43.G.R. No.

192073

RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR.,

vs.
HON. MARISSA MACARAIG-GUILLEN, and UNICAPITAL, INC.,

On August 4, 1999, Unicapital filed a complaint for sum of money with damages against Consing, Jr. and
Dela Cruz before the RTC-Makati City. PBI also filed a complaint for damages and attachment against
Consing, Jr. and Dela Cruz before the RTC of Manila. For his part, Consing, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss
Civil Case No. 99-1418 which was, however, denied by the RTC. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for
Consolidation of Civil Case No. 99-1418 with his own initiated SCA No. 1759 pending before the RTC-
Pasig City.The RTC-Makati City dismissed Consing, Jr.’s motion for consolidation and, in so doing, ruled
that the cases sought to be consolidated had no identity of rights or causes of action and the reliefs
sought for by Consing, Jr. He appealed the CA but was denied. Hence, this petition

The Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Makati City’s denial of Consing, Jr.’s motion for
consolidation.

Ruling:

No.The consolidation of these cases was merely discretionary on the part of the trial court. It added that
it was "impracticable and would cause a procedural faux pas

"if it were to "allow the RTC-Pasig City to preside over the Makati case."

The CA’s ruling is proper.

It is hornbook principle that when or two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely
related subject matters, the same must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best
interest of the parties and to settle the issues between them promptly, thus, resulting in a speedy and
inexpensive determination of cases. In addition, consolidation serves the purpose of avoiding the
possibility of conflicting decisions rendered by the courts in two or more cases, which otherwise could
be disposed of in a single suit. The governing rule is Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules which provides:

SEC. 1. Consolidation. - When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all
the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to
avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

In the present case, the Court observes that the subject cases, i.e., SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 99-
1418, although involving the same parties and proceeding from a similar factual milieu, should remain
unconsolidated since they proceed from different sources of obligations and, hence, would not yield
conflicting dispositions. SCA No. 1759 is an injunction and damages case based on the Civil Code
provisions on abuse of right and defamation, while Civil Case No. 99-1418 is a collection and damages
suit based on actionable documents, i.e., the subject promissory notes. In particular, SCA No. 1759 deals
with whether or not Unicapital and BPI, et al, abused the manner in which they demanded payment
from Consing, Jr., while Civil Case No. 99-1418 deals with whether or not Unicapital may demand
payment from Consing, Jr. based on the subject promissory notes. Clearly, a resolution in one case
would have no practical effect as the core issues and reliefs sought in each case are separate and
distinct from the other. All told, the Court finds the consolidation of SCA No. 1759 and Civil Case No. 99-
1418 to be improper. Consequently, the petition in G.R. No. 192073 must also be denied.

44.Butuan Dev.Corp v.21st Division,CA,et al

April 5,2017
The Facts

On March 31, 1966, Butuan Development Corporation (BDC), which was then still in the process of
incorporation, through its then President Edmundo Satorre , purchased from the Spouses Jose and
Socorro Sering a 7.6923-hectare parcel of land situated in Butuan City .] Thus, on January 28, 1969, the
Registry of Deeds for Butuan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-4724[5] in the name of
BDC.[6]On May 5, 1998, Max L. Arriola, Jr. (Max Jr.), representing himself as the Chairman of BDC and
armed with a duly notarized Resolution[7] of the BDC Board of Directors therefor, mortgaged the subject
property to De Oro Resources, Inc. (DORI) and its President Louie A. Libarios.[8]

On May 13, 2002, Satorre, together with Ma. Laurisse Satorre-Gabor, Liza Therese Satorre-Balansag,
Edmundo C. Satorre II, and Leslie Mae Satorre-King, executed the Articles of Incorporation[9] of BDC. The
Securities and Exchange Commission approved the Articles of Incorporation and issued the Certificate of
Incorporation[10] of BDC on May 23, 2002.

On August 23, 2005, BDC filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of real estate mortgage[11] (REM)
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City against Max Jr., Libarios, and
DORI (collectively, the respondents), and Casilda L. Arriola, Rebecca J. Arriola, and Joseph L. Arriola. It
alleged that, sometime in 2004, it discovered that the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. RT-4724 was
missing and efforts to locate the same proved futile. However, it subsequently discovered that the
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. RT-4724 was already in Libario's possession, pursuant to the REM
executed by the Arriolas who misrepresented themselves as the owners and directors of
BDC.[ Accordingly, claiming that the said REM was a nullity, BDC prayed that the same be nullified.

In their answer, Libarios and DORI denied that the Arriolas misrepresented themselves as the directors
of BDC since, at the time of the execution of the REM, the Arriolas had possession of the subject
property and the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. RT-4724.[15]Further, the tax declaration over the
subject property filed with the Butuan City Assessor's Office indicated that Max Arriola, Sr. (Max Sr.) was
the administrator of the subject property.[16]

As special and affirmative defense, Libarios and DORI claimed that the complaint filed by BDC should be
dismissed outright for failing to state a cause of action since at the time of the execution of the REM on
May 5, 1998, BDC did not yet exist, having been incorporated only on May 23, 2002, and, hence, could
not have claimed ownership of the subject property.On August 11, 2006, the RTC DENIED for lack of
merit. The respondents then filed a petition for certiorari[26] with the CA, claiming that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion in brushing aside their special and affirmative defense. The CA granted the petition
Hence, this petition.
Issue:

Whether the CA abused its discretion when it set aside the RTC's ruling that BDC's complaint failed to
state a cause of action.

Ruling of the Court:

NO.The petition is granted.

Based on the allegations, BDC's complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for declaration of nullity
of the REM. Basically, BDC alleged in its complaint that it is the owner of the subject property as
evidenced by TCT No. RT-4724, which was issued in its name after it purchased the subject property,
through Satorre, from the Spouses Sering on March 31, 1966. It bears stressing that a certificate of title
issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein.BDC further alleged that the subject property was mortgaged to DORI and
Libarios without their knowledge or consent and that the Arriolas were not in any way connected with
BDC. What is clear is that the issues of whether the REM constituted over the subject property is void
and whether BDC has a right to the subject property at the time of the execution of the REM would have
been best resolved during the trial.The respondents' affirmative defense that BDC, at the time of the
execution of the REM, had no right to hold the subject property in its name being merely an
unincorporated association, if at all, amounts to an allegation that BDC has no cause of action against
the respondents. However, failure to state a cause of action is different from lack of cause of action.
Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal
under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers to a situation where
the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading.The remedy in the first is to
move for the dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence.. The
petition is GRANTED. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

45.HERNANDEZ VS RURAL BANK OF LUCENA, INC.

G.R. No. L-29791 1978 Jan 10 (81 SCRA 75)

FACTS:

Spouses Hernandez obtained from the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. a loan of P6,000, payable n a year. The
loan was secured by a mortgage on their two lots situated in Cubao, Quezon City. About three months
after that loan was obtained, the Lucena bank became a distressed bank. It then received directives
from the Central Bank which it construed as a directive to suspend operations. Before the expiration of
the one year term of the loan, Hernandez offered to pay the loan by means of a check which was drawn
against the bank by a depositor, the San Pablo Colleges, and which was payable to Hernandez. The
payment was never consummated. Despite several attempts, Hernandez¶s check was refused, Lucena
bank being no longer in a position to honor withdrawals. In the meantime, the Monetary Board had
decided to liquidate the Lucena bank. A petition was filed with CFI of Manila for assistance and
supervision in the liquidation of the Lucena bank. Hernandez made a judicial deposit of the check with
the CFI of Lipa City. He then filed with the same court an action to compel the Rural Bank and Central
Bank as liquidator to accept the check and to execute the cancellation of the real estate mortgage.
ISSUE:

WoN the venue was properly laid.

HELD:

An action to foreclose a real estate mortgage is a real action, but an action to compel the mortgagee to
accept payment of the mortgage debt and to release the mortgage is a personal action. Section 2(a),
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that "actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall be commenced and
tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies." The rule mentions an action for
foreclosure of a real estate mortgage but does not mention an action for the cancellation of a real
mortgage. In the instant case, the action is primarily to compel the mortgagee to accept payment of the
mortgage debt and to release the mortgage. Hence, the venue of plaintiffs' personal action is the place
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of
the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff (Sec. 2[b], Rule 4). The term "resides" in section 2[b]
of Rule 4 refers to the place of actual residence or the place of abode and not necessarily to the legal
residence or domicile San Juan, Batangas might be the place where the plaintiffs have their domicile or
legal residence but there is no question that Chicago St., Cubao, Quezon City is their place of abode or
the place where they actually reside. So, the action in this case, which is a personal action to compel the
defendants to honor the check in question and to cancel the mortgage, should have been filed in
Quezon City if the plaintiffs intended to use their residence as the basis for their choice of venue

46.CONSUELO MACONO CULTURA, JOSE CUBILLAS AND PANFILO SALINAS, PETITIONERS, VS. HON.
LAURO L. TAPUCAR G.R. NO. L-48430, 1985 DECEMBER 3, 1ST DIVISION

This is a petition for review by certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte
and Butuan City in Civil Case No. 1949 granting the motion of the defendants in said case, the herein
private respondents, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' action had already
prescribed. In a complaint filed on May 31, 1977 by petitioners, the children and grandchildren of the
deceased Juana Macono, it was alleged that during her lifetime she acquired by free patent a parcel of
land with an area of 3,0974 hectares situated in Langihan, Butuan City, but that on November 26, 1934
defendant Bernarda E. Andaya by means of fraud, succeeded in having said Juana Macono execute in
her favor a deed of sale of said property in consideration of the sum of P110.00, and subsequently
secured a new certificate of title for said property in her name, and dispossessed plaintiffs
thereof. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint principally on the ground that plaintiffs'
action had already prescribed and that defendants had acquired ownership of the property by
acquisitive prescription having been in possession thereof continuously in concept of owner since
November 26, 1934 when the property was sold to defendant Bernarda E. Andaya by Juana Macono. On
August 8, 1977, the Trial Court sustained defendants' motion to dismiss.

Issue:
Whether the lower court erred in finding that plaintiffs' cause of action had already prescribed under
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure ?

Ruling:

No. An examination of the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint as well as the amended complaint shows
that it was an action filed to annul a deed of sale executed by means of fraud. Plaintiffs' action,
therefore, prescribed in four years from the time the deed of sale in favor of Bernarda E. Andaya was
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds, which was on December 12, 1934. From said date
petitioners are deemed to have constructive notice of the existence of said deed of sale. Parenthetically,
it may be added that there is no merit to the claim of petitioners that the deed of sale of November 26,
1934 in favor of Bernarda E. Andaya was executed within the period of five years from the issuance of
the free patent in favor of Juana Macono and void ab initio. Said free patent was granted on November
25, 1929 pursuant to which Original Certificate of Title No. 226 was issued in the name of Juana
Macono. The deed of sale claimed to be executed by means of fraud on November 26, 1934 was
executed after the lapse of the period of five years. There is, therefore, no basis for the claim of
petitioners that their action to declare said deed of sale null and void has not prescribed since it is void
ab initio, having been executed within the prohibited period of five years. The period of five years is to
be reckoned from and after the date of the approval of the application for free patent up to and
including the fifth year from and after the date of the issuance of the patent. The period of prescription
that governs the present case, is therefore four years according to Section 43 of Act 190, the old Code of
Civil Procedure. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

47.G.R. No. 192536, March 15, 2017 - DEMETRIO R. ALCANTARA,, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL

Plaintiff-appellant Demetrio R. Alcantara was the owner of a parcel of land, 301 square meters in area,
situated at Panorama Monies, Buhangin, Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
113015.He questions the validity of the forfeiture of his real property since the BIR forfeited the property
without due process. He was not informed about the proceedings as he was in the United States of America
when the BIR seized his property and sold it in public auction.The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of the BIR.
Hence, this petition.After trial, the RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that the respondents could not be
faulted for Alcantara's failure to receive the assessment because the BIR and its officials had only relied on
the address indicated in his tax returns; and that he had never informed the respondents of any change of
his address.The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint
because he was thereby seeking to challenge the validity of the assessment made by the BIR. According to
the CA, the Tax Code mandated that the taxpayer should administratively protest the assessment with the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue before going to court, but he did not do so; hence, he did not exhaust his
administrative remedies, rendering his action dismissible. The CA observed that even assuming that the RTC
had jurisdiction over the complaint, the CA did not have jurisdiction over the appeal because it was the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) that had the authority to entertain the same as provided for by Republic Act
1125, as amended.6

Issues
(a) whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try and decide Alcantara’s
complaint; and (b) whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the proper appellate authority to question the
decision of the RTC was the CTA.8

Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.

Accordingly, the CA correctly determined that the RTC had no jurisdiction to resolve the issues raised in
Alcantara's complaint.
The remedies available to a taxpayer like Alcantara were laid down by law. Section 229 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1158,12 the law in effect at the time of the disputed assessment, stated that prior resort to
the administrative remedies was necessary; otherwise, the assessment would attain finality,

The complaint was brought to assail the assessment and collection made by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. Based on Republic Act No. 1125, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 9282, the CTA had
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the appeal of the decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to
wit:
Section 7. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal, as herein provided.

(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters
arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue; Accordingly, the CA correctly dismissed Alcantara's appeal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction to entertain the same. The erroneous appeal deserved no fate but dismissal. Section 2, Rule 50
of the Rules of Court expressly states: "An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be
transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.". The Court DENIES the petition for
review on certiorari

49.Muos v.Spouses Chan,et al

June 6,2011

Pending resolution by the RTC-Branch 95 of the spouses Chans motion for reconsideration and notice of
appeal in Civil Case No. Q-28580, Muoz instituted before the MeTC on February 4, 1994 a Complaint for
Forcible Entry with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut,
docketed as Civil Case No. 8286. Muoz alleged in her complaint that she had been in actual and physical
possession of the subject property since January 10, 1994. She hired a caretaker and two security guards for
the said property. On February 2, 1994, Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, along with 20 other men, some of
whom were armed, ousted Muoz of possession of the subject property by stealth, threat, force, and
intimidation. Muoz prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing Samuel
Go Chan and Atty. Yabut and all persons claiming right under them to vacate the subject property.

Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut denied Muozs allegations, insisting that Samuel Go Chan is the valid, lawful,
and true legal owner and possessor of the subject property. The MeTC received evidence from the parties
on whether a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued, as prayed for by Muoz. Accordingly, the MeTC
granted Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, restoring possession of
the subject property to Muoz.

Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut questioned the foregoing MeTC order through a Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC which granted the
petition. Muoz appealed the Orders dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of RTC-Branch 88 before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 21, 1995, sustained the appealed orders of
RTC-Branch 88.

Issue: Whether Muoz was indeed ousted by means of Forcible Entry?

Ruling:

Yes.There is forcible entry when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. Based on the foregoing, we find that the RTC-Branch 88
erred in ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 even before completion of the proceedings before the
MeTC. At the time said case was ordered dismissed by RTC-Branch 88, the MeTC had only gone so far as
holding a hearing on and eventually granting Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.

Muoz alleges in her complaint in Civil Case No. 8286 that she had been in prior possession of the subject
property since it was turned-over to her by the sheriff on January 10, 1994, pursuant to the Alias Writ of
Execution issued by the RTC-Branch 95 to implement the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The
factual issue of who was in prior possession of the subject property should be litigated between the parties
regardless of whether or not the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 extended to the spouses
Chan. Hence, the pendency of the latter issue in Civil Case No. Q-28580 before the RTC-Branch 95 did not
warrant the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 before the MeTC on the ground of litis pendentia. The two cases
could proceed independently of one another.

The petition of Muoz is granted.. We DIRECT the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 33 of Quezon City to
reinstate Emerita Muozs complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 8286 and to resume the proceedings
only to determine whether or not Emerita Muoz was forcibly deprived of possession of the subject property
from February 2, 1994 until finality of this judgment, and if so, whether or not she is entitled to an award for
damages for deprivation of possession during the aforementioned period of time.

50.Jan-Dec. Construction and Dev.Corp v.CA, et al

February 6,2006

G.R.No.146818
On December 17, 1999, Jan-Dec Construction Corporation (petitioner) filed a complaint before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 276, Muntinlupa City (RTC) against Metro-South Intermodal Transport Terminal
Corporation (Intermodal) and Food Terminal, Inc. (respondent) for Sum of Money and Enforcement of
Contractor (sic) Lien. In its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim dated January 26, 2000, Intermodal
contends that the petitioner has no cause of action against it since the latter did not properly comply with its
obligation to the former.

On February 14, 2000, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss. On March 24, 2000, the RTC issued the Order
dismissing the complaint against respondent. The RTC held that: there is no privity of contract between
petitioner and respondent; there is no showing that respondent is liable for the contractual obligation of
Intermodal; it would be unfair to put respondent in defense for an obligation it never incurred. On April 19,
2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that, even if there is no contractual relationship
between petitioner and respondent, a quasi-contract exists under Article 1312 of the Civil Code and
respondent is duty bound to respect the creditors lien under Article 2242, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. On
June 7, 2000, the RTC issued the Order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. On August 3, 2000,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing the complaint against respondent. On August 11, 2000, the CA issued the Resolution dismissing
petitioners petition for certiorari for being an improper remedy against the Orders of the RTC. It held that
under Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, appeal is the proper remedy from a judgment or final
order of the RTC. On August 30, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On December 20, 2000,
the CA issued the Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. On February 12, 2001,
petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari based on the following ground.

Issue:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED IT DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN

HOLDING THAT APPEAL UNDER RULE 41 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, NOT CERTIORARI UNDER
RULE 65 IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY IN ASSAILING AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL AGAINST ONE DEFENDANT
WHILE THE CASE STILL PENDS AS TO THE REMAINING DEFENDANT.

Ruling:

No.The assailed Resolution of the CA dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari amounts to nothing more
than an error of judgment, correctible by appeal. When a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the
person and the subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an
exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are
merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not
proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari. For if every error committed by the trial court or quasi-
judicial agency were to be the proper subject of review by certiorari, then trial would never end and the
dockets of appellate courts would be clogged beyond measure. For this reason, where the issue or question
involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, not the jurisdiction of the court to render
said decision, the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. Since petitioner filed the
instant special civil action for certiorari, instead of appeal via a petition for review, the petition should be
dismissed. The petition is DISMISSED.
51.Chu,et al v.Cunanan,et al

September 5,2011

Spouses Manuel and Catalina Chu executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage involving their five
parcels of land situated in Saguin, San Fernando City, Pampanga, in favor of Trinidad N. Cunanan . Cunanan
was able to transfer the title of the five lots to her name without the knowledge of the Chus, and She later
transferred two of the lots to Spouses Amado and Gloria Carlos (Carloses) on July 29, 1987. Cunanan still
assigned the remaining three lots to Cool Town Realty on May 25, 1989

In February 1988, the Chus commenced a case in the RTC to recover the unpaid balance from Spouses
Fernando and Trinidad Cunanan (Cunanans). Five years later, on April 19, 1993, the Chus amended the
complaint to seek the annulment of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and of the TCTs issued
pursuant to the deed, and to recover damages. They impleaded Cool Town Realty and Development
Corporation. Considering that the Carloses had meanwhile sold the two lots to Benelda Estate Development
Corporation in 1995, the Chus further amended the complaint in Civil Case No. G-1936 to implead Benelda
Estate as additional defendant. On December 2, 1999, the Chus, the Cunanans, and Cool Town Realty
entered into a compromise agreement, whereby the Cunanans transferred to the Chus their 50% share in all
the parcels of land situated in Saguin, San Fernando, Pampanga registered in the name of Cool Town Realty
for and in consideration of the full settlement of their case. The RTC approved the compromise agreement in
a partial decision dated January 25, 2000.

Thereafter, on April 30, 2001, the petitioners herein (i.e., Catalina Chu and her children) brought another
suit, Civil Case No. 12251, against the Carloses and Benelda Estate. The petitioners amended their complaint
in Civil Case No. 12251 on February 4, 2002 to implead the Cunanans as additional defendants. The
Cunanans moved to dismiss.On April 25, 2002, the RTC denied both motions to dismiss. The Cunanans
sought reconsideration, but their motion was denied.

On September 2, 2002, the Cunanans filed a petition for certiorari in the CA (SP-72558), assailing the RTCs
denial of their motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration.

On November 19, 2002, the CA , granted the petition for certiorari . The CA ruled that the compromise
agreement had ended the legal controversy between the parties with respect to the cause of action arising
from the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage covering all the five parcels of land; that Civil Case No. G-
1936 and Civil Case No.12251 involved the violation by the Cunanans of the same legal right under the deed
of sale with assumption of mortgage; and that the filing of Civil Case No.12251 contravened the rule against
splitting of a cause of action, and rendered Civil Case No.12251 subject of a motion to dismiss based on bar
by res judicata. The CA GRANTED the petition. Hence, this appeal.

Issue

Was Civil Case No. 12251 barred by res judicata although the compromise agreement did not expressly
include Benelda Estate as a party and although the compromise agreement made no reference to the lots
now registered in Benelda Estates name?
Ruling: Yes.We deny the petition for review. The petitioners contend that the compromise agreement did
not apply or extend to the Carloses and Benelda Estate; hence, their Civil Case No. 12251 was not barred
by res judicata.We disagree.

A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It encompasses the objects specifically stated therein,
although it may include other objects by necessary implication, and is binding on the contracting parties,
being expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement between them. It has the effect and authority of res
judicata upon the parties. In the construction or interpretation of a compromise agreement, the intention of
the parties is to be ascertained from the agreement itself, and effect should be given to that intention.

But was there an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action between Civil Case No.G-
1936 and Civil Case No. 12251?There is identity of parties when the parties in both actions are the same, or
there is privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. The
requirement of the identity of parties was fully met, because the Chus, on the one hand, and the Cunanans,
on the other hand, were the parties in both cases along with their respective privies. The fact that the
Carloses and Benelda Estate, defendants in Civil Case No. 12251, were not parties in the compromise
agreement was inconsequential, for they were also the privies of the Cunanans as transferees and
successors-in-interest. We affirm the decision promulgated in CA

52.BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC.,

vs.
ESTEBAN ICARAÑGAL and ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL CO., INC.,

68 SCRA 287

Defendant , Esteban Icarañgal, with one Jacinto Figueroa, executed in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor
Co., Inc., a promissory note for P1,614, and in security for its payment, said Esteban Icarañgal executed a
real estate mortgage on a parcel of land in Pañgil, Laguna. Thereafter, promissors defaulted in the payment ;
wherefore, plaintiff instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for the collection. Judgment
was there rendered for the plaintiff. A writ of execution was issued and, the provincial sheriff of Laguna,
levied on the properties of the defendants. The other defendant herein, Oriental Commercial Co., Inc.,
interposed a third-party claim, alleging that the property which was the subject of the mortgage and which
has been levied upon by the sheriff, had already been acquired by it at the public auction on May 12, 1933.
By reason of this third-party claim, the sheriff desisted from the sale of the property and the judgment
rendered in favor of the plaintiff remained unsatisfied. Whereupon, plaintiff instituted an action to foreclose
the mortgage. The trial court dismissed the complaint and, from the judgment thus rendered plaintiff took
the present appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not plaintiff-appellant is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage after it has elected to
sue and obtain a personal judgment against the defendant-appellee on the promissory note for the payment
of which the mortgage was constituted as a security.
Ruling:

YES. For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the
debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security.In
other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure
of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that
reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate
agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation.
Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by
applying the rule above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of
the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the
first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints
simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in
effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and
with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor. Judgment is affirmed.

54.LILIA B. ADA, LUZ B. ADANZA, FLORA C. BA YLON, REMO BA YLON, JOSE BA YLON, ERIC BA YLON,
FLORENTINO BA YLON, and MA. RUBY BA YLON,
vs.
FLORANTE BA YLON,

GR.NO.182435

August 13,2012

This case involves the estate of spouses Florentino Baylon and Maximina Elnas Baylon (Spouses Baylon) who
died on November 7, 1961 and May 5, 1974, respectively. At the time of their death, Spouses Baylon were
survived by their legitimate children, namely, Rita Baylon (Rita), Victoria Baylon (Victoria), Dolores Baylon
(Dolores), Panfila Gomez (Panfila), Ramon Baylon (Ramon) and herein petitioner Lilia B. Ada (Lilia).

Victoria died on November 11, 1981 and was survived by her daughter, herein petitioner Luz B. Adanza.
Ramon died intestate on July 8, 1989 and was survived by herein respondent Florante Baylon (Florante]

On July 3, 1996, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Complain for partition, accounting and damages against
Florante, Rita and Panfila. They alleged therein that Spouses Baylon, during their lifetime, owned 43 parcels
of land all situated in Negros Oriental. After the death of Spouses Baylon, they claimed that Rita took
possession of the said parcels of land and appropriated for herself the income from the same. Using the
income produced by the said parcels of land, Rita allegedly purchased two parcels of land, Lot No. 47096 and
half of Lot No. 4706 situated in Canda-uay, Dumaguete City. The petitioners averred that Rita refused to
effect a partition of the said parcels of land.

In their Answer, Florante, Rita and Panfila denied that Rita appropriated solely for herself the income of the
estate of Spouses Baylon, and expressed no objection to the partition of the estate of Spouses Baylon, but
only with respect to the co-owned parcels of land.

During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation dated July 6, 1997, conveyed Lot No.
4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 to Florante. Thereafter, learning of the said donation inter vivos in favor of
Florante, the petitioners filed a Supplemental Pleading praying that the said donation in favor of the
respondent be rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. They further alleged that Rita
was already sick and very weak when the said Deed of Donation was supposedly executed and, thus, could
not have validly given her consent thereto.The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners.

Florante sought reconsideration of the Decision dated October 20, 2005 of the RTC insofar as it rescinded
the donation.He asserted that, at the time of Rita’s death on July 16, 2000, Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No.
4706 were no longer part of her estate as the same had already been conveyed to him through a donation
inter vivos three years earlier. Thus, Florante maintained that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 should
not be included in the properties that should be partitioned among the heirs of Rita.

On July 28, 2006, the RTC issued an Order which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Florante.
The CA SET ASIDE the RTC’s decision . The CA held that before the petitioners may file an action for
rescission, they must first obtain a favorable judicial ruling that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706
actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon and not to Rita. Until then, the CA asserted, an action for
rescission is premature. For this matter, the applicability of Article 1381, paragraph 4, of the New Civil Code
must likewise await the trial court’s resolution of the issue of ownership. The petitioners sought
reconsideration but it was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue

Whether the CA erred in ruling that the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 in
favor of Florante may only be rescinded if there is already a judicial determination that the same actually
belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon.

Ruling:

YES. The petitioners’ right to institute the action for rescission pursuant to Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is
not preconditioned upon the RTC’s determination as to the ownership of the said parcels of land.

It bears stressing that the right to ask for the rescission of a contract under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code
is not contingent upon the final determination of the ownership of the thing subject of litigation. The
primordial purpose of Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is to secure the possible effectivity of the impending
judgment by a court with respect to the thing subject of litigation. It seeks to protect the binding effect of a
court’s impending adjudication vis-à-vis the thing subject of litigation regardless of which among the
contending claims therein would subsequently be upheld. Accordingly, a definitive judicial determination
with respect to the thing subject of litigation is not a condition indispensable before the rescissory action
contemplated under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code may be instituted.. Assuming arguendo that a
rescissory action under Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code could only be instituted after the dispute with
respect to the thing subject of litigation is judicially determined, there is the possibility that the same may
had already been conveyed to third persons acting in good faith, rendering any judicial determination with
regard to the thing subject of litigation illusory. Surely, this situation is not what the law had envisioned.

55-56 MISSING
Rem cases nos. 58 - 67 (second set)

58. JOSE M. ROY III v. CHAIRPERSON TERESITA HERBOSA

Facts:

Before the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 19, 2017 (the Motion) filed by petitioner Jose
M. Roy III (movant) seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision dated November 22, 2016 (the Decision) which
denied the movant's petition, and declared that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in issuing Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 2013 (SEC-MC No. 8) as the same was in compliance
with, and in fealty to, the decision of the Court in Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Teves (Gamboa Decision) and the
resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration therein (Gamboa Resolution).The Motion presents no compelling and
new arguments to justify the reconsideration of the Decision.

The Decision has already exhaustively discussed and directly passed upon these grounds. Movant's petition was
dismissed based on both procedural and substantive grounds.

Issue:

Whether or not SEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
issued SEC-MC No. 8.

Held:

No.

SEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued SEC-MC
No. 8. The Court finds SEC-MC No. 8 to have been issued in fealty to the Gamboa Decision and Resolution.

Pursuant to the Court's constitutional duty to exercise judicial review, the Court has conclusively found no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of SEC in issuing SEC-MC No. 8.

The Decision has painstakingly explained why it considered as obiter dictum that pronouncement in the Gamboa
Resolution that the constitutional requirement on Filipino ownership should "apply uniformly and across the board to all
classes of shares, regardless of nomenclature and category, comprising the capital of a corporation." The Court stated
that:

To the Court's mind and, as exhaustively demonstrated in the Decision, the dispositive portion of the Gamboa Decision
was in no way modified by the Gamboa Resolution.

The heart of the controversy is the interpretation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, which provides: "No
franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens."

The Gamboa Decision already held, in no uncertain terms, that what the Constitution requires is full and legal beneficial
ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights must rest in the
hands of Filipino nationals. And, precisely that is what SEC-MC No. 8 provides; For purposes of determining compliance
with the constitutional or statutory ownership, the required percentage of Filipino ownership shall be applied to both
the total number of outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors; and (b) the total number of
outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to vote.

In conclusion, the basic issues raised in the Motion having been duly considered and passed upon by the Court in the
Decision and no substantial argument having been adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought, the Court resolves to
deny the Motion with finality.

59. BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO

Facts:

On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. [6] Herein respondent filed an Answer dated 19
March 1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer [7] in which she alleged, among
others, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead.[8] The death certificate[9] of Manuel
states "13 July 1995" as the date of death. As a result, petitioner filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require
respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel.[10] In compliance with the verbal order of the court during the 11 October
1999 hearing of the case, respondent submitted the required names and addresses of the heirs.[11] Petitioner then filed
a Motion for Substitution,[12] dated 18 January 2000, praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as party-
defendants. It appears that this motion was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 9 October 2000.

Pre-trial thereafter ensued and on 18 July 2001, the trial court issued its pre-trial order containing, among others, the
dates of hearing of the case.[14]

The trial of the case then proceeded. Herein petitioner, as plaintiff, presented its evidence and its exhibits were
thereafter admitted.

On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled upon agreement of the parties. On 24
September 2004, counsel for herein respondent was given a period of fifteen days within which to file a demurrer to
evidence.[15] However, on 7 October 2004, respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the
following as grounds: (1) that the complaint failed to implead an indispensable party or a real party in interest; hence,
the case must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action; (2) that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (3) that the trial court erred in
ordering the substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs; and (4) that the court must also dismiss the case against
Lolita Toledo in accordance with Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. [16]

The trial court, in an Order dated 8 November 2004, denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time,
citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court which states that: "[W]ithin the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made x x x." [17] Respondent's motion
for reconsideration of the order of denial was likewise denied on the ground that "defendants' attack on the
jurisdiction of this Court is now barred by estoppel by laches" since respondent failed to raise the issue despite several
chances to do so. Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial
court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in denying her motion to dismiss despite discovery, during the
trial of the case, of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal of the case.

The Court of Appeals granted the petition.

[Respondent's] motion to dismiss the complaint should have been granted by public respondent judge as the same was
in order. Considering that the obligation of Manuel S. Toledo is solidary with another debtor, the claim should be filed
against the estate of Manuel S. Toledo, in conformity with the provision of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the trial court is correct in denying respondent's motion to dismiss.

Held:

Yes. We find merit in the petition.

(1) Motion to dismiss filed out of time

To begin with, the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of respondent. Well settled is the
rule that the special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial by the trial court of a motion
to dismiss. The order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory, as it neither terminates nor
finally disposes of a case and still leaves something to be done by the court before a case is finally decided on the
merits.[21] Therefore, "the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered.’’

(2)On whether or not respondent is estopped from

questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court

At the outset, it must be here stated that, as the succeeding discussions will demonstrate, jurisdiction over the
person of Manuel should not be an issue in this case. A protracted discourse on jurisdiction is, nevertheless, demanded
by the fact that jurisdiction has been raised as an issue from the lower court, to the Court of Appeals and, finally,
before this Court. For the sake of clarity, and in order to finally settle the controversy and fully dispose of all the issues
in this case, it was deemed imperative to resolve the issue of jurisdiction.

(3) On whether or not the estate of Manuel

Toledo is an indispensable party

No.
Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:

SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had
of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.

Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable
party to the collection case, for the simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is
solidary.

(4) On whether or not the inclusion of Manuel as

party defendant is a misjoinder of party

Yes. As correctly pointed by defendants, the Honorable Court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Patricio
Sereno since there was indeed no valid service of summons insofar as Patricio Sereno is concerned. Patricio Sereno died
before the summons, together with a copy of the complaint and its annexes, could be served upon him.

However, the failure to effect service of summons unto Patricio Sereno, one of the defendants herein, does not render
the action DISMISSIBLE, considering that the three (3) other defendants, x x x, were validly served with summons and the
case with respect to the answering defendants may still proceed independently. Be it recalled that the three (3)
answering defendants have previously filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was denied by the Court.

Hence, only the case against Patricio Sereno will be DISMISSED and the same may be filed as a claim against the estate
of Patricio Sereno, but the case with respect to the three (3) other accused [sic] will proceed.

60. Land Bank of the Philippines vs Eduardo M. Cacayuran G.R. No. 191667

G.R. No. 191667, April 17, 2013

Facts:

This is a petition for Review on Certiorari of the CA affirming the RTC in declaring the nullity of the loan agreements
entered into by Land Bank and the Municipality of Agoo, La Union.

Agoo SB passed a certain resolution to implement a redevelopment plan to redevelop the Agoo Public Plaza. To finance
the plan, SB passed a resolution authorizing then Maor Eriguel to obtain a loan from Land Bank, incidental to it,
mortgaged a portion of the plaza as collateral. It has also authorized the assignment of a portion if the IRA and monthly
income in favor of Land Bank to secure the payment. 10 Kiosks were made at the plaza, then were rented out. Later, a
commercial center on the Plaza lot was built too, with a loan from Land Bank, posting the same securities as the first
loan.

The commercial loan was opposed by some residents of the municipality embodied in a manifesto launched through a
signature campaign by the residents and Cacayuran. Invoking his right as taxpayer, Cacayuran filed a complaint against
the officials and Land bank assailing the validity of the loans on the ground that the Plaza lot used as collateral is property
of public dominion and therefore beyond the commerce of man.
RTC Ruling: declared the nullity of the subject loans, saying that the loans were passed in a highly irregular manner, as
such, the Municipality is not bound by the same.

Aggrieved, Land Bank filed notice of appeal.

Ruling of CA: affirmed with modification the RTC's ruling, excluding the Vice Mayor from any personal liability arising
from the subject loans. Cacayuran has locus standi as resident and taxpayer in the municipality and the issue involves
public interest. The plaza cannot be a valid collateral to a loans for it is of public dominion.

Land Bank filed this instant petition.

Issues:

(1) whether Cacayuran has locus standi (2) whether the subject resolutions were validly passed and (3) whether the
subject loans are ultra vires. [The doctrine in the law of corporations that holds that if a corporation enters into a contract
that is beyond the scope of its corporate powers, the contract is illegal.]

SC Ruling:

(1) Taxpayer is allowed to sue if: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or
instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly
affected by the alleged act.

In the case, the proceeds from the Subject Loans had already been converted into public funds by the Municipality’s
receipt thereof. Funds coming from private sources become impressed with the characteristics of public funds when they
are under official custody. Public plaza belongs to public dominion, Cacayuran need not to be a privy to the loans, as long
as taxes are involved, people have a right to question the contracts entered into by the government.

(2) While ordinances are laws and possess a general and permanent character, resolutions are merely declarations of the
sentiment or opinion of a law making body on a specific matter and are temporary in nature. As opposed to ordinances,
"no rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution." In this accord, it cannot be denied that the SB violated
Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC altogether. Noticeably, the passage of the Subject Resolutions was also tainted with other
irregularities, such as (1) the SB’s failure to submit the Subject Resolutions to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union
for its review contrary to Section 56 of the LGC; and (2) the lack of publication and posting in contravention of Section 59
of the LGC.

(3) Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object for which a corporation is created as defined by the
law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it by law.43 There are two (2) types of ultra
vires acts. There is a distinction between an act utterly beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation and the
irregular exercise of a basic power under the legislative grant in matters not in themselves jurisdictional. The former are
ultra vires in the primary sense and void; the latter, ultra vires only in a secondary sense which does not preclude
ratification or the application of the doctrine of estoppel in the interest of equity and essential justice.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the Subject Loans belong to the first class of ultra vires acts
deemed as void. Records disclose that the said loans were executed by the Municipality for the purpose of funding the
conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a commercial center pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan. However, the conversion
of the said plaza is beyond the Municipality’s jurisdiction considering the property’s nature as one for public use and
thereby, forming part of the public dominion. Accordingly, it cannot be the object of appropriation either by the State or
by private persons. Nor can it be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking.

61. Sulo ng Bayan vs. Araneta , GR L-31061, 17 August 1976

Facts:

Plaintiff-appellant Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. filed an action against defendant-appellees to recover the ownership and
possession of a large tract of land in Bulacan, registered under Torrens System in the name of the defendants-appellees
predecessors-in-interest. The plaintiff is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Plaintiff Corporation (non-stock) may institute an action in behalf of its individual members for the
recovery of certain parcels of land allegedly owned by said members.

2. Whether the complaint filed by the corporation in behalf of its members may be treated as class suit.

Ruling:

1. No.

It is a doctrine well-established and obtains both at law and in equity that a corporation is a distinct legal entity to be
considered as separate and apart from the individual stockholders or members who compose it, and is not affected by
the personal rights, obligations and transactions of its stockholders or members. The property of the corporation is its
property and not that of the stockholders, as owners, although they have equities in it. Properties registered in the name
of the corporation owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members. Conversely, a corporation ordinarily
has no interest in the individual property of its stockholders unless transferred to the corporation even in the case of a
one-man corporation.

It has not been claimed that the members have assigned or transferred whatever rights they may have on the
land in question to the plaintiff-corporation. Absent of any showing of interest, therefore, a corporation, like plaintiff-
appellant herein, has no personality to bring an action for and in behalf of its stockholders or members for the purpose
of recovering property which belongs to said stockholders or members in their personal capacities.

2. No.

In order that a class suit may prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the subject matter of the
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; and (2) that the parties are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before court.

Here, there is only one plaintiff, and the plaintiff corporation does not even have an interest in the subject
matter of the controversy, and cannot, therefore, represent its members or stockholders who claim to own in their
individual capacities ownership of the said property..
62. ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA v. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, GR No. 166620, 2010-04-20

Facts:

the petitioners filed this action as a class suit on their own behalf and on behalf of all their co- employees at the
National Printing Office. They challenged the constitutionality of executive order no. 378 issued by President GMA which
amended sec 6 of Executive Order no. 285, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services
requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. They perceive it as a threat to their security of tenure as
employees of the NPO contending that it is beyond the executive powers of the President to amend or repeal EO no. 285
issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers and that EO no. 378 violates
petitioner's security of tenure because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.

Issue: Whether or not the petition is indeed qualified as a class suit.

Held:

NO. We dismiss the petition.

Section 12 rule 3 of rules of court provides: When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court
finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend
for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest

Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the assailed Executive Order
and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. There are about 549 employees in the NPO but only 67 petitioners
effectively instituted the present case. There is here an apparent conflict between petitioners' interests and those of the
persons whom they claim to represent.

Since it cannot be said that petitioners sufficiently represent the interests of the entire class, the instant case cannot be
properly treated as a class suit.

63. bonifacio v dizon

(To be followed)

64.

(Sulpico lines Inc. v sesante)

65. Cruz vs crus

66.tanhueco vs aguilar

(to be followed)

67. PRUDENTIAL BANK vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 74886 December 8, 1992, 216 scra 257
FACTS:

Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. entered into a contract with Nissho Co., Ltd. of Japan for the importation of textile
machineries under a five-year deferred payment plan. To effect payment for said machineries, Philippine Rayon Mills
opened a commercial letter of credit with the Prudential Bank and Trust Company in favor of Nissho. Against this letter
of credit, drafts were drawn and issued by Nissho, which were all paid by the Prudential Bank through its correspondent
in Japan. Two of these drafts were accepted by Philippine Rayon Mills while the others were not. Petitioner instituted
an action for the recovery of the sum of money it paid to Nissho as Philippine Rayon Mills was not able to pay its
obligations arising from the letter of credit. Respondent court ruled that with regard to the ten drafts which were not
presented and accepted, no valid demand for payment can be made. Petitioner however claims that the drafts were
sight drafts which did not require presentment for acceptance to Philippine Rayon.

ISSUE:
Whether presentment for acceptance of the drafts was indispensable to make Philippine Rayon liable thereon.

RULING:

In the case at bar, the drawee was necessarily the herein petitioner. It was to the latter that the drafts were
presented for payment. There was in fact no need for acceptance as the issued drafts are sight drafts. Presentment for
acceptance is necessary only in the cases expressly provided for in Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
(NIL). The said section provides that presentment for acceptance must be made:

(a) Where the bill is payable after sight, or in any other case, where presentment for acceptance is necessary in
order to fix the maturity of the instrument; or
(b) Where the bill expressly stipulates that it shall be presented for acceptance; or
(c) Where the bill is drawn payable elsewhere than at the residence or place of business of the drawee.

In no other case is presentment for acceptance necessary in order to render any party to the bill liable. Obviously then,
sight drafts do not require presentment for acceptance.

#68 page 6 JUDGE ANTONIO C. SUMALJAG v. SPOUSES DIOSDIDIT and MENENDEZ M.

LITERATO; and MICHAELES MAGLASANG RODRIGO, G.R. No. 149787

FACTS: Josefa D. Maglasang (Josefa) filed with the RTC an action for the nullity of the
deed of sale of real property purportedly executed between her as vendor and the
spouses Diosdidit and Menendez Literato (the respondent spouses) as vendees.
Josefa died during the pendency of case. Atty. Puray, the petitioners
and Josefa’s common counsel, asked the RTC that he be given an extended period to file
a formal notice of death and substitution of party and such was granted by the court.
Atty. Puray filed with the RTC a notice of death and substitution of party, praying
that Josefa in his capacity as plaintiff be substituted by the petitioner. The submission
alleged that prior to Josefas death, she executed a Quitclaim Deed in favor
of Remismundo D. Maglasang who in turn sold this property to the petitioner.
Menendez, objected to the proposed substitution, alleging that Atty. Puray filed
the notice of death and substitution of party beyond the thirty-day period provided
under Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. She recommended instead
 that Josefa be substituted by the latters full-blood sister, Michaeles Maglasang Rodrigo
(Michaeles).
The RTC denied Atty. Purays motion for substitution and instead ordered the
appearance of Michaeles as representative of the deceased Josefa.

ISSUE: Whether the counsel properly gave the names and address of the legal
representatives of the deceased that Sec. 16, Rule 3 specifies.

RULING: No he did not. The legal representatives refer to those authorized by law, the
administrator, executor or guardian who, under the rule on settlement of estate of
deceased persons, is constituted to take over the estate of the deceased. Section 16, Rule
3 likewise expressly provides that the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator. Significantly, the person now the present petitioner, that counsel gave as
substitute was not one of those mentioned under Section 16, Rule 3.
The reason for the Rule is to protect all concerned who may be affected by the
intervening death, particularly the deceased and her estate. The notice that counsel filed
in fact reflects a claim against the interest of the deceased through the transfer of her
remaining interest in the litigation to another party. Counsel has every authority to
manifest to the court changes in interest that transpire in the course of litigation. Thus,
counsel could have validly manifested to the court the transfer of Josefa’s interests in the
subject matter of litigation pursuant to Section 19, Rule 3. But this can happen only while
the client-transferor was alive and while the manifesting counsel was still the effective
and authorized counsel for the client-transferor, not after the death of the client when
the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

# 227
SPOUSES AMADO O. IBAÑEZ and ESTHER R. IBAÑEZ vs. JAMES HARPER as
Representative of the Heirs of FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, SR., G.R. No. 194272

FACTS: Spouses Amado and Esther Ibañez borrowed from Francisco E. Muñoz, Sr.,
Consuelo Estrada, and Ma. Consuelo E. Muñoz the amount of ₱1,300,000. The petitioners
issued a promissory note to respondents to pay the loan amount with interest and
executed a deed of real estate over a parcel of land as security.
 Thereafter, petitioner extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage for failure of
respondents to pay the loan plus interests within the agreed period. The property in
question was also not redeemed within the period prescribed by law; hence it was sold
at a public auction where defendant Francisco E. Munoz, Sr. was the highest bidder.
The parties later on filed a Joint Motion for Approval of Amended Compromise
Agreement, which the RTC approved and adopted it as its Hatol. Atty. Roberto Bermejo
representing as collaborating counsel of respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for
Execution and Lifting of the Status Quo Order and for the Issuance of Writ of Possession.
Atty. Bermejo alleged that the spouses Ibañez failed to comply with their obligation
under the Amended Compromise Agreement.
Petitioners moved to reconsider on grounds that respondents failed to inform the
court of Francisco’s death and that there was no valid substitution of parties. Atty.
Bermejo then filed a Notice of Death of Francisco and named James Harper as Francisco's
legal representative. The spouses Ibañez filed a motion to adopt the Judicial Compromise
Agreement as the final and executory decision. The RTC granted the spouses Ibañez'
motion. However, James sought reconsideration of the RTC's order, which was later on
denied. Aggrieved, the heirs of Francisco filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari. The
CA resolved James' petition and reinstating the status quo order.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was valid substitution of parties.

RULING:
Yes. While there may have been a failure to strictly observe the provisions of the
rules and there was no formal substitution of heirs, the heirs of Francisco, represented by
James, voluntarily appeared and actively participated in the case, particularly in the
enforcement of the Hatol. As the records show, they have filed multiple pleadings and
moved several times to implement the Hatol to protect Francisco's interest. Following
the court’s ruling in Vda. de Salazar and Berot, a formal substitution of parties is no longer
required under the circumstances.

The rationale behind the rule on substitution is to apprise the heir or the
substitute that he is being brought to the jurisdiction of the court in lieu of the deceased
party by operation of law. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be
properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his
estate. Non-compliance with the rule on substitution would render the proceedings and
the judgment of the trial court infirm because the court acquires no jurisdiction over the
persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the judgment
would be binding.

#228
CAPITOLINA VIVERO NAPERE, vs.
AMANDO BARBARONA and GERVACIA MONJAS BARBARONA
G.R. No. 160426 January 31, 2008
FACTS: Respondent Amando Barbarona is the registered owner of Lot No. 3177.
Lot No. 3176, is owned by o Anacleto Napere, adjoins said lot on the northeastern side.
After Anacleto died, his son, Juan Napere, and the latter’s wife, herein petitioner, planted
coconut trees on certain portions of the property with the consent of his co-heirs.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that in April 1980, the spouses Napere,
their relatives and hired laborers, by means of stealth and strategy, encroached upon and
occupied the northeastern portion of Lot No. 3177; that the Naperes harvested the
coconut fruits thereon, appropriated the proceeds thereof, and, despite demands, refused
to turn over possession of the area. While the case was pending, Juan Napere died. Their
counsel informed the court of Juan Napere’s death, and submitted the names and
addresses of Napere’s heirs.
The RTC later on finds in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the estate of Juan to
pay for damages.
Petitioner appealed the case to the CA, that the judgment of the trial court was
void for lack of jurisdiction over the heirs who were not ordered substituted as party-
defendants for the deceased. However the CA rendered a affirming the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC decision is void for lack of jurisdiction over the heirs of
Juan Napere

RULING:
No.
When a party to a pending case dies and the claim is not extinguished by such
death, the Rules require the substitution of the deceased party by his legal representative
or heirs
The complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages is an
action that survives the death of the defendant. The counsel of Juan Napere complied
with his duty to inform the court of his client’s death and the names and addresses of the
heirs. The trial court, however, failed to order the substitution of the heirs. Despite this
oversight, the Court held that the proceedings conducted and the judgment rendered by
the trial court are valid.
Failure of counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the death of his
client, such that no substitution is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the
judgment rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The trial court’s
jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party. Mere failure to
substitute a deceased party is not sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The
party alleging nullity must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.
The rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement
of due process.
# 229
Spouses JULITA DE LA CRUZ and FELIPE DE LA CRUZ vs. PEDRO JOAQUIN
G.R. No. 162788. July 28, 2005

FACTS: The case originated from a complaint for the recovery of possession and
ownership, the cancellation of title, and damages, filed by Pedro Joaquin against
petitioners in the RTC. Respondent alleged that he had obtained a loan from them in the
amount of P9,000 on June 29, 1974, payable after five (5) years; that is, on June 29,
1979and to secure the payment of the obligation, he supposedly executed a deed of sale
of a parcel of land in favor of petitioners. The parties also executed another document
entitled Kasunduan. Respondent claimed that the Kasunduan showed the Deed of Sale
to be actually an equitable mortgage. Spouses De la Cruz contended that this document
was merely an accommodation to allow the repurchase of the property until June 29,
1979, a right that he failed to exercise.
The RTC issued a Decision in favor Pedro. It held that respondent had made a
valid tender of payment on two separate occasions to exercise his right of
repurchase. Accordingly, petitioners were required to reconvey the property upon his
payment. The CA sustained the decision of the RTC. The Ca likewise denied the motion
for reconsideration and ordered a substitution by legal representatives, in view of Pedro’s
death.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Pedro
Joaquin.

RULING:
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules
of Court require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by
Section 16 of Rule 3. A formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves
voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the
deceased. These actions negate any claim that the right to due process was violated.
The records of the present case contain a Motion for Substitution of Party Plaintiff
filed before the CA. Wherein it was prayed that the heirs of the deceased plaintiff-
appellee as represented by his daughter Lourdes dela Cruz be substituted as party-
plaintiff for the said Pedro Joaquin.
Evidently, the heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntary appeared and participated in the
case. The appellate court had ordered his legal representatives to appear and substitute
for him. The substitution even on appeal had been ordered correctly.
#230
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION vs. HON. SALVADOR S. TENSUAN et al.,
G.R. No. 106920 December 10, 1993

FACTS: Petitioner Bank, a commercial banking corporation with principal office at

Makati, Metro Manila, instituted a complaint for collection of a sum of money against
the respondents, at the RTC of Makati. It appears from the allegations that respondent
obtained several loans from the petitioner. Respondent Circle, for value received,
delivered to petitioner bank four promissory notes, each of which contained the
stipulation that they expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any
legal action which may arise out of the promissory note. On their due dates, Circle failed
to pay its obligations under the promissory notes. Petitioner moved for issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment which was granted by the trial court. A motion to dismiss was
filed by the respondents and averred that the venue of the action was improperly laid
since an agreement had fixed the venue of actions arising from the promissory notes in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, only., Acting upon respondent's motion, respondent Judge
Tensuan, found the said motion to be impressed with merit and dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not venue is properly laid.

RULING: The stipulation here does not purport to deprive either party of it right to elect,
or option to have resort to, another competent court as expressly permitted by Section
2(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, should such party choose to initiate a suit. The
stipulation here merely operated to confer or confirm a right upon a party to elect
recourse to the courts of Valenzuela or, alternatively, to go before any of the tribunals
envisaged by the rules on venue.
In the case at bar, neither qualifying nor restrictive words (e.g., "must," "only" or
"exclusively") were employed which could yield an intent on the part of the parties
mandatorily to restrict the venue of actions arising out of the promissory notes to the
courts of Valenzuela only.
#231
FRANCISCO J. NICOLAS vs. THE REPARATIONS COMMISSION and PEDRO PASTORAL
G.R. No. L-28649 May 21, 1975

FACTS: Francisco Nicolas filed an application with the Reparations Commission for the
acquisition of fishing boats complete with fishing net, gears, and appurtenances which
the Commission granted. The Commission executed in favor of the Francisco a contract
of conditional purchase and sale of reparations goods subject to the terms and
conditions. Incorporated among the terms and conditions in said contract is a stipulation
which provides that "It is expressly agreed upon that all legal actions arising out of this
contract or in connection with the reparations goods made subject hereof may be brought
in and submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper courts in the City of Manila".
The Commission, in view purportedly of the sale by Francisco of the said fishing
vessel to Rodolfo Siojo without previous authority of the Commission "in violation of the
End-Use Contract took legal steps to repossess the vessel.
Francisco filed a case with the CFI of Rizal, Branch VI, against the respondents
and for breach of contract with damages, alleging that after he had complied with his
obligations under the contract, the Commission arbitrarily ordered the repossession of
the fishing vessel.
The respondents filed a a motion to dismiss on the ground that venue was
improperly laid.

ISSUE: Whether or not venue is improperly laid.

RULING: While the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to the jurisdiction of the
Manila courts, there is nothing in the language used in the stipulation which clearly
 shows that the intention of the parties was to limit the venue of the action to the City of
Manila only.

Qualifying restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone
is the venue are totally absent therefrom. It cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and
defendant bound themselves to file suits only or exclusively in Manila. For that
agreement did not change or transfer venue. It simply is permissive. The parties solely
agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort. They did not
waive their right to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2 [b]
of Rule 4.

#232
SPOUSES VICENTE YU AND DEMETRIA LEE-YU vs. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 147902, March 17, 2006

FACTS: Spouses Vicente Yu & Demetria Lee- Yu, among others mortgaged their title,
interest & participation over several parcels of land located in Dagupan City in favor of
the respondent, Philippine Commercial International Bank, as security for the payment
of loan. As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, interests & penalties due thereon,
respondent filed a petition for extra- judicial foreclosure of real estate on Dagupan City
properties before the RTC, Dagupan City. Auction sale of the said properties was
scheduled on September 10, 1998 where respondent emerged as the highest bidder. A
certificate of sale was issued in favor of the respondent. The sale was registered with the
Registry of Deeds, Dagupan City. About two months before the expiration of the
redemption period, respondent filed an ex-parte petition for writ of possession before
the RTC, Dagupan City. A hearing was conducted where the respondent presented its
evidence ex-parte by the testimony of Rodante Manuel.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss & to strike Out testimony of Rodante
Manuel stating that the certificate of sale is void because respondent violated Article
 2089 of the Civil Code in the indivisibility of the mortgaged by conducting two separate
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged properties in Dagupan City &Quezon City.
The RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss to strike out testimony of Rodante
Manuel. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA but dismissed by the CA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the CA. Hence, the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari

ISSUE: Whether or not a real estate mortgage over several properties located in different
localities can be separately foreclosed in different places.

RULING: The petitioners have a mistaken notion that the indivisibility of a real estate
mortgage relates to the venue of extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings. The rule on
indivisibility of a real estate mortgage is provided for in Article 2089 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
Art. 2089. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible, even though the debt may be
divided among the successors in interest of the debtor or of the creditor.
On the other hand, the venue of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings is the
place where each of the mortgaged property is located, as prescribed by Section 2 of Act
No. 3135, to wit:
SECTION 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the
property sold is situated; and in case the place within said province in which the
sale is to be made is subject to stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or
in the municipal building of the municipality in which the property or part thereof
is situated.
A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, the procedure on extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage, lays
down the guidelines for extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings on mortgaged properties
located in different provinces. It provides that the venue of the extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings is the place where each of the mortgaged property is located.
The indivisibility of the real estate mortgage is not violated by conducting two
separate foreclosure proceedings on mortgaged properties located in different provinces
as long as each parcel of land is answerable for the entire debt.

#233
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC. vs. SPOUSES BENEDICTO & TERESITA YUJUICO
G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015

FACTS: The City of Manila filed a complaint against the respondents for the expropriation
of five parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of respondent
Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels of land were previously mortgaged to Citytrust
Banking Corporation, the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, under a First Real Estate
Mortgage Contract. Manila RTC rendered its judgment declaring the five parcels of land
expropriated for public use. The judgment became final and executory and was entered
in the book of entries of judgment The petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to
Intervene in Execution with Partial Opposition to Defendant's Request to Release, but
the RTC denied the motion for having been "filed out of time." Hence, the petitioner
 decided to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage constituted on the two parcels of land
subject of the respondents' loan. After holding the public auction, the sheriff awarded
the two lots to the petitioner as the highest bidder. Claiming a deficiency the petitioner
sued the respondents to recover such deficiency in the Makati RTC The respondents
moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, namely: that the suit was barred by
res judicata; that the complaint stated no cause of action; and that the plaintiffs claim
had been waived, abandoned, or extinguished.
In its order, the Makati RTC denied the respondents' motion to dismiss. The
respondents moved for reconsideration, reiterating their grounds earlier made in their
motion to dismiss. In turn, the petitioner adopted its comment/opposition to the motion
to dismiss.
The respondents then filed their reply, in which they raised for the first time their
objection on the ground of improper venue. They contended that the action for the
recovery of the deficiency, being a supplementary action of the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, was a real action that should have been brought in the Manila RTC because
Manila was the place where the properties were located.

ISSUE: Whether or not an action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial foreclosure
of a real property mortgage is a personal action because it does not affect title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein.

RULING: YES. It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a
personal action. The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature
have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section
1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real
property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is to be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is
also referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions
as personal actions such actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal
property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach,
or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or
property. The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election
of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a transitory one.
Based on the distinctions between real and personal actions, an action to recover
the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is a
personal action, for it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest
therein.

# 234
 SPOUSES EFREN N. RIGOR and ZOSIMA D. RIGOR, for themselves and as owners of
CHIARA CONSTRUCTION, vs. CONSOLIDATED ORIX LEASING and FINANCE
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 136423. August 20, 2002

FACTS: Petitioners obtained a loan from private respondent and executed a promissory
note. The promissory note also provides that, all legal actions arising out of this note or
in connection with the chattels subject hereof shall only be brought in or submitted to
the proper court in Makati City, Philippines.
To secure payment of the loan, petitioners executed in favor of private respondent
a deed of chattel mortgage over two dump trucks. Petitioners failed to pay several
installments despite demand from respondent. Respondent then sought to foreclose the
chattel mortgage by filing a complaint for replevin with damages against petitioners
before the RTC Dagupan. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
improper venue based on a provision in the promissory note which states that, all legal
actions arising out of this note or in connection with the chattels subject hereof shall only
be brought in or submitted to the proper court in Makati City.
Respondent opposed the motion to dismiss and argued that venue was properly
laid in Dagupan City where it has a branch office based on a provision in the deed of
chattel mortgage which states that, in case of litigation arising out of the transaction that
gave rise to this contract, complete jurisdiction is given the proper court of the city of
Makati or any proper court within the province of Rizal, or any court in the city, or
province where the holder/mortgagee has a branch office, waiving for this purpose any
proper venue.
The trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss and likewise denied their
motion to reconsider. Not satisfied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA imputing grave abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the motion to
dismiss. However , the CA rendered the decision denying due course and dismissing the
petition.

ISSUE: Whether venue was properly laid under the provisions of the chattel mortgage
contract.

RULING:
No. The chattel mortgage constituted over the two dump trucks is an accessory
contract to the loan obligation as embodied in the promissory note. The chattel mortgage
cannot exist as an independent contract since its consideration is the same as that of the
principal contract. The Court held in National Power Corporation vs. CA that the
provisions of an accessory contract such as a surety bond must be read in its entirety and
together with the principal contract between the parties. The promissory note and the
deed of chattel mortgage must be construed together to arrive at their true
meaning. Certain stipulations cannot be segregated and then made to control.
The rules on venue are intended to assure convenience for the plaintiff and his
witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. As correctly pointed out by private
respondent, Dagupan City is the more convenient venue for both parties considering that
private respondent has a branch office in the city while petitioners reside in nearby
Tarlac. From this standpoint, petitioners futile insistence on an exclusive venue in
 Makati City smacks of a dilatory tactic to evade or at the very least, prolong the payment
of a just obligation. The case has been pending for four years on account of the question
of venue to the detriment of private respondent which is simply collecting on an
outstanding loan obligation.

#235
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. TROY FRANCIS L. MONASTERIO
G.R. No. 151037, June 23, 2005

FACTS: SMC entered into an Exclusive Warehouse Agreemen (EWA) with SMB
Warehousing Services (SMB), represented by its manager, respondent Troy Francis
Monasterio. SMB undertook to provide land, physical structures, equipment and
personnel for storage, warehousing and related services. The EWA also provide for the
venue o fthe action for the enforcement or duties/rights of the parties should be the
courts in Makati or Pasig, Metro Manila only to the exclusion of the other courts at the
option of the COMPAN.
Respondent Monasterio, a resident of Naga City, filed a complaint for collection
of sum of money against petitioner before the RTC of Naga City. SMC filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. SMC contended that respondent’s money
claim for alleged unpaid cashiering services arose from respondents’ function as
warehouse contractor thus the EWA should be followed and thus, the exclusive venue of
courts of Makati or Pasig, Metro Manila is the proper venue.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and held that the services agreed upon in
said contract is limited to warehousing services and the claim of plaintiff in his suit
pertains to the cashiering services rendered to the defendant, a relationship which was
not documented, and is certainly a contract separate and independent from the exclusive
warehousing agreements. The CA found respondents claim for cashiering services
inseparable from his claim for warehousing services, thus, the venue stipulated in the
EWA is the proper venue. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the CA, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC was correct in denying the motion to dismiss by SMC
alleging improper venue.

RULING: No.
On disputes relating to the enforcement of the rights and duties of the contracting
parties, the venue stipulation in the EWA should be construed as mandatory. On
disputes relating to the enforcement of the rights and duties of the contracting parties,
the venue stipulation in the EWA should be construed as mandatory. Moreover, in the
amended complaint, the respondents cause of action was specifically limited to the
collection of the sum owing to him for his cashiering service in favor of SMC. As
previously ruled, allegations in the complaint determines the cause of action or the nature
of the case. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, it would be erroneous to rule, as
the CA did, that the collection suit of the respondent did not pertain solely to the unpaid
cashiering services but pertain likewise to the warehousing services.
 Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties
thereto when the suit relates to breach of the said contract. But where the exclusivity
clause does not make it necessarily all encompassing, such that even those not related to
the enforcement of the contract should be subject to the exclusive venue, the stipulation
designating exclusive venues should be strictly confined to the specific undertaking or
agreement. Otherwise, the basic principles of freedom to contract might work to the
great disadvantage of a weak party-suitor who ought to be allowed free access to courts
of justice.

#236

UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and KUBOTA AGRI-

MACHINERY PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 119657, February 7, 1997

FACTS:
Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. (Kubota) and Unimasters
Conglomeration, Inc.(Unimasters) entered into a dealership agreement for sales and
services of the former's products. The agreement contained a stipulation that “All suits
arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with / in the proper Courts of Quezon City”.
Five years later, Unimasters filed an action in the RTC of Tacloban against Kubota, for
damages and breach of contracts, and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining
order. Kubota filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. The
denied the motion to dismiss on the reason that Unimasters’ place of business is in
Tacloban City while Kubota’s principal place of business is in Quezon City. In accord
with the Rules of Court, the proper venue would either be Quezon City or Tacloban City
at the election of the plaintiff. Hence, the filing in the RTC of Tacloban is proper. Kubota
appealed the order on the ground that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion in a
special action for certiorari and prohibition filed with the CA. Kubota asserted that RTC
of Tacloban had no jurisdiction was improperly laid. The CA decided in favor of Kubota
and it held that: “the stipulation respecting venue in its Dealership Agreement with
UNIMASTERS did in truth limit the venue of all suits arising thereunder only and
exclusively to the proper courts of Quezon City”. Subsequently, Unimasters filed a
motion for reconsideration but was turned down by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the venue stipulation in the contract limits the venue to a
specified place.

RULING: No.
 As long as the stipulation does not set forth qualifying or restrictive words to
indicate that the agreed place alone and none other is the venue of the action, the parties
do not lose the option of choosing the venue. Absence of qualifying or restrictive words,
venue stipulations in a contract should be considered merely as agreement on additional
forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
Unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical and suitably limiting
language, that they wish the venue of actions between them to be laid only and
exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements
on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely permissive, or
complementary of said rule.

Absent additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting

the parties' desire and intention that actions between them should be ventilated only at
the place selected by them, Quezon City - or other contractual provisions clearly evincing
the same desire and intention -the stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits
between the parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in
Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff, Unimasters in this case

#237
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR. vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN
T. FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINAS
G.R. No. 159507 April 19, 2006

FACTS: Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American
Express International, Inc. (AMEX) with the RTC of Southern Leyte. The complaint
alleged that the petitioner is a member of the house of representatives and a resident of
Southern Leyte, the defendant is a corporation doing business in the Philippines with
office in Makati City. The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful
dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to
his daughter. The first dishonor happened when Saludo’s daughter used her
supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the US. The second dishonor occurred
when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account in a hotel in
Tokyo, Japan. In their answer, respondents averred that the complaint should be
dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was
a resident of Leyte. Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte as evidenced by the fact
that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the
complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay
City, and that the complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the
said city. The trial court held that venue was proper since a man can have but one
domicile but he can have numerous residence. That although Saludo is domiciled in Leyte,
he has residence both in Pasay and in Leyte. The CA reversed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not venue is improperly laid.

RULING: No.
Petitioner Saludo’s complaint for damages is a personal action. As such, it is
governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of ROC. The term “residence” as employed in the rule on
venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode
whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from
“domicile” which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has
the intention of returning. The definition of “residence” for purposes of election law is
more stringent in that it is equated with the term “domicile”; When analyzed, the term
“residence” requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place, and (2)
personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
For purposes of venue, the less technical definition of “residence” is adopted;
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s
domicile; Since a congressman, or the lone representative of a particular district, has his
residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws,
necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue
for filing personal actions. Following the definition of the term “residence” for purposes
of election law, a congressman for a particular locality not only has the intention to reside
therein but also the personal presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. The fact that a party’s community tax certificate was issued in a place
other than where he claims to be a resident of is of no moment because the same does not
preclude his having a residence in another locality for purposes of venue.

#239
YOUNG AUTO SUPPLY CO. AND NEMESIO GARCIA vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND GEORGE CHIONG ROXAS
G.R. No. 104175 June 25, 1993

FACTS: Young Auto Supply Co. Inc. (YASCO) represented by Nemesio Garcia, its
president, sold all of their shares of stock in Consolidated Marketing & Development
Co.(CMDC) to Roxas. The purchase price was 8M payable as follows: a down payment
of 4M and the balance of 4M in four post dated checks of 1M each. The first check
representing the down payment was honored by the drawee bank but the four other
checks representing the balance was dishonored. In the meantime, Roxas sold one of the
markets to a third party. Nelson Garcia and Vicente Sy assigned all their rights and title
to the proceeds of the sale of CMDC shares to Nemesio Garcia. Petitioners filed a
complaint against Roxas in the RTC, Cebu City praying that Roxas be ordered to
pay petitioners or that full control of the three markets be turned over to YASCO and
Garcia. Roxas filed two motions for extension of time to submit his answer. But despite
said motion, he failed to do so causing petitioners to file a motion to have him declared
in default. The trial court declared Roxas in default. The order of default was, however,
 lifted upon motion of Roxas.Roxas filed a motion to dismiss on three grounds, among
which is that venue was improperly laid. The RTC denied such motion to dismiss. He
was again declared in default. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA
susutained the findings of the trial court with regard to the first two grounds raised in
the motion to dismiss but ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
improper venue.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that venue should be in Pasay City and
not in Cebu City.

RULING: Yes. In holding that the venue was improperly laid in Cebu City, the Court
of `Appeals relied on the address of YASCO, as appearing in the Deed of Sale which is
"No. 1708 Dominga Street, Pasay City." This was the same address written in YASCO's
letters and several commercial documents in the possession of Roxas. YASCO is a
domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws with principal
place of business in Cebu City. It also has a branch office in Pasay City. Garcia’s business
address in Cebu City. The Article of Incorporation of YASCO states that the place where
the principal office of the corporation is to be established or located is at Cebu City. A
corporation has no residence in the same sense in which this term is applied to a natural
person. But for practical purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical sense a resident of
the place where its principal office is located as stated in the articles of incorporation.
this Court explained why actions cannot be filed against a corporation in any place where
the corporation maintains its branch offices. The Court ruled that to allow an action to
be instituted in any place where the corporation has branch offices, would create
confusion and work untold inconvenience to said entity. By the same token, a
corporation cannot be allowed to file personal actions in a place other than its principal
place of business unless such a place is also the residence of a co-plaintiff or a defendant.

#240
JORGE C. PADERANGA vs.
Hon. DIMALANES B. BUISSAN and ELUMBA INDUSTRIES COMPANY, represented by its
General Manager, JOSE J. ELUMBA
G.R. No. L-49475 September 28, 1993

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent ELUMBA, a partnership, entered into an oral
contract of lease for the use of a commercial space within a building owned by petition
in Ozamiz City. Petitioner subdivided the leased premises into two (2) by constructing
a partition wall in between. He then took possession of the other half, which repossession
was said to have been undertaken with the acquiescence of the local manager of
ELUMBA. Respondent instituted an action for damages which, at the same time, prayed
 for the fixing of the period of lease at five (5) years, before the then CFI of Zamboanga
del Norte based in Dipolog City. Petitioner, a resident of Ozamiz City, moved for its
dismissal contending that the action was a real action which should have been filed with
the CFI of Misamis Occidental stationed in Ozamiz City where the property in question
was situated. Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss and held that the case
merely involved the enforcement of the contract of lease, and while affecting a portion of
real property, there was no question of ownership raised, hence, venue was properly laid.
Petitioner pleaded for reconsideration contending that while the action did not involve
a question of ownership, it was nevertheless seeking recovery of possession; thus, it was
a real action which must be filed in Ozamiz City, however, the MR was denied. Hence
this petition. ELUMBA counters that the present action is chiefly for damages arising
from an alleged breach in the lease contract; hence, the issue of recovery of possession is
merely incidental. ELUMBA further argues that the action is one in personam and not in
rem.

ISSUE:

RULING: It is indubitable that the action instituted by private respondent against

petitioner affects the parties alone, not the whole world. Hence, it is an action in
personam, i.e., any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.
However, this does not automatically mean that the action for damages and to fix the
period of the lease contract is also a personal action. For, a personal action may not at the
same time be an action in rem. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. In a real
action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in section 2(a) of
Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of
possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on, real
property. An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal
liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the
person. Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action in personam and not
necessarily an action in rem.
While the instant action is for damages arising from alleged breach of the lease
contract, it likewise prays for the fixing of the period of lease at five years. While it may
be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for recovery of possession, such is
the necessary consequence thereof. The instant action therefore does not operate to
efface the fundamental and prime objective of the nature of the case which is to recover
the one-half portion repossessed by the lessor, herein petitioner. Indeed, where the
ultimate purpose of an action involves title to or seeks recovery of possession, partition
or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, such an action must be
deemed a real action and must perforce be commenced and tried in the province where
the property or any part thereof lies.

#241
FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORPORATION v. ARTURO LOO PO,
G.R. No. 217694, January 27, 2016
FACTS: In a complaint for unlawful detainer, filed before the MeTC, Fairland alleged that
it was the owner of Condominium Unit located Pasig City. The said unit was leased by Fairland
to Po by verbal agreement. When Po continuously failed to pay rent. Fairland opted not to renew
the lease agreement anymore. Fairland sent a formal letter to Po demanding to pay the rent and
to vacate the leased premises. Despite receipt of the demand letter Po neither tendered payment
for the unpaid rent nor vacated the premises. Thus, Fairland filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer before the MeTC. Po failed to file his answer within the reglementary period. Hence,
Fairland filed a motion to render judgment. However, the MeTC dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit due to Fairland's failure to prove its claim by preponderance of evidence. On appeal,
the RTC affirmed the MeTC . Fairland file a motion for reconsideration bbut the same was
denied. Fairland filed a petition for review before the Cs. The CA dismissed the petition and
ruled that the action for unlawful detainer would not lie against Po. Hence, theis petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is an error of law to base judgement on preponderance of

evidence in ejectment case wherein no answer was filed seasonably.

RULING: Yes. The lower courts erroneously dismissed the complaint of Fairland simply on
the ground that it failed to establish by preponderance of evidence its ownership over
the subject property.
Section 6 of the Rules on Summary procedure is clear that in case the defendant
failed to file his answer, the court shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon
plaintiffs motion, based solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what
is prayed for. The failure of the defendant to timely file his answer and to controvert the
claim against him constitutes his acquiescence to every allegation stated in the complaint.
Logically, there is nothing to be done in this situation except to render judgment as may
be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint. Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of
the ROC which governs the rules for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, if the
defendant fails to answer the complaint within the period provided, the court has no
authority to declare the defendant in default. Instead, the court, motu proprio or on
motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in
the complaint and limited to what is prayed for.
Also, there was no need to attach proof of ownership in the complaint because the
allegations therein constituted a sufficient cause of action for unlawful detainer. Only
when the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to form a cause of action shall the
attachment become material in the determination thereof.
#84 page 6
AZUCENA GO and REGENA GLORIA SIONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and STAR GROUP
RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
G.R. No. 128954. October 8, 1998

FACTS: Private respondent filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
of Iloilo City an ejectment case against petitioners. Upon motion of petitioners, said
court issued an holding in abeyance the preliminary conference in said case until after the
case for specific performance involving the same parties shall have been finally decided
by the RTC of Iloilo City. An appeal was taken by private respondent from the aforesaid
order which was assigned to herein public respondent RTC of Iloilo City. Thereafter,
petitioner files with the rspondnet a motion to dismiss the appeal on the gound that the
appealed order is interlocutory and not appealable, but the it was denied. The petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied. Hence, petitioners filed
the present petition for certiorari. Private respondent then filed with respondent RTC a
Motion to Resume Proceedings. Respondent RTC issued an Order granting said motion
and directed the remand of the records of the case to the MTCC for further
proceedings. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification but the same
was denied.
Petitioners then filed with the CA a petition for review, raising the issue of
whether or not the same respondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the resumption of the proceedings in the
MTCC. The CA sustained the propriety of appeal as a remedy to challenge the
suspension of ejectment suit by the MTCC.

ISSUE: Whether or not appeal is the proper remedy to challenge the suspension of
proceedings in an ejectment suit.
Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the exception allowing the
suspension of the ejectment case based on strong reasons of equity or when the right of
the private respondent in question is seriously placed in issue.

RULING:
Private respondent nfiled an appeal to question the interlocutory order. This
recourse was upheld by the RTC and the CA in order to fill a procedural void. We affirm
the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. However, that the appeal
should instead be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. An appeal ordinarily
entails a longer process which negates an expeditious resolution. The purpose of the
Rules on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination
of cases without regard to technical rules. Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit
petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary
delays and to expedite the disposition of cases. In this case, private respondent
challenged the MTCC order delaying the ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief
envisioned by the Rules.Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary
proceeding is suspended indefinitely, a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of
discretion may be allowed. Because of the extraordinary circumstances in this case, a
petition for certiorari, in fact, gives spirit and life to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A
contrary ruling would unduly delay the disposition of the case and negate the rationale
of the said Rules.

No. . For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving
ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be
filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to
await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or
ownership. that the exception to the rule in this case of Vda. de Legaspi is based on
strong reasons of equity not found in the present petition. The right of the petitioner is
not so seriously placed in issue in the annulment case as to warrant a deviation, on
equitable grounds, from the imperative nature of the rule. The situation in Vda. de
Legaspi, however, does not obtain in the case at bar.
#85 page 6
VICTORIA G. GACHON and ALEX GUEVARA, vs. HON. NORBERTO C. DEVERA, JR.,
HON. JOSE R. ASTORGA and SUSANA GUEVARA, represented by her attorney-in-fact,
ROSALIE GUEVARA,
G.R. No. 116695. June 20, 1997

FACTS: A complaint for forcible entry was filed by private respondent Susana
Guevara against Patricio Guevara and petitioners Victoria Gachon and Alex Guevara
before the Municipal Trial Court for Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City. Summons was served
on and received by petitioners directing them to file an answer within the reglementary
period of ten (10) days. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did
not acquire jurisdiction over him. Petitioners filed with the MTCC an urgent motion for
extension of time to file an answer. The MTCC denied the motion on the ground that it
was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure. More than ten days
from their receipt of the summons, petitioner submitted an urgent motion praying for
the admission of their answer, which was attached thereto. Two days later, petitioners
filed another motion pleading for the admission of an amended answer. MTCC denied
the motions and considered the case submitted for resolution. The MTCC also denied
the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the MTCC resolved the
complaint for forcible entry in favor of herein private respondents. Instead of filing an
appeal, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and injunction before the RTC. The RTC
dismissed the petition. Respondnet judge ratiocinated that Sec. 36 of BP 129 and Sec.3A,
5, 6 and 19 of the Rules on Summary Procedure should be underscore quite clearly the
reality that the ten day perios to file answer reckoned from the date of the receipt od the
summons is mandatory and no reason of any kind is acceptable to operate as an excuse.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure on the period
of pleadings to be applied strictly and liberally.

RULING: The Rule on Summary Procedure, in particular, was promulgated for the
purpose of achieving an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. For this
reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing of motions for
 extension of time. Consistent with this reasoning is Section 6 of the Rule which allows
the trial court to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to
file an answer within the reglementary period. Furthermore, speedy resolution of
unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy,[28] and this rule should equally apply
with full force in forcible entry cases where the possession of the premises at the start is
already illegal.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the use of the word shall in the Rule on
Summary Procedure underscores the mandatory character of the challenged
provisions. Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the nature of the
Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of
suits. Indeed, to admit a late answer, as petitioners suggest, is to put premium on dilatory
maneuvers -- the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress. In this light, petitioners
invocation of the general principle in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court is misplaced.

86. Farales, et al. v. Judge Camarista/ March 2, 2000

#87 page 6
BOBBY CARRIAGA vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE ROMEO L. ANASARIO
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1403. February 3, 2003]
FACTS: Bobby Carriaga alleged that he is the complainant in two criminal cases for
estafa, less serious physical injuries and grave threats against jail guards. In the criminal
cases covered by theRue on Summary Procedure, respondent judge issued an order
requiring the accused to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses
within ten (10) days from notice. The accused received the order and submitted their
counter-affidavits only after 130 days or late by 120 days which was admitted by the
respondent. Apprehensive that respondent judge is biased in favor of the accused
considering that he admitted their counter-affidavits, complainant filed a motion for
inhibition but it was denied. This prompted complainant to file the administrative
complaint. Respondent judge denied the charges against him, contending that he has not
admitted in evidence the accused counter-affidavits, that the cases were calendared only
for arraignment and preliminary conference, and that the rule requiring the submission
of counter-affidavits within ten (10) days is merely directory, not mandatory.

ISSUE: Whether or not the requirement that the accused shall file a counter-affidavit in
ten days time is merely directory, not mandatory.

RULING: The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated specifically to

achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. In allowing the
submission of the accused counter-affidavits after 130 days from notice, respondent
judge violated the Rule. He should have observed that Section 12(b) of the Rule provides
that the court shall issue an order which shall require the accused to submit his counter-
affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses not later than ten (10) days from receipt of
said order. Sec. 19(e) of the same Rule also provides that a motion for extension to file
 affidavits is prohibited. Clearly, these provisions are mandatory. When the law or rule is
clear, there is no room for interpretation and judges have no option but to obey.

88-92. MISSING

93 page 6
GR. No. 70909. January 5, 1994

CONCHITA T. VDA. DE CHUA, THELMA CHUA v. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT, VICENTE GO, VICTORIA T. GO, and HERMINIGILDA HERRERA

FACTS: Herrera executed a Contract of Lease in favor of Tian On whereby the former leased to the
latter. The contract of lease contains a stipulation giving the lessee an option to buy the leased
property. The lessee, Tian On, erected a residential house on the leased premises. Then Sy Tian On
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Building in favor of Chua Bok. Chua Bok and defendant executed
a contract of lease. After the expiration of the contract of lease in question the plaintiffs herein,
continued possession of the premises.

Defendant Herrera through her attorney-in-fact sold the lots in question to defendants-spouses,
Vicente and Victoria Go. The defendants-spouses were able to have aforesaid sale registered with the
Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu and the titles of the two parcels of land were transferred in their
names. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed the instant case seeking the annulment of the said sale between
Herminigilda Herrera and spouses Vicente and Victoria Go, alleging that the conveyance was in
violation of the plaintiffs' right of option to buy the leased premises as provided in the Contract of
Lease. After due trial, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint and
ordering them to vacate the lots in question and to remove the improvements they had introduced in
the premises.

Petitioners question the jurisdiction of the trial court in Civil Case No. R-16589 in ordering their
ejectment from the leased premises and the removal of the improvements introduced thereon by
them. They claim that the action in Civil Case No. R-16589 was for the annulment of the sale of the
property by defendant Herrera to defendants-spouses Go, and not an appropriate case for an
ejectment. The right of possession of petitioners of the leased premises was squarely put in issue by
defendants-spouse Go in their counterclaim to petitioner's complaint, where they asked that ". . . the
plaintiff should vacate their premises as soon as feasible or as the Honorable Court may direct"

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the right of possession of the
leased premises.
RULING: Yes. The said counterclaim in effect was an accion publiciana for the recovery of the
possession of the leased premises. Clearly the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court)
had jurisdiction over actions which involve the possession of real property or any interest therein,
except forcible entry and detainer actions (Section 44[b], Judiciary Act of 1948). A counterclaim is
considered a complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. It stands
on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action. Hence,
the same rules on jurisdiction in an independent action apply to a counterclaim.
94. page 6
G.R. No. 75379. March 31, 1989

Spouses REYNALDO and ESTELITA JAVIER v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

and LEON S. GUTIERREZ, JR.
FACTS: The information against Leon S. Gutierrez, Jr. was filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. The civil case was not reserved. Gutierrez filed a complaint for damages against the
petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar. In this complaint, the
defendants were charged with having inveigled Gutierrez into signing the very check subject of the
criminal case in the Makati court. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
a cause of action and litis pendentia. The motion was denied. On the other hand, the private
respondent moved to suspend proceedings in Criminal pending the resolution of what was claimed to
be the prejudicial question raised in the civil case. The petitioners filed an opposition. The motion was
also to be denied later. Petitioners not having submitted their answer in the civil case, the private
respondent moved to declare them in default. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the order
denying their motion to dismiss but eventually this was denied. The petitioners filed a second motion
for reconsideration based on the original two grounds and alleging the additional ground of improper
venue.
The respondent judged declared the petitioners in default and set the civil case for trial. Three days
later, the motion to suspend proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Makati was denied and the
criminal case was set for hearing on the merits.
The petitioners went to the Intermediate Appellate Court to question the orders of Judge Cesar R.
Cinco of the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar, denying their motion to dismiss and
their motion for reconsideration of the denial by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant can raise in a separate civil action for damages against the
petitioners in another court.
RULING: No. As the civil action was not reserved by the petitioners, it was deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The applicable provision is
Rule 111, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, reading in full as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately. However, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action cannot
be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
It was before the Makati court that the private respondent, as defendant in the criminal charge
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, could explain why he had issued the bouncing check. As the civil action
based on the same act was also deemed filed there, it was also before that same court that he could
offer evidence to refute the claim for damages made by the petitioners. This he should have done in
the form of a counterclaim for damages for his alleged deception by the petitioners. In fact, the
counterclaim was compulsory and should have been filed by the private respondent upon the implied
institution of the civil action for damages in the criminal action.

95 page 6
G.R. No. 221062, October 05, 2016

ELIZABETH SY-VARGAS v. THE ESTATE OF ROLANDO OGSOS, SR. AND ROLANDO

OGSOS, JR.

FACTS: Petitioner Elizabeth Sy-Vargas, and Kathryn, who are among the heirs of Fermina, filed a
Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against respondents, before the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City. Summons was served but respondent Ogsos, Jr. filed a motion to admit
answer and answer to complaint after two years that the complaint was filed. Petitioner filed an
opposition thereto, and moved to declare the respondents in default, which the RTC granted. The
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration to the RTC, but was denied. The respondents elevated
the matter via a petition for certiorari to the CA, where the petition was granted and remanded to the
RTC. In their answer, respondents alleged that they had faithfully complied with their obligations as
stated in the lease contract and its subsequent amendments. Accordingly, the respondents filed a
counterclaim for the lost profits plus damages.
Respondents filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial, which was granted by the
RTC. The petitioner and their counsel failed to appear at the pre-trial and to file their pre-trial brief.
Thus, respondents filed a manifestation with motion to present evidence ex-parte, which the RTC
granted in an Order dated June 28, 2016. On October 17, 2006, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
respondents’ counterclaim, arguing that the same were permissive and that respondents had not paid
the appropriate docket fees. The RTC, denied the said motion, declaring respondents’ counterclaim
as compulsory; thus holding that the payment of the required docket fees was no longer necessary.
The RTC granted respondents’ counterclaim, and ordered petitioner to pay respondents. Petitioner
appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA ruled that the RTC was correct in
ruling that respondents’ counterclaim is not permissive but compulsory; hence, payment of docket
fees was not necessary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that respondents’ counterclaim for damages is
compulsory and not permissive in nature, and thus, no payment of docket fees is required.

RULING: The Court finds that the counterclaim of respondents is permissive in nature. This is
because: (a) the issue in the main case, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim; (b)
since petitioner and respondents’ respective causes of action arouse from completely different
occurrences, the latter would not be barred by res judicata had they opted to litigate its counterclaim
in a separate proceeding; (c) the evidence required to prove petitioner’s claim that respondents failed
to pay lease rentals is likewise different from the evidence required to prove respondents’
counterclaim that petitioner and Kathryn are liable for damages for performing acts in bad faith; and
(d) the recovery of petitioner’s claim is not contingent or dependent upon proof of respondents’
counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the
time and effort of the court and the parties.
By reason of the respondents’ counterclaim being permissive, and not compulsory as held by
the courts a quo, respondents are required to pay docket fees. However, it must be clarified that
respondents’ failure to pay the required docket fees, per se, should not necessarily lead to the
dismissal of the counterclaim. Its non-payment at the time of the filing of the initiatory pleading does
not automatically causes its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period;
and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.

Here, respondents cannot be faulted for non-payment of docket fees in connection with their
counterclaim. The lower courts did not require respondents to pay docket fees and even proceeded to
rule on their entitlement thereto. Verily, respondents’ reliance on the findings of the courts a quo,
albeit erroneous, exhibits their good faith in not paying the docket fees.

96. page 6
GR No. L-12546, May 20, 1960

REPUBLIC v. LUCAS P. PAREDES 108 Phil. 57

FACTS: On September 20, 1956, plaintiff commenced an action against defendants Lucas P. Paredes,
Aurora C. Paredes and appellant Globe Assurance Company for the recovery of the amount of
P48,529.19, representing unpaid taxes and for the confiscation of Globe Bond No. 1226, issued by the
defendants in favor of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In its amended answer which was accepted by
the trial court, appellant company included a cross-claim against Lucas and Aurora, alleging that they
had bound themselves to indemnify it (company) for any damages which it may sustain as a result of
the execution of said bond, and praying that in case judgment was rendered against it on the
complaint of plaintiff, Lucas and Aurora be condemned in the same judgment jointly and severally to
indemnify it in the same amount as that of the judgment. Lucas and Aurora were declared in default
and evidence against them was presented by plaintiff. Appellant company likewise presented its
evidence on the cross-claim against Lucas and Aurora. The case between the plaintiff-appellee and
defendant-appellant was submitted on a question of law. After hearing, the trial court, on March 28,
1957 rendered a decision without however any judgment on appellant's cross-claim.

On May 2, 1957, within the reglementary period, appellant filed a notice of appeal, an appeal
bond and a motion to extend the period within which to file the record on appeal. On May 7, 1957,
appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, praying that the court render judgment
on its cross-claim. On May 15, 1957, the trial court granted the motion for extension but denied the
motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in refusing to render judgment on the cross-claim of
defendant-appellant.

RULING: Yes. It is clear that the trial court erred in not passing upon and determining the, cross-
claim. The filing of a cross-claim is provided for in Rule 10, Sections 2 and 8 of the Rules of Court, the
purpose being to settle in a single proceeding all the claims of the different parties against each other
in the case in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. And appellant evidently did just that to avoid
multiplicity of suits; otherwise, it would have had to file a separate action against its co-defendants
for indemnity for any damages arising from the execution of the bond. In fact, the filing of the cross-
claim was permitted by the trial court.
Inasmuch as the co-defendants were declared in default, the evidence presented by the
defendant-appellant was not controverted, and the case was submitted on a question of law. It was
just a question of examining the exhibits presented, by the defendant-appellant, which were the bond
itself, the paragraph on indemnity, and the payment of interest in case of delay, in payment, as well
as the different letters of demand made by the defendant-appellant on its co-defendants.
Considering that the record on appeal had not yet been approved, the record being still in its custody
and it had not that inasmuch as the notice of appeal, the corresponding appeal bond and the record
on appeal were all filed within the reglementary period, the said judgment was still open to appeal
which the appellate court could and should correct the error instead of remanding the case to the trial
court, to save time, the case being about four years old, and in the interest of justice.

97 page 6

G.R. No. L-37960 February 28, 1980

TEOFILA TORIBIO vs. ABDULWAHID BIDIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City, and VICENTE COVARRUBIAS and CLARA MONTOJO, Spouses

FACTS: Teofila Toribio filed an action, in forma pauperis, with the Court of First Instance of
Instance of Zamboanga City against the spouses Vicente Covarrubias and Clara Montojo, for the
recovery of possession of a certain parcel of land. The respondent Judge rendered judgment,
dismissing the complaint. A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on May 3, 1973, and
the next day, she filed a "Motion to Appeal" wherein she manifested her intention to appeal the
decision to the Court of Appeals. The motion was set for hearing on May 12, 1973, but since the
respondent Judge was on vacation, the hearing of the motion was reset to June 2, 1973. However, on
motion of the petitioner, the hearing was transferred to June 9, 1973. In the meantime, the
defendants therein, now private respondents, filed an opposition to the Motion to Appeal, claiming
that "that matters involved in said motion has become moot and academic since the period in which
to appeal has already lapsed and no appeal was perfected."

On June 27, 1973, the respondent Judge issued an order denying the "Motion to Appeal" for the reason
that the herein petitioner had not submitted a record on appeal within the reglementary period so
that "it would be an exercise in futility for this Court to grant plaintiffs' Motion to Appeal as pauper
since the decision sought to be appealed had become final." The petitioner filed a motion for the
reconsideration of this order upon the ground that the filing of her Motion to Appeal suspended the
period for the perfection of an appeal since a pauper litigant is not required to file a record on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not a pauper litigant is exempt from filing a record of appeal.

RULING: No. The authority to sue or appeal as pauper does not exempt the pauper litigant from
filing the notice of appeal and the record on appeal in due time. Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court provides:

Sec. 22. Pauper litigant. - Any court may authorize a litigant to prosecute his action or defense as a
pauper upon a proper showing that he has no means to that effect by affidavits, certificate of the
corresponding provincial, city or municipal treasurer, or otherwise. Such authority once given shall
include an exemption from payment of legal fees and from filing appeal bond, printed record and
printed brief. The legal fees shall be a lien to any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the
pauper, unless the court otherwise provides.

A pauper litigant is exempted from submitting a printed record on appeal. Both in appeals by paupers
and non-paupers, a record on appeal should be submitted. The only difference is that in the case of
the pauper, the latter need not print it. In the instant case, the decision of the trial court appears to
be correct so that the allowance of the appeal of the petitioner would serve no useful purpose and
would merely delay the administration of justice.
98. page 7

G.R. No. L-53969 February 21, 1989

PURIFICACION SAMALA and LEONARDO ESGUERRA vs.

HON. LUIS L. VICTOR, CFI of Cavite, Br. II, EMERITA C. JUMANAN and RICARDO
JUMANAN

FACTS: Emerita C. Jumanan, assisted by her husband Ricardo Jumanan, filed before the CFI of
Cavite a complaint for damages arising from physical injuries suffered by her as a passenger of the
jeepney.While admitting to be the owners of the passenger jeepney, the spouses Garcia nonetheless
denied liability, alleging that the vehicular collision complained of was attributable to the fault and
negligence of the owner and driver of the Saint Raphael Transit passenger bus. Consequently, a third-
party complaint was filed by defendant spouses Garcia and Virgilio Profeta against Purificacion
Samala and Leonardo Esguerra, owner and driver, respectively, of the Saint Raphael Transit Bus.After
trial, respondent Judge rendered a decision in favor of the defendants. Third party defendants
Purificacion Samala and Leonardo Esguerra moved to reconsider said decision, but to no avail. Hence,
third party defendants appealed by certiorari. Appellants argue that since plaintiffs filed a complaint
for damages against the defendants on a breach of contract of carriage, they cannot recover from the
third-party defendants on a cause of action based on quasi-delict. The third party defendants, they
allege, are never parties liable with respect to plaintiff s claim although they are with respect to the
defendants for indemnification, subrogation, contribution or other reliefs. Consequently, they are not
directly liable to the plaintiffs. Their liability commences only when the defendants are adjudged
liable and not when they are absolved from liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs can still recover from the third- party defendants on a cause of
action based on tort or quasi-delict since their cause of action is based on culpa contractual against
the defendants only.

RULING: Yes. The third party defendants are brought into the action as directly liable to the
plaintiffs upon the allegation that "the primary and immediate cause as shown by the police
investigation of the vehicular collision.

As provided in Section 16, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court defines a third party complaint as a
"claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action,
called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnification, subrogation, or any other relief,
in respect of his opponent's claim." Under this Rule, a person not a party to an action may be
impleaded by the defendant either (a) on an allegation of liability to the latter; (b) on the ground of
direct liability to the plaintiff-, or, (c) both (a) and (b). The situation in (a) is covered by the phrase
"for contribution, indemnity or subrogation;" while (b) and (c) are subsumed under the catch all "or
any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim."

It is not indispensable in the premises that the defendant be first adjudged liable to plaintiff before
the third-party defendant may be held liable to the plaintiff. It is immaterial that the third-party
plaintiff asserts a cause of action against the third party defendant on a theory different from that
asserted by the plaintiff against the defendant. It has likewise been held that "a defendant in a contract
action may join as third-party defendants those liable to him in tort for the plaintiff s claim against
him or directly to the plaintiff.

99. page 7

G.R. No. L-18911 April 27, 1967

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CLEOFE RAMOS, ET AL.

FACTS: Plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, filed a complaint containing two causes of action: (1)
for the annulment of the registration of Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-117285 in the name of defendants, and
for the reversion of said lot to the plaintiff as part of the public domain; and (2) for an order
prohibiting defendants from further excavating the Wawang Dapdap River and from constructing
works on the land covered by their Foreshore Lease Application bordering said river.
Defendants filed a third-party complaint against third-party defendants that it is not defendants and
third-party plaintiffs "who have illegally appropriated through artificial and illegal means portion of
the Wawang Dapdap River and Manila Bay, but the third-party defendants Felipe E. Asuncion and
his wife who have increased their holding from a mere 27-hectare to around 200-hectare occupying
almost half of the Wawang Dapdap River.
Third-party defendants filed a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint. Over the opposition of
defendants and third-party plaintiffs, the lower court granted the motion, and reconsideration of the
order having been denied, appeal was seasonably made by them.1äwphï1.ñët

ISSUE: Whether or not the third-party complaint is improper and states no cause of action.

RULING: Yes. The allowance of a third-party complaint is predicated on the need for expediency and
the avoidance of unnecessary lawsuits. But it should not be considered as an excuse for
indiscriminately filing any claim which a defendant may have against a third-party defendant,
although unrelated to the main action.
The fundamental issue herein presented is the propriety or impropriety of the third-party
complaint. Rule 6, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"Third-party complaint." — A third-party complaint is a claim that a defendant party may, with leave
of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.
As the lower court said, "if the third-party plaintiffs could be held answerable for damages as per
allegation in the complaint of the plaintiff, it is due to their acts and no due to the acts of third-party
defendants." As far as may be gathered from the pertinent nations in the pleadings, plaintiff's causes
of action against defendants are unrelated to those of the latter against third-party defendants. The
latter would be liable, if at all, on an entirely separate ground, namely, that the illegal constructions
and excavations allegedly made by them on a parcel of land which was altogether different had caused
damages to third-party plaintiffs. There is no averment that the latter's illegal acts were induced or
rendered necessary by the illegal acts of third-party defendants; or more specifically, that if no
constructions or excavations had been made by third-party defendants, Lot No. 2, Psu-117285, would
not be part of the public domain at all. It is alleged, in the third-party complaint that if not for those
acts the river "would not have bent toward third-party plaintiffs' property and become shallower and
narrower." But it is not alleged how this circumstance could affect plaintiff's cause of action against
defendants, or render third-party defendants liable for "contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief" in respect of plaintiff's claim.
100. page 7
G.R. No. L-20266 January 31, 1967

THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. THE HONORABLE JUDGE GAUDENCIO

CLORIBEL, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VI, and HERMINIO
G. TEVES

FACTS: Teves sued for prohibition and mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Manila upon a
complaint dated August 18, 1962. Therein, he prayed for a restraining order against the (a)
Administrator of Economic Coordination requiring him to secure NARIC clearance on his shipments
aforesaid; (b) General Manager, Rice and Corn Administration, from acting on said NARIC
clearances, and (c) Commissioner of Customs, from referring the shipments which arrived prior to
January 12, 1962 to any office for ruling. Also, Teves moved the court to issue a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, ordering the Commissioner to cancel and/or cause to be cancelled the bonds
heretofore recited covering the 22 shipments or more, which arrived prior to January 12, 1962. Then,
Teves asked that, after hearing, all injunctions be declared permanent.
On August 27, 1962, the Commissioner registered written opposition against the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Respondent judge Gaudencio Cloribel made out an order
dated granting the injunctions prayed for, including a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the
Commissioner "to cancel and/or cause to be cancelled the corresponding bonds of the twenty-two
(22) shipments and/or more of them consigned to NARIC-HERMINIO G. Judge Cloribel issued
another order (upon Teves’ urgent ex-parte manifestation filed on the same date that the
Commissioner had not yet obeyed the mandatory injunction) commanding said Commissioner and
those under him to comply with the writ.
Respondent judge denied the motion files by the Commissioner to quash the writ issued.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge abuse his discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.

RULING: Yes. Section 1, Rule 58, 1964 Rules of Court provided that a court, at any stage of an
action prior to final judgment, may "require the performance of a particular act, in which case it
shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction." A mandatory injunction "usually tends to
do more than to maintain the status quo, it is generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to
the final hearing." Per contra, it may issue "in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very
clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant’s favor; where
there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right against his protest and remonstrance, the
injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to re-
establish and maintain a pre-existing continuing relation between the parties, recently and
arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation." Indeed, "the writ should
not be denied the complainant when he makes out a clear case, free from doubt and dispute."
We concede that the issuance of preliminary injunctions rests upon the sound discretion of
the Court. Nevertheless, as this Court pointed out in a recent case, sound judicial discretion, however,
no license to undo the law by defeating its objective. A clear case of abuse of discretion is here present.
Important to the issue here is the fact that the writ issued by the judge does not maintain the status
quo. Had the bonds not been posted by Teves, the goods he imported would not have been released.
The purpose of injunctions i. e., to restore the original situation of the parties, is here absent. Not
being present, the writ itself can hardly be sustained as equitable.
101. page 7

G.R. Nos. 164669-70 October 30, 2009

LIEZL CO vs. HAROLD LIM y GO and AVELINO UY GO

FACTS: On 2 July 2004, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which
sought the reversal of the Resolution dated 16 January 2006 of the Acting Secretary of the
Department of Justice directing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila to withdraw the
information filed against the respondents. The petition was still pending with the Court of Appeals
when the petitioner filed the present petition with the Supreme Court assailing the Orders dated 11
February 2004 and 29 June 2004 of the RTC dismissing the criminal complaints against
respondents.

Respondents alleged that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping since she filed the present
petition assailing the Orders of the RTC after she filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which disallows the deplorable practice of forum
shopping. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment
of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the
acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute wilful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall
be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a
cause for administrative sanctions.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.

RULING: No. The petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping.

Forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails himself of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court. The test for determining forum
shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is an identity of parties, rights or causes
of action, and relief sought.
Petitioner in this case is not guilty of forum shopping since there is no identity of relief and
cause of action in the present petition and in CA-G.R. SP No. 84703. The Petition for Certiorari filed
by petitioners before the Court of Appeals questions the propriety of the Resolution of the Acting
Secretary of Justice. The present petition docketed as G.R. Nos. 164669-70 seeks the reversal of the
Orders dated 11 February 2004 and 29 June 2004 of the RTC. The determination made by the Acting
Secretary of Justice that no prima facie case exists for the prosecution of the case is distinct from the
judicial determination of the RTC that there is no probable cause for the continued hearing of the
criminal case. These are two very different actions which should be separately assailed. The former is
pursuant to the powers and functions of the Department of Justice as provided under Section 2,
Chapter 1, Title III of the Revised Administrative Code.
102. page 7
G.R. No. 128464 June 20, 2006

REV. LUIS AO-AS vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: The acts of the Batong group, as embodied in several board resolutions, have already been
raised and passed upon in other cases pending at the time the Ao-As group instituted the present
controversy. The board resolutions authorizing the dissolution of the LCP business office and
termination of the employees connected therewith was the subject of NLRC case pending before the
National Labor Relations Commission. The board resolution authorizing the transfer of the LCP
corporate records from the Sta. Mesa Office to the Caloocan Office was the subject of Civil Case
pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. On the other hand, the legality of the
composition of the eleven-member LCP Board was already the subject matter of SICD Case No. 3524
which was appealed to the SEC En Banc.Clearly, the act of the Ao-as group in filing multiple petitions
involving the same issues constitutes forum shopping and should be sanctioned with dismissal.
SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 is a petition for accounting with prayer for the appointment of a
management committee and the issuance of a writ of injunction. The causes of action under SEC-
SIDC Case No. 3857 are the following: First, the alleged non-liquidation and/or non-accounting of a
part of the proceeds of the La Trinidad land transaction in the amount of P64,000.00 by petitioner
Thomas Batong; Second, the alleged non-liquidation and/or unaccounting of cash advances in the
aggregate amount of P323,750.00 by petitioner Thomas Batong;Third, the alleged dissipation and/or
unaccounting of the LCP general fund in the amount of 4.8 million; Fourth, the non-registration of
the Leyte land purchased with LCP funds by petitioner Victorio Saquilayan; Fifth, severance of
church-partnership relationship with Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod (LCMS); and Sixth, the
transfer of LCP corporate books from the Sta. Mesa office to the Caloocan office.

ISSUE: Whether or not SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 is a case of forum shopping.

RULING: No. It is not a case of forum shopping. The Ao-As group did not commit willful and
deliberate forum shopping in the filing of SEC-SIDC Case No. 3857.
If the forum shopping is not considered wilful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be dismissed
without prejudice on one of the two grounds mentioned above. However, if the forum shopping is
wilful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with
prejudice.hi1.
The six grounds originally relied upon by the Ao-As group in SEC-SICD Case No. 3857 are
entirely different from the causes of action in NLRC Case, Civil Cases and SEC-SICD Cases. It is true
that the causes of action in the latter cases were included as additional grounds in SEC-SICD Case No.
3857 for the appointment of the management committee and for accounting "of all funds, properties
and assets of LCP which may have come into their possession during their incumbency as officers
and/or directors of LCP." However, the creation of a management committee and the prayer for
accounting could not have been asked for in the labor case and forcible entry cases.
It is not a case of wilful and deliberate forum shopping and, hence, the SEC-SICD Case No.
3857, which contains the earlier prayer to create a management committee, should not be dismissed.
The reason for this is the strict evidentiary requirement needed to grant a prayer to create a
management committee.

103. page 7

G.R. No. 146717 May 19, 2006

 TRANSFIELD PHILIPPINES, INC. v. LUZON HYDRO CORPORATION,
FACTS: The Court required the parties to submit their respective memoranda to dispose a resolution.
Luzon Hydro Corporation (LHC) claims that Transfield Philippines, Inc.(TPI) is guilty of forum-
shopping when it filed the following suits: Civil Case pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati and a case in ICC International Court of Arbitration; The case filed before the International
Court of Arbitration, International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) a request for arbitration pursuant to
the Turnkey Contract between LHC and TPI; G.R. No. 146717 which was an appeal by certiorari with
prayer for TRO/preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction, of the Court of Appeals Decision.
On the other hand, TPI argues that LHC is relitigating in a civil case the very same causes of
action in the ICC Case and even manifesting therein that it will present evidence earlier presented
before the arbitral tribunal.
Meanwhile, ANZ Bank and Security Bank moved to be excused from filing a memorandum. They
claim that with the finality of the Courts Decision, any resolution by the Court on the issue of forum-
shopping will not materially affect their role as the banking entities involved are concerned. The Court
granted their respective motions.

ISSUE: Whether or not forum-shopping is committed.

RULING: There is no forum shopping committed.

There is no identity of causes of action between and among the arbitration case, the instant
petition, and Civil Case. The arbitration case is an arbitral proceeding commenced pursuant to the
Turnkey Contract between TPI and LHC. Together with the primary issue to be settled in the
arbitration case is the equally important question of monetary awards to the aggrieved party. On the
other hand, the civil case was filed to enjoin LHC from calling on the securities and respondent banks
from transferring or paying the securities in case LHC calls on them. Neither is there an identity of
parties between and among the three (3) cases. The ICC case only involves TPI and LHC logically
since they are the parties to the Turnkey Contract. In comparison, the instant petition includes
Security Bank and ANZ Bank, the banks sought to be enjoined from releasing the funds of the letters
of credit. The Civil Case, on the other hand, logically involves TPI and LHC only, they being the parties
to the arbitration agreement whose partial award is sought to be enforced.

The claim of TPI that it was LHC which committed forum-shopping, suffice it to say that its
bare allegations are not sufficient to sustain the charge. The Court resolves to dismiss the charges of
forum-shopping filed by both parties against each other.

103. page 7
G.R. No. 121962. April 30, 1999

ESPERANZA C. ESCORPIZO, and UNIVERSITY OF BAGUIO FACULTY EDUCATION

WORKERS UNION vs. UNIVERSITY OF BAGUIO and VIRGILIO C. BAUTISTA and
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
FACTS: Esperanza Escorpizo was initially hired by respondent university as a high school classroom
teacher. Under the rules of the respondent university, appointment to teach during the first two years
at the university is probationary in nature. Escorpizo failed to pass the PBET. Respondent university
no longer renewed Escorpizos contract of employment on the ground that she failed to qualify as a
regular teacher. This prompted Escorpizo to fille a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment of
backwages and reinstatement against private respondents.
The labor arbiter ruled that respondent university had a permissible reason in not renewing the
employment contract of Escorpizo. She appealed to the NLRC but the NLRC affirmed the decision of
the Labor Arbiter. Instead of filing for a motion for reconsideration, she filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action is proper for filing of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead
of filing a motion for reconsideration.
RULING: No. The precipitate filing of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without first moving for
reconsideration of the assailed resolution warrants the outright dismissal of this case. As we
consistently held in numerous cases, a motion for reconsideration is indispensable for it affords the
NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed before resort to the courts
can be had.
It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against acts of public respondents. The plain and
adequate remedy expressly provided by law was a motion for reconsideration of the impugned
resolution, based on palpable or patent errors, to be made under oath and filed within ten (10) days
from receipt of the questioned resolution of the NLRC, a procedure which is jurisdictional. Hence,
original action of certiorari, as in this case, will not prosper. Further, it should be stressed that
without a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed within the ten-day reglementary period, the
questioned order, resolution or decision of NLRC, becomes final and executory after ten (10) calendar
days from receipt thereof. Consequently, the merits of the case can no longer be reviewed to determine
if the public respondent had committed any grave abuse of discretion.

104. page 7
G.R. No. 86568. March 22, 1990

IMPERIAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and THE

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, INC.
FACTS: An action for the collection of a sum of money that was filed by the private respondent
against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The promissory note was
attached to the complaint.

An answer to the complaint was filed by petitioner. The petitioner denied liability and alleged that
one Julio Tan had no authority to negotiate and obtain a loan on its behalf. While defendant
specifically denied the aforestated promissory note alleged in the complaint, the answer was not
verified. For this reason, in due course, a decision was rendered by the trial court ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiff. Petitioner brought an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court Appeals
affirmed the judgement appealed. A motion for reconsideration of said decision was likewise denied
by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is devoid of merit.

RULING: Yes. No rule is more settled than that in an action based on a written instrument attached
to the complaint, if the defendant fails to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument the same is deemed admitted.

Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court is explicit in that there are two ways of pleading an actionable
document, namely: By alleging the substance of such written instrument in the pleading and attaching
a copy to the pleading; and by copying the instrument in the pleading.

The complaint in the present case complied with the first situation under paragraph (a). The
complaint alleged the substance of the promissory note subject of the litigation and a copy of the
promissory note was attached.

There is no question likewise that the petitioner failed to specifically deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of the promissory note subject of the complaint. By its omission,
petitioner clearly admitted the genuineness and due execution of the document and that the party
whose signature appears thereon had indeed signed the same and that he has the authority to sign
the same and that the agreement between the parties is what was in words and figures in the
document. Defenses which are inconsistent with the due execution and genuineness of the written
instrument are cut-off by such admission.

The claim of petitioner is that its failure to specifically deny under oath the actionable document does
not prevent it from showing that one Julio Tan was not authorized to enter into the transaction and
to sign the promissory note for and in behalf of the petitioner. But precisely, the petitioner is a party
to the instrument represented by Julio Tan so that it may not now deny the authority of Julio Tan to
so represent it. The due execution and genuineness of the document have thereby been conclusively
established.

105. page 7
G.R. No. 114942. November 27, 2000
MAUNLAD SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and VICTOR T. NUBLA
 FACTS: Petitioner Maunlad Savings instituted a complaint for sum of money against private
respondent Victor T. Nubla and Vicente Nubla on the basis of a promissory note. Petitioner presented
its evidence relying on the admission by the Nublas of the genuineness and due execution of the
subject promissory note inasmuch as their answer was not under oath as required by Section 8, Rule
8 of the Rules of Court.
On March 24, 1992, the Nublas filed a Motion to Admit Amended Answer. In seeking admission
of their amended answer, the Nublas cite Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court which allows the
amendment of pleadings to conform to the evidence.The Nublas likewise filed a Motion for
Submission of Plaintiffs Documents Marked by Defendants as Their Evidence after realizing that they
failed to include in their Offer of Evidence the Offering Ticket and the Deed of Assignment earlier
marked for the defense.
Petitioner filed its opposition to the twin motions on May 22, 1992. Both motions were denied by
the trial court ratiocinating that the proposed amendment in the amended answer will ultimately
change or alter the theory of the defense and thus cannot be allowed under Section 3, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioner Nubla interposed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
before the Court of Appeals contending that the trial courts denial of his twin motions amounted to
grave abuse of discretion. The appellate court issued its decision reversing the challenged Orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the amendment of private
respondents answer to the complaint after he had already formally offered his evidence.

RULING: No. Under Sec. 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, when the cause of action is anchored on a
document, the genuineness or due execution of the instrument shall be deemed impliedly admitted
unless the defendant, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the
facts.
In the instant case, while the specific denial in the original answer was not under oath and thus
gave rise to the implied admission of the genuineness and due execution of the contents of the
promissory note, private respondent, thru his testimony, was able to put in issue and present parol
evidence to controvert the terms of the promissory note, which are essentially the bedrock of his
defense. The presentation of the contrariant evidence for and against imputations of genuineness and
due execution undoubtedly cured, clarified or expanded, as the case may be, whatever defects in the
pleadings or vagueness in the issues there might have been as presented in the original answer. Hence,
the amended answer should have been admitted by trial court, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 10.

106. page 7

G.R. No. L-24488 December 28, 1925

ASIA BANKING CORPORATION vs. WALTER E. OLSEN & CO. INC., ET AL.
FACTS: About February 6, 1920 the defendant Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc. obtained a loan of P200,00
from the plaintiff for the purpose of purchasing a piece of land in Tondo. On account of this loan the
other defendant and Mr. A. D. Gibbs — all stockholders of the defendant corporation — executed
jointly and severally a promissory note for the amount of P200,00 in favor of the plaintiff. On April
25, 1921, the defendant corporation through its president and treasurer, Mr. Walter E. Olsen, one of
the defendants, mortgaged the same land to the plaintiff to secure the payment of the loan of P200,
000. Due to the fact that this land, as already stated, was mortgaged by the defendant corporation to
its codefendants and to Mr. A. D. Gibbs, the mortgage in favor of the plaintiff has not been paid until
this date. These are the facts appearing from the record and the documents accompanying the
complaint as a part thereof.

The complaint prays that judgment be rendered against defendants and each and every one of
them jointly and severally for the sum of P200, 000, with interest. All the defendants, except Mr.
Walter E. Olsen, subscribed a document wherein they agreed that a judgment be rendered prayed for
in complaint. An error assigned by the appellant is the fact that the lower court took into consideration
the documents attached to the complaint as a part thereof, without having been expressly introduced
in evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documents attached to the complaint without having been introduced in
evidence shall be admitted.

RULING:

Yes. In the answer of the defendants there was no denial under oath of the authenticity of these
documents. Under section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the authenticity be deemed admitted.
The effect of this to relieve the plaintiff from the duty of expressly presenting such documents as
evidence. The court, for the proper decision of the case, may and should consider, without the
introduction of evidence, the facts admitted by the parties. The judgment appealed from is affirmed
with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

107. page 7

G.R. NO. 148273 April 19, 2006

MILAGROS SIMON and LIBORIO BALATICO v. GUIA W. CANLAS

FACTS: Milagros executed a deed of real estate mortgage in favor of Edgar and she received the
consideration for the mortgage in the amount of P220,000.00. The petitioners' inaction for three
years before the filing of the complaint against them to protest the alleged non-receipt of the
consideration for the mortgage casts serious doubts on their claim. And that the deed of real estate
mortgage was duly notarized and assumed the character of a public instrument.On September 2,
1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, claiming that they were denied due process when
the RTC decided the case without petitioners' evidence. On October 16, 1998, the RTC denied the
motion for reconsideration, holding that petitioners were given ample opportunity to hire a counsel,
prepare for trial and adduce evidence, which they took for granted and they should bear the fault.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. On May 23, 2001, the CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC. Since Milagros admitted the existence, due execution, authenticity and validity of the Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage during the Pre-Trial Conference on June 7, 1995, absence of consideration is
no longer an issue. The amount of P220, 000.00 was actually received by Milagros per the testimony
of Aurelia. The petitioners slept on their rights, if they had any, since they never lifted a finger to
protect and preserve their alleged rights and interests. The respondent contends that the petition
should be dismissed outright for impleading the CA as respondent, despite the clear directive of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure against it. She further points out that the petition lacks verification, a
certification against forum shopping, a copy of the assailed CA decision, and it fails to raise any
specific question of law but only presents and discusses an "assignment of errors."

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed outright due to procedural
defects.
RULING: No. The Court agrees that the correct procedure, as mandated by Section 4, Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as not to implead the lower court which rendered the assailed decision.
However, impleading the lower court as respondent in the Petition for Review on Certiorari does not
automatically mean the dismissal of the appeal but merely authorizes the dismissal of the petition.
Besides, formal defects in petitions are not uncommon. The Court has encountered previous Petitions
for Review on Certiorari that erroneously impleaded the CA. In those cases, the Court merely called
the petitioners' attention to the defects and proceeded to resolve the case on their merits.
The Court finds no reason why it should not afford the same liberal treatment in this case.
While unquestionably, the Court has the discretion to dismiss the appeal for being defective, sound
policy dictates that it is far better to dispose of cases on the merits, rather than on technicality as the
latter approach may result in injustice. This is in accordance with Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure which encourages a reading of the procedural requirements in a manner that will
help secure and not defeat justice. As to respondent's claim that the petition lacks verification, a
certification against forum shopping and a copy of the assailed CA decision, the Court has carefully
examined the rollo of the case and found them to be attached to the petition. As to respondent's
submission that the petition failed to raise a question of law, the Court disagrees. For a question to be
one of law, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. Petitioners' contention that they were denied substantive due process is a
pure question of law.
108.
G.R. No. 150731 September 14, 2007
CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. PHILBANKING CORPORATION

FACTS: Casent Realty Development Corp. executed two promissory notes in favor of Rare Realty.
These promissory notes were used by Rare Realty as a security for a loan that Rare Realty obtained
from Philbanking wherein a Deed of Assignment was executed. When Rare Realty failed to pay its
debt, the bank went after the security of the loan. The bank demanded payment based on the
promissory notes issued by Casent Realty Corp to Rare Realty by virtue of the deed of assignment. On
a separate loan with Philbanking, Casent Realty satisfied its obligation by executing a Dacion en pago.
Philbanking filed for a complaint for the collection of payment against Casent based on the promissory
notes. Casent Realty, in its answer, raised that a Dacion en pago was already executed which
extinguished its obligation. Philbanking failed to file a reply. Casent Realty points out that the defense
of Dacion and Confirmation Statement, which were submitted in the Answer, should have been
specifically denied under oath by respondent in accordance with Rule 8, Section 8 of the Rules of
Court. Its failure constituted an admission on the part of the bank. Philbanking claimed that even
though it failed to file a Reply, all the new matters alleged in the Answer are deemed controverted
anyway, pursuant to Rule 6, Section 10:
Section 10. Reply.--A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in
denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make
issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the
answer are deemed controverted.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure of plaintiff to deny genuineness and due execution of a document
constitutes judicial admission

RULING: Yes. Since respondent failed to file a reply, in effect, respondent admitted the genuineness
and due execution of said documents. This judicial admission has been considered by the appellate
court in resolving the demurrer to evidence. Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written instrument
and provides the manner of denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely
provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the answer is based on an
actionable document, a reply specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the
genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted. Since respondent failed to
deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement under oath, then
these are deemed admitted and must be considered by the court in resolving the demurrer to evidence.
We held in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc. that "[w]hen the due
execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse party's
failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in
evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact."

109.
G.R. No. L-42408 September 21, 1984

ISIDRA P. CADIRAO vs. THE HONORABLE NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Judge, Court

of First Instance of Iloilo.

FACTS: Private respondent Juanita M. Diego filed before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a
complaint against petitioners to Quiet Title and Remove Clouds of Ownership of Real Property with
Damages. The complaint alleged that private respondent is the only child and exclusive legal heir of
the deceased Eusebio Mueda and she is the sole and exclusive owner of the afore-described parcel of
land. Answering the complaint, petitioners (then defendants) denied the material averments thereof
and set up by way of special and affirmative defenses that the parcel of land described in the complaint
is exclusively owned by them. The issues having been joined, the case was thereafter set for pre-trial
on September 8, 1975, during which date, the trial court, then presided by the Hon. respondent Judge
Numeriano G. Estenzo, required the parties to submit affidavits of their witnesses and their exhibits
in order to enable the court to determine the propriety of rendering a summary judgment or a
judgment on the pleadings.

Petitioners, (then defendants) moved to reconsider the Summary Judgment in question

contending that the document referred to as Annex "A" in the judgment, appears to have been signed
by the late Rafael Paguntalan who is not a party to the case and therefore, petitioners who are not
signatories thereto are not bound to make a denial under oath pursuant to the concluding sentence of
Sec. 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in disposing the case by Summary
Judgment.

RULING: Yes. The rendition of a summary judgment is not proper when the defending party's
pleading tenders vital issues which calls for the presentation of evidence.
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court authorizes the rendition of a summary judgment when on motion of the
plaintiff, after the answer to the complaint had been filed, it would appear at the hearing for such a
judgment, from the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits that,
except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
winning party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Conversely, the issue of ownership, thus
raised by the parties may not be categorized as frivolous and sham so as to dispense with the
presentation of evidence in a formal trial. Reliance by the trial court on Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules
of Court as its basis for the rendition of the challenged Summary Judgment is misplaced and without
legal support.

The nullity of the assailed Summary Judgment stems not only from the circumstances that
such kind of a judgment is not proper under the state of pleadings obtaining in the instant case, but
also from the failure to comply with the procedural guidelines for the rendition of such a judgment.
Contrary to the requirements prescribed by the Rules, no motion for a summary judgment was filed
by private respondent. Consequently, no notice or hearing for the purpose was ever conducted by the
trial court. The trial court merely required the parties to submit their affidavits and exhibits, together
with their respective memoranda, and without conducting any hearing, although the parties
presented opposing claims of ownership and possession, hastily rendered a Summary Judgment. The
trial court was decidedly in error in cursorily issuing the said Judgment.

110.
G.R. No. L-10100 August 15, 1916

GALO ABRENICA vs. MANUEL GONDA and MARCELO DE GARCIA

FACTS: The plaintiff brought the proceedings to compel the defendant to return to him the two
parcels which he alleges were sold by him under right of repurchase to the defendant on February 21,
1916, for the sum of P75 and for the period of seven years. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
refused to deliver said property to him when, upon the expiration of the period mentioned, he
endeavored to redeem the same and tendered payment to the defendant of the sum aforesaid. Manuel
Gonda alleged that about 19 years ago he was the sole possessor and owner of said parcels, and in the
course of the trial endeavored to prove that they had been sold to him by the plaintiff and his mother.

The justice of the peace of the provincial capital, who tried the case by assignment of the judge
of the Court of First Instance of the same province, heard the evidence introduced by the parties and
after making a sufficiently clear summary of and duly considering the same. A judgment was rendered
in behalf of the plaintiff and against the two defendants whereby he ordered each and both of them to
return and deliver to the plaintiff the parcels of land claimed by him.
Before the hearing in first instance, counsel for the defendant did in fact challenge the jurisdiction of
the justice of the peace of the provincial capital to try the case at bar, on the ground that Act No. 2041
of the Philippine Legislature is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not the justice of peace of the provincial capital has jurisdiction to try the case.

RULING: Yes. This Supreme Court has held on various occasions, among them in the decision
rendered on December 24, 1914, in the case of Calampiano vs. Tolentino (29 Phil. Rep., 116) that said
Act No. 2041 is valid and does not conflict with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902;
that a justice of the peace, acting under the designation under the law just referred to, acts not as a
justice of the peace or holds a justice's court, but acts as a judge of the zone of first instance and holds,
in effect, a Court of First Instance; and finally, that for this reason the objection that this case falls
within that of Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. Rep., 44 (which is the one cited by the appellants in their
brief to show that the error aforementioned was incurred), is not well taken. This assignment of error
cannot, therefore, be sustained.

111.
G.R. No. 126863. January 16, 2003

SPOUSES NAPOLEON L. GAZA and EVELYN GAZA vs. RAMON J. LIM and AGNES J.
LIM

FACTS: Napoleon Gaza purchased a parcel of land from Angeles Vda. de Urrutia. Thereafter,
Napoleon Gaza and his wife Evelyn constructed a huge lumber shed on the property and installed
engines, machinery and tools for a lumber mill. They also utilized a portion of the property as storage
for copra. In 1975, they ceased engaging in business. They padlocked the gates of the property, leaving
it to the care of Numeriano Ernesto. On the other hand, Ramon and Agnes Lim, both half-siblings of
Napoleon Gaza, claimed that they have used the same lot for their lumber and copra business since
1975. Sometime in November 1993, they designated Emilio Herrera as caretaker of the property. On
November 28, 1993, the padlock of the main gate was destroyed. According to Napoleon Gaza, the
siblings Ramon and Agnes Lim and Emilio Herrera, entered the property by breaking the lock of the
main gate. Thereafter, they occupied a room on the second floor of the warehouse without the consent
of Renato Petil who was then outside the premises.
Ramon and Agnes Lim filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calauag, Quezon an
action for forcible entry against spouses Napoleon and Evelyn Gaza. Spouses Gaza filed with the same
court their answer with compulsory counterclaim. The MTC dismissed the complaint and
counterclaim. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MTC Decision. Ramon and
Agnes Lim filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. The Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the Decision of the RTC. Spouses Gaza filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence,
they filed with this Court the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred to rule that petitioners impliedly admitted
respondents' allegation that they have prior and continuous possession of the property

RULING: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in declaring that herein petitioners impliedly admitted
respondents' allegation that they have prior and continuous possession of the property.
Petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint that respondents have prior
and continuous possession of the disputed property which they used for their lumber and copra
business. Petitioners did not merely allege they have no knowledge or information sufficient to form
a belief as to truth of those allegations in the complaint.
Petitioners’ possession of the property has been sufficiently established by evidence. The title
to the property is in the name of petitioner Napoleon Gaza. On record is a deed of sale showing that
he bought the land in 1961 from Angeles Vda. de Urrutia. Petitioner also presented receipts of
payment of realty taxes. Thus, the petition is granted and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is reversed.

112.
G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery
of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, their relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO)
issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the
Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting the President in the "recovery of all ill-
gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the
takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during
his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office
and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship."
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court
prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the
Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be
relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its
search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits
is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or
illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally
determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying
procedural side tracks.
ISSUE: Whether or not President Marcos committed prohibited and inhibited acts as president
during his term of office.
RULING: Yes. It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the
parties; (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in
other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case. Thus, facts pleaded in the petition
and answer are deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not
permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with such
admissions.
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since
they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their
net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as
President could not receive any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and
instrumentalities. Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not
receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source. In fact, his
management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly
prohibited under the 1973 Constitution.

113.
G.R. No. 207970 January 20 2016
FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC. v. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY
PHILIPPINES, INC.
FACTS: The FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES is a domestic corporation dealing with medical
equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the Wesleyan
University's hospital. According to the petitioner, the respondent paid only P67,3 57,683.23 of its total
obligation of P123,901,650.00. However, they entered into an agreement whereby the former agreed
to reduce its claim and allowed the latter to pay the adjusted obligation on installment. Due to the
respondent’s failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its complaint for sum of money in the
RTC.
The respondent expressly admitted the following in relation to petitioner’s allegations on: (a)
the four transactions for the delivery and installation of various hospital equipment; (b) the total
liability of the Wesleyan University; (c) the payments made by the Wesleyan Universitys; (d) the
balance still due to the FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES; and (e) the execution of the February
11, 2009 agreement. The Wesleyan University denied the rest of the complaint "for lack of knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch as the alleged
transactions were undertaken during the term of office of the past officers of defendant Wesleyan
University-Philippines. The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint but the RTC denied the
motion. On September 28, 2011, the petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings,
stating that the Wesleyan University had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus
did not tender any issue as to such allegations. The respondent opposed the Motion for Judgment
Based on the Pleadings, arguing that it had specifically denied the material allegations in the
complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by
relying on the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission.

RULING: Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying on
the allegations contained in the latter's complaint for rescission. In order to resolve the petitioner's
Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the answer of the
respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the
answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the complaint's material allegations were admitted
or properly denied. As such, the respondent's averment of payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to
the petitioner made in its complaint for rescission had no relevance to the resolution of the Motion
for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a factual issue on the total
liability of the respondent remained to be settled through trial on the merits. It should have openly
wondered why the respondent's answer in Civil Case No. 09-122116 did not allege the supposed
payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if only to buttress the specific denial of its
alleged liability. The omission exposed the respondent's denial of liability as insincere.

114.
G.R. No. 180157 February 8, 2012
EQUITABLE CARDNETWORK, INC. vs. JOSEFA BORROMEO CAPISTRANO
FACTS: Petitioner Equitable Cardnetwork, Inc. (ECI) alleged in its complaint that respondent Josefa
B. Capistrano (Mrs. Capistrano) applied for membership at the Manila Yacht Club (MYC) under the
latters widow-membership program. ECI further alleged that Mrs. Capistrano authorized her
daughter, Valentina C. Redulla (Mrs. Redulla), to claim from ECI her credit card and ATM application
form. Mrs. Redulla signed the acknowledgment receipt on behalf of her mother, Mrs.
Capistrano. After Mrs. Capistrano got hold of the card, she supposedly started using it. Because Mrs.
Capistrano was unable to settle her P217,235.36 bill, ECI demanded payment from her. But she
refused to pay, prompting ECI to file a collection suit against her before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City.
 Answering the complaint, Mrs. Capistrano denied ever applying for MYC membership and
ECI credit card; that Mrs. Redulla was not her daughter; and that she never authorized her or anyone
to claim a credit card for her.
After trial, the RTC ruled that, having failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution
of ECIs actionable documents that were attached to the complaint, Mrs. Capistrano impliedly
admitted the genuineness and due execution of those documents. Mrs. Capistrano appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed ECIs
complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that, although Mrs. Capistrano failed to
make an effective specific denial of the actionable documents attached to the complaint, she overcame
this omission by presenting parol evidence to which ECI failed to object.
.

RULING: Yes. It is of no moment that plaintiff ECI failed to object to Mrs. Capistranos evidence at
the trial that the subject documents were forgeries. The Court holds that the CA correctly ordered the
dismissal of ECIs action since, contrary to the RTCs finding, Mrs. Capistrano effectively denied the
genuineness and due execution of ECIs actionable documents. Mrs. Capistrano denied ECIs
actionable documents merely for lack of knowledge which denial, as pointed out above, is inadequate
since by their nature she ought to know the truth of the allegations regarding those documents. But
this inadequacy was cured by her quick assertion that she was also denying the allegations regarding
those actionable documents for the reasons as stated in her special and affirmative defenses. Since
Mrs. Capistrano in fact verified her claim that she had no part in those transactions, she in effect
denied under oath the genuineness and due execution of the documents supporting them. For this
reason, she is not barred from introducing evidence that those documents were forged. Wherefore,
the Court affirms the order of the Court of Appeals.

115.
G.R. No. 171805 May 30, 2011
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. MERELO B. AZNAR

FACTS: In 1958, RISCO ceased operation due to business reverses. In plaintiffs desire to rehabilitate
RISCO, they contributed a total amount of P212,720.00 which was used in the purchase of the three
(3) parcels of land . After the purchase of the above lots, titles were issued in the name of RISCO. The
amount contributed by plaintiffs constituted as liens and encumbrances on the aforementioned
properties as annotated in the titles of said lots. Thereafter, various subsequent annotations were
made on the same titles, including the Notice of Attachment and Writ of Execution in favor of herein
defendant PNB. As a result, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of Philippine National Bank, being
the lone and highest bidder of the three (3) parcels of land. The plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint
seeking the quieting of their supposed title to the subject properties, declaratory relief, cancellation
of TCT and reconveyance with temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Defendant
PNB on the other hand countered that the issuance of titles to PNB had already become final and
executory and their validity cannot be attacked except in a direct proceeding for their annulment.
Aznar, et al., filed a Manifestation and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Thus, the trial
court rendered the Decision, which ruled against PNB. PNB appealed, although the Court of Appeals
agreed with the trial court that a judgment on the pleadings was proper, the appellate court opined
that the monetary contributions made by Aznar, et al., to RISCO.
PNB argues that a judgment on the pleadings was not proper because its answer which it filed
during the trial court proceedings of this case, tendered genuine issues of fact since it did not only
deny material allegations in Aznar, et al. complaint but also set up special and affirmative
defenses. Furthermore, PNB maintains that, by virtue of the trial courts judgment on the pleadings,
it was denied its right to present evidence and, therefore, it was denied due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the findings of the trial court that a
judgment on the pleadings was warranted despite the existence of genuine issues of facts alleged in
the petitioner’s answer.

Ruling: Yes. The legal basis for rendering a judgment on the pleadings can be found in Section 1,
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court which states that [w]here an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading. x x x.
However, a careful reading of Aznar, et al.s Complaint and of PNBs Answer would reveal that
both parties raised several claims and defenses, respectively, other than what was cited by the Court
of Appeals, which requires the presentation of evidence for resolution.
It was error for the trial court to render a judgment on the pleadings and, in effect, resulted in a denial
of due process on the part of PNB because it was denied its right to present evidence. A remand of this
case would ordinarily be the appropriate course of action. A thorough and comprehensive scrutiny of
the records would reveal that this case should be dismissed because Aznar, et al., have no title to quiet
over the subject properties and their true cause of action is already barred by prescription.

116.

G.R. No. 167399 June 22, 2006

ERNESTINA L. CRISOLOGO-JOSE vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of hectares of land which used to form part of a larger expanse
situated in Talavera, Nueva Ecija and covered by a TCT. She is also the owner of several parcels of
land situated in the same municipality and covered by 12 separate titles. According to the petitioner,
respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) gave these landholdings – which she inherited from
her uncle Lim – a measly valuation of P9,000.00 per hectare (regarding implementation of the
agrarian reform program which partakes of the exercise of the power of eminent domain). Excepting
from the valuation purportedly thus given, petitioner filed, a petition for determination of just
compensation respecting her landholdings aforementioned.
It appears that in the midst of petitioner’s presentation of her evidence, the trial court admitted
LBP’s answer. The trial court, after due proceedings, rendered judgment fixing the fair market value
of the land in question. Following the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration, respondent LBP went
on appeal to the CA. Eventually, the CA reversed that of the trial court. In time, petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the CA denied her motion. Hence this petition for review under Rule 45, on both
procedural and substantive grounds.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in admitting respondent’s answer

Ruling: No. On the procedural angle, petitioner faults the appellate court for relying on and lending
credence to the allegations and defenses that respondent averred in its answer which it filed beyond
the 15-day period prescribed under Section 1, Rule 11 of the ROC. Petitioner also blames the trial court
for admitting, instead of expunging from the records, said answer and for not declaring the
respondent in default.
To admit or to reject an answer filed after the prescribed period is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. In fact, Section 11, Rule 11 of the Rules authorizes the court to accept answer
though filed late, thus:
SECTION. 11. Extension of time to plead. – Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the court
may extend the time to plead provided in these Rules.
The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be filed after the time fixed
by these Rules. And as Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education teaches,
an answer should be admitted where it had been filed before the defendant was declared in default
and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff, as here. Indeed, petitioner has not demonstrated how the
admission by the trial court of respondent’s answer was prejudicial to her case which, at bottom,
involves only the determination of the fair market value of her property.
Given Indiana Aerospace and other related cases cited therein virtually all of which is one in saying
that default orders should be avoided, petitioner’s lament about the trial court not declaring the
respondent in default for alleged belated filing of answer should be denied cogency. A declaration of
default, if proper, shall not issue unless the claiming party asked for it.

#247 ALFREDO REMITERE, ET AL., vs. REMEDIOS MONTINOLA VDA. DE YULO, ET AL.,
 G.R. No. L-19751 February 28, 1966

FACTS: Gregorio Remitere was declared the registered owner of two questioned
lots by the CFI of Negros Occidental. When he died, CFI appointed his wife as
administratrix of his estate, among which are the two lts in question. During this period,
the provincial sheriff of Negros Occidental, conducted a public auction sale over the said
parcels of land, and on the same day, he issued a deed of sale in favor of Mariano Yulo.
This lead to a series of cancellations of the certificate of titles and finally to the
registration of the TCT by virtue of deeds of sales in the name of Remedios Montinola
Vda. De YUlo. Hence, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants and the
register of deeds of Negros Occidental. The complaint prayed that the defendants be
ordered to reconvey the two lots in question to the plaintiffs and that the register of
deeds to cancel the certificates of titles in the name of the defendant and to issue new
ones in the names of the plaintiffs. The defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that complaint does not state a cause of action(and that
even assuming that a cause of action exists, the same has already prescribed). The lower
court dismissed the complaint precisely on the grounds relied upon by the defendants-
appellees. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action.

RULING: No.
The lack of cause of action as a ground for dismissal must appear on the face of the
complaint, and to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action, only the facts
alleged therein and no other, should be considered.
The SC held that no ultimate facts which may constitute the basis of plaintiffs
rights which had been violated are alleged. Neither are there allegations of ultimate facts
showing acts or omissions on the part of the defendants which constitute a violation of
the rights of plaintiffs. Hence, the lower court had correctly ruled that the complaint in
the present case does not narrate facts that constitute a cause of action.