[G.R. No. 14078. March 7, 1919.
] "non-Christian" refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more
RUBI, ET. AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD
OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams and Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTES; SECTION 2145 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917;
VALIDITY; CONSTRUCTION; HISTORY. — Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 reads as follows: "With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when
such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants
to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board." Beginning with Act No. 387, Sections 68-71, having
reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 411, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549,
550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 1268, 1306 were enacted for the province of Abra, Antique,
Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva
Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. Act No.
547 referred especially to the Manguianes. All of these special laws with the exception of Act
No. 1306 were repealed by Acts Nos. 1396 and 1397. The last named Act incorporated and
embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1916. The last Administrative Code retains the provision which
originated in Act No. 387, enacted in 1202, in Section 2145 herein quoted.
2. ID.; ID.; ID; ID.; GOVERNMENT POLICY. — These different laws denote an
anxious regard for the welfare of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled
and consistent practice with reference to the method to be followed for their advancement.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Every really new question that comes before the courts
is in the last analysis determined by the application of public policy as aratio decidendi. In
balancing conflicting solutions that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes
will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle.
4 ID.; ID.; ID.; "NON-CHRISTIAN;" HISTORY. — A skeleton history of the
attitude assumed towards the backward inhabitants of the Islands both before and after the
acquisition of the Philippines by the United States is set forth in the opinion. The most
important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject are compiled in Book 6,
Title 3. A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government in its efforts to
improve the conditions of such inhabitants by concentrating them in "reducciones" is found
in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881. Ever
since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the
best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one. Organic
and statutory law has given the subject consideration.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINED. — "Non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory
expression. Legislative, judicial, and executive authority has held that the term "non-
Christian" should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was
intended to relate to degree of civilization. This has been the uniform construction of
executive officials who have been called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The term
directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE "MANGUIANES" — The name "Manguian" signifies
savage, mountaineer, pagan, negro. The Manguianes are very low in culture.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY. — From the beginning of the United
States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The
recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be
described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how
the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority
of the United States.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — With reference to the laws affecting the Indians, it has been
held that it is not within the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For
very good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the
jurisdiction of the judicial department of the Government.
9. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
— The maxim of constitutional law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be
zealously protected.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. " (Cincinnati,
W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comrs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio St., 88.)
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The legislature may make decisions of executive
departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decisions is to give
prominence to the "necessity," of the case.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — An exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial
practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local
authorities.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an
unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial officials
and a department head.]
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION. — Since the term "non-Christian"
is here construed to refer to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization,
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 does not discriminate between individuals
on account of religious differences and is therefore not invalid.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; CIVIL LIBERTY. — Various conceptions of civil liberty are quoted
in the opinion. Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be
enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in
others. Liberty includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways;
to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any
avocation, and for that purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary,
and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion.
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — "Liberty" as understood in democracies is not license; it is
"liberty regulated by law." "Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if
exercised without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural,
such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The authority conferred upon executive officials by Section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 does not unduly interfere with the liberty of the
citizen when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered.
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 18. ID; ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
— "Due process of law" is defined and analyzed in the opinion. The pledge that no person
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is
applicable to all of a class.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Due process of law and the equal protection of the laws
are not violated by Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 since there exists a law;
the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure;
and it applies to all of a class.
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE. — Slavery and
involuntary servitude, together with their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of
enforced, compulsory service of one to another."
21. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Confinement in reservations in accordance with Section 2145
of the Administrative Code of 1917 does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
22. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE POLICE POWER. — The police power of the State is a power
coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity."
23. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on
reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the
general welfare and the public interest.
24. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of
the individual, as axioms of economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern
period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental
activity.
25. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the
courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority in enacting
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917.
26. ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; LEGISLATIVE INTENTION. —
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the
so-called non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and
economic development and advancement in civilization.
27. ID.; ID; ID.; ID.; ID. — In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned,
the purposes of the Government are to gather together the children for educational purposes,
and to improve the health and morals — is in fine, to begin the process of civilization.
28. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State
is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch
in enforcing it, are to protect the settlers in Mindoro and to develop the resources of that great
Island.
29. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION. — Most cautiously should the power of this
court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be
exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered cases is toward non-interference on
the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration.
30. ID.; ID.; ID. — Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Per CARSON, J., concurring:
31. STATUTES; "NON-CHRISTIAN;" DEFINED. — The words "non-Christian"
have a clear, definite and well settled signification when used in the Philippine statute-book
as a descriptive adjective applied to "tribes," "peoples" or "inhabitants," dwelling in more or
less remote districts and provinces throughout the Islands.
32. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTS. — The tests for the determination of the fact that an
individual or tribe is, or is not of the "low grade of civilization" denoted by the words "non-
Christian" are, and throughout the period of American occupation always have been, "the
mode of life, the degree of advancement in civilization, and connection or lack of connection
with some civilized community."
33. ID.; ID.; STANDARD OF CIVILIZATION OF INHABITANTS NOT NON-
CHRISTIAN. — The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly
discloses that the standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be found to have
advanced, to justify its removal from the class embraced within the descriptive term "non-
Christian," as that term is used in the Philippine statute-book, is that degree of civilization
which results in a mode of life within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend
to, and enforce upon its membership the general laws and regulations, administrative,
legislative and judicial, which control the conduct of the admittedly civilized inhabitants of the
Islands; a mode of life, furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal customs or
practices which tend to brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such
customs or practices, or to expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may be
brought in contact with the members of the tribe.
34. ID.; ID.; ID. — So the standard of civilization to which any given number or
group of inhabitants of a particular province in these Islands, or any individual member of
such a group, must be found to have advanced, in order to remove such group or individual
from the class embraced within the statutory description of "non-Christian," is that degree of
civilization which would naturally and normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of
permanent allegiance or adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe, had they at any time adhered
to or maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would qualify them whether they reside
within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a mode of life
independent of and apart from that maintained by such tribe, but such a mode of life as would
not be inimical to the lives or property or general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of the
Islands with whom they are brought in contact.
35. ID.; SECTION 2145 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917; BASIS;
WHEN PROPERLY APPLICABLE. — The power to provide for the issuance of the
reconcentration orders contemplated in Section 2145 of the Administrative Code rests upon
analogous principles to those upon which the liberty and freedom of action of children and
persons of unsound minds is restrained, without consulting their wishes, but for their own
good and the general welfare. The power rests upon necessity, that "great master of all
things," and is properly exercised only where certain individuals or groups of individuals are
found to be of such a low grade of civilization, that their own wishes cannot be permitted to
determine their mode of life or place of residence.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J p:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History
(Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of
American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words
which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion
— This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest.
The legislative power of a state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the
rights, if they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen,
are all involved in the subject now to be considered. To imitate still further the opinion of the
2
Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce the facts and the issues,
next to give a history of the so-called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the
"non-Chritans" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional
questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of
the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of
their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to
be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one
Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
"1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro
adopted resolution No. 25 which is as follows:
"'The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the
following resolution: " 'Whereas several attempts and schemes have been
made for the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro, which
were all a failure,
"'Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some
other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of this province, no
successful result will be obtained toward educating these people,
"'Whereas it is deemed necessary to oblige them to live in one
place in order to make a permanent settlement,
"'Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands
to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board,
"'Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that
the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the
Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"'Resolved, That under Section 2077 of the Administrative Code,
800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be
selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro
subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"'Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads
on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are
previously recommended by the provincial governor.'
"2. That said Resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial
board of Mindoro was approved by the Secretary of the Interior of February
21, 1917.
"3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of
Mindoro issued Executive Order No. 2 which says:
"'Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current
series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the
permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"'Whereas said resolution has been duly approved by the
Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on February 21, 1917.
"'Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, Jr., provincial governor of
Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of Section 2145 of the Revised
Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the vicinities
of the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco
River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not
later than December 31, 1917.
"'Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall
upon conviction be imprisoned not exceeding sixty days, in accordance
with section 2759 of therevised Administrative Code.'
"4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied
in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the governor of the same
province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public
forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
"5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed
their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be
punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
"6. That the undersigned has no information that Doroteo
Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained
it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act
No. 2711." It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the
provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up
their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by
the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action
was taken in accordance with Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required
by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section
of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount
question which the court is called upon to decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
"SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christians upon sites
selected by provincial governor. — With the prior approval of the
Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands
to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board." In connection
with the above-quoted provision, there should be noted Section 2759 of
the same Code, which reads as follows:
"SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Chritian to take up appointed
habitation. — Any non-Christian who shall refuse to comply with the
directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two
thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation
upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be
imprisoned for a period not exceeding sixty days."
The substance of what is now found in said Section 2145 is not new to Philippine
law. The genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology,
would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; Section 62, Act No. 1397; Section
2 of various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the
Manguianes; Section 69, Act No. 387.
3
 Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians."
This word, as will later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the
Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category, and in order to
understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to the
uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the
attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard
for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at
hand are compiled in Book VI, Title III, in the following language:
"LAW I.
"The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales,
on March 21,1551. Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest
of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568.
Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20.
1578.
"THAT THE 'INDIOS' BE REDUCED INTO
'POBLACIONES'(COMMUNITIES).
"In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic
Faith and the evangelical law, and in order that they may forget the
blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live
in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with
great care and special attention, to use all the means most convenient to
the attainment oœ these purposes. To carry out this work with success,
our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at various times;
the prelates of New Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of
glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six — all
of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve God and our
Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in
communities, and not to live in places divided and separated from one
another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual
and temporal benefits and wherein they can not profit from the aid of our
ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which
men are obliged to give one another. Having realized the convenience of
this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have
entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute
with great care and moderation the concentration of the indios
into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such forbearance and
gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who would not
presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection
of those already in settlements would, of their own accord, present
themselves, and it is ordained that they be not required to pay taxes more
than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in the greater
part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied
with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomenderos shall
entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the laws
of this title."
xxx xxx xxx
"LAW VIII.
"Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid,
October 10, 1618.
THAT THE 'REDUCCIONES' BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
"The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be
formed should have the facilities of waters, lands, and mountains, ingress
and egress, husbandry and a passageway of one league long, wherein
the indios can have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those
of the Spaniards.
"LAW IX
"Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560.
THAT THE 'INDIOS' IN 'REDUCCIONES' BE NOT DEPRIVED
OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
"With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be
concentrated in reducciones. Provided they shall not be deprived of the
lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We
hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they
be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that they may
cultivate them and profit therefrom."
xxx xxx xxx
"LAW XIII.
"THE SAME AS ABOVE. "THAT THE 'REDUCCIONES' BE NOT
REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
"No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other
court, has the right to alter or to remove the pueblos or
the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order
or that of the viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided,
however, that the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change
or consent to it by offering or giving information to that end. And, because
these claims are often made for private interests and not for those of
theindios, we hereby order that this law be always complied with, otherwise
the change will be considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of one
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who
should violate this law."
"LAW XV.
"Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMAN IN THE REDUCCIONES,'
WHO SHALL BE 'INDIOS.'
"We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor,
who should be an indio of the same reduccion; if there be more than eighty
houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and,
even if the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than
two mayors and four aldermen. If there be less than eighty indios but not
less than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one
alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in the presence of the
priests, as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios."
"LAW XXI.
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 "Philip II, in Madrid, on May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578.
At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at
Tordesillas, on July 12,1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and
December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4,
Book 7.
"THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE 'INDIOS,' THERE SHALL LIVE NO
SPANIARDS, NEGROES, 'MESTIZOS,' AND MULATTOES.
"We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattoes,
or mestizos to live in the reducciones and towns of the indios, because it
has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate
with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living;
robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs
done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the
negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing
their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also
some of their blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal
which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and
tranquility. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon the
commission of the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in
the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take
great care in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of
the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As regards
the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are
children of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their
houses and haciendas, they shall not be affected by this law, it appearing
to be a harsh thing to separate them from their parents." (Law of the Indies,
vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to
improve the condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them
in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands
of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
"It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every
inhabitant of a territory recognized as an integral part of a nation should
respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on the other-hand, it is
the duty to conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those
backward races that might exist in the nation, and which, living in the
obscurity of ignorance, lack all the notions which enable them to grasp the
moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns under
the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
"It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate
any longer the separation and isolation of the non-Christian races from the
social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the
commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is
located the seat of the representative of the Government of the metropolis.
"It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have
occupied themselves with this most important question, and that much has
been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the
missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that
those degenerate races might be brought to the principles of Christianity,
but the means and the preaching employed to allure them have been
insufficient to complete the work undertaken. Neither have the
punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which
have not been guarded against, thus giving way for the majority of these
races to persist in their mode of living and customs of isolation.
"As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a
lamentable state of things, taking into account the prestige which the
country demands and the inevitable duty which every government has in
enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all who
reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded in the
premises by giving the most careful study of this serious question which
involves important interests for civilization, from the moral and material as
well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all
the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of
Northern Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous conformity of the
meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu,
and the provincial prelates of the Orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians,
Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council
of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate
conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner
for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the
manner and the only form of accomplishing such a task.
"For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying
out these objects, I hereby promulgate the following:
"DECREE.
"1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Island of Luzon are,
from this date, to be governed by the common law, save those exceptions
prescribed in this decree which are based upon the differences of
instruction, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan
races which occupy a part of its territory.
"2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of
these races — which may be divided into three classes: one, which
comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming a
town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have
not as yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of those
mountain and rebellious pagans — shall be published in their respective
dialects, and the officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces
wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these
races learn these rules. These rules shall have executive character,
beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their compliance, they
must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
"3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall
proceed, from now on, with all the means which their zeal may suggest to
them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or
settlements already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations
for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the
construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of
means of communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative
organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished before
the first day of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they
shall have the same rights and obligations which affect the remaining
towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years
they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those
previously indicated.
"4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located
in fertile lands appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not
5
be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute
necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this
purpose the place most convenient for them and which prejudices the least
their interests; and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made to
establish their homes within the reach of the sound of the bell.
"5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there
shall be established an armed force composed precisely of native
Christians, the organization and service of which shall be determined in a
regulation based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of
the Guardia Civil).
"6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new
towns understand all the rights and duties affecting them and the liberty
which they have as to where and how they shall till their lands and sell the
products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be
bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other
producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the
others from engaging in commerce or any other transaction with the
rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with deportation.
"7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the
limits of the territory of the rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever
should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned
governmentally wherever convenient.
"8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans
into the fraternity of the Catholic Church, all who have settled and who
profess our sacred religion shall by this fact alone be exempt for eight years
from rendering personal labor.
"9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the
races not subdued (aetas and mountain igorots) the following advantages
in return for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their
families; concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the
manner they wish and in the way they deem most productive; support
during a year, and clothes upon affecting submission; respect for their
habits and customs in so far as the same are not opposed to natural law;
freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to be
Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of recognized
honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust
them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption
from contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind
of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the
local authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the direct
charge of the authority of the province or district.
"10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily
admit the advantages offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of
constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and
country roads which place them in communication with one another and
with the Christians; provided, that the location of these towns be distant
from their actual residences, when the latter do not have the good
conditions of location and cultivation, and provided further that the putting
of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns
already constituted.
"11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and
punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding the peace, protection, and
advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of
next April, committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the
Christian towns; and for this purpose, the Captain General's Office shall
proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in
conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the
territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy their
dwelling- houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their products
and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year,
and for this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately order a
detachment of the military staff to study the zones where such operations
shall take place and everything conducive to the successful
accomplishment of the same.
"12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missionaries, local
authorities, and other subordinates to my authority, civil as well as military
authorities, shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said
forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of
each.
"13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in
some of the provinces in the southern part of the Archipelago, which I
intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to
them.
"14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-
General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or permanent commission which
shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of the
foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultation by the chiefs
of provinces and priests and missionaries.
"15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a
complement to the foregoing, in bringing about due compliance with this
decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within their
respective jurisdictions." (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la
Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B AFTER ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the
question as to the best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a
perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American
Government in the Philippines, was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of
April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill,
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions have remained
undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph of particular interest
should here be quoted, namely:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the
Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress in
permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government and under which many of these tribes are
now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which
they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should,
however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or
petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to
prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs."
6
 Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature
of an Organic Act for the Philippines. The purpose of Section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to
provide for a legislative body and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the
organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of the
Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the
Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive
jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is
the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This law
transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the
Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (Sec. 12). It divided the Philippine
Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain
Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and
representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not
represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (Sec. 16). The law
established a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have
general supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the
Legislature by appointed senators and representatives (Sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognize a dividing line
between the territory not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory
which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of
the Philippine Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos.
48and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act No. 82, the Municipal
Code; Act No. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Charter of the city of
Manila; Act No. 787, providing for the organization and government of the Moro
Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397,
the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of
settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio Charter; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the
Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried
forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 and 1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of
the primitive peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, Sections 68-71, enacted on April 9,
1902, by the United States Philippine Commission, having reference to the Province of
Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos.
411, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579,753 855, 1113, 1145, 1268, 1306 were
enacted for the provinces of Abra. Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela,
Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan),
Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the
Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
"No. 547. — AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE
PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
"By authority of the United States, be it enacted the Philippine
Commission, that:
"SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it
practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the
provincial governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary
of the Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from
among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to prescribe
their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus
prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers
by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled 'An Act
providing for the establishment of local civil governments in the townships
and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya.'
"SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior,
the provincial governor is further authorized, when he deems such a course
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to
take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected
by him and approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to
comply with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisoned for a
period not exceeding sixty days.
"SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the
Manguianes of his province to acquire the knowledge and experience
necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision
and control over them shall be exercised to this end, and to the end that
law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained.
"SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro
any settlement of Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a
course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections
one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-
seven, as a township, and the geographical limits of such township shall
be fixed by the provincial board.
"SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this
bill, the passage of the same is hereby expedited in accordance with
section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the
Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth,
nineteen hundred.
"SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
"Enacted, December 4, 1902."
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed
by Acts Nos. 1396 and 1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the
provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in question.
These different laws, if they mean anything, denote an anxious regard for the
welfare of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent
practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying
forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instructions to the
Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian
tribes." These words are to be found in Section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in Section 22 of
the Jones Law., They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippine Commission,
establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674of the Philippine
Legislature, carried forward into Sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917,
reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be
mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397 1639, and 2551.
7
 "Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos"
have been the favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the
coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in Sections 2076,
2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; Sections 701-705, 2145, 2422,
2426 Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the
Philippine Legislature, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall
include Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; Sec.
2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, Sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of
course result in giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christians would be those
who profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be those who do not profess
the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited Section
2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuniga,
"Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and
Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair &
Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez,
"Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I, p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further
to ascertain what is its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be
seen by the provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of
the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by
Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Lawconfers similar recognition in the
authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the
Philippine Assembly. " The Philippine Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making
certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or
other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in Article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative
Code. The first section of this article, preceding Section 2145, makes the provisions of the
article applicable only in specially organized provinces. The specially organized provinces
are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the
provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of
local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the
Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a
geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons
some of whom are Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law
specifically recognizes this. (Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so again the geographical
conception is likewise inadequate. The reason is that the motive of the law relates not to a
particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular province because of its
location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated on the civilization or lack of civilization
of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic
words usually introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression.
The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these people under his jurisdiction,
recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward
Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes.'" (See Hearings before
the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session
on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the
future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous
government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30,
1906 circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of
civilization, is substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674,
and Sections 701 et seq., and Sections 2422 et seq., of the Administrative Code of 1917.
For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct
"systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to
determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization
and material prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29 Phil., 434). The question here arose as to
the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with Article 423 of the Penal Code concerning
the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court
makes use of the following language:
". . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes
as legal a tribal marriage of so-called non-Christians or members of
uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance with
the requisites prescribed by General Orders No. 68. . . . We hold also that
the fact that the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe,
of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken
into consideration as a second marked extenuating circumstance."
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of executive officials who have
been called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the
Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-called non-
Christians and who had these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the
Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all governors of
provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later
received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive
Secretary, reading as follows:
"SIR: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people
who were originally non-Christians but have recently been baptized or who are children of
persons who have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of Acts 1396 and 1397, to
be considered Christian or non-Christians.
"It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the
tribes in these islands which are not advanced far in civilization, to hit
upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of
individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to
enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the
designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real
purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people
having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient
advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought
under the Provincial Government Act and theMunicipal Code.
"The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change
the degree of civilization to which the person baptized has attained at the
time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you
will give the member of so-called 'wild tribes' of your province the benefit
of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.
"The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be
allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of regularly organized
8
 municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should
be the degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are
requested to govern yourself accordingly.
"I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-
General, who concurs in the opinion above expressed and who will have
the necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces
organized under the Provincial Government Act." (Internal Revenue
Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of
this court, has the following to say on the subject:
"As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed
unfortunate, but while no other better classification has as yet been made
the present classification should be allowed to stand. . . . I believe the term
carries the same meaning as that expressed in the letter of the Secretary
of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the
degree of civilization rather than of religious denomination, for to hold that
it is indicative of religious denomination will make the law invalid as against
that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom."
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the
Collector of Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relative to the cedula taxation
of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior , was
requested on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the
Collector of Internal Revenue. This construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be
found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907,
reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
"The internal revenue law exempts 'members of non-Christian
tribes' from the payment of cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue
has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess
some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and
that all other persons are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all
persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes
are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others, including Jews,
Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long
as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In
other words, it is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship
or profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it
is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is
associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a
recruit. So far, this question has not come up as to whether a Christian,
maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non-
Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one
occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was
exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This
Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all of the Jews, East
Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion
of the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the
nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and others are quite widely
scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist
in Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes
are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these Islands on
the broad ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-
civilized people preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) "JNO. S. HORD,
"Collector of Internal Revenue."
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular
letter No. 327, approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial
treasurers. This letter in part reads:
"In view of the many questions that have been raised by
provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes due from members of non-
Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purpose of settling
down and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands,
the following clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest
of rulings thereunder is hereby published for the information of all
concerned:
"Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so
classed, not by reason of the fact that they do not profess Christianity, but
because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian
tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is
concerned. . . .
"Whenever any member of a non-Christian tribe leaves his wild
and uncivilized mode of life, severs whatever tribal relations he may have
had and attaches himself to some civilized community, becoming a
member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely
the same law that governs the other members of that community and from
and after the date when he so attaches himself to the community the same
cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other members thereof.
If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule
should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or
reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such period,
and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be
furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to play the tax for
former years.
"In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factor in
determining whether or not a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not
the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor even
his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the
well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in
civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized
community. For this reason so called 'Remontados' and 'Montescos' will be
classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the
application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though
they belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of
advancement and so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots
and members of other recognized non-Christian tribes.
"Very respectfully, ( Sgd. )
"ELLIS CROMWELL, "
Collector of Internal Revenue,
"Approved:
(Sgd.) "GREGORIO ARANETA,
"Secretary of Finance and Justice."
9
 The two circulars above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal
Revenue Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of
Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary
of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular
Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief
of Constabulary requested the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-
Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were
these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By
purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the law and does the
person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of
Attorney-General Avanceña, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out,
concludes:
"In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable
that the person in question remains a non-Christian, so that in purchasing
intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same make
themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At
least, I advise you that these should be the constructions placed upon the
law until a court shall hold otherwise."
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
"With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian
inhabitants has in the provisions of the Administrative Code which we are
studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning
which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether
Filipinos or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those
uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who,
living without home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the
reach of law and order. . . .
"The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that
portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines which live in tribes as non-
Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry
on a social and civilized life, did not intend to establish a distinction based
on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the
difficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the
expression which the Spanish legislation employed to designate the
uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
"The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of
Articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (Articles 2145 and 2759) should
be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the
Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law, but
because to give it its literal meaning would make the law null and
unconstitutional as making distinctions based on the religion of the
individual."
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than
Dr. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the
population into Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of
the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq.) The present Director of the Census,
Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now
being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos. " In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and
Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs,
War Department, a subdivision under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political
Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the term refers to
culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different
executive officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers,
not to religious belief, but, in a way, to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of
the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart
from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various stages approaching civilization. The
Philippine Census of 1903 divided them into four classes.
Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro. Of the
derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimologia de los
nombres de Razas de Filipinas, says:
"In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies 'savage,'
'mountainer,' 'pagan,' 'negro.' It may be that the se of this word is applicable
to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to
certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this
name was given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its
employment in three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had
in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending
still exists and signifies 'ancient,' from which we can deduce that the name
was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that
these men were pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders, in
whose language they were called the 'ancients.' "
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood
and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid,
primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The Manguianes
have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547,
have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under
any form of municipal government. (See Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. I, pp.
22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE — THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the
policy adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the
Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people
is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United States
Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be
derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been
treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the
United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the
Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians
are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore
mentioned, tells how the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane
designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on —
"This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought
by the United States, and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them
from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United
States vs. Kagama ( [1886], 118 U. S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the
United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds
10
to indite a brief history of the position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended finally, we note the following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress
account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive
follows: usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as
a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and
"The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the
protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its
United States, both before and since the Revolution, to the people of the
original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits
United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a complex
of a state."
character.
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within
"Following the policy of the European Governments in the
the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the
discovery of America towards the Indians who were found here, the
subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the
colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since,
judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U. S., 488; U. S. vs.
have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which
Celestine [1909], 215 U. S., 278; U. S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra;
they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But they
U. S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; The Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall., 616; Roff
asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were
vs. Burney [1897], 168 U. S., 218; Thomas vs. Gay [1898], 169 U. S., 264; Lone Wolf vs.
forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without the
Hitchcock [1903], 187 U. S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs.
consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its
Bollinger [1910], 216 U. S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U. S., 286; U. S.
land, or any part of it, or the State or the United States wished to purchase
vs. Lane [1913], 232 U. S., 598; Cyr vs. Walker [1911], 29 Okla., 281; 35 L. R. A. [N. S.],
it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could be done.
795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian
The United States recognized no right in private persons, or in other
reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be
nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians
necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property. (U. S.
themselves these relations are equally difficult to define. They were, and
vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U. S., 577.)
always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when
they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as All this is borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an
possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, unbroken line of judicial decisions.
with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally,
not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits
might result in the issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ( [1879],
they resided."
Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued
The opinion then continues: against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians,
formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the
"It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the
relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located
competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation.
in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and
They are communitiesdependent on the United States. Dependent largely
completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of
for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no
the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and
allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of
without aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged,
the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often
and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested
their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so
and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The substance of
largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them
the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of, and connected with,
and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of
the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped from a reservation situated some
protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the
place within the limits of the Indian Territory — had departed therefrom without permission
Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has
from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the
arisen. . . . The power of the General Government over these remnants of
Army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to
a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary
their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the
to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell.
relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
It must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere
else, because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal
the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone imprisonment by habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related
can enforce its laws on all the tribes." to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of
being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U. S., 28) the
discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its
question to be considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands
dealings with the friendly tribe of Poncas. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed
was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands
for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and
notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports
intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government almost
of the different superintendents charged with guarding their interests and found that these
unlimited power over the persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority. . . .
Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the government "like
Whether such an extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of
reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish
Indian affairs or not, need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully
dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection,
exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld. "The decision
were subjected to restraints and official supervision in the alienation of their property." And
concluded as follows:

11
 "The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to
conclude:
"1. That an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of
the United States, and has, therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas
corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he
may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the United States
or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of
the United States.
"2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being
commander of the military department of the Platte, has the custody of the
relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the
laws thereof.
"3. That no rightful authority exists for removing by force any of
the relators to the Indian Territory, as the respondent has been directed to
do.
"4. That the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as
well as the more fortunate white race, and have the inalienable right to 'life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,' so long as they obey the laws and do
not trespass on forbidden ground. And,
"5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the
United States, and in violation of the laws thereof, the relators must be
discharged from custody, and it is so ordered."
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as
authority to determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the
Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, and as
such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895],
70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case
are not exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that
Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from
different parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without any previous
consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made
to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If
any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the
determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government
and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully
planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the
segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different
Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could
not delegate this power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the
Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative
power should be zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however,
disclose that it has not been violated in this instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by
Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: "The true distinction
therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution,
to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no
valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County
[1852], 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in
Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an
executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U. S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The
growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the
enactment of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely
conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the
Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this
"necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U. S., 80) was a petition for
mandamus to require the Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of
one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by
the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised
Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the
Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe,
have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out of the Indian
relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the
long established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was not
broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless
people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated
as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In
the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian
Department." (See also as corroborative authority, if any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.
S. [1907], 204 U. S., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme
Court; U. S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U. S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An
exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central
legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine
Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by
the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official
representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge "when such a course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better
fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who
have the misfortune of being in a backward state ?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of
legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial officials and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION.
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on
behalf of his unknown clients, says that — "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous.
In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it
provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result, then,
is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals
because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his argument is unanswerable — the
Legislature must be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction
12
is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has
violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we
do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given to a common expression,
especially as classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to
what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action.
We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippine Islands of
a low grade of civilization, and that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does
not discriminate between individuals on account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's
instructions to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no
law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of
the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution — and these provisions, it has been said, "are universal in their
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences
of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356.) The
protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
"Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties,
compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other." (Spencer,
Social Statistics, p. 94.)
"Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that
authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined
idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never understood,
and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome
restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty
we have . . . That man is free who is protected from injury." (II Webster's
Works, p. 393.)
"Liberty consists in the ability to do what one ought to desire and
in not being forced to do what one ought not to desire." (Montesquieu, Spirit
of the Laws.)
"Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted
license to act according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint
under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by
others." (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U. S., 86.)
"Liberty does not import 'absolute right in each person to be, at
all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are
manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the
common good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist with
safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law
unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real
liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which
recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in
respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be
done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual
may assert the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the
authority of any human government — especially of any free government
existing under a written Constitution — to interfere with the exercise of that
will. But it is equally true that in every well-ordered society charged with the
duty of conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual in
respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be
subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as
the safety of the general public may demand.' " (Harlan, J., in
Jacobson vs.Massachusetts [1905] 197 U. S., 11.)
"Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided
by reason and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual."
(Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be
enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom
in others. The right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and
the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common
welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, liberty includes the right of the citizen to be free to use
his faculties in lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and for that purpose, to enter into all contracts
which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a
successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right
to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that liberty means the opportunity to do those things
which are ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs.Missouri [1866],
4 Wall., 277, Wilkinson vs. Leland [18293, 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U. S.,
274; Allgeyer vs.Louisiana [1896], 165 U. S., 578; State vs.Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis.,
530. See 6 R. C. L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly
apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "liberty
regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and
for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man
can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the
individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common
good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizens would, if exercised without
restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed
rights must yield to the regulation of law. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the
interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper
scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U. S., 539: Hardie-Tynes
Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Ala., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of
law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before
the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the
meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property,
and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To
constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always
necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is
especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in
applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is
due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by
public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion
of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves
these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
(Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110 U. S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . .
"first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its
operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
13
prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all
of a class." (U. S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies
with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peabody [1909], 212 U.
S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not
infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a
reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statements, leaving the logical deductions to be
made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution particularly as found in those portions
of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall
involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to
"any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippines.
However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary
modifications, of Sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code,
prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together
with their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one
to another." (Hodges vs. U. S. [1906], 208 U. S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly
involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter
under what form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219
U. S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners
rely for their freedom. Next must come a description of the police power under which the
State must act if Section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to
note at this moment is the far reaching scope of the power, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep, and that among its purposes is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health. peace, morals, education, and good order of the people,
and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add
to its wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U. S., 27.) What we are
most interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the
police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a
power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law
of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake Viewvs. Rose Hill Cemetery
Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the
judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative
discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great
principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily
interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the
right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the
public interest. "There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the
Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the
Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all
republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U. S.
vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us,
before finally deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of
the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should
be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart
the Tigbao reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons for the action, the
following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian
people of the province; and (2) the only successful method for educating the Manguianes
was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the
following: (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in
which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the
motives for its selection, the following:
"To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who
were taken together to Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to
13, 1918, made a trip to that place. There he found that the site selected is
a good one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of
forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be
encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the
requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after
the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children
wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also
gathered the impression that the results obtained during the period of less
than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its
continuance and development.
"Of course, there were many who were protesting against that
segregation. Such was naturally to be expected. But the Secretary of the
Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement to the
press:
" 'It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those
who prefer to live a nomadic life and evade the influence of civilization. The
Government will follow its policy to organize them into political communities
and to educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens
of this country. To permit them to live a way-faring life will ultimately result
in a burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit
crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subject to involuntary
servitude by those who may want to abuse them.' "
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all
the non-Christian people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration — The
advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to equality and unification
with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the
following measures:
"(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people
of seminomadic race are induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in
organized communities.
14
 "(b) The extension of the public school system and the system
of public health throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian
people.
"(c) The extension of public works throughout the Mohammedan
regions to facilitate their development and the extension of government
control.
"(d)Construction of roads and trails between one place and
another among non-Christians, to promote social and commercial
intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with the
Christian people.
"(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic
resources, especially agriculture.
"(f) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the
investment of private capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu."
The Secretary adds:
"To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have
been continued among the non-Christian people. These people are being
taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they may
fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given
to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and
settle in organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it
is the purpose of the Government to organize them politically into fixed and
permanent communities, thus bringing them under the control of the
Government, to aid them to live and work, protect them from involuntary
servitude and abuse, educate their children, and show them the
advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short,
they are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the
Government of leading them to economic, social, and political equality, and
unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country." (See
Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations
with the so-called non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial,
and economic development and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos.
2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes,
defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people in the following
unequivocal terms:
"It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to
continue the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the regions
inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and
in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material,
economic, social, and political development of those regions, always
having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence
between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian
elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago." (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States,
proper wards of the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not
these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for
the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the
ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the
Government is evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a
nomadic life, making depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the
ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What
the Government wished to do by bringing them into a reservation was to gather together
the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals — was in fine,
to begin the process of civilization. This method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing
under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with
reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if
they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there
live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of
the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the Manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically,
we know that the axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not
free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers.
True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies.
And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low
degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the
purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it,
are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected from
predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are
punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed after commission of the
offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the
great Island of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be in a
position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of
the State. Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to
protect itself from destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of
overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
"Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence
of civilization, they (the Manguianes) are engaged in the works of
destruction — burning and destroying the forests and making
illegal caiñgins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead
injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these
people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are
now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the
State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make
depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by
those who may want to abuse them.
"There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right
conception of liberty and does not practise liberty in a rightful way. They
understand liberty as the right to do anything they will — going from one
place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and
making illegal caiñgins thereon.
"Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same
rightfully, how can they allege that they are being deprived thereof without
due process of law?
xxx xxx xxx
"But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be
deprived of his liberty without due process of law' apply to a class of
persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not
practise liberty in a rightful way?
15
 "To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an
erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean,
in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures
looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question.
It will mean that this people should be let alone in the mountains and in a
permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to
understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
"In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes,
the Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting them
alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was
adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national
conscience."
xxx xxx xxx
"The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people
has tended more and more towards the education and civilization of such
people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under
the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the
times point to a day which is not far distant when they will become useful
citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished which has
been winning the gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give
up the noble work simply because a certain element, believing that their
personal interests would be injured by such a measure has come forward
and challenged the authority of the Government to lead this people in the
path of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even
blood only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and
superstition, now willingly retire because there has been erroneously
invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be
deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow them to
successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the
Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and
making them useful citizens. They will thus be left in a permanent state of
savagery and become a vulnerable point of attack by those who doubt, any
challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
"The Manguianes in question have been directed to live together
at Tigbao. There they are being taught and guided to improve their living
conditions. They are being made to understand that the object of the
government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent
communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children are
being educated in a school especially established for them. In short,
everything is being done for them in order that their advancement in
civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living
together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a condition
compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody but for
themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
"But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from
emigrating to some other place under penalty of imprisonment. Attention
in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and
wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from
one place to another as the conditions of living warrant, and the entire
space where they are roving about is the property of the nation, the greater
part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one place to another
on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to
concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of
permitting them to roam all over the entire territory? This measure is
necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about
which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes
and objectives. of the Government. For as people accustomed to nomadic
habit, they will always long to return to the mountains and follow a
wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provided for, you can not make them
live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them
politically will come to naught."
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific
objections and to reach a general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to
go where he pleases. Could he not, however, be kept away from certain localities? To
furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U. S.
Stat. at L., p. 141) punished those intruders who should cross the line into an Indian
reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again
the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this
law and other similar laws were accepted and followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and
defenseless people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous officials. What, it
is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally
be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have little
or no motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that
they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If,
indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists the power of removal
in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a redress of
grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no
particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would seem that the
Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its
laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom,
may the rights and liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will
of the Government? It is a question which has as sailed the very existence of government
from the beginning of time. Not now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to
be decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In
resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government
renders imperative a power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of course,
on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree to
which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen,
this is, and for a long time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as
axioms of economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a
widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. The
courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trail after the other two branches of the
Government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts
cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an
unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for
their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process
of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws. there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
16
 according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a
class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of
doubt, would lead to the determination that Section 2145 is valid, is the attitude which the
courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with
which we are in full accord, Gamble vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter,
510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
"We can see no objection to the application of public policy as
a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes before the courts
is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by
differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid
of analogies furnished by such prior cases. In balancing conflicting
solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes
will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general
rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise
enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions
must be made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of
justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-
called non-Christians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental
policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days to the present. The idea is to
unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of
nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in
intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be
populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government
of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The
Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we
have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the
Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best
considered cases is toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenever political
ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is
justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some
chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U. S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave
questions which this case presents, the court must take "a chance," it should be, with a
view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental
policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense,
but with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a
force as are the other departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny
to him the equal protection of the laws. and that confinement in reservations in accordance
with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of
the opinion that Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145
of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas
corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is the ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxed against
petitioners. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
||| (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, G.R. No. 14078, [March 7, 1919], 39 PHIL 660-738)

17
 BENGZON, J.P., J p:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23794. February 17, 1968.]
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE
TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC
CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS, as Mayor of Ormoc City and
ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Belo and Teehankee, Carreon &
Tañada for plaintiff-appellant.
Ramon O. de Veyra for defendants-appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; POWER TO IMPOSE EXPORT OR IMPORT
TAX; REP. ACT 2264, SEC. 2; EFFECT ON SEC. 2287 OF REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE. — Section 2 of Rep. Act 2264 which became effective on June 19, 1959, gave
chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public purposes
just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees. This provision of law has repealed Sec. 2287 of the
Revised Administrative Code (Nin Bay Mining Co. vs. Municipality of Roxas, L-20125, July
20, 1965), which withheld from municipalities the power to impose an import or export tax
upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW; REASONABLE
CLASSIFICATION; REQUISITES. — The equal protection clause applies only to persons or
things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of
legislation. A classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who
belong to the same class.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TAX ORDINANCE SHOULD NOT BE SINGULAR AND
EXCLUSIVE. — When the taxing ordinance was enacted, Ormoc Sugar Co,, Inc. was the
only sugar central in the City. A reasonable classification should be in terms applicable to
future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to
exclude any subsequently established sugar central.
4. TAXATION; TAX, REFUND OF; NO INTEREST CAN BE CLAIMED;
REASONS. — Appellant is not entitled to interest on the refund because the taxes were not
arbitrarily collected. There is sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness. The constitutionality of
the statute is presumed until declared otherwise.
DECISION
On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed 1 Ordinance No.
4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum
(1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." 2
Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000.00, or a total of
P12,087.50.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint 3against the
City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-
stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec.
1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1], Art. VI,
Constitution), aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised
Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax
which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act
2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax
amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic
Act 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar.
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant
city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the
afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on
memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld
the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered
city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees
not excluded in its charter.
Appeal therefrom was directly taken to Us by plaintiff Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
Appellant alleges the same statutory and constitutional violations in the aforesaid taxing
ordinance mentioned earlier.
Section 1 of the ordinance states: "There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any
and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in
Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United
States of America and other foreign countries." Though referred to as a "production tax", the
imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax
applies is when the sugar produced is exported.
Appellant questions the authority of the defendant Municipal Board to levy such an
export tax, in view of Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which denies from
municipal councils the power to impose an export tax. Section 2287 in part states: "It shall
not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon
goods and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to
impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for
wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be void."
Subsequently, however, Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, effective June 19, 1959,
gave chartered cities, municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for public
purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees. Anent the inconsistency between Section
2287 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of Republic Act 2264, this Court,
in Nin Bay Mining Co. v. Municipality of Roxas, 4 held the former to have been repealed by
the latter. And expressing Our awareness of the transcendental effects that municipal export
or import taxes or licenses will have on the national economy, due to Section 2 of Republic
18
 Act 2264, We stated that there was no other alternative until Congress acts to provide
remedial measures to forestall any unfavorable results.
The point remains to be determined, however, whether constitutional limits on the
power of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation,
were infringed.
The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1[1], Art. 111) In Felwa v. Salas 5 We ruled that the
equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not
bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable
where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions
but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not
meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well.
The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is
now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the
ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied
upon.
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest on the refund because the taxes were
not arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan).6 At the time of
collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being
then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged
ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the defendants- appellees are hereby ordered to
refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff- appellant paid under protest. No. costs. So ordered.
||| (Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, G.R. No. L-23794, [February 17, 1968],
130 PHIL 595-599)

19
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000.]
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M. FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG,
EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO
A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI
KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MALOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA,
DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU
MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUARDO BANDA,
DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY,
TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU
SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI
NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAI INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO,
BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW
ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY
MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA
GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE
G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE
CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY,
CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN,
VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES,
ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES,
PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO,
WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O.
SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE
ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO,
ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANGCAGAN, PAQUITO S.
LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY,
LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON,
VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO,
MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P.
SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D.
EMBA, NORMA MAPANSA GONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON
P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG,
SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN,
DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her
father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her
father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her
mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN
BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN
FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR
THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
Barbara Anne C. Migallos & Troy A. Luna and Raymond Parsifal A. Fortun & Bienvenido
O. Bulataw for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Luna Bontin Perez & Associates, Rodolfo C. Raquista for intervenors/oppositors.
Leilene Carantes-San Juan for Sioco-Carino and Family.
SYNOPSIS
This is a suit for prohibition and mandamus assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Court en banc deliberated on the petition and the votes
gathered were equally divided with no majority vote obtained. Seven (7) members voted to dismiss
the petition. Seven (7) other members voted to grant the petition. After redeliberation, the voting
remained the same (7 to 7). Thus, the petition, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, was dismissed.
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; DISMISSAL OF PETITION WHERE VOTES
EQUALLY DIVIDED AND MAJORITY VOTE ARE NOT OBTAINED. — Petitioners Isagani Cruz
and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise
known as the Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules). After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court
voted as follows: Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. While Seven (7) other members of the
Court voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary
majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Puno, J., Separate Opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RA 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
OF 1977); RECOGNIZES EXISTENCE OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES OR
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE. — Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and
Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997" or the IPRA. The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural
communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants
these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and
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defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of
ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.
2. ID.; ID.; ANCESTRAL DOMAINS AND ANCESTRAL LAND ARE PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE PART OF PUBLIC DOMAIN. — Ancestral domains
and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of
the land of the public domain. The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over
ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The private character of ancestral lands and domains as
laid down in the IPRA is further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their
individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and the
Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public agricultural land
which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is that ancestral land is
private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural land simply for
registration purposes. Since ancestral domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to
avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his ancestral land, regardless
of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or over, from private to public
agricultural land for proper disposition. The option to register land under the Public Land Act and
the Land Registration Act has nonetheless a limited period. This option must be exercised within
twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the date of approval of the IPRA.
3. ID.; ID.; OWNERSHIP BY ICCs/IPs OF ANCESTRAL DOMAIN LIMITED AND DOES
NOT INCLUDE RIGHT TO ALIENATE. — The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/lPs
of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate
the same. Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens
title but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes
the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. The right of
ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the indigenous
concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs
private but community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public domain. But
its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and
not by one particular person. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains
remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve"
them for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their allocation and utilization, and
"negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring ecological
and environmental protection and conservation measures." Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights
over the natural resources take the form of management or stewardship.
4. ID.; ID.; SECTIONS 7(a), 7(b) AND 57 THEREOF DO NOT VIOLATE REGALIAN
DOCTRINE. — Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the regalian doctrine
enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing
in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral
domains. The right of ICCs/lPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this "ownership"
is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a). The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim
ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred
places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration does not mentionbodies of water not
occupied by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting
grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds, forests ortimber in the sacred places, etc. and all
other natural resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under
Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other
natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution-as belonging to
the State. The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section
7(a) complies with the Regalian doctrine. The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section
57 of the IPRA is allowed under paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/lPs the right to "manage and conserve" the natural
resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or
exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural
resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that
there is a superior entity that owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant
preferential rights over the resources to whosoever itself chooses. Section 57 is not a repudiation
of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine that all natural resources
found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by implication the Regalian
doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
5. ID.; ID.; SECTION 1, PART II, RULE III OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULE,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the
parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA and is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of Section 1,
Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not specifically and categorically challenged by
petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in general.
Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare
that the inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules
goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article X11
of the 1987 Constitution.
Vitug, J., Separate Opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; SHOULD RESOLVE ISSUES OF GRAVE
NATIONAL INTEREST. — An issue of grave national interest indeed deserves a proper place in
any forum and, when it shows itself in a given judicial controversy, the rules of procedure, like locus
standi, the propriety of the specific remedy invoked, or the principle of hierarchy of courts, that
may ordinarily be raised by party-litigants, should not be so perceived as good and inevitable
justifications for advocating timidity, let alone isolationism, by the Court.
2. ID.; ACTIONS; PARTIES; MUST HAVE PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL
INTEREST IN THE DISPUTE. — A cardinal requirement, to which I agree, is that one who invokes
the Court's adjudication must have a personal and substantial interest in the dispute; indeed, the
developing trend would require a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought
to be adjudicated in order to ensure that one is the proper and appropriate party to invoke judicial
power. The rule requires a party to aptly show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an
injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant his invocation of
the Court's jurisdiction and to render legally feasible the exercise of the Court's remedial powers
in his behalf. If it were otherwise, the exercise of that power can easily become too unwieldy by
its sheer magnitude and scope to a point that may, in no small measure, adversely affect its
intended essentiality, stability and consequentiality.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE RELAXED WHERE ISSUE IS OF TRANSCENDENTAL
IMPORTANCE. — Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason exists, such as when the matter
is of transcendental importance and paramount interest to the nation, the Court must take the
liberal approach that recognizes the legal standing of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as citizens and
taxpayers, to raise constitutional issues that affect them. This Court thus did so in a case that
involves the conservation of our forests for ecological needs. Until an exact balance is struck, the
Court must accept an eclectic notion that can free itself from the bondage of legal nicety and hold
trenchant technicalities subordinate to what may be considered to be of overriding concern.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONGRESS; AUTHORITY TO ENACT LAWS FOR
APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMARY LAWS, CONSTRUED. — The second paragraph of Section
5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to provide "for the applicability of customary
laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domains." I do not see this statement as saying that Congress may enact a law that would simply,
express that "customary laws shall govern" and end it there. Had it been so, the Constitution could
have itself easily provided without having to still commission Congress to do it. The constitutional
aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to look closely into the customary laws and, with specificity
and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them part of, the stream of laws. The "due
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process clause," as I so understand it in Tanada vs. Tuvera would require an apt publication of a
legislative enactment before it is permitted to take force and effect. So, also, customary laws,
when specifically enacted to become part of statutory law, must first undergo that publication to
render them correspondingly binding and effective as such.
Kapunan, J., Separate Opinion:
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; SHOULD BE CONSTRUED
WHENEVER POSSIBLE IN HARMONY WITH CONSTITUTION. — It is established doctrine that
a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in violation of, the
Constitution. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just
law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose
of the law. AHSEaD
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW;
REQUISITES. — The time-tested standards for the exercise of judicial review are: (1) the
existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; "ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY," DEFINED. — An "actual case
or controversy" means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe for resolution and
susceptible of judicial determination, and that which is not conjectural or anticipatory, or that which
seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems. A petition raising a constitutional
question does not present an "actual controversy," unless it alleges a legal right or power.
Moreover, it must show that a conflict of rights exists, for inherent in the term "controversy" is the
presence of opposing views or contentions. Otherwise, the Court will be forced to resolve issues
which remain unfocused because they lack such concreteness provided when a question emerges
precisely framed from a clash of adversary arguments exploring every aspect of a multi-faceted
situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests. The controversy must also be justiciable;
that is, it must be susceptible of judicial determination.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR, A CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE. — In the case at bar, there
exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law has been enacted, and the
Implementing Rules and Regulations approved. Money has been appropriated and the
government agencies concerned have been directed to implement the statute. It cannot be
successfully maintained that we should await the adverse consequences of the law in order to
consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution. It is precisely the contention of the
petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of State ownership
over lands of the public domain and other natural resources. Moreover, when the State machinery
is set into motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this Court possesses sufficient
authority to resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional process.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTIES MUST HAVE PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST
IN CASE. — In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, he
has sustained, or will sustain, a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Evidently, the rights
asserted by petitioners as citizens and taxpayers are held in common by all the citizens, the
violation of which may result only in a "generalized grievance." Yet, in a sense, all citizen's and
taxpayer's suits are efforts to air generalized grievances about the conduct of government and the
allocation of power.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PARTIES; COURT HAS ADOPTED LIBERAL
ATTITUDE WITH REGARD TO STANDING. — In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal
attitude with regard to standing. The proper party requirement is considered as merely procedural,
and the Court has ample discretion with regard thereto. This Court has recognized that a "public
right," or that which belongs to the people at large, .may also be the subject of an actual case or
controversy.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS AS CITIZENS POSSESS PUBLIC RIGHT TO ENSURE
THAT NATIONAL PATRIMONY IS NOT ALIENATED AND DIMINISHED. — Petitioners, as
citizens, possess the "public right" to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated and
diminished in violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as the guardian of the national
patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos without distinction as to ethnicity, it follows that a
citizen has sufficient interest to maintain a suit to ensure that any grant of concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony strictly complies with constitutional requirements. Thus, the
preservation of the integrity and inviolability of the national patrimony is a proper subject of a
citizen's suit.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; TAXPAYERS, WITH RIGHT TO RESTRAIN OFFICIALS FROM
WASTING PUBLIC FUNDS. — It is well-settled that a taxpayer has the right to enjoin public
officials from wasting public funds through the implementation of an unconstitutional statute, and
by necessity, he may assail the validity of a statute appropriating public funds. The taxpayer has
paid his taxes and contributed to the public coffers and, thus, may inquire into the manner by
which the proceeds of his taxes are spent. The expenditure by an official of the State for the
purpose of administering an invalid law constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
9. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS; PROPER
REMEDIES TO RESTRAIN IMPLEMENTATION OF CHALLENGED PROVISIONS OF IPRA AND
ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES. — In this case, the petitioners pray that respondents be restrained
from implementing the challenged provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules and the
assailed DENR Circular No. 2, series of 1998, and that the same officials be enjoined from
disbursing public funds for the implementation of the said law and rules. They further ask that the
Secretary of the DENR be compelled to perform his duty to control and supervise the activities
pertaining to natural resources. Prohibition will lie to restrain the public officials concerned from
implementing the questioned provisions of the IPRA and from disbursing funds in connection
therewith if the law is found to be unconstitutional. Likewise, mandamus will lie to compel the
Secretary of the DENR to perform his duty to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. Consequently, the petition for
prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy for the relief sought.
10. ID.; ACTIONS; HIERARCHY OF COURTS; MAY BE DISPENSED WITH IN
EXCEPTIONAL AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES. — Between two courts of concurrent
original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that should initially pass upon the issues of a case. That
way, as a particular case goes through the hierarchy of courts, it is shorn of all but the important
legal issues or those of first impression, which are the proper subject of attention of the appellate
court. This is a procedural rule borne of experience and adopted to improve the administration of
justice. This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts. Although
this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give a party unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The resort to this
court's primary jurisdiction to issue said writs shall be allowed only where the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify such invocation.
11. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; SHOULD BE CONSTRUED IN
HARMONY, AND NOT IN VIOLATION, OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW; RATIONALE. — A statute
should be construed in harmony with, and not in violation, of the fundamental law. The reason is
that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is assumed to have acted within its authority and adhered
to the constitutional limitations. Accordingly, courts should presume that it was the intention of the
legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law and one which operates no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.
12. POLITICAL LAW; NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY; JURA
REGALIA, CONSTRUED. — Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must
be traced to some grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the
American Colonial government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic. The belief that the
22
Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines has persisted because title to land
must emanate from some source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere. In its broad sense, the
term "jura regalia" refers to royal rights, or those rights which the King has by virtue of his
prerogatives. In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over anything in which a
subject has a right of property or propriedad. These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by
the king as the sovereign.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT NEGATE NATIVE TITLE TO LANDS HELD IN PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP. — The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in
private ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Cariño vs. Insular
Government the United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the pre-war Philippine
Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement: . . . Every presumption is and ought to be
taken against the Government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient
to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. . . . . The above ruling
institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by
Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and
independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia. A
proper reading of Cariño would show that the doctrine enunciated therein applies only to lands
which have always been considered as private, and not to lands of the public domain, whether
alienable or otherwise. A distinction must be made between ownership of land under native title
and ownership by acquisitive prescription against the State. Ownership by virtue a of native title
presupposes that the land has been held by its possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the
concept of an owner since time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain
or its successors-in-interest, the United States and the Philippine Government. There has been
no transfer of title from the State as the land has been regarded as private in character as far back
as memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State
involves a conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to private land,
which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private person. Since native title assumes
that the property covered by it is private land and is deemed never to have been part of the public
domain, the Solicitor General's thesis that native title under Cariño applies only to lands of the
public domain is erroneous. Consequently, the classification of lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks under the Constitution is irrelevant
to the application of the Cariño doctrine because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State
ownership of lands of the public domain does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral domains.
14. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 1935 CONSTITUTION; SECTION 1, ARTICLE XII
THEREOF DOES NOT DIVEST LANDOWNERS OF THEIR LANDS COVERED BY ANCESTRAL
LANDS AND DOMAIN. — The text of the provision of the 1935 Constitution invoked by the
Solicitor General, while embodying the theory of jura regalia, is too clear for any misunderstanding.
It simply declares that all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State." Nowhere does it state that certain lands which
are "absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence," including those which are not part of
the public domain, shall thereafter be owned by the State. If there is any room for constitutional
construction, the provision should be interpreted in favor of the preservation, rather than
impairment or extinguishment, of vested rights. Stated otherwise, Section 1, Article XII of the 1935
Constitution cannot be construed to mean that vested right which had existed then were
extinguished and that the landowners were divested of their lands, all in the guise of "wrest[ing]
control of those portions of the natural resources [which the State] deems absolutely necessary
for social welfare and existence." On the contrary, said Section restated the fundamental rule
against the diminution of existing rights by expressly providing that the ownership of lands of the
public domain and other natural resources by the State is "subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concessions." The "existing rights" that were intended to be protected must, perforce,
include the right of ownership by indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and domains. The
words of the law should be given their ordinary or usual meaning, and the term "existing rights"
cannot be assigned an unduly restrictive definition.
15. ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION AS
WELL AS THE PEOPLE ADOPTING IT, PRESUMED TO BE AWARE OF PREVAILING
DOCTRINES CONCERNING SUBJECT PROVISIONS. — It cannot be correctly argued that,
because the framers of the Constitution never expressly mentioned Cariño in their deliberations,
they did not intend to adopt the concept of native title to land, or that they were unaware of native
title as an exception to the theory of jura regalia. The framers of the Constitution, as well as the
people adopting it, were presumed to be aware of the prevailing judicial doctrines concerning the
subject of constitutional provisions, and courts should take these doctrines into consideration in
construing the Constitution.
16. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTION; MUST BE CONSTRUED AS A
WHOLE. — The Constitution must be construed as a whole. It is a rule that when construction is
proper, the whole Constitution is examined in order to determine the meaning of any provision.
That construction should be used which would give effect to the entire instrument.
17. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RA 8371 (INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT);
SECTION 3(a) THEREOF MERELY DEFINES COVERAGE OF ANCESTRAL DOMAIN AND
DOES NOT CONFER OWNERSHIP OVER NATURAL RESOURCES. — Section 3(a) merely
defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the extent, limit and composition of
ancestral domains by setting forth the standards and guidelines in determining whether a particular
area is to be considered as part of and within the ancestral domains. In other words, Section 3(a)
serves only as a yardstick which points out what properties are within the ancestral domains. It
does not confer or recognize any right of ownership over the natural resources to the indigenous
peoples. Its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title.
19. ID.; ID.; SECTION 7 (a and b) THEREOF MAKES NO MENTION OF ANY RIGHT
OF OWNERSHIP OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OVER NATURAL RESOURCES. — Section 7
makes no mention of any right of ownership of the indigenous peoples over the natural resources.
In fact, Section 7(a) merely recognizes the "right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by indigenous peoples, sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains." Neither
does Section 7(b), which enumerates certain rights of the indigenous peoples over the natural
resources found within their ancestral domains, contain any recognition of ownership vis-a-vis the
natural resources.
20. ID.; ID.; SECTIONS 7(b) AND 57 THEREOF REFER TO EXPLORATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES AND PRIORITY RIGHTS IN THE UTILIZATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES. — A careful reading of Section 7(b) would reveal that the rights given to the
indigenous peoples are duly circumscribed. These rights are limited only to the following: "to
manage and conserve natural resources within territories and uphold it for future generations; to
benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found
therein; to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas
for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures,
pursuant to national and customary laws; to an informed and intelligent participation in the
formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact
upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which
they may sustain as a result of the project, and the right to effective measures by the government
to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment of these rights." It must be noted
that the right to negotiate terms and conditions granted under Section 7(b) pertains only to
theexploration of natural resources. The term "exploration" refers only to the search or prospecting
of mineral resources, or any other means for the purpose of determining the existence and the
feasibility of mining them for profit. The exploration, which is merely a preliminary activity, cannot
be equated with the entire process of "exploration, development and utilization" of natural
resources which under the Constitution belong to the State. Section 57, on the other hand, grants
the indigenous peoples "priority rights" in the utilization of natural resources and not absolute
23
ownership thereof. Priority rights do not mean exclusive rights. What is granted is merely the right
of preference or first consideration in the award of privileges provided by existing laws and
regulations, with due regard to the needs and welfare of indigenous peoples living in the area.
21. ID.; ID.; SECTION 3(a) and (b), DO NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION. — Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and
ancestral domains under Section 3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA includes private lands. They argue that
the inclusion of private lands in the ancestral lands and ancestral domains violates the due process
clause. Petitioners' contention is erroneous. Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the
definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains are "subject to Section 56," which
reads: Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. - Property rights within the ancestral domains
already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and protected. The
"property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by individuals, whether
indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic origins
of the ownership of these "property rights." The IPRA thus recognizes and respects "vested rights"
regardless of whether they pertain to indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Where the law does
not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. What IPRA only requires is that these "property
rights" already exist and/or vested upon its effectivity.
22. ID.; ID.; SECTION 1, RULE IX OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES; CUSTOMARY
LAW APPLIES WHERE ALL PARTIES INVOLVED ARE MEMBERS OF THE INDIGENOUS
GROUP. — The IPRA prescribes the application of such customary laws where these present a
workable solution acceptable to the parties, who are members of the same indigenous group. This
interpretation is supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules. The application of
customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of the ancestral domains, where all the parties involved are members of
indigenous peoples, specifically, of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one
of the parties to a dispute is a non-member of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous
peoples involved belong to different groups, the application of customary law is not required.
Mendoza, J., Separate Opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; JUDICIAL POWER EXTENDS ONLY
TO ACTUAL CASES AND CONTROVERSIES. — The judicial power vested in this Court by Art.
VIII, § I extends only to cases and controversies for the determination of such proceedings as are
established by law for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress or
punishment of wrongs. I do not conceive it to be the function of this Coat under Art. VIII, § 1 of the
Constitution to determine in the abstract whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and executive departments
in enacting the IPRA. Our jurisdiction is confined to cases or controversies. No one reading Art.
VIII, §5 can fail to note that, in enumerating the matters placed in the keeping of this Court, it
uniformly begins with the phrase "all cases.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In this case the purpose of the suit is not to enforce a
property right of petitioners against the government and other respondents or to demand
compensation for injuries suffered by them as a result of the enforcement of the law, but only to
settle what they believe to be the doubtful character of the law in question. Any judgment that we
render in this case will thus not conclude or bind real parties in the future, when actual litigation
will bring to the Court the question of the constitutionality of such legislation. Such judgment cannot
be executed as it amounts to no more than an expression of opinion upon the validity of the
provisions of the law in question.
3. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL POWER; DUTY TO DETERMINE GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION PRECLUDES COURT FROM INVOLVING POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
TO EVADE CERTAIN CASES. — The statement that the judicial power includes the duty to
determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion was inserted in Art. VIII, §1 not
really to give the judiciary a roving commission to right any wrong it perceives but to preclude
courts from invoking the political question doctrine in order to evade the decision of certain cases
even where violations of civil liberties are alleged.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESOLUTION OF ABSTRACT CONTROVERSIES WILL UPSET
BALANCE OF POWER. — Judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve
actual cases or controversies without upsetting the balance of power among the three branches
of the government and erecting, as it were, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, as a third
branch of Congress, with power not only to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.;-CASE AT BAR. — Yet that is exactly what we would be permitting
in this case were we to assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of the
IPRA contrary to the established rule that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as
applied to him, it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face.
6. ID.; STATUTES; FACIAL CHALLENGE TO STATUTE, NOT ALLOWED;
EXCEPTION. — The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it
operates in the area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits
a party to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is not unconstitutional
but it might be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected. Invalidation of the statute "on its face" rather than "as applied" is permitted in the interest
of preventing a "chilling" effect on freedom of expression. But in other cases, even if it is found
that a provision of a statute is unconstitutional, courts will decree only partial invalidity unless the
invalid portion is so far inseparable from the rest of the statute that a declaration of partial invalidity
is not possible.
7. ID.; SUPREME COURT; CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION CANNOT TAKE
PLACE IN A VACUUM. — For the Court to exercise its power of review when there is no case or
controversy is not only to act without jurisdiction but also to run the risk that, in adjudicating
abstract or hypothetical questions, its decision will be based on speculation rather than
experience. Deprived of the opportunity to observe the impact of the law, the Court is likely to
equate questions of constitutionality with questions of wisdom and is thus likely to intrude into the
domain of legislation. Constitutional adjudication, it cannot be too often repeated, cannot take
place in a vacuum.
8. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; RATIONALE IN REFUSAL TO RESOLVE ABSTRACT
CONTROVERSIES. — To decline the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine
controversy is not to show timidity but respect for the judgment of a co-equal department of
government whose acts, unless shown to be clearly repugnant to the fundamental law, are
presumed to be valid. The polestar of constitutional adjudication was set forth by Justice Laurel in
the Angara case when he said that "the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further
to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota, presented." For the exercise of this power
is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and
vital controversy between individuals. Until, therefore, an actual case is brought to test the
constitutionality of the IPRA, the presumption of constitutionality, which inheres in every statute,
must be accorded to it.
Panganiban, J., Separate Opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY;
PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS TO BENEFICIAL USE OF PUBLIC DOMAIN MAY BE ACCORDED TO
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES; PRIVILEGE MUST
BE SUBJECT TO FUNDAMENTAL LAW. — Our fundamental law mandates the protection of the
indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral lands, but such mandate is "subject to the
provisions of this Constitution." I concede that indigenous cultural communities and indigenous
peoples (ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential rights to the beneficial use of public domains, as
well as priority in the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources. Such privileges,
however, must be subject to the fundamental law.
24
 2. ID.; CONSTITUTION, A COMPACT MADE BY AND AMONG CITIZENS TO
GOVERN THEMSELVES; NO GROUP NOR SECTOR IS EXEMPT FROM ITS COMPASS. —
[T]he Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, to which all other laws must conform. It is
the people's quintessential act of sovereignty, embodying the principles upon which the State and
the government are founded. Having the status of a supreme and all-encompassing law, it speaks
for all the people all the time, not just for the majority or for the minority at intermittent times. Every
constitution is a compact made by and among the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a
certain manner. Truly, the Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant made by all the Filipinos
to govern themselves. No group, however blessed, and no sector, however distressed, is exempt
from its compass. I submit, that all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the
Constitution. Indeed, no one is exempt from its all-encompassing provisions. Unlike the 1935
Charter, which was subject to "any existing right, grant, lease or concession," the 1973 and the
1987 Constitutions spoke in absolute terms. Because of the State's implementation of policies
considered to be for the common good, all those concerned have to give up, under certain
conditions, even vested rights of ownership.
3. ID.; R.A. NO. 8371 (INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' RIGHTS ACT OF 1997); SECS. 3(a
and b), 5, 6, 7 (a and b), 8 AND OTHER RELATED PROVISIONS, CONTRAVENE REGALIAN
DOCTRINE. — RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communities and
indigenous peoples, admittedly professes a laudable intent. It was primarily enacted pursuant to
the state policy enshrined in our Constitution to "recognize and promote the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development." Though laudable
and well-meaning, this statute, however, has provisions that run directly afoul of our fundamental
law from which it claims origin and authority. More specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a)
and (b), 8 and other related provisions contravene the Regalian Doctrine - the basic foundation of
the State's property regime. Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, more specifically the
declaration that the State owns all lands of the public domain, minerals and natural resources -
none of which, except agricultural lands, can be alienated. In several cases, this Court has
consistently held that non-agricultural land must first be reclassified and converted into alienable
or disposable land for agricultural purposes by a positive act of the government. Mere possession
or utilization thereof, however long, does not automatically convert them into private properties.
The presumption is that "all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Hence, . . . all applicants in land registration proceedings have
the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of
the public domain. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence
that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from
the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper
acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant
must present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general
statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title."
4. ID.; ID.; CONTRAVENES CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON ACQUISITION OF
ALIENABLE PUBLIC LANDS. — Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution Filipino citizens
may acquire no more than 12 hectares of alienable public land, whether by purchase, homestead
or grant. More than that, but not exceeding 500 hectares, they may hold by lease only. RA 8371,
however, speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In fact, by their mere
definitions, they could cover vast tracts of the nation's territory. The properties under the assailed
law cover everything held, occupied or possessed "by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial." It also includes all "lands which may no longer
be exclusively occupied by [them] but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/ IPs who are still
nomadic and/or shifting cultivators." Already, as of June 1998, over 2.5 million hectares have been
claimed by various ICCs/IPs as ancestral domains; and over 10 thousand hectares, as ancestral
lands. Based on ethnographic surveys, the solicitor general estimates that ancestral domains
cover 80 percent of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of the 30 million hectares
of land in the country. This means that four fifths of its natural resources and one third of the
country's land will be concentrated among 12 million Filipinos constituting 110 ICCs, while over
60 million other Filipinos constituting the overwhelming majority will have to share the remaining.
These figures indicate a violation of the constitutional principle of a "more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth" among Filipinos. ACTaDH
5. ID.; ID.; ABDICATES DUTY OF STATE TO TAKE FULL CONTROL AND
SUPERVISION OF NATURAL RESOURCES. — Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, further
provides that "[t]he exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State." The State may (1) directly undertake such activities;
or (2) enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens
or entities, 60 percent of whose capital is owned by Filipinos. Such agreements, however, shall
not exceed 25 years, renewable for the same period and under terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor
of ICCs/IPs, insofar as natural resources found within their territories are concerned. Pursuant to
their rights of ownership and possession, they may develop and manage the natural resources,
benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and the utilization thereof. And they may
exercise such right without any time limit, unlike non-ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period
not exceeding 25 years, renewable for a like period. Consistent with the Constitution, the rights of
ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and utilize natural resources must also be limited to such period.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM p:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition
and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to
comment. 1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to
implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they
defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view
that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of
the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et al.),
filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of
IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to
Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the
principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the
rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays
that the petition be dismissed.
25
 On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and
the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a
Motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and
Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition
and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors
filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier
pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and
its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
State's ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral
domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral
lands; TECcHA
"(2) Section 5, in relation to Section 3(a), which provides that ancestral
domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water,
mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are
private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to Section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
"(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples
in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of
minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to
be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into
agreements with non-indigenous peoples for the development
and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains
and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness,
protected areas, forest cover or reforestation." 2
Petitioners also contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
"ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within
said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners. 3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes
involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the
due process clause of the Constitution. 4
These provisions are:
"(1) Sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the
sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to
the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local
Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices
of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to
property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and
settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in
the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be
used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples." 5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of
the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship
for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
President's power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution. 6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[i], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and
66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional
and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and
Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from
implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease
and desist from implementing Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget
and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public
funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A.
8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of
carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
26
 supervise the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of Philippine natural resources." 7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the
Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all
challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA,
and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-
scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition
solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban
filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of
Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by
those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., join in the separate opinions of Justices
Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained,
the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the
same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban. DcaECT

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Yñares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,concur.

27
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-25246. September 12, 1974.]
BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE
WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY,
INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION, defendant-
appellant.
Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-appellant.
DECISION
ZALDIVAR, J p:
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 58894.
The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:
Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the
religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope
Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a
member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had
with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision
which reads as follows:
"Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this
Agreement."
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed
the following day, March 4, 1964.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment
by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with
a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such
labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961,
however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4)
subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: . . . "but such agreement shall
not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any
such labor organization".
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with
any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and
when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974.
Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate
Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a
member. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that
unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company
would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Appellee to file an
action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila
to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee. 1 In its answer, the Union
invoked the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement; assailed the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction
over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e). 2 Upon the
facts agreed upon by the parties during the pre-trial conference, the Court a quo rendered its
decision on August 26, 1965, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered
enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing the
plaintiff from his present employment and sentencing the defendant
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees
and the costs of this action." 3
From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely questions
of law, assigning the following errors:
"I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that Republic
Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional.
"II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant
herein to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as attorney's fees and the cost
thereof."
In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350, the Union
contented, firstly, that the Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations;
that "the very phraseology of said Republic Act 3350, that membership in a labor organization
is banned to all those belonging to such religious sect prohibiting affiliation with any labor
organization" 4 , "prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor
union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ; and, consequently,
deprives said members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or
organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III,
Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution. 6
Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional for
impairing the obligation of contracts in that, while the Union is obliged to comply with its
collective bargaining agreement containing a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves the
employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the maintenance of union
membership as a condition of employment; and that said Act, furthermore, impairs the
Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues from members who, under the Act, are relieved
from the obligation to continue as such members. 7
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors
those religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions, in violation of Article
III, Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution; and while said Act unduly protects certain religious
sects, it leaves no rights or protection to labor organizations. 8
Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the constitutional
provision that "no religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right," in that the
laborer's exercise of his civil right to join associations for purposes not contrary to law has to
be determined under the Act by his affiliation with a religious sect; that conversely, if a worker
has to sever his religious connection with a sect that prohibits membership in a labor
organization in order to be able to join a labor organization, said Act would violate religious
freedom. 9
28
 Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the "equal
protection of laws" clause of the Constitution, it being a discriminatory legislation, inasmuch
as by exempting from the operation of closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia
ni Cristo", it has granted said members undue advantages over their fellow workers, for while
the Act exempts them from union obligation and liability, it nevertheless entitles them at the
same time to the enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and other emoluments that the union
might secure from the employer. 10
Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional
provision regarding the promotion of social justice. 11
Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop provision" in a
collective bargaining agreement cannot be considered violative of religious freedom, as to
call for the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350; 12 and that unless Republic
Act No. 3350 is declared unconstitutional, trade unionism in this country would be wiped out
as employers would prefer to hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristo in order to do
away with labor organizations. 13
Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that Republic Act No.
3350 does not violate the right to form lawful associations, for the right to join associations
includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization, if one's conscience does
not allow his membership therein, and the Act has given substance to such right by
prohibiting the compulsion of workers to join labor organizations; 14 that said Act does not
impair the obligation of contracts for said law formed part of, and was incorporated into, the
terms of the closed shop agreement; 15 that the Act does not violate the establishment of
religion clause or separation of Church and State, for Congress, in enacting said law, merely
accommodated the religious needs of those workers whose religion prohibits its members
from joining labor unions, and balanced the collective rights of organized labor with the
constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise his chosen religion; that the
constitutional right to the free exercise of one's religion has primacy and preference over
union security measures which are merely contractual 16 ; that said Act does not violate the
constitutional provision of equal protection, for the classification of workers under the Act
depending on their religious tenets is based on substantial distinction, is germane to the
purpose of the law, and applies to all the members of a given class; 17 that said Act, finally,
does not violate the social justice policy of the Constitution, for said Act was enacted precisely
to equalize employment opportunities for all citizens in the midst of the diversities of their
religious beliefs. 18
I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error, it is necessary
to premise that there are some thoroughly established principles which must be followed in
all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtains in the instant case are involved. All
presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work
hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived
which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible
bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of
legislation should be adopted. 19
1. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits and bans the
members of such religious sects that forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions from
joining labor unions appears nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No. 3350; neither can
the same be deduced by necessary implication therefrom. It is not surprising, therefore, that
appellant, having thus misread the Act, committed the error of contending that said Act is
obnoxious to the constitutional provision on freedom of association.
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association.
Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of Article n of the
Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 ofRepublic Act No. 875 provides that
employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or
protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is
the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by
the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it can be
safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broad
notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an
employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby
an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore,
the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association;
and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would
join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel
his membership with said organization at any time. 20 It is clear, therefore, that the right to
join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. 21 Inasmuch as what
both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the
employee, is the "right" to join associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the
law also imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The
law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of
the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to
refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer
have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only members
of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the
union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of
the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that
although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from making
an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership
therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue,
therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if
any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his
employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right
of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No.
3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of theIndustrial Peace
Act the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects
which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". Republic Act No.
3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop
agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that
members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even
when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any
closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or
dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the
constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not
prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to
said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up
with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they
refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law
prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to
29
join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on
freedom of association.
2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for impairing the
obligation of its contract, specifically, the "union security clause" embodied in its Collective
Bargaining Agreement with the Company, by virtue of which "membership in the union was
required as a condition for employment for all permanent employees workers". This
agreement was already in existence at the time Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted of June
18, 1961, and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been incorporated into the agreement.
But by reason of this amendment, Appellee, as well as others similarly situated, could no
longer be dismissed from his job even if he should cease to be a member, or disaffiliate from
the Union, and the Company could continue employing him notwithstanding his disaffiliation
from the Union. The Act, therefore, introduced a change into the express terms of the union
security clause; the Company was partly absolved by law from the contractual obligation it
had with the Union of employing only Union members in permanent positions. It cannot be
denied, therefore, that there was indeed an impairment of said union security clause.
According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into the express terms
of the contract, or its legal construction, or its validity, or its discharge, or the remedy for its
enforcement, impairs the contract. The extent of the change is not material. It is not a
question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation
or dispensing with any part of its force. There is an impairment of the contract if either party
is absolved by law from its performance. 22Impairment has also been predicated on laws
which, without destroying contracts, derogate from substantial contractual rights. 23
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the obligation
of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general, affording a broad
outline and requiring construction to fill in the details. The prohibition is not to be read with
literal exactness like a mathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable impairment
only. 24 In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to
safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said
interests may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. 25 For not only are existing laws
read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the reservation
of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the
legal order. All contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under
the police power must be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of that
power. 26 Otherwise, important and valuable reforms may be precluded by the simple device
of entering into contracts for the purpose of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited.
The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a
government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile — a government which
retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. The contract clause
ofthe Constitution must, therefore, be not only in harmony with, but also in subordination to,
in appropriate instances, the reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of
the people. It follows that not all legislations, which have the effect of impairing a contract,
are obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to impairment, and a statute passed in the
legitimate exercise of police power, although it incidentally destroys existing contract rights,
must be upheld by the courts. This has special application to contracts regulating relations
between capital and labor which are not merely contractual, and said labor contracts, for
being impressed with public interest, must yield to the common good. 27
In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition against impairing the
obligations of contracts has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the
domain of the general legislative powers of the state involving public welfare. 28 Thus, this
Court also held that the Blue Sunday Law was not an infringement of the obligation of a
contract that required the employer to furnish work on Sundays to his employees, the law
having been enacted to secure the well-being and happiness of the laboring class, and being,
furthermore, a legitimate exercise of the police power. 29
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract
obligations, no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by
which the validity of each statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but
every case must be determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the
obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general
good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both
the end sought and the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the
reserved power of the state construed in harmony with the constitutional limitation of that
power. 30
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its
purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by
preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their
members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and
constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they
can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said
purpose is legitimate.
The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects
against two aggregates of group strength from which the individual needs protection. The
individual employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates of
power — collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by
management. The union, an institution developed to organize labor into a collective force
and thus protect the individual employee from the power of collective capital, is,
paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a new source of their frustration.
Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it produces yet a third aggregate of
group strength from which the individual also needs protection — the collective bargaining
relationship. 31
The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in the
Explanatory Note to House Bill No. 5859, which later became Republic Act No. 3350, as
follows:
"It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person who, on
account of his religious beliefs and convictions, cannot accept membership
in a labor organization although he possesses all the qualifications for the
job. This is tantamount to punishing such person for believing in a doctrine
he has a right under the law to believe in. The law would not allow
discrimination to flourish to the detriment of those whose religion discards
membership in any labor organization, Likewise, the law would not
commend the deprivation of their right to work and pursue a modest means
of livelihood, without in any manner violating their religious faith and/or
belief." 32
It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to achieve
that purpose — exempting the members of said religious sects from coverage of union
security agreements — is reasonable.
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession
or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to
the former. The Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on several occasions
that the rights in the First Amendment, which include freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred
position in the constitutional system. 33 Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a
fundamental personal right and liberty,34 and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of
values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where
unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare
of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the
smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.
30
 3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional,
appellant Union averred that said Act discriminates in favor of members of said religious
sects in violation of Section 1(7) of Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and which is now
Section 8 of Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
"No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without. discrimination
and preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights."
The constitutional provision not only prohibits legislation for the support of any
religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of
the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship, 35 but also assures the
free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been
said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good. 36 Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede
the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is
invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. 37 But if the
stage regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose
and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden
on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such
burden. 38
In Aglipay v. Ruiz 39 , this Court had occasion to state that the government should
not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular ID character even if the incidental
result would be favorable to a religion or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in
order to withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 40 Assessed by
these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional inhibition of
the "no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the Constitution.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not
spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of
advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain
persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to
work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union
security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment whereby they can make
a living to support themselves and their families is a valid objective of the state. In fact, the
state is enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to labor, and regulate the
relations between labor and capital and industry. 41 More so now in the 1973
Constitution where it is mandated that "the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex,
race or creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers." 42
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of
members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor
organization, is the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the collective
bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs;
and by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a
serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also
promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed
shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular
religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that
prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely
incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban regulation on
conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of
some or all religions. 43 The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to
require that religious exercise be preferentially aided. 44
We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently
with the spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion,
by certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was
Congress itself that imposed that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic
Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take away the same
burden. It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the
land; but when general laws conflict with scrupples of conscience, exemptions ought to be
granted unless some "compelling state interest" intervenes. 45 In the instant case, We see
no such compelling state interest to withhold exemption.
Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects members of certain
religious sects, it leaves no right to, and is silent as to the protection of, labor organizations.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The rights of
labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No. 875and the new Labor Code. As to
the lamented silence of the Act regarding the rights and protection of labor unions, suffice it
to say, first, that the validity of a statute is determined by its provisions, not by its silence 46 ;
and, second, the fact that the law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional. 47
It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel persons to join
and remain members of a union to keep their jobs in violation of their religious scrupples,
would hurt, rather than help, labor unions. Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious
objectors lest their resistance spread to other workers, for religious objections have
contagious potentialities more than political and philosophic objections.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country,
and a fortiori to a labor union - assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through
coercion — is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious
liberty. 48 A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the
constitutional prohibition against requiring a religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a
political right, is not well taken. The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for
joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect;
neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits Its members from
joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining
or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only
exempts members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop
agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required to do a positive act — to
exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need
of any positive act on his part. A conscientious religious objector need not perform a positive
act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor union — he is exempted from the
coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. How then
can there be a religious test required for the exercise of a right when no right need be
exercised?
We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact Republic Act
No. 3350, and that its purpose was legal and in consonance with the Constitution. It is never
an illegal evasion of a constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result,
which is lawful in itself, by discovering or following a legal way to do it. 49
5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is a discriminatory
legislation, inasmuch as it grants to the members of certain religious sects undue advantages
over other workers, thus violating Section 1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution which forbids
the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. 50
31
 The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and
child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though
they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things
that are different. 51 It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars.
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. 52 The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality.53 All that is required of a valid classification is that
it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. 54 This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary. 55
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws
over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of
discretion. 56 It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked
differences of things or in their relation. 57 Neither is it necessary that the classification be
made with mathematical nicety. 58 Hence legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, 59 for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude
the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils
as they may appear.
We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements.
The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop
security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions
cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in
labor unions. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions. There is such real distinction in the beliefs, feelings and sentiments
of employees. Employees do not believe in the same religious faith and different religions
differ in their dogmas and canons. Religious beliefs, manifestations and practices, though
they are found in all places, and in all times, take so many varied forms as to be almost
beyond imagination. There are many views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious
beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in
the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. Today the country is far more heterogenous
in religion than before, differences in religion do exist, and these differences are important
and should not be ignored.
Even from the psychological point of view, the classification is based on real and
important differences. Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs, mere ideas existing only in the
mind, for they carry with them practical consequences and are the motives of certain rules of
human conduct and the justification of certain acts.60 Religious sentiment makes a man view
things and events in their relation to his God. It gives to human life its distinctive-character,
its tone, its happiness, or unhappiness, its enjoyment or irksomeness. Usually, a strong and
passionate desire is involved in a religious belief. To certain persons, no single factor of their
experience is more important to them than their religion, or their not having any religion.
Because of differences in religious belief and sentiments, a very poor person may consider
himself better than the rich, and the man who even lacks the necessities of life may be more
cheerful than the one who has all possible luxuries. Due to their religious beliefs people, like
the martyrs, became resigned to the inevitable and accepted cheerfully even the most painful
and excruciating pains. Because of differences in religious beliefs, the world has witnessed
turmoil, civil strife, persecution, hatred, bloodshed and war, generated to a large extent by
members of sects who were intolerant of other religious beliefs. The classification, introduced
by Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, rests on substantial distinctions.
The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The
purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief,
join labor unions, from being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from
their work because of union shop security agreements.
Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to conditions
existing at the time of its enactment. The law does not provide that it is to be effective for a
certain period of time only. It is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions to
which the law is applicable exist. As long as there are closed shop agreements between an
employer and a labor union, and there are employees who are prohibited by their religion
from affiliating with labor unions, their exemption from the coverage of said agreements
continues.
Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident
from its provision.
The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said religious sects cannot
by itself render the Act unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, the Act only restores to
them their freedom of association which closed shop agreements have taken away, and puts
them in the same plane as the other workers who are not prohibited by their religion from
joining labor unions. The circumstance, that the other employees, because they are
differently situated, are not granted the same privilege, does not render the law
unconstitutional, for every classification allowed by the Constitution by its nature involves
inequality.
The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not
violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for
regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered
invalid. A classification otherwise reasonable does not offendthe constitution simply because
in practice it results in some inequality. 61 Anent this matter, it has been said that whenever
it is apparent from the scope of the law that its object is for the benefit of the public and the
means by which the benefit is to be obtained are of public character, the law will be upheld
even though incidental advantage may occur to individuals beyond those enjoyed by the
general public. 62
6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the
constitutional provision on social justice is also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote
the welfare of all the people. 63 Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it
looks after the welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions;
the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In determining
whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not necessary that the entire
state be directly benefited — it is sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited thereby.
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures calculated
to insure economic stability of all component elements of society, through the maintenance
of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the
community. 64 Republic Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to the members of a
religious sect, like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also component elements of society, for it
insures security in their employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union having
a closed shop agreement with the employer. The Act also advances the proper economic
and social equilibrium between labor unions and employees who cannot join labor unions,
for it exempts the latter from the compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed
32
shop agreements, and equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work is concerned, those whose
religion prohibits membership in labor unions with those whose religion does not prohibit said
membership. Social justice does not imply social equality, because social inequality will
always exist as long as social relations depend on personal or subjective proclivities. Social
justice does not require legal equality because legal equality, being a relative term, is
necessarily premised on differentiations based on personal or natural conditions. 65 Social
justice guarantees equality of opportunity 66 , and this is precisely what Republic Act No.
3350proposes to accomplish — it gives laborers, irrespective of their religious scrupples,
equal opportunity for work.
7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment introduced
by Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for - in other words, the Act is not proper, necessary
or desirable. Anent this matter, it has been held that a statute which is not necessary is not,
for that reason, unconstitutional; that in determining the constitutional validity of legislation,
the courts are unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the enactment of the legislation
in question. 67 Courts do inquire into the wisdom of laws. 68 Moreover, legislatures, being
chosen by the people, are presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of the
people, and it may change the laws accordingly. 69 The fear is entertained by appellant that
unless the Act is declared unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing members of
religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, and thus be a fatal blow
to unionism. We do not agree. The threat to unionism will depend on the number of
employees who are members of the religious sects that control the demands of the labor
market. But there is really no occasion now to go further and anticipate problems We cannot
judge with the material now before Us. At any rate, the validity of a statute is to be determined
from its general purpose and its efficacy to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects
on a particular case. 70 The essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere
incidental result arising from its exertion, is the criterion by which the validity of a statute is to
be measured. 71
Section 2 (j) of Republic Act No. 875 a question involving tenure of employment is included
in the term "labor dispute". 74 The discharge or the act of seeking it is the labor dispute itself.
It being the labor dispute itself, that very same act of the Union in asking the employer to
dismiss Appellee cannot be "an act done . . . in furtherance of an industrial dispute". The
mere fact that appellant is a labor union does not necessarily mean that all its acts are in
furtherance of an industrial dispute. 75 Appellant Union, therefore, cannot invoke in its favor
Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875. This case is not intertwined with any unfair labor practice
case existing at the time when Appellee filed his complaint before the lower court.
Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union, serve as its
shield. The article provides that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded
"when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff . . . to incur expenses to
protect his interest"; and "in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered". In the instant case, it cannot
be gainsaid that appellant Union's act in demanding Appellee's dismissal caused Appellee
to incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his job. Costs according to Section 1,
Rule 142, of the Rules of Court, shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision, dated August
26, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 58894, appealed from
is affirmed, with costs against appellant Union.
It is so ordered.
Makalintal, C .J ., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra,
Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ ., concur.
Fernandez, J ., did not take part because he was co-author, when he was a
Senator, of Rep. Act No. 3350.

II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of which the Union
argued that the decision of the trial court ordering the Union to pay P500 for attorney's fees
directly contravenes Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875, for the instant action involves an
industrial dispute wherein the Union was a party, and said Union merely acted in the exercise
of its rights under the union shop provision of its existing collective bargaining contract with
the Company; that said order also contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil Code; that,
furthermore, Appellee was never actually dismissed by the defendant Company and did not
therefore suffer any damage at all. 72
In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in the instant case
there was really no industrial dispute involved in the attempt to compel Appellee to maintain
its membership in the union under pain of dismissal, and that the Union, by its act, inflicted
intentional harm on Appellee; that since Appellee was compelled to institute an action to
protect his right to work, appellant could legally be ordered to pay attorney's fees under
Articles 1704 and 2208 of the Civil Code.73
The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which is relied upon
by appellant provides that:
"No suit, action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in
any court against a labor organization or any officer or member thereof
for any act done by or on behalf of such organization in furtherance of an
industrial dispute to which it is a party, on the ground only that such act
induces some other person to break a contract of employment or that it is
in restraint of trade or interferes with the trade, business or employment
of some other person or with the right of some other person to dispose of
his capital or labor." (Emphasis supplied)

That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be 'disputed for appellant
sought the discharge of respondent by virtue of the closed shop agreement and under

33
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001.]
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Agarin Verzola Hermoso & Layasen Law Offices, Saguisag Carao & Associates, Jose
B. Flaminiano and Fortun Narvasa & Salazar for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
The Court affirmed the constitutionality of RA 7080, otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659. The Plunder Law contained ascertainable standards and well-
defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation.
Indeed, it can be understood that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer
in amassing ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000 through a series or combination of acts
enumerated in the Plunder Law. Petitioner bewailed the failure of the law to provide statutory
definitions of the terms used. The Court, however, ruled that the same will not render the law void
and the words of the statute will be interpreted in their ordinary acceptation. Hence, petitioner's
reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is misplaced. That the Plunder Law requires only
proof of pattern of the criminal acts showing unlawful scheme, the Court ruled that the same does
not do away with the requirement of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, what the
prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to
have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
to amass ill-gotten wealth.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATION; PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. —
The whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the
basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.
Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a
constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection
for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the
government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the
presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch — the
legislature. If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts
must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers,
and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and
act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in
favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the
provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to
sidestep the question of constitutionality. CADHcI
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF WHEN LAW IS CHALLENGED. — The onerous
task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute.
He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of
the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt,
even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."
3. ID.; ID.; PLUNDER LAW; CONTAINS WELL-DEFINED PARAMETERS. — As it is
written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which
would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit
in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the
elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. As long as the law affords some
comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would
render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge
in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly,
the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with
little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or
accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts
enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law. In fact, the amended Information itself closely
tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the
offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; TERMS USED; ABSENCE OF STATUTORY DEFINITION THEREOF
DOES NOT RENDER LAW VOID; POPULAR MEANING GENERALLY APPLIED. — Petitioner
bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and
"series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par.
(d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner,
render the Plunder Lawunconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny
him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative
of his fundamental right to due process. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining
them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so
define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of
the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act,
which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special
legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers — who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers — to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed. Further, that Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood
in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which
eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WORDS "COMBINATION," "SERIES" AND "PATTERN";
ELUCIDATED. — When the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2)
acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on
the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging
to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3). On the other hand, to constitute a
"series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public
treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a
technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains
in specifically providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
34
Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and
Sec. 2 of the Plunder Law.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; "VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS" DOCTRINE; NOT APPLICABLE. —
Petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine
has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be
invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot
be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. A statute or act may be said to be vague
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to
the Constitution in two (2) respects — it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely
couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively
phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of
activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted
as against the second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine
cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The
test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.
An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible
to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot
be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the
want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation
and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the
well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori,
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators
who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon
by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative
vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVISION IN SEC. 4 THAT ONLY PROOF OF PATTERN OF
CRIMINAL ACTS SHOWING UNLAWFUL SCHEME IS REQUIRED; DOES NOT DO AWAY
WITH PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. — Petitioner advances the highly stretched
theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it
requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor
the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal. The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command
the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the
moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual
going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of
a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This
"reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law
as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in
the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of
doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ELUCIDATED. — The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of
each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that
provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount
of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the
accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the
public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove
by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted
to at least P50,000,000.00. A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical
conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated
otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the
predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no
other explanation for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or
more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth." The
prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern
as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "PATTERN," NOT AN ELEMENT OF CRIME AND DOES NOT
AFFECT SEC. 4 PROVIDING FOR RULE OF EVIDENCE. — Relative to petitioner's contentions
on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of
the crime of plunder"; and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a
substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder
— We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can
be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern"
is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and
unequivocal: SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. — For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder . . .
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case
for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a
means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction
for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to
engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and
vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the
provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on
evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a
separability clause. And implicit in that section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared
invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it
is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each
other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved. DCcIaE
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; A CRIME MALUM IN SE. — We agree with Justice Mendoza that
plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says . . . "The legislative
declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For
when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it
does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder
the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for
plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg.
22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts."
35
 11. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PLUNDER LAW, UPHELD. — Petitioner
likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds.
Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue,
the same having been eternally consigned byPeople v. Echegaray to the archives of
jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid
stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in
the Constitution now as an integral part of it. Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption
and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The
anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as
unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the
government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated,
extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such
is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale
corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the
moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will
of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice
and other venalities in public office. These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history
of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion
generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution
and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among
our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to
rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
MENDOZA, J., concurring opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESUMPTION OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LEGISLATIVE ACT, WHEN APPLICABLE. — Again, it should be
noted that what the U.S. Supreme Court said is that "there may be narrower scope for the
operation of the presumption of constitutionality" for legislation which comes within the first ten
amendments to the American Federal Constitution compared to legislation covered by the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The American Court did not say that such legislation
is not to be presumed constitutional, much less that it is presumptively invalid, but only that a
"narrower scope" will be given for the presumption of constitutionality in respect of such statutes.
There is, therefore, no warrant for petitioner's contention that "the presumption of constitutionality
of a legislative act is applicable only where the Supreme Court deals with facts regarding ordinary
economic affairs, not where the interpretation of the text of the Constitution is involved."
2. ID.; ID.; ANTI-PLUNDER LAW; VALIDITY, CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY
APPLYING THE TEST OF STRICT SCRUTINY IN FREE SPEECH CASES. — Hence, strict
scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or
race and facial challenges are allowed for this purpose. But criminal statutes, like the Anti-Plunder
Law, while subject to strict construction, are not subject to strict scrutiny. The two (i.e., strict
construction and strict scrutiny) are not the same. The rule of strict construction is a rule of legal
hermeneutics which deals with the parsing of statutes to determine the intent of the legislature.
On the other hand, strict scrutiny is a standard of judicial review for determining the quality and
the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. It
is set opposite such terms as "deferential review" and "intermediate review."
3. ID.; ID.; STATUTES; DEGREES OF STRICTNESS IN THEIR REVIEW. — Thus,
under deferential review, laws are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental
interest, without courts seriously inquiring into the substantiality of such interest and examining
the alternative means by which the objectives could be achieved. Under intermediate review, the
substantiality of the government interest is seriously looked into and the availability of less
restrictive alternatives are considered. Under strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of
compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive
means for achieving that interest. Considering these degrees of strictness in the review of statutes,
how many criminal laws can survive the test of strict scrutiny to which petitioner proposes to
subject them? How many can pass muster if, as petitioner would have it, such statutes are not to
be presumed constitutional? Above all, what will happen to the State's ability to deal with the
problem of crimes, and, in particular, with the problem of graft and corruption in government, if
criminal laws are to be upheld only if it is shown that there is a compelling governmental interest
for making certain conduct criminal and if there is no other means less restrictive than that
contained in the law for achieving such governmental interest?
4. ID.; ID.; ANTI-PLUNDER LAW; VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH
DOCTRINES; FACIAL CHALLENGE, ALLOWED TO A VAGUE STATUTE AND TO ONE WHICH
IS OVERBROAD DUE TO POSSIBLE EFFECT UPON PROTECTED SPEECH; RATIONALE,
NOT APPLICABLE TO PENAL LAWS. — Nor do allegations that the Anti-Plunder Law is vague
and overbroad justify a facial review of its validity. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected
speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify
allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished
is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This
rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the
State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; HAVE SPECIAL APPLICATION ONLY TO FREE SPEECH CASES
AND INAPT FOR TESTING THE VALIDITY OF PENAL STATUTES. — The overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for
testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context
of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v.Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct."
For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . . the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant
may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law
as applied to the conduct of others."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINES OF STRICT SCRUTINY, OVERBREADTH, AND
VAGUENESS ARE TOOLS FOR TESTING ON THEIR FACES STATUTES IN FREE SPEECH
CASES, NOT IN CRIMINAL STATUTES. — In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth,
and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to
do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established
rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
36
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only]
'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that
this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; "ON ITS FACE" INVALIDATION OF STATUTES MUST BE EMPLOYED
SPARINGLY. — Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely
on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of
the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts. . . . This is the reason "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described
as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is
generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which
are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with
which the defendant is charged. cdtai
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO NEED TO SPECIFY HOW MANY ACTS ARE NEEDED IN ORDER
TO HAVE A "COMBINATION" OR A "SERIES." — Petitioner contends that the phrase
"combination or series of overt, or criminal acts" in §1(d) and §2 should state how many acts are
needed in order to have a "combination" or a "series." It is not really required that this be specified.
. . . Indeed, the record shows that no amendment to S. No. 733 was proposed to this effect. To
the contrary, Senators Gonzales and Tañada voted in favor of the bill on its third and final reading
on July 25, 1989. The ordinary meaning of the term "combination" as the "union of two things or
acts" was adopted, although in the case of "series," the senators agreed that a repetition of two or
more times of the same thing or act would suffice, thus departing from the ordinary meaning of
the word as "a group of usually three or more things or events standing or succeeding in order
and having a like relationship to each other," or "a spatial or temporal succession of persons or
things," or "a group that has or admits an order of arrangement exhibiting progression.". . . Thus,
resort to the deliberations in Congress will readily reveal that the word "combination" includes at
least two different overt or criminal acts listed in R.A. No. 7080, such as misappropriation
(§1(d)(1)) and taking undue advantage of official position (§1(d)(6)). On the other hand, "series"
is used when the offender commits the same overt or criminal act more than once. There is no
plunder if only one act is proven, even if the ill-gotten wealth acquired thereby amounts to or
exceeds the figure fixed by the law for the offense (now P50,000,000.00). The overt or criminal
acts need not be joined or separated in space or time, since the law does not make such a
qualification. It is enough that the prosecution proves that a public officer, by himself or in
connivance with others, amasses wealth amounting to at least P50 million by committing two or
more overt or criminal acts.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE PHRASE "SERIES OF ACTS OR TRANSACTIONS," NOT VAGUE;
SIMILAR PROVISION HAS BEEN IN THE RULES OF COURT SINCE 1940. — Petitioner also
contends that the phrase "series of acts or transactions" is the subject of conflicting decisions of
various Circuit Courts of Appeals in the United States. It turns out that the decisions concerned a
phrase in Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides: (b) Joinder of
Defendants. Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if
they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts
or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or
more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged on each count.
The fact that there is a conflict in the rulings of the various courts does not mean that Rule 8(b) is
void for being vague but only that the U.S. Supreme Court should step in, for one of its essential
functions is to assure the uniform interpretation of federal laws. We have a similar provision in
Rule 3, §6 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure. It reads: SEC. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. —
All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to
all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just
to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with
any proceedings in which he may have no interest. This provision has been in our Rules of
Court since 1940 but it has never been thought of as vague. It will not do, therefore, to cite the
conflict of opinions in the United States as evidence of the vagueness of the phrase when we do
not have any conflict in this country.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT NECESSARY TO PROVE EACH AND EVERY CRIMINAL ACT
DONE IN FURTHERANCE OF THE SCHEME OR CONSPIRACY AS LONG AS THOSE
PROVEN SHOWED A PATTERN INDICATING THE SCHEME OR CONSPIRACY. — A "pattern
of overt or criminal acts" is required in §4 to prove "an unlawful scheme or conspiracy." In such a
case, it is not necessary to prove each and every criminal act done in furtherance of the scheme
or conspiracy so long as those proven show a pattern indicating the scheme or conspiracy. In
other words, when conspiracy is charged, there must be more than a combination or series of two
or more acts. There must be several acts showing a pattern which is "indicative of the overall
scheme or conspiracy." As Senate President Salonga explained, if there are 150 constitutive
crimes charged, it is not necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt all of them. If a pattern can
be shown by proving, for example, 10 criminal acts, then that would be sufficient to secure
conviction.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENTS ONLY PROBLEMS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION,
NOT VAGUENESS OR OVERBREADTH. — As thus applied to petitioner, the Anti-Plunder
Law presents only problems of statutory construction, not vagueness or overbreadth. In Primicias
vs. Fugoso, an ordinance of the City of Manila, prohibiting the holding of parades and assemblies
in streets and public places unless a permit was first secured from the city mayor and penalizing
its violation, was construed to mean that it gave the city mayor only the power to specify the streets
and public places which can be used for the purpose but not the power to ban absolutely the use
of such places. A constitutional doubt was thus resolved through a limiting construction given to
the ordinance. Nor is the alleged difference of opinion among the Ombudsman, the Solicitor
General, and the Sandiganbayan as to the number of acts or crimes needed to constitute plunder
proof of the vagueness of the statute and, therefore, a ground for its invalidation. For sometime it
was thought that under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code convictions can be had for the complex
crime of rebellion with murder, arson, and other common crimes. The question was finally resolved
in 1956 when this Court held that there is no such complex crime because the common crimes
were absorbed in rebellion. The point is that Art. 134 gave rise to a difference of opinion that nearly
split the legal profession at the time, but no one thought Art. 134 to be vague and, therefore, void.
Where, therefore, the ambiguity is not latent and the legislative intention is discoverable with the
aid of the canons of construction, the void for vagueness doctrine has no application.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; PLUNDER, A MALUM IN SE, REQUIRING PROOF OF CRIMINAL
INTENT. — Plunder is a malum in se, requiring proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; MENS REA, AN ELEMENT OF PLUNDER SINCE THE DEGREE OF
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OFFENDER IS DETERMINED BY HIS CRIMINAL INTENT. — The
application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens reais an element of
plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is
true that §2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officers in the commission
of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it
does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no
canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; THAT THE CRIME OF PLUNDER IS A MALUM IN SE PROVED BY
ITS INCLUSION BY CONGRESS AS AMONG THE HEINOUS CRIMES PUNISHABLE
BYRECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH. — Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder
37
is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of
Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE DECLARATION IN R.A. NO. 7659 THAT PLUNDER
IS A HEINOUS OFFENSE IMPLIES THAT IT IS A MALUM IN SE. — The legislative declaration
in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the
acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not
matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the
predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder
as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or
of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUANTUM OF PROOF REQUIRED TO PROVE PREDICATE CRIMES
IN PLUNDER IS THE SAME AS THAT REQUIRED IF SEPARATELY PROSECUTED. — We
have explained why, contrary to petitioner's contention, the quantum of proof required to prove the
predicate crimes in plunder is the same as that required were they separately prosecuted.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY; LEGISLATURE VIEWED PLUNDER AS A CRIME AS
SERIOUS AS ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE OR RAPE WITH HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE
BYRECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH BY PUNISHING IT WITH THE SAME PENALTY. — But
this is also the case whenever other special complex crimes are created out of two or more existing
crimes. For example, robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under Art. 294, par.
5 of the Revised Penal Code is punished with prision correccional in its maximum period (4 years,
2 months, and 1 day) to prision mayor in its medium period (6 years and 1 day to 8 years).
Homicide under Art. 249 of the same Code is punished with reclusion temporal (12 years and 1
day to 20 years). But when the two crimes are committed on the same occasion, the law treats
them as a special complex crime of robbery with homicide and provides the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death for its commission. Again, the penalty for simple rape under Art. 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua, while that for homicide under Art. 249 it is reclusion
temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years). Yet, when committed on the same occasion, the two
are treated as one special complex crime of rape with homicide and punished with a heavier
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Obviously, the legislature views plunder as a crime as
serious as robbery with homicide or rape with homicide by punishing it with the same penalty.
18. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A REGULATION OF SPEECH, BUT A CRIMINAL STATUTE
DESIGNED TO COMBAT GRAFT AND CORRUPTION. — But the Anti-Plunder Law is not a
regulation of speech. It is a criminal statute designed to combat graft and corruption, especially
those committed by highly-placed public officials. As conduct and not speech is its object, the
Court cannot take chances by examining other provisions not before it without risking vital interests
of society. Accordingly, such statute must be examined only "as applied" to the defendant and, if
found valid as to him, the statute as a whole should not be declared unconstitutional for
overbreadth or vagueness of its other provisions. ACTIcS
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion:
1. CRIMINAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT 7080 (PLUNDER LAW); ELEMENTS OF THE
CRIME. — The Anti-Plunder Law more than adequately answers the question "What is the
violation?" Indeed, to answer this question, any law student — using basic knowledge of criminal
law — will refer to the elements of the crime, which in this case are plainly and certainly spelled
out in a straightforward manner in Sections 2 and 1 (d) thereof. Those elements are: 1. The
offender is a public officer acting by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives
by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons. 2. The offender
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth. 3. The aggregate amount or total value of the
ill-gotten wealth so amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least fifty million
pesos (P50,000,000.00). 4. Such ill-gotten wealth — defined as any asset, property, business
enterprise or material possession of any of the aforesaid persons (the persons within the purview
of Section 2, RA 7080) — has been acquired directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes: (i) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury; (ii) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission,
gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or
entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position
of the public officer concerned; (iii) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the national government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (iv) by obtaining, receiving
or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking; (v) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combination and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons
or special interests; or (vi) by taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
2. ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF WORDS USED IN A
STATUTE WILL NOT RENDER THE LAW "VOID FOR VAGUENESS," IF THE MEANINGS OF
SUCH WORDS CAN BE DETERMINED THROUGH THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION OF
CONSTRUCTION. — Citing People v. Nazario, petitioner adds that "a statute or act may be said
to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." I say, however, that in that very
case cited by petitioner, the Court cautioned that "the act (or law) must be utterly vague on its
face." When it can be "clarified either by a saving clause or by construction," the law cannot be
decreed as invalid. In other words, the absence of statutory definitions of words used in a statute
will not render the law "void for vagueness," if the meanings of such words can be determined
through the judicial function of construction.
3. ID.; ID.; SPECIFIC NUMBER OR PERCENTAGE NOT ALWAYS NECESSARY. —
As pointed out during the Oral Argument on September 18, 2001, the crime of plunder can be
committed by a public officer acting alone. Section 2 of RA 7080 reads as follows: "Definition of
the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with . . . ."
Thus, the insistence on a mathematical specification or precise quantification is essentially without
basis. And lest anyone believe that the Anti-Plunder Law is unusual in this respect, let me just
recall that the RICO law, to which petitioner made repeated references in his Amended Petition,
can likewise be violated by a single individual.
4. ID.; ID.; NOT OPPRESSIVE OR ARBITRARY. — Neither can it be said that RA
7080 is oppressive or arbitrary for imposing a more severe penalty on acombination or series of
the offenses enumerated in Section 1(d) of the law, than would otherwise be imposed if the said
offenses were taken separately. As Mr. Justice Mendoza lucidly pointed out in his interpellation
during the Oral Argument, the Anti-Plunder Law is merely employing a familiar technique or
feature of penal statutes, when it puts together what would otherwise be various combinations of
traditional offenses already proscribed by existing laws and attaching thereto higher or more
severe penalties than those prescribed for the same offenses taken separately.
5. ID.; ID.; INNOCENT ACTS NOT PENALIZED. — The claim of "innocent acts" is
possible only because items 4 and 5 have been taken completely out of context and read in
isolation instead of in relation to the other provisions of the same law, particularly Section 2. The
above-enumerated acts, means or similar schemes must be understood as having reference to or
connection with the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth by a public officer, by himself or in connivance
with others. Those acts are therefore not innocent acts. Neither are those prohibitions new or
unfamiliar. The proscribed acts under item 4, for instance, may to some extent be traced back to
some of the prohibitions in RA 3019 (the Anti-Graft Law). On the other hand, the prohibited acts
under item 5 have antecedents in the Revised Penal Code's interdiction against monopolies and
combinations in restraint of trade. Clearly, the acts dealt with in Items 4 and 5 of Section 1(d) are
in no wise the innocent or innocuous deeds that petitioner would have us mistake them for.
38
 6. ID.; ID.; "PATTERN OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS"; NOT AN ESSENTIAL OR
SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENT OF THE CRIME. — Petitioner, in line with his "void for vagueness"
attack on RA 7080, faults the statute for failing to provide a definition of the phrase a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy used in Section 4 of
the law. This definition is crucial since, according to him, such pattern is an essential element of
the crime of plunder. A plain reading of the law easily debunks this contention. First, contrary to
petitioner's suggestions, such pattern of overt or criminal acts and so on is not and should not be
deemed an essential or substantive element of the crime of plunder. It is possible to give full force
and effect to RA 7080 without applying Section 4 — an accused can be charged and convicted
under the Anti-Plunder Law without resorting to that specific provision. After all, the heading and
the text of Section 4, leave no room for doubt that it is not substantive in nature.
7. ID.; ID.; PLUNDER INVOLVES NOT JUST THIEVERY BUT ECONOMIC
DEPREDATION WHICH AFFECTS NOT JUST PRIVATE PARTIES OR PERSONAL INTEREST
BUT THE NATION AS A WHOLE. — As can be gleaned from the legislative deliberations, the
Plunder Law was enacted to curb the "despoliation of the National Treasury by some public
officials who have held the levers of power" and to penalize "this predatory act which has reached
unprecedented heights and has been developed by its practitioners to a high level of sophistication
during the past dictatorial regime." Viewed broadly, "plunder involves not just plain thievery but
economic depredation which affects not just private parties or personal interests but the nation as
a whole." Invariably, plunder partakes of the nature of a "a crime against national interests which
must be stopped, and if possible, stopped permanently."
8. ID.; ID.; NO PATENT AND CLEAR CONFLICT WITH THE CONSTITUTION. — The
law must be proven to be clearly and unequivocally repugnant to theConstitution before this Court
may declare its unconstitutionality. To strike down the law, there must be a clear showing that
what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute allows to be done. To justify the nullification of the
law, there must be a clear, unequivocal breach of the Constitution; not a doubtful, argumentative
implication. Of some terms in the law which are easily clarified by judicial construction, petitioner
has, at best, managed merely to point out alleged ambiguities. Far from establishing, by clear and
unmistakable terms, any patent and glaring conflict with the Constitution, the constitutional
challenge to the Anti-Plunder Law must fail. For just as the accused is entitled to the presumption
of innocence in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt, so must a law be accorded the
presumption of constitutionality without the same requisite quantum of proof.
9. ID.; ID.; QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN CRIMINAL CASES NOT
LOWERED BY THE LAW. — First, petitioner's allegation as to the meaning and implications of
Section 4 can hardly be taken seriously, because it runs counter to certain basic common sense
presumptions that apply to the process of interpreting statutes; that in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, it will be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just
law; that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail; and that the legislature aimed
to impart to its enactments such meaning as would render them operative and effective and
prevent persons from eluding or defeating them. Second, petitioner's allegation is contradicted by
the legislative Records that manifest the real intent behind Section 4, as well as the true meaning
and purpose of the provision therein. This intent is carefully expressed by the words of Senate
President Salonga: "Senate Pres. Salonga. Is that if there are let's say 150 crimes all in all, criminal
acts, whether bribery, misappropriation, malversation, extortion, you need not prove all of those
beyond reasonable doubt. If you can prove by pattern, let's say 10, but each must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, you do not have to prove 150 crimes. That's the meaning of this."
10. ID.; ID.; THE INDICATIVE PATTERN MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. — Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the indicative pattern must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. To my mind, this means that the prosecution's burden of
proving the crime of plunder is, in actuality, much greater than in an ordinary criminal case. The
prosecution, in establishing a pattern of overt or criminal acts, must necessarily show a
combination or series of acts within the purview of Section 1(d) of the law. These acts which
constitute the combination or series must still be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On top of that,
the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt such pattern to overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy, as well as all the other elements thereof.
11. ID.; ID.; SECTION 4 OF THE LAW PERTAINS ONLY TO A RULE ON EVIDENCE
OR TO A PROCEDURAL MATTER THAT DOES NOT BEAR UPON OR FORM ANY PART OF
THE ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER AND THE COURT MAY DECLARE THE SAME
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND STRIKE IT OFF THE STATUTE WITHOUT NECESSARILY
AFFECTING THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT. — Even granting arguendo that Section 4 of the Anti-
Plunder Law suffers from some constitutional infirmity, the statute may nonetheless survive the
challenge of constitutionality in its entirety. Considering that this provision pertain only to a rule on
evidence or to a procedural matter that does not bear upon or form any part of the elements of the
crime of plunder, the Court may declare the same unconstitutional and strike it off the statute
without necessarily affecting the essence of the legislative enactment. For even without the
assailed provision, the law can still stand as a valid penal statute inasmuch as the elements of the
crime, as well as the penalties therein, may still be clearly identified or sufficiently derived from the
remaining valid portions of the law. This finds greater significance when one considers that Section
7 of the law provides for a separability clause declaring the validity, the independence and the
applicability of the other remaining provisions, should any other provision of the law be held invalid
or unconstitutional. aScITE
12. ID.; ID.; REGARDLESS OF WHETHER PLUNDER IS CLASSIFIED AS MALA
PROHIBITA OR IN SE, IT IS THE PREROGATIVE OF THE LEGISLATURE TO DETERMINE
WHETHER CERTAIN ACTS ARE CRIMINAL IRRESPECTIVE OF THE ACTUAL INTENT OF
THE PERPETRATOR. — While I simply cannot agree that the Anti-Plunder Laweliminated mens
rea from the component crimes of plunder, my bottom-line position still is: regardless of whether
plunder is classified as mala prohibita or in se, it is the prerogative of the legislature — which is
undeniably vested with the authority — to determine whether certain acts are criminal irrespective
of the actual intent of the perpetrator.
13. ID.; ID.; MATTER OF CLASSIFICATION IS NOT SIGNIFICANT, THE KEY IS
WHETHER THE SAME BURDEN OF PROOF THAT IS PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT WOULD APPLY. — Without being facetious, may I say that, unlike the act of discharging
a gun, the acts mentioned in Section 1(d) — bribery, conversion, fraudulent conveyance, unjust
enrichment and the like — cannot be committed sans criminal intent. And thus, I finally arrive at a
point of agreement with petitioner: that the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) are by their
nature mala in se, and most of them are in fact defined and penalized as such by the Revised
Penal Code. Having said that, I join the view that when we speak of plunder, we are referring
essentially to two or more instances of mala in se constituting one malum prohibitum. Thus, there
should be no difficulty if each of the predicate acts be proven beyond reasonable doubt as mala
in se, even if the defense of lack of intent be taken away as the Solicitor General has suggested. In
brief, the matter of classification is not really significant, contrary to what petitioner would have us
believe. The key, obviously, is whether the same burden of proof — proof beyond reasonable
doubt — would apply.
14. POLITICAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; EMPOWERED TO CONSTRUE AND
APPLY THE LAW. — At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is essentially
judicial. To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or
has been is judicial. Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be expected to spell out with
mathematical precision how the law should be interpreted under any and all given situations. The
application of the law will depend on the facts and circumstances as adduced by evidence which
will then be considered, weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the constitutionally
mandated function of the courts to interpret, construe and apply the law as would gives flesh and
blood to the true meaning of legislative enactments.
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; CRIMINAL STATUTE; PRESUMED CONSTITUTIONAL;
EXCEPTION. — Every law enacted by Congress enjoys a presumption of constitutionality, and
39
the presumption prevails in the absence of contrary evidence. A criminal statute is generally valid
if it does not violate constitutional guarantees of individual rights.Conversely, when a
constitutionally protected right of an individual is in danger of being trampled upon by a criminal
statute, such law must be struck down for being void.
2. ID.; ID.; CLARITY AND DEFINITENESS; REQUIRED; RATIONALE. — One of the
fundamental requirements imposed by the Constitution upon criminal statutes is that pertaining to
clarity and definiteness. Statutes, particularly penal laws, that fall short of this requirement have
been declared unconstitutional for being vague. This "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is rooted in
the basic concept of fairness as well as the due process clause of the Constitution.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as well as the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. A criminal
statute should not be so vague and uncertain that "men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; "VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS" DOCTRINE; CONSTRUED. — There are
three distinct considerations for the vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to ensure
that individuals are properly warned ex-ante of the criminal consequences of their conduct. This
"fair notice" rationale was articulated in United States v. Harriss: The constitutional requirement of
definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that
no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand
to be proscribed. Second, and viewed as more important, the doctrine is intended to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement. Vague laws are invariably "standardless" and as
such, they afford too great an opportunity for criminal enforcement to be left to the unfettered
discretion of police officers and prosecutors. Third, vague laws fail to provide sufficient guidance
to judges who are charged with interpreting statutes. Where a statute is too vague to provide
sufficient guidance, the judiciary is arguably placed in the position of usurping the proper function
of the legislature by "making the law" rather than interpreting it. While the dictum that laws be clear
and definite does not require Congress to spell out with mathematical certainty the standards to
which an individual must conform his conduct, it is necessary that statutes provide reasonable
standards to guide prospective conduct. And where a statute imposes criminal sanctions, the
standard of certainty is higher. The penalty imposable on the person found guilty of violating R.A.
No. 7080 is reclusion perpetua to death. Given such penalty, the standard of clarity and
definiteness required of R.A. No. 7080 is unarguably higher than that of other laws.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION THEREOF. — A view has been proferred that
"vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are not applicable to penal laws." These two concepts,
while related, are distinct from each other. On one hand, the doctrine of overbreadth applies
generally to statutes that infringe upon freedom of speech. On the other hand, the "void-for-
vagueness" doctrine applies to criminal laws, not merely those that regulate speech or other
fundamental constitutional rights. The fact that a particular criminal statute does not infringe upon
free speech does not mean that a facial challenge to the statute on vagueness grounds cannot
succeed. As earlier intimated, the "vagueness doctrine" is anchored on the constitutionally-
enshrined right to due process of law. Thus, as in this case that the "life, liberty and property" of
petitioner is involved, the Court should not hesitate to look into whether a criminal statute has
sufficiently complied with the elementary requirements of definiteness and clarity. It is an
erroneous argument that the Court cannot apply the vagueness doctrine to penal laws. Such
stance is tantamount to saying that no criminal law can be challenged however repugnant it is to
the constitutional right to due process. While admittedly, penal statutes are worded in reasonably
general terms to accomplish the legislature's objective of protecting the public from socially
harmful conduct, this should not prevent a vagueness challenge in cases where a penal statute is
so indeterminate as to cause the average person to guess at its meaning and application. For if a
statute infringing upon freedom of speech may be challenged for being vague because such right
is considered as fundamental, with more reason should a vagueness challenge with respect to a
penal statute be allowed since the latter involve deprivation of liberty, and even of life which,
inarguably, are rights as important as, if not more than, free speech.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; R.A. NO. 7080 (PLUNDER LAW); CRIME OF PLUNDER,
DEFINED. — Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 7080 provides: Definition of the Crime of Plunder;Penalties. —
Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity
or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in
Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of
an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes
and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment
thereof forfeited in favor of the State. (As amended by Sec. 12, RA No. 7659.) On the other hand,
Section 4 states: Rule of Evidence. — For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall
not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
6. ID.; ID.; "ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH"; DEFINED. — Section 1(d) of the same law defines
"ill-gotten wealth" as "any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2)" hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through
dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates, and/or business associates by any combination or
series of the following means or similar schemes: 1. Through misappropriation, conversion,
misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; 2. By receiving, directly or
indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary
benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned; 3. By the illegal or fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries; 4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,
equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in
any business enterprise or undertaking; 5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combination and/or other combination and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or 6. By taking undue advantage
of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
7. ID.; ID.; "COMBINATION" AND "SERIES"; USE THEREOF FAILED TO SATISFY
STRICT REQUIREMENTS ON CLARITY AND DEFINITENESS. — Although the law has no
statutory definition of "combination" or "series," the majority is of the view that resort can be had
to the ordinary meaning of these terms. Thus, Webster's Third New International Dictionary gives
the meaning of "combination"; "the result or product or product of combining: a union or aggregate
made of combining one thing with another." In the context of R.A. No. 7080, "combination" as
suggested by the Solicitor General means that at least two of the enumerated acts found in Section
1(d), i.e., one of any of the enumerated acts, combined with another act falling under any other of
the enumerated means may constitute the crime of plunder. With respect to the term "series," the
majority states that it has been understood as pertaining to "two or more overt or criminal acts
falling under the same category" as gleaned from the deliberations on the law in the House of
Representatives and the Senate. . . . To my mind, resort to the dictionary meaning of the terms
"combination" and "series" as well as recourse to the deliberations of the lawmakers only serve to
prove that R.A. No. 7080 failed to satisfy the strict requirements of the Constitution on clarity and
definiteness. Note that the key element to the crime of plunder is that the public officer, by himself
or in conspiracy with others, amasses, accumulates, or acquires "ill-gotten wealth" through a
"combination or series of overt or criminal acts" as described in Section 1(d) of the law. Senator
40
Gonzales, during the deliberations in the Senate, already raised serious concern over the lack of
a statutory definition of what constitutes "combination" or "series," consequently, expressing his
fears that Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 might be violative of due process. . . . The point raised by
Senator Gonzales is crucial and well-taken. I share petitioner's observation that when penal laws
enacted by Congress make reference to a term or concept requiring a quantitative definition, these
laws are so crafted as to specifically state the exact number or percentage necessary to constitute
the elements of a crime. . . . The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee and of the
Senate cited by the majority, consisting mostly of unfinished sentences, offer very little help in
clarifying the nebulous concept of plunder. All that they indicate is that Congress seemingly
intended to hold liable for plunder a person who: (1) commits at least two counts of any one of the
acts mentioned in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080, in which case, such person commits plunder by
a series of overt criminal acts; or (2) commits at least one count of at least two of the acts
mentioned in Section 1(d), in which case, such person commits plunder by a combination of overt
criminal acts. Said discussions hardly provide a window as to the exact nature of this crime. . . .
Moreover, if "combination" as used in the law simply refers to the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least P50 Million through at least two of the means
enumerated in Section 1(d), and "series," to at least two counts of one of the modes under said
section, the accused could be meted out the death penalty for acts which, if taken separately, i.e.,
not considered as part of the combination or series, would ordinarily result in the imposition of
correctional penalties only. If such interpretation would be adopted, the Plunder Law would be
so oppressive and arbitrary as to violate due process and the constitutional guarantees
against cruel or inhuman punishment. The penalty would be blatantly disproportionate to the
offense. ISTECA
8. ID.; ID.; PENALTY; VIOLATIVE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS. — The
argument that higher penalties may be imposed where two or more distinct criminal acts are
combined and are regarded as special complex crime, i.e., rape with homicide, does not justify
the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death in case plunder is committed. Taken
singly, rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua; and homicide, by reclusion temporal. Hence, the
increase in the penalty imposed when these two are considered together as a special complex
crime is not too far from the penalties imposed for each of the single offenses. In contrast, as
shown by the examples above, there are instances where the component crimes of plunder, if
taken separately, would result in the imposition of correctional penalties only; but when considered
as forming part of a series or combination of acts constituting plunder, could be punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. The disproportionate increase in the penalty is certainly violative
of substantive due process and constitute a cruel and inhuman punishment. It may also be pointed
out that the definition of "ill-gotten wealth" in Section 1(d) has reference to the acquisition of
property (by the accused himself or in connivance with others) "by any combination or series" of
the "means" or "similar schemes" enumerated therein, which include the following: . . . 4. By
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other forms
of interest or participation including the promise of future employment or any business enterprise
or undertakings; 5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combination and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons
or special interests; . . . The above-mentioned acts are not, by any stretch of the imagination,
criminal or illegal acts. They involve the exercise of the right to liberty and propertyguaranteed by
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws." Receiving or accepting any shares of stock is not per se objectionable. It is in
pursuance of civil liberty, which includes "the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in
all lawful ways; . . . to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and/or that
purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying
out these purposes to a successful conclusion. Nor is there any impropriety, immorality or illegality
in establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or
implementation of decrees and orders even if they are intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests. The phrases "particular persons" and "special interests" may well refer to the
poor, the indigenous cultural communities, labor, farmers, fisherfolk, women, or those connected
with education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports. In contrast, the monopolies and
combinations described in Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code are punishable because, as
specifically defined therein, they are "on restraint of trade or commerce or to prevent by artificial
means of free competition in the market, or the object is "to alter the price" of any merchandise
"by spreading false rumors," or to manipulate market prices in restraint of trade. There are no
similar elements of monopolies or combinations as described in the Plunder Law to make the acts
wrongful. If, as interpreted by the Solicitor General, "series" means a "repetition" or pertains to
"two or more" acts, and "combination as defined in the Webster's Third New International
Dictionary is "the result or product of combining one thing with another," then, the commission of
two or more acts falling under paragraphs (4) and (5) of Section 1(d) would make innocent acts
protected by the Constitution as criminal, and punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
9. ID.; ID.; PATTERN AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT THEREOF; NOT PROPERLY
DEFINED. — It is a basic rule of statutory construction that to ascertain the meaning of a law, the
same must be read in its entirety. Section 1 taken in relation to Section 4 suggests that there is
something to plunder beyond simply the number of acts involved and that a grand scheme to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth is contemplated by R.A. No. 7080. Sections 1 and
2 pertain only to the nature and quantitative means or acts by which a public officer, by himself or
in connivance with other persons, "amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth." Section
4, on the other hand, requires the presence of elements other than those enumerated in Section
2 to establish that the crime of plunder has been committed because it speaks of the necessity to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy." Clearly, it will not suffice that the "illegal wealth" amassed is at
least Fifty Million Pesos and that this was acquired by any two or more of the acts described in
Section 1(d); it is necessary that these acts constitute a "combination or series" of acts done in
furtherance of "the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth," and
which constitute "a person of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy."
That pattern is an essential element of the crime of plunder is evident from a reading of the
assailed law in its entirety. It is that which would distinguish plunder from isolated criminal acts
punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws, for without the existence a "pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy" to acquire ill-gotten wealth, a
person committing several or even all of the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) cannot be convicted
for plunder, but may be convicted only for the specific crimes committed under the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Penal Code or other laws. For this reason, I do not agree that Section 4
is merely a rule of evidence or a rule of procedure. It does not become such simply because its
caption states that it is, although its wording indicates otherwise. On the contrary, it is
of substantive characterbecause it spells out a distinctive element of the crime which has to be
established, i.e., an overall unlawful "scheme or conspiracy" indicated by a "pattern of overt or
criminal acts" or means or similar schemes "to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth."
The meaning of the phrase "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy," however, escapes me. As in "combination" and "series," R.A. No.
7080 does not provide a definition of "pattern" as well as "overall unlawful scheme." Reference to
the legislative history of R.A. No. 7080 for guidance as to the meanings of these concepts would
be unavailing, since the records of the deliberations in Congress are silent as to what the
lawmakers mean by these terms. Resort to the dictionary meanings of "pattern" and "scheme" is,
in this case, wholly inadequate. These words are defined as: pattern: an arrangement or order of
things or activity. Scheme: design; project; plot. At most, what the use of these terms signifies is
that while multiplicity of the acts (at least two or more) is necessary, this is not sufficient to
constitute plunder. As stated earlier, without the element of "pattern" indicative of an "overall
unlawful scheme," the acts merely constitute isolated or disconnected criminal offenses
punishable by the Revised Penal Code or other special laws. The commission of two or more of
the acts falling under Section 1(d) is no guarantee that they fall into a "pattern" or "any arrangement
or order." It is not the number of acts but the relationship that they bear to each other or to some
external organizing principle that renders them "ordered" or "arranged": A pattern is an
arrangement or order of things, or activity, and the mere fact that there are a number of predicates
is no guarantee that they fall into an arrangement or order. It is not the number of predicates but
the relationship that they bear to each other or to some external organizing principle that renders
them 'ordered' or 'arranged.' In any event, it is hardly possible that two predicate acts can form a
41
pattern: The implication is that while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Indeed,
in common parlance, two of anything will not generally form a 'pattern.' . . . Clearly, "pattern" has
been statutorily defined and interpreted in countless ways by circuit courts in the United States.
Their divergent conclusions have functioned effectively to create variant criminal offenses. This
confusion has come about notwithstanding that almost all these state laws have respectively
statutorily defined "pattern." In sharp contrast, R.A. No. 7080, as earlier pointed out, lacks such
crucial definition. As to what constitutes pattern within the meaning of R.A. No. 7080 is left to
the ad hoc interpretation of prosecutors and judges. Neither the text of R.A. No. 7080 nor
legislative history afford any guidance as to what factors may be considered in order to prove
beyond reasonable doubt "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy." Be that as it may, it is glaringly fallacious to argue that "series" simply
means a "repetition" or "pertaining to two or more" and "combination" is the "result or product of
combining." Whether two or more or at least three acts are involved, the majority would interpret
the phrase "combinations" or "series" only in terms of number of acts committed. They
entirely overlook or ignore Section 4 which requires "a pattern of overt of criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" to convict.
10. ID.; ID.; PERSON WHO PARTICIPATES IN THE COMMISSION OF ONLY ONE
OF THE COMPONENT CRIMES CONSTITUTING PLUNDER MAY BE LIABLE AS CO-
PRINCIPAL. — Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 states that "[a]ny person who participated with the said
public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court." Both parties share the view that the law as it is worded makes
it possible for a person who participates in the commission of only one of the component crimes
constituting plunder to be liable as co-conspirator for plunder, not merely the component crime in
which he participated. While petitioner concedes that it is easy to ascertain the penalty for an
accomplice or accessory under R.A. No. 7080, such is not the case with respect to a co-principal
of the accused. In other words, a person who conspires with the accused in the commission of
only one of the component crimes may be prosecuted as co-principal for the component crime, or
as co-principal for the crime of plunder, depending on the interpretation of the prosecutor.
Theunfettered discretion effectively bestowed on law enforcers by the aforequoted clause in
determining the liability of the participants in the commission of one or more of the component
crimes of a charge for plunder undeniably poses the danger of arbitrary enforcement of the
law. EHaCID
11. ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD THEREOF; NOT CLEARLY STATED. — Section
6 of R.A. No. 7080 provides that the crime punishable under said Act shall prescribe in twenty (20)
years. Considering that the law was designed to cover a "combination or series of overt or criminal
acts," or "a pattern of overt or criminal acts," from what time shall the period of prescription be
reckoned? From the first, second, third or last act of the series or pattern? What shall be the time
gap between two succeeding acts? If the last act of a series or combination was committed twenty
or more years after the next preceding one, would not the crime have prescribed, thereby resulting
in the total extinction of criminal liability under Article 89(b) of the Revised Penal Code? In
antithesis, the RICO law affords more clarity and definiteness in describing "pattern of racketeering
activity" as "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred within ten years
(excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
The U.S. state statutes similarly provide specific time frames within which racketeering acts are
committed.
12. ID.; ID.; SECTION 4 THEREOF ELIMINATES PROOF OF EACH AND EVERY
COMPONENT CRIMINAL ACT OF PLUNDER AND LIMITS ITSELF TO ESTABLISHING
PATTERN OF OVERT ACTS; EFFECT THEREOF. — By its language, Section 4 eliminates proof
of each and every component criminal act of plunder by the accused and limits itself to establishing
just the pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The law, in
effect, penalizes the accused on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy to commit plunder
without the necessity of establishing beyond reasonable doubt each and every criminal act done
by the accused in the crime of plunder. To quote Fr. Bernas again: "How can you have a 'series'
of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be
criminal?" Moreover, by doing away with proof beyond reasonable doubt of each and every
criminal act done by the accused in the furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to acquire ill-
gotten wealth, it being sufficient just to prove a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy, the Plunder Law effectively eliminated the mens rea or
criminal intent as an element of the crime. Because of this, it is easier to convict for plunder and
sentence the accused to death than to convict him for each of the component crimes otherwise
punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws which are bailable offenses. The
resultant absurdity strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees of due process and
equal protection. . . . Mens rea is a substantive due process requirement under the Constitution,
and this is a limitation on police power. Additionally, lack of mens rea or a
clarifying scienter requirement aggravates the vagueness of a statute.
13. ID.; ID.; "MALA IN SE" AND "MALA PROHIBITA"; DISTINGUISHED;
APPLICATION THEREOF. — The facts that the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) of R.A.
7080were made criminal by special law does not necessarily make the same mala prohibita where
criminal intent is not essential, although the term refers generally to acts made criminal by special
laws. For there is a marked difference between the two. According to a well-known author on
criminal law: There is a distinction between crimes which are mala in se, or wrongful from their
nature, such as theft, rape, homicide, etc., and those that are mala prohibita, or wrong merely
because prohibited by statute, such as illegal possession of firearms. Crimes mala in se are those
so serious in their effects on society as to call for almost unanimous condemnation of its members;
while crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more
orderly regulation of the affairs of society. (Bouvir's Law Dictionary, Rawle's 3rd Revision) (1) In
acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in those mala prohibita the only inquiry is, has the law been
violated? (People vs. Kibler, 106 N.Y., 321, cited in the case of U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 132)
Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy, as in
illegal possession of firearms. (People vs. Canosa, C.A., 45 O.G. 3953) (2) The term mala in
se refers generally to felonies defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code. When the acts
are inherently immoral, they are mala in se, even if punished by special laws. On the other hand,
there are crimes in the Revised Penal Code which were originally defined and penalized by special
laws. Among them are possession and use of opium, malversation, brigandage, and libel. The
component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being inherently wrongful and immoral, are
patently mala in se, even if punished by a special law and accordingly, criminal intent must clearly
be established together with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.
By eliminating mens rea, R.A. 7080 does not require the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the component acts constituting plunder and imposes a lesser burden of proof on the
prosecution, thus paving the way for the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
on the accused, in plain violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Constitution. Evidently, the authority of the legislature to omit the element of scienter in the
proof of a crime refers to regulatory measures in the exercise of police power, where the emphasis
of the law is to secure a more orderly regulations of the offense of society, rather than the
punishment of the crimes. So that in mala prohibita prosecutions, the element of criminal intent is
a requirement for conviction and must be provided in the special law penalizing what are
traditionally mala in se crimes.
14. ID.; ID.; RULE ON ESTOPPEL; MAY BE RESORTED TO ONLY AS A MEANS OF
PREVENTING INJUSTICE; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The fact that one of petitioner's
counsel was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and petitioner himself voted for its passage when
he was still a Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to question its constitutionality. The
rule on estoppel applies to question of fact, not of law. Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to
only as a means of preventing injustice. To hold that petitioner is estopped from questioning the
validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted for its passage would result in injustice not
only to him, but to all others who may be held liable under this statute. In People vs. Vera, citing
the U.S. case of Attorney General v. Perkins, the Court held: . . . The idea seems to be that the
people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law enacted by their representatives; that
42
to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation upon their government, a statute enacted
by the people of Michigan is an adequate statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is a
statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more saving effect to justify action
under it had never been enacted. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the
courts, the legislature, and the people must bow. . . . The Court should not sanction the use of an
equitable remedy to defeat the ends of justice by permitting a person to be deprived of his life and
liberty under an invalid law.
15. ID.; ID.; AMBIGUITY THEREOF RUNS AFOUL OF DUE PROCESS CONCEPT;
RATIONALE. — Undoubtedly, the reason behind the enactment of R.A. 7080 is commendable. It
was a response to the felt need at the time that existing laws were inadequate to penalize the
nature and magnitude of corruption that characterized a "previous regime." However, where the
law, such as R.A. 7080, is so indefinite that the line between innocent and condemned conduct
becomes a matter of guesswork, the indefiniteness runs afoul of due process concepts which
require that persons be given full notice of what to avoid, and that the discretion of law enforcement
officials, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, be limited by
explicit legislative standards. It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an ambiguous law as R.A.
No. 7080 would put on the balance the life and liberty of the accused against whom all the
resources of the State are arrayed. It could be used as a tool against political enemies and a
weapon of hate and revenge by whoever wields the levers of power.
PARDO, J., dissenting opinion:
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PLUNDER LAW; AMENDMENTS
THEREOF PRESCRIBING DEATH PENALTY UNCONSTITUTIONAL; SINCE LAW PENALIZES
ACTS MALA IN SE, CHARGES MUST BE THE SPECIFIC ACTS ALLEGED IN VIOLATION OF
LAW, COMMITTED WITH MALICE AND CRIMINAL INTENT; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF ALL ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER, INCLUDING COMPONENT CRIMES, REQUIRED.
— Hence, the amendments to the plunder law prescribing the death penalty therefor are
unconstitutional. I am of the view that the plunder law penalizes acts that are mala in se, and
consequently, the charges must be the specific acts alleged to be in violation of the law, committed
with malice and criminal intent. At any rate, I venture the view that Section 4, R.A. No. 7080, must
be interpreted as requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt of all the elements of plunder as
prescribed in the law, including the elements of the component crimes, otherwise, the section will
be unconstitutional.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PLUNDER LAW; VAGUE, UNCERTAIN
AND BROAD. — A reading of the Plunder Law immediately shows that it is phrased in a manner
not susceptible to ready or clear understanding. In the desire to cover under one single offense of
plunder every conceivable criminal activity committed by a high government official in the course
of his duties, Congress has come out with a law unduly vague, uncertain and broad.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A STATUTE INVOLVING CRIMINAL PROSECUTION MUST BE
DEFINITE TO BE VALID; A VAGUE OR OVERBROAD STATUTE VIOLATES THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE. — The doctrines of overbreadth and void-for-vagueness in Constitutional
Law were developed in the context of freedom of speech and of the press. However, they apply
equally, if not more so, to capital offenses. In the present case, what the law seeks to protect or
regulate involves the deprivation of life itself and not merely the regulation of expression. In its
early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. A statute, especially
one involving criminal prosecution, must be definite to be valid. A statute is vague or overbroad,
in violation of the due process clause, where its language does not convey sufficiently definite
warning to the average person as to the prohibited conduct. A statute is unconstitutionally vague
if people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. It is not only prosecutors
and judges who are concerned. The need for definiteness applies with greater force to the accused
and those in positions where opportunities for them to commit the proscribed offense are present.
They must understand exactly what prohibited activity will be punished by capital punishment.
Sadly, even the record of deliberations in Congress cited in the motion to quash shows that even
the members of the Senate who are illustrious lawyers found the Plunder Law vague.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS INFIRMITY OF LAW BECOMES MORE
APPARENT IF PROSCRIBED ACTIVITY IS "MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNDS." — Under the same
paragraph of the Plunder Law, malversation is lumped with "misuse of public funds." Misuse can
be as innocuous as error or it can be as severe as corruption or embezzlement. The terms "abuse,"
"distortion," "misapplication," "mismanagement," "poor stewardship," "malpractice,"
"debasement," or "breach of trust," all conceivably fall under the generic term "misuse." Exactly
when does an administrative offense of misuse become the capital crime of plunder? What degree
of misuse is contemplated under the law? A penal law violates due process where inherently
vague statutory language permits selective law enforcement. Under the Plunder Law, a crusading
public officer who steps on too many important toes in the course of his campaign could be
prosecuted for a capital offense, while for exactly the same acts, an official who tries to please
everybody can be charged either administratively or for a much lighter offense. For instance, direct
bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code is punished with prision mayor in its medium
or minimum periods, prision correctional in its medium period, or prision mayor in its minimum
period, depending on the manner of commission. Indirect bribery under Article 211 is punished
with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Underthe Plunder Law, the penalty
is reclusion perpetua to death. The void-for-vagueness infirmity becomes all the more apparent if
the proscribed activity is "misuse of public funds." The prosecutor is given broad powers of
selective law enforcement. For "misuse," exactly the same acts could be punished with death
under the Plunder Law, or mere dismissal with prejudice to future government employment under
the Civil Service Law.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVISION THEREOF ON "IMPLEMENTATION OF DECREES AND
ORDERS INTENDED TO BENEFIT PARTICULAR PERSONS OR SPECIAL INTERESTS"
CALLS FOR MORE SPECIFIC ELUCIDATION. — The provision in the Plunder Law on
"implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests"
also calls for more specific elucidation. If the only person benefited is himself, does that fall under
"particular person?" Decrees and orders issued by a top government official may be intended to
benefit certain segments of society such as farmers, manufacturers, residents of a geographical
area and the like. If in the process a close relative acquires P50,000,000.00 because of
development in that sector solely because of the decree and without lifting a finger, is that plunder?
The vagueness can be better appreciated by referring to petitioner's arguments that the element
of mens rea in mala in se crimes has been abolished and the offenses have been converted
to mala prohibita. If the guilty intent is eliminated, even innocent acts can be plunder. The law was
not drafted for petitioner alone. It applies to all public officers.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CRIMINAL INTENT TO COMMIT THE CRIME NOT REQUIRED TO BE
PROVED; VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND STANDARDS OF FAIR PLAY.
— Early in the history of this Court, it ruled that in acts mala in se, the criminal intent governs. But
in those acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is: has the law been violated? Acts constituting
malversation, estafa, and bribery are mala in se. The courts must inquire into the criminal intent,
the evil nature or wrongful disposition behind the criminal acts. In mala prohibita crimes, there is
a violation of a prohibitory law and the inquiry is, therefore, has the law been violated? In the crime
of plunder, it is enough that the acts defining malversation or bribery are described. The court then
proceeds to determine whether the acts fall under the prohibitory terms of the law. Criminal intent
no longer has to be proved. The criminal intent to commit the crime is not required to be proved.
The desire to benefit particular persons does not have to spring from criminal intent under the
special law creating the crime of plunder. In malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal
Code, the criminal intent is an important element of the criminal acts. Under the Plunder Law, it is
enough that the acts are committed. Thus, even if the accused can prove lack of criminal intent
with respect to crimes mala in se, this will not exonerate him under the crime mala prohibita. This
43
violates substantive due process and the standards of fair play because mens rea is a
constitutional guarantee under the due process clause.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOING AWAY WITH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA AND
DEPRIVING ACCUSED OF DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL INTENT AS TO MALA IN
SECOMPONENTS OF PLUNDER, ANATHEMA TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS. — By
grafting several felonies, some mala in se and some mala prohibita, to constitute the crime of
plunder and by doing away with the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt for the component
elements, the State would practically be given the judicialimprimatur to impose the extreme
penalty of death on the basis of proof only of the overall pattern of overt or criminal acts showing
unlawful scheme or conspiracy. This attempt of Congress to tip the scales of criminal justice in
favor of the state by doing away with the element of mens rea and to pave the way for the accused
to be convicted by depriving him of the defense of criminal intent as to mala in se components of
plunder will be anathema to substantive due process which insures "respect for those personal
immunities which are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CIRCUMVENTS OBLIGATION OF PROSECUTION TO PROVE
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT EVERY FACT NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE THE CRIME;
PROOF OF PATTERN OF OVERT ACTS SHOWING AN UNLAWFUL SCHEME OR
CONSPIRACY IS MERELY REQUIRED. — Equally disagreeable is the provision of the Plunder
Law which does away with the requirement that each and every component of the criminal act of
plunder be proved and instead limits itself to proving only a pattern of overt acts indicative of the
unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In effect, the law seeks to penalize the accused only on the basis
of a proven scheme or conspiracy, and does away with the rights of the accused insofar as the
component crimes are concerned. In other words, R.A. No. 7080 circumvents the obligation of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime of
plunder, because the law requires merely proof of a pattern of overt acts showing an unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. What aggravates matters on this point is that under controlling case law,
conspiracy to defraud is not punishable under the Revised Penal Code. Cutting corners on the
burden of proof is unconstitutional because the standard of reasonable doubt is part of the due
process safeguard accorded an accused. The due process clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE THE STATUTE HAS AN OVERBROAD SWEEP AND IT IS
VAGUE, THE HAZARD OF LOSS OR IMPAIRMENT OF LIFE OR LIBERTY IS CRITICAL. —
Where the statute has an overbroad sweep just as when it is vague, the hazard of loss or
impairment of life or liberty is critical. The problem of vagueness is reduced or eliminated if the
different schemes mentioned in the law used in the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth are prosecuted
under existing penal law. The offenses are by their nature distinct and separate from each other
and have acquired established meanings. Thus, the acts of misappropriation or malversation may
be prosecuted as separate offenses. So may the receipt of commissions, gifts, or kickbacks by
higher officials in connection with government contracts. The four other methods or schemes
mentioned in the law may be the object of separate penal statutes.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURTS; SANDIGANBAYAN; EXPANSION OF THE COVERAGE OF
THE LAW THROUGH THE USE OF PHRASES AS "OVER-ALL SCHEME" OR "GENERAL
PLAN" AND SUPPLYING THE MISSING INGREDIENTS OF THE LAW BY CONSTRUCTION OF
A VAGUE OR AMBIGUOUS PROVISION, NOT ALLOWED. — The Sandiganbayan interprets the
words "combination" and "series" of overt or criminal acts through terms found in American
decisions like "pattern," "conspiracy," "over-all unlawful scheme," or "general plan of action or
method." The above definitions are not found in the Plunder Law. The use of such phrases as
"over-all scheme" or "general plan" indicates that the Sandiganbayan is expanding the coverage
of the law through the use of ambiguous phrases capable of dual or multiple applications. When
do two or three acts of the same offense of malversation constitute a "pattern," "a general plan of
action," or an "over-all scheme?" Would one malversation in the first week of a public officer's
tenure and another similar act six (6) years later become a "combination," a "pattern," or a "general
plan of action?" I agree with petitioner's concern over the danger that the trial court may allow the
specifications of details in an information to validate a statute inherently void for vagueness. An
information cannot rise higher than the statute upon which it is based. Not even the construction
by the Sandiganbayan of a vague or ambiguous provision can supply the missing ingredients
of the Plunder Law.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE CLARITY AND PARTICULARITY REQUIRED OF A COMPLAINT
OR INFORMATION SHOULD BE PRESENT IN THE LAW UPON WHICH THE CHARGES ARE
BASED. — The right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him is most often exemplified in the care with which a complaint or information should be
drafted. However, the clarity and particularity required of an information should also be present in
the law upon which the charges are based. If the penal law is vague, any particularity in the
information will come from the prosecutor. The prosecution takes over the role of
Congress. DACIHc
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACT THAT DETAILS OF CHARGES ARE SPECIFIED IN THE
INFORMATION WILL NOT CURE THE STATUTE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY. —
The fact that the details of the charges are specified in the Information will not cure the statute of
its constitutional infirmity. If on its face the challenged provision is repugnant to the due process
clause, specification of details of the offense intended to be charged would not serve to validate
it. In other words, it is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the rule to govern
conduct and warns against transgression. No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property
to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the
State commands or forbids.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINITENESS, A DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT; ESPECIALLY
APPLIED TO PENAL STATUTES. — Definiteness is a due process requirement. It is especially
important in its application to penal statutes. Vagueness and unintelligibility will invariably lead to
arbitrary government action. The purpose of the due process clause is to exclude everything that
is arbitrary and capricious affecting the rights of the citizen. Congress, in exercising its power to
declare what acts constitute a crime, must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts
it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know what
acts it is his duty to avoid.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE LAW WAS ENACTED, NOT SERVED;
CASE AT BAR. — The questioned statutes were enacted purportedly in the interest of justice,
public peace and order, and the rule of law. These purposes are not served by R.A. Nos. 7080
and 7659. These statutes allow the prosecutors and the courts arbitrary and too broad
discretionary powers in their enforcement. Fair, equal and impartial justice would be denied.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., dissenting opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; R.A. NO. 7080, AS AMENDED,
OR THE PLUNDER LAW, UNCONSTITUTIONAL; LESSENED THE BURDEN OF
PROSECUTION BY DISPENSING WITH PROOF OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS THEREOF.
— R.A. No. 7080, as amended, is unconstitutional. Albeit the legislature did not directly lower the
degree of proof required in the crime of plunder from proof beyond reasonable doubt to mere
preponderance of or substantial evidence, it nevertheless lessened the burden of the prosecution
by dispensing with proof of the essential elements of plunder. Let met quote the offending
provision: SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. — For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall
not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In every criminal prosecution, the law recognizes certain elements
as material or essential. Calling a particular fact an "essential element" carries certain legal
consequences. In this case, the consequence that matters is that the Sandiganbayan cannot
44
convict the accused unless it unanimously finds that the prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt each element of the crime of plunder.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTUAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME. — Ordinarily, the factual
elements that make up a crime are specified in the law that defines it. Under R.A. No. 7080, as
amended, the essential elements of the crime of plunder are: a) that the offender is a public officer;
b) that he amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts described in Section 1(d) . . . and c) that the aggregate amount or total value
of the ill-gotten wealth is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVISION THAT PROSECUTION NEED NOT PROVE EACH AND
EVERY CRIMINAL ACT DONE BY THE ACCUSED, RENDERED THE ENUMERATED
"CRIMINAL ACTS" IN SECTION 1(D) OF THE LAW MERELY AS A MEANS, AND NOT AS
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS THEREOF. — When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall
not be necessary for the prosecution to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused,
the legislature, in affect, rendered the enumerated "criminal acts" under Section 1(d) merely
as means and not as essential elements of plunder. This is constitutionally infirmed and repugnant
to the basic idea of justice and fair play. As a matter of due process, the prosecution is required
to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the
defendant is charged. The State may not specify a lesser burden of proof for an element of a
crime. With more reason, it should not be allowed to go around the principle by characterizing an
essential element of plunder merely as a "means" of committing the crime. For the result is the
reduction of the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TREATING THE SPECIFIC "CRIMINAL ACTS" MERELY AS
MEANS TO COMMIT THE GREATER CRIME OF PLUNDER ALLOWS IMPOSITION OF DEATH
PENALTY, EVEN ABSENT A UNANIMITY AMONG THE SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICES. — First,
treating the specific "criminal acts" merely as means to commit the greater crime of plunder, in
effect, allows the imposition of the death penalty even if the Justices of the Sandiganbayan did
not "unanimously" find that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of those "criminal
acts." The three Justices need only agree that the accused committed at least two of the criminal
acts, even if not proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt. They do not have to agree
unanimously on which two.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SINCE THE LAW PUNISHES PLURALITY OF CRIMINAL ACTS
INDICATIVE OF GRAND SCHEME OR CONSPIRACY TO AMASS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH,
FOCUS UPON INDIVIDUAL "CRIMINAL ACTS" NECESSARY TO ASSURE GUILT. —
Considering that what R.A. No. 7080 punishes is the plurality of criminal acts indicative of the
grand scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth, it is imperative to focus upon the individual
"criminal acts" in order to assure the guilt of the accused of plunder.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; LUMPING UP INTO ONE NEW OFFENSE OF PLUNDER SIX DISTINCT
CRIMES PUNISHABLE BY SEPARATE STATUTES RENDERS THE INTENT INSIGNIFICANT;
EVEN ACTS RECKLESSLY COMMITTED WITHOUT INTENT CAN BE PUNISHED BY DEATH.
— R.A. No. 7080 lumps up into one new offense of plunder six (6) distinct crimes which by
themselves are currently punishable under separate statutes or provisions of law. The six (6)
separate crimes become mere "means or similar schemes" to commit the single offense of
plunder. It bears emphasis that each of the separate offenses is a crime mala in se. The
commission of any offense mala in seis inherently accompanied by a guilty mind or a criminal
intent. Unfortunately, R.A. No. 7080 converted the six mala in se offenses into one crime which
is mala prohibita wherein the intent becomes insignificant. Upon the commission of the proscribed
act, without proof of intent, the law is considered violated. Consequently, even acts recklessly
committed (i.e. without intent) can be punished by death. DcSTaC
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PATTERN OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS CANNOT BE PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT WHEN SPECIFIC "CRIMINAL ACTS" ARE NOT REQUIRED
TO BE PROVED. — Section 4 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove
each and every criminal act done by the accused . . . it being sufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts. By its own terminology, Section 4 requires
that the "pattern" be proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Initially, we must disassociate
the specific "criminal acts" from the "pattern of criminal acts." These two phrases do not refer to
one and the same thing. Pattern, as defined in the dictionary, means an established mode of
behavior. In the crime of plunder, the existence of a "pattern" can only be inferred from the specific
"criminal acts" done by the accused. Several queries may be raised to determine the existence of
a "pattern." Are these criminal acts related or tied to one another? Is the subsequent criminal act
a mere continuation of the prior criminal act? Do these criminal acts complement one another as
to bring about a single result? Inevitably, one must focus first on each criminal act to ascertain the
relationship or connection it bears with the other criminal acts, and from there determine whether
a certain "pattern" exists. But how could "pattern" be proved beyond reasonable doubt when in
the first place the specific "criminal acts" from which such pattern may be inferred are not even
required to be proved?
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE THAT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT TO ESTABLISH
EVERY FACT NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE THE CRIME IS NOT REQUIRED, AN
INFRINGEMENT OF DUE PROCESS. — Providing a rule of evidence which does not require
proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish every fact necessary to constitute the crime is a clear
infringement of due process. While the principles of the law of evidence are the same whether
applied on civil or criminal trials, they are more strictly observed in criminal cases. Thus, while the
legislature of a state has the power to prescribe new or alter existing rules of evidence, or to
prescribe methods of proof, the same must not violate constitutional requirements or deprive any
person of his constitutional rights. Unfortunately, under R.A. No. 7080, the State did not only
specify a lesser burden of proof to sustain an element of the crime; it even dispensed with proof
by not considering the specific "criminal acts" as essential elements.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RULE ABSENT; EXISTENCE OF THE
REQUISITE "COMBINATION OR SERIES" BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED. — In dispensing with proof of each criminal act, the clear objective
of Congress is to render it less difficult for the prosecution to prove the crime of plunder. While this
presupposes a noble intention, I do not think there is a sufficient justification. I, too, have the strong
desire to eliminate the sickness of corruption pervading in the Philippine government, but more
than anything else, I believe there are certain principles which must be maintained if we want to
preserve fairness in our criminal justice system. If the prosecution is not mandated to prove the
specific "criminal acts" then how can it establish the existence of the requisite "combination or
series" by proof beyond reasonable doubt?
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNCONSTITUTIONAL DUE TO VAGUENESS OF THE TERM
"PATTERN." — Another valid constitutional objection to R.A. No. 7080 is the vagueness of the
term "pattern." As stated by Mr. Justice Kapunan, in his Dissent, the concept of "pattern of overt
or criminal acts" embodied in the law was derived by Congress from the RICO (Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) statute. I am, therefore, constrained to refer to US law and
jurisprudence. "Pattern" as defined in the RICO statute means "as requiring at least two acts of
racketeering activity . . . the last of which occurred within ten years . . . after the commission of the
prior act of racketeering activity. Mr. Justice Kapunan observed that unlike the RICO law, the law
on plunder does not specify a) the number of criminal acts necessary before there could be a
"pattern," as well as b) the period within which the succeeding criminal acts should be committed.
These failures render the law void for its vagueness and broadness. Indeed, Congress left much
to be desired. I am at a quandary on how many delictual acts are necessary to give rise to a
"pattern of overt or criminal acts" in the crime of plunder. If there is no numerical standard, then,
how should the existence of "pattern" be ascertained? Should it be by proximity of time or of
relationship? May an act committed two decades after the prior criminal act be linked with the
latter for the purpose of establishing a pattern?
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF PERIOD WITHIN WHICH NEXT CRIMINAL ACT MUST
BE COMMITTED TO ESTABLISH PATTERN SUBJECTS PERSON TO CRIMINAL
45
PROSECUTION AD INFINITUM. — It must be remembered that plunder, being a continuous
offense, the "pattern of overt or criminal acts" can extend indefinitely, i.e., as long as the
succeeding criminal acts may be linked to the initial criminal act. This will expose the person
concerned to criminal prosecution ad infinitum. Surely, it will undermine the purpose of the statute
of limitations, i.e., to discourage prosecution based on facts obscured by the passage of time, and
to encourage law enforcement officials to investigate suspected criminal activity promptly. All
these undesirable consequences arise from the fact that the plunder law fails to provide a period
within which the next criminal act must be committed for the purpose of establishing a pattern. I
believe R.A. No. 7080 should have provided a cut-off period after which a succeeding act may no
longer be attached to the prior act for the purpose of establishing a pattern. In reiteration, the RICO
law defines "pattern" as requiring at least two acts of racketeering activity . . . the last of which
occurred within ten years . . . after the commission of the prior act of racketeering activity. Such
limitation prevents a subsequent racketeering activity, separated by more than a decade from the
prior act of racketeering, from being appended to the latter for the purpose of coming up with a
pattern. We do not have the same safeguard under our law.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; VAGUENESS OF THE TERMS "COMBINATION" AND "SERIES"; LAW
SHOULD ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME AND PROVIDE REASONABLY
ASCERTAINABLE STANDARDS OF GUILT; REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION ON
CLARITY AND DEFINITENESS, NOT SATISFIED. — Lastly, the terms "combination" and "series"
are likewise vague. Hence, on the basis of the law, a conviction of an accused cannot be
sustained. A statute that does not provide adequate standards for adjudication, by which guilt or
innocence may be determined, should be struck down. Crimes must be defined in a statute with
appropriate certainty and definiteness. The standards of certainty in a statute prescribing
punishment for offenses are higher than in those depending primarily on civil sanctions for their
enforcement. A penal statute should therefore be clear and unambiguous. It should explicitly
establish the elements of the crime which it creates and provide some reasonably ascertainable
standards of guilt. It should not admit of such a double meaning that a citizen may act on one
conception of its requirements and the courts on another. I agree with the observation of Mr.
Justice Kapunan that "resort to the dictionary meaning of the terms 'combination' and 'series' as
well as recourse to the deliberations of the lawmakers only serve to prove that R.A. No. 7080 failed
to satisfy the requirement of the Constitution on clarity and definiteness." The deliberations of our
law-makers, as quoted verbatim in Justice Kapunan's Dissent, indeed, failed to shed light on what
constitute "combination" and "series".
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ESSENCE OF THE LAW LIES IN THE PHRASE "COMBINATION
OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS." — The essence of the law on plunderlies in the
phrase "combination or series of overt or criminal acts." As can be gleaned from the Record of the
Senate, the determining factor of R.A. 7080 is the plurality of the overt acts or criminal acts under
a grand scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth. Thus, even if the amassed wealth equals
or exceeds fifty million pesos, a person cannot be prosecuted for the crime of plunder if there is
only a single criminal act. DEcSaI
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE TERMS "COMBINATION" AND "SERIES" SHOULD BE
DEFINED WITH EXACTITUDE TO SATISFY THE DEMANDS OF DUE PROCESS. —
Considering that without plurality of overt or criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder, due
process of law demands that the terms "combination" and "series" be defined with exactitude in
the law itself. Equating these terms with mere "plurality" or "two or more," is inaccurate and
speculative. For one, a "series" is a group of usually three or more things or events standing or
succeeding in order and having like relationship to each other. The Special Prosecution Division
Panel defines it as "at least three of the acts enumerated under Section 1(d) thereof." But it can
very well be interpreted as only one act repeated at least three times. And the Office of the Solicitor
General, invoking the deliberations of the House of Representatives, contends differently. It
defines the term series as a "repetition" or pertaining to "two or more." The disparity in the
Prosecution and OSG's positions clearly shows how imprecise the term "series" is. This should
not be countenanced. Crimes are not to be created by inference. No one may be required, at the
peril of life, liberty or property to guess at, or speculate as to, the meaning of a penal statute. An
accused, regardless of who he is, is entitled to be tried only under a clear and valid law.
15. ID.; ID.; ID.; VAGUENESS OF THE LAW NOT CURED BY SPECIFICATION IN
THE INFORMATION OF DETAILS OF THE OFFENSE TO BE CHARGED; THE STATUTE, NOT
THE ACCUSATION, PRESCRIBES THE RULE TO GOVERN CONDUCT AND WARNS
AGAINST AGGRESSION. — Respondents argue that the vagueness of R.A. No. 7080, as
amended, is cured when the Information clearly specified the acts constituting the crime of
plunder. I do not agree. It is the statute and not the accusation under it that prescribes the rule to
govern conduct and warns against aggression. If on its face, a statute is repugnant to the due
process clause on account of vagueness, specification in the Information of the details of the
offense intended to be charged will not serve to validate it.
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VAGUENESS CANNOT BE CURED BY JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTION. — Precision must be the characteristic of penal legislation. For the Court to
define what is a crime is to go beyond the so-called positive role in the protection of civil liberties
or promotion of public interests. As stated by Justice Frankfurter, the Court should be wary of
judicial attempts to impose justice on the community; to deprive it of the wisdom that comes from
self-inflicted wounds and the strengths that grow with the burden of responsibility. A statute which
is so vague as to permit the infliction of capital punishment on acts already punished with lesser
penalties by clearly formulated law is unconstitutional. The vagueness cannot be cured by judicial
construction.
17. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AS IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION. — To recapitulate, R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional because
it violates the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE of the Constitution. The vagueness of its terms and its
incorporation of a rule of evidence that reduces the burden of the prosecution in proving the crime
of plunder tramples upon the basic constitutional rights of the accused.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in
defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal
pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond
which the State cannot tread — asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish
with very little regard to social interference — he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights
and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost,
against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says —
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is
self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-
preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it
behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective
wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
46
 The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought
changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties
more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the
web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of
multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision,
between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members
to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted
against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted
under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA
7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses
that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes
a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly
because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have
transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced
hereunder:
SECTION 1. . . . . (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset,
property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within
the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly
through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form
of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection
with any government contract or project or by reason of the office
or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or
government owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest
or participation including the promise of future employment in
any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or
commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
SECTION 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. —
Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of
at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person
who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the
Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall
declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes
and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring
supplied).
SECTION 4. Rule of Evidence. — For purposes of establishing
the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8)
separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as
amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3,
par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564,
for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use
of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the
Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses
under specifications "a", "b", and "c" to give the accused the opportunity to file counter-affidavits
and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised
were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the
vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus
Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case
No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance
of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558
on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law
on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for
Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition
47
to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply
to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001,
the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is
unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and,
(c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within
the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation
is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with
the Constitution. 3 Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a
legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication.
This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for
one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has
been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its
coordinate branch — the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts
must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers,
and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and
act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in
favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the
provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to
sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon 4 we held that as long as there is some
basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched
and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not
sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of
course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law,
it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly
eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party
challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there
is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding
of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice
Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain." 5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to
discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and
prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus —
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a)
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly,
any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of
pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of
assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting
directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest
or participation including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or
commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten
wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those
who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one
charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the
proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute
punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least
P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the
Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating
with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have
committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director,
EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a.
'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose
'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES &
Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No.
7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, by himself
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO
ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION,
OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE
of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE
48
EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A
series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on
SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000.000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE
'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for
HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the
TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000.000.00) tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur
under R.A. No 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-
accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas,
AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (emphasis supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS
PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000
SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social
Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK,
MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE
AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED
TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED
FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND
AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00)
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY
REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN
THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00)
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH
BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM
COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the
amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED
THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE
SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous — as there is obviously
none — that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual
assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions,
petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for
an intelligent defense. aCSEcA
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition
of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These
omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Lawunconstitutional for being impermissibly
vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain
and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms
without defining them; 6 much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every
word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability
to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or
ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the
whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will
be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. 8 The
intention of the lawmakers — who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers — to
use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and
"series":
Combination — the result or product of combining; the act or
process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship
as to obscure individual characters.
Series — a number of things or events of the same class coming
one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their
popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually
became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO:
I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH
A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL
ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when
we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or
49
 more means, we mean to say that number one and two or REP. GARCIA:
number one and something else are included, how about a
series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, A series.
conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. ISIDRO:
REP. GARCIA:
That's not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination
Yeah, because we say a series. or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?

REP. ISIDRO: REP. GARCIA:

Series. Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said,
that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it
REP. GARCIA: may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts. So . . .
Yeah, we include series.
REP. GARCIA:
REP. ISIDRO:
Series. One after the other eh di . . .
But we say we begin with a combination.
SEN. TAÑADA:
REP. GARCIA:
So that would fall under the term "series?"
Yes.
REP. GARCIA:
REP. ISIDRO:
Series, oo.
When we say combination, it seems that —
REP. ISIDRO:
REP. GARCIA:
Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations . . .
Two.
REP. GARCIA:
REP. ISIDRO:
Its not . . . Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means
not twice of one enumeration. REP. ISIDRO:

REP. GARCIA: So, it is not a combination?

No, no, not twice. REP. GARCIA:

REP. ISIDRO: Yes.

Not twice? REP. ISIDRO:

REP. GARCIA: When you say combination, two different?

Yes. Combination is not twice — but combination, two acts. REP. GARCIA:

REP. ISIDRO: Yes.

So in other words, that's it. When we say combination, we mean, two SEN. TAÑADA:
different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.
Two different.
REP. GARCIA:
REP. ISIDRO:
That be referred to series, yeah.
Two different acts.
REP. ISIDRO:
REP. GARCIA:
No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.

50
 For example, ha . . .
REP. ISIDRO:
Now a series, meaning, repetition . . .
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA:
In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two"
acts may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would
the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or,"
to read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts
such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway,
the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TAÑADA:
That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in
this.
THE PRESIDENT:
Probably two or more would be . . . .
SENATOR MACEDA:
Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TAÑADA:
Accepted, Mr. President . . . .
THE PRESIDENT:
If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular
crime. But when we say "acts of plunder" there should be, at
least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO:
In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2)
acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on
the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging
to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a "series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal
acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par.
(d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for
"combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the
law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term
is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 —
. . . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least
a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law,
the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose
or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall
unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As
commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a
'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public
officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the aforesaid
common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where
the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or
criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the
"void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in
various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal
offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence
can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that
specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a
saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects — it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 10 But the doctrine does not apply
as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless
specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly
applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no
challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such
activities. 11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear
and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice. 12 It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness"
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather
than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit
in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it
would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. ESCacI
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague
and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity —
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." 13 The
overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.'' 14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and
to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
51
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle
for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that
the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not
be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." 15 The possible
harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished
is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible
inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes
have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if
facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area
of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity
of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment." 16 In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 17 the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this
reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the
most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid." 18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
conduct of others.'' 19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established
rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be
heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional." 20 As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth
challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague
as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a
particular defendant.'' 21 Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's
claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking
them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. 22 It
constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of
the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual
settings and in sterile abstract contexts. 23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court
pointed out in Younger v. Harris 24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing
its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate
task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness
of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the
relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous
nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, .
. . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory
for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might
be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been
described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and
only as a last resort,"25 and is generally disfavored. 26 In determining the
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to
have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct
with which the defendant is charged. 27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the
Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than
real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute
to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision
of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will
take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and
validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is
all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the
law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of
which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound
constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan 28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate
and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless
the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable
construction that will support and give it effect. In that case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term
"unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition
by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due
process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.
Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit:
(a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits
through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable
negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess
which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases
"manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe
the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be
committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the
indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
52
 The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking
adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third
International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate
reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa.,
405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol.
43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public
officer in:
. . . or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, . . . (Section 3
[e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted
penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party
benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or
without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use
of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which
was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners'
objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the
Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern
of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy —
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. — For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal
act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption
of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal. 29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect
and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force
of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent
men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about
his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal
offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable
doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life
to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged. 30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on
this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating —
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO:
Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is
alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other
acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against
the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed,
say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of
the crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation,
bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA:
Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For
example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things
taken by the robber in the information — three pairs of pants,
pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for
which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of
diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element
of the offense.
MR. ALBANO:
I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of
plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that
such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For
instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only
P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to
accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the
other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation
on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we
now convict him?
MR. GARCIA:
With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential
element of the crime, there is a need to prove that element
beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element
of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in
a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the
enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million,
but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will
sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were
proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions,
proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is
a crime of plunder (emphasis supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion
the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the
prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the
crime.
53
 The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime
suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs
to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or
series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There
is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed
by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate
or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information
for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not
prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids
beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00. 31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that
"pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres
in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such
pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts
as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts.
This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other
explanation for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more,
than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth. The prosecution
is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts. DaHISE
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission
that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder"; and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged,
(as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the
accused cannot be convicted of plunder —
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder
Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there
is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts
complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN:
In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the
Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have
a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN:
Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused
charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN:
Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive
element of the law . . . .
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
What I said i — do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting
plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN:
Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of
evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime of
plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:
But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate
crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that
far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN:
Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important
element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by
the prosecution. 32
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder
can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and
"pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and
unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence — For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder . . . .
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a
criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish
any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is
only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient
evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is
flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest
of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules
on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a
separability clause —
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. — If any provisions of this Act
or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to
other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid
as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not
really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other,
especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is
a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion —
. . . Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the
element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder
54
 was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty
knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the
requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is
void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during
the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA
. . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be
evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only
evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to
commit this crime of plunder. 33
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the
succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO:
And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4,
Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide
for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of
cases?
SENATOR TAÑADA:
Yes, Mr. President . . . 34
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder,
the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern
are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens
rea must be shown. IaECcH
Indeed, §2 provides that —
Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime
of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as
provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in
the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly thatmens rea is an element of plunder since the
degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.
It is true that §2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder."
There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the
public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree
to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit,
but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as
saying what they obviously mean." 35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is
a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by
the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are
punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to
these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray: 36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are
crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because
life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and
utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course
of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the
capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped,
tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or
resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as
well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more
than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor,
robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive
arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized
by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very
nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination
lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal
acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic
context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop
and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling
from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the
government and impoverished the population, the Philippine
Government must muster the political will to dismantle the
culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated
criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of
society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government]
terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic
services to its people, any form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat
to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very
survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no
less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like
qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug
offenses involving government officials, employees or officers,
that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further
destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a
heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in
se 37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law,
especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are
mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for
plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of
55
 the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against
jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA
7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him
to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v.
Echegaray 38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein
that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by
necessary effect, assimilated in theConstitution now as an integral part of it.

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials
in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has
become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentless]y contrive more
and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are
imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically
catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread
like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The
Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this
scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.

These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues
of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's
ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal
statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger
for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and
prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the
Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

56
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010.]
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE
TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, respondent.
[G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010.]
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP.
SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA,
SR., petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments;
it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them.
— Justice Jose P.
Laurel 1
The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution
that the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by
which these powers are distributed among the several departments. 2 The Constitution is the
basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons,
including the highest officials of the land, must defer. 3 Constitutional doctrines must remain
steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and
accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of
government and the people who run it. 4
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases 5 both of which
essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30,
2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by
petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails
Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section
1, Article VI of the Constitution 6 as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to
create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor. 7
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A.
Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the
House of Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic
May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch
condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang
mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this
noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. ITESAc
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for
a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed
during the previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed
Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth
Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines solemnly enshrines the principle that a public office is a public
trust and mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants
of the people, must at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of
defiance of this principle and notorious violation of this mandate;
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously
affects the political, economic, and social life of a nation; in a very special
way it inflicts untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized
and underprivileged sector of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very
alarming levels, and undermined the people's trust and confidence in the
Government and its institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the
truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the
government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate
cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the people's faith and confidence in the
Government and in their public servants;
WHEREAS, the President's battlecry during his campaign for the
Presidency in the last elections "kung walang corrupt, walang
mahirap" expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he would end
corruption and the evil it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely
to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will
recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;
57
 WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of the
Philippines, gives the President the continuing authority to reorganize the
Office of the President. cTIESa
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III,
President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. — There is hereby
created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as
the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and
toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale
and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of
the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any,
during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full
measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4)
members who will act as an independent collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. — The Commission, which
shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked
to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft
and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers
and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and
the Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:
a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and
corruption which it will investigate;
b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or
regarding the cases of large scale corruption which it has chosen to
investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or employee of the
Executive Branch, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
to produce documents, books, records and other papers;
c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and
documents from the Senate and the House of Representatives records of
investigations conducted by committees thereof relating to matters or
subjects being investigated by the Commission;
d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information
from the courts, including the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court
Administrator, information or documents in respect to corruption cases filed
with the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be;
e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and
for that purpose, administer oaths or affirmations as the case may be;
f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any
person as a state witness to ensure that the ends of justice be fully served,
that such person who qualifies as a state witness under the Revised Rules
of Court of the Philippines be admitted for that purpose; TacADE
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to
the appropriate prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special
or interim report and recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public
officers and employees and their private sector co-principals, accomplices
or accessories, if any, when in the course of its investigation the
Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that they are
liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws;
h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial
agency such as the Department of Justice or any of the agencies under it,
and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for such assistance and
cooperation as it may require in the discharge of its functions and duties;
i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons,
professionals and other personnel determined by it as necessary to carry
out its mandate;
j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it
deems necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out the objectives of
this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations,
proceedings and hearings, including the presentation of evidence;
k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and
necessary in connection with the objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. — . . . .
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. — . . . .
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. — . . .
SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. — . . . .
SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource
Persons. — . . . .
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. — . . .
.
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give
Testimony. — Any government official or personnel who, without lawful
excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who,
appearing before the Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give
testimony or produce documents for inspection, when required, shall be
subject to administrative disciplinary action. Any private person who does
the same may be dealt with in accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. —
.....
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. — The Office of the
President shall provide the necessary funds for the Commission to ensure
that it can exercise its powers, execute its functions, and perform its duties
and responsibilities as effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as
possible. aDSAEI
SECTION 12. Office. — . . . .
58
 SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. — . . . .
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. — The Commission
shall accomplish its mission on or before December 31, 2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. — . . . .
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the
Commission. — . . . .
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. — If and
when in the judgment of the President there is a need to expand the
mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the
investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior
administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of
a supplemental Executive Order.
SECTION 18. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this
Order is declared unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity and
effectivity of the other provisions hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. — This Executive Order shall take
effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July
2010.
(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
By the President:
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary
Nature of the Truth Commission
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial
body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his
control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one. 8
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body
under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of
graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has
no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding
body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of
an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or
administrative penalties or sanctions. cADaIH
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have
been created as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies "to establish the facts
and context of serious violations of human rights or of international humanitarian law in a
country's past." 9 They are usually established by states emerging from periods of internal
unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following
characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse
committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary
bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and
recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the
State. 10 "Commission's members are usually empowered to conduct research, support
victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their
investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or
formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and
recommend institutional reforms." 11
Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg and
Tokyo war crime tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and
punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A form of a reconciliatory tribunal is
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the principal function of which was
to heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic
experience for victims.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africa's model. The latter placed more emphasis
on reconciliation than on judicial retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the
identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one writer 12 puts it:
The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian
code spelled out by Aquino in his inaugural speech: "To those who talk
about reconciliation, if they mean that they would like us to simply forget
about the wrongs that they have committed in the past, we have this to say:
There can be no reconciliation without justice. When we allow crimes to go
unpunished, we give consent to their occurring over and over again."
The Thrusts of the Petitions
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked
the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.
A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows that they are essentially
the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates
the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds
for its operation. cAaTED
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of
the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto
inexistent like the "Truth Commission."
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent
statutes when it vested the "Truth Commission" with quasi-judicial powers
duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice created
under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it
selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel
of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even
as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable.
59
 (e) The creation of the "Philippine Truth Commission of 2010"
violates the consistent and general international practice of four decades
wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively investigate
human rights violations, which customary practice forms part of the
generally accepted principles of international law which the Philippines is
mandated to adhere to pursuant to the Declaration of Principles enshrined
in the Constitution.
(f) The creation of the "Truth Commission" is an exercise in
futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a launching pad for trial/conviction
by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the
people that widespread poverty will altogether vanish if corruption is
eliminated without even addressing the other major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not
constitutionally challenged is of no moment because neither laches nor
estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity
of an executive issuance or even a statute." 13
In their Consolidated Comment, 14 the respondents, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), essentially questioned the legal standing of petitioners and
defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to
create a public office because the President's executive power and power
of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations
to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No.
292), 15 Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416 16 (as amended by P.D. No.
1772), R.A. No. 9970, 17 and settled jurisprudence that authorize the
President to create or form such bodies. DIAcTE
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to
appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation
of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the
functions of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a fact-finding body and not a
quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the
latter's jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection
clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive
orders and presidential issuances creating similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC
such as Presidential Complaint and Action Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B.
Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) by
President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency on Reform and Government
Operations (PARGO) by President Ferdinand E. Marcos. 18
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the
principal issues to be resolved:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file
their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers
of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its power of
judicial review are present.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review
is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. 19 AIHDcC
Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put
at issue.
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their
petition for failure to demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues
that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining
any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of
the commission's investigations, petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result
of its proceedings. 20
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the
petitioners-legislators to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily
invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members.
This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and
present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the
legislature before the Court. As held inPhilippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 21
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate
in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress
causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be
questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of
Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are
allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators. 22
60
 With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing
to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations. 23 It emphasizes that
the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be taken from
those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of
funds for the commission will not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of
the President's power over contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or
is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of
Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify
his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential
issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo 24 explained the deep-
seated rules on locus standi. Thus:ACcHIa
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question." In private suits, standing is governed by the
"real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest."
Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff's standing is based on his
own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.
Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly
illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He
may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He
could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or
"taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to
seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient
interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
"citizen" or "taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and
"taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down
in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit
is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen's suit. In the former,
the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter,
he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New
York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere
public right, however . . . the people are the real parties . . . It is at least the
right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public
offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied." With respect to taxpayer's suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the
right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain
the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial
interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and
thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public
service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent
"direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v.
Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the
judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative
action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result
of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest
common to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction.
In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result."
The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v.
President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers' Association v. De la
Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of
the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted]
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest." 25 cDAITS
Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, 26 the Court held that in
cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the
standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where
there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases, 27 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general
interest shared in common with the public.
The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance 28 laid down
in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco 29 are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds
reason in Biraogo's assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance
to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to
the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of
all. 30Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the
President's first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes
cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue
in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its
constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth
Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the
President. 31 Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be
empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According
to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed 32 since there is no provision in the
Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth
commission. 33 He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the
President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the
creation of a truth commission considering the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such
as "reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and "abolish." 34 Insofar as it vests in the
President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the extent of creating
a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined
in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof. 35
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a
public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of
government. They maintain that the delegated authority of the President to reorganize under
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a
public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the reorganization of the
administrative structure of the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the
internal organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of
61
agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. 36 Such continuing
authority of the President to reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order
No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of this delegated authority. HCEaDI
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation
by the President of a fact-finding body such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous
offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the President to create public
offices within the Office of the President Proper has long been recognized. 37 According to
the OSG, the Executive, just like the other two branches of government, possesses the
inherent authority to create fact-finding committees to assist it in the performance of its
constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its administrative functions. 38 This
power, as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the
President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of
the Constitution. 39
It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct fact-
finding investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public
officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of his authority to assume
directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the
discretion of his officials. 40 The power of the President to investigate is not limited to the
exercise of his power of control over his subordinates in the executive branch, but extends
further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his power to discipline
subordinates, 41 his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes 42 and in
order to be informed on matters which he is entitled to know. 43
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita, 44 where it was held that
the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive
department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control and by virtue of a valid
delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power
to create offices. For the OSG, the President may create the PTC in order to, among others,
put a closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption in the government. 45
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall
within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following
functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the
President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under
the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the
provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an
office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The
creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.
Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President
under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the
term "restructure" — an "alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part
of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No.
1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary, 46 aSIAHC
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to
reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not
have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power
— that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31,
Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office
and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v.
Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there
is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or
units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the
Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it
is subject to the President's continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis
Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President's power
of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former with that of the latter. 47 Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from
the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter
finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully
execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress,
empowering the President to create a public office?
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the
above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772. 48 The
said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish
offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer
appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section
20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive
Secretary. 49
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the
President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable.
P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and
transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last
"Whereas" clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of
government will necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national
government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency
during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, becamefunctus oficio upon
the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last whereas clause
of P.D. 1416 says "it was enacted to prepare the transition from
presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary form of
government, the legislative and executive powers are fused,
correct?
62
 SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would you agree
with me that P.D. 1416 should not be considered effective
anymore upon the promulgation, adoption, ratification of the
1987 Constitution.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:
Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
The power of the President to reorganize the entire National
Government is deemed repealed, at least, upon the adoption of
the 1987 Constitution, correct. cHSIDa
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ:
Yes, Your Honor. 50
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of
P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three
principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President's
power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws — in this
case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency — is inherent in the
President's powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct
investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. 51 As explained
in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus: 52
. . . . The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the
presidential system of government and restored the separation of
legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among
three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and
balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive
power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state
as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws
is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other
powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his
power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the
scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot
be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. . . .
. cSATEH
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific
powers under the Constitution. 53 One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees.
This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano, 54 the authority of the President
to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the
administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the
anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:
The Chief Executive's power to create the Ad
hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all
executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO
298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity
is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had
the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of
the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to
exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective
of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano
Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes
in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as
non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to
appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no
appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, "whatever funds
the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds
for the commission." 55 Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The President's power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution
under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. 56 As the Chief Executive, the president represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees
of his department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive
department. 57
63
 Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate
reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously
stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate
rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and
to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law." 58 In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the
exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and
must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies. caAICE
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was
delineated by the Court in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights. 59 Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine,
explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary
definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into
systematically: "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe
. . . : to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course,
is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or
intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy
involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o
follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track;
to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find
out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn
described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily
does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry,
judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a
certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to
adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The
dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the
parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment
on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or
rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award
or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." HScaCT
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise
of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its
strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide,
settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . . Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included.
Citations Omitted]
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be
considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 60 Even
respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power. 61
Contrary to petitioners' apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman
or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General,
the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission
to conduct a fact-finding investigation." 62 The actual prosecution of suspected offenders,
much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, 63 is certainly not a
function given to the commission. The phrase, "when in the course of its investigation," under
Section 2 (g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of
the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. 64
At any rate, the Ombudsman's power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not
exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the
case of Ombudsman v. Galicia, 65 it was written:
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the
1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared
with other similarlyauthorized government agencies such as the PCGG
and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The
power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public
employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the
Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code
in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of
the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against
local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].
Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take
over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the
investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied] AIHDcC
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates
the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of probable
cause. This is categorically out of the PTC's sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is
limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard,
the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsman's primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2),
Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive
and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the
PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide
Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would,
at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a
wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices,
therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports
of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power
of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section
1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:
64
 Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this
constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the
same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object
makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility." 66 Thus, in order to be accorded with
validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all
administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo. 67
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft
and corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the administration of former
President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the "same magnitude of
controversies and anomalies" 68 were reported to have been committed against the Filipino
people. They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under
the recognized exceptions because first, "there is no substantial distinction between the
group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or
persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective
classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption." 69 In
order to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission should
deal with "graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the strong
arm of the law with equal force." 70 cEaDTA
Position of respondents
According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the "previous
administration" as the initial subject of the investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC
will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption solely during the said
administration. 71 Assuming arguendo that the commission would confine its proceedings to
officials of the previous administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is committed
against the equal protection clause for "the segregation of the transactions of public officers
during the previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification
based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks
to correct." 72 To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, it recited
the following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of
large scale graft and corruption in the previous administration which have
eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is, therefore, an
urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of
large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure to
them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the
people's faith and confidence in the Government and in their public
servants.
Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the
object of fact-finding is warranted by the reality that unlike with
administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely bear
the immediate consequence of the policies of the previous administration.
Third. The classification of the previous administration as a
separate class for investigation lies in the reality that the evidence of
possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of public
monies illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that
anti-corruption laws are faithfully executed, aremore easily established in
the regime that immediately precede the current administration.
Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their
predecessors to investigations to provide closure to issues that are pivotal
to national life or even as a routine measure of due diligence and good
housekeeping by a nascent administration like the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), created by the late President
Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the recovery of
ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former President Ferdinand Marcos
and his cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created by former
President Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an
ad-hoc and independent citizens' committee to investigate all the facts and
circumstances surrounding "Philippine Centennial projects" of his
predecessor, former President Fidel V. Ramos. 73[Emphases
supplied] TcHEaI
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal
protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue
favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause. 74
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed." 75 It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner." 76 "The purpose of the equal protection clause is
to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." 77 "In other words, the concept of
equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective." 78
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of
the legislature. 79 Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal
protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 80
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification.
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to
all members of the same class. 81 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification." 82
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. 83 "The classification will be regarded
as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute
symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same
characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that
an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
65
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to
him." 84 cSICHD
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a
nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and
conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a
certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union 85 and
reiterated in a long line of cases, 86
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality,
not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The
equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that
of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality
in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required
of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard
is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down
as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration" 87only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least
three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely
to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will
recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. — There is hereby
created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as
the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and
toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale
and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of
the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any,
during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full
measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. — The Commission, which
shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked
to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft
and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers
and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the
private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and
the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied] HIaSDc
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a
member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to
include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo
administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough
to merit the restriction of the investigation to the "previous administration" only. The reports
of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for
distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by
similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely
to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, "Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification."88
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the
scope of the intended investigation to the previous administration only. The OSG ventures to
opine that "to include other past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily overburden
the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness."89 The reason given is specious. It is
without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or "end
corruption and the evil it breeds."90
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the
earlier reports involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into is beside the
point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already prescribed can no
longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct
simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the body's limited time and
resources. "The law does not require the impossible"(Lex non cogit ad impossibilia). 91
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes
the unfeasibility of investigating almost a century's worth of graft cases. However, the fact
remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true
to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The
PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down
for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 92
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is
limited. The Court, however, is of the considered view that although its focus is restricted, the
66
constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should not in any way be
circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which
all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and
all public authority administered.93 Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be
stricken down for being unconstitutional. 94 While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is,
for investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be
read together with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations
in the guise of "substantial distinctions" would only confirm the petitioners' lament that the
subject executive order is only an "adventure in partisan hostility." In the case of US v.
Cyprian, 95 it was written: "A rather limited number of such classifications have routinely
been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin, gender, political
activity or membership in a political party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or
more generally the exercise of first amendment rights."
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class.96 "Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of
such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and
conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative to the
discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the
class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as
are the members of the class." 97 TaDAIS
The Court is not unaware that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity
of a law under the equal protection clause." 98 "Legislation is not unconstitutional merely
because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils within its reach." 99 It has
been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of
a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. 100 In several instances,
the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation
where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to
the "step by step" process. 101 "With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does
not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through
inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been
attacked." 102
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous
administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact
that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted
that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be
focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. "The equal protection
clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination." 103
To disprove petitioners' contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG
clarifies that the commission does not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and
corruption committed during the previous administration. 104 The OSG points to Section 17
of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. — If and
when in the judgment of the President there is a need to expand the
mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the
investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior
administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of
a supplemental Executive Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the
discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft
and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would
be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the
whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to include them, the section would
then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order
No. 1 was "crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo
administration."105
The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v.
Sandiganbayan, 106 that the "PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and
14) does not violate the equal protection clause." The decision, however, was devoid of any
discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the principal issue in said case
being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is — whether or not the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with
respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising
undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the
Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of
powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the
present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it
continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nation's thrust to progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." SECHIA
Furthermore, in Section 4 (2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review
which is the power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power
also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation of
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations.
These provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court,
on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the Court
has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of
enlightenment, to wit: "And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries,
it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them." 107
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own
will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of government is done
in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after
said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more
authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to
pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble
intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it
is important to remember this ethical principle: "The end does not justify the means." No
matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be
employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it
cannot still be allowed. 108 The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It
will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.
67
 "The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to
the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength
nor greed for power debase its rectitude." 109

Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly
envisioned by the present administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so
as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the test of
reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches of the
government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth and so it will
not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be
emphasized that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds for "ours is still
a government of laws and not of men." 110
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from
carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1.

68
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013.]
JESUS C. GARCIA, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T.
DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod
City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of
minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE
ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million
Filipinos — or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million — adhering to the teachings of Jesus
Christ. 1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ
loved the church and gave himself up for her 2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness
of violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
(NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90% of
all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by
the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners." 3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups,
Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004. 4 aHDTAI
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence
against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners, i.e.,husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child. 5 The law provides for protection
orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and
outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court
personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local government officials in
responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being
violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial
power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in
behalf of her minor children, a verified petition 6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of
physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity
on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support. 7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former
was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia,17 years old,
who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J.
Garcia,6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old. 8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved
around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is
dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade
private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law,
and even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her
ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his
attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would have any
man eyeing her killed. 9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of
Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to
the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the
household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private
respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the
bank. 10 EHTIcD
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically
and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both
arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner
hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes
turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour
and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many
times. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for
fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private
respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his
father because of his cruelty to private respondent. 11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of
despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She
was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her
to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time
petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private
respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant
medications. 12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she
intends to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the
manager's job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for
good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that
private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his
paramour and has not sired a child with her. 13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he
would take her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously
warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo. 14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells.
He is the President of three corporations — 326 Realty Holdings, Inc.,Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation — of which he and private respondent are both
stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private
respondent merely draws a monthly salary of P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros
69
Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than P200,000.00 a month are
paid for by private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same
corporation together with the bills for utilities. 15 cDCIHT
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00 from Negros
Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of
thousands of pesos from the corporations. 16 After private respondent confronted him about the
affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses
of the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos. 17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO 18 on March
24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein),Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal
dwelling or family home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by
police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable
notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty
Holdings, Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"),
this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the
conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent. IcADSE
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling,
or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to
remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when
re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on
Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will
attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from Manila and
finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her
household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not
enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily
residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate
with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or
contact directly or indirectly her children, mother and household help,
nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to the
children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a
Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and
Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the
Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender
any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children,
including rental of a house for them, and educational and medical
expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business. aCTHEA
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other
cash he received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31
March 2006, which himself and as President of the corporations and his
Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006.
Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court
by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the
month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting
support pendente lite,and considering the financial resources of the
Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a
single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP
THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient
sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion 19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an
amended TPO, 20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued
use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in
Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the
house in Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro
Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace,
in two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum
of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php150,000.00) per month plus
rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) per month
until the matter of support could be finally resolved. cAaDCE
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO 21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the
grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing.
He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent
and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or
reducing the amount of the bond from P5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at P100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved 22 for the modification of the TPO to
allow him visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to
the following modifications prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other
personal belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos,
co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect
Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and
equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St.,Capitolville Subdivision,
Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel;
70
 c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police
Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within
eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners
have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can
remove things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the
household furniture, equipment and other things in the conjugal home,
which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for
rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of Court; DaHSIT
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed
firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the
children upon presentation of proof of payment of such expenses. 23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully
comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children,
private respondent filed another application 24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.She
alleged inter alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of
which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan
Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served
upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the
two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard. 25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly
attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to
school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and
threatened her. 26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a
criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids
working at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private
respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to
get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl
Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against
Jamola. 27 CDTHSI
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, 28 effective for thirty (30) days, which
reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein),Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or
through another, acts of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating in any form with the offended party, either
directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives,
employees or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her
children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype,
cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman
Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's
other household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not
enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily
residing, as well as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore,
that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly or
indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or
other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through
the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm
and a Walther PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month
and Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September
6, 2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the
total amount of Php1,312,000.00; CIaDTE
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount
of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No.
FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the
respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide
the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise
dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of
Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal partnership of
gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest
in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini
St.,Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are
conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of
Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and
listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT
Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B.
Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION
ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or
disposition of these above-cited properties to any person, entity or
corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J.
Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of
Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be
forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to
defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order 29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO
for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause
why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's
manifestation, 30 however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to
modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order 31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner
be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order 32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had
already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted
hereunder:AacDHE
xxx xxx xxx
71
 ...it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated,
the Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby
renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended
and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further
orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the
court. STHAaD
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only
be an "exercise in futility." 33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction
and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being
violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified
TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining
Order 35 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders
pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed 36 the
petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court
in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to
the validity of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders
issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution 37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that —
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION
ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS
NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE
PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE LAW. EcHIAC
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY,
UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT
FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW
DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT
THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS. 38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition
for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner. EDIHSC
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if
not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. 39 Courts will not anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of
Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is
"inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality." 41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority
and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same
level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of
1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
domestic violence against women and children. 42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme
Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court
in each of several key cities identified. 43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law,
Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz.:
SEC. 7. Venue. — The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases
of violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed,
the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any
of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
(Emphasis supplied) HIAESC
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed
of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil,
criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency. 44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute, 45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law." 46 The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare
the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. 47 We
said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA 48 that, "[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the
inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for
it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in
part as follows:
72
 SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question. aADSIc
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A.
9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for
protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same,
subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their
Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the
petition and not an answer. 49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. — (a) The respondent may file an
opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a
temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint,but any cause of action which
could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
(Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim,
cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of
constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for
money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. 50 A cross-
claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim
therein. 51 Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of
court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. 52 As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-
de Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of
a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being
raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. IHcSCA
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a
quo because the right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very
statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all
intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have
deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence. 54 Be
that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SCnonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to
determine legal issues, among others, viz.:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. — In case the court determines
the need for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the
following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked
and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct
testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall
be done in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of
the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis
supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing
when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection
order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of
thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or
renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With
the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional
issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on
summary procedure. DcAaSI
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No.
01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior
court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22 (j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-
SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari,mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate
court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders
pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course
in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is
prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement, 55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
time, 56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself
entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined. 57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr., 58the Supreme Court of
the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their
entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not
to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are
unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from
prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of
such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence,
unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its
extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who
seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears
fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex
73
parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction
against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to
determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time
and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more
reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment 59 to the instant Petition that we
should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in
enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal
and child abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender
alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law. 60 IHTaCE
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723, 61 which
became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known
as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure" 62 —
an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse
of Women in Intimate Relationships Act" 63 — providing protection to "all family members, leaving
no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims"
of violence and abuse, 64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection
under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President.
Some women's groups have expressed concerns and relayed these
concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart from
against women as well as other members of the household, including
children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to
address domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the
victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a
relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good
Senator respond to this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who
call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not
want to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also
being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members
of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective
measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-
law wives, and those related with the family. 65
xxx xxx xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxx xxx xxx
The President Pro Tempore. ... SDITAC
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion
whether to limit this to women and not to families which was the issue of
the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would be
having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly,
Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during
the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the
measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need
to protect women's rights especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who
have not had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their
live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we
broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be
abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the
already difficult situation for women, Mr. President. aIcDCA
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with
this position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their
women in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation.
Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or
not, no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal
opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho
Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the
Filipino woman.
xxx xxx xxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee
came up with this bill because the family members have been included
in this proposed measure since the other members of the family other
than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are
most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the
measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few
cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children are almost
always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not
be enough protection extended to other family members particularly
children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for
instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused children.
The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available
in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same
protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their
abusive behavior against women. However, we should also recognize
that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which
give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and
whimsically entertain baseless complaints. cSCADE
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations
and to protect the family as the basic social institution. Though I
recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in our
society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and
dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family members,
particularly children.
74
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include
other family members as a critical input arrived at after a series of
consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and
other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other
senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is
recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of
Senator Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this
particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net
effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by
the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not
sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of
Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is
going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment
rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President. EcATDH
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Sotto. ...May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used
by the distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I
tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa
sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan.
Okey lang iyan.But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this
particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment —
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. — more than the women, the children are very much
abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not
limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old
children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it
breaks my heart to find out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this
particular measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent
the abuse of children and not only women. DEScaT
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the
aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND
CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There
being none, the amendment, as amended, is approved. 66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency
of a statute. 67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members
of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding.
Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice
may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or
repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that
determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. 68 We only step in when
there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate
the guaranty of equal protection
of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union 69 is
instructive: cSICHD
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality,
not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The
equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of
the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea
of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
75
 mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must
be germane to the purpose of the law;that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only;and that it must apply equally to each member
of the class.This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is
based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the
equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the State extends its protection. IDAaCc
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ...is the essence of true
equality." 70
A. Unequal power relationship
between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender
Equality and Women's Empowerment),violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely
linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as
"gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the
leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers,
men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads
to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that
power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power. 71 HSaIET
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed
its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December
20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power
relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination
against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence
against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into
subordinate positions, compared with men." 72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-
based violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered
during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the
pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of
violence against women. The patriarch of a family was accorded the right
to use force on members of the family under his control. I quote the early
studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history
rooted in patriarchy — the institutional rule of men.
Women were seen in virtually all societies to be
naturally inferior both physically and intellectually.
In ancient Western societies, women whether
slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority
of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to
beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her.
Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal
family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over
women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his
commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that one was the
husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English
common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives.
Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands
to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb. TcDAHS
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these
rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then,
the preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing
violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States
followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of
Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the common law
right of a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat
one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her,
spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict
upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged
by our law. ..In person, the wife is entitled to the
same protection of the law that the husband can
invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became
more organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had
a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause
of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and
their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was
joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's
agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own property, and more.
Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the
domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the
issue into an important public concern. No less than the United States
Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey,noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country,
approximately two million women are the victims of
severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985
survey, women reported that nearly one of every
eight husbands had assaulted their wives during
the past year. The [American Medical Association]
views these figures as "marked underestimates,"
because the nature of these incidents discourages
women from reporting them, and because surveys
typically exclude the very poor, those who do not
76
 speak English well, and women who are homeless Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for
conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on other Purposes." (Citations omitted)
family violence agree that the true incidence of
partner violence is probably double the above B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
estimates; or four million severely assaulted women victims of violence.
per year." cIDHSC
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to against women and children show that —
one-third of all women will be physically assaulted
by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime. ...physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002
..Thus on an average day in the United States, representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903).And for the first
nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases
their male partners. Many of these incidents involve which represent 54.31%....(T)he total number of women in especially
sexual assault. ..In families where wife beating difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and
takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically
as well. abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. ...(T)here are
1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all
Physical violence is only the most visible form of forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases
abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their
social and economic isolation of women, is also husbands and live-in partners. 73
common.
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their violence against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations
abusers, perhaps because they perceive no under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in
superior alternative ...Many abused women who 2004, 74 thus: ADECcI
find temporary refuge in shelters return to their
husbands, in large part because they have no other Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004-2011*
source of income. ..Returning to one's abuser can
Reported 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of
Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of Cases
all homicide victims in the United States are killed
by their spouses ...Thirty percent of female Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832
homicide victims are killed by their male Incestuous Rape 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
partners. CHTcSE
Attempted Rape 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the
Violence Against Women Act. Acts of 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was Lasciviousness
no less successful. The United States Charter and the Universal Physical 3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In
1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Injuries
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).In
Sexual 53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on the role and Harassment
rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen,
Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021
of Women. TEaADS Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half — and full — Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15
steps of all these women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II
of our 1987 Constitutionmandates the State to recognize the role of women Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62
women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Abduction/ 29 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act

77
Kidnapping
Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
——— ———— ———— ———— ———— ———— ———— ————
—— —— —— —— —— —— —— ——
Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948
===== ====== ====== ====== ====== ====== ====== ======
*2011 report covers only from January to
August
Source: Philippine National Police — Women and Children Protection Center
(WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and
violence against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps,
because many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of
women who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared
with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women
constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic
violence. 75 Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less
likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who
experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands
of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical
violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical
or emotional abuse. 76 CADSHI
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against
men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-
drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by
their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said
ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application
is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not
utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may
be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be
negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones,
as not to constitute a menace to the health of the community." 77 The mere fact that the legislative
classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every
classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but
the law is not thereby rendered invalid. 78 TcSHaD
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes
against women are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued
by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,now Vice President, chief sponsor of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of
the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed
that the widespread gender biasin the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against
victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" — first at the
hands of the offender and then of the legal system. 79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No.
2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and
advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the
prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This
lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the
escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence." 80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our
women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila
for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to
the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in
partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship."
Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable
greed" and of absconding with the contested property. 81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's
prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases
and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does not discriminate against men. 82 Petitioner's contention, 83 therefore,
that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men"
law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to
take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or
on stereotyped roles for men and women." 84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he
paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense
will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the
judges." 85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which
is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of
Policy,as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared that the State
values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for
human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family
and its members particularly women and children, from violence and
threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address
violence committed against women and children in keeping with the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights
instruments of which the Philippines is a party. DHECac
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified
on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the
Philippines on October 6, 2003. 86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to
women equality with men before the law 87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis
of equality of men and women. 88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights
of the Child and its two protocols. 89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective
protocols.
78
 III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it
was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women
and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.
Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:
...any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following
acts: SACHcD
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include
bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual
in nature, committed against a woman or her child.
It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman or her
child as a sex object, making demeaning
and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of
the victim's body, forcing her/him to
watch obscene publications and indecent
shows or forcing the woman or her child
to do indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal
home or sleep together in the same room
with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause
the victim to engage in any sexual activity
by force, threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm
or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C."Psychological violence" refers to acts or
omissions causing or likely to cause mental or
emotional suffering of the victim such as but not
limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness
the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs,
or to witness pornography in any form or to witness
abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation
of common children. CDEaAI
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or
attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or
preventing the victim from engaging in
any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects
on valid, serious and moral grounds as
defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of
financial resources and the right to the
use and enjoyment of the conjugal,
community or property owned in
common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or
properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are
attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts
described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women. 90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes
abuse removes the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and
need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application. 91 Yet, petitioner insists 92 that phrases
like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling
the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or
emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However,
we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty
for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner
seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes
and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it
might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions. 93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or
father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral
word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even
lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected
to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude
the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code(RPC). Thus, in the
case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were
held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their
79
son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her
insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home;
and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically. TCIEcH
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all
protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of
family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
seconds, without an inkling of what happened." 95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women
and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their
daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or
offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the
victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and
any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also
enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by
the petitioner 98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation
therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be
prevented," 99 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and
hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground
to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger
of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. 100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex
parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach
her witnesses' affidavits to the petition. 101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to
due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property, 102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice
and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace
that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests, 103 among which is protection of women and children from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise
order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within
five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and
TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially
effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent. 104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate
issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the
petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on
the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice. 105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent
protection order should not be issued. 106 HSCcTD
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order
should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side.
Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a
mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April
24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to
allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006,
gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or
extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise
in futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited
period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he
can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to
complain that he was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in
the VAWC case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is
virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. 108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination
suggest that this is so. It states: aIETCA
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. — The protection order
shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence
of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either
temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently
where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove
personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law
enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain
there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the
residence;
xxx xxx xxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's
residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such
removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then
can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner
seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
80
 Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of
encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the
State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." 109
Under Section 23 (c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any
issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary
on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows: 110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to
mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a
process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily
reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence,
however, is not a subject for compromise.A process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is
somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an
order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently
unable to participate equally with the person against whom the
protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which,
under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may
be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue
protection orders. 111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows: HCDAac
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs);Who May Issue and
How. — Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection
order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist
from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong
Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection
order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of
the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act
on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any
available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay
Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by
the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at
the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen
(15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO,
the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a
copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to
effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any
proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 112 On the other hand, executive power "is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the
laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance." 113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong
Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the
perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening
to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce
all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay." 114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the
existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct
shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of
judicial powers." 115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry
or proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed
and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable
ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists
or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds
true with the issuance of a BPO. DHEcCT
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials
and other law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and
abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the
chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and
order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of,
or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the
grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt. 116 In the instant case, however, no
concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law
by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and
edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose
of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement
against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the
violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of
women for equality but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is,
as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE,the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
81
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 197676. February 4, 2014.]
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE
AND BUILDERS' ASSOCIATION, petitioners,vs.PROFESSIONAL
REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE and
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision 1 dated July 12, 2011
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42 denying the petition to declare as
unconstitutional Sections 28 (a), 29 and 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9646.
R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was
signed into law on June 29, 2009 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims to professionalize
the real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision
of real estate service practitioners (real estate brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and
salespersons) in the country. Prior to its enactment, real estate service practitioners were under
the supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade
Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in the exercise of its consumer regulation
functions. Such authority is now transferred to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES) created under the
new law.
The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated on
July 21, 2010 by the PRC and PRBRES under Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010.DHITSc
On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Association (CREBA) instituted Civil Case No. 10-124776
in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners sought to declare as void and
unconstitutional the following provisions of R.A. No. 9646:
SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of
Real Estate Service. — The provisions of this Act and its rules and
regulations shall not apply to the following:
(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform
by himself/herself the acts mentioned in Section 3 hereof with reference to
his/her or its own property, except real estate developers;
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real
Estate Service. — No person shall practice or offer to practice real estate
service in the Philippines or offer himself/herself as real estate service
practitioner, or use the title, word, letter, figure or any sign tending to
convey the impression that one is a real estate service practitioner, or
advertise or indicate in any manner whatsoever that one is qualified to
practice the profession, or be appointed as real property appraiser or
assessor in any national government entity or local government unit,
unless he/she has satisfactorily passed the licensure
examination given by the Board, except as otherwise provided in this
Act, a holder of a valid certificate of registration,and professional
identification card or a valid special/temporary permit duly issued to
him/her by the Board and the Commission, and in the case of real estate
brokers and private appraisers, they have paid the required bond as
hereto provided.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service. — (a)
No partnership or corporation shall engage in the business of real estate
service unless it is duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC),and the persons authorized to act for the
partnership or corporation are all duly registered and licensed real
estate brokers, appraisers or consultants,as the case may be. The
partnership or corporation shall regularly submit a list of its real estate
service practitioners to the Commission and to the SEC as part of its annual
reportorial requirements. There shall at least be one (1) licensed real estate
broker for every twenty (20) accredited salespersons.
(b) Divisions or departments of partnerships and corporations
engaged in marketing or selling any real estate development project in the
regular course of business must be headed by full-time registered and
licensed real estate brokers.
(c) Branch offices of real estate brokers, appraisers or
consultants must be manned by a duly licensed real estate broker,
appraiser or consultant as the case may be.
In case of resignation or termination from employment of a real
estate service practitioner, the same shall be reported by the employer to
the Board within a period not to exceed fifteen (15) days from the date of
effectivity of the resignation or termination.
Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code, a corporation or
partnership may hire the services of registered and licensed real estate
brokers, appraisers or consultants on commission basis to perform real
estate services and the latter shall be deemed independent contractors
and not employees of such corporations. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because (1) it violates
Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that "[e]very bill
passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof";
(2) it is in direct conflict with Executive Order (E.O.) No. 648 which transferred the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Housing Authority (NHA) to regulate the real estate trade and business
to the Human Settlements Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), which authority includes the issuance of license to sell of subdivision owners and
developers pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957; (3) it violates the due process clause
as it impinges on the real estate developers' most basic ownership rights, the right to use and
dispose property, which is enshrined in Article 428 of the Civil Code; and (4) Section 28 (a) of R.A.
No. 9646 violates the equal protection clause as no substantial distinctions exist between real
estate developers and the exempted group mentioned since both are property owners dealing
with their own property.
82
 Additionally, petitioners contended that the lofty goal of nurturing and developing a
"corps of technically competent, reasonable and respected professional real estate service
practitioners" is not served by curtailing the right of real estate developers to conduct their
business of selling properties. On the contrary, these restrictions would have disastrous effects
on the real estate industry as the additional cost of commissions would affect the pricing and
affordability of real estate packages. When that happens, petitioners claimed that the millions of
jobs and billions in revenues that the real estate industry generates for the government will be a
thing of the past. CASTDI
After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
On July 12, 2011, the trial court rendered its Decision 2 denying the petition. The trial
court held that the assailed provisions are relevant to the title of the law as they are intended to
regulate the practice of real estate service in the country by ensuring that those who engage in it
shall either be a licensed real estate broker, or under the latter's supervision. It likewise found no
real discord between E.O. No. 648 and R.A. No. 9646 as the latter does not render nugatory the
license to sell granted by the HLURB to real estate developers, which license would still subsist.
The only difference is that by virtue of the new law, real estate developers will now be compelled
to hire the services of one licensed real estate broker for every twenty salespersons to guide and
supervise the coterie of salespersons under the employ of the real estate developers.
On the issue of due process, the trial court said that the questioned provisions do not
preclude property owners from using, enjoying, or disposing of their own property because they
can still develop and sell their properties except that they have to secure the services of a licensed
real estate broker who shall oversee the actions of the unlicensed real estate practitioners under
their employ. Since the subject provisions merely prescribe the requirements for the regulation of
the practice of real estate services, these are consistent with a valid exercise of the State's police
power. The trial court further ruled that Section 28 (a) does not violate the equal protection clause
because the exemption of real estate developers was anchored on reasonable classification
aimed at protecting the buying public from the rampant misrepresentations often committed by
unlicensed real estate practitioners, and to prevent unscrupulous and unethical real estate
practices from flourishing considering the large number of consumers in the regular course of
business compared to isolated sale transactions made by private individuals selling their own
property.
Hence, this appeal on the following questions of law:
1. Whether there is a justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to
adjudicate;
2. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-
one subject" rule under Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Philippine
Constitution;
3. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO
648, with respect to the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB to
regulate real estate developers;
4. Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they
affect the rights of real estate developers, are unconstitutional
for violating substantive due process; and
5. Whether Section 28(a),which treats real estate developers differently
from other natural or juridical persons who directly perform acts
of real estate service with reference to their own property, is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause. 3
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Justiciable Controversy
The Constitution 4 requires as a condition precedent for the exercise of judicial power
the existence of an actual controversy between litigants. An actual case or controversy involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible to judicial resolution. 5 The
controversy must be justiciable — definite and concrete — touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests, which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of
a law. 6 In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right,
on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 7 An actual case is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 8
There is no question here that petitioners who are real estate developers are entities
directly affected by the prohibition on performing acts constituting practice of real estate service
without first complying with the registration and licensing requirements for brokers and agents
under R.A. No. 9646. The possibility of criminal sanctions for disobeying the mandate of the new
law is likewise real. Asserting that the prohibition violates their rights as property owners to dispose
of their properties, petitioners challenged on constitutional grounds the implementation of R.A. No.
9646 which the respondents defended as a valid legislation pursuant to the State's police power.
The Court thus finds a justiciable controversy that calls for immediate resolution. SCHIac
No Violation of One-Title One-Subject Rule
Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution states:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary, 9 the Court explained the provision as follows:
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called
omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or
unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act
relating to its subject finding expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in
its title, the Court laid down the rule that —
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter
and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that
the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should
receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably
to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect,
without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that
object.Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be
an abstract or index of the Act. 10 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject requirement under
the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject
matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject and title. 11 An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
83
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object. 12
It is also well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress
to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect. 13 Indeed, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of
the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." 14
R.A. No. 9646 is entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Real Estate Service in the
Philippines, Creating for the Purpose a Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." Aside from provisions establishing a
regulatory system for the professionalization of the real estate service sector, the new law
extended its coverage to real estate developers with respect to their own properties. Henceforth,
real estate developers are prohibited from performing acts or transactions constituting real estate
service practice without first complying with registration and licensing requirements for their
business, brokers or agents, appraisers, consultants and salespersons.
Petitioners point out that since partnerships or corporations engaged in marketing or
selling any real estate development project in the regular course of business are now required to
be headed by full-time, registered and licensed real estate brokers, this requirement constitutes
limitations on the property rights and business prerogatives of real estate developers which are
not all reflected in the title of R.A. No. 9646. Neither are real estate developers, who are already
regulated under a different law, P.D. No. 957, included in the definition of real estate service
practitioners.
We hold that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the one-title, one-subject rule.
The primary objective of R.A. No. 9646 is expressed as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State recognizes the vital
role of real estate service practitioners in the social, political, economic
development and progress of the country by promoting the real estate
market, stimulating economic activity and enhancing government income
from real property-based transactions. Hence, it shall develop and nurture
through proper and effective regulation and supervision a corps of
technically competent, responsible and respected professional real estate
service practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be
globally competitive and will promote the growth of the real estate industry.
We find that the inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the law's primary goal
of developing "a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional real
estate service practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive
and will promote the growth of the real estate industry." Since the marketing aspect of real estate
development projects entails the performance of those acts and transactions defined as real estate
service practices under Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 9646, it is logically covered by the regulatory
scheme to professionalize the entire real estate service sector.
No Conflict Between R.A. No. 9646
and P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O. No. 648
Petitioners argue that the assailed provisions still cannot be sustained because they
conflict with P.D. No. 957 which decreed that the NHA shall have "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
the real estate trade and business." Such jurisdiction includes the authority to issue a license to
sell to real estate developers and to register real estate dealers, brokers or salesmen upon their
fulfillment of certain requirements under the law. By imposing limitations on real estate developers'
property rights, petitioners contend that R.A. No. 9646 undermines the licenses to sell issued by
the NHA (now the HLURB) to real estate developers allowing them to sell subdivision lots or
condominium units directly to the public. Because the HLURB has been divested of its exclusive
jurisdiction over real estate developers, the result is an implied repeal of P.D. No. 957 as
amended by E.O. No. 648, which is not favored in law.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand
together. The clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and
convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that
standard does not suffice. 15 Moreover, the failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates
that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. 16
There is nothing in R.A. No. 9646 that repeals any provision of P.D. No. 957, as
amended by E.O. No. 648. P.D. No. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers' Protective Decree," 17 vested the NHA with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real
estate trade and business in accordance with its provisions. It empowered the NHA to register,
approve and monitor real estate development projects and issue licenses to sell to real estate
owners and developers. It further granted the NHA the authority to register and issue/revoke
licenses of brokers, dealers and salesmen engaged in the selling of subdivision lots and
condominium units.DcaECT
E.O. No. 648, issued on February 7, 1981, reorganized the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) and transferred the regulatory functions of the NHA under P.D.
957 to the HSRC. Among these regulatory functions were the (1) regulation of the real estate trade
and business; (2) registration of subdivision lots and condominium projects; (3) issuance of license
to sell subdivision lots and condominium units in the registered units; (4) approval of performance
bond and the suspension of license to sell; (5) registration of dealers, brokers and salesman
engaged in the business of selling subdivision lots or condominium units; and (6) revocation of
registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen. 18
E.O. No. 90, issued on December 17, 1986, renamed the HSRC as the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and was designated as the regulatory body for housing and
land development under the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC).
To date, HLURB continues to carry out its mandate to register real estate brokers and salesmen
dealing in condominium, memorial parks and subdivision projects pursuant to Section 11 of P.D.
No. 957, which reads:
SECTION 11. Registration of Dealers, Brokers and
Salesmen. — No real estate dealer, broker or salesman shall engage in
the business of selling subdivision lots or condominium units unless he has
registered himself with the Authority in accordance with the provisions of
this section.
If the Authority shall find that the applicant is of good repute and
has complied with the applicable rules of the Authority, including the
payment of the prescribed fee, he shall register such applicant as a dealer,
broker or salesman upon filing a bond, or other security in lieu thereof, in
such sum as may be fixed by the Authority conditioned upon his faithful
compliance with the provisions of this Decree: Provided, that the
registration of a salesman shall cease upon the termination of his
employment with a dealer or broker.
Every registration under this section shall expire on the thirty-
first day of December of each year. Renewal of registration for the
84
 succeeding year shall be granted upon written application therefore made
not less than thirty nor more than sixty days before the first day of the
ensuing year and upon payment of the prescribed fee, without the
necessity of filing further statements or information, unless specifically
required by the Authority. All applications filed beyond said period shall be
treated as original applications.
The names and addresses of all persons registered as dealers,
brokers, or salesmen shall be recorded in a Register of Brokers, Dealers
and Salesmen kept in the Authority which shall be open to public
inspection.
On the other hand, Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 requires as a condition precedent for
all persons who will engage in acts constituting real estate service, including advertising in any
manner one's qualifications as a real estate service practitioner, compliance with licensure
examination and other registration requirements including the filing of a bond for real estate
brokers and private appraisers. While Section 11 of P.D. No. 957 imposes registration
requirements for dealers, brokers and salespersons engaged in the selling of subdivision lots and
condominium units, Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 regulates all real estate service practitioners
whether private or government. While P.D. No. 957 seeks to supervise brokers and dealers who
are engaged in the sale of subdivision lots and condominium units, R.A. No. 9646 aims to regulate
the real estate service sector in general by professionalizing their ranks and raising the level of
ethical standards for licensed real estate professionals.
There is no conflict of jurisdiction because the HLURB supervises only those real estate
service practitioners engaged in the sale of subdivision lots and condominium projects, specifically
for violations of the provisions of P.D. No. 957, and not the entire real estate service sector which
is now under the regulatory powers of the PRBRES. HLURB's supervision of brokers and dealers
to effectively implement the provisions of P.D. No. 957 does not foreclose regulation of the real
estate service as a profession. Real estate developers already regulated by the HLURB are now
further required to comply with the professional licensure requirements underR.A. No. 9646, as
provided in Sections 28, 29 and 32. Plainly, there is no inconsistency or contradiction in the
assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 and P.D. No. 957, as amended.
The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with other
laws in a way that will form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The legislature is presumed to have
known existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting laws. 19 Congress,
therefore, could not be presumed to have intended Sections 28, 29 and 32 of R.A. No. 9646 to
run counter to P.D. No. 957. ACTESI
No Violation of Due Process
Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 are unduly oppressive
and infringe the constitutional rule against deprivation of property without due process of law. They
stress that real estate developers are now burdened by law to employ licensed real estate brokers
to sell, market and dispose of their properties. Despite having invested a lot of money, time and
resources in their projects, petitioners aver that real estate developers will still have less control
in managing their business and will be burdened with additional expenses.
The contention has no basis. There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on
their use and enjoyment of property is caused by the implementation of R.A. No. 9646. If
petitioners as property owners feel burdened by the new requirement of engaging the services of
only licensed real estate professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties, such is an
unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure.
Indeed, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business
or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power of
the State particularly when their conduct affects the execution of legitimate governmental
functions, the preservation of the State, public health and welfare and public morals. 20 In any
case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation
requirements violate the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of
police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. 21
Here, the legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of real
estate practitioners by increasing their competence and raising ethical standards as real property
transactions are "susceptible to manipulation and corruption, especially if they are in the hands of
unqualified persons working under an ineffective regulatory system." The new regulatory regime
aimed to fully tap the vast potential of the real estate sector for greater contribution to our gross
domestic income, and real estate practitioners "serve a vital role in spearheading the continuous
flow of capital, in boosting investor confidence, and in promoting overall national progress." 22
We thus find R.A. No. 9646 a valid exercise of the State's police power. As we said in
another case challenging the constitutionality of a law granting discounts to senior citizens:
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to
the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police
power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled
in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response
to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.
Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs."
It is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to
the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined
by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power
because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield
to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would
be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer
loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated.
Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged
confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its
nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its
favor. 23 (Emphasis supplied.)
No Violation of Equal Protection Clause
Section 28 of R.A. No. 9646 exempts from its coverage natural and juridical persons
dealing with their own property, and other persons such as receivers, trustees or assignees in
insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings. However, real estate developers are specifically mentioned
as an exception from those enumerated therein. Petitioners argue that this provision violates the
equal protection clause because it unjustifiably treats real estate developers differently from those
exempted persons who also own properties and desire to sell them. They insist that no substantial
distinctions exist between ordinary property owners and real estate developers as the latter, in
fact, are more capable of entering into real estate transactions and do not need the services of
licensed real estate brokers. They assail the RTC decision in citing the reported fraudulent
practices as basis for the exclusion of real estate developers from the exempted group of persons
under Section 28 (a).
85
 We sustain the trial court's ruling that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the equal bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
protection clause. statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of
legislation should be adopted." 30
In Ichong v. Hernandez, 24 the concept of equal protection was explained as
follows: CSTEHI WHEREFORE,the petition is DENIED.The Decision dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 10-124776 is herebyAFFIRMED and UPHELD.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the No pronouncement as to costs.
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which SO ORDERED.
it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like |||
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within such class, and reasonable
grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-
825).25

Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it
is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a
reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. 26 If classification is germane to the
purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future
conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee. 27

R.A. No. 9646 was intended to provide institutionalized government support for the
development of "a corps of highly respected, technically competent, and disciplined real estate
service practitioners, knowledgeable of internationally accepted standards and practice of the
profession." 28 Real estate developers at present constitute a sector that hires or employs the
largest number of brokers, salespersons, appraisers and consultants due to the sheer number of
products (lots, houses and condominium units) they advertise and sell nationwide. As early as in
the '70s, there has been a proliferation of errant developers, operators or sellers who have
reneged on their representation and obligations to comply with government regulations such as
the provision and maintenance of subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water system and other
basic requirements. To protect the interest of home and lot buyers from fraudulent acts and
manipulations perpetrated by these unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators, P.D. No. 957 was issued to strictly regulate housing and real estate development
projects. Hence, in approving R.A. No. 9646, the legislature rightfully recognized the necessity of
imposing the new licensure requirements to all real estate service practitioners, including and
more importantly, those real estate service practitioners working for real estate developers. Unlike
individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate developers
sell lots, houses and condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business which is
highly regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and lot buyers.

The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between ordinary property
owners exempted under Section 28 (a) and real estate developers like petitioners, and the
classification enshrined in R.A. No. 9646 is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The
Court thus rules that R.A. No. 9646 is valid and constitutional.

Since every law is presumed valid, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome
only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of theConstitution, and only when
such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge
of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down. 29

Indeed, "all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a
statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law
may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be
conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible

86
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 211833. April 7, 2015.]
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, Presiding Judge, MCTC, Compostela-
New Bataan, Compostela Valley Province, petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J p:
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this
Court via a Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief 1under
Rules 65 and 63 of the Rules of Court, respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts
before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Facts
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley
Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the
vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31,
Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter 2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and
Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the
said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking
reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and protesting the
inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter 3 dated
February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc.
However, its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the
JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to,
among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five
years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded
from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the
qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year
requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution; and
(3) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and
Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that the
requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 10 4 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8557 5 should not be merely directory and should be fully implemented. He further
alleged that he has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution and
by Congress, since he has already complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of
law.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution 6 dated April 22, 2014, the JBC 7 and
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) 8 separately submitted their Comments. Summing
up the arguments of the JBC and the OSG, they essentially stated that the petition is
procedurally infirm and that the assailed policy does not violate the equal protection and due
process clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to
prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution to recommend
appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial function; (2) the remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie because the
petitioner has no clear legal right that needs to be protected; (3) the equal protection clause
is not violated because the classification of lower court judges who have served at least five
years and those who have served less than five years is valid as it is performance and
experience based; and (4) there is no violation of due process as the policy is merely internal
in nature.
The Issue
The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level
courts is constitutional.
Ruling of the Court
Procedural Issues:
Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it necessary to first
determine whether or not the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and declaratory
relief commenced by the petitioner was proper.
One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of
Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions
for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65." 9As discussed in the case
of Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al., 10 this
Court explained that:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies
of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach,
and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the
text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or
nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials. 11 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and
screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor
assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since
the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails,
is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a
determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the
Court's power of supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of
87
supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government
entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed,
but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only
to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act.
They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. 12
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to
see to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of
the JBC are being attacked, then the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC,
has the duty to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules.
Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing
JBC's policy. The petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was violated
when he was not included in the list of candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said
that his non-inclusion in the list of candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have
a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent
to perform the act required. 13 The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a
clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the
part of the respondent to perform the act. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary
writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary
one. 14 Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually
exclusive.
The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion
or to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner would
have the JBC do in his favor. The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees
for vacant judicial positions is discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot
claim any legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession
of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the judiciary may not be
used to legally demand that one's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial
vacancy. One's inclusion in the list of the candidates depends on the discretion of the JBC,
thus:
The fact that an individual possesses the constitutional and
statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary does not create
an entitlement or expectation that his or her name be included in the list
of candidates for a judicial vacancy. By submitting an application or
accepting a recommendation, one submits to the authority of the JBC to
subject the former to the search, screening, and selection process, and
to use its discretion in deciding whether or not one should be included
in the list. Indeed, assuming that if one has the legal right to be included
in the list of candidates simply because he or she possesses the
constitutional and statutory qualifications, then the application process
would then be reduced to a mere mechanical function of the JBC; and
the search, screening, and selection process would not only be
unnecessary, but also improper. However, this is clearly not the
constitutional intent. One's inclusion in the list of candidates is
subject to the discretion of the JBC over the selection of nominees
for a particular judicial post. Such candidate's inclusion is not,
therefore, a legally demandable right, but simply a privilege the
conferment of which is subject to the JBC's sound discretion.
Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional
appointment, that is, a promotion from a first-level court to a second level
court. There is no law, however, that grants him the right to a
promotion to second-level courts. 15 (Emphasis in the original)
Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly
compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the
JBC.
Three. The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory
relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an
ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination
of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or
duties thereunder." 16 "[T]he purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of
the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance
in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach." 17
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy.
Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right
to be included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement
policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal right under
the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The
opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially
enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the list of
candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the
petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been affected by the assailed policy.
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not
have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are
involved. 18 The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 19 19 ofBatas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended
by R.A. No. 7691. 20
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the
exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present
petition. But in any event, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant
petition should still be dismissed.
Substantive Issues
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend
appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted
to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the
JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines
the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has
provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from
having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its
mandate.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental
to the JBC's principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the
judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in
precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants' qualifications.
In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in
choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum
qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. The search for these
long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is
most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act
in performing its duties.
88
 JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial
vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this
pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain
whether an applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses the
qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement policy
applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and incidental to the function conferred
by the Constitution to the JBC.
Equal Protection
There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to screen
applicants who cannot be all accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to
determine who is best qualified among the applicants, and not to discriminate against any
particular individual or class.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Hence, the Court
has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the
classification stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government
end. 21
"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary." 22 "The mere fact that the legislative
classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for
every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some
degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid." 23
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised
its discretion in accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a member
of the Judiciary must be of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. 24 "To
ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been
tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the
nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for appointment. In
this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of extending judicial
appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or
disqualified." 25
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended
appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not
discriminate when it employs number of years of service to screen and differentiate
applicants from the competition. The number of years of service provides a relevant basis to
determine proven competence which may be measured by experience, among other factors.
The difference in treatment between lower court judges who have served at least five years
and those who have served less than five years, on the other hand, was rationalized by JBC
as follows:
Formulating policies which streamline the selection process
falls squarely under the purview of the JBC. No other constitutional body
is bestowed with the mandate and competency to set criteria for
applicants that refer to the more general categories of probity, integrity
and independence.
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a
second-level court, which is five years experience as judge of a first-
level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by
the Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of judicial
experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent
constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of
"proven competence." In determining competence, the JBC considers,
among other qualifications,experience and performance.
Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been
judges of first-level courts for five (5) years are better qualified for
promotion to second-level courts. It deems length of experience as a
judge as indicative of conversance with the law and court procedure.
Five years is considered as a sufficient span of time for one to acquire
professional skills for the next level court, declog the dockets, put in
place improved procedures and an efficient case management system,
adjust to the work environment, and gain extensive experience in the
judicial process.
A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of
the integrity, probity, and independence of judges seeking promotion.
To merit JBC's nomination for their promotion, they must have had a
"record of, and reputation for, honesty, integrity, incorruptibility,
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards." Likewise, their decisions must be reflective of the soundness
of their judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of
character.
Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are
worthy of promotion to the next level court, it would be premature or
difficult to assess their merit if they have had less than one year of
service on the bench. 26 (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)
At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only factor that
determines the selection of candidates for RTC judge to be appointed by the President.
Persons with this qualification are neither automatically selected nor do they automatically
become nominees. The applicants are chosen based on an array of factors and are evaluated
based on their individual merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the questioned policy was
arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis.
Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational
basis test. The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between lower court
judges with five year experience and those with less than five years of experience, like the
petitioner, and the classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant
to its legitimate purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the questioned policy does not infringe
on the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable classification intended to gauge
the proven competence of the applicants. Therefore, the said policy is valid and
constitutional.
Due Process
The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural due process for
lack of publication and non-submission to the University of the Philippines Law Center Office
of the National Administrative Register (ONAR). The petitioner said that the assailed policy
will affect all applying judges, thus, the said policy should have been published.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be filed in
the ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of
administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the government. 27 Since the JBC is
a body under the supervision of the Supreme Court, 28 it is not covered by the publication
requirements of the Administrative Code.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of
first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have
been published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes,
including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain
89
binding force and effect. There are, however, several exceptions to the requirement of
publication, such as interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, which
regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties. 29
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and
regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a
qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant.
It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the
members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process involves a call to lawyers
who meet the qualifications in theConstitution and are willing to serve in the Judiciary to apply
to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural consequence thereof that potential
applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be
able to prepare for and comply with them.
The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known as the Rules of
the Judicial and Bar Council, the JBC had put its criteria in writing and listed the guidelines
in determining competence, independence, integrity and probity. Section 1, Paragraph 1 of
Rule 9 expressly provides that applicants for the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan,
should, as a general rule, have at least five years of experience as an RTC judge, thus:
RULE 9 — SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO A
VACANCY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SANDIGANBAYAN
Section 1. Additional criteria for nomination to the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. — In addition to the foregoing
guidelines the Council should consider the following in evaluating the
merits of applicants for a vacancy in the Court of Appeals
and Sandiganbayan:
1. As a general rule, he must have at least five years of
experience as a judge of Regional Trial Court, except when he has
in his favor outstanding credentials, as evidenced by, inter alia,
impressive scholastic or educational record and performance in the Bar
examinations, excellent reputation for honesty, integrity, probity and
independence of mind; at least very satisfactory performance rating for
three (3) years preceding the filing of his application for nomination; and
excellent potentials for appellate judgeship.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis ours)
The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which have been duly
published on the website of the JBC and in a newspaper of general circulation suggests that
the JBC is aware that these are not mere internal rules, but are rules implementing
the Constitution that should be published. Thus, if the JBC were so-minded to add special
guidelines for determining competence of applicants for RTC judges, then it could and should
have amended its rules and published the same. This, the JBC did not do as JBC-009 and
its amendatory rule do not have special guidelines for applicants to the RTC.
Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be
published. Thus, by analogy, publication is also required for the five-year requirement
because it seeks to implement a constitutional provision requiring proven competence from
members of the judiciary.
Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced the
petitioner's private interest. At the risk of being repetitive, the petitioner has no legal right to
be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession of the
constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used
to legally demand that one's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy.
One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC. 30
As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the completion of the
prejudicature program as a requirement for appointment or promotion in the judiciary
under R.A. No. 8557, this ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded.
Clearly, it cannot be said that JBC unlawfully neglects the performance of a duty enjoined by
law.
Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the assailed policy violates
the constitutional provision under social justice and human rights for equal opportunity of
employment. The OSG explained:
[T]he questioned policy does not violate equality of
employment opportunities. The constitutional provision does not call for
appointment to the Judiciary of all who might, for any number of reasons,
wish to apply. As with all professions, it is regulated by the State. The
office of a judge is no ordinary office. It is imbued with public interest and
is central in the administration of justice . . . . Applicants who meet the
constitutional and legal qualifications must vie and withstand the
competition and rigorous screening and selection process. They must
submit themselves to the selection criteria, processes and discretion of
respondent JBC, which has the constitutional mandate of screening and
selecting candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to
the President. So long as a fair opportunity is available for all applicants
who are evaluated on the basis of their individual merits and abilities,
the questioned policy cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional. 31(Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not established a clear
legal right to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The petitioner has merely filed
an application with the JBC for the position of RTC judge, and he has no clear legal right to
be nominated for that office nor to be selected and included in the list to be submitted to the
President which is subject to the discretion of the JBC. The JBC has the power to determine
who shall be recommended to the judicial post. To be included in the list of applicants is a
privilege as one can only be chosen under existing criteria imposed by the JBC itself. As
such, prospective applicants, including the petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to
take part in it if they fail to meet these criteria. Hence, in the absence of a clear legal right,
the issuance of an injunctive writ is not justified.
As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening, and
selecting applicants relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the
authority to determine how best to perform such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this
authority, the JBC issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the
evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines in order to ensure that the rules
are updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its discretion is freed from legislative,
executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is shielded from any outside pressure
and improper influence. Limiting qualified applicants in this case to those judges with five
years of experience was an exercise of discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants,
however, should have been informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that
they could properly prepare for and comply with them. Hence, unless there are good and
compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of JBC's
powers, and will respect the initiative and independence inherent in the latter.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court,
however, DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the publication requirement
of (1) the assailed policy requiring five years of experience as judges of first-level courts
before they can qualify as applicant to the Regional Trial Court, and (2) other special
guidelines that the Judicial and Bar Council is or will be implementing.
90
SO ORDERED.

91
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 189185. August 16, 2016.]
WILFREDO MOSQUEDA, MARCELO VILLAGANES, JULIETA
LAWAGON, CRISPIN ALCOMENDRAS, CORAZON SABINADA,
VIRGINIA CATA-AG, FLORENCIA SABANDON, and LEDEVINA
ADLAWAN, petitioners, vs. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & SECTION 1. TITLE. — This Ordinance shall be known as "An
EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION,
and LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 189305. August 16, 2016.]
CITY GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION
(PBGEA), DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION, and LAPANDAY
AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
This appeal through the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari assails the
decision promulgated on January 9, 2009, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed
and set aside the judgment rendered on September 22, 2007 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 17, in Davao City upholding the validity and constitutionality of Davao City
Ordinance No. 0309-07, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal
is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2007 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), 11th Judicial Region, Branch 17, Davao
City, upholding the validity and constitutionality of Davao City Ordinance
No. 0309-07, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
FURTHER, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 28
January 2008 enjoining the City Government of Davao, and any other
person or entity acting in its behalf, from enforcing and implementing
City Ordinance No. 0309-07, is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Antecedents
After several committee hearings and consultations with various
stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309,
Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all
agricultural entities within Davao City, viz.:
ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07
Series of 2007
AN ORDINANCE BANNING AERIAL SPRAYING AS AN
AGRICULTURAL PRACTICE IN ALL AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES BY
ALL AGRICULTURAL ENTITIES IN DAVAO CITY
Be it enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City
in session assembled that:
Ordinance Banning Aerial Spraying as an Agricultural Practice in all
Agricultural Activities by all Agricultural Entities in Davao City";
SECTION 2. POLICY OF THE CITY. — It shall be the policy
of the City of Davao to eliminate the method of aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all entities within
Davao City;
SECTION 3. DEFINITION OF TERMS:
a. Aerial Spraying — refers to application of substances
through the use of aircraft of any form which dispenses the substances
in the air.
b. Agricultural Practices — refer to the practices conducted by
agricultural entities in relation to their agricultural activities;
c. Agricultural Activities — refer to activities that include, but
not limited to, land preparation, seeding, planting, cultivation, harvesting
and bagging;
d. Agricultural Entities — refer to persons, natural or juridical,
involved in agricultural activities
e. Buffer Zone — is an identified 30-meter zone within and
around the boundaries of agricultural farms/plantations that need special
monitoring to avoid or minimize harm to the environment and inhabitants
pursuant to policies and guidelines set forth in this Ordinance and other
government regulations. It is an area of land that must lie within the
property which does not include public lands, public thoroughfares or
adjacent private properties. It must be planted with diversified trees that
grow taller than what are usually planted and grown in the plantation to
protect those within the adjacent fields, neighboring farms, residential
area, schools and workplaces.
SECTION 4. SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY. — The
provisions of this Ordinance shall apply to all agricultural entities within
the territorial jurisdiction of Davao City;CAIHTE
SECTION 5. BAN OF AERIAL SPRAYING. — A ban on aerial
spraying shall be strictly enforced in the territorial jurisdiction of Davao
City three (3) months after the effectivity of this Ordinance.
SECTION 6. BUFFER ZONE. — Consistent with national
legislation and government regulations, all agricultural entities must
provide for a thirty (30) meter buffer zone within the boundaries of their
agricultural farms/plantations. This buffer zone must be properly
identified through Global Positioning System (GPS) survey. A survey
plan showing the metes and bounds of each agricultural farm/plantation
92
 must be submitted to the City Mayor's Office, with the buffer zone clearly
identified therein;
SECTION 7. PENAL PROVISION. — Violation of any
provision of this Ordinance shall be punished as follows:
a. First Offense: Fine of P5,000.00 and imprisonment of not
less than one (1) month but not more than three (3) months;
b. Second Offense: Fine of P5,000.00 and imprisonment of
not less than three (3) months but not more than six (6) months and
suspension of City-issued permits and licenses for one (1) year;
c. Third Offense: Fine of P5,000.00 and imprisonment of not
less than six (6) months but not more than one (1) year and perpetual
cancellation of City-issued permits and licenses;
Provided, that in case the violation has been committed by a
juridical person, the person in charge of the management thereof shall
be held liable;
SECTION 8. REPEALING CLAUSE. — Any Ordinance that is
contrary to or inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Ordinance
shall be deemed amended or repealed accordingly.
SECTION 9. EFFECTIVITY. — This Ordinance shall take
effect thirty (30) days from its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Davao City;
ENACTED, January 23, 2007 by a majority vote of all the
Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. 2
City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance on February 9, 2007. 3 The
ordinance took effect on March 23, 2007 after its publication in the newspaperMindanao
Pioneer. 4 Pursuant to Section 5 of the ordinance, the ban against aerial spraying would be
strictly enforced three months thereafter.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of
its members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development
Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality
of the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs through a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. 5 They alleged that the
ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal
protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and
lacked publication pursuant to Section 511 6 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government
Code).
On May 8, 2007, the residents living within and adjacent to the banana plantations
in Davao City led by Wilfredo Mosqueda, 7 joined by other residents of Davao
City, 8 (Mosqueda, et al.) submitted their Motion for Leave to Intervene and Opposition to the
Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction. 9 The RTC granted their motion on June 4, 2007. 10
On June 20, 2007, the RTC granted the prayer for issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, and subsequently issued the writ. 11
Judgment of the RTC
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring
Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional, decreeing thusly:
WHEREFORE, finding the subject [O]rdinance No. 0309-07
valid and constitutional in all aspect of the grounds assailed by the
petitioner, said [C]ity [O]rdinance No. 0309-07, is sustained of its validity
and constitutionality.
Accordingly, the order of this court dated June 20, 2007,
granting the writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by petitioner is
ordered cancelled and set aside as a result of this decision.
SO ORDERED. 12 DETACa
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police
power 13 under the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code; 14 that the
ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides application
because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial
drift; 15 and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and could be
invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution. 16
However, the RTC, recognizing the impracticability of the 3-month transition period
under Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07, recommended the parties to agree on an
extended transition period. 17
Decision of the CA
PBGEA, et al. appealed, 18 and applied for injunctive relief from the CA, 19 which
granted the application 20 and consequently issued a TRO to meanwhile enjoin the effectivity
of the ordinance. 21
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the
judgment of the RTC. 22 It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and
unconstitutional for being unreasonable and oppressive; found the three-month transition
period impractical and oppressive in view of the engineering and technical requirements of
switching from aerial spraying to truck-mounted boom spraying; and opined that the ban ran
afoul with the Equal Protection Clause inasmuch as Section 3 (a) of the ordinance — which
defined the term aerial spraying — did not make reasonable distinction between the hazards,
safety and beneficial effects of liquid substances that were being applied aerially; the different
classes of pesticides or fungicides; and the levels of concentration of these substances that
could be beneficial and could enhance agricultural production.
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the
public and the environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and
the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other. It
ruled that the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone within and around the agricultural
plantations under Section 6 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 constituted taking of property without
due process because the landowners were thereby compelled to cede portions of their
property without just compensation; that the exercise of police power to require the buffer
zone was invalid because there was no finding that the 30-meter surrounding belt was
obnoxious to the public welfare; and that, accordingly, Ordinance No. 0309-07 was
unconstitutional because of the absence of a separability clause.
The City of Davao and the intervenors filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, but the CA denied the motions on August 7, 2009. 23
Hence, the separate, but now consolidated, appeals by petition for review
on certiorari.
Issues
In G.R. No. 189185, petitioners Mosqueda, et al. rely on the following grounds,
namely:
I
93
 THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED FUNDAMENTAL PRECEPTS
AND CONCEPTS OF LAW WHICH, PROPERLY CONSIDERED,
NECESSARILY LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DAVAO
ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND VALID
II
THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
III
THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS MORE
THAN REASONABLY RELATED TO THE PURPOSE IT SEEKS TO
ACHIEVE
IV
THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS VALID, BEING DEMONSTRABLY
REASONABLE AND FAIR
V IV
THE REQUIREMENT RELATING TO THE 30-METER BUFFER ZONE
ARE [SIC] CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS OF LAW, BEING A
VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER aDSIHc
Mosqueda, et al. state that the CA ignored well-established precepts like the
primacy of human rights over property rights and the presumption of validity in favor of the
ordinance; that the CA preferred the preservation of the profits of respondents PBGEA, et
al. to the residents' right to life, health and ecology, 24 thereby disregarding the benevolent
purpose of the ordinance; that the CA assumed the functions of the lawmaker when it set
aside the wisdom behind the enactment of the ordinance; that the CA failed to apply the
precautionary principle, by which the State was allowed to take positive actions to prevent
harm to the environment and to human health despite the lack of scientific certainty; that the
CA erred in applying the "strict scrutiny method" in holding that the ordinance violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it only thereby applied in reviewing classifications that
affected fundamental rights; that there was nothing wrong with prohibiting aerial spraying per
se considering that even the aerial spraying of water produced drift that could affect unwilling
neighbors whose constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment might be
impinged; 25 that as far as the three-month period was concerned, the CA should have
considered that manual spraying could be conducted while the PBGEA, et al. laid down the
preparations for the conduct of boom spraying; 26 that "reasonableness" could be more
appropriately weighed by balancing the interests of the parties against the protection of basic
rights, like the right to life, to health, and to a balanced and healthful ecology; 27 that
PBGEA, et al. did not substantiate their claim of potential profit losses that would result from
the shift; that business profits should remain inferior and subordinate to their fundamental
rights as residents of Davao City, which were the rights that the assailed ordinance has
sought to protect; 28 that PBGEA, et al. did not explore other modes of pesticide treatment
either as a stop-gap or as a temporary measure while shifting to truck mounted boom
spraying; 29 that the imposition of the 30-meter buffer zone was a valid exercise of police
power that necessarily flowed from the protection afforded by the ordinance from the
unwanted effects of ground spraying; that the imposition of the buffer zone did not constitute
compensable taking under police power, pursuant to the pronouncements in Seng Kee & Co.
v. Earnshaw and Piatt, 30 Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals, 31 and Social Justice Society
(SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.; 32 and that the 30-meter buffer zone conformed with the ISO
14000 33 and the DENR Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) requirement. 34
In G.R. No. 189305, petitioner City of Davao submits the following as the issues to
be considered and resolved, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 5 OF ORDINANCE NO. 0309-
07, SERIES OF 2007 IS OPPRESSIVE AND AN UNREASONABLE
EXERCISE OF DELEGATED POLICE POWER
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07 IS VIOLATIVE
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION;
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07
CONSTITUTES TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT
COMPENSATION, THUS, VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
WHETHER OR NOT AERIAL SPRAYING OF FUNGICIDES IS SAFE
TO THE PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The City of Davao explains that it had the authority to enact the assailed ordinance
because it would thereby protect the environment and regulate property and business in the
interest of the general welfare pursuant to Section 458 of the Local Government
Code; 35 that the ordinance was enacted to carry out its mandate of promoting the public
welfare under the General Welfare Clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code); that
the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the distinction lies in aerial
spray as a method of application being more deleterious than other modes; that aerial
spraying produces more drift that causes discomfort, and an extremely offensive and
obnoxious experience on the part of the residents; that spray drift cannot be controlled even
with the use by the respondents of highly advanced apparatus, such as the Differential Global
Positioning System, Micronair Rotary Drift Control Atomizers, Intellimap, Intelliflow Spray
Valve System, Control and Display Unit and the Target Flow Spray Valve Switch
System; 36 that because of the inherent toxicity of Mancozeb (the fungicide aerially applied
by the respondents), there is no need to provide for a substantial distinction based on the
level of concentration; 37 that as soon as fungicides are released in the air, they become air
pollutants pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8749 (Philippine Clean Air Act of
1999), 38 and the activity thus falls under the authority of the local government units to ban;
and that the ordinance does not only seek to protect and promote human health but also
serves as a measure against air pollution.
The City of Davao insists that it validly exercised police power because it does not
thereby oblige the shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying; that the respondents
only choose boom spraying to justify the alleged impracticability of the transition period by
erroneously adding the months required for each of the stages without considering other
steps that may be simultaneously undertaken; 39 that the Court should apply its ruling
in Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr., 40 by which the six-month period for the folding-up
of business operations was declared a legitimate exercise of police power; that the
respondents did not present any documentary evidence on the feasibility of adopting other
methods; 41 that only 1,800 hectares out of 5,200 hectares of plantations owned and
operated by PBGEA's members use aerial spraying, hence, the perceived ominous
consequence of imposing a ban on aerial spray to the banana industry is entirely
misleading; 42 that the urgency of prohibiting aerial spray justifies the three-month transition
period; that the complaints of the community residents — ranging from skin itchiness,
contraction and/or tightening in the chest, nausea, appetite loss and difficulty in breathing
94
after exposure to spray mist — only prove that aerial spraying brings discomfort and harm to
the residents; that considering that the testimony of Dr. Lynn Crisanta R. Panganiban, a
pharmacologist and toxicologist, established that fungicides could cause debilitating effects
on the human body once inhaled or digested, the CA erred in holding that there was no
correlation between aerial application and the complaints of the residents; that given that
aerial spray produces more drift and is uncontrollable compared to the other methods of
applying fungicides, the ordinance becomes reasonable; 43 and that the medical-related
complaints of the residents need not be proven by medical records considering that these
were based on personal knowledge. 44 ETHIDa
The City of Davao contends that the imposition of the 30-meter buffer zone is a
valid exercise of police power, rendering the claim for just compensation untenable; that the
maintenance of the buffer zone does not require the respondents to cede a portion of their
landholdings; that the planting of diversified trees within the buffer zone will serve to insulate
the residents from spray drift; that such buffer zone does not deprive the landowners of the
lawful and beneficial use of their property; 45 and that the buffer zone is consistent with
the Constitution, which reminds property owners that the use of property bears a social
function. 46
In their comment, the respondents posit that the petition of the City of Davao should
be dismissed for failure to attach material portions of the records, and for raising factual errors
that are not within the realm of this appeal by petition for review on certiorari; 47 that the CA
correctly declared the ordinance as unreasonable due to the impossibility of complying with
the three-month transition period; that shifting from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying
will take at least three years and entails careful planning, equipment and machineries, civil
works, and capital funding of at least P400,000,000.00; 48 that the Court could rely on its
ruling in City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 49 where an ordinance directing an existing
establishment to wind up or to transfer its business was declared as confiscatory in nature,
and, therefore, unconstitutional; 50 that the total ban against aerial spraying, coupled with
the inadequate time to shift to truck-mounted boom spraying, effectively deprives the
respondents with an efficient means to control the spread of the Black Sigatoka disease that
threatens the banana plantations; that the ordinance will only expose the plantations to the
virulent disease that is capable of infecting 60% of the plantations on a single
cycle 51 missed; 52 that compared with other modes of application, aerial spraying is more
cost-efficient, safe and accurate; that truck-mounted boom spraying, for instance, requires
80-200 liters of solution per hectare,53 while manual spraying uses 200-300 liters of solution
per hectare; that aerial spraying only requires 30 liters per hectare; that in terms of safety
and accuracy, manual spraying is the least safe and accurate, 54 and produces more drift
than aerial spraying; 55 that due to the 300-liter solution required, the workers will be more
exposed to the solution during manual application and such application will thus be more in
conflict with the purpose of the ordinance to prevent human exposure; 56 that the
respondents also find the irrigation sprinklers suggested by the City of Davao as wasteful,
unsafe and impractical because it cannot provide the needed coverage for application of the
solution to effectively control the Black Sigatoka disease; that in contrast, aerial application,
coupled with the latest state-of-the art technology and equipment, ensures accuracy,
effectiveness, efficiency and safety compared to the other methods of application; that the
respondents vouch for the safety of the fungicides they use by virtue of such fungicides
having been registered with the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) and classified as
Category IV, 57 and found to be mild; and that oral ingestion in large doses is required before
any adverse effects to humans may result. 58
The respondents lament that the ban was imposed without any scientific basis;
that the report 59 prepared by a fact-finding team (composed of the Vice Mayor, the City
Health Officer, The City Planning and Development Coordinator and the Assistance City
Planning and Development Coordinator) organized by the City of Davao revealed that there
was no scientific evidence to support the clamor for the ban against aerial spraying; that
furthermore, national government agencies like the Department of Agriculture (DA),
Department of Health (DOH) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) similarly
concluded that there was no scientific evidence to support the ban; 60 that for four decades
since the adoption of aerial spraying, there has been no reported outbreak or any
predisposition to ailment connected with the pesticides applied; that the testimonies of the
residents during the trial were mere "emotional anecdotal evidence" that did not establish
any scientific or medical bases of any causal connection between the alleged health
conditions complained of and the fungicides applied during aerial spraying; 61 that the
allegations of health and environmental harm brought by the pesticides used to treat the
banana plantations were unfounded; that the 2001 study of the International Agency for
Research on Cancer showed that, contrary to the claim of Dra. Panganiban, the by-product
of Mancozeb (Ethylenethiourea or ETU) was "non-genotoxic" and not expected to produce
thyroid cancer; 62 that Carlos Mendoza, a geo-hydrologist and geophysicist, testified that
underground water contamination through aerial spraying would be impossible because of
the presence of latex, thick layers of clay and underlying rock formations; 63 that even the
study conducted by the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) showed that the rhinoceros
beetle infestation in coconut plantations adjacent to the banana plantations was due to the
farmer's failure to observe phytosanitary measures, not to aerial spraying; 64 that
furthermore, aerial spraying is internationally accepted as a "Good Agricultural Practice"
(GAP) 65 under the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides
by the United Nations-Food and Agricultural Organization (UN-FAO); that as such, they
observe the standards laid down by the UN-FAO, and utilize aerial spraying equipment that
will ensure accuracy, safety and efficiency in applying the substances, and which more than
complies with the requirement under the Guidelines on Good Practice for Aerial Application
of Pesticides (Rome 2001); 66 that in addition, they strictly observe standard operating
procedures prior to take-off, 67 in-flight 68 and post-flight; 69 that they substantially invested
in state-of-the-art technology and equipment designed to ensure safety, accuracy, and
effectiveness of aerial spraying operations, to avoid aerial drift; 70 that their equipment
include: wind meters (to measure the wind velocity in a specific area), wind cones (to
determine the wind direction, and whether the wind is a headwind, tailwind or a crosswind);
central weather station (to measure wind speed, the temperature and relative humidity),
Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS), 71Intellimap, 72 Control and Display
Unit, 73 Micronair Rotary Drift Control Atomizers (AU 5000 Low-Drift model), 74 Intelliflow
Spray Valve System, 75 and Target Flow Spray Valve Switch System; 76 and that they want
to minimize, if not, eliminate the occurrence of spray drift in order to minimize wastage of
resources and reduced efficiency of spraying programs implemented to control the Black
Sigatoka disease. 77 cSEDTC
The respondents maintain that Ordinance No. 0309-07 will regulate aerial spraying
as a method of application, instead of the substances being used therein; that the prohibition
is overbroad in light of other available reasonable measures that may be resorted to by the
local government; that the ordinance is unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, and tantamount to
a restriction or prohibition of trade; 78 that the ordinance will effectively impose a prohibition
against all pesticides, including fungicides that fall under the mildest type of substance; that
as such, the petitioner has disregarded existing valid and substantive classifications
established and recognized by the World Health Organization (WHO) that are adopted by
the FPA; that the FPA is the national agency armed with the professional competence,
technical expertise, and legal mandate to deal with the issue of use and application of
pesticides in our country; that the fungicides they administer are duly registered with the FPA,
and with other more developed countries that have observed a stricter environmental and
public health regulation such as the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and the European Union (EU); that as such, the City of Davao has disregarded valid,
substantial and significant distinctions between levels of concentration of the fungicides in
the water solution aerially sprayed; that it is the FPA that regulates the level of concentration
of agricultural chemicals prior to commercial distribution and use in the country; that the
members of PBGEA only spray a water solution (water cocktail) containing 0.1 liter to 1.5
liters of the active ingredient of fungicide in a 30-liter water solution per hectare that has
undergone rigorous testing and evaluation prior to registration by the FPA; that the active
ingredients of the fungicide are so diluted that no harm may be posed to public health or to
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the environment through aerial application; 79that the ordinance was so broad that it prohibits
aerial application of any substance, including water; 80 and that aside from fungicides, the
respondents also aerially apply vitamins, minerals and organic fertilizers. 81
The respondents submit that the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under
Section 5 of the ordinance constitutes an improper exercise of police power; that the
ordinance will require all landholdings to maintain the buffer zone, thereby diminishing to a
mere 1,600 square meters of usable and productive land for every hectare of the plantation
bounding residential areas, with the zone being reserved for planting "diversified trees;" that
this requirement amounts to taking without just compensation or due process; and that the
imposition of the buffer zone unduly deprives all landowners within the City of Davao the
beneficial use of their property; 82 that the precautionary principle cannot be applied blindly,
because its application still requires some scientific basis; that the principle is also based on
a mere declaration that has not even reached the level of customary international law, not on
a treaty binding on the Government. 83
The respondents argue that the illegality of the transition period results in the
invalidity of the ordinance as it does not carry a separability clause; and that the absence of
such clause signifies the intention of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of City of Davao to make
the ordinance effective as a whole. 84
The main issue is whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on
due process and equal protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an
invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural
practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month transition period to shift
to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance
of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.
Ruling of the Court
We deny the petitions for review for their lack of merit.
I under its corporate powers
Preliminary considerations:
The significant role of the banana industry
in ensuring economic stability and food security
There is no question that the implementation of Ordinance No. 0309-07, although
the ordinance concerns the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying in all agricultural
lands within Davao City, will inevitably have a considerable impact on the country's banana
industry, particularly on export trading.
Banana exportation plays a significant role in the maintenance of the country's
economic stability and food security. Banana is a consistent dollar earner and the fourth
largest produced commodity in the Philippines. 85 In 2010, the Philippines figured among the
top three banana producing countries in the world. 86 In 2014, fresh bananas accounted for
17% of the country's top agricultural export commodities, gaining a close second to coconut
oil with 18%. 87 The Davao Region (Region XI) 88 was the top banana producing region in
2013, with a production growth rate of 16.4%, and 33.76% share in the total agricultural
output of the Region. 89
Despite these optimistic statistics, the banana industry players struggle to keep up
with the demands of the trade by combatting the main threat to production posed by two
major fungal diseases: the Panama Disease Tropical Race 4 (Fusarium oxysprum f.sp.
cubense) and the Black Sigatoka leaf spot disease(Mycosphaerella fjiensis morelet).
Pesticides have proven to be effective only against the Black Sigatoka disease. There is yet
no known cure for the Panama disease.90
The menace of the Black Sigatoka disease cannot be taken lightly. The disease
causes destruction of the plant by significantly reducing the leaf area, leading to premature
ripening of the produce and resulting in yield losses of at least 50%. 91 Due to its effects on
banana export trading, the disease has emerged as a global concern that has
correspondingly forced banana producers to increase the use of chemical
pesticides. 92 Protectant fungicides such as Mancozeb, chlorothalonil and Propiconazole
are applied to combat the disease. 93 These agricultural chemicals are aerially applied by
the respondents in the banana plantations within the jurisdiction of Davao City to arrest the
proliferation of the disease.
Considering that banana export plantations exist in vast monocultures, effective
treatment of the Black Sigatoka disease is done by frequent aerial application of fungicides.
This is an expensive practice because it requires permanent landing strips, facilities for the
mixing and loading of fungicides, and high recurring expense of spray materials. 94 The cost
of aerial spraying accounts to 15-20% of the final retail price of the crop, making the
technology essentially unavailable to small landholdings that are more vulnerable to the
disease. 95
Aerial spraying has become an agricultural practice in Davao City since the
establishment of the banana plantations in 1960. 96 Out of the 5,205 hectares of commercial
plantations devoted to Cavendish banana being operated by the respondents in Davao
City, 97 around 1,800 hectares receive treatment through aerial application. These
plantations are situated in Barangays Sirib, Manuel Guianga, Tamayong, Subasta Dacudao,
Lasang, Mandug, Waan, Tigatto and Callawa, 98 and are affected by the ban imposed by
Ordinance No. 0309-07. The DTI has issued a statement to the effect that the ban against
aerial spraying in banana plantations "is expected to kill the banana industry," affects the
socio-economic development of the barangays hosting the affected plantations, and has a
disastrous impact on export trading. The DTI has forecasted that the ban would discourage
the entry of new players in the locality, which would have a potential drawback in employment
generation. 99
IIThe Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City
enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07
The petitioners assert that Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid act of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City pursuant to its delegated authority to exercise police
power in the furtherance of public welfare and in ensuring a sound and balanced environment
for its constituents. The respondents negate this assertion, describing the ordinance as
unreasonable, discriminatory and oppressive.
The petitioners' assertion of its authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07 is upheld.
To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-
pronged test: the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers
of the local government unit, and whether it is passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of
the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy). 100 AaCTcI
The formalities in enacting an ordinance are laid down in Section 53 101 and
Section 54 102 of The Local Government Code. These provisions require the ordinance to
be passed by the majority of the members of the sanggunian concerned, and to be presented
to the mayor for approval. With no issues regarding quorum during its deliberation having
been raised, and with its approval of by City Mayor Duterte not being disputed, we see no
reason to strike down Ordinance No. 0309-07 for non-compliance with the formal requisites
under the Local Government Code.
We next ascertain whether the City of Davao acted within the limits of its corporate
powers in enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07.
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 The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations in order to promote the general welfare. 103 Such legislative powers spring from
the delegation thereof by Congress through either theLocal Government Code or a special
law. The General Welfare Clause in Section 16 of the Local Government Code embodies the
legislative grant that enables the local government unit to effectively accomplish and carry
out the declared objects of its creation, and to promote and maintain local
autonomy. 104 Section 16 reads:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers, namely: the general
legislative power and the police power proper. General legislative power refers to the power
delegated by Congress to the local legislative body, or the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the
case of Davao City, 105 to enable the local legislative body to enact ordinances and make
regulations. This power is limited in that the enacted ordinances must not be repugnant to
law, and the power must be exercised to effectuate and discharge the powers and duties
legally conferred to the local legislative body. The police power proper, on the other hand,
authorizes the local government unit to enact ordinances necessary and proper for the health
and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the local
government unit and its constituents, and for the protection of their property. 106
Section 458 of the Local Government Code explicitly vests the local government
unit with the authority to enact legislation aimed at promoting the general welfare, viz.:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. — (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative
body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this
Code, . . .
In terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a balanced and healthful
ecology, the local government unit takes its cue from Section 15 and Section 16, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution. Following the provisions of the Local Government Code and
the Constitution, the acts of the local government unit designed to ensure the health and lives
of its constituents and to promote a balanced and healthful ecology are well within the
corporate powers vested in the local government unit. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Bayan
of Davao City is vested with the requisite authority to enact an ordinance that seeks to protect
the health and well-being of its constituents.
The respondents pose a challenge against Ordinance No. 0309-07 on the ground
that the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City has disregarded the health of the plantation
workers, contending that by imposing the ban against aerial spraying the ordinance would
place the plantation workers at a higher health risk because the alternatives of either manual
or truck-boom spraying method would be adopted; and that exposing the workers to the same
risk sought to be prevented by the ordinance would defeat its purported purpose.
We disagree with the respondents.
With or without the ban against aerial spraying, the health and safety of plantation
workers are secured by existing state policies, rules and regulations implemented by the
FPA, among others, which the respondents are lawfully bound to comply with. The
respondents even manifested their strict compliance with these rules, including those in the
UN-FAO Guidelines on Good Practice for Aerial Application of Pesticides (Rome 2001). We
should note that the Rome 2001 guidelines require the pesticide applicators to observe the
standards provided therein to ensure the health and safety of plantation workers. As such,
there cannot be any imbalance between the right to health of the residents vis-à-vis the
workers even if a ban will be imposed against aerial spraying and the consequent adoption
of other modes of pesticide treatment.
Furthermore, the constitutional right to health and maintaining environmental
integrity are privileges that do not only advance the interests of a group of individuals. The
benefits of protecting human health and the environment transcend geographical locations
and even generations. This is the essence of Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution.
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. 107 we declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be
appreciated. EcTCAD
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health
risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of
the ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will
promote the general welfare, specifically the health of its constituents. Such authority should
not be construed, however, as a valid license for the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it
deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact
legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.
By distinguishing authority from method we face this question: Is a prohibition
against aerial spraying a lawfully permissible method that the local government unit of Davao
City may adopt to prevent the purported effects of aerial drift? To resolve this question, the
Court must dig deeper into the intricate issues arising from these petitions.
II
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates
the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local
government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. 108In order to declare
it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive
requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene theConstitution or any statute; (2) it must
be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must
not be unreasonable. 109
In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the Government. 110 A
local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it
satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive. 111 The first requirement refers to the Equal
Protection Clause of theConstitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution. 112
97
 Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient
justification for the Government's action. 113 This means that in exercising police power the
local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance
regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate
public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose
without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due
process challenge. 114
The respondents challenge Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for being
unreasonable and oppressive in that it sets the effectivity of the ban at three months after
publication of the ordinance. They allege that three months will be inadequate time to shift
from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying, and effectively deprives them of efficient means
to combat the Black Sigatoka disease.
The petitioners counter that the period is justified considering the urgency of
protecting the health of the residents.
We find for the respondents.
The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application
within three months can readily be appreciated given the vast area of the affected plantations
and the corresponding resources required therefor. To recall, even the RTC recognized the
impracticality of attaining a full-shift to other modes of spraying within three months in view
of the costly financial and civil works required for the conversion. 115 In the assailed
decision, the CA appropriately observed:
There appears to be three (3) forms of ground spraying, as
distinguished from aerial spraying, which are: 1. "Truck-mounted boom
spraying;" 2. "manual or backpack spraying." and 3. "sprinkler spraying."
Petitioners-appellants claim that it was physically impossible for them to
shift to "truck-mounted boom spraying" within three (3) months before
the aerial spraying ban is actually enforced. They cited the testimony of
Dr. Maria Emilia Rita G. Fabregar, Ph.D, PBGEA Chairperson, to the
effect that since banana plantations in Davao City were configured for
aerial spraying, the same lack the road network to make "truck-mounted
boom spraying" possible. According to Dr. Fabregar, it was impossible
to construct such road networks in a span of three (3) months. Engr.
Magno P. Porticos, Jr., confirmed that the shift demands the
construction of three hundred sixty (360) linear kilometers of road which
cannot be completed in three (3) months.
In their separate testimonies, Dr. Fabregar and Engr. Porticos
explained that a shift to "truck-mounted boom spraying" requires the
following steps which may be completed in three (3) years:
1. six (6) months for planning the
reconfiguration of banana plantations to ensure
effective truck-mounted boom spraying for the
adequate protections of the plantations from the
Black Sigatoka fungus and other diseases, while
maximizing land use; HSAcaE
2. two (2) months to secure government
permits for infrastructure works to be undertaken
thereon;
3. clearing banana plants and
dismantling or reconstructing fixed infrastructures,
such as roads, drains, cable ways, and irrigation
facilities, which phase may be completed in
eighteen (18) months;
4. importation and purchase of trucks
mounted with boom spraying, nurse trucks and
protective gears. The placing of orders and delivery
of these equipment, including the training [of] the
personnel who would man the same, would take six
(6) months; and
5. securing the needed capitalization to
finance these undertakings would take six (6)
months to a year.
Ms. Maria Victoria E. Sembrano, CPA, Chairperson of the
PBGEA Finance Committee, testified that her committee and the
Technical Committee and Engineering Group of PBGEA conducted a
feasibility study to determine the cost in undertaking the shift to ground
spraying. Their findings fixed the estimated cost for the purpose at
Php400 Million.
xxx xxx xxx
Both appellees failed to rebut the foregoing testimonies with
empirical findings to the contrary.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, in view of the infrastructural requirements as
methodically explained, We are convinced that it was physically
impossible for petitioners-appellants to carry out a carefully planned
configuration of vast hectares of banana plantations and be able to
actually adopt "truck-mounted boom spraying" within three (3) months.
To compel petitioners-appellants to abandon aerial spraying in favor of
"manual or backpack spraying" or "sprinkler spraying" within 3 months
puts petitioners-appellants in a vicious dilemma between protecting its
investments and the health of its workers, on the one hand, and the
threat of prosecution if they refuse to comply with the imposition. We
even find the 3-months transition period insufficient, not only in acquiring
and gearing-up the plantation workers of safety appurtenances, but
more importantly in reviewing safety procedures for "manual or
backpack spraying" and in training such workers for the purpose.
Additionally, the engineering works for a sprinkler system in vast
hectares of banana plantations could not possibly be completed within
such period, considering that safety and efficiency factors need to be
considered in its structural re-designing.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent-appellee argues that the Ordinance merely
banned an agricultural practice and did not actually prohibit the
operation of banana plantations; hence, it is not oppressive. While We
agree that the measure did not impose a closure of a lawful enterprise,
the proviso in Section 5, however, compels petitioners-appellants to
abandon aerial spraying without affording them enough time to convert
and adopt other spraying practices. This would preclude petitioners-
appellants from being able to fertilize their plantations with essential
vitamins and minerals substances, aside from applying thereon the
needed fungicides or pesticides to control, if not eliminate the threat of,
plant diseases. Such an apparent eventuality would prejudice the
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 operation of the plantations, and the economic repercussions thereof
would just be akin to shutting down the venture.
This Court, therefore, finds Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-
07 an invalid provision because the compulsion thereunder to abandon
aerial spraying within an impracticable period of "three (3) months after
the effectivity of this Ordinance" is "unreasonable, oppressive and
impossible to comply with." 116
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone
will consume considerable time and financial resources given the topography and
geographical features of the plantations. 117 As such, the conversion could not be completed
within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents and other affected
individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-month period under
pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would
definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under
Section 6 of the ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition
unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their
property that amounts to taking without just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 118 we have thoroughly explained that taking only
becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its
property, viz.:
An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property
that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property
rights of individuals.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9,
that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation." The provision is the most important protection of
property rights in the Constitution. This is a restriction on the general
power of the government to take property. The constitutional provision
is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property
of some to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the
government takes away a person's property to benefit society, then
society should pay. The principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole. HESIcT
There are two different types of taking that can be identified.
A "possessory" taking occurs when the government confiscates or
physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the
government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use
of the property.
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, it was
held that a taking also could be found if government regulation of the
use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to support the act. While property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of
what is too far and when regulation becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice
Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore
cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other
occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that the issue of
when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts
in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require that
the economic loss caused by public action must be compensated by the
government and thus borne by the public as a whole, or whether the loss
should remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the public
action.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings
is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use. A regulation that permanently denies
all economically beneficial or productive use of land is, from the owner's
point of view, equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or
property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make the
use prohibitable. When the owner of real property has been called upon
to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common
good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a
taking.
A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or
productive use of land will require compensation under the takings
clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of
eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may
have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the
regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the
regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations
and the character of government action. These inquiries are informed by
the purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent the government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking"
if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public
purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-
backed expectations of the owner. (bold emphasis supplied)
The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the
effects of aerial spraying within and near the plantations. Although Section 3 (e) of the
ordinance requires the planting of diversified trees within the identified buffer zone, the
requirement cannot be construed and deemed as confiscatory requiring payment of just
compensation. A landowner may only be entitled to compensation if the taking amounts to a
permanent denial of all economically beneficial or productive uses of the land. The
respondents cannot be said to be permanently and completely deprived of their landholdings
because they can still cultivate or make other productive uses of the areas to be identified as
the buffer zones.
III
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates
the Equal Protection Clause
A serious challenge being posed against Ordinance No. 0309-07 rests on its
supposed collision with the Equal Protection Clause. The respondents submit that the
ordinance transgresses this constitutional guaranty on two counts, to wit: (1) by prohibiting
aerial spraying per se, regardless of the substance or the level of concentration of the
99
chemicals to be applied; and (2) by imposing the 30-meter buffer zone in all agricultural lands
in Davao City regardless of the sizes of the landholding.
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner. The guaranty of equal protection secures every person within the State's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's duly constituted
authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs
impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective. 119
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or
things without distinction, 120 nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which
it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. 121 The guaranty of equal protection
envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid classification. 122 If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from another. 123 In other words, a valid
classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of
the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members
of the class. 124
Based on these parameters, we find for the respondents. caITAC
The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the justification given by the
Government for its conduct is gauged by using the means-end test. 125 This test requires
analysis of: (1) the interests of the public that generally require its exercise, as distinguished
from those of a particular class; and (2) the means employed that are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. 126 To determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to three levels
of scrutiny, viz.: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.
The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or rational basis
test) demands that the classification reasonably relate to the legislative purpose. 127 The
rational basis test often applies in cases involving economics or social welfare, 128 or to any
other case not involving a suspect class. 129
When the classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be
treated under intermediate or heightened review. Classifications based on gender or
illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny. 130 To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law
must not only further an important governmental interest and be substantially related to that
interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on
broad generalizations. 131
The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class
disadvantage of a suspect class. The Government carries the burden to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest. 132
The petitioners advocate the rational basis test. In particular, the petitioning
residents of Davao City argue that the CA erroneously applied the strict scrutiny approach
when it declared that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because the ban
included all substances including water and vitamins. The respondents agree with the CA,
however, and add that the ordinance does not rest on a valid distinction because it has lacked
scientific basis and has ignored the classifications of pesticides observed by the FPA.
We partly agree with both parties.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach
appropriately applies herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the
reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2)
examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a
substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all persons or
things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. 133
Applying the test, the established classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 is to
be viewed in relation to the group of individuals similarly situated with respect to the avowed
purpose. This gives rise to two classes, namely: (1) the classification under Ordinance No.
0309-07 (legislative classification); and (2) the classification based on purpose (elimination
of the mischief). The legislative classification found in Section 4 of the ordinance refers to "all
agricultural entities" within Davao City. Meanwhile, the classification based on the purpose
of the ordinance cannot be easily discerned because the ordinance does not make any
express or implied reference to it. We have to search the voluminous records of this case to
divine the animus behind the action of the Sangguniang Panglungsod in prohibiting aerial
spraying as an agricultural activity. The effort has led us to the following proposed resolution
of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, 134 viz.:
RESOLUTION NO. _______
Series of 2007
A RESOLUTION TO ENACT AN ORDINANCE BANNING AERIAL
SPRAYING AS AN AGRICULTURAL PRACTICE IN ALL
AGRICULTURAL ENTITIES IN DAVAO CITY
WHEREAS, the City of Davao, with fertile lands and ideal
climactic condition, hosts various large farms planted with different
crops;
WHEREAS, these farms lay adjacent to other agricultural
businesses and that residential areas abuts these farm boundaries;
WHEREAS, aerial spraying as a mode of applying chemical
substances such as fungicides and pesticides is being used by
investors/companies over large agricultural plantations in Davao City;
WHEREAS, the Davao City watersheds and ground water
sources, located within and adjacent to Mount Apo may be affected by
the aerial spraying of chemical substances on the agricultural farms and
plantations therein;
WHEREAS, the effects of aerial spraying are found to be
detrimental to the health of the residents of Davao City most especially
the inhabitants nearby agricultural plantations practicing aerials
spraying;
WHEREAS, the unstable wind direction during the conduct of
aerial spray application of these chemical substances pose health
hazards to people, animals, other crops and ground water sources;
WHEREAS, in order to achieve sustainable development,
politics must be based on the Precautionary Principle. Environment
measures must anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of
environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious,
irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation;
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the City of Davao to ensure the
safety of its inhabitants from all forms of hazards, especially if such
100
 hazards come from development activities that are supposed to be
beneficial to everybody;
WHEREAS, pesticides are by its nature poisonous, it is all the
more dangerous when dispensed aerially through aircraft because of
unstable wind conditions which in turn makes aerial spray drifting to
unintended targets a commonplace.
WHEREAS, aerial spraying of pesticides is undeniably a
nuisance.
WHEREAS, looking at the plight of the complainants and
other stakeholders opposed to aerial spraying, the issue of aerial
spraying of pesticides is in all fours a nuisance. Given the vastness of
the reach of aerial spraying, the said form of dispensation falls into the
category of a public nuisance. Public nuisance is defined by the New
Civil Code as one which affects a community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal.
WHEREAS, the General Welfare Clause of the Local
Government Code empowers Local Government Units to enact
ordinances that provide for the health and safety, promote the comfort
and convenience of the City and the inhabitants thereof.
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY
RESOLVED, that for the health, safety and peace of mind of all the
inhabitants of Davao City, let an ordinance be enacted banning aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural entities in Davao
City. cDHAES
xxx xxx xxx
The proposed resolution identified aerial spraying of pesticides as a nuisance
because of the unstable wind direction during the aerial application, which (1) could
potentially contaminate the Davao City watersheds and ground water sources; (2) was
detrimental to the health of Davao City residents, most especially those living in the nearby
plantations; and (3) posed a hazard to animals and other crops. Plainly, the mischief that the
prohibition sought to address was the fungicide drift resulting from the aerial application;
hence, the classification based on the intent of the proposed ordinance covered all
agricultural entities conducting aerial spraying of fungicides that caused drift.
The assailed ordinance thus becomes riddled with several distinction issues.
A brief discussion on the occurrence of the drift that the ordinance seeks to address
is necessary.
Pesticide treatment is based on the use of different methods of application and
equipment, 135 the choice of which methods depend largely on the objective of distributing
the correct dose to a defined target with the minimum of wastage due to "drift." 136 The term
"drift" refers to the movement of airborne spray droplets, vapors, or dust particles away from
the target area during pesticide application. 137 Inevitably, any method of application causes
drift, which may either be primary or secondary. As fittingly described by scholars: 138
Primary drift is the off-site movement of spray droplets at, or
very close to, the time of application. For example, a field application
using a boom in a gusty wind situation could easily lead to a primary
drift. Primary spray drift is not product specific, and the active
ingredients do not differ in their potential to drift. However, the type of
formulation, surfactant, or other adjuvant may affect spray drift potential.
Secondary drift is associated with pesticide vapor. Pesticide
vapor drift is the movement of the gas that forms when an active
ingredient evaporates from plants, soil, or other surfaces. And while
vapor drift is an important issue, it only pertains to certain volatile
products. Vapor drift and other forms of secondary driftare product
specific. Water-based sprays will volatize more quickly than oil-based
sprays. However, oil-based sprays can drift farther, especially above
95ºF, because they are lighter.
Understandably, aerial drift occurs using any method of application, be it through
airplanes, ground sprayers, airblast sprayers or irrigation systems. 139 Several factors
contribute to the occurrence of drift depending on the method of application, viz.:
AERIAL AIRBLAST GROUND CHEMIGATION
Droplet size Crop canopy Droplet size Application height
Application height Droplet size Boom height Wind speed
Wind speed Wind speed Wind speed
Swath adjustment
Canopy
Boom length
Tank mix physical
properties
Source: F.M. Fishel and J.A. Ferrell, "Managing Pesticide Drift," available
at http://edis.ifas.edu/pi232, citing Pesticide Notes, MSU Extension.
The four most common pesticide treatment methods adopted in Davao City are
aerial, truck-mounted boom, truck-mounted mechanical, and manual spraying.140 However,
Ordinance No. 0309-07 imposes the prohibition only against aerial spraying.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the
occurrence of drift causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the
environment. Given this justification, does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the
classification must rest on substantial distinction?
We answer in the negative. ASEcHI
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from
the conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted
boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and
alleged health risks to the community and to the environment. 141 A ban against aerial
spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve. 142 In the
process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the classification does
not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to
eliminate. 143 A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or
end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the
intended purpose of the law. 144
The claim that aerial spraying produces more aerial drift cannot likewise be
sustained in view of the petitioners' failure to substantiate the same. The respondents have
refuted this claim, and have maintained that on the contrary, manual spraying produces more
drift than aerial treatment. 145 As such, the decision of prohibiting only aerial spraying is
tainted with arbitrariness.
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 Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be
"overinclusive" because its impending implementation will affect groups that have no relation
to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose. Its implementation will unnecessarily
impose a burden on a wider range of individuals than those included in the intended class
based on the purpose of the law. 146
It can be noted that the imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance
applies irrespective of the substance to be aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural
activity to be conducted. The respondents admit that they aerially treat their plantations not
only with pesticides but also vitamins and other substances. The imposition of the ban against
aerial spraying of substances other than fungicides and regardless of the agricultural activity
being performed becomes unreasonable inasmuch as it patently bears no relation to the
purported inconvenience, discomfort, health risk and environmental danger which the
ordinance seeks to address. The burden now will become more onerous to various entities,
including the respondents and even others with no connection whatsoever to the intended
purpose of the ordinance.
In this respect, the CA correctly observed:
Ordinance No. 0309-07 defines "aerial spraying" as the
"application of substances through the use of aircraft of any form which
dispenses the substances in the air." Inevitably, the ban imposed therein
encompasses aerial application of practically all substances, not only
pesticides or fungicides but including water and all forms of chemicals,
regardless of its elements, composition, or degree of safety.
Going along with respondent-appellee's ratiocination that the
prohibition in the Ordinance refers to aerial spraying as a method of
spraying pesticides or fungicides, there appears to be a need to single
out pesticides or fungicides in imposing such a ban because there is a
striking distinction between such chemicals and other substances
(including water), particularly with respect to its safety implications to the
public welfare and ecology.
xxx xxx xxx
We are, therefore, convinced that the total ban on aerial
spraying runs afoul with the equal protection clause because it does not
classify which substances are prohibited from being applied aerially
even as reasonable distinctions should be made in terms of the hazards,
safety or beneficial effects of liquid substances to the public health,
livelihood and the environment. 147
We clarify that the CA did not thereby apply the strict scrutiny approach but only
evaluated the classification established by the ordinance in relation to the purpose. This is
the essence of the rational basis approach. The petitioners should be made aware that the
rational basis scrutiny is not based on a simple means-purpose correlation; nor does the
rational basis scrutiny automatically result in a presumption of validity of the ordinance or
deference to the wisdom of the local legislature. 148 To reiterate, aside from ascertaining
that the means and purpose of the ordinance are reasonably related, the classification should
be based on a substantial distinction.
However, we do not subscribe to the respondents' position that there must be a
distinction based on the level of concentration or the classification imposed by the FPA on
pesticides. This strenuous requirement cannot be expected from a local government unit that
should only be concerned with general policies in local administration and should not be
restricted by technical concerns that are best left to agencies vested with the appropriate
special competencies. The disregard of the pesticide classification is not an equal protection
issue but is more relevant in another aspect of delegated police power that we consider to
be more appropriate in a later discussion.
The overinclusiveness of Ordinance No. 0309-07 may also be traced to its Section
6 by virtue of its requirement for the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone. This
requirement applies regardless of the area of the agricultural landholding, geographical
location, topography, crops grown and other distinguishing characteristics that ideally should
bear a reasonable relation to the evil sought to be avoided. As earlier discussed, only large
banana plantations could rely on aerial technology because of the financial capital required
therefor. ITAaHc
The establishment and maintenance of the buffer zone will become more
burdensome to the small agricultural landholders because: (1) they have to reserve the 30-
meter belt surrounding their property; (2) that will have to be identified through GPS; (3) the
metes and bounds of the buffer zone will have to be plotted in a survey plan for submission
to the local government unit; and (4) will be limited as to the crops that may be cultivated
therein based on the mandate that the zone shall be devoted to "diversified trees" taller than
what are being grown therein. 149 The arbitrariness of Section 6 all the more becomes
evident when the land is presently devoted to the cultivation of root crops and vegetables,
and trees or plants slightly taller than the root crops and vegetables are then to be planted.
It is seriously to be doubted whether such circumstance will prevent the occurrence of the
drift to the nearby residential areas.
Section 6 also subjects to the 30-meter buffer zone requirement agricultural
entities engaging in organic farming, and do not contribute to the occurrence of pesticide
drift. The classification indisputably becomes arbitrary and whimsical.
A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to undercut the
governmental claim that the classification serves legitimate political ends. 150Where
overinclusiveness is the problem, the vice is that the law has a greater discriminatory or
burdensome effect than necessary. 151 In this light, we strike down Section 5 and Section 6
of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for carrying an invidious classification, and for thereby violating
the Equal Protection Clause.
The discriminatory nature of the ordinance can be seen from its policy as stated in
its Section 2, to wit:
Section 2. POLICY OF THE CITY. — It shall be the policy of
the City of Davao to eliminate the method of aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all entities within
Davao City.
Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large farmholdings that are the only
ideal venues for the investment of machineries and equipment capable of aerial spraying. It
effectively denies the affected individuals the technology aimed at efficient and cost-effective
operations and cultivation not only of banana but of other crops as well. The prohibition
against aerial spraying will seriously hamper the operations of the banana plantations that
depend on aerial technology to arrest the spread of the Black Sigatoka disease and other
menaces that threaten their production and harvest. As earlier shown, the effect of the ban
will not be limited to Davao City in view of the significant contribution of banana export trading
to the country's economy.
The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive and
unreasonable in light of the existence and availability of more permissible and practical
alternatives that will not overburden the respondents and those dependent on their
operations as well as those who stand to be affected by the ordinance. In the view of Regional
Director Roger C. Chio of DA Regional Field Unit XI, the alleged harm caused by aerial
spraying may be addressed by following the GAP that the DA has been promoting among
plantation operators: He explained his view thusly: cSaATC
The allegation that aerial spraying is hazardous to animal and
human being remains an allegation and assumptions until otherwise
scientifically proven by concerned authorities and agencies. This issue
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 can be addressed by following Good Agricultural Practices, which DA is
promoting among fruit and vegetable growers/plantations. Any method
of agri-chemical application whether aerial or non-aerial if not properly
done in accordance with established procedures and code of good
agricultural practices and if the chemical applicators and or handlers lack
of necessary competency, certainly it could be hazardous. For the
assurance that commercial applicators/aerial applicators possessed the
competency and responsibility of handling agri-chemical, such
applicators are required under Article III, Paragraph 2 of FPA Rules and
Regulations No. 1 to secure license from FPA.
Furthermore users and applicators of agri-chemicals are also
guided by Section 6 Paragraph 2 and 3 under column of Pesticides and
Other agricultural Chemicals of PD 11445 which stated: "FPA shall
establish and enforce tolerance levels and good agricultural practices in
raw agricultural commodities; to restrict or ban the use of any chemical
or the formulation of certain pesticides in specific areas or during certain
period upon evidence that the pesticide is eminent [sic] hazards has
caused, or is causing widespread serious damage to crops, fish,
livestock or to public health and environment."
Besides the aforecited policy, rules and regulations enforced
by DA, there are other laws and regulations protecting and preserving
the environment. If the implementation and monitoring of all these laws
and regulation are closely coordinated with concerned LGUs, Gas and
NGAs and other private sectors, perhaps we can maintain a sound and
health environment . . . . 152
Indeed, based on the Summary Report on the Assessment and Factfinding
Activities on the Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations, 153 submitted by the fact-
finding team organized by Davao City, only three out of the 13 barangays consulted by the
fact-finding team opposed the conduct of aerial spraying; and of the three barangays, aerial
spraying was conducted only in Barangay Subasta. In fact, the fact-finding team found that
the residents in those barangays were generally in favor of the operations of the banana
plantations, and did not oppose the conduct of aerial spraying.
IV
The Precautionary Principle
still requires scientific basis
The petitioners finally plead that the Court should look at the merits of the
ordinance based on the precautionary principle. They argue that under the precautionary
principle, the City of Davao is justified in enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 in order to prevent
harm to the environment and human health despite the lack of scientific certainty.
The petitioners' plea and argument cannot be sustained.
The principle of precaution originated as a social planning principle in Germany. In
the 1980s, the Federal Republic of Germany used the Vorsogeprinzip("foresight principle")
to justify the implementation of vigorous policies to tackle acid rain, global warming and
pollution of the North Sea. 154 It has since emerged from a need to protect humans and the
environment from increasingly unpredictable, uncertain, and unquantifiable but possibly
catastrophic risks such as those associated with Genetically Modified Organisms and climate
change, 155 among others. The oft-cited Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development (1992 Rio Agenda), first embodied this principle, as follows:
Principle 15
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.
In this jurisdiction, the principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) involves matters of evidence in cases where
there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity
and environmental effect. 156 In such an event, the courts may construe a set of facts as
warranting either judicial action or inaction with the goal of preserving and protecting the
environment. 157
It is notable, therefore, that the precautionary principle shall only be relevant if
there is concurrence of three elements, namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental
damage and serious or irreversible harm. In situations where the threat is relatively certain,
or that the causal link between an action and environmental damage can be established, or
the probability of occurrence can be calculated, only preventive, not precautionary measures,
may be taken. Neither will the precautionary principle apply if there is no indication of a threat
of environmental harm, or if the threatened harm is trivial or easily reversible. 158
We cannot see the presence of all the elements. To begin with, there has been no
scientific study. Although the precautionary principle allows lack of full scientific certainty in
establishing a connection between the serious or irreversible harm and the human activity,
its application is still premised on empirical studies. Scientific analysis is still a necessary
basis for effective policy choices under the precautionary principle. 159
Precaution is a risk management principle invoked after scientific inquiry takes
place. This scientific stage is often considered synonymous with risk assessment. 160 As
such, resort to the principle shall not be based on anxiety or emotion, but from a rational
decision rule, based in ethics. 161 As much as possible, a complete and objective scientific
evaluation of the risk to the environment or health should be conducted and made available
to decision-makers for them to choose the most appropriate course of
action. 162 Furthermore, the positive and negative effects of an activity is also important in
the application of the principle. The potential harm resulting from certain activities should
always be judged in view of the potential benefits they offer, while the positive and negative
effects of potential precautionary measures should be considered. 163 cHDAIS
The only study conducted to validate the effects of aerial spraying appears to be
the Summary Report on the Assessment and Fact-Finding Activities on the Issue of Aerial
Spraying in Banana Plantations. 164 Yet, the fact-finding team that generated the report was
not a scientific study that could justify the resort to the precautionary principle. In fact, the
Sangguniang Bayan ignored the findings and conclusions of the fact-finding team that
recommended only a regulation, not a ban, against aerial spraying. The recommendation
was in line with the advocacy of judicious handling and application of chemical pesticides by
the DOH-Center for Health Development in the Davao Region in view of the scarcity of
scientific studies to support the ban against aerial spraying. 165
We should not apply the precautionary approach in sustaining the ban against
aerial spraying if little or nothing is known of the exact or potential dangers that aerial spraying
may bring to the health of the residents within and near the plantations and to the integrity
and balance of the environment. It is dangerous to quickly presume that the effects of aerial
spraying would be adverse even in the absence of evidence. Accordingly, for lack of scientific
data supporting a ban on aerial spraying, Ordinance No. 0309-07 should be struck down for
being unreasonable.
V
Ordinance No. 0309-07 is an ultra vires act
103
 The Court further holds that in addition to its unconstitutionality for carrying an
unwarranted classification that contravenes the Equal Protection Clause, Ordinance No.
0309-07 suffers from another legal infirmity.
The petitioners represent that Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid exercise of
legislative and police powers by the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City pursuant to Section
458 in relation to Section 16 both of the Local Government Code. The respondents counter
that Davao City thereby disregarded the regulations implemented by the Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority (FPA), including its identification and classification of safe pesticides and
other agricultural chemicals.
We uphold the respondents.
An ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity on the basis that:
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot
be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be
familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all
the facts and circumstances which surround the subject, and necessities
of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances
which surround the subject, and necessitate action. The local legislative
body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well-being of the people. 166
Section 5 (c) of the Local Government Code accords a liberal interpretation to its
general welfare provisions. The policy of liberal construction is consistent with the spirit of
local autonomy that endows local government units with sufficient power and discretion to
accelerate their economic development and uplift the quality of life for their constituents.
Verily, the Court has championed the cause of public welfare on several occasions.
In so doing, it has accorded liberality to the general welfare provisions of the Local
Government Code by upholding the validity of local ordinances enacted for the common
good. For instance, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., 167the Court validated a
zoning ordinance that reclassified areas covered by a large oil depot from industrial to
commercial in order to ensure the life, health and property of the inhabitants residing within
the periphery of the oil depot. Another instance is Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon
City, 168 where the Court declared as valid a city ordinance ordering the construction of
arcades that would ensure the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants, improvement
of their morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience, as well as the promotion of
their prosperity. Even in its early years, the Court already extended liberality towards the
exercise by the local government units of their legislative powers in order to promote the
general welfare of their communities. This was exemplified inUnited States v.
Salaveria, 169 wherein gambling was characterized as "an act beyond the pale of good
morals" that the local legislative council could validly suppress to protect the well-being of its
constituents; and in United States v. Abendan, 170 whereby the right of the then Municipality
of Cebu to enact an ordinance relating to sanitation and public health was upheld.
The power to legislate under the General Welfare Clause is not meant to be an
invincible authority. In fact, Salaveria and Abendan emphasized the reasonableness and
consistency of the exercise by the local government units with the laws or policies of the
State. 171 More importantly, because the police power of the local government units flows
from the express delegation of the power by Congress, its exercise is to be construed in
strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting the power
should be construed against the local legislative units. 172 Judicial scrutiny comes into play
whenever the exercise of police power affects life, liberty or property. 173 The presumption
of validity and the policy of liberality are not restraints on the power of judicial review in the
face of questions about whether an ordinance conforms with the Constitution, the laws or
public policy, or if it is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a
common right. The ordinance must pass the test of constitutionality and the test of
consistency with the prevailing laws. 174 ISHCcT
Although the Local Government Code vests the municipal corporations with
sufficient power to govern themselves and manage their affairs and activities, they definitely
have no right to enact ordinances dissonant with the State's laws and policy. The Local
Government Code has been fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and limitations
to guide each local government unit in exercising its delegated powers with the view of
making the local government unit a fully functioning subdivision of the State within the
constitutional and statutory restraints. 175 The Local Government Code is not intended to
vest in the local government unit the blanket authority to legislate upon any subject that it
finds proper to legislate upon in the guise of serving the common good.
The function of pesticides control, regulation and development is within the
jurisdiction of the FPA under Presidential Decree No. 1144. 176 The FPA was established in
recognition of the need for a technically oriented government entity 177 that will protect the
public from the risks inherent in the use of pesticides. 178To perform its mandate, it was
given under Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1144 the following powers and functions
with respect to pesticides and other agricultural chemicals, viz.:
Section 6. Powers and functions. — The FPA shall have
jurisdiction, on over all existing handlers of pesticides, fertilizers and
other agricultural chemical inputs. The FPA shall have the following
powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
III. Pesticides and Other Agricultural Chemicals
1. To determine specific uses or manners of use for each
pesticide or pesticide formulation;
2. To establish and enforce levels and good agricultural
practices for use of pesticides in raw agricultural commodities;
3. To restrict or ban the use of any pesticide or the formulation
of certain pesticides in specific areas or during certain periods upon
evidence that the pesticide is an imminent hazard, has caused, or is
causing widespread serious damage to crops, fish or livestock, or to
public health and environment;
xxx xxx xxx
5. To inspect the establishment and premises of pesticide
handlers to insure that industrial health and safety rules and anti-
pollution regulations are followed;
6. To enter and inspect farmers' fields to ensure that only the
recommended pesticides are used in specific crops in accordance with
good agricultural practice;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied).
Evidently, the FPA was responsible for ensuring the compatibility between the
usage and the application of pesticides in agricultural activities and the demands for human
health and environmental safety. This responsibility includes not only the identification of safe
and unsafe pesticides, but also the prescription of the safe modes of application in keeping
with the standard of good agricultural practices.
On the other hand, the enumerated devolved functions to the local government
units do not include the regulation and control of pesticides and other agricultural
chemicals. 179 The non-inclusion should preclude the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City
104
from enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07, for otherwise it would be arrogating unto itself the
authority to prohibit the aerial application of pesticides in derogation of the authority expressly
vested in the FPA by Presidential Decree No. 1144.
In enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 without the inherent and explicit authority to do
so, the City of Davao performed an ultra vires act. As a local government unit, the City of
Davao could act only as an agent of Congress, and its every act should always conform to
and reflect the will of its principal. 180 As clarified inBatangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals: 181
[W]here the state legislature has made provision for the
regulation of conduct, it has manifested its intention that the subject
matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and that a municipality,
under its general powers, cannot regulate the same conduct. In Keller
vs. State, it was held that: "Where there is no express power in the
charter of a municipality authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating
certain matters which are specifically covered by a general statute, a
municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which
is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature, may be
rendered invalid. . . . Where the subject is of statewide concern, and the
legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its
declaration is binding throughout the State." A reason advanced for this
view is that such ordinances are in excess of the powers granted to the
municipal corporation.
Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the
regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised by the NTC, an LGU
cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said
law.
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are
inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance
in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application
is universally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently expressed in
the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of
power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law
or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every power to pass
ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that the
ordinances shall be consistent with the general law. 182 (Emphasis
ours) CAacTH
For sure, every local government unit only derives its legislative authority from
Congress. In no instance can the local government unit rise above its source of authority. As
such, its ordinance cannot run against or contravene existing laws, precisely because its
authority is only by virtue of the valid delegation from Congress. As emphasized in City of
Manila v. Laguio, Jr.: 183
The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing
law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to
legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation
of legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate cannot
be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter.
This relationship between the national legislature and the
local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in
the Constitutionstrengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which
cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.184
Moreover, Ordinance No. 0309-07 proposes to prohibit an activity already covered
by the jurisdiction of the FPA, which has issued its own regulations under its Memorandum
Circular No. 02, Series of 2009, entitled Good Agricultural Practices for Aerial Spraying of
Fungicide in Banana Plantations. 185 While Ordinance No. 0309-07 prohibits aerial spraying
in banana plantations within the City of Davao, Memorandum Circular No. 02 seeks to
regulate the conduct of aerial spraying in banana plantations 186 pursuant to Section
6, Presidential Decree No. 1144, and in conformity with the standard of Good Agricultural
Practices (GAP). Memorandum Circular No. 02 covers safety
procedures, 187 handling 188 and post-application, 189 including the qualifications of
applicators, 190 storing of fungicides, 191 safety and equipment of plantation
personnel, 192 all of which are incompatible with the prohibition against aerial spraying under
Ordinance No. 0309-07.
Although Memorandum Circular No. 02 and Ordinance No. 0309-07 both require
the maintenance of the buffer zone, they differ as to their treatment and maintenance of the
buffer zone. Under Memorandum Circular No. 02, a 50-meter "no-spray boundary" buffer
zone should be observed by the spray pilots, 193 and the observance of the zone should be
recorded in the Aerial Spray Final Report (ASFR) as a post-application safety
measure. 194 On the other hand, Ordinance No. 0309-07 requires the maintenance of the
30-meter buffer zone to be planted with diversified trees. 195
Devoid of the specific delegation to its local legislative body, the City of Davao
exceeded its delegated authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07. Hence, Ordinance No.
0309-07 must be struck down also for being an ultra vires act on the part of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Davao City.
We must emphasize that our ruling herein does not seek to deprive the LGUs their
right to regulate activities within their jurisdiction. They are empowered under Section 16 of
the Local Government Code to promote the general welfare of the people through regulatory,
not prohibitive, ordinances that conform with the policy directions of the National
Government. Ordinance No. 0309-07 failed to pass this test as it contravenes the specific
regulatory policy on aerial spraying in banana plantations on a nationwide scale of the
National Government, through the FPA.
Finally, the unconstitutionality of the ban renders nugatory Ordinance No. 0309-07
in its entirety. Consequently, any discussion on the lack of the separability clause becomes
entirely irrelevant.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review
on certiorari for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-
07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL; PERMANENTLY ENJOINS respondent City of Davao, and all
persons or entities acting in its behalf or under its authority, from enforcing and implementing
Ordinance No. 0309-07; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. Nos. 189185 &
189305, [August 16, 2016])
105
 EN BANC By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails
the December 8, 2004 Decision 3 and April 1, 2005 Resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), which applied the subject clause, entreating this Court to declare the subject clause
[G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009.] unconstitutional.
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co.,
ANTONIO M. SERRANO, petitioner, vs. GALLANT MARITIME Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-
SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., respondents. approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:

Duration of contract 12 months

Position Chief Officer
DECISION
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month 5
For decades, the toil of solitary migrants has helped lift entire
families and communities out of poverty. Their earnings have built houses,
provided health care, equipped schools and planted the seeds of On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept
businesses. They have woven together the world by transmitting ideas and a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary
knowledge from country to country. They have provided the dynamic of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be
human link between cultures, societies and economies. Yet, only recently made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. 6
have we begun to understand not only how much international
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief
migration impacts development, but how smart public policies can
Officer. 7 Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the
magnify this effect. TacESD
Philippines on May 26, 1998. 8 DHAcET
United Nations Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19,
Secretary-General Ban 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served
Ki-Moon only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine
(9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Global Forum on
Migration and Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint 9 against respondents for
Development constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73, broken down as follows:
Brussels, July 10, 2007 1
May 27/31, 1998 (5 days) incl. Leave pay US$413.90
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, 2 to wit: June 01/30, 1998 2,590.00
Sec. 10. Money Claims. — . . . In case of termination of overseas July 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his August 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his Sept. 01/30, 1998 2,590.00
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three
(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. Oct. 01/31, 1998 2,590.00

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Nov. 01/30, 1998 2,590.00

does not magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to national Dec. 01/31, 1998 2,590.00
development, but exacerbates the hardships borne by them by unduly limiting their Jan. 01/31, 1999 2,590.00
entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum salary either for the unexpired
portion of their employment contract "or for three months for every year of the unexpired Feb. 01/28, 1999 2,590.00
term, whichever is less" (subject clause). Petitioner claims that the last clause violates the
Mar. 1/19, 1999 (19 days) incl. leave pay 1,640.00
OFWs' constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal
protection and denies them due process. ––––––––

106
 25,382.23
Amount adjusted to chief mate's salary
(March 19/31, 1998 to April 1/30, 1998) + 1,060.50 10
–––––––––––––
–
TOTAL CLAIM US$26,442.73 11
=============
as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. SIDTCa
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of
petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring that the dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the
respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the respondents are
hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in
Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time
of payment, the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), representing the
complainant's salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of
the aforesaid contract of employment.
The respondents are likewise ordered to pay the complainant
[petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate
of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of FORTY FIVE
U.S. DOLLARS (US$ 45.00), 12 representing the complainant's claim for
a salary differential. In addition, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay
the complainant, jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, at the
exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment, the complainant's
(petitioner's) claim for attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of
the total amount awarded to the aforesaid employee under this Decision.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages
are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 13 (Emphasis supplied)
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his
computation on the salary period of three months only — rather than the entire unexpired
portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner's employment contract — applying the
subject clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of
petitioner's "[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, +
US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month." 14
Respondents appealed 15 to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to
question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed. ESacHC
Petitioner also appealed 16 to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not
applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission 17 that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their contracts. 18
In a Decision dated June 15, 2000, the NLRC modified the LA Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 15 July 1999 is MODIFIED.
Respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant, jointly and severally,
in Philippine currency, at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of
payment the following:
1. Three (3) months salary
$1,400 x 3 US$4,200.00
2. Salary differential 45.00
US$4,245.00
3. 10% Attorney's fees 424.50
–––––––––––
TOTAL US$4,669.50
==========
The other findings are affirmed.
SO ORDERED. 19
The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to
petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00
because R.A. No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be
proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay." 20
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned
the constitutionality of the subject clause. 21 The NLRC denied the motion. 22
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari 23 with the CA, reiterating the constitutional
challenge against the subject clause. 24 After initially dismissing the petition on a technicality,
the CA eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution dated
August 7, 2003 which granted the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 151833, filed
by petitioner.
In a Decision dated December 8, 2004, the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the
reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised
by petitioner. 25
His Motion for Reconsideration 26 having been denied by the CA, 27 petitioner
brings his cause to this Court on the following grounds:
I
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the
case in a way not in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court
involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages
equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment instead of
limiting it to three (3) months.
II
In the alternative that the Court of Appeals and the Labor
Tribunals were merely applying their interpretation of Section 10
of Republic Act No. 8042, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals gravely
107
 erred in law when it failed to discharge its judicial duty to decide questions
of substance not theretofore determined by the Honorable Supreme Court,
particularly, the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner on the
constitutionality of said law, which unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily
limits payment of the award for back wages of overseas workers to three
(3) months. HETDAa
III
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec.
10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in
excluding from petitioner's award the overtime pay and vacation pay
provided in his contract since under the contract they form part of his
salary. 28
On February 26, 2008, petitioner wrote the Court to withdraw his petition as he is
already old and sickly, and he intends to make use of the monetary award for his medical
treatment and medication. 29 Required to comment, counsel for petitioner filed a motion,
urging the court to allow partial execution of the undisputed monetary award and, at the same
time, praying that the constitutional question be resolved. 30
Considering that the parties have filed their respective memoranda, the Court now
takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme importance of the constitutional
question raised therein.
On the first and second issues
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner
was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00
awarded to petitioner in all three fora. What remains disputed is only the computation of the
lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary
of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of
the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of
US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in
addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to
US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine
months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of
US$2,590.00. 31 AcTHCE
The Arguments of Petitioner
Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because it unduly
impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas employment
contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed salary package. 32 It also impinges
on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local Filipino workers (local
workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are entitled in
case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local workers
when their dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate treatment is not reasonable as
there is no substantial distinction between the two groups; 33 and that it defeats Section
18, 34 Article II of the Constitution which guarantees the protection of the rights and welfare
of all Filipino workers, whether deployed locally or overseas. 35
Moreover, petitioner argues that the decisions of the CA and the labor tribunals
are not in line with existing jurisprudence on the issue of money claims of illegally dismissed
OFWs. Though there are conflicting rulings on this, petitioner urges the Court to sort them
out for the guidance of affected OFWs. 36
Petitioner further underscores that the insertion of the subject clause into R.A. No.
8042 serves no other purpose but to benefit local placement agencies. He marks the
statement made by the Solicitor General in his Memorandum, viz.:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder
the payment of money claims in the event that jurisdiction over the foreign
employer is not acquired by the court or if the foreign employer reneges on
its obligation. Hence, placement agencies that are in good faith and which
fulfill their obligations are unnecessarily penalized for the acts of the foreign
employer. To protect them and to promote their continued helpful
contribution in deploying Filipino migrant workers, liability for money
claims was reduced under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. 37 (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner argues that in mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, the
subject clause sacrifices the well-being of OFWs. Not only that, the provision makes foreign
employers better off than local employers because in cases involving the illegal dismissal of
employees, foreign employers are liable for salaries covering a maximum of only three
months of the unexpired employment contract while local employers are liable for the full
lump-sum salaries of their employees. As petitioner puts it:
In terms of practical application, the local employers are not
limited to the amount of backwages they have to give their employees they
have illegally dismissed, following well-entrenched and unequivocal
jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, foreign employers will only
be limited to giving the illegally dismissed migrant workers the maximum of
three (3) months unpaid salaries notwithstanding the unexpired term of the
contract that can be more than three (3) months. 38
Lastly, petitioner claims that the subject clause violates the due process clause,
for it deprives him of the salaries and other emoluments he is entitled to under his fixed-
period employment contract. 39
The Arguments of Respondents
In their Comment and Memorandum, respondents contend that the constitutional
issue should not be entertained, for this was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal
before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal before
the NLRC. 40 cTACIa
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG) 41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on
July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioner's 1998 employment contract.
Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner's contract, the provisions thereof are
deemed part of the minimum terms of petitioner's employment, especially on the matter of
money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties. 42
Moreover, the OSG emphasizes that OFWs and local workers differ in terms of the
nature of their employment, such that their rights to monetary benefits must necessarily be
treated differently. The OSG enumerates the essential elements that distinguish OFWs from
local workers: first, while local workers perform their jobs within Philippine territory, OFWs
perform their jobs for foreign employers, over whom it is difficult for our courts to acquire
jurisdiction, or against whom it is almost impossible to enforce judgment; and second, as held
in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations Commission 43 and Millares v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 44 OFWs are contractual employees who can never acquire regular
employment status, unlike local workers who are or can become regular employees. Hence,
the OSG posits that there are rights and privileges exclusive to local workers, but not
available to OFWs; that these peculiarities make for a reasonable and valid basis for the
differentiated treatment under the subject clause of the money claims of OFWs who are
108
illegally dismissed. Thus, the provision does not violate the equal protection clause nor
Section 18, Article II of the Constitution. 45
Lastly, the OSG defends the rationale behind the subject clause as a police power
measure adopted to mitigate the solidary liability of placement agencies for this "redounds to
the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare the government seeks to promote. The
survival of legitimate placement agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant
workers are properly deployed and are employed under decent and humane conditions." 46
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains petitioner on the first and second issues.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts
of its co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that
there is an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial
determination; 47 (2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party 48 and at the
earliest opportunity; 49 and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the
case, 50 otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on some other
ground. 51 DICcTa
Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual controversy directly involving
petitioner who is personally aggrieved that the labor tribunals and the CA computed his
monetary award based on the salary period of three months only as provided under the
subject clause.
The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in mind that the
requirement that a constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity entails the
interposition of the issue in the pleadings before a competent court, such that, if the issue
is not raised in the pleadings before that competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial
and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. 52 Records disclose
that the issue on the constitutionality of the subject clause was first raised, not in petitioner's
appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial Reconsideration with said labor
tribunal, 53 and reiterated in his Petition for Certiorari before the CA. 54 Nonetheless, the
issue is deemed seasonably raised because it is not the NLRC but the CA which has the
competence to resolve the constitutional issue. The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely
performs a quasi-judicial function — its function in the present case is limited to determining
questions of fact to which the legislative policy of R.A. No. 8042 is to be applied and to
resolving such questions in accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself; 55 thus, its foremost function is to administer and enforce R.A. No. 8042, and not to
inquire into the validity of its provisions. The CA, on the other hand, is vested with the power
of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof, such
as the subject clause. 56 Petitioner's interposition of the constitutional issue before the CA
was undoubtedly seasonable. The CA was therefore remiss in failing to take up the issue in
its decision.
The third condition that the constitutional issue be critical to the resolution of the
case likewise obtains because the monetary claim of petitioner to his lump-sum salary for the
entire unexpired portion of his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a period of
three months, strikes at the very core of the subject clause.
Thus, the stage is all set for the determination of the constitutionality of the subject
clause.
Does the subject clause violate Section 10,
Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment
of contracts?
The answer is in the negative.
Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in
his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive 57 is
not tenable. ETAICc
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides:
No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have
only a prospective operation, 58 and cannot affect acts or contracts already
perfected; 59 however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into
contracts and deemed a part thereof. 60 Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10,
Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate
from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the
intention of the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded
the execution of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998.
Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the
employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998
employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A.
No. 8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be
declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the
law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business,
profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble
end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may
be employed. 61 Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are generally
applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private
contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote
public welfare. 62
Does the subject clause violate Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor
as a protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the law.
Section 18, 63 Article II and Section 3, 64 Article XIII accord all members of the
labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and
welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional
provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally
enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by
them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by,
or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances. 65 AECacT
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to
incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid,
the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial
109
distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions
only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class. 66
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality
of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the
challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate
state interest; 67 b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must
show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the
classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest; 68 and c) strict judicial
scrutiny 69 in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right 70 or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class 71 is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that
the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest. 72
Under American jurisprudence, strict judicial scrutiny is triggered by suspect
classifications 73 based on race 74 or gender 75 but not when the classification is drawn
along income categories. 76
It is different in the Philippine setting. In Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 77 the constitutionality
of a provision in the charter of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), a government financial
institution (GFI), was challenged for maintaining its rank-and-file employees under the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL), even when the rank-and-file employees of other GFIs had been
exempted from the SSL by their respective charters. Finding that the disputed provision
contained a suspect classification based on salary grade, the Court deliberately employed
the standard of strict judicial scrutiny in its review of the constitutionality of said provision.
More significantly, it was in this case that the Court revealed the broad outlines of its judicial
philosophy, to wit: aHDTAI
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid
classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect
by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The
deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right,
or prejudices persons accorded special protection by
the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge
its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a
stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational
basis should not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded
special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial
scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se
controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have
been used to support many of our decisions. We should not place undue
and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental
crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the
employment of our own endowments. We live in a different ambience and
must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs,
and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with
our own concept of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in
accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may
be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local
legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to
serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our
laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and
different from others.
xxx xxx xxx
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for
the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action
in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely
in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command
to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national
development", further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the
State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. . . .
[T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for
a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of
equality.
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing
vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society,
including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over
backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the
humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have
more in law. And the obligation to afford protection to labor is
incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but
also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. Social
justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. TDcHCa
xxx xxx xxx
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial
restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad
discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial
scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative
discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a
fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons
favored by theConstitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny
ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for
the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant
to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor
committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government
itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down
regardless of the character or nature of the actor.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis
of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction
based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as
recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower
grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages
that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried
employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications
are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly
regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank — possessing
higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement —
110
 are given higher compensation packages to entice them to Prior to Marsaman, however, there were two cases in which the Court made
stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees conflicting rulings on Section 10 (5). One was Asian Center for Career and Employment
consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, System and Services v. National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division, October
especially in terms of job marketability, it is they — and not the 1998), 81 which involved an OFW who was awarded a two-year employment contract, but
officers — who have the real economic and financial need for the was dismissed after working for one year and two months. The LA declared his dismissal
adjustment. This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the illegal and awarded him SR13,600.00 as lump-sum salary covering eight months, the
people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a unexpired portion of his contract. On appeal, the Court reduced the award to SR3,600.00
decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all." Any act of equivalent to his three months' salary, this being the lesser value, to wit:
Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum
deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass Under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, a worker dismissed from
muster. (Emphasis supplied) overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause is entitled to
his salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three
Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor", the Court (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. SATDEI
in the present case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the
subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs. In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondent's
employment contract is eight (8) months. Private respondent should
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to therefore be paid his basic salary corresponding to three (3) months or a
all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory total of SR3,600. 82
intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
Another was Triple-Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one Commission (Third Division, December 1998), 83 which involved an OFW (therein
year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more; respondent Erlinda Osdana) who was originally granted a 12-month contract, which was
deemed renewed for another 12 months. After serving for one year and seven-and-a-half
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than months, respondent Osdana was illegally dismissed, and the Court awarded her salaries for
one year; and the entire unexpired portion of four and one-half months of her contract.
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period The Marsaman interpretation of Section 10 (5) has since been adopted in the following
employment; cITCAa cases:
OFWs with employment contracts of
Case Title Contract Period of Unexpired Period Applied
less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with
employment contracts of one year or Period Service Period in the Computation
more
of the Monetary
As pointed out by petitioner, 78 it was in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission 79 (Second Division, 1999) that the Court laid down Award
the following rules on the application of the periods prescribed under Section 10 (5) of R.A.
No. 804, to wit:
Skippers v. 6 months 2 months 4 months 4 months
A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of
which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract Maguad 84
worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or three (3) months' salary for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the Bahia 9 months 8 months 4 months 4 months
employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or
more. This is evident from the words "for every year of the unexpired Shipping v.
term" which follows the words "salaries . . . for three months". To
Reynaldo
follow petitioners' thinking that private respondent is entitled to three (3)
months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely Chua 85
disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect
to some. This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics
that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part or word Centennial 9 months 4 months 5 months 5 months
thereof be given effect since the law-making body is presumed to know the
meaning of the words employed in the statute and to have used them Transmarine v.
advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 80 (Emphasis supplied)
dela Cruz l 86
In Marsaman, the OFW involved was illegally dismissed two months into his 10-month
contract, but was awarded his salaries for the remaining 8 months and 6 days of his contract.
Talidano v. 12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months

111
Falcon 87 unexpired portion of their contract. The second category consists of OFWs with fixed-period
employment contracts of one year or more; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to
monetary award equivalent to only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their
contracts. IaSCTE
Univan v. 12 months 3 months 9 months 3 months
The disparity in the treatment of these two groups cannot be discounted.
CA 88
In Skippers, the respondent OFW worked for only 2 months out of his 6-month contract, but
was awarded his salaries for the remaining 4 months. In contrast, the respondent OFWs
in Oriental and PCL who had also worked for about 2 months out of their 12-month contracts
Oriental v. 12 months more than 2 10 months 3 months were awarded their salaries for only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts.
CA 89 months Even the OFWs involved in Talidano andUnivan who had worked for a longer period of 3
months out of their 12-month contracts before being illegally dismissed were awarded their
salaries for only 3 months.
PCL v. 12 months more than 2 more or less 9 3 months To illustrate the disparity even more vividly, the Court assumes a hypothetical
OFW-A with an employment contract of 10 months at a monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00
NLRC 90 months months and a hypothetical OFW-B with an employment contract of 15 months with the same monthly
salary rate of US$1,000.00. Both commenced work on the same day and under the same
employer, and were illegally dismissed after one month of work. Under the subject clause,
Olarte v. 12 months 21 days 11 months and 3 months OFW-A will be entitled to US$9,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for the remaining 9 months
of his contract, whereas OFW-B will be entitled to only US$3,000.00, equivalent to his
Nayona 91 9 days salaries for 3 months of the unexpired portion of his contract, instead of US$14,000.00 for
the unexpired portion of 14 months of his contract, as the US$3,000.00 is the lesser amount.

JSS v. 12 months 16 days 11 months and 3 months The disparity becomes more aggravating when the Court takes into account
jurisprudence that, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042 on July 14, 1995, 97illegally
Ferrer 92 24 days dismissed OFWs, no matter how long the period of their employment contracts, were entitled
to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. The matrix below speaks
for itself:
Pentagon v. 12 months 9 months and 2 months and 2 months and
Case Title Contract Period of Unexpired Period Applied in
Adelantar 93 7 days 23 days 23 days
Period Service Period the Computation
of the Monetary
Phil. Employ 12 months 10 months 2 months Unexpired
Award
v. Paramio, portion
et al. 94
ATCI v. 2 years 2 months 22 months 22 months
CA, et al. 98
Flourish 2 years 26 days 23 months and 6 months or
Maritime v. 4 days 3 months for
Phil. 2 years 7 days 23 months and 23 months and
Almanzor 95 each year of
Integrated v. 23 days 23 days
contract
NLRC 99
Athenna 1 year, 10 1 month 1 year, 9 6 months or
Manpower v. months months and 3 months for
JGB v. 2 years 9 months 15 months 15 months
Villanos 96 and 28 days 28 days each year of
NLC 100
contract

Agoy v. 2 years 2 months 22 months 22 months

As the foregoing matrix readily shows, the subject clause classifies OFWs into two
categories. The first category includes OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of less NLRC 101
than one year; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to their salaries for the entire

112
 with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire
unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more
EDI v. 2 years 5 months 19 months 19 months remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary
benefits limited to their salaries for three months only.
NLRC,
To concretely illustrate the application of the foregoing interpretation of the subject
et al. 102
clause, the Court assumes hypothetical OFW-C and OFW-D, who each have a 24-month
contract at a salary rate of US$1,000.00 per month. OFW-C is illegally dismissed on the 12th
month, and OFW-D, on the 13th month. Considering that there is at least 12 months
Barros v. 12 months 4 months 8 months 8 months remaining in the contract period of OFW-C, the subject clause applies to the computation of
the latter's monetary benefits. Thus, OFW-C will be entitled, not to US$12,000.00 or the
NLRC,
latter's total salaries for the 12 months unexpired portion of the contract, but to the lesser
et al. 103 amount of US$3,000.00 or the latter's salaries for 3 months out of the 12-month unexpired
term of the contract. On the other hand, OFW-D is spared from the effects of the subject
clause, for there are only 11 months left in the latter's contract period. Thus, OFW-D will be
Philippine 12 months 6 months and 5 months and 5 months and entitled to US$11,000.00, which is equivalent to his/her total salaries for the entire 11-month
unexpired portion.
Transmarine v. 22 days 18 days 18 days
OFWs vis-à-vis Local Workers
Carilla 104 With Fixed-Period Employment
As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of
the monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment. 107
the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule The earliest rule prescribing a uniform system of computation was actually Article
of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their 299 of the Code of Commerce (1888), 108 to wit:
employment contracts. TaDSHC
Article 299. If the contracts between the merchants and their
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated shop clerks and employees should have been made of a fixed period,
rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their none of the contracting parties, without the consent of the other, may
employment periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an withdraw from the fulfillment of said contract until the termination of
unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of the period agreed upon.
having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion
thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, Persons violating this clause shall be subject to indemnify the
simply because the latter's unexpired contracts fall short of one year. loss and damage suffered, with the exception of the provisions contained
in the following articles.
Among OFWs With Employment
Contracts of More Than One Year In Reyes v. The Compañia Maritima, 109 the Court applied the foregoing provision
to determine the liability of a shipping company for the illegal discharge of its managers prior
Upon closer examination of the terminology employed in the subject clause, the to the expiration of their fixed-term employment. The Court therein held the shipping
Court now has misgivings on the accuracy of the Marsaman interpretation. company liable for the salaries of its managers for theremainder of their fixed-term
The Court notes that the subject clause "or for three (3) months for every year of employment. cAEaSC
the unexpired term, whichever is less" contains the qualifying phrases "every year" and There is a more specific rule as far as seafarers are concerned: Article 605 of the
"unexpired term". By its ordinary meaning, the word "term" means a limited or definite extent Code of Commerce which provides:
of time. 105 Corollarily, that "every year" is but part of an "unexpired term" is significant in
many ways: first, the unexpired term must be at least one year, for if it were any shorter, Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the
there would be no occasion for such unexpired term to be measured by every year; and crew with the agent should be for a definite period or voyage, they cannot
second, the original term must be more than one year, for otherwise, whatever would be the be discharged until the fulfillment of their contracts, except for reasons of
unexpired term thereof will not reach even a year. Consequently, the more decisive factor in insubordination in serious matters, robbery, theft, habitual drunkenness,
the determination of when the subject clause "for three (3) months for every year of the and damage caused to the vessel or to its cargo by malice or manifest or
unexpired term, whichever is less" shall apply is not the length of the original contract period proven negligence.
as held in Marsaman, 106 but the length of the unexpired portion of the contract period —
the subject clause applies in cases when the unexpired portion of the contract period is at Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie, 110 in
least one year, which arithmetically requires that the original contract period be more than which the Court held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance
one year. EDCIcH of its illegally dismissed employees for the entire unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.
Viewed in that light, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among
OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed

113
 While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present, 111 Article 299 of the
Code of Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and
other laborers hired for a certain time and for a certain work cannot
leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause, before the fulfillment of the
contract. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Manresa, the Court in Lemoine v. Alkan 112 read the disjunctive "or" in
Article 1586 as a conjunctive "and" so as to apply the provision to local workers who are
employed for a time certain although for no particular skill. This interpretation of Article 1586
was reiterated in Garcia Palomar v. Hotel de France Company.113 And in
both Lemoine and Palomar, the Court adopted the general principle that in actions for
wrongful discharge founded on Article 1586, local workers are entitled to recover damages
to the extent of the amount stipulated to be paid to them by the terms of their contract. On
the computation of the amount of such damages, the Court in Aldaz v. Gay 114 held: ITDHcA
The doctrine is well-established in American jurisprudence, and
nothing has been brought to our attention to the contrary under Spanish
jurisprudence, that when an employee is wrongfully discharged it is his duty
to seek other employment of the same kind in the same community, for the
purpose of reducing the damages resulting from such wrongful discharge.
However, while this is the general rule, the burden of showing that he failed
to make an effort to secure other employment of a like nature, and that
other employment of a like nature was obtainable, is upon the
defendant. When an employee is wrongfully discharged under a
contract of employment his prima facie damage is the amount which
he would be entitled to had he continued in such employment until
the termination of the period.(Howard vs. Daly, 61 N. Y., 362; Allen vs.
Whitlark, 99 Mich., 492; Farrell vs. School District No. 2, 98 Mich.,
43.) 115 (Emphasis supplied)
On August 30, 1950, the New Civil Code took effect with new provisions on fixed-
term employment: Section 2 (Obligations with a Period), Chapter 3, Title I, and Sections 2
(Contract of Labor) and 3 (Contract for a Piece of Work), Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book
IV. 116 Much like Article 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, the new provisions of the Civil
Code do not expressly provide for the remedies available to a fixed-term worker who is
illegally discharged. However, it is noted that in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v.
Rich, 117 the Court carried over the principles on the payment of damages underlying Article
1586 of the Civil Code of 1889 and applied the same to a case involving the illegal discharge
of a local worker whose fixed-period employment contract was entered into in 1952, when
the new Civil Code was already in effect. 118
More significantly, the same principles were applied to cases involving overseas
Filipino workers whose fixed-term employment contracts were illegally terminated, such as
in First Asian Trans & Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople, 119 involving seafarers who were
illegally discharged. In Teknika Skills and Trade Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 120 an OFW who was illegally dismissed prior to the expiration of her fixed-
period employment contract as a baby sitter, was awarded salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of her contract. The Court arrived at the same ruling in Anderson v.
National Labor Relations Commission,121 which involved a foreman hired in 1988 in Saudi
Arabia for a fixed term of two years, but who was illegally dismissed after only nine months
on the job — the Court awarded him salaries corresponding to 15 months, the unexpired
portion of his contract. In Asia World Recruitment, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 122 a Filipino working as a security officer in 1989 in Angola was awarded his
salaries for the remaining period of his 12-month contract after he was wrongfully discharged.
Finally, in Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 123 an OFW
whose 12-month contract was illegally cut short in the second month was declared entitled
to his salaries for the remaining 10 months of his contract.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term
employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of
their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption
of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more
in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims
are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with
fixed-term employment. DEAaIS
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect
classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term
employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of
OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on
the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject
clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar
disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by
the Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and
determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. 124 It is akin to the paramount
interest of the state 125 for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public
interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, 126 or in maintaining
access to information on matters of public concern. 127
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling
state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.
The OSG defends the subject clause as a police power measure "designed to
protect the employment of Filipino seafarers overseas . . . . By limiting the liability to three
months [sic], Filipino seafarers have better chance of getting hired by foreign employers."
The limitation also protects the interest of local placement agencies, which otherwise may be
made to shoulder millions of pesos in "termination pay". 128
The OSG explained further:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder
the payment of money claims in the event that jurisdiction over the foreign
employer is not acquired by the court or if the foreign employer reneges on
its obligation. Hence, placement agencies that are in good faith and which
fulfill their obligations are unnecessarily penalized for the acts of the foreign
employer. To protect them and to promote their continued helpful
contribution in deploying Filipino migrant workers, liability for money
are reduced under Section 10 of RA 8042. IaHDcT
This measure redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers
whose welfare the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate
placement agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant workers
are properly deployed and are employed under decent and humane
conditions. 129 (Emphasis supplied)
However, nowhere in the Comment or Memorandum does the OSG cite the source
of its perception of the state interest sought to be served by the subject clause.
114
 The OSG locates the purpose of R.A. No. 8042 in the speech of Rep. Bonifacio
Gallego in sponsorship of House Bill No. 14314 (HB 14314), from which the law
originated; 130 but the speech makes no reference to the underlying reason for the adoption
of the subject clause. That is only natural for none of the 29 provisions in HB 14314
resembles the subject clause.
On the other hand, Senate Bill No. 2077 (SB 2077) contains a provision on money
claims, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. — Notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or
by virtue of the complaint, the claim arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal and the recruitment/placement
agency or any and all claims under this Section shall be joint and several.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement
on any money claims exclusive of damages under this Section shall not be
less than fifty percent (50%) of such money claims: Provided, That any
installment payments, if applicable, to satisfy any such compromise or
voluntary settlement shall not be more than two (2) months. Any
compromise/voluntary agreement in violation of this paragraph shall be null
and void. TaDAHE
Non-compliance with the mandatory period for resolutions of
cases provided under this Section shall subject the responsible officials to
any or all of the following penalties:
(1) The salary of any such official who fails to render
his decision or resolution within the prescribed period shall be,
or caused to be, withheld until the said official complies
therewith;
(2) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
(3) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to
hold any appointive public office for five (5) years.
Provided, however, That the penalties herein provided shall be
without prejudice to any liability which any such official may have incurred
under other existing laws or rules and regulations as a consequence of
violating the provisions of this paragraph.
But significantly, Section 10 of SB 2077 does not provide for any rule on the computation of
money claims.
A rule on the computation of money claims containing the subject clause was
inserted and eventually adopted as the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. The
Court examined the rationale of the subject clause in the transcripts of the "Bicameral
Conference Committee (Conference Committee) Meetings on the Magna Carta on OCWs
(Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 2077 and House Bill No. 14314)." However, the
Court finds no discernible state interest, let alone a compelling one, that is sought to be
protected or advanced by the adoption of the subject clause.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence
of a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against
OFWs under the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to
protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies,
such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification
for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the
same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private
businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of
OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private
business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious. EScIAa
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability
of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in
place that can be employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional
rights of OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of
Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary
measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant
workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary
disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the
Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar
administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means
of aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is
violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
Further, there would be certain misgivings if one is to approach the declaration of
the unconstitutionality of the subject clause from the lone perspective that the clause directly
violates state policy on labor under Section 3, 131 Article XIII of the Constitution.
While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-
executing, 132 there are some which this Court has declared not judicially enforceable,
Article XIII being one, 133 particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature of which, this Court,
in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 134 has described to be not self-
actuating:
Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and
security of tenure may be deemed as self-executing in the sense that these
are automatically acknowledged and observed without need for any
enabling legislation. However, to declare that the constitutional provisions
are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein,
and the realization of ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not
unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency
of being overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees of "full protection to
labor" and "security of tenure", when examined in isolation, are facially
unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible suggests a blanket
shield in favor of labor against any form of removal regardless of
circumstance. This interpretation implies an unimpeachable right to
continued employment — a utopian notion, doubtless — but still hardly
within the contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is still
needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights to ensure the
protection and promotion, not only the rights of the labor sector, but of the
employers' as well. Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial
115
 bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at
least the aims of the Constitution. cSCTEH
Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its
own, be a source of a positive enforceable right to stave off the
dismissal of an employee for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper
notice or hearing. As manifested by several framers of the 1987
Constitution, the provisions on social justice require legislative enactments
for their enforceability. 135 (Emphasis added)
Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct
enforceable rights, for the violation of which the questioned clause may be declared
unconstitutional. It may unwittingly risk opening the floodgates of litigation to every worker or
union over every conceivable violation of so broad a concept as social justice for labor.
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the
working class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the status of a sector
for whom the Constitution urges protection through executive or legislative action
and judicial recognition. Its utility is best limited to being an impetus not just for the
executive and legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of
the working class. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional agenda that the Court
in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, penned by then Associate Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
formulated the judicial precept that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection
— such as the working class or a section thereof — the Court may recognize the existence
of a suspect classification and subject the same to strict judicial scrutiny.
The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial scrutiny
formulated inCentral Bank Employee Association exaggerate the significance of Section 3,
Article XIII is a groundless apprehension. Central Bank applied Article XIII in conjunction with
the equal protection clause. Article XIII, by itself, without the application of the equal
protection clause, has no life or force of its own as elucidated in Agabon. aCTHDA
Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further holds that the subject clause
violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting
of monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose. 136
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10 (5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For
seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard
Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage,
exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation
for all work "performed" in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation
for any work "performed" on designated rest days and holidays. SAcCIH
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of
overtime and holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's monetary award, unless there is
evidence that he performed work during those periods. As the Court held in Centennial
Transmarine, Inc. v. Dela Cruz, 138
However, the payment of overtime pay and leave pay should be
disallowed in light of our ruling in Cagampan v. National Labor Relations
Commission, to wit:
The rendition of overtime work and the submission of
sufficient proof that said was actually performed are conditions
to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay
which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic
monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the
right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first
be established.
In the same vein, the claim for the day's leave pay for
the unexpired portion of the contract is unwarranted since the
same is given during the actual service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause "or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the
December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired
portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the
rate of US$1,400.00 per month.

The argument of the Solicitor General, that the actual purpose of the subject clause No costs. THacES
of limiting the entitlement of OFWs to their three-month salary in case of illegal dismissal, is
SO ORDERED.
to give them a better chance of getting hired by foreign employers. This is plain speculation.
As earlier discussed, there is nothing in the text of the law or the records of the deliberations ||| (Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., G.R. No. 167614, [March 24, 2009], 601 PHIL
leading to its enactment or the pleadings of respondent that would indicate that there is an 245-324)
existing governmental purpose for the subject clause, or even just a pretext of one.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose;
and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal
protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1, 137 Article III of
the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for
the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant
to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
On the Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary
basis in the computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have
been stipulated into his contract.

116
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148208. December 15, 2004.]
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the
ground that its continued operation would violate the equal protection of the law? We hold
that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other
governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination
on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of theBangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
I.
The Case
First the facts.
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished
the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner
Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against
BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from
further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the
ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15.Exercise of Authority. — In the exercise of its
authority, the Monetary Board shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)establish a human resource management system which shall
govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal
of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and
excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound
principles of management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and
wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an
integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development
program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system
conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under
Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however,
That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall
under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates
prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. [emphasis supplied]
The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes
an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the
BSPofficers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL)
(exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not
exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this
classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's
position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article
II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and
excellence at all levels in the BSP. 1 Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments:
a.the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the
questioned proviso does not appear in the original and amended
versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of
Senate Bill No. 1235; 2
b.subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the
rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the
law 3 of establishing professionalism and excellence at all
levels in the BSP; 4 (emphasis supplied)
c.the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during
the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its
relevance to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one
senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the
BSP; 5
d.GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage
of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of
government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file
are also discriminated upon; 6 and
e.the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP
rank-and-file and resulted in the gross disparity between their
compensation and that of the BSP officers'. 7
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and
capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 8Petitioner also
stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of
the unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and
(b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file
employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner
concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents'
implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for
prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental
importance of the legal issue involved. 9
Respondent BSP, in its comment, 10 contends that the provision does not violate
the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in
harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative autonomy
of BSP," and the mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and
excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management."
117
 The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends
the validity of the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on
actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653
to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and
policies of the national government. 11
II.
Issue
Thus, the sole — albeit significant — issue to be resolved in this case is whether
the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional
mandate that "No person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the laws." 12
III.
Ruling
A.UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c),
ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the
classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no
constitutional infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent
the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate — so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held in Victoriano
v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 13 and reiterated in a long line of cases: 14
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them.. It guarantees equality,
not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The
equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that
of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality
in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required
of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard
is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the
purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is
recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that
the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or
in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with
mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does
not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and
legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear. (citations
omitted) IaEASH
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. 15 The
equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class. 16 If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently
from another. 17 The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must
apply to all those belonging to the same class. 18
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of
officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of
competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended
to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of
treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the
discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely
arbitrary in the legislative sense. 19
That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation
of the Senate Bill does not detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in
subsequent cases, 20 this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to
refuse invalidating a provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated
contained no such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee
of both Houses.
Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. 21 An act of the legislature,
approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. 22 To justify
the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not a doubtful and equivocal breach. 23
B.THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS — EXEMPTING ALL
OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE SSL —
RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED
PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power,
we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of
other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.
1.The concept of relative constitutionality.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a
mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the
statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application
to another. 24
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
circumstances. 25 Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or
confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry
and investigation in the light of changed conditions. 26
Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount
Vernon, 27 where the Court of Appeals of New York declared as unreasonable and arbitrary
a zoning ordinance which placed the plaintiff's property in a residential district, although it
118
was located in the center of a business area. Later amendments to the ordinance then
prohibited the use of the property except for parking and storage of automobiles, and service
station within a parking area. The Court found the ordinance to constitute an invasion of
property rights which was contrary to constitutional due process. It ruled:
While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact
zoning laws respecting the use of property in accordance with a well-
considered and comprehensive plan designed to promote public health,
safety and general welfare, such power is subject to the constitutional
limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is
so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the use of the property for
any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an
ordinance valid when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid
when, at a later time, its operation under changed conditions proves
confiscatory such, for instance, as when the greater part of its value is
destroyed, for which the courts will afford relief in an appropriate
case. 28 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid
law as unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes in circumstances. Rutter
v. Esteban 29 upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law — its enactment and
operation being a valid exercise by the State of its police power 30 — but also ruled that
the continued enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable and oppressive.
It noted the subsequent changes in the country's business, industry and agriculture. Thus,
the law was set aside because its continued operation would be grossly discriminatory and
lead to the oppression of the creditors. The landmark ruling states: 31
The question now to be determined. is, is the period of eight (8)
years which Republic Act No. 342 grants to debtors of a monetary
obligation contracted before the last global war and who is a war sufferer
with a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage Commission
reasonable under the present circumstances?
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief
to debtors of prewar obligations who suffered from the ravages of the last
war and who filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War Damage
Commission. It is therein provided that said obligation shall not be due and
demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the
claim filed by the debtor with said Commission. The purpose of the law is
to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by
giving them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as
to prevent them from being victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted
in said law that since liberation conditions have gradually returned to
normal, this is not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages
of war and so it was therein declared as a policy that as to them the debt
moratorium should be continued in force (Section 1).
But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had
been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders
Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because
of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be
unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to
afford. them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain
language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least
twelve (12) years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment
dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to us unreasonable, if not
oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be
commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are
practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection
becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the
injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even
required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar
statutes in the United States.
xxx xxx xxx
In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with
what we believe to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and
righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us under the present
circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and enforcement
of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore,
the same should be declared null and void and without effect. (emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
2.Applicability of the equal protection clause.
In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. Ivey 32 is illuminating. The Supreme Court of Florida ruled against the continued
application of statutes authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney's fees
against railroad companies, for animals killed on unfenced railroad right of way without proof
of negligence. Competitive motor carriers, though creating greater hazards, were not
subjected to similar liability because they were not yet in existence when the statutes were
enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes became invalid as denying "equal protection of the
law," in view of changed conditions since their enactment.
In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner, 33 the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky declared unconstitutional a provision of a statute which imposed a duty upon a
railroad company of proving that it was free from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle
by its engine or cars. This, notwithstanding that the constitutionality of the statute, enacted in
1893, had been previously sustained. Ruled the Court:
The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because
it applied to all similar corporations and had for its object the safety of
persons on a train and the protection of property. . . . Of course, there were
no automobiles in those days. The subsequent inauguration and
development of transportation by motor vehicles on the public highways by
common carriers of freight and passengers created even greater risks to
the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury and death
of domestic animals. Yet, under the law the operators of that mode of
competitive transportation are not subject to the same extraordinary legal
responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads as are railroad
companies for killing them on their private rights of way.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in
Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488,
79 L.Ed. 949, stated, "A statute valid when enacted may become invalid
by change in the conditions to which it is applied. The police power is
subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily
or unreasonably." A number of prior opinions of that court are cited in
support of the statement. The State of Florida for many years had a statute,
F.S.A. § 356.01 et seq. imposing extraordinary and special duties upon
railroad companies, among which was that a railroad company was liable
for double damages and an attorney's fee for killing livestock by a train
without the owner having to prove any act of negligence on the part of the
carrier in the operation of its train. InAtlantic Coast Line Railroad
Co. v. Ivey, it was held that the changed conditions brought about by motor
119
 vehicle transportation rendered the statute unconstitutional since if a
common carrier by motor vehicle had killed the same animal, the owner
would have been required to prove negligence in the operation of its
equipment. Said the court, "This certainly is not equal protection of the
law." 34 (emphasis supplied)
Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz:
[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under
challenge in determining whether that statute has any discriminatory
effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly
discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the Constitution 35 (emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
[W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal
protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be
fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and
illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition. . . . In other
words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect
in operation. . . . If a law has the effect of denying the equal protection of
the law it is unconstitutional. . . . 36 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
3.Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763 + 9302 =
consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.
According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653
is also violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of
the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs were
all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. 37 Thus, within the class of rank-and-file
personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993,
Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS,
and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz:
1.R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
2.R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS);
3.R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance
Corporation, (SBGFC);
4.R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);
5.R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP);
6.R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC); 38 and
7.R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC).
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven
other GFIs share this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees from the
coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly, as illustrated below:
1.LBP (R.A. No. 7907)
Section 10.Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Section 90.Personnel. —
xxx xxx xxx
All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a
compensation, position classification system and qualification
standards approved by the Bank's Board of Directors based on
a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and
responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable
with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and
shall be subject to periodic review by the Board no more than
once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit
reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The
Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and
regulations on compensation, position classification and
qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its
system conform as closely as possible with the principles under
Republic Act No. 6758. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
2.SSS (R.A. No. 8282)
Section 1.[Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the
SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and such other
personnel as may [be] deemed necessary; fix their reasonable
compensation, allowances and other benefits; prescribe their
duties and establish such methods and procedures as may be
necessary to insure the efficient, honest and economical
administration of the provisions and purposes of this
Act: Provided, however, That the personnel of the SSS below
the rank of Vice President shall be appointed by the SSS
President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by
the SSS President, except those below the rank of assistant
manager, shall be subject to the confirmation by the
Commission; Provided further, That the personnel of the SSS
shall be selected only from civil service eligibles and be subject
to civil service rules and regulations: Provided, finally, That the
SSS shall be exempt from the provisions of Republic Act
No. 6758 and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis supplied)
3.SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)
Section 8.[Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:
xxx xxx xxx
The Small Business Guarantee and Finance
Corporation shall:
xxx xxx xxx
120
 (e)notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act
No. 6758, and Compensation Circular No. 10, series of
1989 issued by the Department of Budget and Management, the
Board of Directors of SBGFC shall have the authority to extend
to the employees and personnel thereof the allowance and fringe
benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by
the employees and personnel of other government financial
institutions. (emphases supplied)
4.GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)
Section 1.[Amending Section 43(d)].
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 43.Powers and Functions of the Board of
Trustees. — The Board of Trustees shall have the following
powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(d)upon the recommendation of the President and
General Manager, to approve the GSIS' organizational and
administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to establish,
fix, review, revise and adjust the appropriate compensation
package for the officers and employees of the GSIS with
reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and
other benefits as may be necessary or proper for the effective
management, operation and administration of theGSIS, which
shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known
as the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430,
otherwise known as the Attrition Law. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
5.DBP (R.A. No. 8523)
Section 6.[Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:
Section 13.Other Officers and Employees. — The
Board of Directors shall provide for an organization and staff of
officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation
of the President of the Bank, fix their remunerations and other
emoluments. All positions in the Bank shall be governed by the
compensation, position classification system and qualification
standards approved by the Board of Directors based on a
comprehensive job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities.
The compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing
compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to
periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2)
years, without prejudice to yearly merit or increases based on
the Bank's productivity and profitability. The Bank shall,
therefore, be exempt from existing laws, rules, and regulations
on compensation, position classification and qualification
standards.The Bank shall however, endeavor to make its system
conform as closely as possible with the principles under
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758, as amended). (emphasis supplied) AaHTIE
6.HGC (R.A. No. 8763)
Section 9.Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of
Directors. — The Board shall have the following powers, functions and
duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(e)To create offices or positions necessary for the
efficient management, operation and administration of the
Corporation: Provided, That all positions in the Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC) shall be governed by a compensation and
position classification system and qualifications standards
approved by the Corporation's Board of Directors based on a
comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and
responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan
shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in
the private sector and which shall be exempt from Republic Act
No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law,
and from other laws, rules and regulations on salaries and
compensations; and to establish a Provident Fund and
determine the Corporation's and the employee's contributions to
the Fund; (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
7.PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)
Section 2.Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is
hereby further amended to read:
xxx xxx xxx
3.
xxx xxx xxx
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation
studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval,
shall be instituted as an integral component of the Corporation's
human resource development program: Provided, That all
positions in the Corporation shall be governed by a
compensation, position classification system and qualification
standards approved by the Board based on a comprehensive job
analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The
compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing
compensation plans of other government financial
institutions and shall be subject to review by the Board no more
than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit
reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The
Corporation shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules
and regulations on compensation, position classification and
qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its
system conform as closely as possible with the principles under
Republic Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied)
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of
seven other GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-
file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioner's injury, even the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000! 39
121
 The prior view on. the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an
evaluation of its classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found
reasonable because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between
the two classes.
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant
changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation
of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the
proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the
classification — albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws
— between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must
not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class.
The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly
discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons
who are without differences. 40
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions:
Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the
SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional
scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of
the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and
discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through
a single overt act, but gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress?
Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can
only be invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a
discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and (b) is the
legal analysis confined to determining the validity within the parameters of the statute or
ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation
vis-Ã -vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar enactments made over a
period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on
the mere assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy
determination by the legislature." All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy
determination — even those that have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily,
if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process
and equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct
in a policy determination made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun
the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.
In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support the inequality of treatment
between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of
treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs' who are similarly situated. It fails to
appreciate that what is at issue in the second level of scrutiny is not the declared policy of
each law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress' inconsistent and unequal
policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the
second challenge to the constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653
is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its
treatment of persons similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no
person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the laws" includes the prohibition against
enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect
of denying the equal protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional. 41
It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from
the other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage
of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file
from the other rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows that
GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other
governmental entities.
Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State
policy (1) to provide equal pay for substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in pay
upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of
the positions. P.D. No. 985 was passed to address disparities in pay among similar or
comparable positions which had given rise to dissension among government employees. But
even then, GFIs and government-owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) were
already identified as a distinct class among government employees. Thus, Section 2 also
provided, "[t]hat notwithstanding a standardized salary system established for all employees,
additional financial incentives may be established by government corporation and financial
institutions for their employees to be supported fully from their corporate funds and for such
technical positions as may be approved by the President in critical government agencies." 42
The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL.
Section 3(b) provides that one of the principles governing the Compensation and Position
Classification System of the Government is that: "[b]asic compensation for all personnel in
the government and government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions
shall generally be comparable with those in the private sector doing comparable work, and
must be in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages."
Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified
Compensation and Position Classification System of the SSL, 43 but rates of pay under the
SSL were determined on the basis of, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for
comparable work. Notably, the Compensation and Position Classification System was to be
governed by the following principles: (a) just and equitable wages, with the ratio of
compensation between pay distinctions maintained at equitable levels; 44 and (b) basic
compensation generally comparable with the private sector, in accordance with prevailing
laws on minimum wages. 45Also, the Department of Budget and Management was directed
to use, as guide for preparing the Index of Occupational Services, the Benchmark Position
Schedule, and the following factors: 46
(1)the education and experience required to perform the duties and
responsibilities of the positions;
(2)the nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
(3)the kind of supervision received;
(4)mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;
(5)nature and extent of internal and external relationships;
(6)kind of supervision exercised;
(7)decision-making responsibility;
(8)responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
(9)accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and
(10)hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.
The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within
Salary Grades 1 to 20.
Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated
in all aspects pertaining to compensation and position classification, in consonance with
Section 5, Article IX-B of the 1997 Constitution. 47
122
 Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP, implicitly exempting
the Monetary Board from the SSL by giving it express authority to determine and institute its
own compensation and wage structure. However, employees whose positions fall under SG
19 and below were specifically limited to the rates prescribed under the SSL.
Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly,
each government financial institution (GFI) was not only expressly authorized to determine
and institute its own compensation and wage structure, but also explicitly exempted —
without distinction as to salary grade or position — all employees of the GFI from the SSL.
It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of
exemption from the SSL, based on the perceived need "to fulfill the mandate of the institution
concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in
character; (2) the GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with their [sic] counterparts in the
private sector, not only in terms of the provisions of goods or services, but also in terms of
hiring and retaining competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were [sic]
experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla positions with competent personnel and/or retaining
these personnel. The need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular
circumstances of each institution, and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by
the employees is merely incidental."
The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary
authority, 48 and the banker of the government and all its political subdivisions.49 It has the
sole power and authority to issue currency; 50 provide policy directions in the areas of
money, banking, and credit; and supervise banks and regulate finance companies and non-
bank financial institutions performing quasi-banking functions, including the exempted
GFIs. 51 Hence, the argument that the rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs were
exempted because of the importance of their institution's mandate cannot stand any more
than an empty sack can stand.
Second, it is certainly misleading to say that "the need for the scope of exemption
necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each institution." Nowhere in the
deliberations is there a cogent basis for the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file from the
exemption which was granted to the rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in
fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as Congress deemed it
necessary for these institutions to be exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of
the BSP and the seven GFIs was granted in the amended charters of each GFI, enacted
separately and over a period of time. But it bears emphasis that, while each GFI has a
mandate different and distinct from that of another, the deliberations show that the raison
d'etre of the SSL-exemption was inextricably linked to and for the most part based on factors
common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they play in the economy; (2) the necessity
of hiring and retaining qualified and effective personnel to carry out the GFI's mandate; and
(3) the recognition that the compensation package of these GFIs is not competitive, and fall
substantially below industry standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI
granted SSL exemption; and (b) the subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not distinguish
between the officers and the rank-and-file; it is patent that the classification made between
the BSP rank-and-file and those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT
intended, i.e., it was not based on any substantial distinction vis-Ã -vis the particular
circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs makes express
reference to allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed
by the employees and personnel of other GFIs, 52 underscoring that GFIs are a particular
class within the realm of government entities.
It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of
the BSP — made manifest and glaring with each and every consequential grant of blanket
exemption from the SSL to the other GFIs — that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even
more so, when the SEC — which is not a GFI — was given leave to have a compensation
plan that "shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP] and other
[GFIs]," 53 then granted a blanket exemption from the SSL, and its rank-and-file endowed a
more preferred treatment than the rank-and-file of the BSP.
The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when
we are faced with this undeniable truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole
purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP
rank-and-file employees would have been devoid of any substantial or material basis. It bears
no moment, therefore, that the unlawful discrimination was not a direct result arising from
one law. "Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum." No one is
allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.
It has also been proffered that "similarities alone are not sufficient to support the
conclusion that rank-and-file employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar
employees of the other GOCCs for purposes of compensation, position classification and
qualification standards. The fact that certain persons have some attributes in common does
not automatically make them members of the same class with respect to a legislative
classification." Cited is the ruling in Johnson v.Robinson: 54 "this finding of similarity ignores
that a common characteristic shared by beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike, is not
sufficient to invalidate a statute when other characteristics peculiar to only one group
rationally explain the statute's different treatment of the two groups."
The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the
validity of the classification as there were quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly
recognized by Congress, which formed a rational basis for the classification limiting
educational benefits to military service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to
civilian life. The Court listed the peculiar characteristics as follows:
First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively
greater than that caused by alternative civilian service. A conscientious
objector performing alternative service is obligated to work for two years.
Service in the Armed Forces, on the other hand, involves a six-year
commitment. . .
xxx xxx xxx
Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and
alternative service performers are qualitatively different. Military veterans
suffer a far greater loss of personal freedom during their service careers.
Uprooted from civilian life, the military veteran becomes part of the military
establishment, subject to its discipline and potentially hazardous duty.
Congress was acutely aware of the peculiar disabilities caused by military
service, in consequence of which military servicemen have a special need
for readjustment benefits. . . . 55 (citations omitted)
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the
SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as
to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the
anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only
superficial, 56 but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real
differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
Moreover, the issue in this case is not — as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice
Carpio-Morales would put it — whether "being an employee of a GOCC or GFI is reasonable
and sufficient basis for exemption" from R.A. No. 6758. It is Congress itself that distinguished
the GFIs from other government agencies, not once but eight times, through the enactment
of R.A. Nos. 7653, 7907, 8282, 8289, 8291, 8523, 8763, and 9302. These laws may have
created a "preferred sub-class within government employees," but the present challenge is
not directed at the wisdom of these laws. Rather, it is a legal conundrum involving the
exercise of legislative power, the validity of which must be measured not only by looking at
123
the specific exercise in and by itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as to the legal effects brought
about by seven separate exercises — albeit indirectly and without intent. ECTAHc
Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged "a comparable change in the factual milieu
as regards the compensation, position classification and qualification standards of the
employees of the BSP (whether of the executive level or of the rank-and-file) since the
enactment of the new Central Bank Act" is of no moment. InGSIS v. Montesclaros, 57 this
Court resolved the issue of constitutionality notwithstanding that claimant had manifested
that she was no longer interested in pursuing the case, and even when the constitutionality
of the said provision was not squarely raised as an issue, because the issue involved not
only the claimant but also others similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny
based on the challenged proviso. The Court held that social justice and public interest
demanded the resolution of the constitutionality of the proviso. And so it is with the
challenged proviso in the case at bar.
It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the
legislative prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of
the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the
latter's right to equal protection. In other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a
matter of policy exclusively within the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or
legality of the exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review. 58 So when the
distinction made is superficial, and not based on substantial distinctions that make real
differences between those included and excluded, it becomes a matter of arbitrariness that
this Court has the duty and the power to correct. 59 As held in the United Kingdom case
ofHooper v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 60 once the State has chosen to
confer benefits, "discrimination" contrary to law may occur where favorable treatment already
afforded to one group is refused to another, even though the State is under no obligation to
provide that favorable treatment. 61
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the
other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination — no
one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent
blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld
from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any rational basis.
Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand
absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection
and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class
should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is
equally binding on the rest. 62
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal
treatment between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the
enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the
challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be
declared as an outlaw.
IV.
Equal Protection Under
International Lens
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the
main have followed the "rational basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications 63 and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. 64
A.Equal Protection
in the United States
In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static "rational basis"
test. Professor Gunther highlights the development in equal protection jurisprudential
analysis, to wit: 65
Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial
intervention in most contexts. Ordinarily, the command of equal protection
was only that government must not impose differences in treatment "except
upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of
regulation." The old variety of equal protection scrutiny focused solely on
the means used by the legislature: it insisted merely that the classification
in the statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose. Unlike
substantive due process, equal protection scrutiny was not typically
concerned with identifying "fundamental values" and restraining
legislative ends. And usually the rational classification requirement was
readily satisfied: the courts did not demand a tight fit between classification
and purpose; perfect congruence between means and ends was not
required.
xxx xxx xxx
[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren
Court's "new equal protection" and the two-tier approach.]
From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into
a major intervention tool during the Warren era, especially in the 1960s.
The Warren Court did not abandon the deferential ingredients of the old
equal protection: in most areas of economic and social legislation, the
demands imposed by equal protection remained as minimal as ever . . .
But the Court launched an equal protection revolution by finding large new
areas for strict rather than deferential scrutiny. A sharply differentiated two-
tier approach evolved by the late 1960s: in addition to the deferential "old"
equal protection, a "new" equal protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose.
. . . The intensive review associated with the new equal protection imposed
two demands — a demand not only as to means but also one as to ends.
Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between
classification and statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility
traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown
"necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not merely "reasonably related"
ones. Moreover, equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as
well: legislation in the areas of the new equal protection had to be justified
by "compelling" state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of
"legitimate" state ends.
The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict
scrutiny by searching for two characteristics: the presence of a "suspect"
classification; or an impact on "fundamental" rights or interests. In the
category of "suspect classifications," the Warren Court's major contribution
was to intensify the strict scrutiny in the traditionally interventionist area of
racial classifications. But other cases also suggested that there might be
more other suspect categories as well: illegitimacy and wealth for example.
But it was the 'fundamental interests' ingredient of the new equal protection
that proved particularly dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous . . . [Other
fundamental interests included voting, criminal appeals, and the right of
interstate travel . . .]
124
 xxx xxx xxx
The Burger Court and Equal Protection.
The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new
equal protection, although its best established ingredient retains vitality.
There was also mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier formulations of
the Warren Court's equal protection doctrine. It was prepared to use the
clause as an interventionist tool without resorting to the strict language of
the new equal protection. . . . [Among the fundamental. interests identified
during this time were voting and access to the ballot, while "suspect"
classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.]
xxx xxx xxx
Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in
form, there has also been an increasingly noticeable resistance to the
sharp difference between deferential "old" and interventionist "new" equal
protection. A number of justices sought formulations that would blur the
sharp distinctions of the two-tiered approach or that would narrow the gap
between strict scrutiny and deferential review. The most elaborate attack
came from Justice Marshall, whose frequently stated position was
developed most elaborately in his dissent in the Rodriguez case: 66
The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal
protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate
the appropriate standard of review — strict scrutiny or mere
rationality. But this (sic) Court's [decisions] defy such easy
categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done
reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing
discrimination allegedly violative of the equal protection clause.
This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of
care with which Court will scrutinize particular classification,
depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal
importance of the interests adversely affected and the
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn.
Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach describes many of
the modern decisions, although it is a formulation that the majority refused
to embrace. But the Burger Court's results indicate at least two significant
changes in equal protection law: First, invocation of the "old" equal
protection formula no longer signals, as it did with the Warren Court, an
extreme deference to legislative classifications and a virtually automatic
validation of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even while
voicing the minimal "rationality" "hands-off" standards of the old equal
protection, proceed to find the statute unconstitutional. Second, in some
areas the modern Court has put forth standards for equal protection review
that, while clearly more intensive than the deference of the "old" equal
protection, are less demanding than the strictness of the "new" equal
protection. Sex discrimination is the best established example of an
"intermediate" level of review. Thus, in one case, the Court said that
"classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." That
standard is "intermediate" with respect to both ends and means: where
ends must be "compelling" to survive strict scrutiny and merely "legitimate"
under the "old" mode, "important" objectives are required here; and where
means must be "necessary" under the "new" equal protection, and merely
"rationally related" under the "old" equal protection, they must be
"substantially related" to survive the "intermediate" level of review.
(emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
B.Equal Protection
in Europe
The United Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also
gone forward in discriminatory legislation and jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom
domestic law, the most extensive list of protected grounds can be found in Article 14 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on grounds such
as "sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status." This list is illustrative and
not exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis of race, sex and religion is regarded as grounds
that require strict scrutiny. A further indication that certain forms of discrimination are
regarded as particularly suspect under the Covenant can be gleaned from Article 4, which,
while allowing states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times of national
emergency, prohibits derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of
"race, colour, language, religion or social origin." 67
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of
justification which varies with the ground of discrimination. In the Belgian
Linguisticscase 68 the European Court set the standard of justification at a low level:
discrimination would contravene the Convention only if it had no legitimate aim, or there was
no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim
sought to be realised. 69 But over the years, the European Court has developed a hierarchy
of grounds covered by Article 14 of the ECHR, a much higher level of justification being
required in respect of those regarded as "suspect" (sex, race, nationality, illegitimacy, or
sexual orientation) than of others. Thus, in Abdulaziz, 70 the European Court declared that:
. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a
major goal in the member States of the Council of Europe. This means that
very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a difference of
treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the
Convention.
And in Gaygusuz v. Austria, 71 the European Court held that "very weighty
reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment
based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the
Convention." 72 The European Court will then permit States a very much narrower margin of
appreciation in relation to discrimination on grounds of sex, race, etc., in the application of
the Convention rights than it will in relation to distinctions drawn by states between, for
example, large and small land-owners. 73
C.Equality under
International Law
The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article
1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights. Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and
equal protection of the law without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the
protection of human rights. 74
Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on
discrimination and/or provisions about equality. 75 The general international provisions
pertinent to discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR); 76 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
125
Discrimination (CERD); 77 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional
instruments such as the American Convention on Human Rights; 78 the African Charter on
Human and People's Rights; 79 the European Convention on Human Rights; 80 the
European Social Charter of 1961 and revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European
Union Charter of Rights (of particular importance to European states). Even the Council of
the League of Arab States has adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although
it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of the League. 81
The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional
"first generation" rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining rather than
requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires "guarantee[s]" of "equal and effective
protection against discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European
Conventions oblige States Parties "to ensure . . . the full and free exercise of [the rights
guaranteed] . . . without any discrimination" and to "secure without discrimination" the
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed. 82 These provisions impose a measure of positive
obligation on States Parties to take steps to eradicate discrimination.
In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and
prevention of discrimination, are laid down in the ICESCR 83 and in a very large number of
Conventions administered by the International Labour Organisation, a United Nations
body. 84 Additionally, many of the other international and regional human rights instruments
have specific provisions relating to employment. 85
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier
tendency to view the prohibition against discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR
rights. 86 In Broeks 87 and Zwaan-de-Vries, 88 the issue before the Committee was
whether discriminatory provisions in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within
the scope of Article 26. The Dutch government submitted that discrimination in social security
benefit provision was not within the scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the
ICESCR and not the ICCPR. They accepted that Article 26 could go beyond the rights
contained in the Covenant to other civil and political rights, such as discrimination in the field
of taxation, but contended that Article 26 did not extend to the social, economic, and cultural
rights contained in ICESCR. The Committee rejected this argument. In its view, Article 26
applied to rights beyond the Covenant including the rights in other international treaties such
as the right to social security found in ICESCR:
Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit
discrimination, it does not of itself contain any obligation with respect to the
matters that may be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for
example, require any state to enact legislation to provide for social security.
However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State's
sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with Article 26 of the
Covenant. 89
Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification
may be struck down if it has the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal protection.
International law recognizes that discrimination may occur indirectly, as the Human Rights
Committee 90 took into account the definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and
CEDAW in declaring that:
. . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood
to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and
freedoms. 91 (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision,
and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in
consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law. There
should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to
eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice
imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to
labor, compel this approach. 92
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and
international law, we held in International School Alliance of Educators v.Quisumbing: 93
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond
contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils.
The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil
Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law,
likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include
principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice,
based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in
Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect
of Employment and Occupation — all embody the general principle against
discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines,
through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its
national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor
are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the
employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to
"humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the
physical workplace — the factory, the office or the field — but include as
well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of
employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that
the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or
creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions
if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal
employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory
terms and conditions of employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof, provides:
126
 The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and [favorable]
conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a.Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i.Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal
value without distinction of any kind, in
particular women being guaranteed
conditions of work not inferior to those
enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal
work;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work."
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
(citations omitted)
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its
policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when
they run afoul of the Constitution. 94 The deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.
When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to
constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per
se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support
many of our decisions. 95 We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and
regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own
decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a different ambience
and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our
qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and
justice. 96Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers
and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local
legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public
interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that
our public interest is distinct and different from others. 97
In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated
that: "[A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only
limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. . . . [I]n resolving
constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of
which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional
settings and needs." 98 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to
that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. 99
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal
protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action
in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely
in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command
to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national
development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the
State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. . . .
[T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for
a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of
equality. 100
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and
economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. 101 Under the policy of
social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working
class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in
law. 102 And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the
legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a
living reality. 103 Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. 104
V.
A Final Word
Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the
challenged provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court,
but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No.
7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has
supposedly been filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding
questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test,
and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment. 105
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right,
or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would
call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the
Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities.
Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor. 106
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or
subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is
justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or
validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications,
conditions or limitations — particularly those prescribed or imposed by the
Constitution — would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry
into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts
of justice under the Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935
Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic
predicates. As a consequence, We have neither the authority nor the
discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable
obligation — made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath,
as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the
Constitution — to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was
held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power", to determine whether
another branch of the government has "kept within constitutional limits."
Not satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and stressed that, if
the Constitution provides how it may be amended — as it is in our 1935
127
 Constitution — "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the
interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In fact,
this very Court — speaking through Justice Laurel, an outstanding
authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well as one of the highly
respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that drafted the 1935
Constitution — declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution
are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can
be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments" of the government. 107 (citations omitted; emphasis
supplied) DHcESI

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade
or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with
the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades.
Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the
industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the
SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly
regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank — possessing higher and better
education and opportunities for career advancement — are given higher compensation
packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file
employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in
terms of job marketability, it is they — and not the officers — who have the real economic
and financial need for the adjustment. This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to
free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent
standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all." 108 Any act of Congress that runs
counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can
pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this
Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike
employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining
unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a
strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their
efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the
other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the
politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their
unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature
to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any
waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is
the Court's duty to save them from reasonless discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of
the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.
||| (Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208,
[December 15, 2004], 487 PHIL 531-793)

128
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 221029. April 24, 2018.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MARELYN TANEDO
MANALO, respondent.
DECISION n
PERALTA, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision 1 and October 12, 2015
Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion
of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED.
The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO.
2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a
petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila,
by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012.
The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo
marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial court's Order dated January 25,
2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012,
February 28-March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner
Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear
on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or
caption of the petition considering that, based on the allegations therein, the proper action
should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted.
The Amended Petition, which captioned that it is also a petition for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese
national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage
Contract x x x;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in
Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6,
2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and
her divorced Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact,
petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese
former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in the
Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner
and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered,
in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married
to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no
longer married to her; furthermore, in the event that petitioner decides
to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry
of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the
cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said
Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the
cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to
return and use her maiden surname, MANALO. 4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan
for her employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its
attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February
28-March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese
husband;
5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General
in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce. 5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of
Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling
that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based
on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to
file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to
Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another
country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine
129
laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with
the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil
relations, including marriages." 6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce
against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer
married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec.
Secretary Ermita, et al. 7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of
the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of
injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no
longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce
case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo,
Jr. 8 where the marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a divorce
filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage,
are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage,
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force. 9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence,
our courts cannot grant it. 10
2. Consistent with Articles 15 11 and 17 12 of the New Civil
Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even
by an absolute divorce obtained abroad. 13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are
both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws. 14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the
former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry. 15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines, which took
effect on August 3, 1988. 16 Shortly thereafter, E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17,
1987. 17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph
was added to Article 26. 18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision
Committee (Committee), but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres.
Aquino signed E.O. No. 209. 19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine
the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. 20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects
of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. 21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to
trying a divorce case. 22 Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on
custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be
determined by our courts. 23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her
alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had
obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national law. 24 The aim was that
it would solve the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still
considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced
them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again. 25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case
where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce
proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido
III: 26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case
of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case,
Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The
Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by
his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law
and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should
be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if
the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
xxx
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
130
 valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry. 27
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino
citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding
abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated
to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition and enforcement of the divorce
decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in
the local civil registry "in order that it would not appear anymore that [she] is still married to
the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her;
[and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed
by said entry of marriage," and to return and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin 28 and Van Dorn 29 already recognized a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint
custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband, who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino
wife to enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody
of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among
others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this
jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by
his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to
entertain the suit but not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged
invalidity — not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the
divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse — to support the Agreement's
enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v.
Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is
bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the
alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign
divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x
x x. 30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint
was filed by the ex-husband, who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an
accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with
right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but
the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree
issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and
its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially
if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction. In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court
discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the
Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding
on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid
and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and
public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States
in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of
divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife,
and to free them both from the bond. The marriage
tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the
law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the
guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well
as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond
of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 31
In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino
spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our
rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al. 32 and Medina v. Koike. 33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a Japanese
national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court, which declared the
marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the
ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can
file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his
or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he
131
 has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse
not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property
interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime
of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x 34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly
filed for divorce, which was granted. Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce
decree must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,
et al. 35 and Garcia v. Recio, 36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse
must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate
action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual
issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When
this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it
should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary
consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual
obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased
to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of
them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal
status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce
decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without
dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said that a contrary ruling will
subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino people, as
expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until
the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the
law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse
is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by
the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. 37 "The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly,
and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure." 38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted
to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the
Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent
of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose
of the act. 39 Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to
defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. 40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils.,
et al. v. COMELEC, et al.: 41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in
the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba
legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice.
To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the
intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule
that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the
Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the
laws of his or her country. 42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or
her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be
without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same
place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance,
it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's
national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found
under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere
existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an
exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed
if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose
rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce
as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional. 43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification
and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice, such
classification may be subjected to judicial review. 44 The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection
by the Constitution. 45 When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role
as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations. 46 If a legislative classification impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage
of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional,
and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest. 47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the
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Constitution. 48 It includes the right of procreation, the right to marry, the right to exercise
free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel, and the
right to vote. 49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured
by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. 50 It
is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give
way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare. 51 It
essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual
rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter. 52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle
applies with respect to the acts of the President, which have the force and effect of law unless
declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates
one of the essential requisites 53 of the equal protection clause. 54 Particularly, the limitation
of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable
as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino
who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences
between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and religious
dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a
Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly,
while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void,
a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made
in accordance with the national law of the foreigner. 55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon
the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both
are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are
still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to
make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they
initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue
favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is
inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by
a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on
grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. 56 In filing for divorce based
on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim,
tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she
chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she
may still pray for the severance of her marital ties before the RTC in accordance with the
mechanisms now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the
guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail
what these "mechanisms" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as
those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will
automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted.
All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice
of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien
spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was shown
to support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in
this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputably presumed (i.e., satisfactory if
uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or
wrong, 57 that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, 58 that a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns, 59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that
the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage, 61 and that the law has been obeyed. 62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any
illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to
marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered
into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We
take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative
in nature and that they are more often the victims or at the losing end of mixed marriages.
And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind a Filipino's decision to marry an
alien national. In one case, it was said:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex.
The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple
chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the
realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together
or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not,
and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and
title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally
valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not
the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage. 63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 64Nevertheless, it was not
meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C.
Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point. 65 Their exchange
reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA.
Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be
recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS.
Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically
answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of Commissioner
Gascon. Is this to be understood as a prohibition of a general
law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that
the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON.
Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention
was primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but
not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that he mentioned
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 the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it, Mr. e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or chronic
Presiding Officer. gambling of the respondent;
FR. BERNAS. f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
No, my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent
prohibiting a divorce law? bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
abroad;
MR. GASCON.
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child
No, Mr. Presiding Officer. with another person other than one's spouse during
FR. BERNAS. the marriage, except when upon the mutual
agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them
Thank you. 66 by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife
bears a child after being a victim of rape;
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective March 11,
1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery on the i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the
part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the petitioner, a common child or a child of the
Philippine Legislature. 67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him petitioner; and
by the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the
approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without
E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.
grounds for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more than
least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an
against the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.
spouse's incurable insanity. 68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth
Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again 1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of
prevailed. 69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity ofRepublic Act No. 386 or the New the Family Code, restated as follows:
Civil Code, an absolute divorce obtained by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the
longer recognized. 70
marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the of age or over but below twenty-one (21),
Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the current 17th and the marriage was solemnized without
Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 116, 71 1062, 72 2380 73 and 6027 74 were filed in the the consent of the parents, guardian or
House of Representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act person having substitute parental authority
Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute over the party, in that order, unless after
Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population and Family attaining the age of twenty-one (21), such
Relations on February 28, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading — party freely cohabited with the other and
with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 abstentions. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial both lived together as husband or wife;
decree of absolute divorce are as follows: b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, after coming to reason, freely cohabited
modified or amended, as follows: with the other as husband and wife;

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud,
directed against the petitioner, a common child, or unless such party afterwards with full
a child of the petitioner; knowledge of the facts constituting the
fraud, freely cohabited with the other as
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel husband and wife;
the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation; d. The consent of either party was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence, unless the
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the same having disappeared or ceased, such
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the party thereafter freely cohabited with the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance other as husband and wife;
in such corruption or inducement;
e. Either party was physically incapable of
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to consummating the marriage with the other
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if and such incapacity continues or appears to
pardoned; be incurable; and

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 f. Either party was afflicted with a sexually
transmissible infection found to be serious
or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the
time of the marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least
five (5) years at the time the petition for absolute
divorce is filed, and reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in
Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or not the
incapacity was present at the time of the celebration
of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment
surgery or transitions from one sex to another, the
other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce
with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or
vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have
resulted in the total breakdown of the marriage
beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at
reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react
adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our
customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution
and their nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity. However, none of our laws
should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching; otherwise, the separation of
Church and State will be violated. 75
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or
cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a
state religion. 76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if
it sincerely believes that they are good for the country. 77 While marriage is considered a
sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. 78 It
is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right
and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total
isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside from
strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively
promote its total development. 79 It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of
children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. 80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively
enforce these obligations if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those
foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and
children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence.
In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the
menace are R.A. No. 6955 (prohibiting mail order bride and similar practices), R.A. No.
9262 ("Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 "), R.A. No. 9710 ("The
Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No. 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012"), and R.A. No. 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003"), as
amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover,
in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution,
the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human
person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men. 81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If
We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing
"mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would
enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse,
any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as
illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the
parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject
provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article
XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not
formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs. 82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of
the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed
marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages
are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect
unions. 83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of
the individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and achieved in the
context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages
and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. 84 In
reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis 85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule
that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but
in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the
same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find
a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even
as the law is obeyed.
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 As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce. 93
command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt
to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is
by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes rendered admissible as a written act of the foreign court. 94 As it appears, the existence of
beyond them." the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce
court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion,
xxx xxx xxx fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so. 95
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the
in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 86 answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged
the law. 87 A statute may, therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 88 caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative. 96
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by
granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent
Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely
Manila. upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that
Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18,
country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. 89 The fact of divorce must 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
still first be proven. 90 Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
law allowing it. 91 SO ORDERED.
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive ||| (Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, [April 24, 2018])
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body
or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record
is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a
quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2)
the Authentication/Certificateissued by the Philippine Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance
of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of
the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject

136
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 166715. August 14, 2008.]
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly
AASJS) * OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED
VINCENT S. ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and
EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners, vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in
his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L.
PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as
Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J p:
This petition for prohibition 1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 2 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends
to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). 3 It covers
all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status. 4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their
revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating
Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR
and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount
of tax revenue. 5
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the
Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of the
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the
Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives
from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their
recognized organization. 6 AaHcIT
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the
service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3)
terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a
system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of
rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress. 7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were
tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, 8 to be
approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose. 9
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a
system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption
and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve
the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and
incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to
why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government
agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix
revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section
7 (b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the
service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not,
however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has
been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the
President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC
personnel. TCASIH
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on
the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function
is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the
creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
question the petition for being premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet.
Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will necessitate the exercise of this
Court's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public policy requires the
resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case. They assert that the allegation
that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to
invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly
classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are distinct from those of
the other government agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient
standard that will guide the executive in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the
creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than
violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves
as a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the
implementing agencies.
After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court
finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor
of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be discussed.
ACTUAL CASE AND RIPENESS
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial adjudication. 10 A closely related requirement is
ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question is
ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect
on the individual challenging it. 11 Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner
137
must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be
redressed by a favorable decision of the Court. 12 IaHAcT
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial
controversy by the mere enactment of the law even without any further overt
act, 13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate
any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show a personal stake in
the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this account, their petition is
procedurally infirm.
This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional
issues raised by petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on
the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law. And where an action of the legislative
branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact
the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 14
ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism, and justice, and lead modest lives.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own
personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding
accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and
justice, all government officials and employees have the duty to be responsive to the needs
of the people they are called upon to serve. caIDSH
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties. This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and
employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a system
of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation
capability and collection. 15
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It
cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have
the Court do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared
public policy.
Petitioners' claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC
officials and employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual
and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of theConstitution, not a
doubtful and equivocal one. 16 To invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners' baseless
supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of
the executive which approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be
rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding
the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public accountability.
In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public
service of deserving government personnel.
In United States v. Matthews, 17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which
awards to officers of the customs as well as other parties an amount not exceeding one-half
of the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws against smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer
v. United States, 18 the U.S. Supreme Court said:
The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to
stimulate and reward their zeal and industry in detecting fraudulent
attempts to evade payment of duties and taxes. HaTSDA
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a
reward when, as a consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws,
they exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure
that the reward will not be claimed if it will be either the fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary
activity" or the product of the irregular performance of official duties. One of these
precautionary measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law:
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the
BIR and the BOC. — The officials, examiners, and employees of the
[BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of negligence,
abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise
extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held
liable for any loss or injury suffered by any business establishment or
taxpayer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance,
misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same
conditions and among persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of
treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial differences in relation to the
object to be accomplished. 19 When things or persons are different in fact or circumstance,
they may be treated in law differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 20 this
Court declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty
of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the [S]tate.
It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should
be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not
mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on
persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not
forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it
is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. CDTSEI
The equal protection of the laws clause of
the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very
idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it
be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences,
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not
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 be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on
a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the
purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is
recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary
that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of
things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification
be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may
in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal
protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing
degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may
appear. 21 (emphasis supplied)
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. 22 With
respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC. 23 Since the subject of the law is the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or
sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law
concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function
of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs
duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. — The Bureau of
Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject to the
supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who
shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the
Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following functions: SECcIH
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and
account for all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper
performance of its functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal
economic activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and
subordinate units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law. 24
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:
Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. — The Bureau of Customs
which shall be headed and subject to the management and control of
the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President
upon the recommendation of the Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter
referred to as Commissioner, shall have the following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding
fees, charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and
customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other
economic frauds within all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the
clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities
in all ports under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent
units; cAEaSC
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law. 25
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform
the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of
its great inherent functions — taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane
and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment
accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal
protection. SHTEaA
UNDUE DELEGATION
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. 26 It lays down
a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 27 To
be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented. 28
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law.
Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State to
optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by
providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of
a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" 29 the delegated
power to the President to fix revenue targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. — A Rewards and
Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby created,
to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess
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 of their respective revenue targets of the year, as determined by the
Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the
following percentages:
Excess of Collection Percent (%) of the
of the Excess the Excess Collection to
Revenue Targets Accrue to the Fund
30% or below — 15%
More than 30% — 15% of the first
30% plus 20% of the
remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the
year immediately following the year when the revenue collection target
was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated
revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given
fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of
Financing (BESF) submitted by the President to Congress. The BIR
and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies'
revenue targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of
the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the BOC. CEDScA
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected
respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and
stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. 30 Thus, the determination of
revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the
DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board's authority and
identifies the conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls
short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board in
the agency shall have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from
service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls
short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with
due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of
collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under
this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and
compliance with substantive and procedural due process:
Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is
newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation, as has
no historical record of collection performance that can be used
as basis for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or
employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period
under consideration unless the transfer was due to
nonperformance of revenue targets or potential
nonperformance of revenue targets: Provided, however, That
when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue
or customs officials or employees has suffered from economic
difficulties brought about by natural calamities or force
majeure or economic causes as may be determined by the
Board, termination shall be considered only after careful and
proper review by the Board. IAETSC
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria
adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided, That such decision shall
be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of
the criteria for the separation of an official or employee from
service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the application
of other relevant laws on accountability of public officers and
employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of
Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act;
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an
employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes other than those provided by law
and only after due process is accorded the employee. 31 In the case of RA 9335, it lays down
a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by
at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection.
This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official
duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. 32 The action for removal is
also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and
procedural due process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public
interest", "justice and equity", "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and
welfare". 33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest. STcDIE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. — There
is hereby created a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from
the House of Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be
appointed by the Senate President, with at least two senators
representing the minority. The Members from the House of
Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at least two
members representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will
have approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall
thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
140
 The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the
purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF,
DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then
on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be
considered moot and academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront
the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter). ATDHSC
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of
congressional oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections 34 is illuminating:
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all
activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of
and influence over theimplementation of legislation it has enacted.
Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken
by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d)
to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to
assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of
public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the
grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. . . .
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power
with increased frequency to check the perceived "exponential
accumulation of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the
20th century, Congress has delegated an enormous amount of
legislative authority to the executive branch and the administrative
agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that
the administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority
delegated to them. . . .
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its
oversight powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny, investigation andsupervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and
continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its primary purpose
is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government
activities. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request
information and report from the other branches of government. It can
give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the
agency involved. AaCTID
xxx xxx xxx
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive
process of looking at the facts that are readily available, congressional
investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of
Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by the 1987
Constitution under section 21, Article VI, . . .
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress
exercises its oversight power is thru legislative supervision.
"Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the
part of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a
given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and
investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order
to influence future executive branch performance, congressional
supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-
making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated
authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies
through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting
the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate
regulations with the force of law. These provisions require the President
or an agency to present the proposed regulations to Congress, which
retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes
effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed
regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of
time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation
in the meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed
regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves
it. EHCDSI
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to
maintain the balance of power between the legislative and the executive
branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast
power to the executive branch or to independent agencies while
retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of such power without
having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend
that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it provides
legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies.
One proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation
policy: the policy is too deeply embedded in our law and
practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of modern
government have often led Congress-whether by actual or
perceived necessity — to legislate by declaring broad policy
goals and general statutory standards, leaving the choice of
policy options to the discretion of an executive officer.
Congress articulates legislative aims, but leaves their
implementation to the judgment of parties who may or may
not have participated in or agreed with the development of
those aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many
instances the reverse of our constitutional scheme could be
effected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes. One
safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to enact new
legislation or to change existing law. But without some means
of overseeing post enactment activities of the executive
141
 branch, Congress would be unable to determine whether its
policies have been implemented in accordance with
legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention is
appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue
encroachment upon the executive prerogatives. They urge that any
post-enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch
should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure
beyond that would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the Constitution. They contend that legislative veto constitutes an
impermissible evasion of the President's veto authority and intrusion into
the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of government.
Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of powers
as it prevents the executive branch and independent agencies from
accumulating too much power. They submit that reporting requirements
and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to
scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do
not allow Congress to review executive proposals before they take effect
and they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding
expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits
Congress to participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval
of "subordinate law" or those enacted by the executive branch pursuant
to a delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue that
legislative veto "is a necessary response by Congress to the accretion
of policy control by forces outside its chambers". In an era of delegated
authority, they point out that legislative veto "is the most efficient means
Congress has yet devised to retain control over the evolution and
implementation of its policy as declared by statute". SAHEIc
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S.
Supreme Court resolved the validity of legislative veto provisions.
The case arose from the order of the immigration judge suspending the
deportation of Chadha pursuant to § 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. The United States House of Representatives passed a
resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to § 244(c)(2) authorizing
either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the
executive branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the
United States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation
proceedings to implement the House order and the alien was ordered
deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the alien's
appeal, holding that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of
Congress. The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit held that
the House was without constitutional authority to order the alien's
deportation and that § 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine on
separation of powers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared § 244(c)(2)
unconstitutional. But the Court shied away from the issue of
separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the
presentment clause and bicameralism. It held that the one-house veto
was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is subject to
the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the
passage by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President.
...
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in
memorandum decision, two lower court decisions invalidating the
legislative veto provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980. Following this
precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes containing legislative veto
provisions although some of these provisions required the approval of
both Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism requirement
of Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even
exercised. 35 (emphasis supplied)
In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional
oversight and considering the nature and powers of a constitutional body like the Commission
on Elections, the Court struck down the provision in RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional Committee. The committee was tasked
not only to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said law but also to review, revise,
amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the Commission on Elections. The Court held
that these functions infringed on the constitutional independence of the Commission on
Elections. 36
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the
executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-
accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the
legislative sphere", the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on
Congress. 37 It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive
or judicial power. 38 And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under
the Constitution, 39 including the procedure for enactment of laws and
presentment. cECaHA
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited
to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the
following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the
budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either
of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and
its power of confirmation 40and
(2) investigation and monitoring 41 of the implementation of laws pursuant
to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. 42
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by
the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress
which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve
or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form
of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation
designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to
an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. 43 It radically
changes the design or structure of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to
Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws. 44
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 Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within
the broad horizons of its legislative competence. 45 It can itself formulate the details or it can
assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions
in conformity with those standards. 46 In the latter case, the law must be complete in all its
essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. 47 Thus, what is
left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules
and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or
ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-
making). 48 CSDcTH
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to
respect. 49 Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute 50 and are just as
binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and
effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside
with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court. 51 Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its
stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by
the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress
arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by
the Constitution.
CONSIDERED OPINION OF
MR. JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA
Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to
approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional
principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment. 52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people
by the provision on initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) 53 is
vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of
Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers.
Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee
of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-
chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid. EHTCAa
Additionally, Section 27 (1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return
the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which
shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members
of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with
the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that
House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House
shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the members
voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within
thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a
law as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied) SCcHIE
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or
veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become
a law. In this sense, law-making under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of
the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it
cannot take effect without such presentment even if approved by both chambers of
Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be
approved by both Houses of Congress. 54 Second, it must be presented to and approved by
the President. 55 As summarized by Justice Isagani Cruz 56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J., 57 the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of
Representatives or the Senate except for some measures that must
originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and
title of the measure and its referral by the Senate President or the
Speaker to the proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be
recommended for approval, with or without amendments, sometimes
after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other bills of the
same nature or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under
common authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second
reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in its entirety, scrutinized,
debated upon and amended when desired. The second reading is the
most important stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final
form and copies thereof are distributed at least three days before the
third reading. On the third reading, the members merely register their
votes and explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further
debate is allowed. ATHCDa
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other
chamber, where it will also undergo the three readings. If there are
differences between the versions approved by the two chambers, a
conference committee 58 representing both Houses will draft a
compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and the House of
Representatives will then be submitted to the President for his
consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the
Congress, thereafter authenticated with the signatures of the Senate
President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective
chambers. . . 59
The President's role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval.
Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication. 60
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has
enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be
complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature.
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And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it becomes effective
because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become
available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable
requisite of publication under the due process clause, 61 the determination as to when a law
takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress. 62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity
that a law may be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to
execute the said law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the
President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law. 63
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this
principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the implementing
rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that
allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of
the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as
unconstitutional. While there may be similar provisions of other laws that may be invalidated
for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from invalidating them wholesale but will
do so at the proper time when an appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought
before us. 64 SEcADa
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate
and detach any invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter may continue in
force and effect. The valid portions can stand independently of the invalid section. Without
Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a complete, intelligible and valid law
which carries out the legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through
the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board. CAcDTI
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR
of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in two newspapers of general circulation 66 and
became effective 15 days thereafter. 67 Until and unless the contrary is shown, the IRR are
presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA
9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules
and regulations of the law is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID.
The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA 9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section
13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.
SO ORDERED.

The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of ||| (Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, [August 14, 2008], 584 PHIL 246-
Section 12 of RA 9335 on the other provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law 331)
unconstitutional? No.
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. — If any provision of this Act is
declared invalid by a competent court, the remainder of this Act or any
provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in
force and effect.
In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 65 the Court laid down the
following rules:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as
repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The
presence of a separability clause in a statute creates the presumption
that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of
the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far
independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could
not constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative
intent. . . .
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a
statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity
of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute
dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature
intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have
enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or
connected must fall with them.

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