CONFLICT OF LAWS-CASE DIGESTS ON JURISDICTION
But
1. NATIONAL RENTAL VS . SZUKHENT ET AL., 3 75 U.S. 311 (1964)
FACTS
Petitioner, a corporation with its principal place of business in New York, sued
respondents, residents of Michigan, in New York, claiming that respondents had
defaulted in payments due under a farm equipment lease. The last paragraph of the
contract provided that "the Lessee hereby designates Florence Weinberg as agent for
the purpose of accepting service of any process within the State of New York." The
respondents were not acquainted with Florence Weinberg, and she had not expressly
undertaken to transmit notice to them. The Marshal delivered two copies of the
summons and complaint to Florence Weinberg. That same day she mailed the
summons and complaint to the respondents, together with a letter stating that the
documents had been served upon her as the respondents' agent. The petitioner itself
also notified the respondents by certified mail of the service of process upon Florence
Weinberg. The District Court quashed service of the summons and complaint, holding
that, although Florence Weinberg had promptly notified the respondents of the
service of process and mailed copies of the summons and complaint to them, the
lease agreement itself had not explicitly required her to do so, and there was
therefore a "failure of the agency arrangement to achieve intrinsic and continuing
reality." The Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE
Whether the person upon whom the summons and complaint were served was "an
agent authorized by appointment" to receive the same, so as to subject the
respondents to the jurisdiction of the federal court in New York
RULING
Yes. We need not and do not in this case reach the situation where no personal
notice has been given to the defendant. Since the respondents did in fact receive
complete and timely notice of the lawsuit pending against them, no due process
claim has been made. The question presented here is whether a party to a private
contract may appoint an agent to receive service of process within the meaning of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (d) (1), where the agent is not personally known to
the party, and where the agent has not expressly undertaken to transmit notice to
the party.
The purpose underlying the contractual provision here at issue seems clear. The
clause was inserted by the petitioner and agreed to by the respondents in order to
assure that any litigation under the lease should be conducted in the State of New
York.
Florence Weinberg's prompt acceptance and transmittal to the respondents of the
summons and complaint pursuant to the authorization was itself sufficient to validate
the agency, even though there was no explicit previous promise on her part to do so.
BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
We deal here with a Federal Rule, applicable to federal courts in all 50 States.
even if we were to assume that this uniform federal standard should give way to
contrary local policies, there is no relevant concept of state law which would
invalidate the agency here at issue. In Michigan, where the respondents reside, the
statute which validates service of process under the circumstances present in this
case contains no provision requiring that the appointed agent expressly undertake to
notify the principal of the service of process. Similarly, New York law, which it was
agreed should be applicable to the lease provisions, does not require any such
express promise by the agent in order to create a valid agency for receipt of process.
It is argued, finally, that the agency sought to be created in this case was invalid
because Florence Weinberg may have had a conflict of interest. This argument is
based upon the fact that she was not personally known to the respondents at the
time of her appointment and upon a suggestion in the record that she may be
related to an officer of the petitioner corporation. But such a contention ignores the
narrowly limited nature of the agency here involved. Florence Weinberg was
appointed the respondents' agent for the single purpose of receiving service of
process. An agent with authority so limited can in no meaningful sense be deemed to
have had an interest antagonistic to the respondents, since both the petitioner and
the respondents had an equal interest in assuring that, in the event of litigation, the
latter be given that adequate and timely notice which is a prerequisite to a valid
judgment.
Dissent:
The record on the motion to quash shows that the Szukhents had never had any
dealings with Mrs. Weinberg, their supposed agent. They had never met, seen, or
heard of her. She did not sign the lease, was not a party to it, received no
compensation from the Szukhents, and undertook no obligation to them. In fact, she
was handpicked by the New York company to accept service of process in any suits
that might thereafter be filed by the company. Only after this suit was brought was it
reluctantly revealed that Mrs. Weinberg was in truth the wife of one of the
company's officers. I disagree with that holding, believing that:
(1) Whether Mrs. Weinberg was a valid agent upon whom service could validly be
effected under Rule 4 (d) (1) should be determined under New York law and that we
should accept the holdings of the federal district judge and the Court of Appeals
sitting in New York that under that State's law the purported appointment of Mrs.
Weinberg was invalid and ineffective. No federal statute has undertaken to regulate
the sort of agency transaction here involved. It is to the law of New York - the State
where this action was brought in federal court, the place where the contract was
deemed by the parties to have been made, and the State the law of which was
specified as determining rights and liabilities under the contract - that we should turn
to test the validity of the appointment.
I agree with the district judge that this agency is invalid under the laws of New York.
The highest state court that has passed on the question has held that, because of
New York statutes, the designation by a nonresident of New York of an agent to
receive service of process is ineffective; the court, in denying an order for
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interpleader, held that only residents of New York can make such an appointment,
and even then only in compliance with the terms of the controlling statute.;
(2) if, however, Rule 4 (d) (1) is to be read as calling upon us to formulate a new
federal definition of agency for purposes of service of process, I think our formulation
should exclude Mrs. Weinberg from the category of an "agent authorized by
appointment . . . to receive service of process." If Rule 4 (d) (1) is to be read as
requiring this Court to formulate new federal standards of agency to be resolved in
each case as a federal question, rather than as leaving the question to state law, I
think the standards we formulate should clearly and unequivocally denounce as
invalid any alleged service of process on nonresidents based on purported agency
contracts having no more substance than that naming Mrs. Weinberg. State courts in
general quite properly refuse to uphold service of process on an agent who, though
otherwise competent, has interests antagonistic to those of the person he is meant
to represent.
2. INTERNATIONAL SHOE CO. VS. WASHINGTON, 326 U.S. 310
(1945)
FACTS
Appellant is a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of business in St.
Louis, Missouri, and is engaged in the manufacture and sale of shoes and other
footwear. It maintains places of business in several states, other than Washington,
at which its manufacturing is carried on and from which its merchandise is
distributed interstate through several sales units or branches located outside the
State of Washington.
Appellant has no office in Washington and makes no contracts either for sale or
purchase of merchandise there. It maintains no stock of merchandise in that state
and makes there no deliveries of goods in intrastate commerce. During the years
from 1937 to 1940, now in question, appellant employed 11 to 13 salesmen under
direct supervision and control of sales managers located in St. Louis. These salesmen
resided in Washington; their principal activities were confined to that state; and they
were compensated by commissions based upon the amount of their sales.
The authority of the salesmen is limited to exhibiting their samples and soliciting
orders from prospective buyers, at prices and on terms fixed by appellant. The
salesmen transmit the orders to appellant’s office in St. Louis for acceptance or
rejection, and when accepted, the merchandise for filling the orders is shipped f.o.b.
from points outside Washington to the purchasers within the state. All the
merchandise shipped into Washington is invoiced at the place of shipment from
which collections are made. No salesman has authority to enter into contracts or to
make collections.
The Supreme Court of Washington was of opinion that the regular and systematic
solicitation of orders in the state by appellant’s salesmen, resulting in a continuous
flow of appellant’s product into the state, was sufficient to constitute doing business
in the state so as to make appellant amenable to suit in its courts. But it was also of
BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
opinion that there were sufficient additional activities shown to bring the case within
the rule frequently stated, that solicitation within a state by the agents of a foreign
corporation plus some additional activities are sufficient to render the corporation
amenable to suit brought in the courts of the state to enforce an obligation arising
out of its activities there. The court found such additional activities in the salesmen’s
display of samples sometimes in permanent display rooms, and the salesmen’s
residence within the state, continued over a period of years, all resulting in
substantial volume of merchandise regularly shipped by appellant to purchasers
within the state.
Appellant also insists that its activities within the state were not sufficient to
manifest its “presence” there and that in its absence the state courts were without
jurisdiction, that consequently it was a denial of due process for the state to subject
appellant to suit.... And appellant further argues that since it was not present within
the state, it is a denial of due process to subject it to taxation or other money
exaction.
ISSUES
1. Does the Washington court have jurisdiction over International Shoe?
2. Does International Shoe have “presence” in Washington?
RULING
Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on
their de facto power over the defendant’s person. Hence his presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment
personally binding him. But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to
personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that
in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he should have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.”
Since the corporate personality is a fiction although a fiction intended to be acted
upon as though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike an individual, its “presence”
without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities
carried on its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it. To say that the
corporation is so far “present” there as to satisfy due process requirements, for
purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the state,
is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms “present” or “presence” are used
merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which
courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. Those
demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum
as to make it reasonable, in the context of the federal system of government, to
require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there. An
“estimate of the inconveniences” which would result to the corporation from a trial
away from its “home” or principal place of business is relevant in this connection.
“Presence” in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the activities of
the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give
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rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to
an agent to accept service of process has been given. Conversely, it has been
generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his
conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation’s behalf
are not enough to subject it to suit on cause of action unconnected with the
activities. To require the corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away
from its home or other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has
been thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to
comport with due process.
There have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a
state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.
We are likewise unable to conclude that the service of the process within the state
upon an agent whose activities establish appellant’s presence there was not
sufficient notice of the suit, or that the suit was so unrelated to those activities as to
make the agent an inappropriate vehicle for communicating the notice. It is enough
that appellant has established such contacts with the state that the particular form of
substituted service adopted there gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be
actual. Nor can we say that the mailing of the notice of suit to appellant by
registered mail at its home office was not reasonably calculated to apprise appellant
of the suit.
Appellant having rendered itself amendable to suit upon obligations arising out of the
activities of its salesmen in Washington, the state may maintain the present suit in
personam to collect the tax laid upon the exercise of the privilege of employing
appellant’s salesmen within the state. For Washington has made one of those
activities, which taken together establish appellant’s “presence” there for purposes of
suit, the taxable event by which the sate brings appellant within the reach of its
taxing power. The stat thus has constitutional power to lay the tax and to subject
appellant to a suit to recover it. The activities which establish its “presence” subject
it alike to taxation by the state and to suit to recover the tax.
3. PERKINS VS. BENGUE T CONSOLIDATED MININ G CO 342 U.S.
437, 72 S. CT. 413 9 6 (1952)
FACTS
Perkins, a non-resident of Ohio, filed two in personam cases in an Ohio court. Among
those he sued is Benguest Consolidated (“Benguet”), a sociedad anima organized in
the Philippines where it owns and operates gold and silver mines. Perkins sued to
collect an amount in dividends and damages she claimed to be due her as a
stockholder of Benguet.
BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
Benguet has been carrying on in Ohio a continuous and systematic, but limited, part
of its general business. Its president, while engaged in doing such business in Ohio,
has been served with summons in this proceeding. Benguet, for its part, sought to
quash the summons served upon their president. The courts have sustained the
motions to quash.
ISSUE
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States precludes Ohio from subjecting a foreign corporation to the
jurisdiction of its courts in this action in personam
RULING
No. Ohio is free to decline or take jurisdiction over the corporation. To begin with,
Benguet is a foreign corporation according to Ohio law. The Federal Constitution does
not compel Ohio to open its courts to such a case, even though Ohio permits a
complainant to maintain a proceeding in personam in its courts against a properly
served nonresident natural person to enforce a cause of action which does not arise
out of anything done within the State.
As a matter of federal due process, the business done by the corporation in Ohio was
sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to permit Ohio to entertain the cause
of action against it, though the cause of action arose from activities entirely distinct
from its activities in Ohio.
4. MCGEE VS. INTERNAT IONAL LIFE INS. CO.3 55 U.S. 220
(DECEMBER 16, 1957)
FACTS
Lulu McGee, was the mother of Lowell Franklin who purchased a life insurance policy
from Arizona-based Empire Mutual Insurance Company that named McGee as the
beneficiary. In 1948, International Life Insurance Co. ("International"), a Texas
corporation, agreed to assume Empire's insurance obligations.
International mailed a reinsurance certificate to the Franklin in California, offering to
insure him according to the terms of the Empire policy. Franklin accepted the offer
and paid premiums from California until his death in 1950. When Franklin's mother
tried to collect on the policy, the insurance company refused to pay, claiming
Franklin had committed suicide. McGee brought suit in California, and sought to
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enforce it in Texas. The Texas Court, however, refused to enforce the judgment by
the California Court for the collection of the proceeds of the life insurance policy.
Note that International had conducted no other business in California except for this
one policy.
ISSUE
Can California exercise jurisdiction over a International, whose contacts with that
state are limited to a single act or contract?
RULING
Yes. A state may exercise jurisdiction over a party whose contacts with that state
consist of only a single act, provided that that act is what gave rise to the claim for
which jurisdiction is being sought, and was deliberately directed toward the state.
The court relied on the fact that the suit was based on "substantial connection" with
California, particularly the facts that the contract was delivered to McGee's son while
he was a resident of California, International continued to maintain a financial
relationship with McGee's son by collecting his premium payments, and that the
policy holder was a resident of the state when he died.
The court also gave weight to California's interest in protecting its residents as
consumers of insurance policies, and validated the long arm statute which gave the
California courts their power of jurisdiction over out of state companies by declaring
that California had a "manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its
residents.
5. PHILSEC. INVESTMENT V. COURT OF APPEALS, 274 SCRA 102
(1997)
FACTS
 Ducat obtained two separate loans from Ayala and Philsec in the sum of
$2.5M secured by shares of stock owned by Ducat.
 In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, 1488 Inc. undertook the
obligation to pay by virtue of a Warranty Deed with a Vendor’s Lien.
Through the latter, 1488 Inc. sold to Athona Holdings (“Athona”) a parcel of
land in Texas while Philsec and Ayala extended a $2.5M loan to Athona to
partially cover the value of the $2.8M lot.
 Athona executed a promissory note in favour of 1488 Inc. worth $.3M to
complete the payment for the lot. After all these transactions, Ducat was
released by Philsec and Ayala of his loan.
 Athona failed to pay the $.3M promissory note.
BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
 1488 Inc. sued Athona, Philsec and Ayala for the payment of the $.3M.
 The case was filed in Texas. While the Texas case was pending, Philsec filed
a complaint to recover a sum of money with damages in a Makati RTC
against Ducat.
 Ducat, on the other hand, filed and was granted a MTD on the basis of
litispendentia and forum non conveniens.
 The trial court also held that it had no jurisdiction over 1488 Inc. because
the action was neither in rem nor quasi in rem, accompanied by the fact
that the said defendant was a non-resident.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
ISSUES
1. Does a judgment in a US court bar actions to be instituted in Philippine
courts? (i.e. Can the foreign judgment constitute res judicata?)
2. Did CA err in dismissing the case based on the principle of forum non
conveniens?
RULING
1. It depends. The FOREIGN JUDGMENT CANNOT BE GIVEN THE EFFECT OF
RES JUDICATA WITHOUT GIVING THE ADVERSE PARTY AN OPPORTUNITY
TO IMPEACH IT ON GROUNDS STATED IN RULE 39, §50 of the Rules of
Court, to wit: “WANT OF JURISDICTION, WANT OF NOTICE TO THE PARTY,
COLLUSION, FRAUD, OR CLEAR MISTAKE OF LAW OR FACT.”
 While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in
several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law.
 IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE TO INITIATE A SEPARATE
ACTION OR PROCEEDING FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT.
 WHAT IS ESSENTIAL IS THAT THERE IS OPPORTUNITY TO CHALLENGE THE
FOREIGN JUDGMENT, IN ORDER FOR THE COURT TO PROPERLY DETERMINE
ITS EFFICACY.
 This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to ACTIONS IN PERSONAM,
as distinguished from actions in rem, a FOREIGN JUDGMENT MERELY
CONSTITUTES PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE JUSTNESS OF THE CLAIM
OF A PARTY AND, AS SUCH, IS SUBJECT TO PROOF TO THE CONTRARY.
 In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for
declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents.
 The proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial court nor
the appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S.
court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper
determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court
were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that
might be rendered would constitute res judicata.
2. Yes.
 First, a MTD is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, §1, which does not
include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on
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 this principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly
considered a matter of defense.
 Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from
assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after “vital facts
are established, to determine whether special circumstances” require the
court’s desistance.
 In this case, the TRIAL COURT ABSTAINED FROM TAKING JURISDICTION
SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS FILED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE MOTION TO DISMISS.
 IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT PHILSEC IS A DOMESTIC CORPORATION
AND DUCAT IS A FILIPINO, AND THAT IT WAS THE EXTINGUISHMENT OF
THE LATTER’S DEBT WHICH WAS THE OBJECT OF THE TRANSACTION
UNDER LITIGATION.
 The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat
was not a party in the U.S. case.
As has long been settled, and as we reaffirm today, a state court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only as long as there exist
“minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum state. The concept of
minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable,
functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do
not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system.
The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of
“reasonableness” or “fairness.” We have said that the defendant’s contacts with the
forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit “does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

Thus, the Due Process Clause “does not contemplate that a state may make binding
6. WORLD -WIDE VOLKSWA GEN CORP. VS. WOODSO N 444 U.S. 286
a judgement in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which
(1980)
the state has no contacts, ties, or relations”. Even if the defendant would suffer
minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of
FACTS
another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the
controversy; even if the forum state is the most convenient location for litigation, the
Spouses Harry and Kay Robinson, residents of New York, who had purchased a car
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
from Seaway Volkswagen, a retailer in New York, brought a suit against the retailer
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgement.
and its wholesale distributor, in the District Court for Creek county, Oklahoma. The
Robinsons claimed that the injuries which they suffered in a car accident in
Apply these principles to the case at hand, we find in the record before us a total
Oklahoma were caused by the defective design and placement of their automobile’s
absence of those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any
gas tank and fuel system. Seaway Volkswagen and Worldwide Volkswagen both
exercise of state-court jurisdiction. Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in
incorporated and doing business in New York, asserted that Oklahoma’s exercise of
Oklahoma. They close no sales and perform no services there. They avail themselves
jurisdiction over them would violate the limitations on state jurisdiction imposed by
of none of the privileges either through salespersons or through advertising
the due process clause. Seaway and Worldwide Volkswagen sought a writ of
reasonably calculated to reach the State. Nor does the record show that they
prohibition in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to prevent the trial judge from
regularly sell cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma customers or residents or that
exercising in personam jurisdiction over them. The writ was denied on the ground
they indirectly, through others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market. In
that personal jurisdiction was authorized by Oklahoma’s “long-arm” statute allowing
short, respondents seek to base jurisdiction on one, isolated occurrence and
an Oklahoma court’s exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a tortfeasor who
whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the fortuitous circumstance that a
causes injury in Oklahoma by an act or omission outside Oklahoma “if he regularly
single Audi automobile, sold in New York to New York residents, happened to suffer
does or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or
an accident while passing through Oklahoma.
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered” in
Oklahoma. It is argued, however that because an automobile is mobile by its very design and
purpose it was “foreseeable” that the Robinsons’ Audi would cause injury in
ISSUE
Oklahoma. Yet “foreseeability” alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.
W/N Oklahoma has jurisdiction over the controversy? NONE

RULING

Page 5 of 10
BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
Because we find that petitioners have no “contacts, ties or relations” with the State
of Oklahoma the judgement of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is reversed.
7. CALDER VS. JONES, 465 U.S. 783 (MARCH 20, 1984)
Brief Fact Summary. Respondent, Shirley Jones, brought a libel suit in a California
state court against Petitioners, Calder et al. Petitioners South and Calder are Florida
residents who argue that California courts lack personal jurisdiction over them.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state has personal jurisdiction over any party whose
actions intentionally reach another party in the state and are the basis for the cause
of action.
Facts. Petitioners South is a reporter, and Petitioner Calder is president and an
editor, of Petitioner National Enquirer. South wrote an article that accused
Respondent of a drinking problem that was so severe that it affected her acting
career. Calder reviewed the article and edited it to its final form for publication.
Respondent brought a suit for libel, and South and Calder challenged California’s
personal jurisdiction since neither had any physical contacts with California,
particularly as it pertained to this article. South did rely on sources from California,
and Respondent’s life and career were centered in California. The district court cited
Petitioner’s rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as
trumpeting Due Process Clause concerns. The appellate court reversed because First
Amendment arguments are irrelevant to jurisdictional analysis.
Issue. The issue is whether California has personal jurisdiction over South and Calder
through their targeting of Respondent with this article.
Held. The United States Supreme Court held that California had personal jurisdiction
over Petitioners. The first step in the analysis is to determine the focal point of the
harm suffered, and that was in California. The Court then determined that
Petitioners’ actions intentionally aimed at a California resident, and the injuries
suffered would be in that state.
Discussion. Petitioners argued that, because they were merely employees of the
libelous newspaper, their case was analogous to a welder who works on a boiler in
Florida that subsequently explodes in California. The Court distinguishes this by
noting that unlike the welder they intentionally targeted the California contact.
Other version
BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
Calder v. Jones
465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct.1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984)
Plaintiff/Respondent: Shirley Jones
Defendant/Petitioner: Calder
Rule of Law: A state has personal jurisdiction over any party whose actions
intentionally reaches another party in the state and is the basis for the cause of
action.
Facts:
-Defendant South is a reporter, and defendant Calder is president and an editor, of
National Enquirer.
-South wrote an article that accused P of a drinking problem that was so severe that
it affected her acting career. Calder reviewed the article and edited it to its final form
for publication.
-P brought a suit for libel in CA. South and Calder challenged California’s personal
jurisdiction since neither had any physical contacts with California, particularly as it
pertained to this article.
-D’s are Florida residents who argue that California courts lack personal jurisdiction
over them.
-South did rely on sources from California, and P’s life and career were centered in
California.
-The district court cited D’s rights under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution as trumpeting Due Process Clause concerns.
-The appellate court reversed because First Amendment arguments are irrelevant to
jurisdictional analysis
Issue: Whether California has personal jurisdiction over South and Calder through
their targeting of Respondent with this article?
Holding: California had personal jurisdiction over Petitioners
Reason: The first step in the analysis is to determine the focal point of the harm
suffered, and that was in California. The Court then determined that Petitioners’
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actions intentionally aimed at a California resident, and the injuries suffered would
be in that state
8. KEETON VS. HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC. E T A L, 465 U.S. 770
(MARCH 20, 1984)
FACTS
Keeton (NY) brought a libel suit against Hustler Magazine (Ohio) in New Hampshire,
alleging jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship. Keeton’s only connection
with New Hampshire is the circulation there of a magazine that she assists in
producing. Hustler Magazine’s contacts with New Hampshire consist of monthly
sales of some 10,000 to 15,000 copies of its nationally published magazine.
ISSUE
Whether or not New Hampshire has jurisdiction
RULING
YES. Hustler Magazine’s regular circulation of magazines in the forum State is
sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction in a libel action based on the
contents of the magazine. The fact that Keeton has very limited contacts in New
Hampshire does not defeat jurisdiction, since a plaintiff is not required to have
“minimum contacts” with the forum State before that State is permitted to assert
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.
Here, where Hustler Magazine has continuously and deliberately exploited the New
Hampshire market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there in a
libel action based on the contents of its magazine, and since Hustler Magazine can be
charged with knowledge of the “single publication rule”, it must anticipate that such
a suit will seek nationwide damages. There is no unfairness in calling Hustler
Magazine to answer for the contents of its national publication wherever a
substantial number of copies are regularly sold and distributed.
9. ASAHI METAL INDUSTR Y CO VS. SUPERIOR CO URT, 480, U.S
102 (FEBRUARY 24, 19 87)
FACTS
 Asahi Metal Industry Co. was an international corporation based in
Japan, which manufactured a valve used in the manufacture of
motorcycle wheels.
 These valves were bought by Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., a
Taiwanese distributor.
BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
 One of these valves was alleged to have failed, causing an accident
in the State of California.
 As a result of the accident the driver of the motorcycle sustained
serious injuries and his wife, who was riding on the motorcycle as a
passenger, was killed.
 The accident victim sued Cheng Shin in a California state court, and
Cheng Shin in turn filed a third-party complaint (impleader) seeking
indemnification from Asahi.
 Asahi contested California's personal jurisdiction over Asahi, but the
California courts found jurisdiction based on Asahi's alleged awareness
of the international distribution of its products.
 Specifically, Asahi moved to quash Cheng Shin's summons.
 The California Superior Court and the California Supreme Court both
denied the motion, leading Asahi to appeal to the United States Supreme
Court.
ISSUE
Does Asahi have minimum contacts with California such that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and
substantive justice”?
RULING
 NO
 The Supreme Court applied a five-factor test in determining whether
"traditional notions of fair play" would permit the assertion of in personam
jurisdiction over a foreign (meaning out-of-state) defendant:
1. What is the burden on the defendant?
2. What are the interests of the forum state in the litigation?
3. What is the interest of the plaintiff in litigating the matter in that state?
4. Does the allowance of jurisdiction serve interstate efficiency?
5. Does the allowance of jurisdiction serve interstate policy interests?
 The Court finds that fair play would be violated because:
o The burden on the defendant is “severe” because the corporation
would have to travel from Japan to California and defend itself
under the laws of a foreign country.
o The plaintiff is not a California resident, and thus California’s
interests in the case are “diminished”. California can enforce its
interest in having safe products in its state indirectly by applying
pressure to direct suppliers of goods to California, who in turn will
apply commercial pressure to their suppliers.
o Cheng Shin has not shown that California is a more convenient
forum than Japan or Taiwan in which to pursue its claim.
o Jurisdiction is not necessarily in the best interests of the other
countries involved.
o Jurisdiction is not warranted by any international policy
considerations, if they even exist.
Page 7 of 10
  Because an assertion of jurisdiction would disturb the "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice," the decision of the California Supreme
Court was reversed and the judgment of California Court of Appeal
(California's intermediate appellate court) was effectively reinstated.
10. BENSUAN RESTAURANT CORPORATION VS. RICH ARD B . KING,
DOCKET NO. 96 -9344, (SEPTEMBER 10, 1997)
Bensusan Restaurant Corporation, the plaintiff, owned the Blue Note jazz club in New
York’s Greenwich Village, and owned a federal trademark registration for the mark
“THE BLUE NOTE.” The defendant, Richard King, operated “The Blue Note,” a small
club in the college town of Columbia, Missouri, and had used that mark on a local
basis since 1980 — several years prior to use of “Blue Note” by the now-famous New
York club. Although the New York jazz club had obtained a federal registration for
the Blue Note mark in 1985, the Missouri club could continue to use the name within
its local area based on the Missouri club's prior use of the name.
In April 1996, the Missouri club began operation of a website
(http//www.throughport.com/cyberspot) that offered general information about
King’s club, including a calendar of events and ticketing information. Tickets could
not be ordered via the Internet; instead, one could order tickets for an advertised
event by telephone and then pick-up the tickets in person at a box office in
Columbia, Missouri. The Missouri club’s website also included a hyperlink to the
website for Greenwich Village’s Blue Note club, while also offering a disclaimer that
"The Blue Note’s Cyberspot should not be confused with one of the world’s finest jazz
clubs, the Blue Note, located in the heart of New York’s Greenwich Village. If you
should find yourself in the Big Apple give them a visit.”
The New York jazz club viewed the Missouri club's website on the Internet as an
expansion of use of the Blue Note name outside of the local area, and raised this
objection with King. In response, King removed the second sentence of the
disclaimer and the hyperlink from his website.
The operator of the New York jazz club sued the operator of the Missouri jazz club
for trademark infringement in New York.
Trial Court Proceedings Edit
Looking to New York’s long-arm statute, the court inquired whether King’s operation
of a website on a server in Missouri represented the commission of a tort in New
BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
York. Although a New York user could access the Missouri Club’s website to obtain
event ticket information, a purchase of tickets required calling the Missouri club via
its website-advertised telephone number and picking up the tickets at the Columbia,
Missouri box office.
The court stated that "[t]he mere fact that a person can gain information on the
allegedly infringing product is not the equivalent of a person advertising, promoting,
selling or otherwise making an effort to target its product in New York."
Consequently, the district court concluded that any tortious action of trademark
infringement would arise in Missouri rather than in New York.
In examining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over King would satisfy due
process, the court asserted that “creating a site, like placing a product into the
stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide — or even worldwide — but, without
more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state.” The court
distinguished the CompuServe v. Patterson case based on the observation that the
facts in CompuServe v. Patterson,[1] were vastly different from the present action.
Unlike the software developer in CompuServe, King did not direct any contact to or
have any contact with New York, nor did he intend to avail himself of the benefits of
New York.
Thus, the court held that King's operation of the website was not sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of New York’ long-arm statute, and that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction would violate the precepts of constitutional due process. Significantly, the
court found that the owner of the Missouri club was only trying to attract local
patrons by the club's operation of its website, and dismissed the action for lack of
personal jurisdiction
11. COMPUSERVE INC. VS. RICHARD PATTERSON, NO. 95 -3452,
(JULY 22, 1996)
FACTS
 CompuServe is a computer information serviceheadquartered in
Columbus, Ohio.
 It contracts withindividual subscribers, such as the defendant, to provide,
inter alia, accessto computing and information services via the Internet.
 Defendant, Richard Patterson, is a resident of Houston, Texas who claims
never to have visited Ohio.
 He subscribed to CompuServe, and he also placed items of "shareware" on the
CompuServe system for others to use and purchase.
 When he became a shareware "provider," Patterson entered into a
"Shareware Registration Agreement" ("SRA") with CompuServe.
Page 8 of 10
 The SRA incorporates by reference two other documents: the
CompuServe Service Agreement ("Service Agreement") and the Rules of
Operation, both of which are published on the CompuServe Information
Service.
 Both the SRA and the Service Agreement expressly provide that they are
entered into in Ohio, and the Service Agreement further provides that it
is to "be governed by and construed in accordance with" Ohio law.
 The SRA asks a new shareware "provider" like Patterson to type "AGREE" at
various points in the document, "[i]n recognition of your online agreement to all
the above terms and conditions." Thus, Patterson's assent to the SRA was first
manifested at his own computer in Texas, then transmitted to the CompuServe
computer system in Ohio.
 From 1991 through 1994, Patterson electronically transmitted 32 master
software files to CompuServe.
 These files were stored in CompuServe's system in Ohio, and they were
displayed in different services for CompuServe subscribers, who could
"download" them into their own computers and, if they chose to do so, pay for
them. Patterson's software product was, apparently, a program designed to help
people navigate their way around the larger Internet network.
 CompuServe began to market a similar product, however, with markings and
names that Patterson took to be too similar to his own. Thus, in December of
1993, Patterson notified CompuServe (appropriately via "E-mail" message) that
the terms "WinNAV," "Windows Navigator," and "FlashPoint Windows Navigator"
were common law trademarks which he and his company owned. Patterson
stated that CompuServe's marketing of its product infringed these trademarks,
and otherwise constituted deceptive trade practices. CompuServe changed the
name of its program, but Patterson continued to complain.
 After Patterson demanded at least $100,000 to settle his potential claims,
CompuServe filed this declaratory judgment action in the federal district court
for the Southern District of Ohio, relying on the court's diversity subject matter
jurisdiction. Patterson responded pro se with a consolidated motion to dismiss
on several grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction. Patterson also
submitted a supporting affidavit, in which he denied jurisdictional facts,
including his having ever visited Ohio.
ISSUE
Did CompuServe make a prima facie showing that Patterson's contacts with Ohio,
which have been almost entirely electronic in nature, are sufficient, under the Due
Process Clause, to support the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over
him?
RULING
Yes. Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific in nature, depending on
the nature of the contacts in a given case. In the instant case, because CompuServe
bases its action on Patterson's act of sending his computer software to Ohio for sale
on its service, CompuServe seeks to establish such specific personal jurisdiction over
Patterson.
BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18
The crucial federal constitutional inquiry is whether, given the facts of the case, the
nonresident defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state that the district
court's exercise of jurisdiction would comport with "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." This court has employed three criteria to make this
determination: First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of
acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the
cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities there. Finally, the acts of
the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial
enough connection with the forum to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the
defendant reasonable.
"Purposeful availment" requirement: The question of whether a defendant has
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum state is "the
sine qua non for in personam jurisdiction." The "purposeful availment" requirement
is satisfied when the defendant's contacts with the forum state "proximately result
from actions by the defendant himself that create a ´substantial connection' with the
forum State," and when the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are
such that he "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." This
requirement does not, however, mean that a defendant must be physically present
in the forum state.
There is no question that Patterson himself took actions that created a connection
with Ohio in the instant case. He subscribed to CompuServe, and then he entered
into the Shareware Registration Agreement when he loaded his software onto the
CompuServe system for others to use and, perhaps, purchase. Once Patterson had
done those two things, he was on notice that he had made contracts, to be governed
by Ohio law, with an Ohio-based company. Then, he repeatedly sent his computer
software, via electronic links, to the CompuServe system in Ohio, and he advertised
that software on the CompuServe system. Moreover, he initiated the events that led
to the filing of this suit by making demands of CompuServe via electronic and
regular mail messages.
The real question is whether these connections with Ohio are "substantial" enough
that Patterson should reasonably have anticipated being haled into an Ohio court.
Patterson entered into a written contract with CompuServe which provided for the
application of Ohio law, and he then purposefully perpetuated the relationship with
CompuServe via repeated communications with its system in Ohio. Patterson was a
third-party provider of software who used CompuServe, which is located in
Columbus, to market his wares in Ohio and elsewhere. This was a relationship
intended to be ongoing in nature; it was not a "one-shot affair." Patterson sent
software to CompuServe repeatedly for some three years, and the record indicates
that he intended to continue marketing his software on CompuServe.
Cause of action arising from Patterson's activities in Ohio Requirement: The cause of
action in the instant case concerns allegations of trademark or trade name
infringement and unfair competition. Patterson's contacts with Ohio are certainly
related to the operative facts of that controversy. He used that system to advertise
his software and sell it. The proceeds of those sales flowed to him through Ohio. It is
uncontroverted that Patterson placed, marketed, and sold his software only on Ohio-
Page 9 of 10
based CompuServe. Thus, any common law trademark or trade name which
Patterson might have in his product would arguably have been created in Ohio, and
any violation of those alleged trademarks or trade names by CompuServe would
have occurred, at least in part, in Ohio.
The reasonableness requirement: A court must consider several factors in this
context, including "the burden on the defendant, the interest of the forum state, the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, and the interest of other states in securing the
most efficient resolution of controversies." It may be burdensome for Patterson to
defend a suit in Ohio, but he knew when he entered into the Shareware Registration
Agreement with CompuServe that he was making a connection with Ohio, and
presumably he hoped that connection would work to his benefit. Further, Ohio has a
strong interest in resolving a dispute involving an Ohio company, which will involve
the Ohio law on common law trademarks and trade names. CompuServe alleges that
more than $10 million could be at stake in this case, and it also contends that this
case will have a profound impact on its relationships with other "shareware"
providers like Patterson, who also directed their activities toward Ohio-based
CompuServe
12. RUSH VS. SAUCHUK , 444 US 320 (1980)
FACTS
 While a resident of Indiana, Savchuk was injured in an accident in Indiana while
riding as a passenger in a car driven by Rush, also an Indiana resident.
 After moving to Minnesota, Savchuk commenced this action against Rush in a
Minnesota state court, alleging negligence and seeking damages.
 As Rush had no contacts with Minnesota that would support in personam
jurisdiction, Savchuk attempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction by garnishing
the contractual obligation of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
(“State Farm”) to defend and indemnify Rush in connection with such a suit.
 State Farm, which does business in Minnesota, had insured the car, owned by
Rush's father, under a liability insurance policy issued in Indiana.
 Rush was personally served in Indiana, and after State Farm's response to the
garnishment summons asserted that it owed the Rush nothing, Savchuk moved
the trial court for permission to file a supplemental complaint making the
garnishee, State Farm, a party to the action.
 Rush and State Farm moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over
the defendant.
TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY HIM IN
CONNECTION WITH THE SUIT.
 A State may exercise jurisdiction over an absent defendant only if the
defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.
 In determining whether a particular exercise of state court jurisdiction is
consistent with due process, the inquiry must focus on "the relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."
 Here, the only affiliating circumstance offered to show a relationship
among Rush, Minnesota, and this lawsuit is that Rush's insurance
company does business in the State.
 However, the fictional presence in Minnesota of State Farm's policy
obligation to defend and indemnify Rush -- derived from combining the
legal fiction that assigns a situs to a debt, for garnishment purposes, wherever
the debtor is found with the legal fiction that a corporation is "present," for
jurisdictional purposes, wherever it does business -- cannot be deemed to
give the State the power to determine Rush's liability for the out-of-
state accident.
 The mere presence of property in a State does not establish a sufficient
relationship between the owner of the property and the State to support
the exercise of jurisdiction over an unrelated cause of action, and it
cannot be said that the defendant engaged in any purposeful activity
related to the forum that would make the exercise of jurisdiction fair,
just, or reasonable merely because his insurer does business there. Nor
does the policy provide significant contacts between the litigation and the forum,
for the policy obligations pertain only to the conduct, not the substance, of the
litigation.

ISSUE
May Minnesota courts obtain jurisdiction over both Rush and State
Farm by virtue of a quasi in rem jurisdiction?

RULING
 No.
 A STATE MAY NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY EXERCISE QUASI IN REM
JURISDICTION OVER A DEFENDANT WHO HAS NO FORUM CONTACTS BY
ATTACHING THE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OF AN INSURER LICENSED
Page 10 of 10
BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. OSORIO SY 17-18