plaintiffs have specifically indicated they do not offer such treatment
options and their clients have agreed to care subject to the disclosed limitations of services.
61. P.A. 99-690 is overbroad because it compels Plaintiffs and others to discuss certain legal
treatment options despite their knowing or having reason to believe that their clients have no
interest in those treatment options.
62. P.A. 99-690 is overbroad because it compels Plaintiffs and others to discuss certain legal
treatment options with patients although they know or have good reason to believe that their
clients will be offended or distressed by the discussion of the treatment options, or simply do not
want to discuss the treatment options, and have said so.
63. P.A. 99-690 is overbroad because it regulates and compels speech by private citizens
who serve as staff or volunteer counselors at the Plaintiffs, individuals who are not licensed
healthcare professionals, who do not hold themselves out as such to the public as licensed
healthcare providers, and who do not provide medical advice. These lay counselors discuss
abortion, a matter of public concern, and its implications for the women who come to Plaintiffs
for help, matters of private concern. In addition, lay counselors discuss forms of assistance that
may be available to women both as a result of public social welfare programs and private
charitable assistance that is available. The discussions are between private citizens concerning
matters of public concern as well as deeply private matters that the government may not regulate.
64. By its terms PA 99-690 seeks to regulate and dictate the content of these discussions,
and as a result, the law violates the First Amendment.
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COUNT 3
DUE PROCESS
66. P.A. 99-690 is vague and violates due process in that it appears to regulate and compel
speech regardless of the limited nature of medical services provided; regardless of the scope and
nature of the work performed by individuals working for, or volunteering with, Plaintiffs;
regardless of whether the individuals working for or with Plaintiffs are licensed healthcare
professionals or working under the direct supervision of licensed healthcare providers for the
purpose of rendering medical care; and regardless of whether the entity or individual possesses
the competence to provide the information required by state law governing the practice of
medicine.
67. PA 99-690 is vague and violates due process because the nature and scope of the
statutory duty is unclear. The statutory requirements are not clearly tied to, and limited by, the
precise health care service being provided. In addition, the law purports to require conduct based
upon current standards of professional care although there are no clearly defined standards in the
areas covered by the statute, e.g. the risks and benefits of abortion, contraception, and
sterilization, which are subjects upon which reasonable professionals can differ in the exercise of
their reasonable and professional medical judgment consistent with the standard of care, at least
as it existed prior to the operation of P.A. 99-690.
68. As a result, the law is open to arbitrary interpretation and enforcement and,
consequently, it exposes Plaintiffs and individuals working with them to liability to public and
private parties based on how the law is interpreted and applied by the State Defendants.
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69. Because PA 99-690 fails to provide reasonable notice of the conduct required by the law
and the conduct that subjects Plaintiffs to legal sanction and liability, and because it is open to
arbitrary interpretation and enforcement, it violates Due Process.
COUNT 4
FIRST AMENDMENT - EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
71. When they associate to carry out their charitable work the Plaintiffs and those associated
with them are engaged in expressive association designed to advance their religious beliefs and
speech on matters of public and private concern. Their goal in associating is to give charitable
assistance, to share their pro-life message, and to help influence their clients and society.
72. 1st Way and PASS seek to associate with, and do associate with, healthcare
professionals as well as non-professionals to achieve its mission.
73. 1st Way and PASS seek to secure charitable donations so they can provide assistance to
clients free of charge.
74. Some individuals have discontinued their association with 1st Way because they fear
discrimination, sanctions, or liability under P.A. 99-690. In addition, 1st Way has been forced to
cease providing medical services, a cessation which undermines its ability to generate donations
to support its effort to help women in a way consistent with its pro-life convictions.
75. PASS is also at risk of disassociation by employees and donors because it is complying
with the law albeit under duress.
76. P.A. 99-960 violates the Plaintiffs’ right to expressive association because it chills and
destroys their ability to associate and attract support for the purpose of exercising its speech and
free exercise rights.
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COUNT 5
FIRST AMENDMENT - FREE EXERCISE
78. The stated purpose of the IHRCA is to protect the ability of healthcare providers to
provide healthcare in a manner consistent with their conscientious convictions.
79. P.A. 99-690 amends the IHRCA to impose statutory duties on physicians and healthcare
providers who have a conscientious objection to certain legal treatment options in order to force
the Plaintiffs and others to engage in speech and conduct that violates their religious convictions.
80. On its face as well as in its purpose and effects P.A. 99-690 targets individuals who have
conscience-based objections to taking the actions compelled by P.A. 99-690 and subjects them to
a range of sanctions and liability solely because they render healthcare and counseling in a
manner consistent with their sincerely held religious convictions.
81. On its face as well as in its purpose and effects P.A. 99-690 is not religion-neutral or
generally applicable because it does not impose duties or expose to sanctions or liability persons
who refuse to comply with its requirements for reasons unrelated to conscientious objection to
the treatment option, for example, because the healthcare provider knows that someone desiring
an abortion, sterilization, or contraception can easily find such products and services.
82. On its face as well as in its purpose and effects P.A. 99-690 discriminates against
persons with conscience-based objections to certain treatment options. It prevents them, and
them alone, from limiting the scope of services they provide to the patient with the patient’s
consent. It requires them, and them alone, to discuss options they know or have reason to know
that their patient does not wish to hear about those treatment options, or would find such
discussion offensive or distressing.
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83. P.A. 99-690 forces the Plaintiffs to violate their sincerely-held religious convictions or
face discrimination, sanctions, and liability under state law.
84. Actions taken by the State Defendants to enforce P.A. 99-690 will violate Plaintiffs’
right to free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United State
Constitution.
COUNT 6
EQUAL PROTECTION
86. On its face and in its purpose and effects, P.A. 99-690 creates a class of health care
providers, including Plaintiffs, who have conscience-based objections to abortion, contraception
and sterilization, and treats the class unfavorably and discriminatorily compared to all others who
have no conscience-based objections. It mandates that Plaintiffs discuss so-called benefits of
abortion, contraception and sterilization, even if they have, with their patients' agreement,
expressly restricted the services they offer, or if they know or have reason to know that their
patients do not wish to hear about such treatment options, and may have even indicated as much.
But it imposes no similar requirement on providers who have no conscience-based opposition to
the treatment options mentioned and decline to discuss them for different reasons, such as that
they would lose business if a patient selected a mentioned treatment option, or they believed that
information about the option was unnecessary to talk about because it was already available to
the patient, or because they simply couldn't be bothered talking about it.
87. Any action taken by Defendants to enforce P.A. 99-690 will violate the Plaintiffs’ right
to equal protection of the law.
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COUNT 7
VIOLATION OF 114 P.L. 223
89. 114 P.L. 113, Title V, §507(d), provides that no federal funds may be made available to
any state or local government if the state or local government subjects an institution or individual
healthcare entity to discrimination because it does not provide or refer for abortions. Those
restrictions are legally binding by virtue of 114 P.L. 223, Title III, Division C, Section 101(a)(8).
90. The State of Illinois receives millions of dollars of federal financial assistance each year
and therefore is subject to the restrictions of 114 P.L. 113, Title V, §507(d).
91. The Plaintiffs are healthcare entities entitled to the protection under 114 P.L. 113, Title
V, §507(d) because at least some of the assistance rendered by them constitutes healthcare in the
ordinary sense of that term and within the meaning of the IHRCA.
92. P.A. 99-690 discriminates against the Plaintiffs and healthcare professionals who work
with it as staff members or volunteers for two reasons. First, it requires Plaintiffs to provide
information about the risks and benefits of abortion or sterilization: an essential and integral part
of providing these treatment options. Second, it requires Plaintiffs to provide information about
individuals or entities that provide abortion or sterilization amounting to a "referral" within the
meaning of the statute. In both of these ways P.A. 99-690 forces physicians and healthcare
personnel to assist in the performance of abortions or sterilizations against their conscience.
93. Any action taken by the State Defendants or others to enforce P.A. 99-690 against the
Plaintiffs will violate 114 P.L. 116, Title V, §507(d).
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COUNT 8
VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300a-7.
95. 42 U.S.C., §300a-7 provides that no federal funds may be made available to a state or
local government if the state or local government subjects a physician or healthcare personnel to
discrimination because such person declines or refuses to assist in abortion or sterilization
procedures on the basis of their religious or moral convictions.
and therefore is subject to the restrictions of 42 U.S.C., §300a-7.
97. The Plaintiffs and healthcare professionals who work with it as staff members or
volunteers are healthcare entities entitled to the protection provided by 42 U.S.C., §300a-7,
because at least some of the assistance rendered by them is healthcare in the ordinary sense of
that term, and within the meaning of the IHRCA.
98. P.A. 99-690 discriminates against the Plaintiffs and healthcare professionals who work
with it as staff members or volunteers for two reasons. First, it requires Plaintiffs to provide
information about the risks and benefits of abortion or sterilization: an essential and integral part
of providing these treatment options. Second, it requires Plaintiffs to provide information about
individuals or entities that provide abortion or sterilization amounting to a "referral" within the
meaning of the statute. In both these ways P.A. 99-690 forces physicians and healthcare
personnel to assist in the performance of abortions or sterilizations against their conscience.
99. Any action taken by the State Defendants or others to enforce P.A. 99-690 against the
Plaintiffs will violate 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300a-7.
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COUNT 9
VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. §238N
101. 42 U.S.C. §238n inter alia prohibits the federal government, as well as any state or local
government receiving federal financial assistance pursuant to the statute, from discriminating
against a health care entity because that entity refuses to perform induced abortions, provides
referrals for abortions, or makes arrangements for abortions.
and therefore is subject to the restrictions and prohibitions of 42 U.S.C. §238n.
103. The Plaintiffs are protected by 42 U.S.C. §238n because at least some of the assistance
rendered by them constitutes healthcare in the ordinary sense of that term, and within the
meaning of the IHRCA.
104. P.A. 99-690 violates 42 U.S.C. §238n. First, it requires Plaintiffs to provide information
about the risks and benefits of abortion or sterilization: an essential and integral part of providing
these treatment options. Second, it requires Plaintiffs to provide information about individuals or
entities that provide abortion or sterilization, amounting to a "referral" within the meaning of the
statute.
105. Any action taken by Defendants to enforce P.A. 99-690 against the Plaintiffs will violate
42 U.S.C. Sec. 238n.
RELIEF REQUESTED
The Plaintiff respectfully request that this honorable Court provide the following relief:
1. A declaratory judgment that any action taken by the Defendants against the Plaintiffs
and those who work with them for noncompliance with P.A. 99-690 arising from their sincerely-
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held religious beliefs and conscientious objections would violate their rights under the U.S.
Constitution and federal statutes cited;
2. An injunction prohibiting the Defendants and others acting in concert with them from
violating the Plaintiffs’ rights as claimed herein including, but not limited to the following:
(A) an injunction prohibiting the State Defendants from taking any adverse action against
the Plaintiffs, and those who associate with them, for noncompliance with the provisions of P.A.
99-690, when the noncompliance has arisen from their conscience-based objections and
sincerely-held religious convictions;
(B) an injunction prohibiting the State Defendants from accepting federal funds from
HHS or its agencies, including CMMS, unless the State Defendants stipulate by means of a
sworn statement placed in the record that they will not take any action based on the provisions of
P.A. 99-690 against the Plaintiffs, and those who associate with them, for noncompliance with
the provisions of P.A. 99-690, when the noncompliance has arisen from their conscience-based
objections and sincerely-held religious convictions; and
(C) an injunction preventing the State Defendants and others acting in concert with them
from taking any adverse action towards the Plaintiffs because the Plaintiffs did not comply with
the provisions of P.A. 99-690 because of their sincerely-held religious convictions for the period
during which this litigation was pending.
3. Attorneys’ fees and costs as authorized by law;
4. Actual and nominal damages; and
5. Such other relief as this Court shall deem lawful and just.
Plaintiffs demand a jury trial on all issues so triable.
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Respectfully submitted this 16th day of March, 2017.
/s/Thomas Olp
Thomas Brejcha
Thomas Olp ARDC#3122703
Thomas More Society
19 South LaSalle St. Suite 603
Chicago, IL 60603
(312) 782-1680
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VERIFICATION
I am an adult of sound mind and body who is competent to testify based upon personal
knowledge about the factual allegations in the Complaint pertaining to me. I declare, under
penalty of perjury, that these factual allegations are true and correct to the best of my personal
knowledge, information, and belief.
This 21 day of February, 2017.

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VERIFICATION
I am an adult of sound mind and body who is competent to testify based upon personal
knowledge about the factual allegations pertaining to PASS. I declare, under penalty of perjury,
that the factual allegations concerning PASS are true and correct to the best of my personal
knowledge, information, and belief.
This 21 day of February, 2017.
_______________________
Tim Dilbeck
Executive Director, PASS
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EXHIBIT ONE
3/16/2017 Illinois General Assembly Full Text of Public Act 0990690
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Previous General Public Act 0990690
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Bill Status PrinterFriendly Version PDF

Public Act 0990690

SB1564 Enrolled LRB099 05684 HEP 25727 b
AN ACT concerning civil law.

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois,
represented in the General Assembly:

Section 5. The Health Care Right of Conscience Act is
amended by changing Sections 2, 3, 6, and 9 and by adding
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 as follows:

(745 ILCS 70/2) (from Ch. 111 1/2, par. 5302)
Sec. 2. Findings and policy. The General Assembly finds and
declares that people and organizations hold different beliefs
about whether certain health care services are morally
acceptable. It is the public policy of the State of Illinois to
respect and protect the right of conscience of all persons who
refuse to obtain, receive or accept, or who are engaged in, the
delivery of, arrangement for, or payment of health care
services and medical care whether acting individually,
corporately, or in association with other persons; and to
prohibit all forms of discrimination, disqualification,
coercion, disability or imposition of liability upon such
persons or entities by reason of their refusing to act contrary
to their conscience or conscientious convictions in providing,
paying for, or refusing to obtain, receive, accept, deliver,
pay for, or arrange for the payment of health care services and
medical care. It is also the public policy of the State of
Illinois to ensure that patients receive timely access to
information and medically appropriate care.
(Source: P.A. 90‐246, eff. 1‐1‐98.)

(745 ILCS 70/3) (from Ch. 111 1/2, par. 5303)
Sec. 3. Definitions. As used in this Act, unless the
context clearly otherwise requires:
(a) "Health care" means any phase of patient care,
including but not limited to, testing; diagnosis; prognosis;
ancillary research; instructions; family planning,
counselling, referrals, or any other advice in connection with
the use or procurement of contraceptives and sterilization or
abortion procedures; medication; or surgery or other care or
treatment rendered by a physician or physicians, nurses,
paraprofessionals or health care facility, intended for the
physical, emotional, and mental well‐being of persons;
(b) "Physician" means any person who is licensed by the
State of Illinois under the Medical Practice Act of 1987;
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(c) "Health care personnel" means any nurse, nurses' aide,
medical school student, professional, paraprofessional or any
other person who furnishes, or assists in the furnishing of,
health care services;
(d) "Health care facility" means any public or private
hospital, clinic, center, medical school, medical training
institution, laboratory or diagnostic facility, physician's
office, infirmary, dispensary, ambulatory surgical treatment
center or other institution or location wherein health care
services are provided to any person, including physician
organizations and associations, networks, joint ventures, and
all other combinations of those organizations;
(e) "Conscience" means a sincerely held set of moral
convictions arising from belief in and relation to God, or
which, though not so derived, arises from a place in the life
of its possessor parallel to that filled by God among adherents
to religious faiths; and
(f) "Health care payer" means a health maintenance
organization, insurance company, management services
organization, or any other entity that pays for or arranges for
the payment of any health care or medical care service,
procedure, or product; and .
(g) "Undue delay" means unreasonable delay that causes
impairment of the patient's health.
The above definitions include not only the traditional
combinations and forms of these persons and organizations but
also all new and emerging forms and combinations of these
persons and organizations.
(Source: P.A. 90‐246, eff. 1‐1‐98.)

(745 ILCS 70/6) (from Ch. 111 1/2, par. 5306)
Sec. 6. Duty of physicians and other health care personnel.
Nothing in this Act shall relieve a physician from any duty,
which may exist under any laws concerning current standards, of
normal medical practice or care practices and procedures, to
inform his or her patient of the patient's condition,
prognosis, legal treatment options, and risks and benefits of
treatment options, provided, however, that such physician
shall be under no duty to perform, assist, counsel, suggest,
recommend, refer or participate in any way in any form of
medical practice or health care service that is contrary to his
or her conscience.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to relieve a
physician or other health care personnel from obligations under
the law of providing emergency medical care.
(Source: P.A. 90‐246, eff. 1‐1‐98.)

(745 ILCS 70/6.1 new)
Sec. 6.1. Access to care and information protocols. All
health care facilities shall adopt written access to care and
information protocols that are designed to ensure that
conscience‐based objections do not cause impairment of
patients' health and that explain how conscience‐based
objections will be addressed in a timely manner to facilitate
patient health care services. The protections of Sections 4, 5,
7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of this Act only apply if conscience‐based
refusals occur in accordance with these protocols. These
protocols must, at a minimum, address the following:
(1) The health care facility, physician, or health care
personnel shall inform a patient of the patient's
condition, prognosis, legal treatment options, and risks
and benefits of the treatment options in a timely manner,
consistent with current standards of medical practice or
care.
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(2) When a health care facility, physician, or health
care personnel is unable to permit, perform, or participate
in a health care service that is a diagnostic or treatment
option requested by a patient because the health care
service is contrary to the conscience of the health care
facility, physician, or health care personnel, then the
patient shall either be provided the requested health care
service by others in the facility or be notified that the
health care will not be provided and be referred,
transferred, or given information in accordance with
paragraph (3).
(3) If requested by the patient or the legal
representative of the patient, the health care facility,
physician, or health care personnel shall: (i) refer the
patient to, or (ii) transfer the patient to, or (iii)
provide in writing information to the patient about other
health care providers who they reasonably believe may offer
the health care service the health care facility,
physician, or health personnel refuses to permit, perform,
or participate in because of a conscience‐based objection.
physician, or health care personnel shall provide copies of
medical records to the patient or to another health care
professional or health care facility designated by the
patient in accordance with Illinois law, without undue
delay.

(745 ILCS 70/6.2 new)
Sec. 6.2. Permissible acts related to access to care and
information protocols. Nothing in this Act shall be construed
to prevent a health care facility from requiring that
physicians or health care personnel working in the facility
comply with access to care and information protocols that
comply with the provisions of this Act.

(745 ILCS 70/9) (from Ch. 111 1/2, par. 5309)
Sec. 9. Liability. No person, association, or corporation,
which owns, operates, supervises, or manages a health care
facility shall be civilly or criminally liable to any person,
estate, or public or private entity by reason of refusal of the
health care facility to permit or provide any particular form
of health care service which violates the facility's conscience
as documented in its ethical guidelines, mission statement,
constitution, bylaws, articles of incorporation, regulations,
or other governing documents.
Nothing in this Act act shall be construed so as to relieve
a physician, or other health care personnel, or a health care
facility from obligations under the law of providing emergency
medical care.
(Source: P.A. 90‐246, eff. 1‐1‐98.)
Effective Date: 1/1/2017
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or physicians, nurses, paraprofessionals or health care
facility, intended for the physical, emotional, and mental
wellbeing of persons;
(b) "Physician" means any person who is licensed by
the State of Illinois under the Medical Practice Act of

1987;
(c) "Health care personnel" means any nurse, nurses'
aide, medical school student, professional,
paraprofessional or any other person who furnishes, or
assists in the furnishing of, health care services;
(d) "Health care facility" means any public or
private hospital, clinic, center, medical school, medical
training institution, laboratory or diagnostic facility,
physician's office, infirmary, dispensary, ambulatory
surgical treatment center or other institution or location

wherein health care services are provided to any person,
including physician organizations and associations,
networks, joint ventures, and all other combinations of
those organizations;
(e) "Conscience" means a sincerely held set of moral
convictions arising from belief in and relation to God, or
which, though not so derived, arises from a place in the

life of its possessor parallel to that filled by God among
adherents to religious faiths;
(f) "Health care payer" means a health maintenance
organization, insurance company, management services
organization, or any other entity that pays for or

arranges for the payment of any health care or medical
care service, procedure, or product; and
(g) "Undue delay" means unreasonable delay that
causes impairment of the patient's health.
The above definitions include not only the traditional
combinations and forms of these persons and organizations but
also all new and emerging forms and combinations of these
persons and organizations.
(Source: P.A. 99690, eff. 1117.)
(745 ILCS 70/4) (from Ch. 111 1/2, par. 5304)
Sec. 4. Liability. No physician or health care personnel
shall be civilly or criminally liable to any person, estate,
public or private entity or public official by reason of his
or her refusal to perform, assist, counsel, suggest,
recommend, refer or participate in any way in any particular
form of health care service which is contrary to the
conscience of such physician or health care personnel.
(Source: P.A. 90246, eff. 1198.)
(745 ILCS 70/5) (from Ch. 111 1/2, par. 5305)
Sec. 5. Discrimination. It shall be unlawful for any
person, public or private institution, or public official to
discriminate against any person in any manner, including but
not limited to, licensing, hiring, promotion, transfer, staff
appointment, hospital, managed care entity, or any other
privileges, because of such person's conscientious refusal to
receive, obtain, accept, perform, assist, counsel, suggest,
recommend, refer or participate in any way in any particular
form of health care services contrary to his or her
conscience.
(Source: P.A. 90246, eff. 1198.)
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(745 ILCS 70/6) (from Ch. 111 1/2, par. 5306)
Sec. 6. Duty of physicians and other health care
personnel. Nothing in this Act shall relieve a physician from
any duty, which may exist under any laws concerning current
standards of medical practice or care, to inform his or her
patient of the patient's condition, prognosis, legal treatment
options, and risks and benefits of treatment options,
provided, however, that such physician shall be under no duty
to perform, assist, counsel, suggest, recommend, refer or
participate in any way in any form of medical practice or
health care service that is contrary to his or her conscience.
physician or other health care personnel from obligations
under the law of providing emergency medical care.
(Source: P.A. 99690, eff. 1117.)
(745 ILCS 70/6.1)
Sec. 6.1. Access to care and information protocols. All
health care facilities shall adopt written access to care and
information protocols that are designed to ensure that
consciencebased objections do not cause impairment of
patients' health and that explain how consciencebased
objections will be addressed in a timely manner to facilitate
patient health care services. The protections of Sections 4,
5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of this Act only apply if conscience
based refusals occur in accordance with these protocols. These
protocols must, at a minimum, address the following:
(1) The health care facility, physician, or health
care personnel shall inform a patient of the patient's
condition, prognosis, legal treatment options, and risks
and benefits of the treatment options in a timely manner,
consistent with current standards of medical practice or
care.
(2) When a health care facility, physician, or
health care personnel is unable to permit, perform, or
participate in a health care service that is a diagnostic
or treatment option requested by a patient because the
health care service is contrary to the conscience of the
health care facility, physician, or health care personnel,

then the patient shall either be provided the requested
health care service by others in the facility or be
notified that the health care will not be provided and be
referred, transferred, or given information in accordance
with paragraph (3).
physician, or health care personnel shall: (i) refer the
patient to, or (ii) transfer the patient to, or (iii)
provide in writing information to the patient about other

health care providers who they reasonably believe may
offer the health care service the health care facility,
physician, or health personnel refuses to permit, perform,
or participate in because of a consciencebased objection.
physician, or health care personnel shall provide copies
of medical records to the patient or to another health

care professional or health care facility designated by
the patient in accordance with Illinois law, without undue
delay.
(Source: P.A. 99690, eff. 1117.)
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(745 ILCS 70/6.2)
Sec. 6.2. Permissible acts related to access to care and
information protocols. Nothing in this Act shall be construed
to prevent a health care facility from requiring that
physicians or health care personnel working in the facility
comply with access to care and information protocols that
comply with the provisions of this Act.
(Source: P.A. 99690, eff. 1117.)
(745 ILCS 70/7) (from Ch. 111 1/2, par. 5307)
Sec. 7. Discrimination by employers or institutions. It
shall be unlawful for any public or private employer, entity,
agency, institution, official or person, including but not
limited to, a medical, nursing or other medical training
institution, to deny admission because of, to place any
reference in its application form concerning, to orally
question about, to impose any burdens in terms or conditions
of employment on, or to otherwise discriminate against, any
applicant, in terms of employment, admission to or
participation in any programs for which the applicant is
eligible, or to discriminate in relation thereto, in any other
manner, on account of the applicant's refusal to receive,
obtain, accept, perform, counsel, suggest, recommend, refer,
assist or participate in any way in any forms of health care
services contrary to his or her conscience.
(Source: P.A. 90246, eff. 1198.)
(745 ILCS 70/8) (from Ch. 111 1/2, par. 5308)
Sec. 8. Denial of aid or benefits. It shall be unlawful
for any public official, guardian, agency, institution or
entity to deny any form of aid, assistance or benefits, or to
condition the reception in any way of any form of aid,
assistance or benefits, or in any other manner to coerce,
disqualify or discriminate against any person, otherwise
entitled to such aid, assistance or benefits, because that
person refuses to obtain, receive, accept, perform, assist,
counsel, suggest, recommend, refer or participate in any way
in any form of health care services contrary to his or her
conscience.
(Source: P.A. 90246, eff. 1198.)
(745 ILCS 70/9) (from Ch. 111 1/2, par. 5309)
Sec. 9. Liability. No person, association, or corporation,
which owns, operates, supervises, or manages a health care
facility shall be civilly or criminally liable to any person,
estate, or public or private entity by reason of refusal of
the health care facility to permit or provide any particular
form of health care service which violates the facility's
conscience as documented in its ethical guidelines, mission
statement, constitution, bylaws, articles of incorporation,
regulations, or other governing documents.
physician, health care personnel, or a health care facility
from obligations under the law of providing emergency medical
care.
(Source: P.A. 99690, eff. 1117.)
(745 ILCS 70/10) (from Ch. 111 1/2, par. 5310)
Sec. 10. Discrimination against facility. It shall be
unlawful for any person, public or private institution or
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public official to discriminate against any person,
association or corporation attempting to establish a new
health care facility or operating an existing health care
facility, in any manner, including but not limited to, denial,
deprivation or disqualification in licensing, granting of
authorizations, aids, assistance, benefits, medical staff or
any other privileges, and granting authorization to expand,
improve, or create any health care facility, by reason of the
refusal of such person, association or corporation planning,
proposing or operating a health care facility, to permit or
perform any particular form of health care service which
violates the health care facility's conscience as documented
in its existing or proposed ethical guidelines, mission
regulations, or other governing documents.
(Source: P.A. 90246, eff. 1198.)
(745 ILCS 70/11) (from Ch. 111 1/2, par. 5311)
Sec. 11. Denial of aid or benefit to a facility. It shall
be unlawful for any public official, agency, institution or
entity to deny any form of aid, assistance, grants or
benefits; or in any other manner to coerce, disqualify or
discriminate against any person, association or corporation
attempting to establish a new health care facility or
operating an existing health care facility which otherwise
would be entitled to the aid, assistance, grant or benefit
because the existing or proposed health care facility refuses
to perform, assist, counsel, suggest, recommend, refer or
participate in any way in any form of health care services
contrary to the health care facility's conscience as
documented in its existing or proposed ethical guidelines,
mission statement, constitution, bylaws, articles of
incorporation, regulations, or other governing documents.
(Source: P.A. 90246, eff. 1198.)
(745 ILCS 70/11.2)
Sec. 11.2. Liability of health care payer. No health care
payer and no person, association, or corporation that owns,
operates, supervises, or manages a health care payer shall be
civilly or criminally liable to any person, estate, or public
or private entity by reason of refusal of the health care
payer to pay for or arrange for the payment of any particular
form of health care services that violate the health care
payer's conscience as documented in its ethical guidelines,
mission statement, constitution, bylaws, articles of
incorporation, regulations, or other governing documents.
(Source: P.A. 90246, eff. 1198.)
(745 ILCS 70/11.3)
Sec. 11.3. Discrimination against health care payer in
licensing. It shall be unlawful for any person, public or
private institution, or public official to discriminate
against any person, association, or corporation (i) attempting
to establish a new health care payer or (ii) operating an
existing health care payer, in any manner, including but not
limited to, denial, deprivation, or disqualification in
licensing; granting of authorizations, aids, assistance,
benefits, or any other privileges; and granting authorization
to expand, improve, or create any health care payer, because
the person, association, or corporation planning, proposing,
or operating a health care payer refuses to pay for or arrange
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for the payment of any particular form of health care services
that violates the health care payer's conscience as documented
in the existing or proposed ethical guidelines, mission
regulations or other governing documents.
(Source: P.A. 90246, eff. 1198.)
(745 ILCS 70/11.4)
Sec. 11.4. Denial of aid or benefits to health care payer
for refusal to participate in certain health care. It shall be
unlawful for any public official, agency, institution, or
entity to deny any form of aid, assistance, grants, or
benefits; or in any other manner to coerce, disqualify, or
discriminate against any person, association, or corporation
attempting to establish a new health care payer or operating
an existing health care payer that otherwise would be entitled
to the aid, assistance, grant, or benefit because the existing
or proposed health care payer refuses to pay for, arrange for
the payment of, or participate in any way in any form of
health care services contrary to the health care payer's
conscience as documented in its existing or proposed ethical
guidelines, mission statement, constitution, bylaws, articles
of incorporation, regulations, or other governing documents.
(Source: P.A. 90246, eff. 1198.)
(745 ILCS 70/12) (from Ch. 111 1/2, par. 5312)
Sec. 12. Actions; damages. Any person, association,
corporation, entity or health care facility injured by any
public or private person, association, agency, entity or
corporation by reason of any action prohibited by this Act may
commence a suit therefor, and shall recover threefold the
actual damages, including pain and suffering, sustained by
such person, association, corporation, entity or health care
facility, the costs of the suit and reasonable attorney's
fees; but in no case shall recovery be less than $2,500 for
each violation in addition to costs of the suit and reasonable
attorney's fees. These damage remedies shall be cumulative,
and not exclusive of other remedies afforded under any other
state or federal law.
(Source: P.A. 90246, eff. 1198.)
(745 ILCS 70/13) (from Ch. 111 1/2, par. 5313)
Sec. 13. Liability for refusal to provide certain health
care. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as excusing any
person, public or private institution, or public official from
liability for refusal to permit or provide a particular form
of health care service if:
(a) the person, public or private institution or public
official has entered into a contract specifically to provide
that particular form of health care service; or
(b) the person, public or private institution or public
official has accepted federal or state funds for the sole
purpose of, and specifically conditioned upon, permitting or
providing that particular form of health care service.
(Source: P.A. 90246, eff. 1198.)
(745 ILCS 70/14) (from Ch. 111 1/2, par. 5314)
Sec. 14. Supersedes other Acts. This Act shall supersede
all other Acts or parts of Acts to the extent that any Acts or
parts of Acts are inconsistent with the terms or operation of
#:167-2 Page
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this Act.
(Source: P.A. 90246, eff. 1198.)
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EXHIBIT 2


)
v. )
capacity as Secretary of the Illinois ) LOCAL RULE 56.1 SHORT
Department of Financial and Professional ) STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED
)
Regulation, MATERIAL FACTS
)
Defendants.
)
Plaintiffs, Donald Ronald L. Schroeder, 1st Way Pregnancy Support Services, and
Pregnancy Assistance South Suburbs, through counsel, respectfully submit the following
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contents there is no genuine dispute and
that entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.
1. Defendant Bryan A. Schneider, Secretary of the Illinois Department of Financial and
Professional Regulation, is charged with enforcing P.A. 99-690. Exhibit 1, Verif. Compl. at ¶8.
2. Plaintiffs provide healthcare services to women for whom abortion, sterilization, and
contraception are legal treatment options. Exhibit 1, Verif. Compl. at ¶¶1, 14-16 (Schroeder),
17-23 (1st Way), 28-35 (PASS).
3. Plaintiffs cannot facilitate abortion, sterilization, or contraception because of their
sincerely held religious convictions. Exhibit 1, Verif. Compl. at ¶¶16, 24, 28, 36-38; Exhibit 3,
Schroeder Aff. at ¶¶1, 6, 11-12, 16; Exhibit 4, Cocks Aff. ¶¶3, 10; Exhibit 5, Dilbeck Aff. at ¶¶2,
10-11.
1
4. The State maintains that P.A. 99-690 applies to the Plaintiffs and requires them to comply
with P.A. 99-690 as applied to the legal treatment options of abortion, sterilization, and
contraception.
5. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1361 and 42 U.S.C.
§1983 because the Plaintiffs claim that application of P.A. 99-690 to them violates rights
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. Exhibit 1, Verif. Compl. at ¶¶11, 12.
6. Venue in this Court is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because the state defendants, sued
in their official capacity, maintain offices in this district and division, and also because the
Defendants requested that this matter be transferred to this division of this Court. Exhibit 1,
Verif. Compl. at ¶13; State’s Answer to ¶13 admitting venue is proper.
/s/Thomas Olp
Thomas Brejcha
Thomas Olp
Thomas More Society
Chicago, IL 60603
(312) 782-1680
2
EXHIBIT 3
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EXHIBIT 4
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ATTACHMENT ONE
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1st Way Life Center

Intake Form
Last Name________________________ MI_______ First Name______________________________
Date of Service_________________________Volunteer____________________________________
Limitations of Service
1. The 1stWay Life Center is a non-profit organization. All of our services are free, including a urine
pregnancy test, ultrasound (upon assessment), as well as a situational assessment and
personalized pregnancy options consultation provided by a trained Volunteer Counselor. 1st
Way Life Center does not profit from your decision, and the 1st Way Life Center does not
provide or refer for abortion, contraception, or sterilization. We are here to be a resource of
information to empower you to make the best decision.
2. By signing below, you are giving your consent for a urine pregnancy test to be performed by an
RN – Volunteer and for the results to be verbally provided to you by that individual immediately
following the completion of the test. If a need for our limited ultrasound service is indicated, that
service will be available to you upon consent and availability.
3. 1st Way Life Center offers limited services. Primary care services for pregnancy related issues are
not provided by 1st Way Life Center. If you need to consult with a physician who can provide you
with medical advice and treatment after your visit with us, we have a list of physicians who
might be willing to take you as a patient for your reference. Whether the pregnancy test is
positive or negative, you should consult with a licensed physician if you believe you are
pregnant.
4. Some of our volunteers are trained in pregnancy options consultation. Counseling obtained from
our unlicensed staff and volunteers is not intended as a substitute for professional counseling.
When licensed professionals provide care as allowed by state law, e.g. nurse, ultrasound
technician, or licensed counselor, you will be informed of their status.
5. All information is kept confidential except if child abuse or other mandated reporting laws apply
or if we believe or hear that you are in danger of hurting yourself or others.
I have read and understood the above and hereby authorize the staff of this office to render
services as provided herein. I understand the limited nature of services available to me here.
Client Signature:
Volunteer Signature:
Date:
EXHIBIT 5
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FOR THE
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DR. RONALD E. SCHROEDER, 1ST WAY

PREGNANCY SUPPORT SERVICES, an
Illinois not-for-profit corporation, and Case No.:
PREGNANCY AID SOUTH SUBURBS, an
Illinois not-for-profit corporation,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DECLARATION OF TIM DILBECK
BRUCE RAUNER, in his official capacity as
Governor of Illinois; BRYAN A.
SCHNEIDER, in his official capacity as
Secretary of the Illinois Department of
Financial and Professional Regulation,
THOMAS E. PRICE, in is official capacity
as Secretary of Health and Human Services,
and SEAN CAVANAUGH, in his official
capacity as Acting Director, Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services,
Defendants,
,
1. I am the Executive Director at Pregnancy Aid South Suburbs (PASS).
2. PASS is a faith-based Christian ministry founded in 1983. PASS and those who work
with and through it for the purpose of achieving its mission (referred to collectively as “PASS”),
believe ALL human life has intrinsic value because each person is created in the image and
likeness of God. The value of a human life is not measured by position or ability.
1
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3. Our mission is to help pregnant women choose life for their baby and support the mother
in first two years of motherhood. In the 34 years of existence, PASS has served over 51,000
women.
4. If women who believe they are pregnant come to us, we offer pregnancy tests, and if they
are pregnant, a limited ultrasound (during first trimester). The ultrasound provided by PASS is
administered consistent with state law. All healthcare (in the ordinary sense of that term, e.g. the
free ultrasound), is performed by licensed professionals acting within the scope of their
licensure.
5. PASS does not provide primary care. In fact, women who come to PASS seeking
assistance we specifically inform them about the limited services PASS makes available and the
need to seek further assistance. I have attached form that make this clear. Once a woman
receives the limited services made available at PASS, women are told that they should seek the
assistance of a licensed physician.
2
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6. Also, free of charge, through our ‘Earn while you Learn’ program we give pre-natal
education, basic finance, and father & mother management classes. This counseling is provided
by dedicated lay volunteers who are not licensed healthcare professionals and who do not hold
themselves out as licensed professionals when they are providing support and advice to women
who come to PASS. These discussions deal with important topics of public concern like
abortion, but their primary focus is on the personal situation of the woman and how we can help
her choose life for her baby and take care of her child. These are often intensely personal
discussions between women in difficult situations and lay volunteers who wish to offer them
emotional support and advice about how they can overcome the challenges the face.
7. If clients choose to work with PASS’ program, we support them by helping them provide
for their baby’s needs, e.g. diapers, wipes, car seats, clothing, etc., from birth through age two.
PASS distributes material aid that, on average, is worth at least $75,000. We receive these
materials from businesses and local churches who donate them to support our mission. PASS is
committed to help its clients understand their responsibilities and give them help through the
family process.
8. PASS also offers the IMPACT prevention program. IMPACT educators go into local
schools, churches, and community organizations to encourage and empower young people to be
PURPOSEFUL about WHO they are, WHAT they are choosing, and HOW to move ahead with
hope into their futures. The centerpiece of this is education on abstinence from sexual activity
until marriage. PASS has seen first-hand that teaching abstinence until marriage prevents a lot of
3
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self-inflicted pain among teens.
9. Information about health care providers in close proximity to clients that offer or refer for
abortions and contraception is readily available in the phone book and on the internet. Internet
searches, and phone directories in print and online near the PASS centers in the South Suburbs of
Chicago, Illinois, and throughout Cook and Will counties, and the cities and villages where
PASS centers are located. Telephone directories are available at many stores, bars, and other
establishments, if a member of the public approaches the proprietor or an employee and asks to
see the phone book. Less than 1000 yards from each of PASS’s offices, a person can walk to
dozens of business and medical establishments to ask for and look at a phone book or computer
to choose an abortion and/or contraception provider if desired. It is not necessary that anyone
from PASS provide any person with such information.
10. PASS is a Christian ministry that believes all human life is sacred and that abortion is
harmful to the mother and deadly for her child. We cannot counsel women to have an abortion
or discuss supposed “benefits” of abortion. Likewise, we believe that premarital sex is immoral
and harmful to those who engage in it. Therefore, we cannot counsel individuals about the
“benefits” of contraception or sterilization. Further, we cannot refer individuals who come to
PASS for help to other individuals or entities who provide these drugs and procedures or provide
information about individuals or entities who do so. We believe cooperation with abortion,
sterilization, or contraception is gravely wrong and sinful.
11. PASS is currently being forced to violate its sincerely held religious convictions because
4
# 3-3
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it cannot risk the sanctions, liability, and discrimination to which it is exposed for non-
compliance but it cannot abandon the women and other clients who come to it seeking help
without neglecting its sincerely-held religious conviction that it should aid those most in need.
PASS has filed suit to end this intolerable and unnecessary dilemma.
12. I am an adult of sound mind and body who is competent to testify and make this affidavit
based upon personal knowledge. I declare, under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true
and correct to the best of my personal knowledge, information, and belief.
This 21st day of February, 2017.
Tim Dilbeck
Executive Director, PASS
5
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ATTACHMENT ONE
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Test administered at PASS Center

q Initial Test
q Re-Test
Confidentiality Policy and Limitations of Services
Client # _________________
All information shared with PASS pregnancy care center is treated as confidential and can only be released
with your written consent.
In accordance with the State Law, two exceptions of this policy are:
• If PASS believes that you are in danger of hurting yourself or someone else.
• If PASS has reasonable suspicion that a minor child is being abused or that you are being abused.
• Or other mandated reporting laws.
Limitations of Services:
1. PASS is a non-profit organization. All of our services are free, including a urine pregnancy test,
ultrasound (upon assessment), as well as a situational assessment and personalized pregnancy options
consultation provided by Patient Advocate. PASS does not profit from your decision, and PASS does not
provide Contraceptives or abortion services. We are here to be a resource of information and empower
you to make your best decision.
2. By signing below, you are giving your consent to a urine self-administered pregnancy test, supervised by a
trained Volunteer Advocate. The results of your pregnancy test is not a medical diagnosis.
3. PASS is a limited medical facility. Primary care services for pregnancy related issues, contraceptives or
abortions are not provided by PASS. Whether your pregnancy test is positive or negative, PASS advises you
to consult with a physician who can advise you with medical advice and treatment after your visit with us.
4. Our Advocates are lay volunteers who are trained in pregnancy options consultation. Information
obtained form our unlicensed staff and volunteers is not intended as a substitute for professional
counseling. When licensed professionals provide care as allowed by state law, e.g. nurse or ultrasound
technician, you will be informed of their status.
I have read and understood the above and hereby authorize PASS to render services as provided herein.
I understand the limited nature of services available to me from PASS.
Client Printed Name: _________________________
Client Signature: ____________________________ Date: ________________________
Advocate Signature: __________________________ Date: ________________________
PASS pregnancy care center Client Pregnancy Test Intake 193.0217

PASS network for life

Schroeder MSJ

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Case: 1:17-cv-04663 Document #: 67 Filed: 01/31/19 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:1220

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DR. RONALD L. SCHROEDER, et al., ) Case No. 17 cv 04663

with the exhibits attached thereto.

Respectfully submitted this 31st day of January, 2019.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

One of the Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DR. RONALD L. SCHROEDER, et al., ) Case No. 17 cv 04663

TO: All Counsel of Record

Date: January 31, 2019.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

One of the Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DR. RONALD L. SCHROEDER, et al., ) Case No. 17 cv 04663

the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Plaintiffs​. Pregnancy Resource Centers (“PRCs”) are religiously motivated

abortion, sterilization, or contraception. They therefore oppose describing supposed “benefits”

Aff.”) at ¶¶2, 10-11.

contraception … sterilization … or abortion … rendered by a physician[s] … nurse[s],

LAW AND ARGUMENT

proceedings because it would bear that burden at trial).

I. P.A. 99-690 VIOLATES THE FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF THE PRCs.

P.A. 99-690 is a content, speaker, and viewpoint-based compelled speech requirement

A. P.A. 99-690 Must Satisfy Strict Scrutiny Because it Imposes a Content,

Moreover, P.A. 99-690’s compelled speech requirement is speaker-based. The regulation

form of content discrimination.” ​Reed,​ 135 S.Ct. at 2230.

B. The State’s Application of P.A. 99-690 To The PRCS Cannot Withstand

2231 (noting town’s “burden to demonstrate” that “differentiation between…signs…furthers a

unprohibited …” ​Reed, 1​ 35 S.Ct. at 2232 (internal quotations and citations omitted)(underline

religiously-inspired healthcare providers from keeping patients in ignorance of legal treatment

sense and the facts.

them is so widely available it is common knowledge. Such information is readily accessed

99-690 advances a compelling interest.

Professional Regulation alleging that a healthcare professional failed to provide informed

Barnette,​ 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

​ .” ​Sable Communications​, 492 U.S. at 126 (brackets and italics supplied).

prevent religiously-inspired healthcare providers from keeping patients in ignorance of legal

In addition, P.A. 99-690 is not narrowly drawn because it is ​overinclusive​, a damning

None of these scenarios implicate the State’s purported interest in preventing

religiously-inspired healthcare providers from keeping patients in ignorance of legal treatment

When plaintiffs challenge a content-based speech restriction, the ​burden is on the

PRC’s free speech imaginable.

underlying and generally applicable duty.

and generally applicable.

constitutional protected freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit).

Respectfully submitted this 31st day of January, 2019.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

One of the Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATED DISTRICT COURT

DR. RONALD L. SCHROEDER, 1st WAY ) Case No.

BRUCE RAUNER, in his official capacity as Governor of Illinois, BRYAN A. SCHNEIDER, in

Court enter a judgment providing the relief requested herein.

NATURE OF THE CASE

sterilization, or contraception; (2) counseling women to have abortions or to use contraceptive

or individuals who provide such drugs, devices, or procedures.

sincerely held religious convictions. As a result, the Plaintiffs confront an unacceptable

sanctions, and exposure to liability under state law.

States and federal law.

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE

4. Plaintiff Dr. Ronald L. Schroeder is a resident of Illinois and licensed physician.

doing business as 1st Way Life Center (“1st Way”).

6. Plaintiff Pregnancy Aid South Suburbs (“PASS”) is an Illinois not-for-profit

of Illinois. As Governor he is ultimately responsible for the enforcement of the IHRCA, as

Schneider. He is sued in his official capacity.

8. Defendant Bryan A. Schneider is Director of the Illinois Department of Financial &

by P.A. 99-690. He is sued in his official capacity.

The Plaintiffs. Pregnancy Resource Centers (“PRCs”) are religiously motivated

form of content discrimination.” Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2230.

unprohibited …” Reed, 1 35 S.Ct. at 2232 (internal quotations and citations omitted)(underline

Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

.” Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126 (brackets and italics supplied).

In addition, P.A. 99-690 is not narrowly drawn because it is overinclusive, a damning

When plaintiffs challenge a content-based speech restriction, the burden is on the