1

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

31] [G. R. No. 119775. October 24, 2003] EN BANC

JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION, MATEO CARIO FOUNDATION INC., CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE
SYSTEMS FOUNDATION INC., REGINA VICTORIA A. BENAFIN REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER MRS.
ELISA BENAFIN, IZABEL M. LUYK REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER MRS. REBECCA MOLINA LUYK,
KATHERINE PE REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY HER MOTHER ROSEMARIE G. PE, SOLEDAD S. CAMILO, ALICIA C.
PACALSO ALIAS KEVAB, BETTY I. STRASSER, RUBY C. GIRON, URSULA C. PEREZ ALIAS BA-YAY, EDILBERTO T.
CLARAVALL, CARMEN CAROMINA, LILIA G. YARANON, DIANE MONDOC, petitioners, vs. VICTOR LIM, PRESIDENT,
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; JOHN HAY PORO POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CITY
OF BAGUIO, TUNTEX (B.V.I.) CO. LTD., ASIAWORLD INTERNATIONALE GROUP, INC., DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N - CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By the present petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners assail, in the main, the constitutionality of
Presidential Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994, CREATING AND DESIGNATING A PORTION OF THE AREA COVERED
BY THE FORMER CAMP JOHN [HAY] AS THE JOHN HAY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7227.
Republic Act No. 7227, AN ACT ACCELERATING THE CONVERSION OF MILITARY RESERVATIONS INTO OTHER
PRODUCTIVE USES, CREATING THE BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY FOR THIS PURPOSE,
PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992, which was enacted on March 13, 1992, set out the policy of the government to accelerate
the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the former military bases under the 1947
Philippines-United States of America Military Bases Agreement, namely, the Clark and Subic military reservations as
well as their extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay or the camp) in the City of Baguio.[1]
As noted in its title, R.A. No. 7227 created public respondent Bases Conversion and Development
Authority[2] (BCDA), vesting it with powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the ultimate
objective of utilizing the base areas in accordance with the declared government policy.
R.A. No. 7227 likewise created the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes and
bounds of which were to be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines. [3]
R.A. No. 7227 granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of
businesses therein from local and national taxes, to other hallmarks of a liberalized financial and business climate.[4]
And R.A. No. 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject
to the concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas
covered respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp
John Hay.[5]
On August 16, 1993, BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with private
respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.) Co., Ltd (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private
corporations registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a joint venture
for the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist destinations and recreation
centers. Four months later or on December 16, 1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORD executed a Joint Venture
Agreement[6] whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint venture company known as the Baguio International
Development and Management Corporation which would lease areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for the
purpose of turning such places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as originally envisioned by the parties
under their Memorandum of Agreement.
The Baguio City government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions in response to the actions taken by
BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay.
By Resolution[7] of September 29, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City (the sanggunian) officially
asked BCDA to exclude all the barangays partly or totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage
of any plan or program for its development.
 2
[8]
By a subsequent Resolution dated January 19, 1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an abdication, waiver
or quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots being occupied by residents of nine (9) barangays surrounding the
military reservation.
Still by another resolution passed on February 21, 1994, the sanggunian adopted and submitted to BCDA a 15-
point concept for the development of Camp John Hay. [9] The sanggunians vision expressed, among other things, a
kind of development that affords protection to the environment, the making of a family-oriented type of tourist
destination, priority in employment opportunities for Baguio residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed
participation of the city government in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously
named nine barangays from the area for development, and liability for local taxes of businesses to be established
within the camp.[10]
BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other proposals of
the sanggunian.[11] They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full
development in accordance with the mandate of R.A. No. 7227.[12]
On May 11, 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution requesting the Mayor to order the determination of
realty taxes which may otherwise be collected from real properties of Camp John Hay. [13] The resolution was
intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian in determining its position on whether Camp John Hay be declared a
SEZ, it (the sanggunian) being of the view that such declaration would exempt the camps property and the economic
activity therein from local or national taxation.
More than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed Resolution No. 255, (Series of 1994),[14] seeking and
supporting, subject to its concurrence, the issuance by then President Ramos of a presidential proclamation
declaring an area of 288.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7227. Together
with this resolution was submitted a draft of the proposed proclamation for consideration by the President. [15]
On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420,[16] the title of which was earlier indicated,
which established a SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay and which reads as follows:

xxx

Pursuant to the powers vested in me by the law and the resolution of concurrence by the City Council of Baguio, I,
FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby create and designate a portion of the area covered by the
former John Hay reservation as embraced, covered, and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between
the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended, as the John Hay Special Economic Zone, and
accordingly order:

SECTION 1. Coverage of John Hay Special Economic Zone. The John Hay Special Economic Zone shall cover the area
consisting of Two Hundred Eighty Eight and one/tenth (288.1) hectares, more or less, of the total of Six Hundred
Seventy-Seven (677) hectares of the John Hay Reservation, more or less, which have been surveyed and verified by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as defined by the following technical description:

A parcel of land, situated in the City of Baguio, Province of Benguet, Island of Luzon, and particularly
described in survey plans Psd-131102-002639 and Ccs-131102-000030 as approved on 16 August 1993
and 26 August 1993, respectively, by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, in detail
containing : Lot 1, Lot 2, Lot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6, Lot 7, Lot 13, Lot 14, Lot 15, and Lot 20 of Ccs-131102-
000030
-and-
Lot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6, Lot 7, Lot 8, Lot 9, Lot 10, Lot 11, Lot 14, Lot 15, Lot 16, Lot 17, and Lot 18 of
Psd-131102-002639 being portions of TCT No. T-3812, LRC Rec. No. 87.

With a combined area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT AND ONE/TENTH HECTARES (288.1 hectares); Provided
that the area consisting of approximately Six and two/tenth (6.2) hectares, more or less, presently occupied by the
VOA and the residence of the Ambassador of the United States, shall be considered as part of the SEZ only upon
turnover of the properties to the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
 3
Sec. 2. Governing Body of the John Hay Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7227,
the Bases Conversion and Development Authority is hereby established as the governing body of the John Hay
Special Economic Zone and, as such, authorized to determine the utilization and disposition of the lands
comprising it, subject to private rights, if any, and in consultation and coordination with the City Government of
Baguio after consultation with its inhabitants, and to promulgate the necessary policies, rules, and regulations to
govern and regulate the zone thru the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation, which is its implementing
arm for its economic development and optimum utilization.

Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to Section 5(m) and Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 7227, the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation shall implement all necessary policies, rules, and
regulations governing the zone, including investment incentives, in consultation with pertinent government
departments. Among others, the zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the Special Economic Zone under
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones, the
Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991, and new investment laws that may
hereinafter be enacted.

Sec. 4. Role of Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities. All Heads of departments, bureaus,
offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the government are hereby directed to give full support to Bases
Conversion and Development Authority and/or its implementing subsidiary or joint venture to facilitate the
necessary approvals to expedite the implementation of various projects of the conversion program.

Sec. 5. Local Authority. Except as herein provided, the affected local government units shall retain their basic
autonomy and identity.

Sec. 6. Repealing Clause. All orders, rules, and regulations, or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Proclamation, are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

Sec. 7. Effectivity. This proclamation shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-four.

The issuance of Proclamation No. 420 spawned the present petition [17] for prohibition, mandamus and
declaratory relief which was filed on April 25, 1995 challenging, in the main, its constitutionality or validity as well as
the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement between public respondent BCDA and
private respondents TUNTEXand ASIAWORLD.
Petitioners allege as grounds for the allowance of the petition the following:
I. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, SERIES OF 1990 (sic) IN SO FAR AS IT GRANTS TAX EXEMPTIONS
IS INVALID AND ILLEGAL AS IT IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE BY THE PRESIDENT OF A POWER
GRANTED ONLY TO THE LEGISLATURE.
II. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, IN SO FAR AS IT LIMITS THE POWERS AND INTERFERES WITH THE
AUTONOMY OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO IS INVALID, ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
III. PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 420, SERIES OF 1994 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT IT VIOLATES THE
RULE THAT ALL TAXES SHOULD BE UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE.
IV. THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY HAVING BEEN ENTERED INTO ONLY BY
DIRECT NEGOTIATION IS ILLEGAL.
V. THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RESPONDENT BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY IS (sic) ILLEGAL.
VI. THE CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN OF RESPONDENTS NOT HAVING UNDERGONE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT ASSESSMENT IS BEING ILLEGALLY CONSIDERED WITHOUT A VALID ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT.
A temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction was prayed for to enjoin BCDA, John Hay
Poro Point Development Corporation and the city government from implementing Proclamation No. 420,
and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD from proceeding with their plan respecting Camp John Hays development pursuant to
their Joint Venture Agreement with BCDA.[18]
 4
Public respondents, by their separate Comments, allege as moot and academic the issues raised by the petition,
the questioned Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement having already been deemed abandoned
by the inaction of the parties thereto prior to the filing of the petition as in fact, by letter of November 21, 1995,
BCDA formally notified TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD of the revocation of their said agreements.[19]
In maintaining the validity of Proclamation No. 420, respondents contend that by extending to the John Hay
SEZ economic incentives similar to those enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which was established under R.A. No. 7227, the
proclamation is merely implementing the legislative intent of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of
business activity or investment. They underscore the point that the governments policy of bases conversion can not
be achieved without extending the same tax exemptions granted by R.A. No. 7227 to Subic SEZ to other SEZs.
Denying that Proclamation No. 420 is in derogation of the local autonomy of Baguio City or that it is violative
of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, respondents assail petitioners lack of standing to bring the
present suit even as taxpayers and in the absence of any actual case or controversy to warrant this Courts exercise
of its power of judicial review over the proclamation.
Finally, respondents seek the outright dismissal of the petition for having been filed in disregard of the
hierarchy of courts and of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Replying,[20] petitioners aver that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies finds no application
herein since they are invoking the exclusive authority of this Court under Section 21 of R.A. No. 7227 to enjoin or
restrain implementation of projects for conversion of the base areas; that the established exceptions to the aforesaid
doctrine obtain in the present petition; and that they possess the standing to bring the petition which is a taxpayers
suit.
Public respondents have filed their Rejoinder[21] and the parties have filed their respective memoranda.
Before dwelling on the core issues, this Court shall first address the preliminary procedural questions
confronting the petition.
The judicial policy is and has always been that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it except when the
redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts, or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Courts primary jurisdiction. [22] Neither will it
entertain an action for declaratory relief, which is partly the nature of this petition, over which it has no original
jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, as it is only this Court which has the power under Section 21[23] of R.A. No. 7227 to enjoin
implementation of projects for the development of the former US military reservations, the issuance of which
injunction petitioners pray for, petitioners direct filing of the present petition with it is allowed. Over and above this
procedural objection to the present suit, this Court retains full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition
filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. [24]Besides,
remanding the case to the lower courts now would just unduly prolong adjudication of the issues.
The transformation of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay into a SEZ is not simply a re-classification
of an area, a mere ascription of a status to a place. It involves turning the former US military reservation into a focal
point for investments by both local and foreign entities. It is to be made a site of vigorous business activity, ultimately
serving as a spur to the countrys long awaited economic growth. For, as R.A. No. 7227 unequivocally declares, it is
the governments policy to enhance the benefits to be derived from the base areas in order to promote the economic
and social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general.[25] Like the Subic SEZ, the John Hay
SEZ should also be turned into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center.[26]
More than the economic interests at stake, the development of Camp John Hay as well as of the other base
areas unquestionably has critical links to a host of environmental and social concerns. Whatever use to which these
lands will be devoted will set a chain of events that can affect one way or another the social and economic way of
life of the communities where the bases are located, and ultimately the nation in general.
Underscoring the fragility of Baguio Citys ecology with its problem on the scarcity of its water supply,
petitioners point out that the local and national government are faced with the challenge of how to provide for an
ecologically sustainable, environmentally sound, equitable transition for the city in the wake of Camp John Hays
reversion to the mass of government property.[27] But that is why R.A. No. 7227 emphasizes the sound and balanced
conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions consistent with ecological
 5
[28]
and environmental standards. It cannot thus be gainsaid that the matter of conversion of the US bases into SEZs,
in this case Camp John Hay, assumes importance of a national magnitude.
Convinced then that the present petition embodies crucial issues, this Court assumes jurisdiction over the
petition.
As far as the questioned agreements between BCDA and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD are concerned, the legal
questions being raised thereon by petitioners have indeed been rendered moot and academic by the revocation of
such agreements. There are, however, other issues posed by the petition, those which center on the constitutionality
of Proclamation No. 420, which have not been mooted by the said supervening event upon application of the rules
for the judicial scrutiny of constitutional cases. The issues boil down to:
(1) Whether the present petition complies with the requirements for this Courts exercise of jurisdiction over
constitutional issues;
(2) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax exemption within
and granting other economic incentives to the John Hay Special Economic Zone; and
(3) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or interfering with the local autonomy of
Baguio City;
It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised, the court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review
is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[29]
An actual case or controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory.[30] The controversy needs to be definite and concrete, bearing upon
the legal relations of parties who are pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interests. [31] There is in the
present case a real clash of interests and rights between petitioners and respondents arising from the issuance of a
presidential proclamation that converts a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay into a SEZ, the former
insisting that such proclamation contains unconstitutional provisions, the latter claiming otherwise.
R.A. No. 7227 expressly requires the concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs
out of all the base areas in the country.[32] The grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence
on the bases conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real
interests that communities nearby or surrounding a particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of
petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of Proclamation No. 420, is personal and substantial
such that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being
challenged.[33] Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an
interest in the question involved or an incidental interest,[34] for what is at stake in the enforcement of Proclamation
No. 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City.
Petitioners locus standi parallels that of the petitioner and other residents of Bataan, specially of the town of
Limay, in Garcia v. Board of Investments[35] where this Court characterized their interest in the establishment of a
petrochemical plant in their place as actual, real, vital and legal, for it would affect not only their economic life but
even the air they breathe.
Moreover, petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the
time, engaged in the local governance of Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their
constituents the question of whether to concur with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John
Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, petitioners Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted
against[36] the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) supporting the issuance of the now challenged
Proclamation No. 420, have legal standing to bring the present petition.
That there is herein a dispute on legal rights and interests is thus beyond doubt. The mootness of the issues
concerning the questioned agreements between public and private respondents is of no moment.

By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is deemed to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.[37]
 6
As to the third and fourth requisites of a judicial inquiry, there is likewise no question that they have been
complied with in the case at bar. This is an action filed purposely to bring forth constitutional issues, ruling on which
this Court must take up. Besides, respondents never raised issues with respect to these requisites, hence, they are
deemed waived.
Having cleared the way for judicial review, the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420, as framed in the
second and third issues above, must now be addressed squarely.
The second issue refers to petitioners objection against the creation by Proclamation No. 420 of a regime of
tax exemption within the John Hay SEZ. Petitioners argue that nowhere in R. A. No. 7227 is there a grant of tax
exemption to SEZs yet to be established in base areas, unlike the grant under Section 12 thereof of tax exemption
and investment incentives to the therein established Subic SEZ. The grant of tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ,
petitioners conclude, thus contravenes Article VI, Section 28 (4) of the Constitution which provides that No law
granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.
Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420, the challenged provision, reads:

Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to Section 5(m) and Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 7227, the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation shall implement all necessary policies, rules, and
regulations governing the zone, including investment incentives, in consultation with pertinent government
departments. Among others, the zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the Special Economic Zone under
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones, the
Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991, and new investment laws that may
hereinafter be enacted. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Upon the other hand, Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 provides:x x x

(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent
provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-
sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment opportunities in and
around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments;

b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free
flow or movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well
as provide incentives such as tax and duty free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment. However,
exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the
Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other
relevant tax laws of the Philippines;

(c) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, no taxes, local and
national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes, three percent (3%) of
the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be
remitted to the National Government, one percent (1%) each to the local government units affected by the
declaration of the zone in proportion to their population area, and other factors. In addition, there is hereby
established a development fund of one percent (1%) of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises
within the Subic Special Economic Zone to be utilized for the Municipality of Subic, and other municipalities
contiguous to be base areas. In case of conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax exemption
privileges in the Subic Special Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved in favor of the latter;

(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and futures
shall be allowed and maintained in the Subic Special Economic Zone;

(e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall supervise and regulate the operations of banks and other
financial institutions within the Subic Special Economic Zone;

(f) Banking and Finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of foreign currency depository units of local
commercial banks and offshore banking units of foreign banks with minimum Central Bank regulation;
 7
(g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose continuing investment shall not be less than Two
Hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), his/her spouse and dependent children under twenty-one (21) years of
age, shall be granted permanent resident status within the Subic Special Economic Zone. They shall have freedom
of ingress and egress to and from the Subic Special Economic Zone without any need of special authorization from
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority referred to in Section 13 of this
Act may also issue working visas renewable every two (2) years to foreign executives and other aliens possessing
highly-technical skills which no Filipino within the Subic Special Economic Zone possesses, as certified by the
Department of Labor and Employment. The names of aliens granted permanent residence status and working visas
by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall be reported to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within
thirty (30) days after issuance thereof;

x x x (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear that under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic SEZ which was granted by Congress with
tax exemption, investment incentives and the like. There is no express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other
SEZs still to be created at the time via presidential proclamation.
The deliberations of the Senate confirm the exclusivity to Subic SEZ of the tax and investment privileges
accorded it under the law, as the following exchanges between our lawmakers show during the second reading of
the precursor bill of R.A. No. 7227 with respect to the investment policies that would govern Subic SEZ which are
now embodied in the aforesaid Section 12 thereof:

xxx

Senator Maceda: This is what I was talking about. We get into problems here because all of these following
policies are centered around the concept of free port. And in the main paragraph above, we have declared both
Clark and Subic as special economic zones, subject to these policies which are, in effect, a free-port arrangement.

Senator Angara: The Gentleman is absolutely correct, Mr. President. So we must confine these policies only to
Subic.

May I withdraw then my amendment, and instead provide that THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE OF SUBIC SHALL BE
ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING POLICIES. Subject to style, Mr. President.

Thus, it is very clear that these principles and policies are applicable only to Subic as a free port.

Senator Paterno: Mr. President.

The President: Senator Paterno is recognized.
Senator Paterno: I take it that the amendment suggested by Senator Angara would then prevent the
establishment of other special economic zones observing these policies.
Senator Angara: No, Mr. President, because during our short caucus, Senator Laurel raised the point
that if we give this delegation to the President to establish other economic zones, that may be an
unwarranted delegation.

So we agreed that we will simply limit the definition of powers and description of the zone to Subic, but that does
not exclude the possibility of creating other economic zones within the baselands.

Senator Paterno: But if that amendment is followed, no other special economic zone may be created
under authority of this particular bill. Is that correct, Mr. President?
Senator Angara: Under this specific provision, yes, Mr. President. This provision now will be confined
only to Subic.[38]

x x x (Underscoring supplied).
 8
As gathered from the earlier-quoted Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the privileges given to Subic SEZ consist
principally of exemption from tariff or customs duties, national and local taxes of business entities therein
(paragraphs (b) and (c)), free market and trade of specified goods or properties (paragraph d), liberalized banking
and finance (paragraph f), and relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors (paragraph g). Yet, apart from these,
Proclamation No. 420 also makes available to the John Hay SEZ benefits existing in other laws such as the privilege
of export processing zone-based businesses of importing capital equipment and raw materials free from taxes, duties
and other restrictions;[39] tax and duty exemptions, tax holiday, tax credit, and other incentives under the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987;[40] and the applicability to the subject zone of rules governing foreign investments in the
Philippines.[41]
While the grant of economic incentives may be essential to the creation and success of SEZs, free trade zones
and the like, the grant thereof to the John Hay SEZ cannot be sustained. The incentives under R.A. No. 7227
are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no support therein.
Neither does the same grant of privileges to the John Hay SEZ find support in the other laws specified under Section
3 of Proclamation No. 420, which laws were already extant before the issuance of the proclamation or the enactment
of R.A. No. 7227.
More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is one of tax exemption. It is the legislature,
unless limited by a provision of the state constitution, that has full power to exempt any person or corporation or
class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. [42] Other than Congress, the
Constitution may itself provide for specific tax exemptions, [43] or local governments may pass ordinances on
exemption only from local taxes.[44]
The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitutions imposition that a law granting any
tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. [45] In the same vein, the
other kinds of privileges extended to the John Hay SEZ are by tradition and usage for Congress to legislate upon.
Contrary to public respondents suggestions, the claimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation
should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based; it must be expressly granted
in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken. [46] Tax exemption cannot be implied as it must be
categorically and unmistakably expressed.[47]
If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ the same tax exemption and incentives given
to the Subic SEZ, it would have so expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227.
This Court no doubt can void an act or policy of the political departments of the government on either of two
groundsinfringement of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion.[48]
This Court then declares that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and other privileges to the
John Hay SEZ is void for being violative of the Constitution. This renders it unnecessary to still dwell on petitioners
claim that the same grant violates the equal protection guarantee.
With respect to the final issue raised by petitioners that Proclamation No. 420 is unconstitutional for being in
derogation of Baguio Citys local autonomy, objection is specifically mounted against Section 2 thereof in which BCDA
is set up as the governing body of the John Hay SEZ.[49]
Petitioners argue that there is no authority of the President to subject the John Hay SEZ to the governance of
BCDA which has just oversight functions over SEZ; and that to do so is to diminish the city governments power over
an area within its jurisdiction, hence, Proclamation No. 420 unlawfully gives the President power of control over the
local government instead of just mere supervision.
Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit. Under R.A. No. 7227, the BCDA is entrusted with, among other
things, the following purpose:[50]

xxx

(a) To own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of John Hay Air Station, Wallace Air Station, ODonnell
Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station, Mt. Sta. Rita Station (Hermosa, Bataan) and those
portions of Metro Manila Camps which may be transferred to it by the President;

x x x (Underscoring supplied)
 9
With such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in BCDA over Camp John Hay, BCDA virtually has
control over it, subject to certain limitations provided for by law. By designating BCDA as the governing agency of
the John Hay SEZ, the law merely emphasizes or reiterates the statutory role or functions it has been granted.
The unconstitutionality of the grant of tax immunity and financial incentives as contained in the second
sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 notwithstanding, the entire assailed proclamation cannot be declared
unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant to law or the Constitution. The delineation and
declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ was well within the powers of the President
to do so by means of a proclamation.[51] The requisite prior concurrence by the Baguio City government to such
proclamation appears to have been given in the form of a duly enacted resolution by the sanggunian. The other
provisions of the proclamation had been proven to be consistent with R.A. No. 7227.
Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.[52] This Court finds that the other provisions in Proclamation
No. 420 converting a delineated portion of Camp John Hay into the John Hay SEZ are separable from the invalid
second sentence of Section 3 thereof, hence they stand.
WHEREFORE, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID
and is accordingly declared of no legal force and effect. Public respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing
the aforesaid void provision.
Proclamation No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and effective.
SO ORDERED.

32] [G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005]SECOND DIVISION

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. DANTE O. GARIN, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 creating the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the
enforcement of traffic laws and regulations.
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic
violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila,
on 05 August 1995. The following statements were printed on the TVR:

YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE MMDA TRAFFIC OPERATIONS CENTER PORT AREA MANILA AFTER
48 HOURS FROM DATE OF APPREHENSION FOR DISPOSITION/APPROPRIATE ACTION THEREON. CRIMINAL CASE
SHALL BE FILED FOR FAILURE TO REDEEM LICENSE AFTER 30 DAYS.

VALID AS TEMPORARY DRIVERS LICENSE FOR SEVEN DAYS FROM DATE OF APPREHENSION.[1]

Shortly before the expiration of the TVRs validity, the respondent addressed a letter [2] to then MMDA Chairman
Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his drivers license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in
court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint[3] with application for preliminary injunction in
Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque, on 12 September 1995, contending that, in the absence of
any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to
deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation,
thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further contended that the provision
violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the
MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
In support of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Garin alleged that he suffered and continues
to suffer great and irreparable damage because of the deprivation of his license and that, absent any implementing
rules from the Metro Manila Council, the TVR and the confiscation of his license have no legal basis.
 10
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the powers granted
to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines and penalties for
traffic violations, which powers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine
the validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude
admixture of the three powers of government in administrative agencies. [4]
The MMDA also refuted Garins allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the governing board and policy
making body of the petitioner, has as yet to formulate the implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 and
directed the courts attention to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April 1995. Respondent
Garin, however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, as he claims that it was
passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.
Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a temporary restraining order on 26 September 1995, extending the
validity of the TVR as a temporary drivers license for twenty more days. A preliminary mandatory injunction was
granted on 23 October 1995, and the MMDA was directed to return the respondents drivers license.
On 14 August 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision [5] in favor of the herein respondent and held
that:

a. There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of the MMDA Council held on March 23, 1995, hence
MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, authorizing confiscation of drivers licenses upon issuance of a TVR, is
void ab initio.

b. The summary confiscation of a drivers license without first giving the driver an opportunity to be heard;
depriving him of a property right (drivers license) without DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in Court the complaint of
supposed traffic infraction, cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the temporary writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made permanent; th(e) MMDA is directed to
return to plaintiff his drivers license; th(e) MMDA is likewise ordered to desist from confiscating drivers license
without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.

In filing this petition,[6] the MMDA reiterates and reinforces its argument in the court below and contends that
a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable
regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The petitioner further argues that
revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without due process as long as the licensee is
given the right to appeal the revocation.
To buttress its argument that a licensee may indeed appeal the taking and the judiciary retains the power to
determine the validity of the confiscation, suspension or revocation of the license, the petitioner points out that
under the terms of the confiscation, the licensee has three options:

1. To voluntarily pay the imposable fine,

2. To protest the apprehension by filing a protest with the MMDA Adjudication Committee, or
3. To request the referral of the TVR to the Public Prosecutors Office.
The MMDA likewise argues that Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 was validly passed in the presence of a
quorum, and that the lower courts finding that it had not was based on a misapprehension of facts, which the
petitioner would have us review. Moreover, it asserts that though the circular is the basis for the issuance of TVRs,
the basis for the summary confiscation of licenses is Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 itself, and that such power is self-
executory and does not require the issuance of any implementing regulation or circular.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented
Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket
(MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch.
Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations. All
motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given seven days from the date of implementation of the new system to pay
their fines and redeem their license or vehicle plates.[7]
 11
It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to enjoin the petitioner from
confiscating drivers licenses is concerned, recent events have overtaken the Courts need to decide this case, which
has been rendered moot and academic by the implementation of Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004.
The petitioner, however, is not precluded from re-implementing Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, or any
other scheme, for that matter, that would entail confiscating drivers licenses. For the proper implementation,
therefore, of the petitioners future programs, this Court deems it appropriate to make the following observations:
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power.
The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a
privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power,
in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements. This is consistent
with our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal[8] on the license to operate a cockpit, Tan v. Director of
Forestry[9] and Oposa v. Factoran[10] on timber licensing agreements, and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of
Surigao[11] on a legislative franchise to operate an electric plant.
Petitioner cites a long list of American cases to prove this point, such as State ex. Rel. Sullivan,[12] which states
in part that, the legislative power to regulate travel over the highways and thoroughfares of the state for the general
welfare is extensive. It may be exercised in any reasonable manner to conserve the safety of travelers and
pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments of potential danger, their registration and the licensing of their
operators have been required almost from their first appearance. The right to operate them in public places is not a
natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the
interest of the public safety and welfare. The power to license imports further power to withhold or to revoke such
license upon noncompliance with prescribed conditions.
Likewise, the petitioner quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Funk,[13] to the effect
that: Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and power. The use of them constitutes an element of danger to
persons and property upon the highways. Carefully operated, an automobile is still a dangerous instrumentality, but,
when operated by careless or incompetent persons, it becomes an engine of destruction. The Legislature, in the
exercise of the police power of the commonwealth, not only may, but must, prescribe how and by whom motor
vehicles shall be operated on the highways. One of the primary purposes of a system of general regulation of the
subject matter, as here by the Vehicle Code, is to insure the competency of the operator of motor vehicles. Such a
general law is manifestly directed to the promotion of public safety and is well within the police power.
The common thread running through the cited cases is that it is the legislature, in the exercise of police power,
which has the power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles may be operated on the state
highways.
2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,[14] we categorically stated that Rep.
Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are
administrative in nature.
The said case also involved the herein petitioner MMDA which claimed that it had the authority to open a
subdivision street owned by the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. to public traffic because it is an agent of the state
endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From this premise, the MMDA argued
that there was no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune Street to the public.
Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we concluded that the MMDA is not a
local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro
Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Thus, in the absence of
an ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to open the street was invalid.
We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police power, as an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant
to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of
the same.
 12
Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government
units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991.[15] A local government
is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs.[16] Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police
power through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of Rep.
Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and
the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority"
referred to as the MMDA. Thus:

. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative
bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its
Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an
agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government
agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in
nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:

Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- -x x x.

The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise
regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila,
without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters.

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the
Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs
functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis. [17] (footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied)

Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to
grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative
enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power.
3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila Development
Authority. The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall install and administer a single ticketing
system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether
moving or nonmoving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of such
traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136[18] and P.D. No. 1605[19] to the contrary
notwithstanding, and that (f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro
Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local
government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be
delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose.
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom
legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded and in fact is
duty-bound to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and
 13
traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic
engineering services and traffic education programs.[20]
This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development authority created for the purpose
of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory construction that a statute is to be read in a
manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it, [21] and is supported by the criteria in cases of this nature
that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. [22]
A last word. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that transcend local
political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with regard to
transport and traffic management,[23] and we are aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the
increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited by the MMDAs enabling
law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in this respect must be authorized
by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED

33] G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003 EN BANC

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO,
JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-
TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention, vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE
 14
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA
IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS,
DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA,
EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-
JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS
LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE
BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO
SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE
SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY,
JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN
PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO,
JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO
LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO,
DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG,
GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON,
JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO
MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN
CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES,
ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS
PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS,
RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO
GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A.
LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO
PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG,
ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO,
DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA,
SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON
SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU
RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.
 15
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET
AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND
ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND
MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES
REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE
WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH
THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C.
ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO,
DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-
PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX
FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP
OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE
HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
 16
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.,
ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON,
PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO
B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF
CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED
MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION
INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO,
PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT
CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS
SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable
it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and
extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for
its resolution.

Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the
relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature
and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to
vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant
petitions – whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with
the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the
resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that
it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this
controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-
constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and
protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth
that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
 17
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying
their indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that
governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and
coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are
harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-being of the
people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI - Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives
or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included
in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three
session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for
that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is
on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment
Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules 1 approved by the 11th
 18
Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in the
following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. –
Impeachment shall be initiated only by a
verified complaint for impeachment filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives
or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof or by a
verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of
all the Members of the House.
RULE V
BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. – In cases where a Member of the House
files a verified complaint of impeachment or a
citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by
a Member of the House through a resolution of
endorsement against an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against such official are
deemed initiated on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or
resolution against such official, as the case may be,
is sufficient in substance, or on the date the House
votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in
substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution
of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the case
may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members
of the House, impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such
verified complaint or resolution of impeachment
with the Secretary General.

RULE V Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment

BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within the period of
one (1) year.
Proceedings. – Within a period of one (1) year from
the date impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated
against the same official. (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, 2 sponsored by Representative Felix William
D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint 4 (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." 6 The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, 7 and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which
reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives
or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
 19
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient
in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. 10 To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day
after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint 11 was filed with the
Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William
B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of
all the Members of the House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that
the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and
that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against
then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that
(1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this
Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX,
Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the
records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and
(3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of
the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ
"perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the
Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the
event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest
as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment
complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings
on said second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus
standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be
declared unconstitutional.
 20
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray
in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting,
adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents De
Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez,
alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only
constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the
second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all
forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court,
the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is
instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment complaint as
well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the
Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and
issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any
proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-
petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition,
which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount
public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment
complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar
Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer,
pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the
House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that
the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and
Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in
behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of
Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and
that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House
of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for
Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its
officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting
the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from
receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that
respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely
 21
without any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the
alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law
they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a
constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of
Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the
second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the
second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF)
was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the
examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of
Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be
declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment
and from conducting any proceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate
and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which
were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary
injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the
second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed
for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being
unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003,
sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution
No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the
second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of
Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have
yet to be forwarded to the Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the
Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a)
consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor
General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral
arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In
 22
addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and
others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr.
and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has
no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-
equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty
to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to
Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority
and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one
where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the
Constitution."22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the
earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November
3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a
Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or
in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1)
its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles
of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28,
2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and
praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a
"Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a
Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and
Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners,
intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal
issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what
issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution; and
 23
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as
the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has
sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of
judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-
requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet
remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the
validity of the second impeachment complaint.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII
of our present 1987 Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive
1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions,
unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what
judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it
was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations
and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to
direct the course of government along constitutional channels,for then the distribution of powers would be
mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere
political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they
should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2
of article VIII of our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent
of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational
way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
 24
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt
at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the
different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is
inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its
Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review
was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall
be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the
principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is
void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.28(Italics in the original;
emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of
judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted
political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, 30 the executive and legislative
branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused
by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the
laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate
system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the
bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of
the people for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
 25
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system
of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x
x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative
acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential
for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three
great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and
control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation – or
instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or
instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the
first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the
nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its
proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a
matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime
was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then
had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it.
As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of
courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of
martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court
said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels
that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law
regime. x x x x x x

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government
as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not
a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the
duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in
the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
 26
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there,
but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the
people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus
these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration.
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will
be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to
enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue 40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A.
Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De
Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution
merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others.When they adopted
subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance
and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be

separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by
any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
 27
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which
will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 45 (Emphasis
supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the
same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention
in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when
other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who
did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force
of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The
proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framers's understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the
power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the
novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action
which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the
impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review. 47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1)
entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to
determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings. 49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial
review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American
authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers'
decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of
checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a
lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief. 51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US
Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide
impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the
power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably
support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine
constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for
these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes,
[this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they
have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution
can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the
colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
 28
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in
the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power
to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to
the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows
sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting
in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, 55 provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These
limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of
one and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead
to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship
on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed
legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride." 56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through
the power of judicial review.

The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument
that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the
denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not
concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional
action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of
the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a
justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v.
Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being
violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether
the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the
political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v.
Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the Constitution, the
legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon
the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the
National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential
before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." 67 Both are integral components of
the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
 29
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect
the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist
of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing
since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice
Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past,
accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public
interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution
and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them. 72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan
of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule
exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in
the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the
courts will grant petitioners standing.

There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former
is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set
forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what
is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is
important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different
from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although
all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing
restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper
role of the judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have
been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers
or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have
 30
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."

xxx

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefited
or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House
of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice.
On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress;
citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession – which were supposedly
violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have
been met have been given standing by this Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to
be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or
that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review,
however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. 80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This
Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the
Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate
the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members, 84 especially when it is composed of
substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented
by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be
sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all
interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is,
under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the
court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent
 31
issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while
Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds
or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. 90 Applying these determinants,
this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party
should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence
of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to
allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to
possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody
of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts
when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. 92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same
standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier
stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner
Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this
insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the
requisites for intervention had been complied with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the
Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II
Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective
motions to intervene were hereby granted.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and
arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's
jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an
impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives.
Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress
against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating
to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
 32
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a
taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners
seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.94 (Citations omitted)

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in
illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his
mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if
and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second
impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been
already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished
and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus
curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render
a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that
all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take
judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw
their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise
constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to
the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate,
the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not,
by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by
itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of
Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their
injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before
coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor
the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether
concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the
earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of
power to grant it.

Justiciability
 33
98
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco, Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political
question," viz:

[T]he term "POLITICAL QUESTION" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.99(Italics in the original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court
vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court
hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review. 100 In
other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed
jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether
the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took
cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity.

The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over
certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political
questions, viz:

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the
weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive
the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason
and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all other powers
without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the
Committee on the Judiciary.

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter
of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred
considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal
defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of
courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of
martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court
said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that
this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the
rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am
sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the
 34
Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973
on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on
September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its
publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21.
So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything about it. In fact,
the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also
because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the
ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not
finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon
the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were
picked up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the
Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to
the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973
Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree
calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited
discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to
allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January
1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the
draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the danger of
its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would
consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be submitted
in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision
not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus
the barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers
thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum
should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court
praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme
Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new
Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored
the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room
where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation
declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense put
up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case.

xxx

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft
of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had
been notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the
alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that
there had been no referendum.

Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum and a
plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question.
Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of "political question"
was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.

xxx
 35
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions:
What is judicial power? What is a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts
of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be
enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her
duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to
comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There
are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would
be highly derogatory to human dignity."

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable or enforceable . . .

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of
government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government are generally
considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme
within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether
a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction.
This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the
duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on
the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept
of judicial power, thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the
Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with
jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question
as to whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking
jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty
to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according
to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
 36
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political
question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the
Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition that
we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question
doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond
the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power
is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called
the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII
was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are
two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political
questions."

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of
powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can
review questions which are not truly political in nature.

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a
number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the
present Constitution.

In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.106 x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the
Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987
Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in
appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason
is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would
still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable
political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There
has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
 37
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.112(Underscoring supplied)

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are
interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically
different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less
discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard
to the present controversy.

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of
the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development
Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these,
namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate
the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative
examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor. 114 Clearly, the issue
calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power
under Section 1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota
 38
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should
be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a
law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is
raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises
in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated
Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is
shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus,
there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party,
and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case
itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment
complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could
possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be
passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second
impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution 120 calling for a legislative inquiry into
the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a
violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an
assault on the independence of the judiciary.121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the
issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the
issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the
Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of
legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated
cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of
their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by
this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute
or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as
provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
 39
rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self. 123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition
of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was
verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not
fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned
section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said
Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the
"Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:

"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second
impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
"forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of
the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they concede that the second
impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under
Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall
be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the
Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second
impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment.
Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-
third of the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment
contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member
whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the
constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its
adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the
second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant
consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262,
but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases
is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et.
 40
al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this
Court's decision.

In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota
of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by
the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and
(2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.

Judicial Restraint

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates
that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court
to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment."125But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass
laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be
declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other
tribunal to which the controversy may be referred." 126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested
under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound
to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is
not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be
a dereliction of duty."

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and
must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. 128 On the occasion that this Court
had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but
in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness." 129 After all, "by [his]
appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally
and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless
in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with
a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas
v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a
Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET
Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This
would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not
sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the
Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the
substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it
cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a
duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest
as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not
have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—elect, six of
 41
whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in
the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at
stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the
substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such
situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may
inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of
the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where
he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial
judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its
Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial
election contest.

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short
of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.
Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by
the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the
deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court
itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned
and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Justices. 133 (Italics in the original)

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.

In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the
power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,
declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that,
by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to
the constitutionality of the legislative act.'

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.'
. . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case.'

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied.'

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found
most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a
constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will
decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question
under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an
independent state ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is
injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of
the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official
 42
interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v.
Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth
Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity
Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed
himself of its benefits.

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial
review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They
stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario
that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary
countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official. 137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this
argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the
diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the
possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the
Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their
action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.

x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until
the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only
juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the
Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of votes.
Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent
and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes
either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims," 140 the pre-existing constitutional order was
disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
 43
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government
would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the
laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a
precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the
fundamental law of the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion,
to wit:141

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the
guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which
they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A
government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting
under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to
protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or
even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings

adopted by the 12th Congress

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of
the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that
the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a
collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly
mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3
ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2)
by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the
House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives,
acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory
construction is, therefore, in order.

That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who
eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered
and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings,
which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant petitions
held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on
the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of
the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.

"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set
going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to
perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who
elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a
beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate.
The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of
impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella
says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment
 44
or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say
"impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition
that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after
actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law.
Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:

MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on
impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time
for Committee action.

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment
proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my
experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took
charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the information
of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with
initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report,
transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the
amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do
not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed
out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on
the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved
by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the
initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment
proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who
approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of
Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of
Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of
the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section
3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and
the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then
capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section
will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the
United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to
 45
impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third
of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not
vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, Madam President. 143 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the
Accountability of Public Officers.144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus
curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it
understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the
complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the
impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3,
paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means
to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the
constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.

xxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)

refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first
sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the
principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An
impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision
provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense
that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However,
before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to
begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place
not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either
by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the
complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the
resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same
complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or
overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members
upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that
the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is successfully
impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as
impeachment court.
 46
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted
to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding,
namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution
passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House
is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or
begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating
step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached
the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary…
to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of
the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. 146 Thus the line was
deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on
the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution
is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read
ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not
as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because
Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by
equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members
of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice
that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article
XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous
construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court
stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on
the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly
recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the
former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that
intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and
disinterestedness.148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members
of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf
 47
Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has
not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional Commission, but has
examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal
that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised
on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is
misplaced.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the
phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article
XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:

Section 3. (1) x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session
days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from
receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress
had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its
rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta
v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this
Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to
a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v.
De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court,
held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the
Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts
to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I
agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case
 48
at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before
the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the
judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:

"x x x

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this
as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient
to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in
the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be counted and
announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of
this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the
presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any
matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode
or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But
within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just.
It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length
of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond
the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e,
whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test:
(1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3)
its method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the
Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of
powers.154

xxx

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935
and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state
constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under
martial law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse
of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the
Legislative departments of government.155
 49
xxx

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can
decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this
Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government
despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people. 156

xxx

The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of
the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other branches of
government. This provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x

xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave
abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations
by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this
Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but
what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the
present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision
as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the
rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we
refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity
to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga
that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation
should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case
at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the
violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.

Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may
not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed,
the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised.
No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not
hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as
earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding
of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by
 50
the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or
a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to
the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer
within a one-year period.

Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage
of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or
tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For
many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting
experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be
the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against
the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their
voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and
denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the
governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was
specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by
the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. When
the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-
interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and
"judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment
proceedings.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of
initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been
already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its
constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the
construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a
genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in
accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a
matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it
to pass upon that problem head on.

The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively
set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of
whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally
imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of
 51
this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison
d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring
about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.

It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings
against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the
members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be
farther from the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the
judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This
Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer
therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment
according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just
because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the
fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the
Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case
in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme
Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non
sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of
all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and
obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous
in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning
and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just
because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is
solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment
case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in
search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely
a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it
went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the
use of force and aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

34] THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 116033 February 26, 1997
ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C.
BATAUSA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a private individual who is charged with malversation of public
funds as a principal after the said individual had been designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a custodian
of distrained property? Did such accused become a public officer and therefore subject to the graft court's
jurisdiction as a consequence of such designation by the BIR?
 52
1
These are the main questions in the instant petition for review of Respondent Sandiganbayan's Decision in
Criminal Case No. 14260 promulgated on March 8, 1994, convicting petitioner of malversation of public funds and
property, and Resolution2 dated June 20, 1994, denying his motion for new trial or reconsideration thereof.

The Facts

Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling "dirt and ore."3 His services
were contracted by the Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) at its concession in Mangagoy,
Surigao del Sur. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at
the former's premises.4 From this set of circumstances arose the present controversy.

. . . It appears that on May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the Main Office
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) addressed to the Regional Director (Jose Batausa) or his authorized
representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City commanding the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or
effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent
taxpayer. The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to accused Alfredo Azarcon ordering him to transfer,
surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla. The Warrant
of Garnishment was received by accused Azarcon on June 17, 1985.5

Petitioner Azarcon, in signing the "Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized Under Authority of the National
Internal Revenue," assumed the undertakings specified in the receipt the contents of which are reproduced as
follows:

(I), the undersigned, hereby acknowledge to have received from Amadeo V. San Diego, an Internal Revenue
Officer, Bureau of Internal Revenue of the Philippines, the following described goods, articles, and things:

Kind of property — Isuzu dump truck

Motor number — E120-229598
Chassis No. — SPZU50-1772440
Number of CXL — 6
Color — Blue
Owned By — Mr. Jaime Ancla

the same having been this day seized and left in (my) possession pending investigation by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative. (I) further promise that (I) will faithfully keep, preserve,
and, to the best of (my) ability, protect said goods, articles, and things seized from defacement, demarcation,
leakage, loss, or destruction in any manner; that (I) will neither alter nor remove, nor permit others to alter or
remove or dispose of the same in any manner without the express authority of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue; and that (I) will produce and deliver all of said goods, articles, and things upon the order of any court
of the Philippines, or upon demand of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or any authorized officer or agent
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.6

Subsequently, Alfredo Azarcon wrote a letter dated November 21, 1985 to the BIR's Regional Director for Revenue
Region 10 B, Butuan City stating that

. . . while I have made representations to retain possession of the property and signed a receipt of the same,
it appears now that Mr. Jaime Ancla intends to cease his operations with us. This is evidenced by the fact that
sometime in August, 1985 he surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from my custody. . . . In this connection,
may I therefore formally inform you that it is my desire to immediately relinquish whatever responsibilities I
have over the above-mentioned property by virtue of the receipt I have signed. This cancellation shall take
effect immediately. . . .7

Incidentally, the petitioner reported the taking of the truck to the security manager of PICOP, Mr. Delfin Panelo,
and requested him to prevent this truck from being taken out of the PICOP concession. By the time the order to
bar the truck's exit was given, however, it was too late.8
 53
Regional Director Batausa responded in a letter dated May 27, 1986, to wit:

An analysis of the documents executed by you reveals that while you are (sic) in possession of the dump truck
owned by JAIME ANCLA, you voluntarily assumed the liabilities of safekeeping and preserving the unit in behalf
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This is clearly indicated in the provisions of the Warrant of Garnishment
which you have signed, obliged and committed to surrender and transfer to this office. Your failure therefore,
to observe said provisions does not relieve you of your responsibility. 9

Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan found that

On 11 June 1986, Mrs. Marilyn T. Calo, Revenue Document Processor of Revenue Region 10 B, Butuan City,
sent a progress report to the Chief of the Collection Branch of the surreptitious taking of the dump truck and
that Ancla was renting out the truck to a certain contractor by the name of Oscar Cueva at PICOP (Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines, the same company which engaged petitioner's earth moving
services), Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. She also suggested that if the report were true, a warrant of
garnishment be reissued against Mr. Cueva for whatever amount of rental is due from Ancla until such time as
the latter's tax liabilities shall be deemed satisfied. . . However, instead of doing so, Director Batausa filed a
letter-complaint against the (herein Petitioner) and Ancla on 22 January 1988, or after more than one year had
elapsed from the time of Mrs. Calo's report. 10

Provincial Fiscal Pretextato Montenegro "forwarded the records of the complaint . . . to the Office of the
Tanodbayan" on May 18, 1988. He was deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor and granted authority to conduct
preliminary investigation on August 22, 1988, in a letter by Special Prosecutor Raul Gonzales approved by
Ombudsman (Tanodbayan) Conrado Vasquez. 11

Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla, Petitioner Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime
of malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) in the following Information 12 filed on January 12, 1990, by Special Prosecution Officer Victor Pascual:

That on or about June 17, 1985, in the Municipality of Bislig, Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Alfredo L. Azarcon, a private individual but who, in his capacity
as depository/administrator of property seized or deposited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, having
voluntarily offered himself to act as custodian of one Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with Motor No. E120-22958, Chasis
No. SPZU 50-1772440, and number CXL-6 and was authorized to be such under the authority of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, has become a responsible and accountable officer and said motor vehicle having been seized
from Jaime C. Ancla in satisfaction of his tax liability in the total sum of EIGHTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
THIRTY ONE PESOS and 59/100 (P80,831.59) became a public property and the value thereof as public fund,
with grave abuse of confidence and conspiring and confederating with said Jaime C. Ancla, likewise, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, (sic) unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to
his personal use and benefit the aforementioned motor vehicle or the value thereof in the aforestated amount,
by then and there allowing accused Jaime C. Ancla to remove, retrieve, withdraw and tow away the said Isuzu
Dumptruck (sic) with the authority, consent and knowledge of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Butuan City, to
the damage and prejudice of the government in the amount of P80,831.59 in a form of unsatisfied tax liability.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan on May 14, 1991, alleging that: (1) the
petitioner never appeared in the preliminary investigation; and (2) the petitioner was not a public officer, hence a
doubt exists as to why he was being charged with malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. 13 The
Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation on May 22, 1991. 14 After the reinvestigation, Special
Prosecution Officer Roger Berbano, Sr., recommended the "withdrawal of the information" 15 but was "overruled
by the Ombudsman." 16

A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on March 25, 1992 on the ground that the Sandiganbayan did not have
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner since he was not a public officer. 17 On May 18, 1992; the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion. 18
 54
When the prosecution finished presenting its evidence, the petitioner then filed a motion for leave to file demurrer
to evidence which was denied on November 16, 1992, "for being without merit." 19 The petitioner then
commenced and finished presenting his evidence on February 15, 1993.

The Respondent Court's Decision

On March 8, 1994, Respondent Sandiganbayan 20 rendered a Decision, 21 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alfredo Azarcon y Leva GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised
Penal Code and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in view of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its maximum period to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR
(4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal. To indemnify the Bureau of Internal Revenue the amount
of P80,831.59; to pay a fine in the same amount without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer
special perpetual disqualification; and, to pay the costs.

Considering that accused Jaime Ancla has not yet been brought within the jurisdiction of this Court up to this
date, let this case be archived as against him without prejudice to its revival in the event of his arrest or voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, through new counsel, 22 filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration on March 23, 1994, which was
denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution 23 dated December 2, 1994.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

The petitioner submits the following reasons for the reversal of the Sandiganbayan's assailed Decision and
Resolution:

I. The Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed solely by private individuals.
II. In any event, even assuming arguendo that the appointment of a private individual as a custodian or a
depositary of distrained property is sufficient to convert such individual into a public officer, the petitioner
cannot still be considered a public officer because:

[A]

There is no provision in the National Internal Revenue Code which authorizes the Bureau of Internal Revenue
to constitute private individuals as depositaries of distrained properties.

[B]

His appointment as a depositary was not by virtue of a direct provision of law, or by election or by
appointment by a competent authority.

III. No proof was presented during trial to prove that the distrained vehicle was actually owned by the accused
Jaime Ancla; consequently, the government's right to the subject property has not been established.

IV. The procedure provided for in the National Internal Revenue Code concerning the disposition of distrained
property was not followed by the B.I.R., hence the distraint of personal property belonging to Jaime C. Ancla
and found allegedly to be in the possession of the petitioner is therefore invalid.
 55
V. The B.I.R. has only itself to blame for not promptly selling the distrained property of accused Jaime C. Ancla in
order to realize the amount of back taxes owed by Jaime C. Ancla to the Bureau. 24

In fine, the fundamental issue is whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
controversy. Corollary to this is the question of whether petitioner can be considered a public officer by reason of
his being designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a depositary of distrained property.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

It is hornbook doctrine that in order "(to) ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the
law should be inquired into." 25 Furthermore, "the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the statute
law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied." 26 And for this purpose in criminal cases, "the
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law at the time of commencement of the action." 27

In this case, the action was instituted with the filing of this information on January 12, 1990; hence, the applicable
statutory provisions are those of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, but prior to their
amendment by R.A. No. 7975 on May 16, 1995. At that time, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 provided that:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for
six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this
paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for
six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

xxx xxx xxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees.

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provisions unequivocally specify the only instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction
over a private individual, i.e. when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice
or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.

Azarcon: A Public Officer or A Private Individual?

The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public
officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. Thus, unless petitioner be proven a public
officer, the Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged. Article 203 of the RPC determines who
are public officers:
 56
Who are public officers. — For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the preceding titles of the
book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine
Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or
subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer.

Thus, (to) be a public officer, one must be —

(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government, or

Performing in said Government or any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate
official, of any rank or class; and

(2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform public duties must be —

a. by direct provision of the law, or

b. by popular election, or
c. by appointment by competent authority. 28

Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR,
commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized
by popular election. The next logical query is whether petitioner's designation by the BIR as a custodian of
distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct provision of law, or by competent authority. 29 We answer in
the negative.

The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in effecting constructive distraint over the truck allegedly owned by
Jaime Ancla, and in requiring Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon who was in possession thereof to sign a pro forma receipt
for it, effectively "designated" petitioner a depositary and, hence, citing U.S. vs. Rastrollo, 30 a public officer. 31 This
is based on the theory that

(t)he power to designate a private person who has actual possession of a distrained property as a depository of
distrained property is necessarily implied in the BIR's power to place the property of a delinquent tax payer (sic)
in distraint as provided for under Sections 206, 207 and 208 (formerly Sections 303, 304 and 305) of the
National Internal Revenue Code, (NIRC) . . . . 32

We disagree. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not applicable to the case before us simply because the facts therein
are not identical, similar or analogous to those obtaining here. While the cited case involved a judicial deposit of
the proceeds of the sale of attached property in the hands of the debtor, the case at bench dealt with the BIR's
administrative act of effecting constructive distraint over alleged property of taxpayer Ancla in relation to his back
taxes, property which was received by Petitioner Azarcon. In the cited case, it was clearly within the scope of that
court's jurisdiction and judicial power to constitute the judicial deposit and give "the depositary a character
equivalent to that of a public official." 33 However, in the instant case, while the BIR had authority to require
Petitioner Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a
public officer.

It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework, which mandates a limited government, that its branches and
administrative agencies exercise only that power delegated to them as "defined either in the Constitution or in
legislation or in both." 34 Thus, although the "appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, . .
." 35the quantum of powers possessed by an administrative agency forming part of the executive branch will still be
limited to that "conferred expressly or by necessary or fair implication" in its enabling act. Hence, "(a)n
administrative officer, it has been held, has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof." 36 Corollarily, implied powers "are those which are necessarily included in, and are
therefore of lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to other matters not embraced therein, nor
are not incidental thereto." 37 For to so extend the statutory grant of power "would be an encroachment on
powers expressly lodged in Congress by our Constitution." 38 It is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by
 57
the prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring "any person" to preserve a
distrained property, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

The constructive distraint of personal property shall be effected by requiring the taxpayer or any person having
possession or control of such property to sign a receipt covering the property distrained and obligate himself to
preserve the same intact and unaltered and not to dispose of the same in any manner whatever without the
express authority of the Commissioner.

xxx xxx xxx

However, we find no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason of such requirement.
The BIR's power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to
appoint him as a public officer. The prosecution argues that "Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code . . . defines the
individuals covered by the term 'officers' under Article 217 39 . . ." of the same Code. 40 And accordingly, since
Azarcon became "a depository of the truck seized by the BIR" he also became a public officer who can be
prosecuted under Article 217 . . . ." 41

The Court is not persuaded. Article 222 of the RPC reads:

Officers included in the preceding provisions. — The provisions of this chapter shall apply to private individuals
who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property
and to any administrator or depository of funds or property attached, seized or deposited by public authority,
even if such property belongs to a private individual.

"Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to
only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." 42 This is
particularly observed in the interpretation of penal statutes which "must be construed with such strictness as to
carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant . . . ." 43 The language of the foregoing provision is clear. A private
individual who has in his charge any of the public funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of the
acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the
same penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a private
individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer.

After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court thus finds Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon and his co-accused
Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals erroneously charged before and convicted by Respondent
Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction over them. The Sandiganbayan's taking cognizance of this case is of no
moment since "(j)urisdiction cannot be conferred by . . . erroneous belief of the court that it had jurisdiction." 44 As
aptly and correctly stated by the petitioner in his memorandum:

From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the petitioner did not cease to be a private individual when he
agreed to act as depositary of the garnished dump truck. Therefore, when the information charged him and
Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds or property, the prosecution was in
fact charging two private individuals without any public officer being similarly charged as a co-conspirator.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore all the proceedings
taken below as well as the Decision rendered by Respondent Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of
jurisdiction. 45

WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution and Decision of the Sandiganbayan are hereby SET ASIDE and declared
NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 58
35] [G.R. No. 90591. November 21, 1990.]EN BANC
GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO, Petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL C. DOMINGO, in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon and PC/INP/CIS , Respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; PUBLIC OFFICE; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; ACT OR OMISSION THAT MAY BE INVESTIGATED,
NOT REQUIRED TO BE RELATED TO, CONNECTED WITH, OR ARISE FROM, THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY. —
As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate . . . any act or omission
of any public official . . . when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13
[1].) The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to
take appropriate action against a public official . . . and to recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 13 [3]). The clause
"any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the
Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or
arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we. The reason for
the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is
to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges’ and fiscals’ offices,
and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and
influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers.
It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public
officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the
performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by
any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770). The
murder of three persons, is, without any doubt, an illegal act. Since it was allegedly committed by the petitioner as
provincial governor of Zambales, the crime lies within the pale of the Ombudsman’s investigative authority.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; VESTED WITH PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER CASE COGNIZABLE BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN; MURDER
CHARGE INCLUDED THEREIN. — The Ombudsman Act of 1989 which took effect on December 7, 1989 (Sec. 15, R.A.
6770) vests in the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when the penalty prescribed by law for
the offense is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The murder charge against the
petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code),
hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it.
Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman as a special body to investigate
erring public officials would be wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of minor and less grave
offenses arising from, or related to, the duties of public office, but would exclude those grave and terrible crimes
that spring from abuses of official powers and prerogatives, for it is in the investigation of the latter where the
need for an independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like the Ombudsman, is greatest.

D E C I S I O N - GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

By this petition for certiorari and prohibition Governor Amor D. Deloso of Zambales seeks to stop
respondent Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, from conducting a preliminary
investigation of the charge against him of multiple murder in IBP Case No. OSP-88-01770, entitled
"PC/INP/CIS v. Governor Amor Deloso," on the grounds that:cvirtual 1aw library

1. The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to investigate the murder charge against the petitioner for its
jurisdiction is confined to the investigation only of acts or omissions that are connected with the
performance of his duties as governor; and

2. For the same reason, the Tanodbayan (Special Prosecutor) has no jurisdiction to prosecute the
murder case against the petitioner.
 59
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court issued a temporary restraining order on November 7, 1989 (p.
49, Rollo).

The case began in the evening of April 22, 1988, when Governor Deloso attended a basketball victory
party in Cabangan, Zambales. From the party, he proceeded to a pre-wedding celebration in
Danacbunga, Botolan, Zambales. He left Danacbunga at 1:30 A.M., April 23, 1988, on board his service
car, and accompanied by his security force of military/police/civilian escorts on board two other motor
vehicles.

While travelling on the barangay road a few kilometers from the venue of the pre-wedding celebration,
the convoy of three (3) motor vehicles, with the governor’s car in the middle, was allegedly ambushed.
Governor Deloso jumped out of his car and took cover behind it. During a lull in the shooting, he was
allegedly rushed home by his official staff. Later, he learned that three supposed ambushers —
Patrolman Alberto Dullas, Jr., Don Dullas, and Edgar Vinco, Jr. — were killed. His own group suffered no
casualties.

Based, however, on the testimonies of eyewitnesses, the PC/INP/CIS investigators reported that the
Governor’s group was not ambushed, but was the ambusher. The report stated:

"This case was prefaced by the report of Governor Amor Deloso of Zambales that on the morning of
April 23, 1988, at about 1:30 o’clock in the morning, he and his escorts were ambushed by the group of
Pat. Alberto Dullas, Jr. along the Provincial Road of Danacbunga, Botolan, Zambales. However, in the
course of the investigation, it was established, through the testimonies of eyewitnesses, that it was the
group of Pat. Dullas, Don Dullas and Edgar Vinco, Jr., then riding in a Toyota Corolla car with Plate No.
CAG 419, who were ambushed by the group of Governor Deloso and his escorts, numbering more or less
fifteen (15). Initial witnesses positively identified the military/police escorts of Governor Deloso as CIC
Pacifico Uy, CIC Leonito Bandala PC, Cpl Cesar Madoh PC, Cpl Elpidio Manding PC, Pat Pedro Dolojan INP
and Pat Florante Dimaguibo INP. The above-named escorts were already charged of Multiple Murder
before the Regional Staff Judge Advocate (RSJA), Regional Command (RECOM) No. 3, on May 5, 1988,
pursuant to PD 1850. Said witnesses further identified the civilian escorts/companions of Governor
Deloso at the time of the incident as Eto Epan, Dennis Reyes, Arthur Menes and Jaime Detona, Et Al.,
who were, likewise, charged of the same offense before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Zambales
on May 6, 1988, docketed under I.S. No. 88-100-1.

"Follow-up investigation of this case further established the identities of the other military/police
escorts of Governor Deloso who were also implicated in the said shooting incident, namely: Pat Warlito
Quinto, Mario Dial, Jr., Crisostomo Diomino, Jr., Sarito Dedicatoria, Ernesto Isidoro, Delfin Deliquina,
Ramon Pangilinan, Alex de Leon and Carlos Yabut. Consequently, these personalities had already been
included as respondents in the original complaint earlier filed with RSJA, Recom 3, on June 27, 1988.

"Relevantly, the testimonies of additional witnesses, particularly those of the spouses Honorio and
Araceli Dullas strongly inculpated Governor Amor Deloso of Zambales in the commission of the crime.
On the other hand, Governor Deloso, when invited to give his version of the incident, opted instead in
submitting a nineteen (19) page photocopy of his letter dated May 30, 1988 to Justice Secretary Sedfrey
Ordonez." (pp. 63-64, Rollo.)

The military servicemen in the Governor’s security force were charged with murder in the Judge
Advocate General’s Office, while his civilian security men were investigated by the Provincial Fiscal of
Zambales. The Governor was charged with multiple murder before the Special Prosecutor, Raul M.
Gonzales, who, without a referral from the Ombudsman, supposedly handpicked prosecutor Juan
Templonuevo to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case.
 60
On February 20, 1989, Governor Deloso filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that: 1aw
library
1) The Office of the Special Prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case;
2) The said office is without authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case; and
3) The preliminary investigation of Governor Deloso was prohibited by law in view of the Barangay
Elections scheduled on 28 March 1989.

Albeit reluctantly, it may be imagined, Special Prosecutor Gonzales referred the case to the Ombudsman
for preliminary investigation.

On June 19, 1989, respondent Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, issued an order
denying Governor Deloso’s motion to dismiss because "the Constitution empowers the Ombudsman to
investigate any act or omission of any public official . . . without any qualification that said act or
omission must have been committed or incurred in relation to his office." (p. 8, Rollo)

After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Governor Deloso filed this petition for certiorari,
reiterating the grounds of his motion to dismiss.

After careful consideration, the Court finds the petition to be without merit.

Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provide:

"SEC. 12. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof."
virtua1aw library
"SEC. 13. The office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

"(1) investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employees, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.

"x x x"

(Emphasis supplied; pp. 9-10, Rollo.)

The petitioner admits that "the office of the Ombudsman was created under the authority of the
Constitution and was mandated to act as a champion of the citizens, the watchdog of the people, the
official critic of public officials and the government mobilizer." (p. 9, Rollo.) But he theorizes that "the
framers of our Constitution . . . intended to limit the powers of the Ombudsman to crimes related to or
connected with an official’s discharge of his public functions." (p. 15, Rollo.) Hence, the lone issue
presented by the petition is whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate the charge of
multiple murder allegedly committed by the petitioner as provincial governor. The answer is yes.

As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate
. . . any act or omission of any public official . . . when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13 [1].) The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer
concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public official . . .
and to recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 13 [3]).

The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime
 61
committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the
public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or
omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the
law does not distinguish, neither should we.

The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad
investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to
penetrate judges’ and fiscals’ offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials,
and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into
malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to
create a special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether
or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of
their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses "all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by
any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A.
6770).

The murder of three persons, is, without any doubt, an illegal act. Since it was allegedly committed by
the petitioner as provincial governor of Zambales, the crime lies within the pale of the Ombudsman’s
investigative authority.

The Ombudsman Act of 1989 which took effect on December 7, 1989 (Sec. 15, R.A. 6770) vests in the
Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

"SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in
the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases." (p. 74, Rollo.)

The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The
murder charge against the petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code), hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman
has primary jurisdiction to investigate it.

Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman as a special body to
investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of
minor and less grave offenses arising from, or related to, the duties of public office, but would exclude
those grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of official powers and prerogatives, for it is in
the investigation of the latter where the need for an independent, fearless, and honest investigative
body, like the Ombudsman, is greatest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 62
36] G.R. No. 180700 THIRD DIVISION March 4, 2008
GERARDO R. VILLASEOR and RODEL A. MESA,
Petitioners, - versus - SANDIGANBAYAN (5th Division) and LOUELLA MAE OCO-PESQUERRA(Office of the Special
Prosecutor, Ombudsman),Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N - REYES, R.T., J.:

DOES preventive suspension in an administrative proceeding bar preventive suspension in a criminal

case founded on the same facts and circumstances?

The question is posed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Petitioners seek to annul and set aside the Sandiganbayan[1]Resolution[2] of July 3, 2007 in
Criminal Case No. 27756 for violation of Section 3, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,[3] as amended, suspending
them pendente lite. Also assailed is the October 10, 2007 Resolution[4] denying their motion for
reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents

On August 18, 2001, disaster struck. In the wee hours of the morning, the Quezon City Manor Hotel went
ablaze resulting in the death of seventy-four (74) people and injuries to scores of others. Investigation
into the tragedy revealed that the hotel was a veritable fire trap.

Petitioners, together with other officials of the City Engineering Office of Quezon City, are presently
facing criminal charges before the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan for the crime of multiple homicide through
reckless imprudence and for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. They were also
charged administratively with gross negligence, gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the
service in connection with the Manor Hotel inferno.

In two separate Orders dated August 29, 2001[5] and September 7, 2001[6] in the administrative
case, petitioners Villaseor and Mesa were preventively suspended for a period of six (6) months, effective
upon receipt of the suspension order.

On September 20, 2006, during the pendency of the criminal case, respondent special prosecutor Louella
Mae Oco-Pesquera filed a motion for suspension pendente lite[7] ofpetitioners.

Petitioners opposed[8] the motion, contending that they had already been suspended for six (6) months
relative to the administrative case, based on the same facts and circumstances. They posited that any
preventive suspension that may be warranted in the criminal case was already absorbed by the preventive
suspension in the administrative case because both the criminal and administrative cases were anchored
on the same set of facts.

In the assailed Resolution[9] of July 3, 2007, respondent court granted the prosecutions motion for
suspension. It ordered the suspension of petitioners for a period of ninety (90) days. The dispositive
portion reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, accused Romeo M. Montallana, Romualdo C. Santos,

Gerardo R. Villaseor, and Rodel A. Mesa are hereby suspended from their respective public
positions as earlier enumerated, and from any other public office which they may now or hereafter
be holding for a period of ninety (90) days from receipt of this resolution, unless a motion for
reconsideration is seasonably filed. While the prosecution sought to suspend accused Alfredo N.
Macapugay, it appears, however, that he was already dismissed from the service, hence, he can
no longer be subjected to this suspension order.
 63
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished Honorable Feliciano Belmonte, Quezon City Mayor for
implementation of this suspension. He is hereby requested to inform this Court of his action
thereon within five (5) days from receipt of this resolution.

The suspension of the accused shall be automatically lifted upon the expiration of the ninety-day
period from the time of the implementation of this resolution.

SO ORDERED.[10]

In the equally assailed Resolution[11] of October 10, 2007, petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit.

Issue

Petitioners have resorted to the present recourse, hoisting the lone issue of WHETHER OR NOT THE
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE SUSPENSION PENDENTE LITE OF HEREIN
PETITIONERS DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAD ALREADY BEEN PREVIOUSLY SUSPENDED
ADMINISTRATIVELY BASED ON THE SAME FACTS ANDCIRCUMSTANCES.[12]

Our Ruling

Mandatory nature of preventive suspension

It is well-settled that preventive suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is mandatory. It is evident from the
very wording of the law:

Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property, whether
as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of the execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. x x x (Underscoring supplied)
A whole slew of cases reinforce this provision of law. In Luciano v. Provincial Governor,[13] the Court pronounced that
suspension of a public officer under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is mandatory. This was reiterated in Luciano v.
Mariano,[14] People v. Albano,[15] Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan[16] and Bunye v. Escareal.[17] In the last mentioned case,
the Court said:

Adverting to this Courts observation in Ganzon v. CA, 200 SCRA 271, 272, that the sole objective of
an administrative suspension is to prevent the accused from hampering the normal course of the
investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses or to keep him off the
records and other evidence and to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring
official, the petitioners insist that as no such reason for their suspension exists, then the order
suspending them should be set aside as a grave abuse of the courts discretion.

xxxx

The Court finds no merit in those arguments. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
unequivocally provides that the accused public officials shall be suspended from office while the
criminal prosecution is pending in court.

In Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417, 422, 426, this Court ruled that such preventive
suspension is mandatory; there are no ifs and buts about it.[18] (Underscoring supplied)
 64

Again, in Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan,[19] the Court stressed the mandatory nature of preventive suspension as
follows:
x x x It is now settled that Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the
Sandiganbayan to suspend any public official against whom a valid information charging violation
of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property is filed. The court trying a case has neither discretion nor
duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using
his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continuing committing
malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended he may frustrate
his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that upon a
finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of
the accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to
escape or evade the jurisdiction of the court.[20] (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there can be no doubt as to the validity of the Sandiganbayans suspension of petitioners in
connection with the pending criminal case before it. It was merely doing what was required of it by law.

Criminal and administrative cases separate and distinct

Significantly, there are three kinds of remedies that are available against a public officer for impropriety in the
performance of his powers and the discharge of his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3) administrative. These
remedies may be invoked separately, alternately, simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may
be the subject of all three kinds of remedies.[21]

Defeat of any of the three remedies will not necessarily preclude resort to other remedies or affect decisions reached
thereunder, as different degrees of evidence are required in these several actions. In criminal cases, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is needed whereas a mere preponderance of evidence will suffice in civil cases. [22] In administrative
proceedings, only substantial evidence is required.

It is clear, then, that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each other.[23] The settled rule is that criminal
and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the first two will not inevitably govern
or affect the third and vice versa.[24] Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal
proceedings.[25]
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan,[26] citing the Courts pronouncements in Luciano v. Provincial Governor,[27] recounted:

The Court then hastened to clarify that such a view may not be taken as an encroachment upon
the power of suspension given other officials, reiterating in the process that a line should be drawn
between administrative proceedings and criminal actions in court, that one is apart from the other.
x x x[28] (Underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing, criminal actions will not preclude administrative proceedings, and vice-versa, insofar as the
application of the law on preventive suspension is concerned.
Preventive suspension not a penalty
 65
Imposed during the pendency of proceedings, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is merely a measure
of precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from office. Thus,
preventive suspension is distinct from the penalty. While the former may be imposed on a respondent during the
investigation of the charges against him, the latter may be meted out to him at the final disposition of the case.[29]
The Courts discussion in Quimbo v. Gervacio[30] is enlightening:
Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive
measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the
suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved.

Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative

investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his
position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper
with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such
investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts
warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the
penalty.

That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order
No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.

Sec. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in

office but is considered to be a preventive measure.[31]
The accused public officers whose culpability remains to be proven are entitled to the constitutional presumption of
innocence.[32] The law itself provides for the reinstatement of the public officer concerned and payment to him of
the salaries and benefits for the duration of the suspension in the event of an acquittal:
Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property, whether
as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of the execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement and gratuity benefits under the law, but if he is acquitted,
he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against
him.[33] (Underscoring supplied)

Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 3019 not a penal provision but a procedural one
It is petitioners contention that as a penal statute, the provision on preventive suspension should be strictly
construed against the State and liberally in their favor.
We cannot agree. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 on preventive suspension is not a penal provision. It is
procedural in nature. Hence, the strict construction rule finds no application. The Court expounded on
this point in Buenaseda v. Flavier:[34]

Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed (Crawford,
Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456
[1953]). The test in determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed for the
punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz Juris,
Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code prescribing the procedure in
criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted liberally (People v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331;
35 N.E. 644).[35] (Underlining supplied)
 66

As We have already established, preventive suspension is not, in actual fact, a penalty at all. It is a procedural rule.

Automatic lift of suspension after ninety (90) days

It must be borne in mind that the preventive suspension of petitioners will only last ninety (90) days, not
the entire duration of the criminal case like petitioners seem to think.Indeed, it would be constitutionally
proscribed if the suspension were to be of an indefinite duration or for an unreasonable length of
time. The Court has thus laid down the rule that preventive suspension may not exceed the maximum
period of ninety (90) days, in consonance with Presidential Decree No. 807,[36] now Section 52 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.[37]

Even the dispositive portion itself of the assailed July 3, 2007 Resolution[38] could not be any clearer:

WHEREFORE, x x x.

xxxx

The suspension of the accused shall be automatically lifted upon the expiration of the ninety-day
period from the time of the implementation of this resolution.

SO ORDERED.[39]

In fine, the preventive suspension against petitioners must be upheld, as the Sandiganbayan committed no grave
abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND OPATRIMONY

37] [G.R. No. 113079. April 20, 2001] FIRST DIVISION

ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTORS
AND SERVICES CORPORATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 114923. April 20, 2001]
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PETROLEUM
DISTRIBUTORS AND SERVICES CORPORATION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The propriety of building a state-of-the-art gasoline service station along Benigno Aquino, Jr. Avenue in
Paraaque, Metro Manila is the bone of contention in these consolidated petitions for certiorariunder Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioners assert that the construction of such a modern edifice is a necessity dictated by the
emerging economic landscapes. Respondents say otherwise.
The factual antecedents of the case are matters of record or are otherwise uncontroverted.
Petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) is engaged in the business of importing crude oil,
refining the same and selling various petroleum products through a network of service stations throughout the
country.
Private respondent Petroleum Distributors and Service Corporation (PDSC) owns and operates a Caltex service
station at the corner of the MIA and Domestic Roads in Pasay City.
 67
On June 30,1983, Shell filed with the quondam Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) an application for authority
to relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo, Paraaque, Metro Manila, to Imelda Marcos Avenue of the same
municipality. The application, which was docketed as BEU Case No. 83-09-1319, was initially rejected by the BEU
because Shells old site had been closed for five (5) years such that the relocation of the same to a new site would
amount to a new construction of a gasoline outlet, which construction was then the subject of a
moratorium. Subsequently, however, BEU relaxed its position and gave due course to the application.
PDSC filed an opposition to the application on the grounds that: 1.] there are adequate service stations
attending to the motorists requirements in the trading area covered by the application; 2.] ruinous competition will
result from the establishment of the proposed new service station; and 3.] there is a decline not an increase in the
volume of sales in the area. Two other companies, namely Petrophil and Caltex, also opposed the application on the
ground that Shell failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements.
In a Resolution dated March 6, 1984, the BEU dismissed the application on jurisdictional grounds and for lack
of full title of the lessor over the proposed site. However, on May 7, 1984, the BEU reinstated the same application
and thereafter conducted a hearing thereon.
On June 3, 1986, the BEU rendered a decision denying Shells application on a finding that there was no necessity
for an additional petroleum products retail outlet in Imelda Marcos Avenue, Paraaque. Dissatisfied, Shell appealed
to the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA).
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1987, Executive Order No. 172 was issued creating the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)
and transferring to it the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the BEU.
On May 9, 1988, the OEA rendered a decision denying the appeal of Shell and affirming the BEU decision. Shell
moved for reconsideration and prayed for a new hearing or the remand of the case for further proceedings. In a
supplement to said motion, Shell submitted a new feasibility study to justify its application.
The OEA issued an order on July 11, 1988, remanding the case to the ERB for further evaluation and
consideration, noting therein that the updated survey conducted by Shell cited new developments such as the
accessibility of Imelda Marcos Avenue, now Benigno Aquino, Jr. Avenue, to Paraaque residents along Sucat Road
and the population growth in the trading area.
After the records of BEU Case No. 83-09-1319 was remanded to the ERB, Shell filed on March 3, 1989 an
amended application, intended for the same purpose as its original application, which was docketed as ERB Case No.
89-57. This amended application was likewise opposed by PDSC.
On September 17, 1991, the ERB rendered a Decision allowing Shell to establish the service station in Benigno
Aquino, Jr. Avenue. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for authority to relocate a Shell service station from Tambo to
Benigno Aquino Avenue, Paraaque, Metro Manila is hereby approved.

Applicant is hereby directed to:

1. Start the construction and operation of the retail outlet at the actual approved site appearing in the
vicinity map previously submitted to the Board within one (1) year, from the finality of this Decision
and thereafter submit a sworn document of compliance therewith;
2. Submit photographs showing the left side, right side and front view of the retail outlet within fifteen
(15) days from completion of the construction work;
3. Submit to the Board a report on the total volume of petroleum products sold each month during the
first six (6) months of the operation of the station. The report shall be submitted in the form of an
affidavit within ten (10) days after the end of the six-month period;
4. Inform the Board in writing and the general public through a notice posted conspicuously within the
premises of the station of the (a) intention of applicant or its dealer to stop operation of the retail
outlet for a period longer than ninety (90) days; or (b) notice of shutdown of operation of the retail
outlet that will likely extend beyond thirty (30) days. Such notice must be given fifteen (15) days before
 68
the actual cessation of operations in the case of (a) and in the case of (b) within the first five (5) days
of an unplanned stoppage of operations.

SO ORDERED.

PDSC filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision. The motion was, however, denied by ERB in
an Order dated February 14, 1992.
Aggrieved, PDSC elevated its cause on April 1, 1992 to the Court of Appeals, where the same was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 27661.
Thereafter, in a Decision dated November 8, 1993,[1] the appellate courts Tenth Division reversed the ERB
judgment thus:

WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision dated September 17, 1991, as well as the Order dated February 14, 1992,
both of the respondent Energy Regulatory Board in ERB Case No. 89-57, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Correspondingly, the application of respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation to construct and
operate the petroleum retail outlet in question is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 6 April
1994.[2] Dissatisfied, both Shell and ERB elevated the matter to this Court by way of these petitions, which were
ordered consolidated by the Court in a Resolution dated July 25,1994.[3]
It appears, however, from the record that even as the proceedings in CA-G.R. SP No. 27661 were pending in
the appellate court, Caltex filed on January 24, 1992 a similar application for the construction of a service station in
the same area with the ERB, docketed as ERB Case No. 87-393. This application was likewise opposed by respondent
PDSC, citing the same grounds it raised in opposing Shells application in ERB Case No. 89-57.
In the aforesaid case, petitioner ERB thereafter rendered a Decision dated June 19, 1992 approving the
application of Caltex. This ERB Decision was challenged by PDSC, again on the same grounds it raised in CA-G.R. SP
No. 27661, in a petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals, where the same was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
29099.
Subsequently, the appellate courts Sixteenth Division dismissed PDSCs petition in a Decision dated May 14,
1993.[4]
As grounds for the petition in the instant case, ERB asserts that
(1) THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE ERB BASED ITS DECISION IS NEITHER STALE NOR IRRELEVANT AND
THE SAME JUSTIFIES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROPOSED PETROLEUM OUTLET.
(2) THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY APPLICANT SHELL REGARDING VEHICLE VOLUME AND FUEL DEMAND
SUPPORTS THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROPOSED OUTLET.
(3) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SERVICE STATION WILL NOT LEAD TO RUINOUS COMPETITION.
For its part, Shell avers that
I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS OF FACTS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF
THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD WHOSE FINDINGS WERE BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE FEASIBILITY STUDY SUPPORTING
PETITIONERS APPLICATION TO CONSTRUCT A SERVICE STATION BEFORE THE ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD HAS
BECOME IRRELEVANT FOR HAVING BEEN PRESENTED IN EVIDENCE ABOUT TWO (2) YEARS AFTER IT WAS
PREPARED.
 69
III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN PASSING JUDGMENT AND MAKING PRONOUNCEMENTS
ON PURELY ECONOMIC AND POLICY ISSUES ON PETROLEUM BUSINESS WHICH ARE WITHIN THE REALM OF THE
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD WHICH HAS A RECOGNIZED EXPERTISE IN OIL ECONOMICS.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROPOSED SERVICE STATION OF
PETITIONER WOULD POSE RUINOUS COMPETITION TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SERVICE STATION BASED MAINLY
ON EVIDENCE SUBMITTED FOR THE FIRST TIME WITH THE SAID COURT AND WITHOUT CONDUCTING A HEARING
THEREON.

V.

ASSUMING THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS THE POWER TO CONSIDER NEW EVIDENCE PRESENTED FOR
THE FIRST TIME BEFORE SAID COURT, IT SHOULD HAVE REFERRED SUCH MATTER TO THE ENERGY REGULATORY
BOARD UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESORT OR PRIMARY JURISDICTION.

The issues raised by the parties in these consolidated cases bring to the fore the necessity of rationalizing or
reconciling two apparently conflicting decisions of the appellate court on the propriety of building gasoline service
stations along Benigno Aquino, Jr. Avenue in Paraaque, Metro Manila. Considering that the questions raised concern
within the oil industry, whose impact on the nations economy is pervasive and far-reaching, the Court is constrained
to look into the policy and purposes of its governing statutes to resolve this dilemma.
The policy of the government in this regard has been to allow a free interplay of market forces with minimal
government supervision. The purpose of governing legislation is to liberalize the downstream oil industry in order
to ensure a truly competitive market under a regime of fair prices, adequate and continuous supply, environmentally
clean and high-quality petroleum products.[5] Indeed, exclusivity of any franchise has not been favored by the
Court,[6] which is keen on promoting free competition and the development of a free market consistent with the
legislative policy of deregulation as an answer to the problems of the oil industry. [7]
The Court finds the petitions impressed with merit.
The interpretation of an administrative government agency like the ERB, which is tasked to implement a
statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.[8] A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.[9] More explicitly

Generally, the interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute, is
accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. [10] The reason behind this rule was
explained in Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[11] in this wise:

The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing
society and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also
relates to the accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency
charged with implementing a particular statute. In Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, [12] the
Court stressed that executive officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the considerations
pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to have formed an independent, conscientious and
competent expert opinion thereon. The courts give much weight to the government agency or officials charged
with the implementation of the law, their competence, expertness, experience and informed judgment, and the
fact that they frequently are drafters of the law they interpret.

As a general rule, contemporaneous construction is resorted to for certainty and predictability in the
laws,[13] especially those involving specific terms having technical meanings.
 70
However, courts will not hesitate to set aside such executive interpretation when it is clearly erroneous, or when
there is no ambiguity in the rule,[14] or when the language or words used are clear and plain or readily
understandable to any ordinary reader.[15]

Stated differently, when an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means.[16] Thus, an action by an administrative agency may be set aside by the judicial
department if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.[17]
However, there is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule because the findings of the ERB conform
to, rather than conflict with, the governing statutes and controlling case law on the matter.
Prior to Republic Act No. 8479, the downstream oil industry was regulated by the ERB and from 1993 onwards,
the Energy Industry Regulation Board. These regulatory bodies were empowered, among others, to entertain and
act on applications for the establishment of gasoline stations in the Philippines. The ERB, which used to be the Board
of Energy (BOE), is tasked with the following powers and functions by Executive Order No. 172, which took effect
immediately after its issuance on May 8, 1987:

SEC. 3. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions of the Board. When warranted and only when public necessity requires,
the Board may regulate the business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing,
refining, marketing and distributing energy resources. xxx

The Board shall, upon prior notice and hearing, exercise the following, among other powers and functions:

(a) Fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products;

(b) Fix and regulate the rate schedule or prices of piped gas to be charged by duly franchised gas companies
which distribute gas by means of underground pipe systems;
(c) Fix and regulate the rates of pipeline concessionaires under the provisions of Republic Act No. 387, as
amended, otherwise know as the Petroleum Act of 1949, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1700;
(d) Regulate the capacities of new refineries or additional capacities of existing refineries and license refineries
that may be organized after the issuance of this Executive Order, under such terms and conditions as are
consistent with the national interest;
(e) Whenever the Board has determined that there is a shortage of any petroleum product, or when public
interest so requires, it may take such steps as it may consider necessary, including the temporary
adjustment of the levels of prices of petroleum products and the payment to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
created under Presidential Decree No. 1956 by persons or entities engaged in the petroleum industry of
such amounts as may be determined by the Board, which will enable the importer to recover its costs of
importation.[18]

A distinct worldwide trend towards economic deregulation has been evident in the past decade. Both
developed and developing countries have seriously considered and extensively adopted various measures for this
purpose. The country has been no exception. Indeed, the buzzwords of the third millenium are deregulation,
globalization and liberalization.[19] It need not be overemphasized that this trend is reflected in our policy
considerations, statutes and jurisprudence. Thus, in Garcia v. Corona,[20] the Court said:

R.A. 8479, the present deregulation law, was enacted to implement Article XII, Section 19 of the Constitution
which provides:

The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint
of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.

This is so because the Government believes that deregulation will eventually prevent monopoly. The simplest form
of monopoly exists when there is only one seller or producer of a product or service for which there are no
substitutes. In its more complex form, monopoly is defined as the joint acquisition or maintenance by members of
a conspiracy, formed for that purpose, of the power to control and dominate trade and commerce in a commodity
 71
to such an extent that they are able, as a group, to exclude actual or potential competitors from the field,
accompanied with the intention and purpose to exercise such power. [21]

xxx xxx xxx xxx

It bears reiterating at the outset that deregulation of the oil industry is policy determination of the highest order. It
is unquestionably a priority program of Government. The Department of Energy Act of 1992[22] expressly mandates
that the development and updating of the existing Philippine energy program shall include a policy direction
towards deregulation of the power and energy industry.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

Our ruling in Tatad[23] is categorical that the Constitutions Article XII, Section 19, is anti-trust in history and spirit. It
espouses competition. We have stated that only competition which is fair can release the creative forces of the
market. We ruled that the principle which underlies the constitutional provision is competition. Thus:

Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and spirit. It espouses competition. The desirability
of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair
competition, and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus the underlying principle
of Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution which cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We subscribe to the
observation of Prof. Gellhorn that the objective of anti-trust law is to assure a competitive economy based upon
the belief that through competition producers will strive to satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the
sacrifice of the fewest resources. Competition among producers allows consumers to bid for goods and services
and, thus matches their desires with societys opportunity costs. He adds with appropriateness that there is a
reliance upon the operation of the market system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be produced, how
resources shall be allocated in the production process, and to whom various products will be distributed. The
market system relies on the consumer to decide what and how much shall be produced, and on competition,
among producers who will manufacture it.[24]

Tested against the foregoing legal yardsticks, it becomes readily apparent that the reasons relied upon by the
appellate court in rejecting petitioners application to set up a gasoline service station becomes tenuous. This is
especially clear in the face of such recent developments in the oil industry, in relation to controlling case law on the
matter recently promulgated to address the legal issues spawned by these events. In other words, recent
developments in the oil industry as well as legislative enactments and jurisprudential pronouncements have
overtaken and rendered stale the view espoused by the appellate court in denying Shells application to put up the
gasoline station.
In reversing the ERB, the Court of Appeals first avers in sum that there is no substantial evidence to support
ERBs finding of public necessity to warrant approval of Shells application.
The Court disagrees.
On the contrary, the record discloses that the ERB Decision approving Shells application in ERB Case No. 89-57
was based on hard economic data on developmental projects, residential subdivision listings, population count,
public conveyances, commercial establishments, traffic count, fuel demand, growth of private cars, public utility
vehicles and commercial vehicles, etc.,[25] rather than empirical evidence to support its conclusions. In approving
Shells application, the ERB made the following factual findings and, on the basis thereof, justified its ruling thus:

In evaluating the merits of the application, the first question that comes to mind is whether there is indeed an
increase in market potential from the time this very same application was disapproved by the then Bureau of
Energy Utilization up to the present time that would warrant a reversal of the former decision. The history of this
case serves to justify applicant Shells position on the matter. After a little over a year from vigorously opposing the
original application, Caltex and Petron filed their respective applications to construct their own service station
within the same vicinity.

The figures in the applicants feasibility study projects a scenario of growth well up to the year 1994. Where the
applicant listed only thirty-five commercial establishments, oppositor is servicing sixty-five.The development of
 72
subdivisions along the area provides for a buffer of market potential that could readily be tapped by the applicant
service.

Although the applicants witness could have done better in accentuating this fact, the oppositor did not do well
either in downplaying the potentials of the area. The main gist of PDSCs contention is premised on the rising
overhead cost of (increase in salaries and rent) in relation to the establishment of new competition. The proposed
station expects to target a total volume of 460,151 liters per month with a projected increase of 2.6% per annum
and presumably expects to make a corresponding profit thereof. Oppositor PDSC, on the other hand, with its lone
Caltex Service Station, expects to suffer income loss even with a projected volume of 600,000 to 800,000 liters per
month (Exhibit 5).

Considering this premise, it should be noted that the Board is tasked to protect existing petroleum stations from
ruinous competition and not to protect existing establishments from its own ghost. The Board does not exist for
the benefit of any individual station but for the interest of the public and the industry as a whole.

In its first application, the applicants projection was to realize only 255,000 liters per month or some 20 percent of
the total potential demand. With its amended application, the 460,151 liters it hopes to realize is almost twice the
former volume representing a smaller percentage of the present overall potential demand.

With further growth and development of the businesses in the area, the fuel potential will tremendously increase
and the presence of strategically located service stations will greatly benefit the local community as well as the
transient motoring public.

The Board believes that the construction and operation of the Shell Station will not lead to ruinous competition
since [the] additional retail outlet is necessary.

Time and again this Court has ruled that in reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of fact made therein
must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant;
that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses or
otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence; that the
administrative decision in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of
discretion, fraud or error of law.[26] Petitioner ERB is in a better position to resolve petitioner Shells application, being
primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power to determine whether the
building of a gasoline retail outlet in a trading area would benefit public interest and the oil industry lies with the
ERB not the appellate courts.
In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear
and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence and substantial evidence, in that order. [27] A litany of cases has
consistently held that substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact. [28] It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. [29]
Suffice it to state in this regard that the factual landscape, measured within the context of such an evidentiary
matrix, is strewn with well-nigh overwhelming proof of the necessity to build such a gasoline retail outlet in the
vicinity subject of the application.
In denying Shells application, the Court of Appeals next pointed to the alleged staleness of Shells feasibility
study because it was submitted in evidence about two (2) years after it was prepared in early 1988. [30]
Again, this Court is not persuaded.
The record shows that the feasibility study[31] is accompanied by the following data, namely: 1.] Annual
Projection of Estimated Fuel Demand, Base Area; 2.] Projected Volume of the Proposed Shell Station; 3.] Projected
Fuel Volume Derived From Base Area; 4.] Estimated Fuel Demand Base Projection 1993; 5.] Estimated Fuel Demand
Base Projection 1994; 6.] Annual Projection of Population; 7.] Annual Projection Growth of Private Cars in the Area;
8.] Annual Projection Growth of Public Utilities in the Area; and 9] Annual Projected Growth of Commercial Vehicles
in the Area[32] projects a market scenario from 1989 to 1994.
While the Court of Appeals was initially unconvinced that Shells feasibility study was up-to-date and proceeded
to render the assailed judgment, its attention was subsequently called, in Shells motion for reconsideration, to the
 73
[33]
ERBs Decision dated June 19, 1992 approving a similar application by Caltex to build a gasoline retail outlet in the
same vicinity. Said decision was appealed by PDSC to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 29099), and was affirmed
by the latter in a Decision dated May 14, 1993.[34] The Decision in Caltexs application, where PDSC was the lone
oppositor, was challenged before the appellate court on the very same grounds it proffered in opposing Shells
application.[35] In rejecting PDSCs contentions in CA-G.R. SP No. 29099, the Court of Appeals Sixteenth Division ruled:
As to the first ground
xxx xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner had assumed that the entire Sucat Road (starting from as far away as its intersection with the South
Expressway going towards Alabang and further South), Quirino Avenue, Domestic Road (which passes in front of
the Domestic Terminal), MIA Road, and Ninoy Aquino Avenue, constitute what it refers to as the trading area.
Thus, the herein petitioner invites attention to the fact that in Sucat Road there are five existing gasoline stations;
two along Quirino Avenue (from Sucat Road); four along Domestic Road; and two along MIA Road, one of which is
the Caltex-Nayong Pilipino station at the corner of MIA Road and Benigno Aquino Avenue. Except for the gas
station at one end of Benigno Aquino Avenue (located in front of the Nayong Filipino), the petitioner admits that
there has been as yet no gasoline station existing along the entire stretch of the said Benigno Aquino Avenue,
although the ERB had recently approved Shells application to put up one therein.

This court is of the view that the aforementioned assumption adopted by petitioner is fallacious or incorrect
considering the conclusion of ERBs Manuel Alvarez in his Ocular Inspection Report and In-Depth Analysis of
Feasibility Study that no outlet presently exists along the whole stretch of the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (Rollo, p.
126) and that the outlets along Sucat Road are far from the proposed site, a distant several kilometers away
along Dr. A. Santos Avenue in Sucat which can already be considered a different trading area (ibid., -
underscoring supplied)

Assuming in gratia argumenti that the entirety of the above-specified road/avenues may be considered as a single
trading area, the petitioner had failed to show why Caltexs 9.7% share of the total market potential, as found in
Alvarezs Market Study, is not attainable or that it would result in ruinous competition. As pointed by the
respondents (citing MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. v. Pepito, 6 SCRA 140 and Raymundo Trans. Co. v. Cervo, 91 Phil.
313), even if a new station would bring about a decline in the sales of the existing outlets, it need not necessarily
result in ruinous competition, absent adequate proof to that effect.

As to the second and third grounds

Concerning the averment that the evidence of Caltex is stale, this Court notes that the said evidence refers
principally to a revalidation study conducted by ERBs Alvarez who undertook an ocular inspection of the proposed
site on November 23 to 27, 1987. The hearings of the instant case continued up to early 1992 (ERB Decision, p.
4). The Decision was rendered on June 19, 1992 (Rollo, p. 36). It may be conceded that substantial time had
elapsed since the time of the aforementioned revalidation study. However, it is this courts view that unless the
petitioner is able to prove by competent evidence that significant changes have occurred sufficient to invalidate
the afore-stated study, the presumption is that the said study remains valid, as found by the ERB in its
decision. Bare and self-serving manifestations cannot be accepted by Us as proof; especially if We take into
account that hearings (as in the case at bar) would take time and it would be quite absurd if what was once
applicable and acceptable evidence would be ipso facto rendered stale through mere lapse of time absent any
controverting evidence. Sound procedural policy requires that the burden of proof relative to the present
invalidity of the Alvarez report rests not with Caltex but on the herein petitioner.

The petitioner had attempted to make comparisons between the figures specified in the 1987 study and those of
the Bureau of Energy Utilization or BEU (which were given earlier in 1986). Thus, the petitioner points out that
while the BEUs decision indicated that 9,034 cars on the average passed by going in both directions along Ninoy
Aquino Avenue, the Alvarez revalidation study gave an average car traffic of only 8,395 resulting in a decline of 639
cars. The petitioner, however, conveniently ignored or failed to note that the 9,034 figure was that given by
applicant Shell and not be the government agency itself. The BEU refers to the said figure as
the applicants estimated potential demand. It is natural to expect that an applicant would try to give up as high an
estimated potential demand as possible to support its application.
 74
The contention of the petitioner that the Alvarez study/report is hearsay on the ground inter alia that Alvarez was
not presented as a witness deserves scant consideration by this Court. In the first place, the ERB is not bound by
technical rules of procedure as contained in the Rules of Court, the latter being made applicable to ERB only in a
suppletory character (Rule 16 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearings Before the ERB). More
importantly, Section 2, paragraph 2 and Section 7, paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned ERB Rules provides as
follows:

The Board may, in the disposition of cases, before it, take judicial notice of any data or information existing in its
judicial records, that may be relevant, pertinent or material to the issues involved, x x x x

The Board may also, on its own initiative or upon a motion of a party, conduct such investigation or studies on any
matter pertinent, related or material to the issues involved in a case the results of which may be sued by the Board
as bases for the proper evaluation of the said issues. (Rollo, pp. 205-207 underscoring supplied)

The petitioner asserts that the island divider along Benigno Aquino Avenue in front of the proposed site was
not taken into consideration in the 1987 survey. It could not be denied that the construction of such divider could
have an effect on the matter of potential demand. Neither can it be denied however that the gas station that would
be affected would be Caltex itself. It is not alleged that there exists a divider along the whole of Sucat Road for
example. Hence, the existing outlets have no reason to complain about the divider.
The contention that when construction is completed (connecting Sucat Road to the coastal road), a good
number of vehicles would pass through the coastal road instead of along Benigno Aquino [Avenue] appears to Us as
speculative. There is no need for the petitioner, which it failed to do, to show qualitatively and convincingly that the
effect would be such as to make the sales level go down to such an extent that the viability of the existing outlets
would be seriously endangered or threatened.
The foregoing pronouncement of the Court of Appeals Sixteenth Division is more in keeping with the policy of
the State and the rationale of the statutes enacted to govern the industry.
In denying Shells application, the Court of Appeals finally states that the proposed service station would cause
ruinous competition to respondent PDSCs outlet in the subject vicinity.
We remain unconvinced.
It must be pointed out that in determining the allowance or disallowance of an application for the construction
of a service station, the appellate court confined the factors thereof within the rigid standards governing public
utilility regulation, where exclusivity, upon the satisfaction of certain requirements, is allowed. However, exclusivity
is more the exception rather than the rule in the gasoline service station business. Thus, Rule V, Section 1, of the
Rules and Regulations Governing the Establishment, Construction, Operation, Remodelling and/or Refurbishing of
Petroleum Products Retail Outlets issued by the Oil Industry Commission, [36] and adopted by the ERB, enumerates
the following factors determining the allowance or disallowance of an application for outlet construction, to wit:

(a) The operation of the proposed petroleum products retail outlet will promote public interest in a proper
and suitable manner considering the need and convenience of the end-users.
(b) Reasonable expectation of a commercially viable operation.
(c) The establishment and operation thereof will not result in a monopoly, combination in restraint of trade
and ruinous competition.
(d) The requirements of public safety and sanitation are properly observed.
(e) Generally, the establishment and operation thereof will help promote and achieve the purposes of
Republic Act No. 6173.[37]

While it is probable that the operation of the proposed Shell outlet may, to a certain extent, affect PDSCs
business, private respondent nevertheless failed to show that its business would not have sufficient profit to have a
fair return of its investment. The mere possibility of reduction in the earnings of a business is not sufficient to prove
ruinous competition.[38] Indeed

In order that the opposition based on ruinous competition may prosper, it must be shown that the opponent
would be deprived of fair profits on the capital invested in its business. The mere possibility of reduction in the
 75
earnings of a business is not sufficient to prove ruinous competition. It must be shown that the business would
not have sufficient gains to pay a fair rate of interest on its capital investment.[39] Mere allegations by the
oppositor that its business would be ruined by the establishment of the ice plants proposed by the applicants are
not sufficient to warrant this Court to revoke the order of the Public Service Commission.[40]

It would not be remiss to point out that Caltex, PDSCs principal, whose products are being retailed by private
respondent in the service outlet it operates along the MIA/Domestic Road in Pasay City, never filed any opposition
to Shells application. All told, a climate of fear and pessimism generated by unsubstantiated claims of ruinous
competition already rejected in the past should not be made to retard free competition, consistently with legislative
policy of deregulating and liberalizing the oil industry to ensure a truly competitive market under a regime of fair
prices, adequate and continuous supply, environmentally clean and high-quality petroleum products.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 8,
1993, as well as the subsequent Resolution dated April 6, 1994, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27661, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and another one rendered REINSTATING the Order dated September 17, 1991 of the Energy Regulatory Board in ERB
Case No. 89-57, granting the amended application of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation to relocate its service
station to Benigno Aquino Jr., Avenue, Paranaque, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.

38] G. R. No. 153674 FIRST DIVISION December 20, 2006

AVON COSMETICS, INCORPORATED and JOSE MARIE FRANCO,P e t i t i o n e r s, - versus - LETICIA H.
LUNA, R e s p o n d e n t.
D E C I S I O N - CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision[1] dated 20 May 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52550, which
affirmed in toto the Decision[2] dated 26 January 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 138, in Civil Case No. 88-2595, in favor of herein respondent Leticia H. Luna (Luna), rendered by
the Honorable Ed Vicente S. Albano, designated as the assisting judge pursuant to Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 70-94, dated 16 June 1994.
The Facts

The facts of the case are not in dispute. As culled from the records, they are as follows:

The present petition stemmed from a complaint[3] dated 1 December 1988, filed by herein respondent
Luna alleging, inter alia that she began working for Beautifont, Inc. in 1972, first as a franchise dealer
and then a year later, as a Supervisor.

Sometime in 1978, Avon Cosmetics, Inc. (Avon), herein petitioner, acquired and took over the
management and operations of Beautifont, Inc. Nonetheless, respondent Luna continued working for said
successor company.

Aside from her work as a supervisor, respondent Luna also acted as a make-up artist of petitioner Avons
Theatrical Promotions Group, for which she received a per diem for each theatrical performance.

On 5 November 1985, petitioner Avon and respondent Luna entered into an agreement,
entitled Supervisors Agreement, whereby said parties contracted in the manner quoted below:

The Company agrees:

xxxx

1) To allow the Supervisor to purchase at wholesale the products of the Company.

 76

xxxx

The Supervisor agrees:

1) To purchase products from the Company exclusively for resale and to be responsible for
obtaining all permits and licenses required to sell the products on retail.

xxxx

The Company and the Supervisor mutually agree:

xxxx

2) That this agreement in no way makes the Supervisor an employee or agent of the Company, therefore,
the Supervisor has no authority to bind the Company in any contracts with other parties.
3) That the Supervisor is an independent retailer/dealer insofar as the Company is concerned, and shall
have the sole discretion to determine where and how products purchased from the Company will be
sold. However, the Supervisor shall not sell such products to stores, supermarkets or to any entity or
person who sells things at a fixed place of business.
4) That this agreement supersedes any agreement/s between the Company and the Supervisor.
5) That the Supervisor shall sell or offer to sell, display or promote only and exclusively products sold by
the Company.
6) Either party may terminate this agreement at will, with or without cause, at any time upon notice to
the other.

x x x x.[4]

By virtue of the execution of the aforequoted Supervisors Agreement, respondent Luna became part of
the independent sales force of petitioner Avon.

Sometime in the latter part of 1988, respondent Luna was invited by a former Avon employee who was
then currently a Sales Manager of Sandr Philippines, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in direct
selling of vitamins and other food supplements, to sell said products. Respondent Luna apparently
accepted the invitation as she then became a Group Franchise Director of Sandr Philippines, Inc.
concurrently with being a Group Supervisor of petitioner Avon. As Group Franchise Director, respondent
Luna began selling and/or promoting Sandr products to other Avon employees and friends. On 23
September 1988, she requested a law firm to render a legal opinion as to the legal consequence of the
Supervisors Agreement she executed with petitioner Avon. In response to her query, a lawyer of the
firm opined that the Supervisors Agreement was contrary to law and public policy.

Wanting to share the legal opinion she obtained from her legal counsel, respondent Luna wrote a letter to her
colleagues and attached mimeographed copies of the opinion and then circulated them. The full text of her letter
reads:

We all love our work as independent dealers and we all love to continue in this livelihood.
Because my livelihood is important to me, I have asked the legal opinion of a leading Makati law
office regarding my status as an independent dealer, I am sharing this opinion with you.

I have asked their advice on three specific things:

1) May the company legally change the conditions of the existing Supervisors Agreement
without the Supervisors consent? If I should refuse to sign the new Agreement, may the company
terminate my dealership?
 77

On the first issue, my lawyers said that the company cannot change the existing
Agreement without my consent, and that it would be illegal if the company will compel me to sign
the new agreement.

2) Is Section 5 of the Supervisors Agreement which says that a dealer may only sell
products sold by the company, legal?

My lawyers said that Section 5 of the Supervisors Agreement is NOT valid because it is
contrary to public policy, being an unreasonable restraint of trade.

3) Is Section 6 of the Supervisors Agreement which authorizes the company to terminate

the contract at any time, with or without cause, legal?

My lawyer said Section 6 is NOT valid because it is contrary to law and public policy. The
company cannot terminate the Supervisors Agreement without a valid cause.

Therefore, I can conclude that I dont violate Section 5 if I sell any product which is not in
direct competition with the companys products, and there is no valid reason for the company to
terminate my dealership contract if I sell a non-competitive product.

Dear co-supervisor[s], let us all support the reasonable and legal policies of the company.
However, we must all be conscious of our legal rights and be ready to protect ourselves if they are
trampled upon.

I hope we will all stay together selling Avon products for a long time and at the same time
increase our earning opportunity by engaging in other businesses without being afraid to do so.

In a letter[5] dated 11 October 1988, petitioner Avon, through its President and General Manager, Jose Mari
Franco, notified respondent Luna of the termination or cancellation of her Supervisors Agreement with
petitioner Avon. Said letter reads in part:

In September, (sic) 1988, you brought to our attention that you signed up as Group
Franchise Director of another company, Sandr Philippines, Inc. (SPI).

Not only that. You have also sold and promoted products of SPI (please refer for example
to SPI Invoice No. 1695 dated Sept. 30, 1988). Worse, you promoted/sold SPI products even to
several employees of our company including Mary Arlene Nolasco, Regina Porter, Emelisa Aguilar,
Hermie Esteller and Emma Ticsay.

To compound your violation of the above-quoted provision, you have written letters to
other members of the Avon salesforce inducing them to violate their own contracts with our
company. x x x.

For violating paragraph 5 x x x, the Company, pursuant to paragraph 6 of the same

Agreement, is terminating and canceling its Supervisors Agreement with you effective upon your
receipt of this notice. We regret having to do this, but your repeated disregard of the Agreement,
despite warnings, leaves (sic) the Company no other choice.

xxxx

Aggrieved, respondent Luna filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-2595.
 78

On 26 January 1996, after trial on the merits, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent Luna
stating that:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

the plaintiff, and against defendant, Avon, ordering the latter:

1) to pay moral damages to the plaintiff in the amount of P100,000.00 with interest from the date
of this judgment up to the time of complete payment;
2) to pay attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00;
3) to pay the costs.[6]

On 8 February 1996, petitioner Avon filed a Notice of Appeal dated the same day. In an Order[7] dated 15
February 1996, the RTC gave due course to the appeal and directed its Branch Clerk of Court to transmit
the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA G.R. CV No. 52550.

On 20 May 2002, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision, the dispositive part of which
states thus:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.[8]

The Issues

In predictable displeasure with the conclusions reached by the appellate court, petitioner Avon now
implores this Court to review, via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the formers decision and to resolve the following assigned errors:[9]

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THAT THE SUPERVISORS
AGREEMENT EXECUTED BETWEEN AVONAND RESPONDENT LUNA AS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT AVON HAD NO RIGHT TO
TERMINATE OR CANCEL THE SUPERVIOSRS AGREEMENT;
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE AWARD OF MORAL
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT LUNA; and
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN NOT AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES AND
LITIGATION EXPENSES IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.

The Courts Ruling

A priori, respondent Luna objects to the presentation, and eventual resolution, of the issues raised herein
as they allegedly involve questions of facts.

To be sure, questions of law are those that involve doubts or controversies on what the law is on certain
state of facts; and questions of fact, on the other hand, are those in which there is doubt or difference as
to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. One test, it has been held, is whether the appellate court
can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a question
of law, otherwise it will be a question of fact.[10]
 79
In the present case, the threshold issues are a) whether or not paragraph 5 of the Supervisors Agreement
is void for being violative of law and public policy; and b) whether or not paragraph 6 of the Supervisors
Agreement which authorizes petitioner Avon to terminate or cancel the agreement at will is void for being
contrary to law and public policy. Certainly, it is quite obvious that the foregoing issues are questions of
law.

In affirming the decision of the RTC declaring the subject contract null and void for being against public
policy, the Court of Appeals ruled that the exclusivity clause, which states that:

The Company and the Supervisor mutually agree:

xxxx

5) That the Supervisor shall sell or offer to sell, display or promote only and exclusively products sold by
the Company. [Emphasis supplied.]

should be interpreted to apply solely to those products directly in competition with those of
petitioner Avons, i.e., cosmetics and/or beauty supplies and lingerie products. Its declaration is anchored
on the fact that Avon products, at that time, were not in any way similar to the products sold by Sandr
Philippines, Inc. At that time, the latter was merely selling vitamin products. Put simply, the products of
the two companies do not compete with each other. The appellate court ratiocinated that:

x x x If the agreement were interpreted otherwise, so as to include products that do not directly
compete with the products of defendant-appellant Avon, such would result in absurdity. x x x
[A]greements which prohibit a person from engaging in any enterprise whether similar or not to
the enterprise of the employer constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade, thus, it is void as
against public policy.[11]

Petitioner Avon disputes the abovestated conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals. It argues that the
latter went beyond the literal and obvious intent of the parties to the subject contract when it interpreted
the abovequoted clause to apply only to those products that do not compete with that of petitioner
Avons; and that the words only and exclusively need no other interpretation other than the literal
meaning that THE SUPERVISORS CANNOT SELL THE PRODUCTS OF OTHER COMPANIES WHETHER OR NOT
THEY ARE COMPETING PRODUCTS.[12]

Moreover, petitioner Avon reasons that:

The exclusivity clause was directed against the supervisors selling other products utilizing
their training and experience, and capitalizing on Avons existing network for the promotion and
sale of the said products. The exclusivity clause was meant to protect Avon from other companies,
whether competitors or not, who would exploit the sales and promotions network already
established by Avon at great expense and effort.

xxxx

Obviously, Sandre Phils., Inc. did not have the (sic) its own trained personnel and network
to sell and promote its products. It was precisely why Sandre simply invited, and then and there
hired Luna and other Avon supervisors and dealers to sell and promote its products. They had the
training and experience, they also had a ready market for the other products the customers to
whom they had been selling the Avon products. It was easy to entice the supervisors to sign up.
The supervisors could continue to sell Avon products, and at the same time earn additional income
by selling other products.
 80
This is most unfair to Avon. The other companies cannot ride on and exploit the training
and experience of the Avon sales force to sell and promote their own products. [Emphasis
supplied.]

On the other hand, in her Memorandum, respondent Luna counters that there is no allegation nor any
finding by the trial court or the Court of Appeals of an existing nationwide sales and promotions network
established by Avon or Avons existing sales promotions network or Avons tried and tested sales and
promotions network nor the alleged damage caused to such system caused by other companies. Further,
well worth noting is the opinion of respondent Lunas counsel which started the set off the series of events
which culminated to the termination or cancellation of the Supervisors Agreement. In response to the
query-letter[13] of respondent Luna, the latters legal counsel opined that, as allegedly held in the case
of Ferrazzini v. Gsell,[14] paragraph 5 of the subject Supervisors Agreement not only prohibits the
supervisor from selling products which compete with the companys product but restricts likewise the
supervisor from engaging in any industry which involves sales in general.[15] Said counsel thereafter
concluded that the subject provision in the Supervisors Agreement constitutes an unreasonable restraint
of trade and, therefore, void for being contrary to public policy.

At the crux of the first issue is the validity of paragraph 5 of the Supervisors Agreement, viz:

The Company and the Supervisor mutually agree:

xxxx

5) That the Supervisor shall sell or offer to sell, display or promote only and exclusively products sold by
the Company. [Emphasis supplied.]

In business parlance, this is commonly termed as the exclusivity clause. This is defined as agreements
which prohibit the obligor from engaging in business in competition with the obligee.

This exclusivity clause is more often the subject of critical scrutiny when it is perceived to collide with the
Constitutional proscription against reasonable restraint of trade or occupation. The pertinent provision of
the Constitution is quoted hereunder. Section 19 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution on the National
Economy and Patrimony states that:

SEC. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.

First off, restraint of trade or occupation embraces acts, contracts, agreements or combinations which
restrict competition or obstruct due course of trade.[16]

Now to the basics. From the wordings of the Constitution, truly then, what is brought about to lay the test
on whether a given agreement constitutes an unlawful machination or combination in restraint of trade
is whether under the particular circumstances of the case and the nature of the particular contract
involved, such contract is, or is not, against public interest.[17]

Thus, restrictions upon trade may be upheld when not contrary to public welfare and not greater than is
necessary to afford a fair and reasonable protection to the party in whose favor it is imposed.[18] Even
contracts which prohibit an employee from engaging in business in competition with the employer are
not necessarily void for being in restraint of trade.
 81
In sum, contracts requiring exclusivity are not per se void. Each contract must be viewed vis--vis all the
circumstances surrounding such agreement in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.

The question that now crops up is this, when is a restraint in trade unreasonable? Authorities are one in
declaring that a restraint in trade is unreasonable when it is contrary to public policy or public welfare. As
far back as 1916, in the case of Ferrazzini v. Gsell,[19] this Court has had the occasion to declare that:

[T]here is no difference in principle between the public policy (orden pblico) in the in the two
jurisdictions (United States and the Philippine Islands) as determined by the Constitution, laws,
and judicial decisions.

In the United States it is well settled that contracts in undue or unreasonable restraint of
trade are unenforcible because they are repugnant to the established public policy in that country.
Such contracts are illegal in the sense that the law will not enforce them. The Supreme Court in
the United States, in Oregon Steam Navigation Co. vs. Winsor )20 Will., 64), quoted with approval
in Gibbs v. Consolidated gas Co. of Baltimore (130 U.S., 396), said:

Cases must be judged according to their circumstances, and can only be

rightly judged when reason and grounds of the rule are carefully considered.
There are two principle grounds on which the doctrine is founded that a contract
in restraint of trade is void as against public policy. One is, the injury to the public
by being deprived of the restricted partys industry; and the other is, the injury to
the party himself by being precluded from pursuing his occupation, and thus
being prevented from supporting himself and his family.

And what is public policy? In the words of the eminent Spanish jurist, Don Jose Maria Manresa, in his
commentaries of the Codigo Civil, public policy (orden pblico):

[R]epresents in the law of persons the public, social and legal interest, that which is permanent
and essential of the institutions, that which, even if favoring an individual in whom the right lies,
cannot be left to his own will. It is an idea which, in cases of the waiver of any right, is manifested
with clearness and force. [20]

As applied to agreements, Quintus Mucius Scaevola, another distinguished civilist gives the term public

policy a more defined meaning:

Agreements in violation of orden pblico must be considered as those which conflict with
law, whether properly, strictly and wholly a public law (derecho) or whether a law of the person,
but law which in certain respects affects the interest of society. [21]

Plainly put, public policy is that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do
that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.[22] As applied to
contracts, in the absence of express legislation or constitutional prohibition, a court, in order to declare a
contract void as against public policy, must find that the contract as to the consideration or thing to be
done, has a tendency to injure the public, is against the public good, or contravenes some established
interests of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals, or tends clearly to undermine
the security of individual rights, whether of personal liability or of private property.[23]

From another perspective, the main objection to exclusive dealing is its tendency to foreclose existing
competitors or new entrants from competition in the covered portion of the relevant market during the
term of the agreement.[24] Only those arrangements whose probable effect is to foreclose competition in
a substantial share of the line of commerce affected can be considered as void for being against public
policy. The foreclosure effect, if any, depends on the market share involved. The relevant market for this
 82
purpose includes the full range of selling opportunities reasonably open to rivals, namely, all the product
and geographic sales they may readily compete for, using easily convertible plants and marketing
organizations.[25]

Applying the preceding principles to the case at bar, there is nothing invalid or contrary to public policy
either in the objectives sought to be attained by paragraph 5, i.e., the exclusivity clause, in prohibiting
respondent Luna, and all other Avon supervisors, from selling products other than those manufactured
by petitioner Avon. We quote with approval the determination of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case
of Board of Trade of Chicago v. U.S.[26] that the question to be determined is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition.

Such prohibition is neither directed to eliminate the competition like Sandr Phils., Inc. nor foreclose new
entrants to the market. In its Memorandum, it admits that the reason for such exclusion is to safeguard
the network that it has cultivated through the years. Admittedly, both companies employ the direct selling
method in order to peddle their products. By direct selling, petitioner Avon and Sandre, the manufacturer,
forego the use of a middleman in selling their products, thus, controlling the price by which they are to be
sold. The limitation does not affect the public at all. It is only a means by which petitioner Avon is able to
protect its investment.

It was not by chance that Sandr Philippines, Inc. made respondent Luna one of its Group Franchise
Directors. It doesnt take a genius to realize that by making her an important part of its distribution
arm, Sandr Philippines, Inc., a newly formed direct-selling business, would be saving time, effort and
money as it will no longer have to recruit, train and motivate supervisors and dealers. Respondent Luna,
who learned the tricks of the trade from petitioner Avon, will do it for them. This is tantamount to unjust
enrichment. Worse, the goodwill established by petitioner Avon among its loyal customers will be taken
advantaged of by Sandre Philippines, Inc. It is not so hard to imagine the scenario wherein the sale
of Sandr products by Avon dealers will engender a belief in the minds of loyal Avon customers that the
product that they are buying had been manufactured by Avon. In other words, they will be misled into
thinking that the Sandr products are in fact Avon products. From the foregoing, it cannot be said that the
purpose of the subject exclusivity clause is to foreclose the competition, that is, the entrance
of Sandr products in to the market. Therefore, it cannot be considered void for being against public
policy. How can the protection of ones property be violative of public policy? Sandr Philippines, Inc. is
still very much free to distribute its products in the market but it must do so at its own expense.
The exclusivity clause does not in any way limit its selling opportunities, just the undue use of the
resources of petitioner Avon.

It has been argued that the Supervisors Agreement is in the nature of a contract of adhesion; but just
because it is does not necessarily mean that it is void. A contract of adhesion is so-called because its terms
are prepared by only one party while the other party merely affixes his signature signifying his adhesion
thereto.[27] Such contract is just as binding as ordinary contracts. It is true that we have, on occasion, struck
down such contracts as void when the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant
bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the
opportunity to bargain on equal footing. Nevertheless, contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se and
they are not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely,
if he adheres, he gives his consent.[28] In the case at bar, there was no indication that respondent Luna
was forced to sign the subject agreement. Being of age, financially stable and with vast business
experience, she is presumed to have acted with due care and to have signed the assailed contract with
full knowledge of its import. Under the premises, it would be difficult to assume that she was morally
abused. She was free to reject the agreement if she wanted to.
 83
Accordingly, a contract duly executed is the law between the parties, and they are obliged to comply fully
and not selectively with its terms. A contract of adhesion is no exception.[29]

The foregoing premises noted, the Court of Appeals, therefore, committed reversible error in interpreting
the subject exclusivity clause to apply merely to those products in direct competition to those
manufactured and sold by petitioner Avon. When the terms of the agreement are clear and explicit, that
they do not justify an attempt to read into any alleged intention of the parties, the terms are to be
understood literally just as they appear on the face of the contract.[30] Thus, in order to judge the intention
of the contracting parties, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the
subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of
those whose language he is to interpret.[31] It has been held that once this intention of the parties has
been ascertained, it becomes an integral part of the contract as though it has been originally expressed
therein in unequivocal terms.[32]

Having held that the exclusivity clause as embodied in paragraph 5 of the Supervisors Agreement is valid
and not against public policy, we now pass to a consideration of respondent Lunas objections to the
validity of her termination as provided for under paragraph 6 of the Supervisors Agreement giving
petitioner Avon the right to terminate or cancel such contract. The paragraph 6 or the termination
clause therein expressly provides that:

The Company and the Supervisor mutually agree: x x x x

6) Either party may terminate this agreement at will, with or without cause, at any time upon notice to the other.
[Emphasis supplied.]

In the case of Petrophil Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[33] this Court already had the opportunity to opine
that termination or cancellation clauses such as that subject of the case at bar are legitimate if exercised
in good faith. The facts of said case likewise involved a termination or cancellation clause that clearly
provided for two ways of terminating the contract, i.e., with or without cause. The utilization of one mode
will not preclude the use of the other. Therein, we stated that the finding that the termination of the
contract was for cause, is immaterial. When petitioner terminated the contract without cause, it was
required only to give x x x a 30-day prior written notice, which it did.

In the case at bar, the termination clause of the Supervisors Agreement clearly provides for two ways of
terminating and/or canceling the contract. One mode does not exclude the other. The contract provided
that it can be terminated or cancelled for cause, it also stated that it can be terminated without cause,
both at any time and after written notice. Thus, whether or not the termination or cancellation of the
Supervisors Agreement was for cause, is immaterial. The only requirement is that of notice to the other
party. When petitioner Avon chose to terminate the contract, for cause, respondent Luna was duly
notified thereof.

Worth stressing is that the right to unilaterally terminate or cancel the Supervisors Agreement with or
without cause is equally available to respondent Luna, subject to the same notice requirement. Obviously,
no advantage is taken against each other by the contracting parties.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 20 May 2002
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52550, affirming the judgment of the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 138, in Civil Case No. 88-2595, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let a new
one be entered dismissing the complaint for damages. Costs against respondent Leticia Luna.

SO ORDERED.
 84
ADDITIONAL READINGS
39] JAMES OBERGEFELL, ET AL VS. HODGES

Facts of the case

Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to
challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex
marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that
the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in
favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on
same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples'
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.

Question

(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex?
(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same
sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?

Conclusion
 5–4 DECISION FOR OBERGEFELL
MAJORITY OPINION BY ANTHONY M. KENNEDY

The Fourteenth Amendment requires both marriage licensing and recognition for same-sex couples.

Kennedy
Ginsburg
Breyer
Sotomayor
Kagan
Roberts
Scalia
Thomas
Alito

Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects,
and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial
precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual
autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by
according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the
keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union
with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees
the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection
under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the
Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First
Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states
to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples.
 85
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex marriage might be good
and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is beyond the purview of the Court to decide
whether states have to recognize or license such unions. Instead, this issue should be decided by individual state
legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The Constitution and judicial precedent clearly protect a right to
marry and require states to apply laws regarding marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and
engage in judicial policymaking. The precedents regarding the right to marry only strike down unconstitutional
limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and government intrusions, and therefore there is no
precedential support for making a state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the
majority opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with the judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims and while
disregarding the proper role of the courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence
Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority opinion overstepped the
bounds of the Court’s authority both by exercising the legislative, rather than judicial, power and by doing so in a
realm that the Constitution reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the question of whether same-sex
marriage should be recognized is one for the state legislatures, and that for the issue to be decided by unelected
judges goes against one of the most basic precepts of the Constitution: that political change should occur through
the votes of elected representatives. In taking on this policymaking role, the majority opinion departed from
established Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice
Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority
opinion stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment too far and in
doing so distorted the democratic process by taking power from the legislature and putting it in the hands of the
judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the Due Process Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
indicates that they were meant to protect people from physical restraint and from government intervention, but
they do not grant them rights to government entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority opinion
impermissibly infringed on religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than allowing the state legislature
to determine how best to address the competing rights and interests at stake. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent. In
his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Constitution does not address the right of same-sex
couples to marry, and therefore the issue is reserved to the states to decide whether to depart from the traditional
definition of marriage. By allowing a majority of the Court to create a new right, the majority opinion dangerously
strayed from the democratic process and greatly expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the Constitution
allows. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
FACTS:
Two individuals, James Obergefell and John Arthur James filed a lawsuit challenging the state’s refusal to recognize same-
sex marriage on death certificates. The two were legally married in Maryland in 2013. Mr. Arthur, who suffered from a
terminal illness, died several months after litigation began. Due to Ohio law, under both the Ohio Constitution and the
Ohio Revised Code, plaintiffs believed that state officials would refuse to indicate Mr. Arthur was married at the time of
his death and that Mr. Obergefell was his spouse.

The plaintiffs filed the case on July 19, 2013 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and the
case was assigned to Judge Timothy S. Black. The original defendants were Governor John Kasich, Attorney General Mike
DeWine and Registrar of the City of Cincinnati Health Department, Office of Vital Records, Dr. Camille Jones. On July 22,
2013, Judge Black granted a temporary restraining order that required the state to recognize the marriage of Mr.
Obergefell and Mr. Arthur on Mr. Arthur’s death certificate.

On September 26, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding two additional plaintiffs, David Michener and
Robert Grunn. Mr. David Michener had also married his same-sex partner in 2013. Mr. Michener’s spouse passed away
nearly a month later. The third plaintiff, Robert Grunn, is a licensed funeral director who operates his business in
Cincinnati. Mr. Grunn, whose clients included married gay couples, feared prosecution for making false statements on
a death certificate, if he were to classify a legally married same-sex couple as wedded spouses.

The plaintiffs’ amended complaint named as defendants Dr. Camille Jones, Registrar of the City of Cincinnati Health
Department, Office of Vital Records, and Dr. Theodore Wymyslo, the Director of the Ohio Department of Health.
 86
In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs sought a declaration from the court that Ohio’s practice of denying
recognition of marriages lawfully performed in other states on death certificates is unconstitutional and requested an
injunction to stop this practice.

On December 23, 2013, Judge Black held that Ohio’s refusal to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states
violates the substantive due process and equal protection rights of the parties to those marriages.

Judge Black also declared the ban on recognizing same-sex marriages legally performed outside Ohio to be
unconstitutional and prohibited the State from enforcing the ban on the plaintiffs. Wymyslo appealed the case to the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

LEGAL THEORY:
The state’s refusal to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed out of state on death certificates violates due
process and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The right to have one’s marriage recognized
by the state is a fundamental liberty interest protected by due process, and the state cannot infringe this right without
substantial justification. Ohio cannot assert a substantial, or even rational, justification for its refusal to recognize same-
sex marriages.

Further, the state’s refusal to recognize these marriages violates the Equal Protection Clause. Ohio recognizes
marriages of opposite sex individuals lawfully performed in other states that would otherwise have been illegal to
perform in Ohio. However, Ohio does not recognize same-sex marriages that are lawfully performed in other states.
Ohio’s inconsistent treatment of recognizing marriages performed in other states violates the Equal Protection Clause
because the state cannot justify its unequal treatment by any rational or legitimate basis.

STATUS:
Defendant Wymyslo filed his notice of appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on January 16, 2014, and on April 10,
2014, filed his Appellant Brief.
Shortly after Appellant’s brief was filed, Mr. Lance Himes was substituted for Dr. Wymyslo, as Dr. Wymyslo stepped
down as the Director of the Ohio Department of Health and Mr. Himes took his place as Interim Director. Richard
Hodges replaced Mr. Himes as Defendant after being appointed Director of the Ohio Department of Health in August
2014.

On April 24, 2014 Appellee Obergefell filed the Appellee Brief. Appellant Himes filed a Reply Brief on May 12,
2014. During this period, numerous amicus briefs were filed to support each side. Oral arguments took place on
August 6, 2014. On November 6, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Judge Sutton wrote the opinion of the
court, in which Judge Cook joined. Judge Daughtrey dissented.

On November 14, 2014, Obergefell filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. On January 16,
2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an order granting certiorari and agreeing to hear the case. In its order, the
Supreme Court consolidated this case with other Sixth Circuit cases challenging same-sex marriage restrictions. The
Court ordered that each party brief one of two issues that pertain to its respective case: 1) Whether the Fourteenth
Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex; and 2) Whether the
Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their
marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out of state.

This case addresses the second question, and we filed our merit brief on February 27, 2015. The respondents’ briefs
were filed on March 27, 2015, and our Reply brief was filed on April 17, 2015. The case was heard on April 28, 2015.

On June 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled in a landmark decision that the 14th Amendment requires all
states to license marriages between same-sex couples and to recognize all marriages that were lawfully performed out
of state.
 87
40] Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. ___ (2018), was a case in the Supreme
Court of the United States that dealt with whether owners of public accommodations can refuse certain services
based on the First Amendmentclaims of free speech and free exercise of religion, and therefore be granted an
exemption from laws ensuring non-discrimination in public accommodation — in particular, by refusing to provide
creative services, such as making a wedding cake for the marriage of a gay couple, on the basis of the owner's
religious beliefs.
The case dealt with Masterpiece Cakeshop, a bakery in Lakewood, Colorado, which refused to provide a wedding
cake to a gay couple based on the owner's religious beliefs. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission, evaluating the
case under the state's anti-discrimination law, the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, found that the bakery had
discriminated against the couple and issued specific orders for the bakery to follow. Following appeals within the
state that affirmed the Commission's decision, the bakery took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled on narrow grounds that the Commission did not employ religious neutrality,
violating Masterpiece owner Jack Phillips' rights to free exercise, and reversed the Commission's decision. The
Court did not rule on the broader intersection of anti-discrimination laws, free exercise of religion, and freedom of
speech, due to the complications of the Commission's lack of religious neutrality.
In 2012, same-sex couple Charlie Craig and David Mullins from Colorado made plans to be lawfully married
in Massachusettsand return to Colorado to celebrate with their family and friends. At that time state law did not
provide for same-sex marriage in Colorado, though by 2014 the state had allowed same-sex marriages, and the
Supreme Court of the United States would affirm that gay couples have the fundamental right to marry
in Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. ___ (2015).[1]
Craig and Mullins visited Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, Colorado in July 2012 to order a wedding cake for
their return celebration. Masterpiece's owner Jack Phillips, who is a Christian, declined their cake request,
informing the couple that he did not create wedding cakes for marriages of gay couples owing to his Christian
religious beliefs, although the couple could purchase other baked goods in the store. Craig and Mullins promptly
left Masterpiece without discussing with Phillips any of the details of their wedding cake. [2]:2 The following day,
Craig's mother, Deborah Munn, called Phillips, who advised her that Masterpiece did not make wedding cakes for
weddings of gay couples[2]:2 because of his religious beliefs and because Colorado did not recognize same-sex
marriage at the time.[3][2]:1–2
Colorado Civil Rights Commission[edit]
While another bakery provided a cake to the couple, Craig and Mullins filed a complaint to the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission under the state's public accommodations law, the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, which
prohibits businesses open to the public from discriminating against their customers on the basis of race, religion,
gender, or sexual orientation.[4][3] Colorado is one of twenty-one U.S. states that include sexual orientation as
a protected class in their anti-discrimination laws.[5] Craig and Mullins' complaint resulted in a lawsuit, Craig v.
Masterpiece Cakeshop.[6] The case was decided in favor of the plaintiffs; the cake shop was ordered not only to
provide cakes to same-sex marriages, but to "change its company policies, provide 'comprehensive staff training'
regarding public accommodations discrimination, and provide quarterly reports for the next two years regarding
steps it has taken to come into compliance and whether it has turned away any prospective customers."[7]
Colorado Court of Appeals[edit]
Masterpiece appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals with the aid of Alliance Defending Freedom, and
refused to comply with the state's orders, instead opting to remove themselves from the wedding cake
business;[4] Phillips claimed that this decision cost him 40% of his business. [8] Alongside the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, the American Civil Liberties Union represented Craig and Mullins during the appeals.[3] The state's
decision was upheld on the grounds that despite the nature of creating a custom cake, the act of making the cake
was part of the expected conduct of Phillips' business, and not an expression of free speech nor free exercise of
religion.[4][9] The court distinguished its decision in Craig from another case, brought to the Commission by William
Jack, in which three bakeries refused to create a cake for William Jack with the message "Homosexuality is a
detestable sin. Leviticus 18:22",[2]:21 citing that in the latter, the bakeries had made other cakes for Christian
customers and declined that order based on the offensive message rather than the customers' creed, whereas
Masterpiece Cakeshop's refusal to provide Craig & Mullins with a wedding cake "was because of its opposition to
same sex marriage which...is tantamount to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation." [2]:21
The Supreme Court of Colorado declined to hear an appeal.[9]:3
 88
Before the Supreme Court[edit]
Petition for writ of certiorari[edit]
Masterpiece Cakeshop petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari (review), under the case name Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, of the following question:[10]
Whether applying Colorado's public accommodations law to compel Phillips to create expression that violates his
sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage violates the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment.[9]

Both the Colorado Civil Rights Commission and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) urged the Supreme Court
to reject the appeal, fearing that a Court decision in favor of the business would create a "gaping hole" in civil
rights laws on the basis of religion.[4] The final briefs at the certiorari stage were received in December 2016.[10] The
Court agreed to hear the case in the 2017 term[11] and oral arguments were heard on December 5, 2017.[12]
In further filings, Masterpiece requested that the Colorado anti-discrimination law be reviewed by the Supreme
Court under strict scrutiny. He further identified that while the state's law is to assure that same-sex couples had
access to the same services as heterosexual couples, the law goes too far in its enforcement, since Craig and
Mullins were easily able to obtain a wedding cake from a different vendor in the state. [13] Masterpiece further
believed the anti-discrimination law can be used to selectively discriminate against religion, as the Commission has
allowed bakers to refuse to provide cakes with anti-same-sex marriage messages on them, even though the
Commission said these refusals were appropriate due to the offensiveness of the messages and not on the basis of
religion.[13] The State and the ACLU countered these points, stating the law was aimed only at conduct of a
business, not their speech, and in cases like a wedding cake, "[no] reasonable observer would understand the
Company’s provision of a cake to a gay couple as an expression of its approval of the customer's marriage". [13] They
further argued that the cakeshop could provide catchall language to explain that any services they provide do not
endorse any expressions of free speech associated with it, an allowance within the anti-discrimination law.[13]
Amicus briefs[edit]
Around 100 legal briefs were filed by third parties, roughly equally split in supporting either side of the
case.[12] Many civil rights organizations filed briefs in support of Craig and Mullins, including the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund,[14] the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Southern Poverty Law Center, [15] the
Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs,[16] and the Civil Rights Forum, a group of
plaintiff-side civil rights attorneys.[17]
Among those supporting Phillips include the United States Department of Justice under the Trump
administration.[18][5] While the Department asserts that anti-discrimination laws are necessary to prevent
businesses that provide goods and services, these laws cannot be used to compel a business into expressing
speech they do not agree with, nor used to provide goods and services with such expressions without the ability
for the business to assert they do not agree with those expressions. [13] The brief was criticized by several
organizations, including those that support LGBT rights, claiming the brief as a pattern of hostile actions by the
Trump administration and fearing that a decision in favor of Masterpiece would enable such businesses to have a
"license to discriminate".[18][19]
Oral arguments for the plaintiffs were provided by Kristen Waggoner for the Alliance Defending Freedom,
representing Phillips, and the Solicitor General of the United States Noel Francisco, presenting the United States'
government case as amicus curiae in support of Masterpiece Cakeshop. The defendants' arguments were given by
Colorado Solicitor General Frederick Yarger, on behalf of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, and David D.
Cole of the ACLU, on behalf of Craig and Mullins. Questions asked by the Justices attempted to determine where
the bounds of a cake baker's rights and the rights of those soliciting his services would extend by considering
several hypothetical situations involving the making of and selling custom cakes, including situations related to
racial and gender-preference discrimination.[20]
Experts believed the Supreme Court's opinions in the case would be divided, with the ultimate decision falling on
the opinion of Justice Anthony Kennedy, who has historically been a swing vote in his term. In his past case history,
he has been a strong supporter of gay rights (having authored all of the landmark gay rights rulings by the Supreme
Court: Romer v. Evans in 1996, Lawrence v. Texas in 2003, United States v. Windsor in 2013, and Obergefell v.
Hodges in 2015), and a corporation's freedom of speech in his majority opinion for Citizens United v.
FEC 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and freedom of religion through his concurrence with the majority in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. 573 U.S. ___ (2014).[5][21][22][23][24]
 89
Opinion of the Court[edit]
Majority opinion[edit]
The Court issued its ruling on June 4, 2018, ordering a reversal of the decision made by the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission. The majority opinion was written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, and joined by Chief Justice John
Roberts, and Justices Samuel Alito, Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan and Neil Gorsuch. The opinion stated that
although a baker, in his capacity as the owner of a business serving the public, "might have his right to the free
exercise of his religion limited by generally applicable laws", a State decision in an adjudication “in which religious
hostility on the part of the State itself” is a factor violates the "State’s obligation of religious neutrality" under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution. [25] Kennedy's opinion stated that the
Commission's review of Phillips' case exhibited hostility towards his religious views. The Commission compared
Phillips' religious beliefs to defense of slavery or the Holocaust. Kennedy found such comparisons "inappropriate
for a Commission charged with the solemn responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s anti-
discrimination law".[26] Kennedy's opinion also cited the three exemptions the commission previously granted for
the non-discrimination law arising from the William Jack complaints. The opinion also noted differences in handling
previous exemptions as indicative of Commission hostility towards religious belief, rather than maintaining
neutrality.[27] Kennedy's opinion noted that he may have been inclined to rule in favor of the Commission if they
had remained religiously neutral in their evaluation.[28]
Concurring opinions[edit]
Justice Kagan wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Breyer, taking particular notice of the narrow grounds of the
ruling.[29] Justice Gorsuch also wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Alito. Both Kagan's and Gorsuch's concurrence
considered how the Commission handled Masterpiece differently than prior exemption requests. Kagan and
Gorsuch concurrence agreed the Commission exhibited hostility towards Phillips' religious beliefs and concurred
with the reversal. Kagan cited as significant differences between prior Commission exemptions and the instant
case. She posited the Commission could have ruled differently in the two situations if they had stayed religiously-
neutral. Gorsuch indicated the Commission should maintain consistency among similar cases.[30]
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote another opinion, concurring in part and concurring in judgment, joined by Gorsuch.
Thomas found that the Majority opinion did not consider the free speech, free exercise or anti-discrimination
implications of the case, despite significant attention during oral arguments. [31][32] Thomas opined support for
Masterpiece, both on grounds of free speech and free exercise.[33]
Dissenting opinions[edit]
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Sonia Sotomayor. Ginsburg believed that the
Commission acted fairly in evaluating the case, saying "what critically differentiates them is the role the customer’s
'statutorily protected trait,' played in the denial of service".[34]

Analysis[edit]
The Court avoided ruling broadly on the intersection of anti-discrimination laws and rights to free
exercise.[35] Kennedy's decision specifically noted the hostility towards Phillips made by the Commission as their
reason to reverse the ruling, but because of the existence of this hostility in the current case, they could not rule
on the broader issue regarding anti-discrimination law and the free exercise of religion. Kennedy stated that "[t]he
outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts, all in the context of
recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious
beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open
market".[36][37] Kennedy's decision affirmed that there remains protection of same-sex couples and gay rights which
states can still enforce through anti-discrimination laws, a point also agreed to by Ginsburg's dissent.[32] The
general constitutionality of anti-discrimination laws to prevent discrimination against sexual orientation affirmed
by the Masterpiece decision was reflected in lower courts that same week, in a case decided by the Arizona Court
of Appeals, Brush & Nib Studio v. Phoenix,[38] which upheld the city of Phoenix's anti-discrimination ordinance that
included sexual orientation. The Court of Appeals extensively quoted Masterpiece in affirming the Arizona Superior
Court's prior decision.[39][40][41]
The Alliance Defending Freedom, which represented Masterpiece, supported the Court's decision in finding that
condemned the Commission's review of Phillips' case, stating that "Tolerance and respect for good-faith
differences of opinion are essential in a society like ours".[32] The American Civil Liberties Union welcomed the part
 90
of the decision affirming protection of gay rights, stating that the Court "reaffirmed its longstanding rule that
states can prevent the harms of discrimination in the marketplace, including against L.G.B.T. people". [32]
Another predominate case involving anti-discrimination laws and religious freedom that was in the court system
during Masterpiece was the Arlene's Flowers lawsuit in Washington, with the issue over flower arrangements
being provided for a same-sex wedding. Prior to the decision in Masterpiece, a petition for writ of certorari had
been issued to the Supreme Court. Following the decision of Masterpiece, the flower shop owner used that
decision to assert that they were shown similar religious hostility, and requested their case to be reheard. On June
25, 2018, the Supreme Court dismissed the pending petition, and ordered that lower courts review the flower
shop's case in a similar light as Masterpiece.[42]
Masterpiece's basis of evaluating statements of public officials to determine if there was religious hostility in
evaluating cases arose in Justice Sotomayor's dissent in Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018), which dealt with
President Trump's travel ban against several nations which had a high Muslim population. While the majority ruled
that the ban was within the President's powers and sent the case back to lower courts to rule on other matters,
Sotomayor believed that the decision of Masterpiece should have been used to judge President Trump and his
administration's statements that she believed showed hostility towards Muslims and would have not justified the
ban.[43]

Public opinion[edit]
See also: Public opinion of same-sex marriage in the United States
A nationwide and state-by-state poll on the issue conducted throughout 2017 by the Public Religion Research
Institute as part of the annual American Values Atlas survey revealed that 60% of Americans, including a majority
or plurality in every state, opposed allowing religiously-based refusals of services or products to gay people by
small business owners (colloquially known as "the baker's exception"), while 33% supported allowing such
religiously-based refusal, and 7% had no opinion.[44][45][46]

Subsequent events[edit]
Masterpiece Cakeshop became involved in a similar case in 2018, stemming from an incident in June 2017. The
bakery refused to bake Autumn Scardina, a Colorado lawyer, a cake to celebrate her gender transition, which
would have had a pink interior and blue exterior. Philips stated later that he refused to bake such a cake based on
his Christian beliefs that one does not get to choose their gender. Scardina complained to the Colorado Division of
Civil Rights, which found in June 2018 sufficient evidence that the bakery discriminated against her transgender
status, and ordered the parties into compulsory mediation. Philips subsequently filed a lawsuit against the state in
August 2018 to seek a permanent injunction to prevent the state from enforcing its anti-discrimination laws
against him as well as punitive damages. Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper, who is named as a defendant in
the suit, expects that the case will require the Supreme Court to revisit its decision from Masterpiece, as the
previous ruling "did not address the basic issue" of religious freedom. [47][48][49] A federal judge refused to dismiss
Philip's suit in January 2019, though did agree to remove Hickenlooper from the suit due to him no longer being
governor.[50]