Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

ISSN: 1057-610X (Print) 1521-0731 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20

The London Bombers as “Self-Starters”: A Case

Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the
Emergence of Autonomous Cliques

Aidan Kirby

To cite this article: Aidan Kirby (2007) The London Bombers as “Self-Starters”: A Case Study
in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques, Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 30:5, 415-428, DOI: 10.1080/10576100701258619

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100701258619

Published online: 22 Mar 2007.

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 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30:415–428, 2007
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/10576100701258619

The London Bombers as “Self-Starters”: A Case

Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the
Emergence of Autonomous Cliques

AIDAN KIRBY
Hicks and Associates, Inc.
McLean, Virginia, USA
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The emergence of “self-starter” cells represents a distinct and significant development

in the post–9/11 era. These autonomous groups share an ideological affinity with the
original Al Qaeda network, but they operate in the absence of any institutionalized
training or recruitment. As demonstrated by the case of the London bombers,
conventional conceptions of “networks” are ill-suited to analyze groups of this nature.
A broader range of sociological models are necessary to deconstruct how and why
they form. This phenomenon must be examined with reference to the Internet as an
operational tool and “democratizer of violence.”

Amidst the entire landscape of post-9/11 radical Islamic threats, the emergence of the “self-
starter cell” represents a distinct and novel phenomenon.1 This term refers to groups that
have little or no affiliation with the original Al Qaeda network, made up of individuals who
have never attended a formal terrorism training camp and whose attacks occur seemingly
spontaneously, without orders from a member of the known Al Qaeda leadership. There
have been a number of cases since 9/11 that embody this archetype to varying degrees
including the groups that perpetrated the attacks in Casablanca in 2003, the Madrid attacks
of 2004, and the Hofstad Group of the Netherlands. This trend has often been described
as the “decentralization of Al Qaeda” or the growth of Salafism as a social movement.
These descriptions fail to fully capture the significance of the self-starter phenomenon and
consequently neglect crucial analytic distinctions. The self-starter phenomenon is largely
driven by social dynamics but it is infused with radical Islamic ideology and rhetoric. It has
vital implications for the study of contemporary radical Islamic terrorism or jihadism and
represents a more dramatic departure from previous activity than much analysis indicates.
A case study of the “London bombers” helps to shed some light on this trend.
Understanding the emergence of self-starters will require greater use of sociological
analysis. It will also demand that conventional conceptions of network theory (employing
concepts such as “mastermind” and “recruiter”) cease to be the sole underlying framework

Received 18 April 2006; accepted 21 May 2006.

The author thanks Daniel Benjamin, Shawn Brimley, Marc Sageman, and Julianne Smith for
their helpful insights.
This article was drafted while the author was affiliated with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington, DC.
Address correspondence to Aidan Kirby, Hicks and Associates, Inc., 1710 SAIC Drive, Suite
1300, McLean, VA 22102, USA. E-mail: aidan.e.kirby@saic.com

415
 416 A. Kirby

for understanding these groups’ composition and actions. The London bombers were
essentially an autonomous clique whose motivations, cohesiveness, and ideological
grooming occurred in the absence of any organized network or formal entry into the
jihad. The implicit reliance on organizational theory-based models, informed by the
hierarchical nature of Al Qaeda in the 1990s and immediate post-9/11 era, has characterized
investigations into this case. But it has largely failed to provide a clear understanding of the
drivers. These tendencies reflect a failure to take into account the highly dynamic nature of
the jihadist threat. A more sophisticated and nuanced approach must be applied to analyze
the dynamics of self-starter cells—but first they must be recognized as distinct.
It is vital to note that technological developments have been instrumental in the
emergence of this new brand of terrorism. The Internet’s provision of operational instruction
has broadened the existing spectrum of security threats and jihadist opportunities. Its
significance in removing practical obstacles and de-formalizing the jihadist experience has
been profound, and the case of the London bombers must be reviewed in this context.
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Furthermore, the unique sociopolitical and demographic conditions present in Western

Europe render this region vulnerable to future incidents of “self-starter terrorism.” For this
reason it is crucial for analysts, security professionals, and policymakers to sift through the
analytic confusion that has ensued in the aftermath of the London attack and embrace a
new paradigm to interpret cases of this nature going forward.

Context
In identifying and analyzing the self-starter phenomenon it is important to begin by placing
it in the appropriate context. As many scholars have demonstrated, the global jihad as a
movement has always been characterized by a degree of self-selection and autonomy. This
discussion will draw on an existing foundation of analysis and scholarship that has invoked
related concepts including that of cliques, “franchises,” “amateurs,” “free-lancers,” and the
“bunch of guys” scenario.2 Therefore, the emergence of self-starters should be interpreted
as a development that reaches a crucial new threshold in a preexisting environment, rather
than a radical break with all previous patterns. From both an operational and motivational
standpoint many features characterize self-starters, but the level of autonomy they exhibit
provides the crucial distinction. The current global context is one where both the necessity
and the ability for small groups to connect to a larger more organized network have been,
almost simultaneously, radically diminished. Now, in contrast to many jihadist cells of
the past, self-starters demonstrate the features of being largely, if not completely, self-
radicalizing and more importantly, self-activating.

The Bombers
In the weeks and months after the attacks, a significant amount of information regarding
the bombers’ identities slowly surfaced. The bombers were all British; Mohammed Sidique
Khan, 30; Shehzad Tanweer, 22, and Hasib Hussain, 18, were natives and of Pakistani
descent, whereas the fourth, Germaine Lindsay, 19, was a Jamaican immigrant who had
converted to Islam at age 15. The first three had grown up around the Leeds area in a
working-class neighborhood populated mainly by Muslim immigrants. Of the group, there
is more information available on Mohammed Sidique Khan than on any of the other three.
He had held a higher profile in the community and had even been interviewed for the Times
of London Educational Supplement in 2002.
 The London Bombers as “Self-Starters” 417

Based on media reports his is a portrait of a good-looking, personable man, well-liked

in his community and respected for his commitment to working with children.3 Khan was
not raised in a strictly religious household, rather it was quite lenient and he was a strong
student who had gone on to pursue higher education at a local university. But although some
described Khan as a “model immigrant” based on his seemingly well-integrated lifestyle,
other reports suggest that he, like many second generation European Muslims, experienced
some tension over his identity. One account has described Khan as a teenager who had
sought every way to “shed his ethnic skin,” who often went by the nickname “Sid” and who
had been remembered as wearing a leather jacket and cowboy boots, praising the virtues of
American life after a brief trip there at age 15.4 After obtaining his university degree he had
secured a job as a teaching assistant at Hillside Primary School. There he won the affection
of his co-workers and the local parents, but the job paid a modest salary—one upon which it
proved difficult to support his wife and young child. And according to a once close friend of
Khan’s it was after marrying his wife Hasina—a Hindu woman, that Khan was ostracized
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by his family and that after that point they “wanted nothing to do with him.”5 It was shortly
before the attacks that Khan’s wife had announced she was pregnant with their second child
and according to friends he was overjoyed and claimed that it was “Allah’s will.”
Shehzad Tanweer was economically the most well-off of the four. His father was a
successful merchant and Tanweer had been close to earning a degree in sports science at a
local polytechnic university before dropping out in 2003. The used Mercedes sedan he had
received the year before the attacks, a gift from his father, stood out in Beeston and was said
to be the envy of his peers. But acquaintances also described Tanweer as hard-working;
helping out in his family’s restaurant among other jobs. In his youth he had a pattern of
involvement in scuffles forming along racial lines, but no criminal history. After Khan, it
is Tanweer who has been described as the most ideologically driven among the group.6
His superficial knowledge of the faith had given way to his “reversion” to a more militant
stance in his teenage years. In the aftermath, Tanweer’s trips to Pakistan raised numerous
suspicions and allegations that perhaps he spent time at a training camp there or at least
met with operatives affiliated with larger networks.
Based on various reports, Hasib Hussain seems to have led a rather unremarkable
existence up until the attacks. He had grown up in the same area as Khan and Tanweer,
but had drooped out of school at age 16 with no qualifications. He had been a chubby
child—“dorky” by some accounts and peers testified to the fact that he was often picked on
and mocked at school.7 He had gotten into trouble for drug use as a teen and eventually his
parents sent him to Pakistan in hopes of reacquainting him with traditional Islamic values.
It was after a pilgrimage to Mecca that others began noticing the pronounced change in
Hussain’s appearance and demeanor. Once often described as a jock, an enthusiast of cricket,
hockey, and football, Hussain began wearing traditional Islamic clothing and praying five
times daily.
Germaine Lindsay represents an altogether different portrait of a self-starter terrorist.
A Jamaican immigrant and convert to Islam, Lindsay was an outsider in more than one
regard. After his conversion at age 15 his religious zeal became evident to all around him.
He had convinced his mother to embrace the Islamic faith, he exhibited all the outward signs
of an observant Muslim including traditional dress and he was often praised for his skilled
recitation of the Koran. According to acquaintances he had exuded a religious intensity and
many observed that his personality had undergone a dramatic change around the time of his
conversion.8 Reports have revealed that Lindsay’s mother moved away to the United States
in 2002, leaving him to live alone in the family home. This experience has been described
as a traumatic one for him, and an event for which he was not well-prepared. His attempts
 418 A. Kirby

to convert peers often led to confrontations and, over time, it seems Lindsay withdrew from
his former friends and adopted a more isolated existence. He was a naturally strong athlete
and his emergent interest in boxing as a teen ultimately proved to be a crucial one.
Although three of the four bombers shared a common ethnic heritage, it is interesting
to note the relative diversity of personal backgrounds and personality-profiles within the
group.9 Efforts to develop typologies of terror profiles and group dynamics often point
toward the importance of charisma in a leader. Most of the analyses of the July 2005
attacks have described Khan as the likely leader, sometimes described him as the possible
“recruiter” (despite the absence of any evidence of overt recruitment). He was significantly
older than the others and had cultivated a reputation as a mentor in the community—from
a retrospective and speculative standpoint he makes the perfect cell leader. But beyond the
“charismatic leader” phenomena other patterns have emerged in contemporary cases of
jihadist terrorism. The importance of drifters, misfits, and ambitious and naive young
protégés has been identified by analysts in empirical studies of cell dynamics.10 The
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mixtures account for the necessary elements of activism, confidence and skill, and on
the other hand—impressionability and vulnerability. The four bombers reflected this mix
to a certain extent and it is clearly a potent and dangerous mixture.
Significant questions remain regarding the group’s history and relationships and the
circumstances through which they met. Individuals from their community recall that as
Khan, Hussain, and Tanweer began to more openly espouse their radical views, they were
barred from several local mosques. Both Hussain and Tanweer had known Khan for some
time, and some reports identify both Khan and Tanweer as having been members of local
gang in Beeston known as the “Mullah” crew. But it is clear that the friendships began to
intensify when the younger men began to regularly attend a new mosque near Khan’s home.
The group also began to spend a great deal of time at Iqra Islamic bookshop, where Khan and
Tanweer volunteered; it proved a popular spot for other young radicals and converts.11 Iqra
become known in the community for selling “under-the-counter-stuff” including videos of
what was taking place in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq including extremely graphic footage
and narration aimed at inciting rage.12 It seems clear that Iqra was a pivotal site in the
course of their radicalization but whether it served as a tactical planning ground as well
remains unknown. The place where the cell converged—and likely the place where the plot
was first conceived—was the Hamara Healthy Living Center. This local gym drew boxing
enthusiasts Khan, Tanweer, Hussain, and Lindsay and its notoriety had earned it the name
“Al Qaeda gym” in the Beeston community. A church converted into a community center, to
serve the predominantly Muslim community, it was located just two blocks from Tanweer’s
home. It is believed that perhaps the cramped youth annex adjacent to the gym itself had
allowed the four the necessary shroud of privacy to pour over London Tube maps.13 Another
factor in the clique’s consolidation can be traced to a series of paintball sessions beginning
in the summer of 2002 in which, according of the account of one participant, were preceded
by meetings at participant’s homes.14 The group would gather to watch graphic videos,
perhaps those obtained at Iqra, before engaging in the physically rigorous and warlike
action games.

Analytical Confusion
The media reports following the attacks shed some light on the lines along which
this investigation has proceeded. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks much was
unclear—even the identity of the perpetrators. The portraits of the four men emerged slowly
and in bits and pieces. Although the city was in a state of grief and shock, intelligence and law
 The London Bombers as “Self-Starters” 419

enforcement resources were divided between the equally daunting tasks of reconstructing
the events leading up to the attack and uncovering details of the plot, including determining
the presence of a link to a larger network—and trying to establish whether there were
other similar groups waiting to strike. It seems that these competing urgencies caused a
combination of frenzy and paralysis.
Immediate assessments are telling in what they reveal about the analytical impulses
embedded in counterterrorism work. Several assumptions were apparent—one being that
the bombers must have had a fairly extensive support network providing everything from
money and shelter to access to sophisticated detonators and advanced training. One article
that ran in the Independent a couple of weeks after the attacks quotes investigators in its
in-depth discussion of concentric circles and leadership and support networks. It speaks of
the importance of “penetrating the support structure” and the search for a mastermind as
“the key to determining the size and shape of the network behind the bombers.”15 There
were numerous claims over subsequent months that the case for the “Al Qaeda link” was
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being strengthened and that investigators were getting closer to establishing evidence of a
foreign connection. For example, back in mid July a Times piece quoted police sources as
confirming that “the British born mastermind of the London attacks had direct links with al
Qaeda.”16 Months later another piece claimed that recent discoveries had produced “firmer
links between the four British bombers and al Qaeda,”17 Many of these claims proved to
be utterly inconsistent with each other, and completely contrary with the information the
surfaced in late January 2006 with the leak of a MI5 memo.
The discourse present in these articles reflects the mindset of the security community
as it grappled with the unprecedented event. This discussion conveys the unwillingness
on the part of many individuals within the security community to seriously consider the
possibility that this attack could have been conceived, planned, financed, and executed
by just a handful of people—all of them British. The “home-grown” dimension of this
case was so troubling that all the possible international “links” received a great deal of
attention. For instance, frequent reference was made to both Khan’s and Tanweer’s travels
to Pakistan and many commentators speculated on the purpose of these trips.18 One can
trace the escalation of speculative reasoning that these trips to Pakistan “must have”
included time spent in a Lashkar-e-Toiba or another Al Qaeda–affiliated training camp.
Although it remains eminently possible that Khan and Tanweer made contact with other
radicals during those trips and perhaps even received some operational instruction, it is
more likely that those meetings would have been sought out to quench a growing appetite
for radicalism, rather than having instigated it. But as with many of the details of the
bombers’ activities leading up to the attack, this remains unclear.
One individual that received a fair amount of attention and, for a time, was frequently
cited as the “possible mastermind” of the attacks was Haroon Rashid Aswat. A Briton of
Indian origin, with “links” to a convicted Al Qaeda terrorist, became a person of interest
because of the alleged cell phone calls between him and the London bombers in the weeks
before the attacks.19 Aswat had grown up in a town near Leeds and in the 10 years since he
left he was believed to have traveled around to various terrorist camps in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. While in the United Kingdom he had frequented the Finsbury Park mosque—the
notorious landmark at which the other bombers had also spent time. Once this tentative
mastermind was identified much of the analysis turned to a conventional style of network
analysis—how he might have “recruited” this suicide cell and whether he had perhaps
recruited others as well. But as the investigation proceeded, public reports slowly ceased to
identify Aswat as a key player in the events, suggesting that the evidence of his connection
must have been lacking or altogether absent.
 420 A. Kirby

It should be noted that the absence of an overt recruiter or mastermind in no way

precludes the possibility that the bombers had some interaction with a more experienced
facilitator. There is a well-established and well-documented culture of radicalism present
in the United Kingdom dating back to the mid-1990s. Some of the media reports that
allege Khan’s links to other suspected terrorists neglect to provide extensive details for
legal reasons and these omissions significantly cloud the picture. The community of the
Finsbury Park Mosque, and other outlets like it suggest that at least a moderate likelihood
that some such contact was made during the course of the bombers’ radicalization. But
if this contact did occur, its timing, extent, and nature remains subject to speculation.
Furthermore, recent revelations confirm that Khan and Tanweer were not entirely unknown
to the intelligence community prior to the 7 July attacks. Their names had emerged on
the periphery of other investigations in recent years, but it appears that there existed no
sufficient evidence at the time to warrant further action.20
That the attack was actually intended to be a suicide attack also received significant
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scrutiny. When the Nissan Micra was found at Luton railway station during the investigation,
still packed with the same type of explosives as were used in the attacks, some questioned
the plot. This revelation gave lead to the “fifth bomber” theories—a “mastermind” perhaps.
A seven-day ticket had been purchased and extra materials had been left suggesting that
perhaps someone had planned to return to the car at a later date. Similar questions were
raised in relation to footage that was captured of one of the bombers arguing with a
convenience store clerk and eye-witness accounts of Hussain wandering around in the
city, repeatedly calling his accomplices after the other three had detonated their bombs.21
Were these the actions of young men about to commit a coordinated, religiously inspired
suicide? It is a difficult question to answer—for Western Europe, this event was utterly
without precedent and there was therefore no profile to consult.
The questions raised about international connections, and the possibility that the
bombers had not all been aware of the suicide plan, reflect an relative ignorance of the
dynamics of radicalization in an indigenous context. Intuitively, it seems easier for most to
believe that there was an external influence directing the actors and events from a far, or
that the group was somehow duped into bringing about their own deaths. To recognize that
the necessary ingredients for a suicide terror “cell” are present within a Western society,
that some of these forces may be embedded and indigenous to the society, is a far more
troubling realization and its implications far more profound, than to simply embark on the
reconstruction of an infiltration by foreign threats.
When Khan’s video testimony surfaced in September 2005 a whole host of new
questions were raised. Khan’s words were interspersed with footage of Ayman al-Zawahiri
and this gave analysts pause. Michael Scheuer, one of Washington’s leading analysts of Al
Qaeda, seemed convinced the video offered supporting evidence of an Al Qaeda network
link; he even told the Times that there was “little doubt” that Khan had been acting on orders
from the Al Qaeda leadership and the resemblance of the speech itself to those of previous
Al Qaeda videos confirmed this connection.22 While analysts were conducting a forensic
examination of the tape and dissecting it “frame-by-frame” in hopes of determining what
type of equipment was used, perhaps the greater emphasis should have been placed on what
was said. Khan’s proclamation captured on the film is important to consider carefully. In the
tape he explains that civilians are targets because in a democracy citizens bear responsibility
for the government’s actions. He openly rejects his national identity in favor of the global
umma (the community of believers) and he justifies the violence based on the fact that
this global community, his “Muslim brothers and sisters,” is under attack—his actions are
framed as inherently defensive.23
 The London Bombers as “Self-Starters” 421

It was not until early 2006 that a new picture, pieced together by the intelligence
communities, began to emerge regarding the nature of the “cell” and the circumstances
leading up to the attack. The document leaked in January to the British press provided
a rare and telling glimpse into the state of MI5’s investigation and the bottom line was
that they had “run out of leads.” The report, prepared for Tony Blair and other senior
ministers, stated bluntly: “We know little about what three of the bombers did in Pakistan,
when attack planning began, how and when the attackers were recruited, the extent of
any external direction or assistance and the extent and role of any wider network.”24 This
was a far cry from the reports and statements captured in the media over the previous six
months. Clearly, a suicide terror attack poses some unique challenges from an investigative
standpoint. The bombers themselves will never stand trial, and as a result, attempts to
establish the existence of a facilitating network or identify co-conspirators become vastly
more complicated. However, by way of contrast, much of the plot and the extensive network
behind the 9/11 attacks was reconstructed within weeks of that attack.25 Where there had
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once been suspicion of an elaborate network of support for the London bombers and
concentric circles to penetrate, by January 2006, a very different picture had begun to
emerge.
Finally, on 11 May 2006 the Home Office released its official assessment of the 7 July
attacks. Following a disclaimer that the report contains an account that is “not yet the full
one” and that it addresses an ongoing police investigation, it proceeds to detail timelines of
the day of the attacks and the period following them; it offers profiles of the bombers; and
it addresses three of the crucial questions that had received so much speculation throughout
the aftermath: Why did they do it? How did they do it? and Were they directed from
abroad? The culmination of a 10-month investigation, the report revealed a number of
starling findings.26 It dismissed the fifth bomber theories as false; and it also confirmed
that there had never emerged any evidence of a “mastermind.” It acknowledges that Khan’s
and Tanweer’s visit to Pakistan from November 2004 to February 8 could have been a
key point in the development of the notion to attack the United Kingdom, but it offers no
evidence that either Khan or Tanweer trained in any formal camps nor that they met with
any known terrorists during their time there; the report only goes so far as to say “it seems
likely that they had some contact with Al Qaeda figures.” Other key elements that surfaced
in the Official Account were details concerning the financing of the attack and details of the
bomb construction. It was estimated that the entire undertaking including overseas travel,
the bomb-making equipment and car rentals likely cost less that £8,000.27 This was an
operation that was easily self-financed and there was no evidence of external sources of
income. The details of the “bomb-factory” were also crucial revelations. In the account,
the site where the construction of the explosives took place was identified as a rented flat
at 18 Alexandra Grove, in Beeston, subletted from an Egyptian chemistry graduate student
studying at Leeds University. The site was discovered on the 12 July, with the equipment
still in place and Khan, Tanweer, and Hussein were all subsequently linked to it by DNA
evidence.
The report lacks detail on the question of to what extent the Internet acted as the
medium through which the bombers gained their requisite technical knowledge, but it
does acknowledge that the crude formulation of their homemade bombs required no great
expertise and would have been available through open sources. It also documents Lindsay’s
online trades of perfume for material useful in the bomb-making process.28 The details
included in the report have led British officials to accept the following conclusion: “The
London attacks were a modest, simple affair by four seemingly normal men using the
Internet.”29
 422 A. Kirby

A New Paradigm
The source of grievances has been a well-studied theme in the search for patterns of terrorist
motivations. Debates over “root causes” of terrorism have often over-simplified these
complicated issues by failing to make key distinctions, like the difference between absolute
and relative deprivation and between the often intertwined local and global dynamics
driving resentment. Treatment of these issues is gradually becoming more nuanced as they
are receiving more thoughtful attention. In the European context it is clear that systemic
socioeconomic and ethnically based barriers do heighten existing religious sensitivities.
In Britain, Muslims experience three times the unemployment rate as that of the general
population and they heavily populate the most underprivileged districts.30 While one third
of British Muslims claim that they, or someone they know personally, has been subjected to
hostility based on their religion, 70 percent feel Muslims are politically underrepresented.31
These experiences have helped to cultivate frustration and resentment that can translate into
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tacit support for acts of violence, despite the moderate and tolerant nature of the much larger
majority. (In a poll conducted after the attacks, 6 percent of the British Muslim community
responded that the attacks were fully justified but perhaps even more startling, 24 percent
claimed to have had some sympathy for the feelings and motives of the bombers.)32 The
tensions breeding in Britain and in Europe more broadly have been the subject of much
research by sociologists interested in analyzing the motivations of Islamic terrorism.
The findings of Farhad Khosrokhavar, who has conducted extensive interviews of Al
Qaeda affiliates in European prisons, provide some crucial insights. He has elucidated, with
reference to the significance of economic and social marginalization, how a suicide bomber
relates to the concept of the martyr in Fundamentalist Islam. Giving special attention
to the situation of the Muslim in a Western context, he explains that for some, Islam
offers the perfect organizing concept for funneling and focusing this rejection of Western
society. According to Khosrokhavar, Islam “crystallizes” the rejection of the West for many
alienated and radicalized Muslims and that “Islam lends itself well to being a religion of
the dominated or of those who are being crushed by “Western arrogance.”33 His interviews
have indicated that demonization of the West, the casting of it as an absolute principle of
evil provided a pathway out of a deep and profound discontentment and disorientation for
many of the radicals he studied. (Whereas, by contrast, for many living in the West—there
is no simple principle of adversity and clear-cut target upon which to place blame—the
complexity of secular Western society demands that the coming to terms with similar
experiences of alienation and frustration take a very different form.) The bombers’ viewing
of tapes of foreign conflicts prior to their paintball sessions, and the rhetoric contained in
Khan’s video testimony are both consistent with another vital theme that Khosrokhavar
identifies: the feeling of “humiliation-by-proxy.”34 Khan’s words are important to examine:

Our driving motivation doesn’t come from the tangible commodities that this
world has to offer. . . . Your democratically elected governments continuously
perpetrate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of
them makes you directly responsible. . . . Until we feel security, you will be our
targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of
my people we will not stop this fight . . .

Political events in countries such as Chechnya, Palestine, Afghanistan, and Bosnia

and now, most markedly Iraq—situations in which some Muslims believe that their fellow
Muslims are being oppressed and exploited create a feeling of solidarity, despite the fact
they are not suffering these “outrages” personally. The theme of vicarious suffering is a
 The London Bombers as “Self-Starters” 423

prominent one in the current global jihad and clearly contributed to the radicalization of
the London bombers.
In the absence of a wider network and formal indoctrination and training, as was the case
with the London Bombers, new paradigms are needed to understand the process by which
individuals are driven to embrace terrorism and execute attacks. Social dynamics offers
an alternative framework for exploring the nature of motivations and clique development.
Marc Sageman, in his book Understanding Terror Networks, has revolutionized the field
of terrorism analysis in his clear and persuasive depiction of the sociological dynamics
of jihadist enlistment.35 Based on extensive empirical research, Sageman demonstrates
key realities about the nature of these “networks” including how and why people join the
jihad and he effectively debunks many prevailing myths about “recruitment” and terrorist
motivations. A number of his general findings are relevant to the case of the London
bombers and to the phenomena of self-starters more broadly.
One of the key findings resulting from Sageman’s studies concerns the nature of
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“recruitment.” Sageman explains that the conventional understanding of “recruitment”

has largely grown out of an analogy with the intelligence gathering processes; in this
context recruitment refers to agent acquisition to obtain clandestine foreign intelligence.
His findings revealed that in contrast to this top-down process, the process by which
individuals join the jihad is far more of a bottom-up dynamic. The process is driven by
self-selection and he describes it as akin to the process of “application to a highly selective
college.” There is ambition and enthusiasm on the part of prospective mujahideen, rather
than reluctance. The image of sinister recruiter lurking in mosques to prey on unsuspecting
Muslims is not remotely consistent with his empirical observations.
The fact that social bonds often predate ideological indoctrination is another key
point to consider. Although the London bombers all demonstrated signs of alienation and
increasing interest in extreme interpretations of Islam, it appears that the consolidation of
their indoctrination occurred once they came together as a group, through their activities at
the Hamara Healthy Living Center in Beeston and during the series of paintball sessions.36
Sageman’s explanation of “clique” dynamics is also vital here. A clique, within a social
network context, consists of a small group in which every “node” is connected to every other
one. In many ways the term clique is a more accurate label for the London bombers than the
term “cell,” because “cell” refers to a group in the context of a broader organized network,
whereas a clique in most instances is an inherently social entity.37 Sageman explains how
the dynamics within the clique can offer significant insights into the occurrence of suicide
attacks, an act often associated with irrationality:

. . . Cliques solve this rationalist paradox. They are the social mechanism that
puts pressure on prospective participants to join, defines a certain social reality
for the ever more intimate friends, and facilitates the development of a shared
collective social identity and strong emotional feelings for the in-group.38

The clique is the entity that facilitates the escalation of commitment among its members.
As members become closer and bonds become stronger between the “in-group” the clique
is likely to become increasingly isolated from the rest of society, including moderating
influences. This provides for a dynamic of “oneupmanship” in which the criterion for
belonging, and proving one’s devotion to both the cause and the group members is being
held to an increasingly higher standard.39 At this point, the clique identity has essentially
consumed the individual identity. This dynamic is apparent in the case at hand. Various
accounts cite the bombers withdrawing from their activities in the period leading up to
 424 A. Kirby

the attack and turning inward. Khan became progressively less reliable in his teaching job,
often leaving for weeks at a time until he ultimately quit. Tanweer had been very close to
completing a college degree that he abruptly dropped out of in 2003. By the time of his last
visit to Pakistan, Tanweer’s radicalization was clearly complete. It was during this trip that
he boasted to family that he wanted to die in a “revenge attack” to express his rage at the
way Muslims are treated.40 In previous trips relatives recalled he had spent hours playing
cricket with his extended family but during this trip he was visibly subdued and spent hours
alone in his grandfather’s house.
The process and conditions of isolation are important from a sociological standpoint
as it is both a precursor and a necessary condition for radicalization. The concept of control
theory is a useful construct here. Control theory is often used to explain crime and varieties
of social delinquency including religious conversion by using the strength of social bonds.41
Control theory traces the likelihood of deviant behavior to the degree to which individuals
are invested in, or connected to, various elements of society; friends, school, jobs, and so on.
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It offers a different perspective for exploring why people act out through crime or violence,
by inverting the question: Why do so many people not commit these acts? It is theorized that
conformity is largely shaped by the bonds to these elements of conventional society, as these
bonds breakdown, the risk of deviance increases. The more one becomes isolated, the more
one is free to dispose of the norms and values that are otherwise constantly strengthened
by these channels. Whereas, partaking in mainstream social activities reinforces the ethical
codes of any given society, activities built around subcultures and countercultures do the
opposite.
This is one way of exploring the bombers’ relationships to their broader society. The
process described earlier helps answer the question that haunted everyone in the wake of
the July 2005 attacks: how could four British men, seemingly integrated into their societies,
who, on the outside, appeared very much like their peers, spontaneously take their lives
and the lives of 52 others out of a religious conviction? Their respect for the conventional
norms and values had clearly been eroded through their increasing religious militancy,
perhaps driven and ingrained by Internet-based propaganda. Their rejection of both British
society, and Western society more generally, was sealed through the progressively more
intimate relationships they shared—rather than through any institutionalized or organized
indoctrination program. The ideology to which they had all gravitated individually (a
global militant salafist vision—very much the Al Qaeda brand) was then nurtured through
a common alienation from British society. It ultimately provided both a binding element
for the group and a powerful idiom to express their frustration and rage.
Although Khan, for example, was actively involved in his local community and
seemed reasonably invested in his career until the winter of 2004, it is the broader social
backdrop—an experience he shared with many European Muslims—that is crucial to
examine. This experience includes a basic level of alienation from Western European
culture that in some cases provides the fertile ground for indoctrination by virulent Islamic
rhetoric and ideology. Despite the fact that many second-generation Muslim immigrants
are structurally assimilated into mainstream society, identity assimilation has failed to
take root.42 Olivier Roy has explored this social phenomenon at length. The experience
of the Islamic Diaspora, he explains, has effectively created a virtual, de-territorialized
community that rivals the significance of the local, secular community for many “rootless”
young Muslims living in the West. Roy explains how the uprooted condition of many
Muslims pre-disposes them to a process of reassessing what Islam means for them, in a
non-Muslim context. Although for the vast majority this reassessment leads to nonviolent
interpretations, some embrace radical interpretations of their faith.43
 The London Bombers as “Self-Starters” 425

The Democratization of Violence

The role of the Internet in facilitating the emergence of self-starters cannot be overstated.
The Internet has profoundly changed the way existing terrorist networks now conduct their
activities, but equally crucial is the way in which it has changed the range of possibilities for
prospective terrorists. In addition to the vast amounts of radicalizing content, which clearly
played a role in this case, it has effectively removed many of the practical barriers that once
limited entry into the formal jihad. The case of the London bombers must be analyzed in
the context of this new landscape of threats. The tactical and operational tradecraft that can
be gleaned from the thousands of existing sites is comparable to that once only available in
physical training camps. For example, it has been discussed that the type of urban warfare
training required to carry out the London attacks is easily accessible via the Internet. In Al
Qaeda’s Internet journal Mu’asker al-Battar, various contributors have offered instruction
on how to plan and successfully carry out an urban attack.44 Key considerations and tactics
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that are discussed include selecting both a major and secondary target and making the
plan realistic as well as being “coherent, tight and accurate.” More subtle requirements
such as the necessity that members maintain a steady composure without “excessive zeal”
are also discussed. This type of instruction likely informed the planning of the 7/7 attack.
Video footage of the bombers’ apparent “dry-run” nine days before the actual attack further
reinforces this possibility.45 The meticulous planning and well-orchestrated reconnaissance
displayed in the case of 7/7 are elements of tradecraft that are featured prominently in
practically-oriented instruction material like Mu’asker al-Battar.
When it was determined that the bombs detonated on the London Underground
were made from the same ingredients “known to be taught to al-Qaeda recruits in
Afghanistan training camps” this revelation was initially interpreted as evidence that there
was a “network” connection.46 But this conclusion proved hasty; investigations eventually
revealed that the bombs were composed of peroxide found in hair bleach, citric acid, and
heat tablets. The mixture was kept cold through use of an industrial fridge and portable
coolers and cell phones were used as detonators. All of the materials used to construct those
bombs are readily available at a hardware store and the formula is relatively simple, but
they combine to form a volatile peroxide-based explosive called HMDT, or hexamethylene
triperoxide diamine. It is a formulation known to be one of the many step-by-step instruction
projects widely circulated on jihadist sites. In discussing the availability of such “how-to”
information, in reference to the London attacks, Raymond Kelley, a representative of the
NYPD was quoted as saying that “the recipe to make a bomb is unfortunately as available
on the Internet as a recipe for meatloaf.”47 The exchange of this type of instruction through
monthly magazines, chat forums, and sophisticated virtual camps has given rise to the
“do-it-yourself” age of jihadist terror much the way the Internet has facilitated online
education, business, and countless other hobbies and pursuits. To borrow Fareed Zakaria’s
term, it has led to the “democratization of violence”—it has introduced a de-formalized
experience in which a once–Al Qaeda sympathizer now enjoys a radically enhanced
opportunity to become a full-fledged jihadist.48
Analogies like “franchises” and “free-lancers” are aptly applied to this phenomenon.
Through online operational instruction, groups like the London bombers can be actively
inspired by Al Qaeda, execute attacks to emulate and mimic Al Qaeda, without ever having
formally “joined” the network. Like in the aftermath of 7 July, attacks like this will often
be difficult to distinguish from those carried out by the actual network. Membership now
lies in the eye of the beholder in a more profound sense, because of the mass distribution
of terrorist tradecraft. It is the ability to self-activate, in the absence of the concentric
 426 A. Kirby

circles, “masterminds” and “recruiters” that defines this development. In light of this reality,
Sageman’s account of formal acceptance into the jihad may now require some revision.
In Understanding Terror Networks, he explains that “the critical and specific element to
joining the jihad is the accessibility of a link.” He explains that without such a link the
clique will likely to go through a process of progressive isolation, and although they may
try to participate in the jihad they will lack resources and know-how: “Although lethal,
their operations do not constitute a serious threat to society. Only the global jihad, with its
organization, resources and skills poses such a danger.” This may arguably still be true, but
the case of the London bombers, a group of self-starters that killed 52 people, now casts
serious doubt over the assertion.

Self-Starters and the Future of Counterterrorism

Over recent months, as the possibility that the London bombers had acted autonomously
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became more evident, analysts argued that such an act was very much in line with the
original goals and vision of Al Qaeda and bin Laden himself.49 In many ways, it was
the perfect realization of the vision of “the Vanguard”—Al Qaeda had effectively inspired
fellow Muslims in distant lands to embrace the jihad and rise up and challenge their apostate
governments.50 This is clearly an accurate assessment. The acts of the London bombers,
despite their autonomy, do represent the long-term goal of bin Laden and his organization.
But, regardless of this ideological harmony, the emergence of self-starters cannot simply
be interpreted as a chapter in the decentralization of Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda will exploit
and celebrate the emergence of such cliques and eagerly adopt their destructive acts as its
own—an ex post facto ownership of sorts—but this must not lead to analytical confusion
over the real dynamics that drive this phenomena. As the case of the London bombers
demonstrates, new approaches and new paradigms will be required to deconstruct this
phenomenon and develop appropriate strategies to counter the new threat. The necessity
of understanding group dynamics will undoubtedly require more serious analysis, drawing
from sociology and other disciplines. Theories that seek to explain instances of deviance
and the rejection of societal norms also deserve more careful consideration. In the age of
self-starters, an investigative approach based on conventional conceptions of networks will
prove inadequate. The complexities raised by the emergence of radical autonomous cliques,
empowered by the Internet, are clearly innumerable. The 7 July attacks have given the British
government a relatively sudden and painfully acute appreciation for this, as displayed in a
statement contained in their official response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s
Report: “We remain concerned that across the whole of the counter-terrorism community
the development of the home-grown threat and the radicalization of British citizens were
not fully understood or applied to strategic thinking.”51 Even Britain, whose intelligence
and security infrastructure is by nature well-equipped to deal with indigenous threats, faces
profound policy challenges in the wake of this attack. However, this development must be
recognized as a vital new opportunity to gain an unobscured view of the social dynamics of
jihadist terror. Without the network-construct to rely on, analysts will be forced to confront
a whole spectrum of ideological and social drivers and contend with a more complicated
picture, but should they extract the right lessons, they will be left with a more accurate one.

Notes
1. The term “self-starter” was pioneered in The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror
and Strategy for Getting it Right (New York: Henry Holt, 2005), by Daniel Benjamin and Steven
Simon. They develop the concept in their analysis of various attacks in the post-9/11 period, including
discussion of the London bombers.
 The London Bombers as “Self-Starters” 427

2. These concepts are developed in the work of Marc Sageman, Olivier Roy, and Michael
Scheuer.
3. Craig Whitlock, “Trail from London to Leeds Yields Portraits of 3 bombers,” Washington
Post, 15 July 2005.
4. Interviews of Nasreen Suleaman, BBC, in Tom Hundley, “Attacks Spur Identity Crisis for
Britain,” Chicago Tribune, 16 December 2005.
5. Ian Herbert, “Documentary Reveals London Bomber’s Westernized Youth,” The Indepen-
dent (London), 18 November 2005.
6. Ian Herbert, “Khaka’ and ‘Sid,’ the Committed Jihadists who Turned to Murder,” The
Independent (London), 17 December 2005.
7. Olga Craig, “Bowling for Paradise,” Sunday Telegraph, 17 July 2005.
8. Lizette Alvarez, “New Muslim at 15, Terror Suspect at 19,” The New York Times, 18 July
2005.
9. For additional discussion of the bombers’ profiles see Russell Jenkins, Dominic Kennedy,
David Lister, and Carol Midgley, “The London Bombers,” Times Online, 15 July 2005, available at
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(http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,22989–1693739,00.html).
10. Petter Nesser, “Profiles in Jihadist Terrorists in Europe,” published in Cheryl Bernard, A
Future for the Young, Options for Helping Middle Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006).
11. Investigations into Iqra Islamic bookshop revealed connections with Scottish born
James McLintock who became Mohammed Yacoub upon his conversion and Martin “Abdullah”
McDaid, an ex-UK Special Forces operative and fellow convert. (Paul Tumelty, “New Develop-
ments Following the London Bombings,” Terrorism Monitor, 3(23). http://www.jamestown.org/
terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369752 [accessed 7 March 2006]).
12. Craig, “Bowling for Paradise.”
13. Jason Burke, Antony Barnett, Mark Townsend, Tariq Panja, Martin Bright, and Tony
Thompson, “The London Bombs: Three Cities, Four Killers,” The Observer (London), 17 July
2005.
14. The Observer, “A Terrorist in Our Midst,” 20 November2005; Tumelty, “New Developments
Following the London Bombings,”; and The Independent, “Documentary Reveals London Bomber’s
Westernized Youth,” 18 November 2005.
15. Raymond Whitaker, Francis Elliot, and Sophie Goodchild, “The Attacks on London: Part
Two,” The Independent on Sunday, 31 July 2005.
16. Daniel McGory and Michael Evans, “Net Widens as al-Qaeda Bomb Link is Confirmed,”
The Times (London), 15 July 2005.
17. Michael Evans, “New Clues Support al-Qaeda Theory for London Bombing,” The Times
(London), 30 January 2006.
18. Daniel McGory and Zahid Hussain, “Bomber Told Cousin of Suicide Plan,” The Times
(London), 22 July 2005.
19. Roger Woods, David Leppard, and Michael Smith, “Tangled Web that Still Leaves Worrying
Loose Ends,” Sunday Times, 13 July 2005.
20. Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, 11 May 2006.
21. Jason Bennetto, “July 7 Bomber Argued with Cashier Shortly before Blast,” The
Independent, 31 October 2005.
22. Jonathan Calvert and Nick Fielding, “Tape Links Al-Qaeda to London,” Times Online, 4
September 2005.
23. Jason Burke, “Secrets of Bomber’s Death Tape,” The Guardian, 4 September 2005.
24. David Leppard, “MI5 Admits: We’ve Run Out of Leads on Bombers,” Sunday Times, 29
January 2006.
25. For example, unclassified accounts of the 9/11 network appeared in “The Plot: A Web of
Connections,” Washington Post, 24 September 2001 and in Thomas A. Stewart, “Six Degrees of
Mohammed Atta,” Business 2.0, December 2001.
26. Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, 11 May 2006.
27. Ibid.
 428 A. Kirby

28. Ibid.
29. Mark Townsend, “Leak Reveals Official Story of London bombings: Al-Qaeda not Linked,
Says Government; Gang Used Internet to Plan 7/7 Attack,” The Observer, 9 April 2006.
30. According the Home Office’s Official Account, the district of Beeston, where three of the
bombers were raised, is a highly populated but poorly maintained residential area. (Over 10,000 of
the 16,300 residents’ living standards are among the worst 3% in the country.)
31. Daniel Benjamin, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee
on European Affairs, “Islamic Extremism in Europe,” 5 April 2006.
32. Anthony King, “One in Four Muslims Sympathises with Motives of Terrorists,” The
Telegraph, 23 July 2005.
33. Farhad Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs (London: Pluto Press, 2005).
34. Ibid., see pp. 152–157.
35. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2004).
36. This is consistent with Marc Sageman’s findings that cliques are built on a foundation
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of human similarities including background, education, and beliefs (and in the case of the London
bombers—interest in sport), but it is through a process of face-to-face interaction that ideological
affinity develops.
37. The term, as defined by the Merriam Webster dictionary, is: “a narrow exclusive circle or
group of persons; especially: one held together by common interests, views, or purposes.”
38. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, p. 154.
39. Sageman discusses this phenomenon with respect to the Montreal cell and the Hamburg
cell in terms of a spiraling intensity of beliefs, p. 108.
40. McGory and Hussain, “Bomber Told Cousin of Suicide Plan.”
41. For a clear and thorough articulation of control theory, see Travis Hirschi, The Causes of
Delinquency (Somerset, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001).
42. Robert Leiken as cited in: “Currents and Crosscurrents of Radical Islam, A Report of the
Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2006.
43. Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Umma (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2004).
44. For further discussion see Michael Scheuer, “Assessing London and Sharm al-Sheikh: The
Role of Internet Intelligence and Urban Warfare Training,” Terrorism Focus, 2(15) (5 August 2005).
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369764 [accessed 6 March 2006].
45. BBC News, “London Bombers Staged ‘Dummy Run,’” 20 September 2005.
46. McGory and Evans, “Net Widens” and Michael Evans, “Explosives Match Al Qaeda
Blueprint for Bombmaking,” Times, 16 July 2005.
47. Reuters, “London Bombers used Everyday Materials—US Police,” 4 August 2005.
48. Fareek Zakaria, The Future of Freedom (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004).
49. Michael Scheuer, “The London Bombings: For al-Qaeda, Steady as She Goes,” Terror-
ism Focus, 2(14) (22 July 2005). http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=
2369752 [accessed 7 March 2006].
50. For a thorough explanation of this concept see Michael Scheuer’s Through Our Enemies’
Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam and the Future of America, chapter 4, “Getting to Know
Bin Laden: Substantive Themes of the Jihad” (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2003). The role of
inspiring and inciting is explored here and Scheuer cites commentators as realizing that bin Laden’s
“strategy may be to create the leadership and motivation that might galvanize individual independent
units into action,” p. 61.
51. Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Report into the London
Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, May 2006.