G.R. Nos.

147578-85 January 28, 2008 On July 14, 1992, the team flagged down for inspection an "SJ Taxi" owned
by respondent. The team impounded the taxi on the ground that its meter
ROLANDO L. BALDERAMA, petitioner, was defective. However, upon inspection and testing by the LTO Inspection
vs. Division, the results showed that contrary to the report of the team, the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, respondents. meter waiting time mechanism of the vehicle was not defective and was
functioning normally. The vehicle was released to respondent.
x------------------------------------------x
On December 2, 1992, respondent, feeling aggrieved of the malicious
G.R. Nos. 147598-605 January 28, 2008 impounding of his vehicle, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a
complaint for bribery and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
ROLANDO D. NAGAL, petitioner, 3019, as amended,2 against herein petitioners as well as Lubrica and de Jesus.
vs. He alleged that prior to the impounding of his taxi, the four LTO officers had
JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, private respondent been collecting "protection money" from him. On February 15, 1992, they
and went to his office and proposed they would not apprehend his drivers and
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, public respondent. impound his vehicles for violations of LTO rules, provided he gives them the
amount of P400.00 every 15th and 30th day of the month. They agreed to the
DECISION reduced amount of P300.00. On the same day, he started giving
them P300.00 and from then on, every 15th and 30th day of the month until
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: June 15, 1992. Thereafter, he failed to give them the agreed amount because
his business was not doing well.
Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the Eventually, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan nine
Joint Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan dated November 17, 2000 in Criminal (9) Informations for violations of Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Cases Nos. 20669, 20670, 20672, 20674, 20675, 20676, 20677, and 20678; Code3 against petitioners and the other members of the team, docketed as
and its Resolution dated March 20, 2001. Criminal Cases Nos. 20669-20677. All the Informations were identically
worded, except the date of the commission of the crimes. For brevity, we
Rolando L. Balderama, petitioner in G.R. Nos. 147578-85, and Rolando D. reproduce the Information in Criminal Case No. 20669 as sample, thus:
Nagal, petitioner in G.R. Nos. 147598-605, were employed with the Land
Transportation Commission (LTO) assigned to the Field Enforcement Division, Criminal Case No. 20669
Law Enforcement Services. Juan S. Armamento, respondent in both cases,
operates a taxi business with a fleet of ten (10) taxi units. That on or about February 15, 1992 or for sometime prior thereto in
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Acting on complaints that taxi drivers in the Ninoy Aquino International Honorable Court, the above-named accused all public officers, being
Airport discriminate against passengers and would transport them to their all employees of the Land transportation Office assigned with the
destinations only on a "contract" basis, the LTO created a team to look into Field Enforcement Division, Law Enforcement Services, committing
the veracity of the complaints. Petitioners in these cases were members of the offense in relation to their office and taking advantage of their
the team, popularly known as "Flying Squad," together with Cipriano L. position, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
Lubrica and Cresencio de Jesus. solicit, demand and receive from Juan Armamento, a taxicab
operator, the amount of P300.00 in consideration for the said
accused refraining from performing their official duty of conducting
 inspections on the taxicab units being operated by said Juan
Armamento to determine any possible violation of LTO rules and
regulations, thereby causing Juan Armamento and the public service
damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
They were also charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended. The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 20678, reads:
That on or about July 14, 1992 or for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, all accused public officers, being employees of
the Land transportation Office, assigned with the Field Enforcement
Division, Law Enforcement Services, while in the discharge of their
official administrative functions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to Juan Armamento, a
taxicab operator, through evident bad faith by apprehending and
impounding one (1) unit of his taxicab with Plate No. PKD-726 for
alleged violation of LTO rules and regulations, in that, its meter is
defective (waiting time not functioning), which was later on
established to be not true, thereby depriving said Juan Armamento
of the use of his taxicab unit for about three (3) days and to realize
income thereon for the same period, as well as incur unnecessary
expenses in effecting the release of his impounded unit from the
impounding area of the LTO.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on June 30, 1994, the accused, assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty. The cases were consolidated and tried jointly. Prior
thereto, they were suspended pendente lite from the service for a period of
ninety (90) days.
On March 5, 1999, accused de Jesus died. The cases against him were
dismissed. The hearing proceeded against petitioners and Lubrica.
In a Decision dated November 17, 2000, the Sandiganbayan found petitioners
and Lubrica guilty of direct bribery in seven (7) of the nine (9) Informations
filed against them and were sentenced in each count "to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 4 years and 2 months, as
minimum, to 5 years, 4 months and 20 days, as maximum, within the range
of prision correccional, and to suffer the penalty of special temporary
disqualification." They were further ordered to pay a fine of P300.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and "to restitute the amount
of P300.00 as alleged in the Informations." They were acquitted in Criminal
Cases Nos. 20671 and 20673 for failure of the prosecution to establish their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioners and Lubrica were also convicted in Criminal Case No. 20678 for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, and were sentenced
to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to
ten (10) years and one (1) day, as maximum. They were also disqualified
perpetually from holding public office and were ordered to indemnify the
respondent the amount of P1,500.00, representing his lost income for the 3-
day period that the taxi cab remained in the LTO impounding unit.
Petitioners and Lubrica filed separate motions for reconsideration arguing
that they were not yet grouped as a team on February 15, 1992, hence, there
could be no conspiracy. While the motion was pending resolution, both
petitioners filed separate motions for new trial based on an affidavit dated
December 22, 2000 executed by respondent recanting his previous testimony
and pointing to Lubrica and de Jesus as the only culprits.
On March 20, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions for
reconsideration and the motions for new trial. In denying the motions for
reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan ruled:
Anent the second argument, the Supreme Court has made these
pronouncements:
Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy, as it may be
shown by acts and circumstances from which may logically
be inferred the existence of a common design, or may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetuated. (see People v. Cabiling, 74 SCRA
785; People v. Tingson, 47 SCRA 243; People v. Alonso, 73
SCRA 484).
 Thus, for failure of the accused to controvert prosecution’s evidence
that all four of them went to the office of the private complainant on
February 15, 1992 and offered him to refrain from subjecting his taxi
units to apprehension for notation of LTO rules, provided that he
comes across with the amount of P400.00 (later reduced to P300.00)
to be delivered twice a month and it was accused Nagal who received
the P300.00 on April 30, 1992, Balderama on May 30, in the presence
of de Jesus, Lubrica on February 15, February 28 together with Nagal,
March 30 and June 15, and that in fact, Manimtim witnessed the
incident which occurred on May 15 and February 15, 1992 and saw
Balderama and de Jesus waiting in the mobile car together with
Nagal, this Court’s finding of conspiracy holds.
In denying the motions for new trial, the Sandiganbayan held:
Retraction of testimonies previously given in Court are viewed with
disfavor. As a general rule, a motion for new trial will not be granted
if based on an affidavit of a witness where the effect is to free the
appellant from participation in the commission of the crime. The
recantation made by the private complainant after the conviction of
the accused is unreliable and deserves scant consideration.
In the case of People v. Soria, 262 SCRA 739, the Supreme Court
declared:
Indeed, it would be dangerous rule to reject the testimony
taken before the Court of justice simply because the witness
later changed his mind for one reason or another, for such a
rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and will place the
investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. It bears stressing that a testimony in court is made
under conditions calculated to discourage and forestall
falsehood.
Both petitioners filed with this Court separate petitions for review
on certiorari, both arguing that the Sandiganbayan erred: (1) in finding that
they are guilty of the offenses charged; (2) in holding that petitioners and
their co-accused acted in conspiracy; and (3) in disregarding the recantation
made by respondent.
On January 4, 2003, Lubrica likewise filed with this Court a petition for review
on certiorari. In our Decision dated February 26, 2007, we denied his petition
for being late. Our Decision became final and was recorded in the Book of
Entries of Judgments on April 20, 2007.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the guilt of the accused, now
petitioners, in these cases has been proved by evidence beyond reasonable
doubt.
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
contains the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2)
that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or
promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in
consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a
crime, or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and
(4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public
officer.4
The Sandiganbayan found the above elements of direct bribery present. It
was duly established that the accused demanded and received P300.00 as
"protection money" from respondent on several dates. As against the
prosecution’s evidence, all that the accused could proffer was alibi and
denial, the weakest of defenses.
Anent Criminal Case No. 20678, to hold a person liable under Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, the concurrence of the following elements must be established
beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution: (1) that the accused is a public
officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the
said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his
or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; (3) that he or
she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private
party; and (4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.5 The Sandiganbayan found
that petitioners and Lubrica participated directly in the malicious
apprehension and impounding of the taxi unit of respondent, causing him
undue injury.6
Settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases before
this Court are binding and conclusive in the absence of a showing that they
come under the established exceptions, among them: 1) when the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2)
the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is a grave abuse of
discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) said
findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; and, 6) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are
premised on the absence of evidence on record.7 We found none of these
exceptions in the present cases.

Petitioners’ prayer for complete acquittal on the strength of respondent’s

affidavit of recantation fails to impress us.

A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and

reservation.8 The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies
previously given in court. It is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by
a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only
scant attention.9 The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction
can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a
monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There
is always the probability that it will later be repudiated.10 Only when there
exist special circumstances in the case which when coupled with the
retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given,
can retractions be considered and upheld.11 As found by the Sandiganbayan,
"(t)here is indubitably nothing in the affidavit which creates doubts on the
guilt of accused Balderama and Nagal."

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision of the

Sandiganbayan dated November 17, 2000 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20669,
20670, 20672, 20674, 20675, 20676, 20677 and 20678 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 169823-24 September 11, 2013 The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004
charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials,
HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner, penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal
vs. Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).

x-----------------------x The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:

G.R. Nos. 174764-65 Criminal Case No. 28001

HERMINIO T. DISINI, Petitioner, That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines,
vs. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President of the
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously offer, promise and give gifts and presents to said Ferdinand E.
DECISION Marcos, consisting of accused DISINI’s ownership of two billion and five
hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining
BERSAMIN, J.: Corporation and four billion (4 billion)shares of stock in The Energy
Corporation, with both shares of stock having then a book value of ₱100.00
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action per share of stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering and Construction
involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the
considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery mechanical and electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power
of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates Plant Project("Project") of the National Power Corporation at Morong,
and close associates. Bataan, all for and in consideration of accused Disini seeking and obtaining
for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse),
The Case the contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to construct,
respectively, the Project, as in fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue
Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari there solutions advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his office
promulgated by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001and Criminal and in consideration of the aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause
Case No. 28002, both entitled People v. Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, to be awarded to said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do
2005 (denying his motion to quash the informations)1 and August 10, 2005 the engineering and architectural design and to construct the Project,
(denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to respectively, which acts constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.
quash),2 alleging that the Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Antecedents Criminal Case No. 28002

That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI,
conspiring together and confederating with the then President of the
Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then the close personal friend and
golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further the husband
of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos and family physicianof the Marcos family, taking
advantage of such close personal relation, intimacy and free access, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with the
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project ("PROJECT") of the National
Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan, request and receive from Burns
and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars
($1,000,000.00),more or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric
Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen Million U.S.
Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then
having business, transaction, and application with the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, all for and in consideration of accused DISINI
securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did secure and obtain, the contract
for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering and
architectural design, and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT, and
subsequently, request and receive subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc.
owned by accused DISINI, and Engineering and Construction Company of Asia
(ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated
amounts and subcontracts constituted kickbacks, commissions and gifts as
material or pecuniary advantages, for securing and obtaining, as accused
DISINI did secure and obtain, through the direct intervention of said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural
contract, and for Westinghouse the construction contract, for the PROJECT.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash,5 alleging that the criminal
actions had been extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did
not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to
quash.6
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment
to obtain the Sandiganbayan’s favorable action on his motion for permission
to travel abroad.7 He then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
promulgated its first assailed resolution denying the motion to quash.8
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17,
2005,9 but the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion on August 10,
2005 through the second assailed resolution.10
Issues
Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari, alleging
that:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
THEOFFENSES CHARGED.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITRULED
THAT SECTION 4, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OFREPUBLIC ACT
NO. 8249 DO NOT APPLY SINCE THEINFORMATIONS WERE
"FILED PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1,2, 14 AND 14-A".
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
ITASSUMED JURISDICTION WITHOUT HAVING MET
THEREQUISITE UNDER SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 THAT
THEACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC OFFICER.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVEABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, DISREGARDED, AND
DENIED PETITIONER’SCONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT
TOPRESCRIPTION.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED
INDETERMINING THE APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED
INDETERMINING THE COMMENCEMENT OF
THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
 3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED
INDETERMINING THE POINT OF INTERRUPTION OF
THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLYABSENT
ELEMENTS IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED TOUPHOLD THE
‘SUFFICIENCY’ OF THE INFORMATIONS INCRIMINAL CASE NOS. 28001
AND 28002, THE RESPONDENTCOURT DEMONSTRATED ITS
PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF ITSDISCRETION.
D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OFDISCRETION IN REFUSING TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONSDESPITE
THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THEPRESCRIBED FORM,
THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING THEACCUSED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RIGHTTO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF THEACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.11
Ruling
The petition for certiorari has no merit.
1.Preliminary Considerations
To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in
G.R. No. 175730 entitled Herminio Disini v. Sandiganbayan,12 which involved
the civil action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
damages (Civil Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v. HerminioT. Disini, et al.)
filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government(PCGG) against
Disini and others.13 The amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged
that Disini had acted in unlawful concert with his co-defendants in acquiring
and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through them is appropriation of public
funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other
acts of corruption,14 as follows:
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant Ferdinand
E. Marcos and the husband of the first cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos.
By reason of this relationship xxx defendant Herminio Disini obtained
staggering commissions from the Westinghouse in exchange for securing the
nuclear power plant contract from the Philippine government.
xxxx
13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves and/or
in unlawful concert, active collaboration and willing participation of
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue
advantage of their association and influence with the latter defendant
spouses in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten assets,
engaged in devices, schemes, and stratagems such as:
xxxx
(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and Asia Industries,
Inc. as conduits through which defendants received, kept, and/or invested
improper payments such as unconscionably large commissions from foreign
corporations like the Westinghouse Corporation; (d) secured special
concessions, privileges and/or benefits from defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, such as a contract awarded to Westinghouse
Corporation which built an inoperable nuclear facility in the country for a
scandalously exorbitant amount that included defendant’s staggering
commissions – defendant Rodolfo Jacob executed for HGI the contract for the
aforesaid nuclear plant;15
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,16 the PCGG transmitted the records of
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman
Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EduardoM.
Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG (G.R. Nos. 92319–92320) dated October 2,
1990, we are hereby transmitting to your Office for appropriate action the
records of the attached criminal case which we believe is similar to the said
Cojuangco case in certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or elements are also
parts of the causes of action in the civil complaints[-]filed with the
Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or assets of the respondents have been
sequestered; (iii) some of the respondents are also party defendants in the
civil cases.
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme Court,
we are constrained to refer to you for proper action the herein-attached case
in view of the suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial
investigation in cases similar to that of the Cojuangco case. x x x
Ostensibly, the PCGG’s letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling in
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (Cojuangco,
Jr.),17 viz:
x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil
complaint against petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially the same
illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal complaints the
Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. x x x.
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against
petitioner’s properties, it was on the basis of a prima facie finding that the
same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal
disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot
possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints
with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the
matter. x x x18
xxxx
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG cannot
inspire belief that it could be impartial in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation of the aforesaid complaints against petitioner and intervenors.
It cannot possibly preside in the said preliminary investigation with an even
hand.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted
if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for
intervention and that the records of the same should be forwarded to the
Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has primary
jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary
investigation and take appropriate action.19 (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its
conduct of the preliminary investigation on the criminal complaints thus
transmitted by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by the Court in
Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,20
with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file the informations
that became the subject of Disini’s motion to quash in Criminal Case
No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
2.
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the offenses charged
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses
charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.He contends
that: (1) the informations did not allege that the charges were being filed
pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and
14-A; (2) the offenses charged were not of the nature contemplated by E.O.
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because the allegations in the informations neither
pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor involved sequestration
cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the Ombudsman instead of by
the PCGG; and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he should be prosecuted in the
regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section 4 (c) of R.A.
No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints initially
filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A
to investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal cases to recover ill-
gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their immediately family but also
of their relatives, subordinates and close associates.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the
Sandiganbayan and defined its jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No.
7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan
was vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
xxxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold
emphasis supplied)
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended.
xxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. x x x x
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal
complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking
over the investigation of Disini only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr.
the directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the
Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office
following its finding of a prima facie case being established against Disini to
sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the
informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002involved the same transaction, specifically the contracts awarded
through the intervention of Disini and President Marcos in favor of Burns &
Roe to do the engineering and architectural design, and Westinghouse to do
the construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project (PNPPP). Given
their sameness in subject matter, to still expressly aver in Criminal Case
No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 that the charges involved the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth was no longer necessary.21 With Criminal Case
No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil Case
No.0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute the criminal prosecutions
against Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked
the PCGG with assisting the President in "the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of
their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship," expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to
recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their
private or public status.
Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of
R.A. No. 824922
applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand Subsection 4b of R.A. No.
8249, the full text of which follows:
xxxx
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other
city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position
of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and
all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying
the position of provincial director and those holding the rank
of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or -controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade‘27’
and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
(bold emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or
higher are mentioned only in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the
plain legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to such public officials.
To include within the ambit of the qualifying clause the persons covered by
Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring
the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disini’s being a
private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public official in the commission of the
offenses charged.
3.
The offenses charged in the
informations have not yet prescribed
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered,
namely: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged;(2) the time
when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the
prescriptive period is interrupted.23
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini had offered,
promised and given gifts and presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts
were in consideration of Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and Westinghouse
Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse) the contracts, respectively, to do the
engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP; and that
President Marcos did award or cause to be awarded the respective contracts
to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime of
corruption of public officials.24
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001
is punished by Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code with the" same penalties
imposed upon the officer corrupted."25 Under the second paragraph of
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct bribery),26 if the gift was
accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act that does
not constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of
not less than three times the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of
the Revised Penal Code,27 the period of prescription for this specie of
corruption of public officials charged against Disini is 15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section
4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A.
No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive
period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v.
Pacificador,28 however, that the longer prescriptive period of 15years would
not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg.
195, which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the longer period
could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused.
With the information alleging the period from 1974 to February1986 as the
time of the commission of the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive
period is 10 years in order to accord with People v. Pacificador .
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides
that prescription starts to run from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses
punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A. No. 332629 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto30 is also enlightening, viz:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the
crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no
knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises,"
does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to this
rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act
No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon
discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of
action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of
limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of
knowing the existence of a cause of action." It was in this accord that the
Court confronted the question on the running of the prescriptive period in
People v. Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R.
No. 130149), and the subsequent cases which Ombudsman Desierto
dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in
a catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law was not known at the
time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery
thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime
which is the subject herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992
after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint
was filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has
not yet set in. The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that "it was
well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these
crimes committed prior to the 1986EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged
connivance and conspiracy among involved public officials and the
beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R.
No. 130817), the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person would
have dared to question the legality of these transactions. (Citations
omitted)31
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period
began to run from 1974, the time when the contracts for the PNPP Project
were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases
were the offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth
instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy among the public
officials involved and the beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended
rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved
party, to have known of the commission of the crimes charged prior to the
EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-
known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it
were discovered only through the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation, resulting
in the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute
Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts,
which partook of a public character, enjoyed the presumption of their
execution having been regularly done in the course of official functions.32
Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have
dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to
expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to
1986.
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records
transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for
the conduct the preliminary investigation.33 In accordance with Article 91 of
the
Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of
Justice,35 the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman
effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription. According to
Panaguiton:36
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act(R.A. No. 3019) and the
Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293),which are both special laws, the
Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more
recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the
Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively
interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act
No. 3326 appears before" investigation and punishment" in the old law, with
the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for
purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive
branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive
or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and
judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification,
any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which
may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense
charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the
filing of the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for
purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of
prescription. Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five
years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses charged,
up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office
of the Ombudsman.
The informations were sufficient in form and substance
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact
necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss
or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no
offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining
whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this ground is whether
the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential
elements of the offense as defined in the law.37 Extrinsic matters or evidence
aliunde are not considered.38
The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the
elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for
the Prosecution to proceed to trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials)
and Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have
sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules
of Court, viz:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall
be included in the complaint or information.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public
officers specifically put forth that Disini, in the period from 1974 to February
1986 in Manila, Philippines, conspiring and confederating with then President
Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts
and presents to President Marcos, who, by taking undue advantage of his
position as President, committed the offense in relation to his office, and in
consideration of the gifts and presents offered, promised and given by Disini,
President Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse
the respective contracts to do the engineering and architectural design of and
to construct the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted of causing the contracts
for the PNPPP to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of
the gifts and promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised
Penal Code are:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or
presents to a public officer; and
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are
given to a public officer under circumstances that will make the public
officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime.
The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave
gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the
offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the
contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his
position and in committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under
circumstances that would make him liable for direct bribery.39
The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public
officer to be placed under circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would
make him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that
President Marcos received or accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an
essential element in direct bribery – the allegation that President Marcos
caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed
to place him under circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense
under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:
1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public
official;
2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or
close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any
person having some business, transaction, application, request or
contract with the government;
 3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close
personal relation has to intervene in the business transaction,
application, request, or contract with the government.

The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of

R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the
offense, considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-
Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the
same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations
and intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2)
Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal relations,
requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00
from Westinghouse, the entities then having business, transaction, and
application with the Government in connection with the PNPPP; (3) President
Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had family or close personal
relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering
and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the
PNPPP.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the
resolutions promulgated on January 17, 2005 and August 10, 2005 by the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case
No. 28002; and DIRECTS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185224 July 29, 2015
AMELIA CARMELA CONSTANTINO ZOLETA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [FOURTH DIVISION] and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Amelia
Carmela Constantino Zoleta assailing the November 5, 2008 decision2 of the
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) in Criminal Case No. 28326.
The case stemmed from an anonymous complaint filed against the petitioner,
Mary Ann Gadian, and Sheryll Desiree Tangan before the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman) for participating in the scheme of
questionable grants and donations to fictitious entities using provincial funds.
As a result of this complaint, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a
special audit in Sarangani Province. Among the irregularities discovered by
the Special Audit Team was a ₱20,000.00 financial assistance given to Women
in Progress (WIP), a cooperative whose members were mostly government
personnel or relatives of the officials of Sarangani Province.
The COA Special Audit Team submitted its report to the Ombudsman which,
in turn, conducted a preliminary investigation. Thereafter, the Ombudsman,
through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charged the petitioner, Vice-
Governor Felipe Constantino, Violeta Bahilidad, Maria Camanay, and
Teodorico Diaz with malversation of public funds by falsification of public
documents defined and penalized under Article 217 in relation to Article
171(2) and Article48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the
Sandiganbayan in an Information which reads: That on January 24, 2002 or
prior or subsequent thereto in Sarangani, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Felipe Katu Constantino, a high-
ranking public officer, being the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sarangani,
Maria D. Camanay, Provincial Accountant, Teodorico F. Diaz, Provincial Board
Member, Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta, Executive Assistant III, all accountable
public officials of the Provincial Government of Sarangani, by reason of the
duties of their office, conspiring and confederating with Violita Bahilidad,
private individual, the public officers, while committing the offense in relation
to office, taking advantage of their respective positions, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, convert and misappropriate the
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in
public funds under their custody, and for which they are accountable, by
falsifying or causing to be falsified the corresponding Disbursement Voucher
No. 101-2002-01-822 and its supporting documents, making it appear that
financial assistance had been sought by Women In Progress, Malungon,
Sarangani, represented by its President, Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta, when in
truth and in fact, the accused knew fully well that no financial assistance had
been requested by the said group and her association, nor did Amelia
Carmela C. Zoleta and her association receive the aforementioned amount,
thereby facilitating the release of the above-mentioned public funds in the
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00)through encashment by
the accused at Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 36481 dated
January 24, 2002 issued in the name of the Violeta Bahilidad, which amount
they subsequently misappropriated to their personal use and benefit and
despite demand, the said accused failed to return the said amount to the
damage and prejudice of the government and the public interest of the
aforesaid sum.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3 (Emphasis in the original.)
On arraignment, the petitioner, Vice-Governor Constantino and Bahilidad
pleaded "not guilty." Diaz and Camanay, on the other hand, remained at
large.
On March 22, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-trial Order.4 The People
of the Philippines, though the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed its
Comment and Ex Parte Motion to Include Testimonial Evidence and Issue to
Pre-trial Order5 essentially claiming that the Pre-trial Order did not reflect
certain testimonial evidence "as stated during the Pre-Trial."6
In its Order7 dated April 5, 2006, the Sandiganbayan amended certain
portions of the Pre-trial Order.
On April 25, 2006, Vice-Governor Constantino died in a vehicular accident,
resulting in the dismissal of the case against him.
In its decision dated November 5,2008, the Sandiganbayan found the
petitioner and Bahilidad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and sentenced them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to sixteen (16)
years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. It also imposed on them the additional penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding any public office. The Sandiganbayan likewise
directed them to pay back the Province of Sarangani ₱20,000.00 plus interest,
computed from January 2002 until fully paid.8
The Sandiganbayan held that Vice-Governor Constantino had control and
custody of the funds by reason of his office, and that his signature was needed
before a grant, donation, or assistance could be released to a requesting
party. According to the Sandiganbayan, Vice-Governor Constantino approved
the ₱20,000.00 disbursement despite the lack of the required
documentation.
The Sandiganbayan further ruled that Vice-Governor Constantino conspired
with the other accused in using a dummy organization WIP to facilitate the
malversation. It explained that the petitioner, who was Vice-Governor
Constantino’s own daughter and who held the position of Executive Assistant
III in his office, committed the following acts: (a) ordered Mary Ann Gadian, a
computer operator at the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Sarangani, to make a letter-request for financial assistance using a
nonexistent cooperative; (b) directed Jane Tangan, the Local Legislative Staff
Officer of the Office of the Vice-Governor, to falsify the signature of WIP’s
secretary, Melanie Remulta, on the request-letter; and (c) certified and
approved the disbursement voucher; and then presented it to Diaz, Camanay,
and Vice-Governor Constantino for their respective signatures.
The Sandiganbayan likewise ruled that falsification was a necessary means to
commit the crime of malversation.
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
In the present petition, the petitioner argued that: (a) the Sandiganbayan’s
November 5, 2008 decision in Criminal Case No. 28326 was void because one
of its signatories, Justice Gregory Ong, was not a natural-born Filipino citizen
per Kilosbayan Foundation v. Exec. Sec. Ermita,9 and hence not qualified to
be a Sandiganbayan justice; (b) the totality of evidence presented by the
prosecution was insufficient to overcome the petitioner’s presumption of
innocence; and (c) the Sandiganbayan denied her due process when it issued
its Order dated April 5, 2006, amending certain portions of the pre-trial order
without any hearing.
In its Comment,10 the People countered that Kilosbayan merely required
Justice Ong to complete "all necessary steps, through the appropriate
adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural born Filipino
citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship." It added that
Kilosbayan did not categorically rule that Justice Ong was not a natural-born
Filipino who was disqualified from accepting an appointment to the position
of Associate Justice of this Court. The People further pointed out that the
Court in Topacio v. Ong11 already acknowledged Justice Ong’s actual physical
possession and exercise of the functions of the office of an Associate Justice
of the Sandiganbayan.
The People likewise argued that the issue of sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence is a question of fact which is beyond the province of a petition for
review on certiorari. It nonetheless maintained that the Sandiganbayan’s
findings were supported by the evidence on record.
On the third issue, the People maintained that a person charged with willful
malversation can validly be convicted of malversation through negligence.
OUR RULING
We DENY the petition.
I. The Sandiganbayan’s November 5, 2008 decision is valid
The petitioner’s reliance in Kilosbayan to challenge the validity of the
Sandiganbayan’s decision is misplaced.
We point out that Kilosbayana rose from a petition for certiorari filed by both
Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan – both non-governmental
organizations engaged in public and civic causes – assailing then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s appointment of Justice Ong as an Associate Justice
of the Court on the ground that the latter was not a natural born citizen.
Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, Kilosbayan did not rule that Justice Ong
was not a natural-born Filipino (and hence unqualified to assume the position
of a Sandiganbayan Justice). The Court merely stated that Justice Ong cannot
accept an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court or assume the position of that office, "until he shall have successfully
completed all the necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial
proceedings in court to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and
correct the records of his birth and citizenship."12
At any rate, the Court has long settled the issue of Justice Ong’s citizenship.
After the Court promulgated Kilosbayan, Justice Ong immediately filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 264, Pasig City, a petition for the
amendment/ correction/ supplementation or annotation of an entry in [his]
Certificate of Birth, docketed as S.P. Proc No. 11767-SJ. In its decision of
October 24, 2007, the RTC13 granted Justice Ong's petition to be recognized
as a natural-born Filipino. Consequently, the RTC directed the Civil Registrar
of San Juan, Metro Manila to annotate in the Certificate of Birth of Justice
Ong its (RTC’s) decision.
The RTC denied the motions moving for a reconsideration of its decision.
In its six-page resolution in 2013, the Court En Banc also held that Justice Ong
was a natural-born citizen, thus:
The pronouncements of the Court in both GR No. 179895 and GR No. 180543,
and the finality of the decision rendered by the RTC on October 24, 2007,in
S.P. No. 11767-SJrecognizing Justice Ong as a natural born citizen of the
Philippines and directing the correction of the existing records of his birth and
citizenship have already definitively settled the subject of the query posed by
SP Villa-Ignacio.14
Even without this ruling, we hold that Justice Ong was a de facto officer during
the period of his incumbency as a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. A de facto
officer is one who is in possession of an office and who openly exercises its
functions under color of an appointment or election, even though such
appointment or election may be irregular.15 It is likewise defined as one who
is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of
authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment,
however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent be not a mere
volunteer.16 Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are as valid for all
purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons
who are interested therein are concerned.17
In the light of these considerations, we find no basis to invalidate the
November 5, 2008 decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28326.
II. Only questions of law should be raised in a Rule 45 petition
It is settled that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions
and final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited only to questions of law; it
does not review the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan which, as a general
rule, are conclusive upon the Court.
A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts. On the other hand, a question of fact exists
when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. The resolution of a question of fact necessarily involves a calibration of
the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and the relevance
of surrounding circumstances, and the probability of specific situations.18
In the present petition, the petitioner alleges that the presented evidence
were insufficient to support a conviction. She thus seeks a re-evaluation of
the Sandiganbayan’s appreciation of the evidence presented, including the
credibility of witnesses and the probative value of their testimonies. The
petitioner likewise wants the Court to take a closer look into her claim that
the charges against them were politically motivated.
To our mind, the Sandiganbayan’s findings that: the testimonies of Gadian
and Tangan were credible and worthy of belief; WPI was an unregistered
cooperative; the signatures of the petitioner and her co-accused on the
disbursement voucher were authentic; Remulta’s signature had been forged;
and the charges against the accused were not politically motivated, are
questions of fact, as these matters were resolved after a calibration of the
pieces of evidence presented during trial. The Court will not anymore weigh
these pieces of evidence in the absence of a clear showing that these findings
had been arrived at arbitrarily or are devoid of support in the records.
At any rate, we hold that the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted the
petitioner of the complex crime of malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents.
Malversation may be committed by appropriating public funds or property;
by taking or misappropriating the same; by consenting, or through
abandonment or negligence, by permitting any other person to take such
public funds or property; or by being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation
or malversation of such funds or property.19
The elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, are the following: (a) that the offender be
a public officer; (b) that he had custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office; (c) that those funds or property were public
funds or property for which he was accountable; and (d) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment
or negligence, permitted another person to take them. All these elements
have been established by the prosecution.
First, it is undisputed that all the accused, except Bahilidad, are all public
officers. A public officer is defined in the Revised Penal Code as "any person
who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions
in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or
subordinate official, of any rank or class. Constantino was the Vice-Governor
of Sarangani Province, while the petitioner, Camanay, and Diaz were
occupying the positions of Executive Assistant (at the Office of the Vice-
Governor), Provincial Accountant, and Provincial Board Member,
respectively.
Second, the funds misappropriated are public in character, as they were
funds belonging to the Province of Sarangani.
Third, Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay were accountable public
officers. Under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, an
accountable public officer is a public officer who, by reason of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property. The Local Government Code
expanded this definition with regard to local government officials. Section
340 of the LGC reads:
Section 340. Persons Accountable for Local Government Funds. – Any officer
of the local government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession
or custody of local government funds shall be accountable and responsible
for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the provisions of this title.
Other local officials, though not accountable by the nature of their duties,
may likewise be similarly held accountable and responsible for local
government funds through their participation in the use or application
thereof. (Emphasis ours.)
Local government officials become accountable public officers either (1)
because of the nature of their functions; or (2) on account of their
participation in the use or application of public funds.20
As a required standard procedure, the signatures of, among others, the Vice-
Governor and the Provincial Accountant are needed before any disbursement
of public funds can be made. No checks can be prepared and no payment can
be effected without their signatures on a disbursement voucher and the
corresponding check. In other words, any disbursement and release of public
funds require their approval. Thus, Constantino and Camanay, in their
capacities as Vice-Governor and Provincial Accountant, had control and
responsibility over the subject funds.
Finally, Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take the public funds when they signed
Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822. The term voucher, when used
in connection with disbursement of money, implies some instrument that
shows on what account or by what authority a particular payment has been
made, or that services have been performed which entitle the party to whom
it is issued to payment. Corollarily, when an authorized person approves a
disbursement voucher, he certifies to the correctness of the entries therein,
among others: that the expenses incurred were necessary and lawful, the
supporting documents are complete, and the availability of cash therefor. He
also attests that the person who performed the services or delivered the
supplies, materials, or equipment is entitled to payment.21
Notably, the signatures of Camanayand Vice-Governor Constantino also
appeared on the Allotment and Obligation Slip (ALOBS) and in Land Bank
Check No. 0000036481, respectively. Their respective signatures in these
documents allowed Bahilidad to encash ₱20,000.00. We also point out that
although the purported request was made by the WIP, the check was made
payable to a private person, that is, Bahilidad. According to Helen Cailing, the
leader of the COA Special Audit Team, there were no supporting documents
attached to this disbursement voucher proving that Bahilidad was indeed the
treasurer of WIP.
We also agree with the Sandiganbayan’s ruling that falsification was a
necessary means to commit the crime of malversation. Article 171,
paragraphs (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic
minister. - The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any
of the following acts:
xxxx
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate;
xxxx
In the present case, the records showed that the petitioner ordered Tangan
to sign above the name of Remulta in the letter-request to make it appear
that the latter, as WIP Secretary, consented to the request for financial
assistance. We note, too, that this letter-request was made on January 24,
2002, but Gadianante dated it to January 7, 2002, so that the transaction
would not look suspicious (considering that both the disbursement voucher
and check were also dated January 24, 2002).
The Presence of Conspiracy
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
does not need to be proven by direct evidence and may be inferred from
the conduct ―before, during, and after the commission of the crime ―
indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of
sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present
when one concurs with the criminal design of another, as shown by an overt
act leading to the crime committed. It may be deduced from the mode and
manner of the commission of the crime.22
In the present case, the records established with moral certainty that the
petitioner and her co-accused acted in concert to achieve a common
objective. The presence of conspiracy between the petitioner and her co-
accused was explained by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
xxxx
Moreover, the testimony of Gadian and Tangan indubitably established that
accused Constantino and Zoleta took advantage of their official positions.
Zoleta ordered Gadian to make a request using a nonexistent cooperative.
She ordered Tangan to falsify the signature of Remulta in the request letter.
Both followed the directive of Zoleta, being their superior, the Executive
Assistant and the daughter of the Vice-Governor who places her initials
before the Vice-Governor affixes his own signature. Despite the irregularity,
accused Constantino approved the disbursement. The facts taken together
would prove the existence of conspiracy. Zoleta, as president of an in existent
association and a co-terminous employee at the office of her father, initiated
the request for obligation of allotments and certified and approved the
disbursement voucher. There is no doubt that Constantino facilitated the
illegal release of the fund by signing the questioned voucher. Without the
signatures of accused Constantino, Zoleta, and Bahilidad, the amount could
not have been disbursed on that particular day. When the voucher with its
supporting documents was presented to accused Constantino, Diaz, and
Camanay for approval and signature, they readily signed them without
further ado, despite the lack of proper documentation and noncompliance of
the rules. Zoleta had contact with the payee of the check, Bahilidad, and
received the amount. Their combined acts, coupled with the falsification of
the signature of Remulta, all lead to the conclusion that the accused
conspired to defraud the government.
The concurrence of wills or unity of purpose and action between the accused
is indubitable.1âwphi1 A careful scrutiny of the records revealed that indeed:
(a) the petitioner signed the letter-request for financial assistance, and this
was approved by Diaz and Vice-Governor Constantino; (b) the ALOBS was
signed by Camanay; (c) Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822 was
signed by Vice-Governor Constantino, Diaz and Camanay; and (d) Land Bank
Check No. 0000036481 was signed by Vice-Governor Constantino.
The connivance between the accused is made more glaring by the fact that
the entire transaction – from the letter-request, to the approval of the
disbursement voucher, until the processing and release of the check – was
completed in only one day. We note, too, that the disbursement had been
approved even without the required supporting documents such as the
Articles of Cooperation and Certificate from the Cooperative Development
Authority. There was also noncompliance with the COA-prescribed auditing
and accounting guidelines on the release of fund assistance to NGOs, such as
the required monitoring and inspection report either by the Office of the
Provincial Agriculturist or the Provincial Engineering Office. As earlier stated,
the purported request was made by WIP, but the check was made payable to
Bahilidad (despite the COA’s findings that there were no supporting
documents proving that she was WIP’s treasurer). We are aware that
Bahilidad was acquitted by this Court in G.R. No. 18519523 – a case where she
questioned her conviction by the Sandiganbayan. This does not preclude us,
however, from ruling that the other accused, i.e., Vice-Governor Constantino,
Diaz, Camanay, and the petitioner, conspired with each other to attain a
common objective. We point out that Bahilidad’s acquittal was anchored on
the fact that she had no hand in the preparation, processing or disbursing of
the check issued in her name. It cannot be denied in the present case that the
petitioner, Vice-Governor Constantino, Diaz, and Camanay, all participated in
the preparation and processing of Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-
82224 as evidenced by their respective signatures affixed there. Sanggunian
Panlalawigan Bookbinder25 Gadian, in fact, witnessed Vice-Governor
Constantino, Camanay, and Diaz sign these documents.
In Barriga v. Sandiganbayan,26 we ruled that:
It must be stressed that a public officer who is not in charge of public funds
or property by virtue of her official position, or even a private individual, may
be liable for malversation or illegal use of public funds or property if such
public officer or private individual conspires with an accountable public
officer to commit malversation or illegal use of public funds or property.
III. No denial of due process
The petitioner claims that he was denied due process when the
Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution’s motion to amend certain portions
of the pre-trial order without any hearing. In essence, the petitioner argues
that she could not be convicted of malversation through consent,
abandonment, or negligence because this allegation was not contained in the
Information.
The petitioner’s argument lacks merit.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or
the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the
felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same
offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. All that
is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had
received public funds, that he did not have them in his possession when
demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his
failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused
is hardly necessary as long as the accused cannot explain satisfactorily the
shortage in his accounts.27
In People v. Consigna, et al.,28 the Court first ruled that an accused charged
with wilful malversation can be validly convicted of malversation through
negligence where the evidence sustains the latter mode of perpetrating the
offense.
Similarly, in People v. Ochoa,29 the Court stated that [e]ven when the
Information charges wilful malversation, conviction for malversation through
negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode
of commission of the offense.
In Tubola, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,30 we affirmed the accused’s conviction of
malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and
reasoned out as follows:
Besides, even on the putative assumption that the evidence against
petitioner yielded a case of malversation by negligence but the information
was for intentional malversation, under the circumstances of this case his
conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in order.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or
the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the
felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same
offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. A
possible exception would be when the mode of commission alleged in the
particulars of the indictment is so far removed from the ultimate
categorization of the crime that it may be said due process was denied by
deluding the accused into an erroneous comprehension of the charge against
him. That no such prejudice was occasioned on petitioner nor was he
beleaguered in his defense is apparent from the records of this case.
(Underscoring and emphasis in the original.)

The Proper Penalty

We modify the maximum term of the penalty imposed on the petitioner by

the Sandiganbayan, from sixteen (16) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11)
days to eighteen (18) years, two (2) months, and twenty one (21) days of
reclusion temporal, in accordance with Articles 48 and 21 7 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.31 WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the November 5, 2008 decision of the
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) in Criminal Case No. 28326 with the
MODIFICATION that the maximum term of the penalty imposed on the
petitioner be increased from sixteen ( 16) years, five ( 5) months, and eleven
(11) days to eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and twenty one (21) days of
reclusion temporal.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156685 July 27, 2004
NAZARIO N. MARIFOSQUE, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure which assails the decision dated September 23, 2002 and the
Resolution dated January 3, 2003 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
17030 finding petitioner Nazario Marifosque guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of direct bribery, defined and penalized under the second
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Petitioner was charged with direct bribery in an Information which reads:
That on or about October 13, 1990 in Legazpi City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused a public officer being a qualified member of the Police Force
of Legazpi City, now under the Philippine National Police, taking
advantage of his official/public position and committing the crime
herein charged in relation to his office, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously demand, obtain and/or receive directly
from Yu Su Pong1 and Hian Hian Sy2 the total amount of FIVE
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P5,800.00) Philippine Currency
in consideration for his recovery from alleged robbers, eighteen
Shellane gas filled cylinder/s tanks, to the damage and prejudice of the
aforementioned victims in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The antecedent facts as culled from the records are as follows:
On October 13, 1990 at around 5:00 in the afternoon, Hian Hian Yu Sy and her
husband, Arsenio Sy, went to the office of Captain Alberto Salvo, Chief of the
Intelligence and Operating Division stationed at the Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) in Region 5, to report the robbery of Shellane tanks at the gasoline
station of her father, Yu So Pong, and the alleged extortion attempt by
petitioner, Police Sergeant Narciso Marifosque, in exchange for the recovery
of the lost items. Captain Salvo and his men set up a plan to entrap the
petitioner. Hian Hian Yu Sy prepared the pay-off money in the amount of
P4,800.00 and listed down the serial numbers of the bills. The pay-off was
scheduled at 7:00 in the evening of that day in Golden Grace Department Store
which was owned by Yu So Pong. At around 6:15 p.m., Captain Calvo and his
men arrived at the target area and strategically positioned themselves outside
the Golden Grace Department Store to await the arrival of the suspect. Shortly
thereafter, petitioner Marifosque arrived on board a tricycle. He went inside
the store and demanded the money from Hian Hian Yu Sy and Yu So Pong. The
latter handed to him the marked money, which was wrapped in a newspaper.
When petitioner stepped out of the store, Arsenio Sy gave the pre-arranged
signal, whereupon the arresting operatives swooped down upon the suspect
and arrested him.
Hian Hian Yu Sy testified that petitioner demanded the amount of P7,200.00
but she bargained for P4,800.00 only because that was all she had at the time.
She proposed that petitioner return the following morning to pick up the
balance.
By way of defense, petitioner Marifosque testified that in the morning of
October 13, 1990, a police asset came to his house and reported that he
witnessed a robbery at the gasoline station of Yu So Pong. Petitioner went to
the gasoline station of Yu So Pong and relayed to him the information.
Thereafter, petitioner and Yu So Pong proceeded to the police station to
report the robbery to the desk officer, PFC Jesus Fernandez, who then
dispatched petitioner and a certain Pat. Garcia to conduct an investigation. As
they were leaving the police station, the asset approached petitioner asking if
he could get P350.00 per cylinder tank as his reward. Petitioner relayed the
message to Yu So Pong, who said he was amenable "if that [was] the only way
to recover the cylinders and to apprehend the robbers."4 Based on information
furnished by the asset, the police investigators proceeded to the house of
Edgardo Arnaldo in San Roque Legazpi City, where they found the stolen gas
tanks. The group loaded the gas tanks into the vehicle. Meanwhile, Arnaldo
arrived. Petitioner did not arrest him at that time because he promised to lead
them to the other stolen cylinder tanks.5 The group returned to the police
station where petitioner made a written report of the recovery of the gas
tanks.
Elmer Arnaldo testified that he worked as an asset of the Legazpi City police
force and occasionally received rewards from the police for any information
of the criminal activities. On October 13, 1990 at around 4:00 in the morning,
he went out to buy bread and saw three individuals stealing gas cylinder tanks
in the nearby gasoline station. He later visited petitioner and reported to him
the robbery. He went back to his house to feed the chickens. Sometime
thereafter, he dropped by the police station to discuss with petitioner the
reward of P350.00 per cylinder tank recovered. Petitioner gave him 1,000.00
and told him to return at 6:00 p.m. for the remainder. At 7:00 p.m., he and
petitioner went to the store of Yu So Pong to collect the balance of the reward
money. Petitioner went inside the store and Arnaldo, who was left outside,
saw a woman giving him a folded newspaper. Suddenly, armed men
apprehended the petitioner, so he ran away.
On September 23, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting
petitioner of direct bribery, the dispositive portion of which reads:6
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and considering that the agreed
act, which did not constitute a crime, was executed, judgment is
hereby rendered finding the accused NAZARIO MARIFOSQUE Y NUÑEZ
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Bribery,
defined and penalized under the second paragraph of Art. 210 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended. The accused is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 3 years 6 months and 5
days of Prision Correccional medium and maximum periods as the
Minimum and 7 years, 8 months and 9 days of Prision
Mayor minimum and medium periods as the Maximum considering
that there is no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance and a fine in
the amount of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00). The accused
shall also suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
SO ORDERED.7
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner interposes the
present appeal raising the following issues:
I
THE ACT OF PETITIONER – RECEIPT OF THE SUMS OF MONEY FOR
DELIVERY TO HIS ASSET – DOES NOT CONSITUTE AN OFFENSE
DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE
210 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED.
II
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THE
PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
DIRECT BRIBERY. 8
In the first assigned error, petitioner contends that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses do not demonstrate with certainty that the receipt of
the alleged "bribe money" constitutes the act punishable by the offense as
defined by the Revised Penal Code. He draws attention to the following
findings of fact by the appellate court, namely: (1) that he was not the one
who asked for reward from private complainant Yu So Pong but the asset; and
(2) that Hian Hian Yu Sy had no direct knowledge of the alleged transaction,
i.e., the demand for money in consideration of the return/recovery of twenty-
one Shellane gas tanks, between private complainant Yu So Pong and the
accused.
In the second assigned error, petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because there was no competent
evidence to prove that the amount was really intended for him and not for his
asset. He anchors his defense on the fact that: (1) he merely relayed to Yu So
Pong the asset’s request for a reward money; and (2) Yu So Pong was
agreeable to the request. He further contends that the act of receiving money
for the asset is not one of those punishable under the law as direct bribery.
Petitioner cannot feign innocence and profess good faith since all the indicia
point to his guilt and malicious intent.
First, petitioner did not introduce his asset or mention his name to Yu So Pong
or his daughter at the time of the illegal transaction. His claim that he
previously gave P1,000.00 to his asset, which purportedly represented a
partial payment of the reward money, was not corroborated by his asset.
When he was arrested and interrogated at Camp Ibalon, he made no attempt
to present his asset to explain and justify his receipt of the reward money.
Instead, he accepted his arrest and investigation with an air of resignation,
which is characteristic of a culprit who is caught red-handed. Captain Calvo,
one of the arresting CIS officers, testified that petitioner attempted to give
back the money to Yu So Pong when they were about to arrest him.9 This was
a clear showing that he was well aware of the illegality of his transaction. Had
he been engaged in a legitimate deal, he would have faced courageously the
arresting officers and indignantly protested the violation of his person, which
is the normal reaction of an innocent man. Instead, he meekly submitted to
the indignity of arrest and went along the eventual investigation with the
docility of a man at a loss for a satisfactory explanation.
Second, petitioner’s solicitous and overly eager conduct in pursuing the
robbery incident betrays an intention not altogether altruistic. On the
contrary, it denotes a corrupt desire on his part to obtain pecuniary benefits
from an illegal transaction. At the time petitioner was notified by his asset of
the robbery incident, he was no longer on duty, having been assigned to the
night shift the day before. He was too overzealous to meet with Yu So Pong
although the case was already assigned to another police investigator. His
justification that he wanted to encourage the victim to pursue the case against
the robbers rings hollow and untrue. It is clearly an afterthought. As shown in
the testimony of prosecution witness Hian Hian Yu Sy, petitioner met with Yu
So Pong for no apparent reason than to demand money. There was no
mention of any attempt by him to investigate, much less encourage the victims
to file charges against the malefactors. More telling is petitioner’s persistence
in obtaining the monetary reward for the asset although the latter was no
longer complaining about the P1,000.00 he supposedly received earlier, thus:
Pros. Agcaoili:
Since the asset was not complaining at the time, you should
not have gone back anymore to Yu So Pong?
Accused Marifosque:
Why would I not go back? My purpose was to encourage him
to pursue the matter. If he would not pursue this matter, then
we would be the laughing stock of the thieves we arrested and
then we cannot charge them.
Q. So Mr. Witness, you went to Yu So Pong after you received the
P1,000.00 without any intention to receive additional amount for the
asset, am I right?
A: No, ma’am. That was not the purpose. In fact, Yu So Pong had told
me earlier to see him again in order to prepare for the cash and to see
if an additional amount would be needed for my asset.10
While petitioner supposedly supports the "reward system," yet he denied that
he previously gave incentives to the assets for the recovery of stolen items, to
wit:
PJ:
Sometimes you would ask for reward for your assets?
A: I myself voluntarily give them a reward.
Q: That is not the question. The question is, in the past when you
would recover stolen articles, would you ask the owner of the articles
to give some incentive or tip to your assets?
A: That has not happened, your Honor.
PJ:
Next question.
Pros. Agcaoili:
And, in fact, Mr. Witness, you did not give any incentive to
your asset on that incident that happened in the house of Yu
So Pong which is the subject matter of this case?
 A. For that particular case alone, Mr. Yu so Pong gave me something
and I gave it to my asset.
xxx xxx xxx
Pros. Agcaoili
In fact, Mr. Witness, you said that these tips were just given
as an incentive?
A I would be the one to give the incentives to my asset. But in that
particular instance, the P1,000.00 which Mr. Yu So Pong gave me, I
turned it over to my own asset.
Q To your own assessment, Mr. Witness, is P1,000.00 not enough to
serve as an incentive to your asset?
A I do not know whether P1,000.00 is enough or not. The fact, is, that
was the amount I got from Yu So Pong which I gave to my asset.
PJ:
Was the asset complaining that was not enough?
A. No, Your Honor.11
Third, the conduct of the petitioner during the recovery of the stolen articles
leaves much to be desired. He did not apprehend Edgardo Arnaldo or invite
him for investigation although the cylinder tanks were found in his possession.
His flimsy excuse that the latter promised to deliver additional cylinder tanks
is unworthy of credence considering that, as a police officer with years of
experience, he should have known that the proper action, under the
circumstances, was to at least invite him to the police precinct for
investigation. Curiously, the prime suspect Edgardo Arnaldo turned out to be
the brother of petitioner’s police asset who, we recall, directed the police
officers to the location of the stashed articles. This strange coincidence may
well indicate a conspiracy between the petitioner and the thieves to steal from
the victim and later cash in on the recovery of the lost items.
In the final analysis, this case boils down to an issue of credibility. In this regard,
the prosecution witnesses gave clear and straightforward testimonies. The
Sandiganbayan did not err in giving full weight and credence to their version
of the events. Petitioner’s conviction must be affirmed.
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code
consists of the following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2)
that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or
promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration
of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to
refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the
crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
There is no question that petitioner was a public officer within the
contemplation of Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, which includes all
persons "who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in
the Philippine Government, or shall perform in said government or any of its
branches, public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official or any
rank or class." At the time of the incident, petitioner was a police sergeant
assigned to the Legazpi City Police Station. He directly received the bribe
money from Yu So Pong and his daughter Hian Hian Yu Sy in exchange for the
recovery of the stolen cylinder tanks, which was an act not constituting a crime
within the meaning of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. The act of
receiving money was connected with his duty as a police officer.
The instant case falls within the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code, which is quoted hereunder:
Art. 210. Direct Bribery. — Any public officer who shall agree to
perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the
performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through
the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in
its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than three
times the value of the gift, in addition to the penalty corresponding to
the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution
of an act which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed
 said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding
paragraph; and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the
officer shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its medium
period and a fine of not less than twice the value of such gift.

If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make
the public officer refrain from doing something which it was his official
duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine
not less than three times the value of the gift.

In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the

culprit shall suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.

While the Sandiganbayan imposed the correct prison term in applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the amount of the fine is erroneous. Paragraph
1 of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to paragraph 2 thereof,
provides that if the act does not constitute a crime, the fine shall not be less
than three times the value of the amount received. Evidence shows that
petitioner received an aggregate amount of P5,800.00.12 He should therefore
be ordered to pay a fine not less than 3 times its value. Accordingly, a fine of
P18,000.00 is deemed reasonable.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of

the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 17030, finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Bribery and imposing upon
him the indeterminate prison term of 3 years, 6 months, and 5 days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 7 years, 8 months, and 9 days of prision mayor,
as maximum, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine is increased
to P18,000.00.

In addition, petitioner shall suffer the penalty of special temporary

disqualification.

SO ORDERED.