1
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo,
Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the
complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed.
With the approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death
and commuting all existing death sentences to life imprisonment, we
required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to
pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a
statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case by way of
an appeal.
The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban
accuses Francisco Abarca of the crime of Murder with
Double Frustrated Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of
Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation,
and with treachery, armed with an unlicensed firearm
(armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot several times
KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the different parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL
KOH gunshot wounds which caused his instantaneous
death and as a consequence of which also caused gunshot
wounds to LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD
AMPARADO on the different parts of their bodies
thereby inflicting gunshot wounds which otherwise would
have caused the death of said Lina Amparado and Arnold
Amparado, thus performing all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crimes of murders as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will, that is by the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to Lina
Amparado and Arnold Amparado which prevented their
death. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The Solicitor
General states accurately the facts as follows:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco
Abarca, Jenny, had illicit relationship. The illicit
relationship apparently began while the accused was in
Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. His
wife was left behind in their residence in Tacloban, Leyte
(pp. 45-47, 65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in
Tacloban, Leyte. On the morning of that date he went to
the bus station to go to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to fetch
his daughter. However, he was not able to catch the first
trip (in the morning). He went back to the station in the
afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus had
engine trouble and could not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28,
1985). The accused, then proceeded to the residence of
his father after which he went home. He arrived at his
residence at the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at
around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.).
2
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny,
and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When
the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her
paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was
then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room
jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City.
He went to the house of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo,
arriving there at around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's firearm,
an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V & G
Subdivision. He was not able to find his wife and Koh
there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the
"hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh
playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times
with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was hit. Arnold
and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent
to the room where Koh was playing mahjong were also
hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp. 34-49, tsn, Sept.
24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of
cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a
result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and
abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984; see also exh. A):
Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in the
kidney to remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984;
see also exh. C). His wife, Lina Amparado, was also
treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments
(p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold Amparado who received a salary
of nearly P1,000.00 a month was not able to work for 1-
1/2 months because of his wounds. He spent P15,000.00
for medical expenses while his wife spent Pl,000.00 for
the same purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2
On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the
dispositive portion whereof reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
murder with double frustrated murder as charged in the
amended information, and pursuant to Art. 63 of the
Revised Penal Code which does not consider the effect of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances when the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art.
48, he is hereby sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs
of Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of P30,000,
complainant spouses Arnold and Lina Amparado in the
sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley
Paul Koh and defendant's wife had illicit relationship
while he was away in Manila; that the accused had been
deceived, betrayed, disgraced and ruined by his wife's
infidelity which disturbed his reasoning faculties and
deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon his acts.
Considering all these circumstances this court believes the
accused Francisco Abarca is deserving of executive
clemency, not of full pardon but of a substantial if not a
radical reduction or commutation of his death sentence.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency,
the President of the Philippines, thru the Ministry of
Justice, Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
xxx xxx xxx
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the court a
quo:
I.
3
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED
INSTEAD OF ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER
ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
II.
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. 4
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code defining death inflicted under exceptional circumstances,
complexed with double frustrated murder. Article 247 reads in full:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under
exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married person
who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter,
or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury,
shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other
kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same
circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters
under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the
daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of
his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to
the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to
the benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies
in the instant case. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife
and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a
result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate
outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally
married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this
case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder,
therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time
the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with
the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be
understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the
accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused
"shall kill any of them or both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his
spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the
killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing
upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have
been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been
influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of
the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an
offense. 5 In People v. Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place
in the Code, the above-quoted article, far from defining a
felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or benefit —
amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate
punishment — to a legally married person or parent who
shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill
any or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter,
or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury.
Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries,
considering the enormous provocation and his righteous
indignation, the accused — who would otherwise be
criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide,
4
murder, or serious physical injury, as the case may be —
is punished only with destierro. This penalty is mere
banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more for the
protection of the accused than a punishment. (People vs.
Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where physical injuries other
than serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted from
punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the
exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to
an exempting circumstance, for even where death or
serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so
greatly lowered as to result to no punishment at all. A
different interpretation, i.e., that it defines and penalizes a
distinct crime, would make the exceptional circumstances
which practically exempt the accused from criminal
liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby
compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally,
admit them, in the information. Such an interpretation
would be illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating and
much less an exempting circumstance cannot be an
integral element of the crime charged. Only "acts or
omissons . . . constituting the offense" should be pleaded
in a complaint or information, and a circumstance which
mitigates criminal liability or exempts the accused
therefrom, not being an essential element of the offense
charged-but a matter of defense that must be proved to the
satisfaction of the court-need not be pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule
106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more
manifest when we consider that its counterpart in the old
Penal Code (Article 423) was found under the General
Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes
against persons. There can, we think, hardly be any
dispute that as part of the general provisions, it could not
have possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code does not define and provide for a specific
crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for
the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical
injuries under the circumstances therein mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished,
but that is intended for his protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be qualified by either
aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances, We cannot
accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the
physical injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who
were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the victim. The
Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against
the accused-appellant, and being the more severe offense, proposes the
imposition of reclusion temporal in its maximum period pursuant to Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we disagree. The accused-
appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a
rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act,
that rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. 9
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was
not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased.
Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot
therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries
suffered by the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from
any responsibility. Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal
act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be entirely
without fault. While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered
warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") 10 that is not enough a
precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We
nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable
under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious
5

physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. (The records

show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-half
months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the
extent of her injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for
only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her
recovery period.) 12

For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore

impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and
maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being the graver
penalty (than destierro). 13

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The

accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of
arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be
credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to
indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for
hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold
Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla JJ., concur.

6
[G.R. No. 123819. November 14, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. STEPHEN
MARK WHISENHUNT, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 152, in Criminal Case No. 102687, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Stephen Mark Whisenhunt guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder defined and penalized under Art. 248,
Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, to
pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P100,000.00 representing actual
expenses for the funeral services and wake for 5 days, P3,000,000.00 by
way of moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00
and attorneys fees in the amount of P150,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On November 19, 1993, accused-appellant was formally charged with
the murder of Elsa Santos-Castillo, under an Information which read:
That on or about September 24, 1993, in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Elsa Elsie
Santos Castillo by then and there stabbing her with a bladed weapon in
different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of her death and thereafter
outraged or scoffed her corpse by then and there chopping off her head and
different parts of her body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and
was raffled to Branch 152. On January 6, 1994, accused-appellant was
arraigned with the assistance of counsel de parte. He entered a plea of not
guilty.[4]
The evidence shows that accused-appellant and the deceased, Elsa
Santos-Castillo, also known as Elsie, were lovers. They met at the Apex
Motor Corporation where accused-appellant was the Manager while Elsa
was the Assistant Personnel Manager.Both accused-appellant and Elsa were
married, but they were estranged from their respective spouses. In April
1993, Elsa resigned from Apex presumably to avoid the nasty rumors about
her illicit affair with accused-appellant.[5] It appears, however, that she
continued her affair with accused-appellant even after she resigned from
Apex Motor Corporation.
On September 23, 1993, Demetrio Ravelo, an Apex employee
assigned to drive for accused-appellant, reported for work at 8:30 a.m. at the
latters condominium unit at the Platinum Condominium, Annapolis Street,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.[6] Accused-appellant ordered him to
fetch Elsa at her parents house in Blumentritt, Manila at 10:30 a.m. He
found Elsa standing at a corner near her parents house, wearing a violet-
colored blouse with floral prints, and was carrying three bags --- a paper
bag, a violet Giordano bag and a thick brown leather bag with the trademark
of Mitsubishi. He brought Elsa to accused-appellants condominium unit.[7]
At 2:00 p.m., Elsa told Demetrio to go to the Apex office in
Mandaluyong to deliver a paper bag to Amy Serrano, the Personnel
Manager. He proceeded to the Apex office, and then returned to
Platinum. Accused-appellant asked him to stay because he had to drive Elsa
home at 10:00 p.m. He waited until a little past 10:00 p.m. When he had not
heard from accused-appellant, he told Lucy, the housemaid, that he was
going home.[8]
The following day, Demetrio again reported at accused-appellants
unit. At around noon, Lucy asked if he had seen a kitchen knife which was
missing. He then overheard Lucy ask accused-appellant who told her that
the kitchen knife was in his bedroom. Demetrio saw accused-appellant go
inside the room and, shortly thereafter, hand the knife to Lucy. [9]
7
At 3:40 p.m., Lucy told Demetrio to buy cigarettes for accused-
appellant. He went out to buy the cigarettes and gave them to Lucy. At 5:00
p.m., accused-appellant told Demetrio to go home.[10]
On September 25, 1993, Demetrio reported at the Platinum
Condominium at around 8:00 a.m. He was allowed by accused-appellant to
go to Apex to follow up his salary. While he was there, Amy Serrano asked
him if Elsa was still in accused-appellants condominium unit. Although
Demetrio did not see Elsa there, he answered yes. Amy gave him black
plastic garbage bags which he turned over to accused-appellant upon his
return to the condominium. The latter then ordered him to drive Lucy to
Cubao and to go home to get some clothes, since they were leaving for
Bagac, Bataan. On the way to Cubao, Lucy told Demetrio that she was
going home. He dropped her off in front of the Farmers Market. Thereafter,
he proceeded to his house in Fairview, Quezon City, to pick up some
clothes, then returned to the condominium at around 10:00 a.m. [11]
Accused-appellant asked him to check the fuel gauge of the car. He
was told to go to Apex to get a gas slip and then to gas up. At around noon,
he went back to the condominium. He had lunch outside at Goodah, then
returned to accused-appellants unit and stayed in the servants quarters.[12]
While Demetrio was in the servants quarters watching television,
accused-appellant came in. He asked Demetrio how long he wanted to work
for him. Demetrio replied that he was willing to work for him forever, and
expressed his full trust in him.Upon hearing this, accused-appellant shed
tears and embraced Demetrio. Then accused-appellant said, May problema
ako, Rio. Demetrio asked what it was, and accused-appellant told him that
Elsa was dead. Demetrio asked, Bakit mo siya pinatay?[13]Accused-
appellant answered that he did not kill Elsa, rather she died of bangungot.[14]
Demetrio suggested that Elsas body be autopsied, but accused-
appellant said that he had already beheaded her. He asked Demetrio if he
wanted to see the decapitated body, but the latter refused. The two of them
went to Shoppesville at the Greenhills Shopping Center and bought a big
bag with a zipper and rollers, colored black and gray. [15] Demetrio noticed
that accused-appellant seemed nervous and his eyes were teary and
bloodshot.
When they returned to the condominium, accused-appellant asked
Demetrio to help him wrap the body in the black garbage bags. Demetrio
entered accused-appellants bathroom and found the dismembered hands,
feet, trunk and head of a woman. He lifted the severed head by the hair and,
when he lifted it, he saw Elsas face. He placed this in a black trash bag. He
helped accused-appellant place the other body parts in three separate
garbage bags. They packed all the garbage bags in the bag with the zipper
and rollers, which they had bought in Shoppesville. Then, they brought the
bag down and loaded it in the trunk of accused-appellants car. After that,
they boarded the car. Demetrio took the wheel and accused-appellant sat
beside him in front.[16]
It was almost 2:00 p.m. when Demetrio and accused-appellant left the
condominium. Accused-appellant told Demetrio to drive around Batangas
and Tagaytay City. After leaving Tagaytay, they entered the South Luzon
Expressway and headed towards Sta. Rosa, Laguna. When they were near
Puting Kahoy and Silangan, accused-appellant told Demetrio to turn into a
narrow road. Somewhere along that road, accused-appellant ordered
Demetrio to stop the car.[17]
Accused-appellant alighted and told Demetrio to get the bag in the
trunk. Accused-appellant took the plastic bags inside the bag and dumped
them by the roadside. Then, accused-appellant returned the empty bag in the
trunk and boarded the car. He called Demetrio and said, Tayo na Rio, tuloy
na tayo sa Bataan. It was already 6:30 p.m.[18]
Demetrio drove to the Sta. Rosa exit gate, along the South Luzon
Expressway, through EDSA and towards the North Luzon
Expressway. They stopped at a gasoline station to refuel. They then took the
San Fernando, Pampanga exit, and were soon en route to the Whisenhunt
family mansion in Bagac, Bataan.[19]
Before reaching Bagac, accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to stop
the car on top of a bridge. Accused-appellant told Demetrio to get off and to
throw a bag into the river. Later, they passed another bridge and accused-
appellant again told Demetrio to pull over. Accused-appellant alighted and
threw Elsas clothes over the bridge. On the way, Demetrio noticed that
accused-appellant took something from a bag, tore it to pieces and threw it
out of the window. When they passed Pilar, Bataan, accused-appellant
threw Elsas violet Giordano bag. As they reached the road boundary of
Bagac, accused-appellant wrung a short-sleeved dress with violet and green
stripes, and threw it on a grassy lot.[20]
8
It was about midnight when accused-appellant and Demetrio arrived at
the mansion. Demetrio was unable to sleep that night, as he was scared that
he might be the next victim.[21]
The next morning, at 11:00 a.m., accused-appellant ordered Demetrio
to clean the trunk of the car, saying, Rio, linisan mo ang sasakyan para ang
compartment hindi babaho.[22] At 1:00 p.m., accused-appellant and
Demetrio started off for Manila. As they passed a place called Kabog-
kabog, he saw accused-appellant take out an ATM card. Accused-appellant
burned the middle of the card, twisted it and threw it out of the
window. They arrived at the corner of EDSA and Quezon Avenue at 2:30
p.m.Demetrio asked accused-appellant if he can get off since he wanted to
go home to Fairview. Before Demetrio left, accused-appellant told him,
Rio, you and your family can go on a vacation. I will give you
money. Accused-appellant then gave Demetrio P50.00 for his transportation
going to Fairview.[23]
When Demetrio got home, he immediately told his family what
happened. His wife told him to report the incident to Fiscal Joey
Diaz. Demetrio and his wife went to the house of Fiscal Diaz in Fairview to
talk to him.[24]
The following morning, September 27, 1993, Fiscal Diaz, Demetrio,
his wife and his brothers went to the Department of Justice. They were
referred to the National Bureau of Investigation, where Demetrio gave his
statement before Atty. Artemio Sacaquing, head of the Anti-Organized
Crime Division.[25]
Initially, Atty. Sacaguing could not believe what he heard and thought
Demetrio was exaggerating. He dispatched a team of NBI agents, headed by
Marianito Panganiban, to verify Demetrios report.[26] Accompanied by
Demetrio, the team proceeded to Barangay Polong, Sta. Cruz, Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. There, they found a crowd of people gathered around the mutilated
parts of a human body along the road.[27] The body parts had been
discovered by tricycle drivers. The Sta. Rosa Police, under Chief
Investigator SPO3 Alipio Quintos, was already conducting an
investigation. Agent Panganiban radioed Atty. Sacaguing in Manila that
Demetrios report was positive.[28]
The mutilated body parts were brought to the Lim de Mesa Funeral
Parlor in Sta. Rosa. Two NBI agents, together with Demetrio, went to the
house of Elsas family to inform them of her death. The NBI agents
accompanied Elsas two sisters, Amelia Villadiego and Elida Santos, to the
funeral parlor, where they identified the body parts as belonging to Elsa.
In the morning of September 28, 1993, accused-appellant was arrested
by operatives of the NBI as he drove up to his parking space at Apex Motor
Corporation.[29] When Atty. Sacaguing approached and introduced himself,
accused-appellant became nervous and started to tremble.[30]
Accused-appellant was brought to the NBI in his car. When he arrived
there, Atty. Sacaguing informed him that it may be necessary to impound
the car since, based on Demetrios statement, the same was used in the
commission of the crime. Accused-appellant asked permission to retrieve
personal belongings from the car. After getting his things from the car,
accused-appellant opened the trunk to place some items inside. When he
opened the compartment, the people around the car moved away because of
the foul stench that emanated from inside. Atty. Sacaguing inspected the
interior of the trunk and found stains on the lawanit board lying flat inside
the compartment, which he suspected to be blood. Thus, he instructed his
agents to fetch a technician from the NBI Chemistry Division to examine
the stain.[31]
During Atty. Sacaguings interview of accused-appellant, he noticed
contusions on accused-appellants lower lip and cheek. As standard
procedure, and in order to rule out any accusation of violence on accused-
appellant on the part of the NBI agents, Atty. Sacaguing ordered a medical
examination of accused-appellant.[32]
The Medico-Legal Officer found contusions on accused-appellants left
periumbilical region, right elbow, left and right forearms and right leg. [33]
That same afternoon, before the close of office hours, accused-
appellant was brought to the Department of Justice for inquest.[34] However,
accused-appellant moved that a preliminary investigation be conducted, and
signed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. Hence, he was detained at the NBI.[35]
On September 29, 1993, armed with a search warrant,[36] the NBI
agents conducted a search of the condominium unit of accused-
appellant. They recovered hair strands from underneath the rubber mat and
rugs inside accused-appellants bathroom.[37] In accused-appellants bedroom,
they found bloodstains on the bedspread and covers. They also found a pair
9
of Topsider shoes with bloodstains, a bottle of Vicks Formula 44 cough
syrup, and some more hair strands on the lampshade.[38]
Later that day, Demetrio Ravelo accompanied some NBI agents to
retrace the route he took with accused-appellant going to Bataan, with the
objective of retrieving the items thrown away by accused-appellant. They
were able to recover a violet bag, one brown sandal and a shirt with violet
and green floral prints,[39] which were brought to the NBI office. Amelia
Santos Villadiego, Elsas sister, was summoned to identify the items.[40]
In the meantime, Caroline Y. Custodio, Supervising Forensic Biologist
of the NBI, who conducted comparative examinations between the hair
specimens found in accused-appellants bathroom and hair samples taken
from the victim while she lay in state, found that the questioned hair
specimen showed similarities to the hair taken from the victim.[41]
Custodio further reported that the bloodstains on the bed cushion
cover, bedspread and Topsider shoes, all found inside accused-appellants
bedroom, gave positive results for human blood, showing reactions of
Group B.[42] The bloodstains on the plywood board taken from accused-
appellants vehicle were also examined and found to give positive results for
human blood showing reactions of Group B.[43] On the other hand, the
examination of blood taken from the victim likewise showed reactions of
Group B.[44]
Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, the Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the
autopsy, concluded that the cause of death of Elsa Santos Castillo were stab
wounds.[45] Dr. Mendez found one stab wound on the right breast which
penetrated the right lung. He also found two stab wounds under the left
breast which penetrated the diaphragm and abdominal cavity, and also
penetrated the right portion of the liver.[46] More particularly, the autopsy
yielded the following postmortem findings:
Body in moderately advanced stage of decomposition.
Head, decapitated, level above 4th cervical vertebra; both hands severed
cutting completely the lower ends of both radius and ulna; both legs,
disarticulated at knee joints and cut-off with both patellar bones, missing;
both feet, disarticulated at the ankle joints and cut-off; all soft tissues of
both thighs and perineum, removed, exposing completely the femoral bones
and partially the pelvic bone,
Incised wounds: 19.5 cms., left axillary area; 55.0 cms., thoraco-abdominal
area, along median line, with the abdominal incision involving the whole
thickness and the thoracic incision involving the soft tissues and cutting the
sternum from the xiphoid process up to the level of the third cartilage; from
the 3rd cartilage up to the lower border of the neck.
Abdominal organs, removed from the abdominal cavity.
Contusions: 26.0 x 16.5 cms., face, more on the left side involving the
forehead, temporal, nasal, orbital and maxillary areas; 25.0 x 11.0 cms.,
deltoid area, extending down to the upper 2/3, arm, left.
Incised Wound, 3.0 cms., neck area, along anterior median line.
Hematoma, scalp, massive, temporo-parietal, left.
STAB WOUNDS:
1. 1.8 cms., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented obliquely with sharp infero-
lateral extremity and blunt supero-medial extremity, located at the
mammary area, right; 3.0 cms., from the anterior median line, directed
backwards, downwards and laterally, involving the soft tissues, cutting
completely the 4th cartilage, right side, into the right thoracic cavity,
penetrating the lower of the right lung with an approximate depth 8.5 cms.
2. 0.8 cm., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented almost vertically, with sharp
inferior extremity and blunt superior extremity, located at the
inframammary area, left, 1.1 cms., from the anterior median line, directed
backwards, downwards and medially, involving the soft tissues only with an
approximate depth of 2.0 cms.
3. 2.0 cms., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented obliquely, with sharp infero-
lateral extremity and blunt supero-medial extremity, located at the
inframammary area, left, 2.2 cms., from the anterior median line, directed
backwards, downwards, and from left to right, involving the soft tissues,
into the left thoracic cavity, perforating the diaphragm, into the abdominal
cavity, penetrating the right lobe of the liver with an approximate depth
10.0 cms.
10
Brain, markedly softened and reduced to grayish white, pultaceous mass.
Other visceral organs, putrified,
Stomach is almost empty.
CAUSE OF DEATH: --- STAB WOUNDS.[47]
In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that he stayed home on
September 23, 1993 because he was not feeling well. He denied that he
asked Demetrio Ravelo to fetch Elsa. He refuted Demetrios testimony that
accused-appellant asked him to buy cigarettes, or that accused-appellant
told him to go home at 5:00 p.m.. Rather, accused-appellant maintained that
he did not see Demetrio at any time in the afternoon of September 24,
1993.[48]
On September 25, 1993, accused-appellant alleged that he was feeling
better, hence, told Demetrio that they were to leave for Bagac, Bataan that
afternoon. They left the condominium at about 1:00 to 1:30 p.m. and
proceeded straight to Bagac. When they arrived at Bagac, accused-appellant
went straight to the kitchen and met his mother, father, aunt and
grandmother. Demetrio got the things out of the car and then asked accused-
appellants permission to take the car to go to the town.[49]
Accused-appellants mother, Mrs. Nieves Whisenhunt, testified that
accused-appellant arrived at their beach house in Bagac, Bataan on
September 25, 1993 at 5:00 p.m. At 7:00 the next morning, she saw
accused-appellant clad in beach attire. Later that day, she and her husband
had lunch at the clubhouse, which was about three to four minutes drive
from their house. When they returned home at 2:00 p.m., accused-appellant
and his driver, Demetrio, had already left.[50] This was corroborated by
accused-appellants aunt, Ms. Frances Sison.[51]
Accused-appellant claimed that he went jet-skiing in the morning of
September 25, 1993. He alleged that the water was choppy and caused his
jet-ski to lose control. As a result, he suffered bruises on his chest and
legs. Thereafter, he went home, cleaned up, changed clothes and
rested. Later, as he was going down the stairs, he slipped and extended his
arm to stop his fall. He had lunch with this family. At 1:30 p.m., he and
Demetrio left Bagac for Manila.[52]
According to accused-appellant, he first learned of Elsas death when
he was arrested by the NBI on September 28, 1993. [53] He denied having
anything to do with her death, saying that he had no reason to kill her since
he was in love with her.[54]Sometime during his relationship with Elsa, he
claimed having received in the mails two anonymous letters. The first one
reads:
Salamat sa pagpapahiram mo ng sasakyan at driver. Pero masyado kang
pakialamero, Steve. Walanghiya ka. Para kang demonyo. Pinakialaman mo
ang di sa yo. Lintik lang ang walang ganti. Matitiyempuhan din
kita. Putang ina mo.[55]
The second letter says:
Steve,
Ang kay Pedro kay Pedro. Kapag pinakialaman ay kay San Pedro ang
tungo. Mahal mo ba ang pamilya mo? Iniingatan mo ba ang pangalan
mo? Nakakasagasa ka na.[56]
At first, accused-appellant ignored the letters. But when he told Elsa
about them, she got very upset and worried. She said the letters came from
Fred, her estranged husband.[57]
Ms. Frances Sison, accused-appellants aunt, testified that she and her
mother visited accused-appellant at 3:00 p.m. on September 23, 1993. She
went inside the bedroom and talked to accused-appellant for about 30
minutes. While they were there, Ms. Sison testified that she did not see
anyone else in the bedroom. She also said the door of the bathroom inside
the room was open, and there was nobody inside. The next day, at 4:00
p.m., she went back to visit accused-appellant. Again, they went inside
accused-appellants bedroom and stayed there for one hour. The door of the
bathroom was open, and she saw that there was nobody inside. The
following morning, they passed by the condominium before proceeding to
Bagac, Bataan. They went inside accused-appellants bedroom and talked to
him. As in the last two occasions, Ms. Sison saw through the open door of
the bathroom that there was no one inside.[58]
Theresa Whisenhunt, accused-appellants sister-in-law, testified that
between December 21, 1991 and January 15, 1992, and again from the
11
middle of April, 1992 to May 15, 1992, she slept in the bedroom
subsequently occupied by accused-appellant in the Platinum Condominium;
that she regularly has her menstruation around the end of every month; and
that her blood type is B.[59]
On January 31, 1996, the trial court promulgated the appealed
judgment, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the
heirs of the deceased actual damage, moral damages, exemplary damages
and attorneys fees.[60]
Accused-appellant interposed an appeal from the adverse decision of
the trial court, alleging that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PRESENT ENOUGH
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CONCLUSION THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REJECTING,
DISREGARDING AND/OR NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED.[61]
Much of the evidence on accused-appellants complicity was elicited
from Demetrio Ravelo, the so-called prosecution star witness.[62] On the
premise that accused-appellants guilt or innocence depends largely on the
weight of his testimony, this Court has carefully scrutinized and examined
his version of the events, and has found that Demetrio Ravelos narrative is
both convincing and consistent in all material points.
Before accused-appellant confessed to Demetrio Ravelo what had
happened to Elsa Castillo, he first asked the latter how long he was willing
to work for him, and how far his loyalty will go. This was logical if
accused-appellant wanted to ensure that Demetrio would stand by his side
after learning what he was about to reveal. More importantly, Demetrios
description of Elsas dismembered body, as he found it in accused-appellants
bathroom, perfectly jibed with the appearance of the mutilated body parts,
as shown in the photographs presented by the prosecution. [63]
Likewise, the mutilated body parts, as well as the other items thrown
by accused-appellant along the road to Bataan, were found by the NBI
agents as Demetrio pointed, which confirms that, indeed, the latter
witnessed how accused-appellant disposed of Elsas body and personal
belongings one by one.
All in all, the testimony of Demetrio Ravelo bears the ring of truth and
sincerity. The records show that he did not waver even during lengthy and
rigorous cross-examination. In fact, the trial court gave full faith and credit
to his testimony, stating:
The Court had opportunity to observe the demeanor of Demetrio Ravelo
when he took the witness stand on several occasions. He was extensively
cross-examined by one of the defense counsel and he withstood the same
creditably. Demetrio Ravelo is a very credible witness and his testimony is
likewise credible.[64]
This Court has consistently ruled that factual findings of the trial court
deserve the highest respect. This is based on the fact that the trial judge is in
the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses who appeared
before his sala as he had personally heard them and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[65] Especially, where
issues raised involve the credibility of witnesses, the trial courts findings
thereon will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts, or circumstances of
weight or substance, which could have affected the result of the
case.[66] Succinctly put, findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the
credibility of witnesses command great weight and respect since it had the
opportunity to observe their demeanor while they testified in court. [67]
Perhaps more damning to accused-appellant is the physical evidence
against him. The findings of the forensic biologist on the examination of the
hair samples and bloodstains all confirm Elsas death inside accused-
appellants bedroom. On the other hand, the autopsy report revealed that
Elsa was stabbed at least three times on the chest. This, taken together with
Demetrios testimony that accused-appellant kept the kitchen knife inside his
bedroom on September 24, 1993, leads to the inescapable fact that accused-
appellant stabbed Elsa inside the bedroom or bathroom.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it
ranks high in the hierarchy of our trustworthy evidence. [68] For this reason,
12
it is regarded as evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently
than a hundred witnesses.[69]
While it may be true that there was no eyewitness to the death of Elsa,
the confluence of the testimonial and physical evidence against accused-
appellant creates an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence that
naturally leads to the fair and reasonable conclusion that accused-appellant
was the author of the crime, to the exclusion of all others. Circumstantial
evidence may be resorted to in proving the identity of the accused when
direct evidence is not available, otherwise felons would go scot-free and the
community would be denied proper protection. The rules on evidence and
jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial
evidence when the following requisites concur: (1) there must be more than
one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3)
the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of
the guilt of the accused.[70]
In the case at bar, the following circumstances were successfully
proven by the prosecution without a shadow of doubt, to wit: that Elsa
Santos Castillo was brought to accused-appellants condominium unit on
September 23, 1993; that on September 24, 1993, accused-appellants
housemaid was looking for her kitchen knife and accused-appellant gave it
to her, saying that it was in his bedroom; that on September 25, 1993,
accused-appellant and Demetrio Ravelo collected the dismembered body
parts of Elsa from the bathroom inside accused-appellants bedroom; that
accused-appellant disposed of the body parts by a roadside somewhere in
San Pedro, Laguna; that accused-appellant also disposed of Elsas personal
belongings along the road going to Bagac, Bataan; that the mutilated body
parts of a female cadaver, which was later identified as Elsa, were found by
the police and NBI agents at the spot where Demetrio pointed; that hair
specimens found inside accused-appellants bathroom and bedroom showed
similarities with hair taken from Elsas head; and that the bloodstains found
on accused-appellants bedspread, covers and in the trunk of his car, all
matched Elsas blood type.
Accused-appellant makes capital of the fact that the Medico-Legal
Officer, Dr. Mendez, did not examine the pancreas of the deceased
notwithstanding Demetrios statement that, according to accused-appellant,
Elsa died of bangungot, or hemorrhage of the pancreas. Because of this,
accused-appellant insists that the cause of death was not adequately
established. Then, he relied on the controverting testimony of his witness,
lawyer-doctor Ernesto Brion, who was himself a Medico-Legal Officer of
the NBI for several years, to the effect that the autopsy report prepared by
Dr. Mendez was unreliable and inconclusive. The trial court noted,
however, that Dr. Brion was a biased witness whose testimony cannot be
relied upon because he entered his appearance as one of the counsel for
accused-appellant and, in such capacity, extensively cross-examined Dr.
Mendez. Accused-appellant counters that there is no prohibition against
lawyers giving testimony. Moreover, the trial courts ruling would imply that
lawyers who testify on behalf of their clients are presumed to be lying.
By rejecting the testimony of Dr. Brion, the trial court did not mean
that he perjured himself on the witness stand. Notably, Dr. Brion was
presented as expert witness. His testimony and the questions propounded on
him dealt with his opinion on the probable cause of death of the
victim. Indeed, the presentation of expert testimony is one of the well-
known exceptions to the rule against admissibility of opinions in
evidence.[71] In like manner, Dr. Mendez was presented on the stand to give
his own opinion on the same subject. His opinion differed from that of Dr.
Brion, which is not at all unusual. What the trial court simply did was to
choose which --- between two conflicting medico-legal opinions --- was the
more plausible. The trial court correctly lent more credence to Dr. Mendezs
testimony, not only because Dr. Brion was a biased witness, but more
importantly, because it was Dr. Mendez who conducted the autopsy and
personally examined Elsas corpse up close.
In any event, the foregoing does not detract from the established fact
that Elsas body was found mutilated inside accused-appellants
bathroom. This clearly indicated that it was accused-appellant who cut up
Elsas body to pieces. Naturally, accused-appellant would be the only
suspect to her killing. Otherwise, why else would he cut up Elsas body as if
to conceal the real cause of her death?
As already stated above, Demetrios testimony was
convincing. Accused-appellant attempts to refute Demetrios statements by
saying that he had repeatedly reprimanded the latter for discourteous and
reckless driving, and that he had already asked the latter to tender his
resignation. Thus, accused-appellant claims that Demetrio imputed Elsas
death on him in order to get back at him. This Court finds the cruel
treatment by an employer too flimsy a motive for the employee to implicate
him in such a gruesome and hideous crime. Rather than entertain an
accusation of ill-motive and bad faith on Demetrio Ravelo, this Court views
13
his act of promptly reporting the incident to his family and, later, to the
authorities, as a genuine desire to bring justice to the cruel and senseless
slaying of Elsa Santos Castillo, whom he knew well.
Accused-appellant also argues that his arrest was without a warrant
and, therefore, illegal. In this regard, the rule is settled that any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.[72] In other words, it is too
late in the day for accused-appellant to raise an issue about his warrantless
arrest after he pleaded to a valid information and after a judgment of
conviction was rendered against him after a full-blown trial.
Accused-appellant presented in evidence two supposedly threatening
letters which, according to Elsa, were written by the latters husband. There
is nothing in these letters which will exculpate accused-appellant from
criminal liability. The threats were directed at accused-appellant, not
Elsa. The fact remains that Elsa was last seen alive in accused-appellants
condominium unit, and subsequently discovered dead in accused-appellants
bathroom. Surely, the place where her dead body was found does not
support the theory that it was Fred Castillo who was probably responsible
for her death.
We do not agree with the trial court that the prosecution sufficiently
proved the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of
superiority is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken advantage
of by him in the commission of the crime.[73] The fact that the victim was a
woman does not, by itself, establish that accused-appellant committed the
crime with abuse of superior strength. There ought to be enough proof of
the relative strength of the aggressor and the victim. [74]
Abuse of superior strength must be shown and clearly established as
the crime itself.[75] In this case, nobody witnessed the actual
killing. Nowhere in Demetrios testimony, and it is not indicated in any of
the pieces of physical evidence, that accused-appellant deliberately took
advantage of his superior strength in overpowering Elsa. On the contrary,
this Court observed from viewing the photograph of accused-
appellant[76] that he has a rather small frame. Hence, the attendance of the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not adequately
proved and cannot be appreciated against accused-appellant.
However, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the
corpse of the victim was correctly appreciated by the trial court. The mere
decapitation of the victims head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the
corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder. [77] In this case,
accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body like
pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the dismembered parts of her body in a
deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on the ground. The
sight of Elsas severed body parts on the ground, vividly depicted in the
photographs offered in evidence, is both revolting and horrifying. At the
same time, the viewer cannot help but feel utter pity for the sub-human
manner of disposing of her remains.
In a case with strikingly similar facts, we ruled:
Even if treachery was not present in this case, the crime would still be
murder because of the dismemberment of the dead body. One of the
qualifying circumstances of murder under Article 248, par. 6, of the
Revised Penal Code is outraging or scoffing at (the) person or corpse of the
victim. There is no question that the corpse of Billy Agotano was outraged
when it was dismembered with the cutting off of the head and limbs and the
opening up of the body to remove the intestines, lungs and liver. The killer
scoffed at the dead when the intestines were removed and hung around
Victorianos neck as a necklace, and the lungs and liver were facetiously
described as pulutan.[78]
Hence, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of
the crime of murder, qualified by outraging and scoffing at the victims
person or corpse.[79] This circumstance was both alleged in the information
and proved during the trial. At the time of its commission, the penalty for
murder was reclusion temporal maximum to death.[80] No aggravating or
mitigating circumstance was alleged or proved; hence, the penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period.[81] Therefore, the trial courts imposition of
the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correct, and need not be modified.
However, the damages awarded by trial court should be
modified. Elida Santos, Elsas sister, testified that the funeral expenses was
only P50,000.00.[82] Hence, the trial court erred when it awarded the amount
of P100,000.00. Basic is the jurisprudential principle that in determining
actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations,
conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the
14

best obtainable evidence of the actual amount of the loss. Actual damages
cannot be presumed but must be duly proved with reasonable certainty. [83]
The award of moral damages in murder cases is justified because of
the physical suffering and mental anguish brought about by the felonious
acts, and is thus recoverable in criminal offenses resulting in death. [84] It is
true that moral damages are not intended to enrich the victims heirs or to
penalize the convict, but to obviate the spiritual sufferings of the
heirs.[85] Considering, however, the extraordinary circumstances in the case
at bar, more particularly the unusual grief and outrage suffered by her
bereaved family as a result of the brutal and indecent mutilation and
disposal of Elsas body, the moral damages to be awarded to them should be
more than the normal amount dictated by jurisprudence. However, the
amount of P3,000,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages is
rather excessive. The reasonable amount is P1,000,000.00 considering the
immense sorrow and shock suffered by Elsas heirs.
The award of attorneys fees of P150,000.00 was duly proved, [86] and
thus should be affirmed.
Finally, the heirs of Elsa Santos Castillo should be indemnified for her
death. In murder, the civil indemnity has been fixed by jurisprudence at
P50,000.00. The grant of civil indemnity in murder requires no proof other
than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of accused-
appellants responsibility therefor.[87]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 152, in Criminal Case No. 102687, finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Elsa Santos Castillo actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00; civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00; moral damages in the amount of
P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; and
attorneys fees in the amount of P150,000.00. Costs against accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
15
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
G.R. No. 128900. July 14, 2000.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO S.
ANTONIO, SPO4 JUANITO N. NIETO and SPO1 HONORIO
CARTALLA, JR., accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Inconsistencies between the
declaration of the affiant in his sworn statements and those in open court do
not necessarily discredit said witness.—It is a matter of judicial experience
that affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally considered
incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony
given in court, and whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit
and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater
weight. Moreover, inconsistencies between the declaration of the affiant in
his sworn statements and those in open court do not necessarily discredit
said witness. Thus, the trial court followed precedents in giving more
credence to SG Bobis’ testimony given in open court despite his having
executed an earlier statement which was inconsistent with his testimony.
Same; Same; Same; The initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer
information about a criminal case and their aversion to be involved in
criminal investigations due to fear of reprisal is not uncommon and this fact
has been judicially declared not to adversely affect the credibility of
witnesses.—We find no reason to discredit the trial court’s finding that the
reasons given by SG Bobis sufficiently explained the conflicting
declarations he made in his two (2) sworn statements and in his court
testimony. Therefore, he cannot be impeached as an eyewitness. This Court
also recognizes that the initial reticence of witnesses to volunteer
information about a criminal case and their aversion to be involved in
criminal investigations due to fear of reprisal is not uncommon, and this fact
has been judicially declared not to adversely affect the credibility of
witnesses.
Same; Same; Justifying Circumstance; Self-Defense; The rule is that where
an accused admits having killed the victim but invokes self-defense to
escape criminal liability, he assumes the burden of proof to establish his
plea of self-defense by clear, credible and con-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
647
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
647
People vs. Antonio
vincing evidence; Elements of Self-Defense.—Well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence is the rule that where an accused admits having killed the
victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, he assumes the
burden of proof to establish his plea Of self-defense by clear, credible and
convincing evidence. To successfully interpose self-defense, appellant
Antonio must clearly and convincingly prove: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (2) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the attack; and (3) the person defending himself must not
have provoked the victim into committing the act of aggression.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; For unlawful aggression to be appreciated
there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent damage
thereof and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.—Appellant
Antonio never said that Tuadles aimed or pointed the gun at him. There is
no evidence, apart from appellant Antonio’s uncorroborated testimony, that
Tuadles made an attempt to shoot him. Hence, there is no convincing proof
16
that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles. For unlawful
aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected
attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude. The burden of proving unlawful aggression lay on
appellant Antonio, but he has not presented incontrovertible proof that
would stand careful scrutiny before any court. Lacking this requirement,
appellant Antonio’s claim of self-defense cannot be appreciated. He cannot
even claim it as an extenuating circumstance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When he fails to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the positiveness of that justifying circumstance having
admitted the killing, conviction of the accused, is inescapable.—When an
accused invokes self-defense or claims that it was an accident to escape
criminal liability, he admits having caused the death of the victim. And
when he fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence the positiveness of
that justifying circumstance, having admitted the killing, conviction of the
accused is inescapable. Appellant Antonio had to rely on the strength of his
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence for, even if
the latter were weak, his invoking self-defense is already an open admission
of responsibility for the killing. As it was, appellant Antonio’s testimony is
not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also
doubtful by itself for being ambivalent and self-serving.
648
648
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstance; Voluntary Surrender; Elements
of.—Having admitted responsibility for the killing of Tuadles, appellant
Antonio claims the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. On this
score, we find merit in his claim considering that all the elements in order
that voluntary surrender may be appreciated were attendant in his case.
First, he had not been actually arrested; Second, he surrendered himself to a
person in authority; and Third, his surrender was voluntary. It is of no
moment that appellant Antonio did not immediately surrender to the
authorities, but did so only after the lapse of about six (6) hours. In the case
of People v. Bautista, the voluntary surrender of the accused to a police
authority four (4) days after the commission of the crime was considered
attenuating. There is no dispute that appellant Antonio voluntarily
surrendered to the mayor, a person in authority, before he was arrested,
hence the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
considered in appellant Antonio’s favor.
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstance; Treachery; For treachery to be
appreciable, such means, method or form was deliberated upon or
consciously adopted by the offender; Such deliberate or conscious choice
was held non-existent where the attack was the product of an impulse of the
moment.—It is not enough that the means, methods, or form of execution of
the offense was without danger to the offender arising from the defense or
retaliation that might be made by the offended party. It is further required,
for treachery to be appreciable, that such means, method or form was
deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender. Such deliberate or
conscious choice was held non-existent where the attack was the product of
an impulse of the moment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Treachery could not be appreciated where the
victim was forewarned and could have anticipated the aggression of the
accused.—Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was
forewarned and could have anticipated the aggression of the accused. Since
the sudden shooting of Tuadles was preceded by a heated verbal altercation
between Tuadles and appellant Antonio, as admitted by both prosecution
and defense, then it cannot be concluded that the shooting was committed
with treachery.
649
17
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
649
People vs. Antonio
Same; Same; Same; Same; Treachery requires that the mode of attack must
have been thought of by the offender and must have sprung from an
unforeseen occurrence.—It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set
out or plan to kill Tuadles in the first place. His criminal act was an offshoot
of their argument which neither of them had foreseen. Hence, there was no
treachery because treachery requires that the mode of attack must have been
thought of by the offender and must have sprung from an unforeseen
occurrence.
Same; Accessory; Definition of.—The Revised Penal Code in Article 19
defines an accessory as one who has knowledge of the commission of the
crime, yet did not take part in its commission as principal or accomplice,
but took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1)
profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the
crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring,
concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime,
provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the
offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life
of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other
crime.
Same; Same; Public officer must have acted with abuse of his public
functions, and the crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided
it is not a light felony.—Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised
Penal Code, there are two (2) classes of accessories, one of which is a
public officer who harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the principal.
Such public officer must have acted with abuse of his public functions, and
the crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light
felony. Appellant SPO4 Nieto is one such public officer, and he abused his
public function when he failed to effect the immediate arrest of accused
Antonio and to conduct a speedy investigation of the crime committed.
PUNO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Criminal Law; Treachery; The so-called heated altercation is not well-
established by the evidence.—With due respect, I do not agree with the
majority that the case at bar involves a spur of the moment killing, hence,
there is no treachery. The majority states
650
650
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
that there was a prior heated altercation between Tuadles and Antonio. The
heated altercation allegedly forewarned Tuadles of the attack. The so-called
heated altercation, however, is not well-established by the evidence. A
replay of the facts will reveal that eyewitness Bobis initially heard the two
teasing each other (“nagkakantiyawan”). Later, an argument developed
between them which cannot be characterized as a “heated altercation.”
Same; Same; Same; The argument appears to be slight and cannot justify
the conclusion that Antonio acted in the heat of passion or on impulse in
killing the victim.—In sum, it was only Antonio who appeared agitated
during the alleged altercation. Tuadles spoke in a soft and cool voice that
Bobis could hardly hear and understand him. The characterization of the
argument that preceded the shooting of is decisive of the issue of treachery.
I submit that the argument between Antonio and Tuadles was trivial for it
merely concerned the inadvertence of Tuadles to tap the table when making
18
a pass. Nothing in the records shows that Tuadles violated the rule
intentionally. Nothing shows the degree of damage suffered by Antonio as a
consequence of Tuadles’ omission. It is thus my submission that the
argument appears to be slight and cannot justify the conclusion that Antonio
acted in the heat of passion or on impulse in killing the victim.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br.
156.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
San Pedro, San Pedro and Associates and Noel V. Ebora for J. Nieto.
Public Attorney’s Office for H. Catalla, Jr.
Jose B. Flaminiano, Josue A. San Pedro and Jose Alberto C. Flaminiano
for A. Antonio.
651
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
651
People vs. Antonio
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated April 30, 1997, rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156 in Criminal Case No.
111232-H, for Murder, the dispositive portion of which is quoted hereunder,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ “Ambet,”
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery as charged in the Information, and there being no mitigating or
any aggravating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 entitled
“An Act to Impose The Death Penalty On Certain Heinous Crimes” and
Art. 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the service of his sentence, accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @
“Ambet” shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive
imprisonment.
The guilt of both accused JUANITO NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C.
CARTALLA, JR., as accessories, having also been established beyond any
reasonable doubt, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correcional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum.
Accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ “Ambet” is likewise hereby ordered
to pay, unto the heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles, the following sums:
a. P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles;
b. P226,298.36, as actual damages;
c. P7,200,000.00, representing compensable earnings lost by reason of
Arnulfo B. Tuadles’ death;
d. P3,000,000.00 or the stipulated P1,000,000.00 each for the three (3)
children of Arnulfo B. Tuadles, and another P500,000.00 for the widow,
Ma. Odyssa “Suzette” TecarroTuadles, as moral damages;
e. P50,000.00; as exemplary damages;
19
f. Costs.
652
652
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
In case of insolvency of accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ “Ambet,”
accused JUANITO NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C. CARTALLA,
JR., shall be liable to pay, jointly and severally, one-third (1/3) of the
above-adjudicated sums or the amount of P3,675,432.78 unto the said heirs
of Arnulfo B. Tuadles.
In any event, the foregoing civil liabilities shall all be without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Being instruments of the crime, let the caliber .9mm Beretta Mode 92F with
Serial Number BER-041965-Z, including its black magazine and five (5)
live bullets, which are presently under the custody of the Court, be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and turned over to the
Firearms and Explosives Office, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused ALBERTO
S. ANTONIO @ “Ambet” from the San Juan Municipal Jail to the Bureau
of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.1
On that fateful morning of November 2, 1996, what should have been an
amiable game of cards between two erstwhile friends turned into a deadly
confrontation resulting in the fatal shooting of one by the hand of the other.
The victim, Arnulfo “Arnie” Tuadles, a former professional basketball
player, succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound right between
the eyes, inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber
Beretta pistol.
Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto “Ambet” S.
Antonio, a one-time chairman of the Games and Amusement Board (GAB).
It was during his stint as such that he and Tuadles became socially
acquainted. They somehow lost touch, but later became reacquainted when
they both started frequenting the International Business Club (IBC), located
along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila, which houses amenities
such as a dining room, music bar and gameroom. Often, the two would
meet with other members and friends to play cards in the gameroom at the
second floor of the club. Their preferred games were poker or “pusoy dos,”
_______________
1 Decision, Rollo, pp. 104-105.
653
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
653
People vs. Antonio
ordinary poker or Russian poker. Their bets always ran into the tens of
thousands of pesos.
The tragic events began to unravel in the final hours of November 1, 1996.
Antonio, Tuadles, and a certain Danny Debdani, then president of the IBC,
had agreed to meet at the club for another poker session, their third night in
a row. Antonio arrived at the club first, followed by Tuadles at around
midnight. Debdani, however, failed to appear, so after waiting for
sometime, Antonio and Tuadles decided to play “pusoy dos,” a game for
20
two (2) players only. They continued playing until morning, pausing only
when either of them had to visit the restroom. They stopped playing at
around 9:00 o’clock in the morning of November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast.
When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the
loser, an argument arose. It is at this point where the prosecution and the
defense presented two very different scenarios. The prosecution alleged and
sought to prove that in the course of an argument, without warning or cause,
Antonio pulled his gun from behind his back and shot Tuadles at very close
range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish the nefarious deed.
The pivotal evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony of one
Jose Jimmy T. Bobis, a security guard who testified as to how the shooting
of Tuadles occurred.
On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments on the
testimony of accused Antonio himself, who testified that their argument was
caused by Tuadles’ refusal to pay Antonio’s winnings. In the middle of a
heated altercation where they traded expletives, Tuadles suddenly grabbed
Antonio’s gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed
that he reached for Tuadles’ hand and they grappled for possession of the
gun. As they wrestled, a single shot roared, Tuadles fell face down to the
floor, and Antonio was left too stunned to recall who had actually pulled the
trigger. In fine, Antonio alleged that the shooting was accidental, and his
only motivation was to defend himself. He also refuted the testimony of the
prosecution’s eyewitness, averring that SG Bobis could not have seen the
actual shooting since he (Bobis)
654
654
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
and co-accused SPO4 Juanito Nieto, who were alerted by Antonio’s yells,
reached the scene when Tuadles had already been shot and was lying on the
floor.
While Tuadles lay bloodied and still, no one remembered to call an
ambulance or check if he was still alive. Instead, and there is no dispute in
these succeeding events, Antonio convinced the two (2) security guards,
prosecution eyewitness SG Bobis included, to accompany him to his home
in Greenmeadows Subdivision, Quezon City, after which they proceeded to
the San Juan Police Station. With them was SPO4 Nieto, a member of the
San Juan Police Force. They remained at Antonio’s residence for several
hours, during which time Antonio made phone calls and summoned his
lawyer. At around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Antonio, accompanied by
SPO4 Nieto, placed himself and his gun in the custody of San Juan Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada and the police authorities. Later, the two security guards
and SPO4 Nieto were driven back to the club where they waited for the
police investigators. Sometime thereafter, SG Bobis narrated the events and
executed his statement at the police station, a statement which he would
repudiate three (3) days later.
On November 18, 1996, an Information was filed against Antonio for the
crime of murder. Also charged as accessories were SPO4 Nieto and SPO1
Honorio Cartalla, Jr. The Information alleged that:
On or about November 2, 1996, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Antonio, armed with a
gun, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill and with treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
person of Arnulfo “Arnie” Tuadles, by then and there suddenly,
unexpectedly, deliberately and without provocation, shooting Arnulfo
“Arnie” Tuadles on his forehead, right between the eyes, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of
his death;
21

The accused Nieto, without having participated in said crime of murder,
either as principal or accomplice, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take part subsequent to its
655
After trial on the merits, all three accused were found guilty as charged,
imposing on them the appropriate penalties and ordering them to pay to the
heirs of Tuadles various amounts as and for indemnity and damages, set
forth in the dispositive portion quoted above. All three accused filed
separate appeals assailing the trial court’s findings and disposition.

Appellant Antonio assails the trial court’s judgment on the following

assigned errors:
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
I
655

People vs. Antonio

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE
commission, with abuse of his public functions and position as a public
TESTIMONY OF JOSE “JIMMY” BOBIS WHICH CONFLICTS
officer, by harboring or assisting the accused Antonio, by then and there
DRASTICALLY NOT ONLY WITH HIS INITIAL DECLARATIONS
failing to arrest and surrender immediately the said accused Antonio to the
BUT ALSO WITH HIS PREVIOUSLY EXECUTED
authorities and by giving false information which tended to deceive the
investigating authorities; and _______________

The accused Cartalla, Jr., without having participated in said crime of

murder either as principal or accomplice, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take part subsequent to its commission, with 2 Information, Rollo, pp. 14-15.
abuse of his public functions and position as a public officer, by concealing
or destroying the effects or instruments of the body of the crime, in order to 656
prevent its discovery, by then and there removing the laser sight of the gun
used in shooting Tuadles, deliberately omitting to take steps to preserve the
evidence at the scene of the crime, and purposely failing to call on the crime 656
laboratory service of the proper agencies for appropriate action.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Contrary to law.2
People vs. Antonio
Upon arraignment, co-accused SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. entered a plea of “Not
Guilty.” Accused Antonio and SPO4 Nieto both refused to enter a plea, and STATEMENT, AND WHICH TESTIMONY IS TAINTED WITH
the trial court entered a plea of “not guilty” for both of them. SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES, INCREDIBILITIES, AND OMISSIONS
ON SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS.
22

II ARNIE, TUADLES’ DEATH, DESPITE INADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO

SUPPORT SUCH AWARD.

VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY
ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.

III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PALPABLY EXCESSIVE

MORAL DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF ARNIE TUADLES.

657
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
VERSION OF APPELLANT ALBERTO “AMBET” ANTONIO.

IV VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000

657

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE People vs. Antonio
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
VIII
V

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT ALBERTO

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT
PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM ARNULFO “ARNIE”
TUADLES IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE COMMISSION OF THE
IMPUTED ACT, AND IN NOT APPRECIATING THIS MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.
“AMBET” ANTONIO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
THE CRIME OF MURDER.3
Appellant SPO4 Nieto likewise questions the trial court’s decision, arguing
that:

VI I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE SUM OF THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING NIETO AS
P7,200,000.00 AS COMPENSABLE EARNINGS LOST BY REASON OF AN ACCESSORY

II
23
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
CRIME COMMITTED BY THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED ANTONIO
WAS MURDER4
Appellant Cartalla, Jr. also challenged the said decision on the following
grounds:
I
THE COURT OF ORIGIN HAS COMMITTED A BLATANT ERROR IN
CONVICTING SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. AS ACCESSORY TO
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE RECORD IS
SO REPLETE WITH EVIDENCES THAT THERE ARE REASONABLE
DOUBTS TO HOLD HIM AS SUCH.
II
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR AND HAS NOT
SHOWN FAIRNESS IN NOT CONSIDERING FULLY THE GOOD
FAITH, DILIGENCE AND HARD WORK EXERTED BY SPO1
HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. WHEN HE INVESTIGATED THE CASE
ON HAND TILL THE TIME HE DELIVERED THE SPECIMEN OR
PIECES OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME TO THE PNP-
CLS, CAMP CRAME, QUEZON CITY.
_______________
3 Appellant Antonio’s Brief, pp. 8-10.
4 Appellant Nieto’s Brief, pp. 9-10.
658
658
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
III
THE LOWER COURT HAS COMMITTED A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN
DISREGARDING THE SIXTEEN (16) YEARS OF ACTIVE POLICE
SERVICE OF SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. SHOWN WITH
DEDICATION AND LOYALTY THERETO SUSTAINING MORE HIS
INNOCENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGED HEREIN.5
Considering that appellant Antonio is the principal accused, we shall deal
first with the issues raised in his appeal, foremost of which is the credibility
of the prosecution’s sole eyewitness, SG Jose Jimmy Bobis. Appellant
Antonio challenges SG Bobis’ worth and credibility as an eyewitness on
two (2) grounds.
First, SG Bobis, in his first sworn statement before the San Juan authorities
averred that he did not see the actual shooting since he was still ascending
the stairs leading to the second floor where the crime took place when he
heard the gunshot. Days later, in a second statement taken at the Eastern
Police District (EPD) and in his testimony before the trial court, SG Bobis
negated his earlier statement, this time averring that he had indeed seen
appellant Antonio pull his gun from behind, and with neither warning nor
provocation, aim the gun at the head of Tuadles and shoot the latter point-
blank. This complete turnabout in SG Bobis’ testimony, according to
appellant Antonio, is a sure sign of the said witness’ unreliability,
incredibility, and unworthiness. He also points out the contradictions and
24
inconsistencies between SG Bobis’ first and second statements and court
testimony.
Second, appellant Antonio belittles SG Bobis’ reasons for giving the San
Juan Police investigators false information in his first statement, saying that
nobody threatened SG Bobis if he testified against appellant Antonio. On
the other hand, appellant Antonio suggests that it was Colonel Lucas
Managuelod of the EPD who coerced SG Bobis to change his state-
_______________
5 Appellant Cartalla, Jr.’s Brief, Rollo, pp. 237-238.
659
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
659
People vs. Antonio
ment and testimony so that the murder charge against appellant Antonio
would be strengthened.
There is no question that SG Bobis’ second statement and court testimony,
on the one hand, contradicted what he previously narrated in his first
statement, on the other hand. The question therefore is: Which is more
credible and of more value to the courts in ascertaining the guilt or
innocence of the accused?
It is a matter of judicial experience that affidavits or statements taken ex
parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature,
they are inferior to testimony given in court, and whenever there is
inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court,
the testimony commands greater weight.6 Moreover, inconsistencies
between the declaration of the affiant in his sworn statements and those in
open court do not necessarily discredit said witness.7 Thus, the trial court
followed precedents in giving more credence to SG Bobis’ testimony given
in open court despite his having executed an earlier statement which was
inconsistent with his testimony.
Besides, when confronted with his first contradictory statement, SG Bobis
explained the reasons why he was moved to give false information in his
first statement. He had testified that moments after he saw appellant
Antonio shoot Tuadles, the appellant warned him: “Ikaw, ‘wag kang
tumistigo, ha.”8 Later, he and the other security guard, SG Olac, were
allegedly coerced to go to the appellant’s house in Quezon City. He also
testified that while they were there, appellant Antonio and his lawyer
instructed him (Bobis), should
_______________
6 People v. Castro, 276 SCRA 572 (1997); People v. Salazar, 277 SCRA 67
(1997).
7 People v. Nang, 289 SCRA 16 (1998); People v. Padao, 267 SCRA 64
(1997); Naval v. Panday, 275 SCRA 654 (1997); People v. Banguis, 291
SCRA 279 (1998).
8 TSN, January 15, 1997, p. 46.
660
660
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
25

the police investigator ask him who shot Tuadles, to say that what happened _______________
was only an accident.9

At the police station, appellant SPO4 Nieto allegedly told SG Bobis to say
that they were both outside the club when the trouble started, saying: 9 TSN, January 15, 1997, p. 54.
“kailangan ipalabas natin na nasa labas tayo ng club.”10 Bobis stated that
10 TSN, January 15, 1997, p. 55.
he was confused and afraid, and, therefore, told the police investigator,
appellant Cartalla, Jr., on November 2, 1996, that he did not see appellant 11 Decision, Rollo, pp. 45-46.
Antonio shoot Tuadles because he was still ascending the stairs when the
gun went off. 661

Apparently, it was not only fear that ruled his thoughts and actions at that
time, but also remorse and confusion. As found by the trial court:
He admits that he had acted contrary to the ethical standards and code of
conduct of private security guards when he did not make a formal report to
his superior about the shooting incident of November 2, 1996 at the Club
but countered that this was because accused Antonio had taken him to the
latter’s house. This being so, neither was he able to put said accused
Antonio under arrest.
Added to this was the fact that even accused Nieto, a policeman in active
service who was with them at the time and who should have done so, had
also failed to arrest accused Antonio, more so with him and SG Olac who
are just ordinary security guards. (“Dahil po ma’am, si SPO4 Nieto, pulis na
po ang kasama namin, hindi niya po nagawa na arestuhin si Mr. Ambet
Antonio mas lalo po kami na ordinary guard lang po.”)
True, he had his service .38 caliber in his possession at the time.
Nevertheless, because accused Antonio looked: “parang galit pa sila sa
amin” he can not, as in fact he did not, insist that instead of going to the
house of accused Antonio, he will effect the arrest.11
Nevertheless, Bobis stated that his conscience bothered him, and seeing
Tuadles’ widow crying on television, he gathered enough resolve and
courage to finally tell the truth to the
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
661
People vs. Antonio
police authorities at the EPD. When he testified in open court, SG Bobis did
not waver in his declaration that he witnessed appellant Antonio suddenly
pull his gun from behind and shoot Tuadles three (3) feet away.
Rule 132, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other
times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements
must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and
the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in
writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them. (Italics ours).
Thus, this Court has uniformly held that:
Previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of
a witness unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he
26
was then given an opportunity to explain them. It is only when no
reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting
declarations that he should be deemed impeached.12
We find no reason to discredit the trial court’s finding that the reasons given
by SG Bobis sufficiently explained the conflicting declarations he made in
his two (2) sworn statements and in his court testimony. Therefore, he
cannot be impeached as an eyewitness. This Court also recognizes that the
initial reticence of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case
and their aversion to be involved in criminal investigations due to fear of
reprisal is not uncommon, and this fact has been judicially declared not to
adversely affect the credibility of witnesses. 13
Apart from the issue of SG Bobis’ having given an earlier contradictory
statement, his direct testimony and answers
_______________
12 People v. De Guzman, 288 SCRA 346 (1998).
13 People v. Matubis, 288 SCRA 210 (1998).
662
662
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
under cross-examination appear clear and convincing. We agree with the
trial court when it held:
But it is SG Bobis whom the Court finds credible.
Why he had executed a first, then a second statement, totally in conflict
with each other, SG Bobis had fully explained to the satisfaction of the
Court. His lowly station in life had been taken advantage of by accused
Antonio and Nieto. These two (2) had thought that they had succeeded in
completely prevailing upon SG Bobis. For did not SG Bobis tell their lies?
Still, the conscience of a good man had won over.
SG Bobis had redeemed himself. He gave spontaneous and straightforward
answers to the gruelling questions propounded on him and had stuck to his
truth.
The Court had painstakingly, taken note of each of the witnesses’ demeanor
on the stand. While SG Bobis was steadfast with his words, accused
Antonio and Nieto were evidently recalling from a script. The other
prosecution witnesses, SG Olac and Romeo M. Solano were, like SG Bobis,
untainted in their testimonies.14
Finding nothing that would compel us to conclude otherwise, we respect the
findings of the trial court on the issue of the credibility of SG Bobis as an
eyewitness, especially considering that the trial court was in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witness himself and
observed his deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.15
In the recent case of People v. Pili, this Court had occasion to rule that:
It is doctrinally settled that the assessments of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because
of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. These are the
most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in
unearthing
_______________
27
14 Decision, Rollo, p. 102.
15 People v. Aquino, 284 SCRA 369 (1998); People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA
296 (1998); Espano v. CA, 288 SCRA 558 (1998).
663
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
663
People vs. Antonio
the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its
observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to
determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which
witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not
be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially
affect the disposition of the case.16
And in People v. Deleverio, this Court ruled that:
It is axiomatic to point out, furthermore, that in an appeal, where the
culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the
trial court are entitled to and given the highest degree of respect.17
Moreover, in People v. Reynaldo, we reiterated the principle that:
The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best
and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate
magistrates, can weigh the testimony of a witness in the light of his
demeanor, conduct and attitude as he testified, and is thereby placed in a
more competent position to discriminate between the true and the false.18
There are other reasons why the eyewitness testimony of SG Bobis was
given full faith and credit. SG Bobis, a mere security guard, realized he was
no match to appellants Antonio and SPO4 Nieto. The former, a wealthy
businessman, is known as an intimate friend of people in power. Appellant
Antonio admitted in court that he surrendered himself and his gun to Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada, who was his good friend. Hours later, he went to see then
Vice President Joseph Es-
_______________
16 G.R. No. 124739, 289 SCRA 118 (1998).
17 G.R. Nos. 118937-38, 289 SCRA 547 (1998).
18 G.R. No. 116305, 291 SCRA 701 (1998).
664
664
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
trada in Tagaytay City so he (Antonio) could tell his friend, the Vice
President, what happened in his own words.19
Appellant SPO4 Nieto was a member in active duty of the San Juan Police
Force who was close to appellant Antonio. Considering SG Bobis’ lowly
station in life, as compared to that of the said appellants, it is understandable
that his initial reaction to the shocking events would be one of intimidation,
if not fear. SG Bobis believed then, and no one can fault him for thinking
so, that going against the instructions and dictates of appellant Antonio and
SPO4 Nieto would make life very difficult for him, knowing they were
28
well-connected to the powers that be. This perceived threat, whether real or
imagined, compelled him to take the easy way out and just repeat what
appellants told him to say.
There is an oft-quoted adage that a person may be able to avoid his enemies,
but he can never run away from himself. SG Bobis may have momentarily
avoided incurring the wrath of the appellants by acceding to their dictates,
but he could not escape the proddings of his conscience. He realized he had
to right a wrong, and this he did with selflessness and at great risk to
himself.
Furthermore, appellants could not impute any ill motive on the part of SG
Bobis except the statement that it was Colonel Lucas Managuelod of the
EPD who told him how to testify. Thus, his positive and categorical
declarations on the witness stand under solemn oath without convincing
evidence to the contrary deserve full faith and credence.20
Appellant Antonio, however, would seek to completely avoid culpability by
claiming that the shooting of Tuadles was caused by mere accident without
his fault or intention of causing it, or that he acted in self-defense.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that where an accused
admits having killed the victim but invokes
_______________
19 TSN, April 11, 1997, p. 97.
20 People v. Ebrada, 296 SCRA 353 (1998); People v. Gatchalian, 300
SCRA 1 (1998).
665
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
665
People vs. Antonio
self-defense to escape criminal liability, he assumes the burden of proof to
establish his plea of self-defense by clear, credible and convincing
evidence.21 To successfully interpose self-defense, appellant Antonio must
clearly and convincingly prove: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the attack; and (3) the person defending himself must not have
provoked the victim into committing the act of aggression.22
Without granting that his testimony is an accurate narration of the events
that took place, we shall discuss the points raised by appellant Antonio only
for the purpose of determining whether the requisites of self-defense were
attendant as claimed. In his testimony appellant Antonio alleged that
Tuadles committed an act of aggression when he (Tuadles) grabbed the gun
which was on top of a sidetable. Appellant Antonio then concluded that
Tuadles had the sole intention of using the gun against him (Antonio), so he
grappled with Tuadles to prevent the latter from shooting him. His bare
testimony, uncorroborated as it is, does not convince us that Tuadles would,
so to speak, beat him to the draw. The testimony of Bobis shows that
Tuadles was calm in answering Appellant Antonio’s loud invectives, and it
would be hard to imagine Tuadles as the aggressor under such a situation.
And even if Tuadles had grabbed the gun, it could very well have been that
Tuadles intended to keep the gun away from appellant Antonio to prevent
the latter from using it against him considering the state of mind and the
foul mood appellant Antonio was in. This would be a more believable
scenario since even appellant Antonio admitted that he was suffused with
anger, his temper short due to three (3) consecutive sleepless nights.
_______________
29
21 People v. Sambulan, 289 SCRA 500 (1998); People v. Galapin, 293
SCRA 474 (1998).
22 People v. Aguilar, 292 SCRA 349 (1998); People v. Villamor, 292
SCRA 384 (1998).
666
666
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
Appellant Antonio never said that Tuadles aimed or pointed the gun at him.
There is no evidence, apart from appellant Antonio’s uncorroborated
testimony, that Tuadles made an attempt to shoot him. Hence, there is no
convincing proof that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles.
For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden,
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening
or intimidating attitude.23 The burden of proving unlawful aggression lay
on appellant Antonio, but he has not presented incontrovertible proof that
would stand careful scrutiny before any court. Lacking this requirement,
appellant Antonio’s claim of self-defense cannot be appreciated. He cannot
even claim it as an extenuating circumstance.24
Besides, it cannot be said that appellant Antonio did not provoke Tuadles, if
indeed the latter had grabbed the gun from the table. Antonio himself
admitted that he was shouting and cursing Tuadles while in a furious rage.
Such a threatening stance could be interpreted as a provocation which could
have prompted Tuadles to get the gun so that appellant Antonio, in his
anger, would not be able to use it against Tuadles. If ever there was
provocation, it was certainly coming from appellant Antonio, not from
Tuadles.
In the alternative, appellant Antonio claims that the shooting of Tuadles was
an accident. He further argues that Tuadles was killed while he, Antonio,
was performing a lawful act with due care, and without fault or intention of
causing it. Having ruled that appellant Antonio failed to prove his claim of
self-defense, (i.e., there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles
and provocation coming from Antonio himself), there is no basis for us to
argue with appellant Antonio that he was performing a lawful act when he
shot Tuadles.25
_______________
23 People v. Ebrada, supra.
24 People v. Patotoy, 261 SCRA 37 (1996); People v. Balamban, 264
SCRA 619 (1996).
25 People v. Cario, 288 SCRA 404 (1998).
667
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
667
People vs. Antonio
We note that appellant Antonio’s version of how the shooting took place
leaves much room for conjecture. It is true that there is no fixed dictum on
the reaction of a person under the circumstances of a sudden death he may
have caused. He could react in a variety of ways, some of them even
irrational. However, we respect the trial court’s findings. The trial court
upheld the prosecution’s version thus sustaining the theory that if Antonio
indeed shot Tuadles by accident, the natural reaction expected of him would
be to immediately see to it that Tuadles be brought to a hospital or get
30
medical attention at the quickest time possible. Instead, appellant Antonio
left Tuadles, who was supposed to be his good friend, lying dead on the
floor for several hours. If indeed he and Tuadles both had their hands on the
gun and there was no telling who actually pulled the trigger, we agree that
appellant Antonio should have seen to it that no one else would touch the
gun barehanded to preserve the fingerprints on it. Instead, he gave the gun
to SPO4 Nieto who had no concern for preserving the fingerprints on the
gun. Not only that, appellant Antonio also handed the gun to Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada. Thus, one tangible piece of evidence that could have proven his
claim of self-defense or accident was unfortunately lost due to his lack of
presence and due care.
Appellant Antonio’s ambivalence in his choice of defenses is clear from the
records. First, he denies that he pulled the trigger because it was Tuadles
who was holding the gun. Then he says that he cannot recall who fired the
gun so it could have very well been either him or Tuadles who did it. Next,
he admits firing the gun, but he did it in self-defense. Only, he could not
indubitably prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles.
Failing there, he again admitted shooting Tuadles, but that it was an
accident. Again, he failed to prove that he was in the process of performing
a lawful act when he shot Tuadles.
When an accused invokes self-defense or claims that it was an accident to
escape criminal liability, he admits having caused the death of the victim.
And when he fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
positiveness of that justi-
668
668
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
fying circumstance, having admitted the killing, conviction of the accused is
inescapable.26 Appellant Antonio had to rely on the strength of his
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence for, even if
the latter were weak, his invoking self-defense is already an open admission
of responsibility for the killing.27 As it was, appellant Antonio’s testimony
is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also
doubtful by itself28 for being ambivalent and self-serving.29
Having admitted responsibility for the killing of Tuadles, appellant Antonio
claims the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. On this score,
we find merit in his claim considering that all the elements in order that
voluntary surrender may be appreciated were attendant in his case. First, he
had not been actually arrested; Second, he surrendered himself to a person
in authority; and Third, his surrender was voluntary. It is of no moment that
appellant Antonio did not immediately surrender to the authorities, but did
so only after the lapse of about six (6) hours. In the case of People v.
Bautista,30 the voluntary surrender of the accused to a police authority four
(4) days after the commission of the crime was considered attenuating.
There is no dispute that appellant Antonio voluntarily surrendered to the
mayor, a person in authority, before he was arrested, hence the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in appellant
Antonio’s favor.31
Appellant Antonio also claims the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation on the part of Tuadles. To avail of this mitigating circumstance,
it must be shown that the
_______________
26 People v. Aguilar, supra.
27 People v. Peña, 291 SCRA 606 (1998).
28 People v. De la Cruz, 291 SCRA 164 (1998).
31

29 People v. Umadhay, 293 SCRA 545 (1998).
30 People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 109800, 254 SCRA 621 (1996).
31 People v. Amamanpang, 291 SCRA 638 (1998); People v. Medina, 286
SCRA 44 (1998).
669
accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself.”34 It ruled
that treachery qualified the killing to murder. The trial court did not explain
the basis for the qualification except for a terse citation that there was a
sudden attack and the victim had no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate. As stated by counsel for appellant, out of the 71-page decision,
typed single space, the trial court devoted only a few sentences to the issue
of treachery.

There was no treachery in this case.

VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000 _______________

669

People vs. Antonio 32 Almeda v. CA, 269 SCRA 643 (1997).

provocation originated from the offended party.32 However, apart from his 33 Austria v. CA, 273 SCRA 296 (1997).
own testimony, appellant Antonio has not proven by convincing evidence
34 Decision, p. 81.
that he was provoked by Tuadles. He claimed that Tuadles provoked him
when the latter refused or could not pay his winning. Refusal to pay cannot 670
be a mitigating provocation for appellant Antonio to kill Tuadles. An
unpaid debt cannot, and never will, be a reason to shoot the debtor dead.
Besides, appellant Antonio had no other proof that he won and that the
argument arose from Tuadles’ refusal to pay. His bare testimony is, at best, 670
self-serving. Accordingly, appellant Antonio is not entitled to the benefit of
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation.33
People vs. Antonio
There is, however, a significant and consequential aspect of the case which
the trial court overlooked and disregarded. It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There
must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a
As earlier stated, we find no sufficient reason to disagree with the trial court
specific purpose.
when it relied on the testimony of SG Bobis. However, we have carefully
examined said testimony, the records of this petition, and the justifications All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It was a
of the trial court upon which it based its decision. spur of the moment crime:
There is no basis for the trial court’s conclusion “that accused Antonio The precedents are many. They are consistent. Among them:
consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the
32
“Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery where
accused made no preparation or employed no means, method and form of
execution tending directly and specially to insure the commission of a crime
and to eliminate or diminish risk from defense which the victim may
take.”35
“A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia where the
aggressor did not consciously adopt a mode of attack intended to perpetrate
the homicide without risk to himself.”36
“A sudden and unexpected attack constitutes the absence of alevosia where
it did not appear that the aggressor had consciously adopted a mode of
attack intended to facilitate the perpetration of the homicide without risk to
himself, as where the appellant followed the victims when the latter refused
appellant’s invitation to have some more alcoholic drinks.”37
“The mere suddenness of attack does not, of itself suffice for a finding of
alevosia if the mode adopted by the accused does not positively tend to
prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of
their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the
defense that might be offered.”38
“The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to
attack was arrived at on the spur of the moment.”39
The annotations are similarly consistent. It is not enough that the means,
methods, or form of execution of the offense
_______________
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
671
People vs. Antonio
was without danger to the offender arising from the defense or retaliation
that might be made by the offended party. It is further required, for
treachery to be appreciable, that such means, method or form was
deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender.40 Such deliberate
or conscious choice was held non-existent where the attack was the product
of an impulse of the moment.41
The trial court’s ruling that the mere suddenness of an attack makes the
killing a murder because of treachery is not consistent with the decisions of
this Court.42 Conscious deliberation or conscious adoption of the mode of
attack has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. For it is likewise an
established principle that the quantum of evidence to prove a person’s being
guilty of a crime is also required to prove treachery. The same degree of
proof to dispel any reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion may
also be reached respecting the attendance of treachery, whether as
qualifying or aggravating, in a criminal case.43 There is no such proof in
this case.
There is no dispute that prior to the shooting, appellant Antonio and Tuadles
spent several hours having fun playing “pusoy dos.” The situation turned
ugly, however, when Tuadles could not pay to appellant Antonio his alleged
winnings. An argument arose, with appellant Antonio and Tuadles standing
face to face three (3) feet away from each other, a fact attested to by the
defense and even by the prosecution eyewitness himself.
Accordingly to SG Bobis, Tuadles and Antonio were arguing. Antonio even
called out: “Sarge! Sarge! Sarge!” Just before the shooting, Bobis heard
Antonio saying: “Putang ina ka kasi.” The argument precluded the presence
of treachery. If Antonio had consciously adopted means and methods to kill
_______________
33
Tuadles, there was no reason to call for a Sergeant or any eyewitness for
that matter.
To the point is our ruling in the case of People v. Alacar,44 where we held
that there was no treachery where the attempt to kill resulted from a verbal
altercation. More recently, in People v. Salvador, we pronounced that:
“There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as
when a heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was
standing face to face with his assailants and the initial assault could not
have been unforseen.”45 (Italics Ours)
Even if it could be said that the attack was sudden, there would still be no
treachery. In People v. Chua,46 we reiterated our consistent view that:
“While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden impulse, it was
preceded by acts of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper that
indicated an imminent attack and should have put the deceased on guard.”
Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was forewarned
and could have anticipated the aggression of the accused. Since the sudden
shooting of Tuadles was preceded by a heated verbal altercation between
Tuadles and appellant Antonio, as admitted by both prosecution and
defense, then it cannot be concluded that the shooting was committed with
treachery.
It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to kill Tuadles
in the first place. His criminal act was an offshoot of their argument which
neither of them had foreseen. Hence, there was no treachery because
treachery requires that the mode of attack must have been thought of by
_______________
the offender and must have sprung from an unforeseen occurrence.47
In People v. Nitcha,48 we held that:
“To establish treachery, the evidence must show that the accused made
some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to ensure the
execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person
attacked to defend himself. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not
treacherous.” (Italics ours)
It was Antonio’s sudden anger and heated passion which drove him to pull
his gun and shoot Tuadles. Said passion, however, cannot co-exist with
treachery. In passion, the offender loses his reason and control. In treachery,
on the other hand, the means employed is adopted consciously and
deliberately. One who, in the heat of passion, loses his reason and self-
control, cannot consciously employ a particular means, method or form of
attack in the execution of the crime.49 Thus, the killing of Tuadles by
appellant Antonio was not attended by treachery.
That the treachery, which was alleged in the information and favorably
considered by the trial court to elevate the killing to murder, was not proven
by convincing evidence50 is advocated by the Solicitor General in the
Appellee’s Brief. He agreed with Appellant Antonio’s contention on the
matter:
On the basis of the evidence at hand, appellee is constrained to agree with
this particular submission of Antonio. Antonio and Tuadles engaged in
“pusoy dos.” In the beginning, they were heard laughing and kidding each
other (nagtatawanan at nagkakantiyawan). Later, the banter turned into
verbal altercation.
Under the circumstances, Tuadles became aware of the incipient violence.
Hence, Tuadles could have braced himself with the aggression of Antonio.
There is no treachery when the killing results from a verbal altercation or
spat between the victim and the assail-
_______________
674
34
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
ant such that the victim must have been forewarned of the impending
danger. In this case, Bobis testified that he saw Antonio and Tuadles facing
each other before Antonio raised his hand and shot Tuadles on the forehead.
The proximate distance of three feet between Tuadles and Antonio
immediately before the fatal shooting allowed and gave Tuadles opportunity
to defend himself.51
Consequently, Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Having been found guilty of the crime of homicide, the penalty that should
be imposed on appellant Antonio should be reduced to reclusion temporal
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being one (1)
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty to be imposed
shall be the minimum period of reclusion temporal, that is, from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty to be imposed
shall be the penalty next lower which is prision mayor in any of its
periods.52 Therefore, appellant Alberto Antonio is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
Appellant Antonio challenges the award of compensatory and moral
damages to the heirs of Tuadles, arguing that said award was unsupported
by adequate evidence. In arriving at the amount of P7,200,000.00 as
compensatory damages, the trial court relied completely on the testimony of
the victim’s widow, Suzette Tuadles, who stated that at the time of his
death, Tuadles was earning P50,000.00 a month from his construction
business. Applying the formula laid down by this Court in the cases of Villa
Rey Transit v. CA,53 and People v. Quilaton,54 the trial court arrived at the
amount of
_______________
People vs. Antonio
P7,200,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity.
Appellant Antonio argues that the trial court cannot just rely on the sole
testimony of Suzette Tuadles, otherwise, it would be basing its computation
on mere speculation, conjecture, or guess work.
In People v. Silvestre55 and People v. Verde,56 we held that the absence of
documentary evidence to support the prosecution’s claim for damages for
loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of said
damages. There, we awarded damages for loss of earning capacity
computed on the basis of the testimonies of the victim’s wives. This was
reiterated in People v. Dizon,57 where we held that:
“As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the
claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. In People vs. Verde (G.R.
No. 119077, February 10, 1999), the non-presentation of documentary
evidence to support the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity did
not prevent this Court from awarding said damages. The testimony of the
victim’s wife as to the earning capacity of her murdered husband, who was
then 48 years old and was earning P200.00 a day as a tricycle driver,
sufficed to establish the basis for such an award. x x x As in People vs.
Verde, the Court is inclined to grant the claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity despite the absence of documentary evidence.” (Italics
ours)
In the case at bar, however, the award for compensatory damages should be
calculated as follows:
Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x gross - living expenses
annual (50% of gross
income annual income)
35
x = 2(80 - 40) x [P600,000.00 - 300,000.00]
3 trial court’s grounds for finding him guilty are: (1) he failed to arrest
_______________
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
= 26.67 x P300,000.00
= P8,001,000.00
Considering that moral damages may be awarded without proof of
pecuniary loss, the Court shall take into account the circumstances
obtaining in the case and assess damages according to its discretion.58 We
agree with appellant Antonio that the trial court’s award of moral damages
was excessive. While there is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of
what would be a fair amount of moral damages, each case must be governed
by its own peculiar circumstances.59 And though moral damages are
incapable of pecuniary estimation to compensate the claimants for actual
injury, they are not designed to enrich the complainants at the expense of
the accused.60
Applied to this case, we recognize that Tuadles was the sole support of his
family and they will also be deprived of his love and companionship. No
amount of money could ever compensate for their loss. While the award of
moral damages may help ease the emotional and psychological trauma that
they continue to suffer, this Court has not granted so large an amount as
moral damages. Accordingly, we find that the amount of P3,000,000.00
granted by the trial court in this case is excessive, and the same is therefore
reduced to P500,000.00. Moreover, there being no aggravating
circumstances attendant in this case, the award of exemplary damages
should also be deleted.61
We now come to the errors assigned by appellant SPO4 Juanito M. Nieto.
He argues that the trial court erred in convicting him as an accessory. The
appellant Anto-
_______________
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
677
People vs. Antonio
nio; and (2) he gave false information tending to deceive the investigating
authorities.62
The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one who has
knowledge of the commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its
commission as principal or accomplice, but took part in it subsequent to its
commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting himself or assisting the
offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying
the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in order to
prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the
escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse
of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to
be habitually guilty of some other crime.63
Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, there are two
(2) classes of accessories, one of which is a public officer who harbors,
conceals or assists in the escape of the principal. Such public officer must
have acted with abuse of his public functions, and the crime committed by
the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony. Appellant SPO4
Nieto is one such public officer, and he abused his public function when he
failed to effect the immediate arrest of accused Antonio and to conduct a
speedy investigation of the crime committed.
36
The evidence in the case at bar, insofar as appellant Nieto’s culpability is
concerned, shows that in the middle of the argument between appellant
Antonio and the deceased, Antonio called Nieto by shouting, “Sarge!
Sarge!” Hearing this, SG Bobis woke Nieto up and the latter went upstairs.
Immediately thereafter, appellant Antonio shot Tuadles, and then ordered
Nieto to get the scoresheet and the cards from the table, which Nieto did.
Antonio, Nieto and Bobis went downstairs. Antonio told guards Bobis and
Ernesto Olac to go with them, and they all boarded Antonio’s Mercedes
Benz van,
_______________
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
Greenmeadows Subdivision at around 11:30 o’clock in the morning. There,
they had coffee while Antonio made some telephone calls. Soon after, a
certain Atty. Abaya arrived and talked to the two security guards, while
Nieto was present. Nieto then told Bobis that in his statement, he should say
that the two of them, i.e., Bobis and Nieto, were seated outside the entrance
of the Club when the incident took place. At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon,
Nieto, Bobis and Olac returned to the Club. They waited outside until
members of the San Juan police, together with Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and
Vice Mayor Philip Cezar, arrived at 6:00 o’clock in the evening. After the
police investigated the scene, they proceeded to the police station. There,
Nieto reiterated his instruction to Bobis to say that the two of them were
outside the club. While Bobis gave his statement to the police, Nieto
remained in front of him and dictated to him what he should answer to the
questions of the police investigator.64
The foregoing facts were culled from the testimony of SG Bobis. Appellant
Nieto’s actuations immediately after the commission of the crime
demonstrate his liability as an accessory. Being a police officer in the active
service, he had the duty to arrest appellant Antonio after the latter
committed a crime in his presence, and which he himself witnessed.
Unfortunately, he failed to do what was incumbent upon him to do. Instead,
he rode with the offender to the latter’s house where they stayed for more
than five (5) hours. In the early case of U.S. v. Yacat, et al., it was held:65
It is, however, unquestionable that Pedro Ureta, who was the local president
of the town of Cabiao at the time the crime was committed, has incurred
criminal liability. Abusing his public office, he refused to prosecute the
crime of homicide and those guilty thereof, and thus made it possible for
them to escape, as the defendant Pedro Lising did in fact. This fact is
sufficiently demonstrated in the records, and he has been unable to explain
his conduct in
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VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
679
People vs. Antonio
refusing to make an investigation of this serious occurrence, of which
complaint was made to him, and consequently he should suffer a penalty
two degrees inferior to that designated by paragraph 2 of article 405 of the
Code, by virtue of article 68 thereof.
Appellant Nieto knew of the commission of the crime. Right before the
shooting, appellant Antonio called him and he immediately went upstairs.
He saw that appellant shot Tuadles. Despite this knowledge, he failed to
arrest appellant and, instead, left the crime scene together with the latter. To
this extent, he assisted appellant Antonio in his escape.66
Furthermore, as correctly found by the trial court, appellant Nieto provided
false information to deceive the investigating authorities. He instructed
Bobis to answer falsely to the questions of the investigating officer, in order
37
to make it appear that there were no eyewitnesses to the incident and thus
make it more difficult for the police to solve the crime.
Accordingly, the court a quo was correct in convicting appellant as an
accessory to the crime, and he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
prescribed by law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we impose
on appellant Nieto the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional, as maximum.
Finally, we come to appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.’s appeal. After
carefully reviewing the facts and issues raised therein, we find that the trial
court erred in finding said appellant guilty as an accessory.
The trial court’s sole reason for convicting appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. was
his failure to produce the laser sight of the gun as evidence during the trial.
However, such omission does not amount to concealing or destroying the
body of the crime or effects or instruments thereof to prevent its discovery.
The laser sight had been surrendered to the police authorities so there was
no more need for discovery. Its loss thereafter does not make appellant
SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. an accessory. At most,
_______________
66 Cf.: People v. Lojo, 122 SCRA 753, 757 (1983).
680
680
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
as custodian thereof, he may be made answerable administratively.
In his testimony, he made clear that the loss was not intentional. He further
stated:
Q
Finally, Mr. Cartalla, what can you say about the charge against you as
alleged in the information that you tried to conceal or destroy the effects or
body of the crime to prevent its discovery?
A
It’s not true, sir.
Q
Why?
A
Because I did not conceal anything, I did not destroy anything on the body
of the crime and as far as I know, I did all my job as investigator and I
worked for it up to the wee hours of the morning up to the next morning, I
still did it and I gathered evidence and I submitted it to the Crime
Laboratory and even when at the time, I have been hearing that I will not be
the one who will investig ate, they got it from me without proper notice,
that they will take over the investigation, I still did my job, and on the fifth,
I was asked by Prosecutor Llorente to retrieve the slug and what I did was
even the investigation is not with me, I still did it, I still went to the IBC and
I still worked hard, I even remember . . .
Atty. Flaminiano
We want to make of record that the witness is now in tears at this moment.
COURT
38
Continue.
A
The companion of Inspector de Leon and PO2 Rojas even said that this
policeman is very hardworking, even the investigation is not with him
anymore, but still, he’s working and I answered him, whatever, whatever
they will charge to me, maybe it’s just their job and so, I will also do my
job. Because as far as I know, I will not be implicated because I have not
done anything, I have not done the charges that they filed against me, I was
surprised when I was given a confirmation that I was an accessory that is
why my youngest child even told me “kala ko Papa, Mabait ka?” and I told
him that it’s not true. For me, I have not done anything like that.
681
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
681
People vs. Antonio
Atty. Fernandez
That’s all for the witness, your Honor.
COURT
The way I look at your case, you are indicted here as an accessory because
according to one of the witnesses, the gun together with the laser sight was
handled to you and when that gun reached Crame, the laser sight was no
longer there, answer me, what happened?
A
The truth, your Honor, is, when the gun was submitted to me by Inspector
Cabrera, the laser sight was there, I immediately made the transmittal for
the laboratory and I described what is there, together with the laser and aft
er that, I placed it in a brown envelope, I placed it in my drawer. On the
second day, I was really busy on that day because I was the only one. I was
asking for assistance because I would go out, I will investigate and then I
just found out when I was about to submit the laser to the laboratory, I gave
the envelope together with the trans- mittal and when it was being received,
he checked it and he said “Sgt. Where is the laser sight?” and I said “it’s
there, attached.” And he said “please look at it.”
COURT
Who told you that?
A
The person who received, your Honor.
COURT
But in your transmittal, you wrote there that there was a laser?
A
Yes, your Honor. When I saw the envelope, there was no laser, I was
planning to go back right away but I just said, “okay, I will just cross it” out
and I did not erase because I want that I will not hide anything. It has
happened because maybe somebody is interested or I might have left in my
39
drawer. Because I will not hide it. That’s why I did not sno-pake it and I
just crossed it out so it can be read together with my initial and when I came
back, I asked them who touched my things.
COURT
What answer did you get?
682
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
A
There was no answer. Nobody was answering me, nobody was talking.67
From the foregoing, it is clear that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. did not
intentionally conceal or destroy the laser sight, and the prosecution failed to
prove that he did so with intent to derail the prosecution of the principal
accused. On the other hand, while the laser sight was an accessory device
attached to the gun, it was not essential to the commission, investigation
and prosecution of the crime. The gun itself, which was the instrument of
the crime, was surrendered to the authorities and presented as evidence in
court. The failure of appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. to present the laser sight as
part of the evidence did not in any way affect the outcome of the trial, much
less prevent the discovery of the crime. Furthermore, there is no showing
that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. profited by the non-presentation of the
laser sight.
Thus, under the definition of an accessory under the Revised Penal Code
and jurisprudence, appellant Cartalla, Jr.’s omission does not make him
liable as an accessory to the crime committed by appellant Antonio. Even
the Solicitor General submits that there are no grounds to convict appellant
Cartalla, to wit:
At the time the laser sight was turned over to Cartalla, the crime or its
corpus delicti had been discovered. Hence, the loss of the laser sight could
not have prevented the discovery of the crime. The essential instrument of
the crime, namely, a caliber .9 mm Beretta Model 92F with serial number
BER-041965-7 and black magazine had been preserved and presented as
evidence.
Neither could Cartalla be said to have profited with the non-presentation of
the laser sight as this was not proved by the prosecution. Either way,
concealing or profiting, there is no convicting motive for Cartalla to have so
committed. More so, as Cartalla was the investigating officer on the case.
_______________
67 TSN, March 14, 1997, pp. 21-23.
683
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
683
People vs. Antonio
It is submitted that the non-production of the laser sight by Cartalla did not
make him an accessory to the crime committed by Antonio, although he
may be administratively liable for the loss of a part of the evidence for the
prosecution in this case.68
40

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision in 684

Criminal Case No. 111232-H is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant
Alberto “Ambet” Antonio is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of HOMICIDE and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the
684
indeterminate penalty often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
as maximum. Accused-appellant Juanito Nieto y Nemer is likewise found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the crime of People vs. Antonio
HOMICIDE, and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years of amount of P4,388,649.18 unto the said heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles.
prision correccional, as maximum.
In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Accused-appellant Antonio is likewise ordered to pay to the heirs of
SO ORDERED.
Arnulfo B. Tuadles the following sums:
Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
(1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles;
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), I join Mr. Justice R.S. Puno in his
(2) P226,298.36 as actual damages;
concurring and dissenting opinion.
(3) P8,001,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity;
Puno, J., Please see concurring and dissenting opinion.
(4) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
(5) Costs.
PUNO, J.:
For failure to prove accused-appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the crime, he is ACQUITTED and
absolved of all liability, both criminal or civil. I agree with the majority decision except its finding that treachery did not
attend the killing of the victim, Arnulfo Tuadles, and the conclusion that the
In case of insolvency of appellant Alberto S. Antonio @ “Ambet,” appellant
accused-appellant, Alberto “Ambet” Antonio, should not be held guilty of
Juanito Nieto y Nemer shall be liable to pay one-half (1/2) of the above-
murder but only of homicide.
adjudicated sums or the
For proper perspective, I wish to relate the relevant facts on the issue of
_______________
treachery.

On November 2, 1996, at about 9:30 a.m., the victim, Arnulfo “Arnie”

68 Appellee’s Brief, Rollo, p. 395. Tuadles, 40 years old, a former professional basketball player and a family
41
man, was shot to death by accused-appellant Alberto “Ambet” Antonio, 59
years old and former Chairman of the Games and Amusement Board. The
murder weapon was a 9mm Beretta Model 92F pistol, with a laser sight.1
Tuadles sustained a single gunshot wound on the forehead, between the
eyes.2 The bullet hit the brain and exited
_______________
at the right portion of the back of the head.3 He died due to “intracranial
hemmorhage.”4
Dr. Jaime Leal, Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory,
conducted the autopsy examination on the Tuadles. His examination
showed that Tuadles was shot at close range, specifically at a distance of
less than 12 inches.5 The bullet’s trajectory was directed backwards,
slightly upwards and to the right.6
The autopsy also revealed that Tuadles suffered five (5) abrasions
(“gasgas”), located on his forehead, nose, tip of nose, cheek, and right lower
lip. He sustained these abrasions as he collapsed on the floor after he was
shot. There were also contusions on Tuadles’ forehead and lower lip that
could have been sustained when his face hit a hard blunt object, and
hematomas on both eyes caused by the “pulling of the blood in the spaces
between the eyes.” He had a lacerated wound on the cheek which could
have been caused by a forcible contact of the skin with a hard blunt object,
such as chairs or tables, when he was falling to the floor.7 All the injuries
were located on the head of the victim.
Security guard Jose Jimmy Bobis gave the eyewitness account of the
shooting. He reported at the IBC Club in Greenhills, San Juan, on
November 2, 1996 at 7:00 a.m. He relieved co-security guard Ernesto Olac.
At that time, there were only five (5) people inside the club: Antonio,
Tuadles, SPO4 Juanito Nieto, Olac and Bobis. Antonio and Tuadles were at
the second floor playing “pusoy dos,” SPO4 Nieto and Olac were sleeping
in the dining area at the ground floor, while Bobis was in the bar, also at the
ground floor, keeping watch of the premises.
_______________
686
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
In the course of his duty, Bobis heard Antonio and Tuadles laughing and
teasing each other (“nagkakantiyawan”) while playing “pusoy dos.” He
recognized the voice of Antonio because it was loud in contrast to Tuadles’
voice which was soft. At past 9:00 a.m., he heard Antonio say in a loud
voice: “Di ba may usapan tayo na ang mag-pa-pass ay mag-ta-tap ng
dalawang beses sa ibabaw ng mesa?” Antonio then said “Sige” Tuadles’
response was almost inaudible because he spoke in a soft, cool voice
(mahina at malamig ang boses).8 Again, Antonio spoke: “Barya lang itong
pinagla-laruan natin” (We are only playing for loose change). Tuadles kept
silent. Antonio then called: “Sarge, Sarge, Sarge!,” referring to SPO4 Nieto.
Bobis walked to the sleeping Nieto and informed him that Antonio was
calling him. They went to the second floor and saw Antonio and Tuadles
standing between the billiard table and the “pusoy” table. They were facing
each other but at a certain angle, and about three feet of space separated
them. Antonio appeared, hiding his right hand behind his back. He
(Antonio) cursed “putang ina ka kasi.” Tuadles uttered something which
Bobis could not understand because Tuadles’ back was turned on him.
Antonio then quickly raised his right hand, pointed a gun at the Tace of
Tuadles and fired the gun (“Mabilis na inangat niya ang kanang kamay niya
at itinapat sa mukha ni Arnie Tuadles at ipinutok ang baril”).9 Tuadles
twisted to the right and fell on the floor face down. Antonio removed the
gun’s magazine, cocked it and replaced its magazine. The gun had a laser
light attached to its end.10 Antonio ordered SPO4 Nieto to get the score
sheet and the cards laying on top of a table. SPO4 Nieto placed the cards on
a paper, folded it several times, and placed it inside the clutch bag of
Antonio. Bobis was taken aback by the incident. When he regained his
composure, he asked Antonio: “Boss, bakit nangyari ito.” Antonio did not
42
immediately respond but later pointed his finger at Bobis and then warned:
“Ikaw, huwag
_______________
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
687
People vs. Antonio
kang tumistigo, ha!” Bobis kept quiet due to fear. They all went downstairs.
Olac who heard the gunfire inquired from Bobis what happened. He told
him that Antonio shot Tuadles. Antonio then commanded Bobis to get the
key of Tuadles’ car. He did as he was told. Only two vehicles were parked
in the premises of the club: the Mercedes Benz van of Antonio and the car
of Tuadles. They boarded the van, with Antonio driving. Following them
was the car of Tuadles driven by Antonio’s driver. The driver left Tuadles’
car near Shaw Blvd. and rode in the van. They headed to the house of
Antonio. Thejr left the club at 10:00 a.m. and arrived at Antonio’s house in
Green Meadows at 11:30 a.m. On instruction of Antonio, his driver burned
the score sheet and the cards. They stayed at Antonio’s house for several
hours while Antonio conferred with his lawyer. Antonio’s lawyer told Bobis
that he should say that the shooting was an accident SPO4 Nieto instructed
Bobis to claim that he was outside the entrance of the club when the
shooting took place. Bobis, Nieto, Olac and Antonio’s driver returned to the
club at 5:00 p.m. Thirty minutes later, a team of policemen from San Juan
arrived. They found the lifeless body of Tuadles sprawled on the second
floor.
Police investigator SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. took the statement of Bobis that same
day. In his statement, Bobis denied seeing the shooting incident. On
November 4, 1996, Bobis happened to watch the television and he saw the
crying Mrs. Tuadles while being interviewed. Bothered by his conscience,
he requested the operations manager of their security agency to bring him to
the Eastern Police District. On November 5, 1996, he gave another
statement to the EPD and revealed the truth that fateful day of November 2,
1996.
Given these facts, the majority holds that treachery did not attend the killing
of Tuadles.
There is treachery (alevosia) when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself
688
688
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.11
The two elements that must be proved to establish treachery are: (1) the
employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety of the
offender from defensive and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the victim
no opportunity to defend himself, and (2) the means, method and manner of
execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the offender.12
I respectfully submit that the killing of Tuadles was characterized by
treachery.
First. There is little doubt that the first element of treachery was proved by
the prosecution. The victim, Tuadles, had absolutely no opportunity to
defend himself from the aggression of Antonio. The attack was sudden,
coming as it did like a thunderbolt from a blue sky. It was preceded by a not
too serious argument about a rule of the “pusoy dos” game which appeared
to have been overlooked by Tuadles. The little argument agitated Antonio
43
but not Tuadles. Hence, the attack was unexpected, especially because
Tuadles and Antonio did not have any prior misunderstanding. Tuadles
even endearingly called Antonio “uncle.” Likewise, Tuadles was a
basketball player when Antonio served as Chairman of the Games and
Amusement Board.
Second. The prosecution also proved the second element of treachery that
“the means, method and manner of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the offender” This element deals with the subjective
aspect of treachery, hence, the more difficult element to determine. We are
not, however, without any established jurisprudence in determining whether
the accused-appellant deliberately and consciously adopted the means,
method and manner of killing the victim. The authoritative La Fave and
Scott, after a survey of
_______________
VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000
689
People vs. Antonio
court rulings, tell us of the relevant evidence to consider, viz.:13
“On the basis of events before and at the time of the killing, the trier of fact
will sometimes be entitled to infer that the defendant actually premeditated
and deliberated his intentional killing. Three categories of evidence are
important for this purpose: (1) facts about how and what the defendant did
prior to the actual killing which show he was engaged in activity directed
toward the killing, that is, planning activity; (2) facts about the defendant’s
prior relationship and conduct with the victim from which motive may be
inferred; and (3) facts about the nature of the killing from which it may be
inferred that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the
defendant must have intentionally killed according to a preconceived
design. Illustrative of the first category are such acts by the defendant as
prior possession of the murder weapon, surreptitious approach of the victim,
or taking the prospective victim to a place where others are unlikely to
intrude. In the second category are prior threats by the defendants to do
violence to the victim, plans or desires of the defendant which would be
facilitated by the death of the victim, and prior conduct of the victim known
to have angered the defendant. As to the third category, the manner of
killing, what is required is evidence (usually based upon examination of the
victim’s body) showing that the wounds were deliberately placed at vital
areas of the body. The mere fact that the killing was attended by much
violence or that a great many wounds were inflicted is not relevant in this
regard, as such a killing is just as likely (or perhaps more likely) to have
been on impulse. Conduct by the defendant after the killing in an effort to
avoid detection and punishment is obviously not relevant for purposes of
showing premeditation and deliberation, as it only goes to show the
defendant’s state of mind at the time and not before or during the killing.”
(emphasis ours)
The evidence proves the deliberateness of the attack made by Antonio. The
attack was done with swiftness. It was motivated by the failure of Tuadles
to follow an agreement on the “pusoy” game. The deliberateness of the
attack is also shown by the fact that Tuadles was shot at close range, with
the muzzle of the gun less than 12 inches from Tuadles’ forehead.
_______________
Antonio aimed at Tuadles’ forehead, between the eyes. The bullet
penetrated Tuadles’ brain, destroyed its right hemisphere and caused
Tuadles’ instantaneous death. Clearly, Antonio chose to shoot Tuadles at a
vital part of his body. As a result, Tuadles became an instant statistic of the
graveyard.
With due respect, I do not agree with the majority that the case at bar
involves a spur of the moment killing, hence, there is no treachery. The
majority states that there was a prior heated altercation between Tuadles and
Antonio. The heated altercation allegedly forewarned Tuadles of the attack.
44

The so-called heated altercation, however, is not well-established by the Let’s focus on Mr. Antonio, you said his voice was loud, did you hear him
evidence. A replay of the facts will reveal that eyewitness Bobis initially mentioned (sic) anything at that time?
heard the two teasing each other (“nagkakantiyawan”). Later, an argument
developed between them which cannot be characterized as a “heated Atty. Flaminiano:
altercation.” Bobis testified as follows:14

“Q:
Leading, your Honor.
Now, this matter of ‘kantiyawan’ and ‘nagtatawanan’ iyong dalawa, how
COURT:
long did this continue during the per iod of time you were there?

A:
Answer.
A few seconds only.
A:

Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q:
Q:
What did you hear?
Would you be in a position to recognize the voices of Ambet Antonio and
Arnie Tuadles?

A: xxx xxx xxx

Yes, sir. _______________
Q:

Why? 14 TSN, Jaime Bobis, January 15, 1997, pp. 18-22.

A: 691
Arnie Tuadles’ voice is soft and Ambet Antonio’s voice is loud.

Q: VOL. 335, JULY 14, 2000

691
45

People vs. Antonio Prosecutor Llorente:

A:

Di ba may usapan tayo na ang mag-pa-pass ay mag-ta-tap ng dalawang May we put on record the answer of the witness in Tagalog?
beses sa ibabaw ng mesa?
COURT:

xxx xxx xxx

Granted.
Q:
A:
Before you heard this statement, did you hear other things from Mr. Ambet
Antonio apart from what you have said, before that? “Mahina at malamig ang boses. ”

A: Despite the soft response from Tuadles, Antonio continued with his
outburst, thus:15
None, sir.
“Q:

Going back now to Mr. Antonio, did you hear him again mentioned (sic) or
xxx xxx xxx say other things?

Q: A:

Was there any comment that you heard from Mr. Tuadles? Yes, sir.

A: Q:

Yes, sir. What did you hear from Mr. Ambet Antonio?

Q: A:

What did you hear from Mr. Tuadles? ‘Barya lang and pinagla-laruan natin.’ It’s only a (sic) loose change that we
are playing with here.
A:
Q:
I could not understand because his voice was soft and . . .
46
Did you hear any word from Mr. Tuadles?
A:
No more, sir.”
In sum, it was only Antonio who appeared agitated during the alleged
altercation. Tuadles spoke in a soft and cool voice that Bobis could hardly
hear and understand him. The characterization of the argument that
preceded the shooting of is decisive of the issue of treachery. I submit that
the argument between Antonio and Tuadles was trivial for it merely con-
_______________
15 TSN, Jose Jaime Bobis, January 15, 1997, p. 24.
692
692
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Antonio
cerned the inadvertence of Tuadles to tap the table when making a pass.
Nothing in the records shows that Tuadles violated the rule intentionally.
Nothing shows the degree of damage suffered by Antonio as a consequence
of Tuadles’ omission. It is thus my submission that the argument appears to
be slight and cannot justify the conclusion that Antonio acted in the heat of
passion or on impulse in killing the victim.
The case of People vs. Cruz16 is apropos. In said case, the accused and the
victim were “compadres” for having stood as sponsors in the baptism of a
common friend. The accused used to drive one of the tricycles of the victim
until the latter sold the tricycle the accused was driving. It was claimed that
the accused bore a grudge against the victim because of the said incident. At
any rate, while the victim was talking with a co-tricycle driver along the
street while waiting for passengers, the accused appeared and approached
the victim. Upon nearing the victim, accused angrily uttered, “Pare, walang
presidente-presidente sa akin” as he simultaneously drew out a gun from the
front portion of his waist and shot the victim with it point blank, hitting the
upper left eyebrow of the latter which caused him to fall on the ground.
Thereafter, accused left. This Court rejected the claim of the accused that
the shooting was accidental and noted with approval the observation of the
Solicitor General that “if the shooting of the victim were accidental, accused
would have come to his aid and taken him to a hospital, instead of
abandoning him.” The Court further held that the accused was liable for
murder. The victim-was unarmed. He did not have the least suspicion of the
accused’s design to shoot him. In contrast, accused had a gun. The victim,
therefore, had no chance to defend himself against the latter’s frontal attack.
Treachery qualified the killing to murder.
With due respect to the majority, I find the killing of the victim Tuadles
qualified by treachery. I vote to convict accused-appellant Antonio of
murder as charged.
_______________
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
Judgment modified.
Note.—Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression
commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim
unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated. (People vs. Nalangan, 270
SCRA 234 [1997])
——o0o—— People vs. Antonio, 335 SCRA 646, G.R. No. 128900 July
14, 2000
47

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED __________________

People vs. Teehankee, Jr.

G.R. Nos. 111206-08. October 6, 1995.* * SECOND DIVISION.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- 55

appellee, vs. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR.,

accused-appellant. VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995

Criminal Procedure; Out-of-Court Identification of Suspects; 55

Totality of Circumstances Test; Elements.—Out-of-court
identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with Same; Same; Same; There is no hard and fast rule as to the place
the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where
where suspects are identified by witnesses. Identification may be
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is
done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the crime and
also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a
the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim.—Using the
group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-
totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged irregularities
court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court
cited by appellant did not result in his misidentification nor was he
identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out
denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leino’s identification
rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements
of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records
of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and
reveal that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for security
relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have reasons. The need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the
and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security
following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the
officials and brought to the house where he was to make the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention
identification. The Leinos refused to have the identification at the
at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
NBI office as it was cramped with people and with high security risk.
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
Leino’s fear for his safety was not irrational. He and his companions
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
had been shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive, supposedly safe
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
subdivisions in the metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief of the
procedure.
Special Operations Group of the NBI, correctly testified that there is
48
no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are identified by
witnesses. Identification may be done in open field. It is often done
in hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh in the
mind of the victim.
Same; Same; Same; The burden is on the appellant to prove that his
mug shot identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of
impermissible suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the
admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino.—Appellant
cannot also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV
accounts of the shooting before he personally identified him. Indeed,
the records show that on July 15, 1991, while Leino was still in the
hospital, he was shown three (3) pictures of different men by the
investigators. He identified appellant as the gunman from these
pictures. He, however, categorically stated that, before the mug shot
identification, he has not seen any picture of appellant or read any
report relative to the shooting incident. The burden is on appellant to
prove that his mug shot identification was unduly suggestive. Failing
proof of impermissible suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the
admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino.
Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Testimony; Leino had no
illmotive to falsely testify against appellant.—We have no reason to
doubt the correctness of appellant’s identification by Leino. The
scene of the crime was well-lighted by a Meralco lamp post.
Appellant was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot Leino. The
incident happened for a full five (5) minutes. Leino had no ill-motive
to falsely testify against
56
56
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
appellant. His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He was
unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense counsels.
He never wavered in his identification of appellant. When asked how
sure he was that appellant was responsible for the crime, he
confidently replied: “I’m very sure. It could not have been somebody
else.”
Evidence; Witnesses; Testimony; There is no rule of evidence which
requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness whose statement
has not been priorly reduced to writing.—Appellant cannot likewise
capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to a sworn
statement the information revealed by Leino during his hospital
interviews. It was sufficiently established that Leino’s extensive
injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility. The
day he identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically
unable to speak. He was being fed through a tube inserted in his
throat. There is also no rule of evidence which requires the rejection
of the testimony of a witness whose statement has not been priorly
reduced to writing. Reliance by appellant on the case of People v.
Alindog to erode Leino’s credibility is misplaced. In Alindog,
accused was acquitted not solely on the basis of delay in taking his
statement, but mainly on the finding that the prosecution’s evidence
was, at best, circumstantial and “suspiciously short in important
details,” there being no investigation whatsoever conducted by the
police.
49
Same; Same; Same; Natural reaction of victims of criminal violence
is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the
manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body
movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be
easily erased from their memory.—We are not likewise impressed
with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have
remembered appellant’s face when the incident happened within a
span of five (5) minutes. Five (5) minutes is not a short time for
Leino to etch in his mind the picture of appellant. Experience shows
that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed
before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can
remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals.
We have ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal
violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and
observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face
and body movements of the assailant create an impression which
cannot be easily erased from their memory. In the case at bar, there is
absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to
appellant. The victims and appellant were unknown to each other
before their chance encounter. If Leino identified appellant, it must
be because appellant was the real culprit.
57
VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995
57
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Same; Same; Same; Court has taken judicial notice of the natural
reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution of crimes
considering the risks to their lives and limbs.—We reject appellant’s
submission. Cadenas’ initial reluctance to reveal to the authorities
what he witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial. He
related that he feared for his and his family’s safety. His fear was not
imaginary. He saw with his own eyes the senseless violence
perpetrated by appellant. He knew appellant belonged to an
influential family. It was only after consistent prodding and
assurance of protection from NBI officials that he agreed to
cooperate with the authorities. The Court has taken judicial notice of
the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution of
crimes considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these
all too real risks, the court has not considered the initial reluctance of
fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an indicium
of incredulity. It will not depart from this ruling.
Same; Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence; The harmless error rule
has been followed in our jurisdiction in dealing with evidence
improperly admitted in trial wherein its damaging quality and its
impact to the substantive rights of the litigant is examined. If the
impact is deemed slight and insignificant, the error is disregarded.—
Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial
judge violated the rule on res inter alios acta when he considered his
involvement in previous shooting incidents. This stance is a specie of
a mid1800 rule known as the English Exchequer Rule pursuant to
which “a trial court’s error as to the admission of evidence was
presumed to have caused prejudice and therefore, almost
automatically required a new trial.” The Exchequer rule has long
been laid to rest for even English appellate courts now disregard an
error in the admission of evidence “unless in its opinion, some
substantial wrong or miscarriage (of justice) has been occasioned.”
American courts adopted this approach especially after the
enactment of a 1915 federal statute which required a federal
50
appellate court to “give judgment after an examination of the entire
record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or
exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”
We have likewise followed the harmless error rule in our
jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial,
we examine its damaging quality and its impact to the substantive
rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and insignificant, we
disregard the error as it will not overcome the weight of the properly
admitted evidence against the prejudiced party.
58
58
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Same; Same; Positive Identification of Accused; The omission of the
NBI to compare the bullets fired from the bullets found at the scene
of the crime cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive
identification of appellant.—The NBI may have also failed to
compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the bullets found at
the scene of the crime. The omission, however, cannot exculpate
appellant. The omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary
value of the positive identification of appellant.
Civil Law; Damages; Exemplary Damages; The award of exemplary
damages is designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has
socially deleterious consequences and its imposition is required by
public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender.—Moreover,
we find that the grant of exemplary damages is called for by the
circumstances of the case. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, in
addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or corrective
damages may be adjudged in order to deter the commission of
similar acts in the future. The award for exemplary damages is
designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially
deleterious consequences. Its imposition is required by public policy
to suppress the wanton acts of an offender.
Same; Same; Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity;
Compensation for loss of earning capacity is awarded not for loss of
earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money, so it is not necessary
that the victim, at the time of injury or death, is gainfully
employed.—To be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not
necessary that the victim, at the time of injury or death, is gainfully
employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of
earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money. In Cariaga v. Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company, we awarded to the heirs of Cariaga a sum
representing loss of his earning capacity although he was still a
medical student at the time of injury. However, the award was not
without basis for Cariaga was then a fourth year medical student at a
reputable school; his scholastic record, which was presented at the
trial, justified an assumption that he would have been able to finish
his course and pass the board in due time; and a doctor, presented as
witness for the appellee, testified as to the amount of income Cariaga
would have earned had he finished his medical studies.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br.
45.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
51

59 feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Ronald
John Chapman who was hit in the chest, thereby inflicting mortal
wounds which directly caused the death of said Ronald John
VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995 Chapman.

59 “Contrary to law.”2

People vs. Teehankee, Jr. The Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4606
reads:
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
“That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of
Lino M. Patajo for accused-appellant. Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed
PUNO, J.: with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident premeditation, and by
means

_________________
Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. for the shooting of Roland John Chapman, Jussi Olavi
Leino and Maureen Hultman. Initially, he was charged with:
MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) 1 The Court received the Appellant’s Brief on March 21, 1994, the
FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI Appellee’s Brief on November 10, 1994 and Appellant’s Reply Brief
LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman died on on March 6, 1995. With the filing of the Reply Brief, the case was
October 17, 1991, during the course of the trial, the Information for deemed submitted for decision.
Frustrated Murder against accused was amended to MURDER.1
2 Original Records, p. 1.
The Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4605 thus
reads: 60

“That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of

Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this 60
Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed
with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident premeditation and by SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
means of treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
52
of treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro
Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds
which directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”3
Finally, the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No.
91-4607 reads:
“That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a
handgun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot one Jussi Olavi Leino on the head, thereby inflicting
gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have caused the death of
said Jussi Olavi Leino, thereby performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence,
but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or causes
independent of his will, that is, due to the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Jussi Olavi Leino which prevented his
death.
“Contrary to law.”4
In the two (2) Informations for frustrated murder initially filed
against accused, bail was set at twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
each. No bail was recommended for the murder of Roland John
Chapman. A petition for bail was thus filed by accused. Hearing was
set on August 9, 1991, while his arraignment was scheduled on
August 14, 1991.
At the hearing of the petition for bail on August 9, 1991, the
prosecution manifested that it would present the surviving victim,
Jussi Leino, to testify on the killing of Chapman and on the
circumstances resulting to the wounding of the witness himself and
Hultman. Defense counsel Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez objected on the
ground that the incident pending that day was hearing of the
evidence on the petition for bail relative to the murder charge for the
killing of Chapman only. He opined that Leino’s testimony on the
frustrated murder charges with respect to the wounding of
___________________
3 Ibid., p. 220.
4 Ibid., p. 41.
61
VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995
61
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Leino and Hultman would be irrelevant.5
Private prosecutor, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, countered that time would
be wasted if the testimony of Leino would be limited to the killing of
Chapman considering that the crimes for which accused were
charged involved only one continuing incident. He pleaded that
Leino should be allowed to testify on all three (3) charges to obviate
53
delay and the inconvenience of recalling him later to prove the two
(2) frustrated murder charges.6
By way of accommodation, the defense suggested that if the
prosecution wanted to present Leino to testify on all three (3)
charges, it should wait until after the arraignment of accused on
August 14, 1991. The defense pointed out that if accused did not file
a petition for bail, the prosecution would still have to wait until after
accused had been arraigned before it could present Leino.7
The private prosecutor agreed to defer the hearing on the petition for
bail until after arraignment of accused on the condition that there
shall be trial on the merits and, at the same time, hearing on the
petition for bail. The defense counsel acceded.8
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the three (3)
charges. The prosecution then started to adduce evidence relative to
all three (3) cases. No objection was made by the defense.9
A replay of the facts will show that on July 12, 1991, Jussi Olavi
Leino invited Roland Chapman, Maureen Hultman and other friends
for a party at his house in Forbes Park, Makati. The party started at
about 8:30 p.m. and ended at past midnight. They then proceeded to
Roxy’s, a pub where students of International School hang out.10
After an hour, they transferred to Vintage, another pub in Makati,
where they stayed until past 3:00 a.m. of July 13, 1991. Their group
returned to Roxy’s to pick up a friend of Maureen, then went back to
Leino’s house to eat.11
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62
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at
Campanilla Street, Dasmariñas Village, Makati. Chapman tagged
along.12 When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to
stop along Mahogany Street, about a block away from her house in
Campanilla Street. She wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did
not like to create too much noise in going back to her house. She did
not want her parents to know that she was going home that late.
Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and
listened to the radio.13
Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk along Mahogany
Street. When they reached the corner of Caballero and Mahogany
Streets, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by
accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and
stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car,
approached them, and asked: “Who are you? (Show me your) I.D.”
Leino thought accused only wanted to check their identities. He
reached into his pocket, took out his plastic wallet, and handed to
accused his Asian Development Bank (ADB) I.D.14 Accused did not
bother to look at his I.D. as he just grabbed Leino’s wallet and
pocketed it.15
Chapman saw the incident. All of a sudden, he manifested from
behind Leino and inquired what was going on. He stepped down on
the sidewalk and asked accused: “Why are you bothering us?”
Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and
fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment,
and asked: “Why did you shoot me?” Chapman crumpled on the
54
sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused
ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone.16
Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed the gun at him and
asked: “Do you want trouble?” Leino said “no” and took a step
backward. The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When
___________________
63
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
she came to her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming
for help. She repeatedly shouted: “Oh, my God, he’s got a gun. He’s
gonna kill us. Will somebody help us?”
All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to
Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit
down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move
away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. He knew he could
not run far without being shot by accused.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She
strayed to the side of accused’s car. Accused tried but failed to grab
her. Maureen circled around accused’s car, trying to put some
distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two.
Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to
shut up and sit down beside Leino.17
Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. Two (2) meters
away and directly in front of them stood accused.18 For a moment,
accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot
Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the
sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot
and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was
happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away.19
Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least
three (3) people looking on and standing outside their houses along
Caballero Street.20 The three were: DOMINGO FLORECE, a
private security guard hired by Stephen Roxas to secure his residence
at #1357 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, Makati;21 VICENTE
MANGUBAT, a stay-in driver of Margarita Canto, residing at #1352
Caballero Street, corner Mahogany Street, Dasmariñas Village;22
and AGRIPINO CADENAS, a private security guard assigned at the
house of Rey
___________________
64
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Dempsey, located at #1351 Caballero Street, corner Mahogany
Street, Dasmariñas Village.23
Security guards Florece and Cadenas were then on duty at the house
of their employer, while driver Mangubat was in his quarters,
preparing to return to his own house. These three (3) eyewitnesses
heard the first gunshot while at their respective posts.
Upon hearing the first shot, Florece went out to Caballero Street to
see what was happening, while Mangubat and Cadenas peeped over
the fence of their employer’s house and looked out to Caballero
Street. Each saw a man (Chapman) sprawled on the ground, another
55
man (Leino) sitting on the sidewalk, a third man standing up and
holding a gun and a woman (Hultman). They saw the gunman shoot
Leino and Hultman and flee aboard his Lancer car. However,
because of Florece’s distance from the scene of the crime,24 he was
not able to discern the face of the gunman. He saw the control
numbers of the gunman’s car as 566. He described the getaway car
as a box-type Lancer, its color somewhat white (“medyo puti”).25
Cadenas noticed in full the plate number of the getaway car and gave
it as PDW 566. He described the car as silver metallic gray.26 Both
Cadenas and Mangubat saw the gunman’s face. They had a good
look at him. Cadenas was then a mere four (4) meters away from the
gunman’s car,27 while Mangubat was about twenty (20) meters
away from the scene of the crime.28 The three confirmed that the
corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets where the shooting took
place was adequately illuminated by a Meralco lamppost at the time
of the incident.29
_______________
65
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
After the gunman sped away, Mangubat ran outside his employer’s
house and went near the scene of the crime. He noticed security
guard Florece along Caballero Street. A man on a bike passed by and
Mangubat requested him to report the shooting incident to the
security officers of Dasmariñas Village.30 Meanwhile, Florece
returned to his post and narrated to his employer, Mrs. Helen Roxas,
what he saw. Mrs. Roxas repaired to the crime scene while Florece
noted the incident in his logbook (Exhibit “B”). He also jotted down
the license plate control number of the gunman’s car as 566.31
The security guards of Dasmariñas Village came after a few minutes.
They rushed Leino and Maureen to the Makati Medical Center for
treatment.32
The Makati police and agents of the NBI also came. Patrolman
JAMES BALDADO of the Makati police, together with SPO3
ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, investigated the incident.33 Their initial
investigation disclosed that the gunman’s car was a box-type
Mitsubishi Lancer with plate control number 566. They checked the
list of vehicles registered with the village Homeowners’ Association
and were able to track down two (2) Lancer cars bearing plate
control number 566. One was registered in the name of JOSE
MONTAÑO of 1823 Santan Street, Dasmariñas Village, with plate
number PKX 566, and another was traced to accused CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE, JR., of 1339 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village,
with plate number PDW 566.
SALVADOR RANIN, Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG)
of the NBI, was also tasked by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim34 to
head a team to investigate the shooting. Ranin’s team immediately
proceeded to the house of Jose Montaño35 where
___________________
66
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
they found ahead of them the Makati police and operatives of the
Constabulary Highway Patrol. Ranin tried to verify from Mrs.
56
Montaño whether the white Lancer car registered in the name of Mr.
Montaño and bearing plate number 566 was the gunman’s car. Mrs.
Montaño denied and declared they had already sold the car to
Saldaña Enterprises. She averred the car was being used by one Ben
Conti, a comptroller in said company, who resides in Cubao, Quezon
City. Mrs. Montaño called up her husband and informed him about
the investigation. She also called up Conti and asked him to bring the
car to the house.36
Jose Montaño came around noon. Conti followed with the white
Lancer car. Ranin brought them to the NBI office for investigation,
together with the Lancer car. At the NBI, Ranin inquired from
Montaño the whereabouts of his car on July 12 and 13, 1991.
Montaño informed him that the car was at the residence of his
employee, Ben Conti, at E. Rodriguez Street, Cubao, Quezon City,
the night of July 12, 1991. In the morning of July 13, 1991, Conti
drove the car to their office at Saldaña Enterprises. Conti confirmed
this information. Ranin received the same confirmation from two (2)
NBI agents who made a countercheck of the allegation. Upon
Ranin’s request, Montaño left his car at the NBI parking lot pending
identification by possible witnesses.37
On July 14, 1991, a team of NBI agents conducted an on-the-spot
investigation and neighborhood inquiry of the shooting incident.
They interviewed Domingo Florece and asked him to report to their
office the next day for further investigation.38 They also interviewed
Agripino Cadenas who was reluctant to divulge any information and
even denied having witnessed the incident. Sensing his reluctance,
they returned to Cadenas’ post at Dasmariñas tillage that night and
served him a subpoena, inviting him to appear at the NBI office for
investigation the next day.39 The NBI agents also talked with
Armenia Asliami, an
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VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995
67
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Egyptian national residing at #1350 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas
Village, near the scene of the crime. Asliami informed the agents that
the gunman’s car was not white but light gray. A foreign national,
Asliami was afraid and refused to give a statement about the
incident. The agents exerted every effort to convince Asliami to
cooperate, assuring her of their protection. Ranin even asked a
representative of the Egyptian embassy to coax Asliami to cooperate.
They failed.40
On July 15, 1991, Florece and Cadenas appeared at the NBI office as
summoned. Florece readily executed a sworn statement.41 Cadenas,
however, continued to feign ignorance and bridled his knowledge of
the incident. He was lengthily interviewed. At around 2:00 p.m., the
NBI agents informed SOG Chief Ranin that Cadenas was still
withholding information from them. Ranin talked to Cadenas in his
office. Cadenas confided to Ranin his fear to get involved in the
case. He was apprehensive that the gunman would harass or harm
him or his family. After Ranin assured him of NBI protection,
Cadenas relented.42
The next day, July 16, 1991, Cadenas gave a full disclosure to Ranin.
He described the gunman’s car as a box-type Lancer with plate
number PDW 566. He was brought to the NBI parking lot where
Montaño’s white Lancer car was parked to identify the gunman’s
57
car. Ranin asked Cadenas if Montaño’s was the gunman’s car.
Cadenas replied that its color was different. Ranin directed him to
look around the cars in the parking lot and to point the color that
most resembled the color of the gunman’s car. He pointed to a light
gray car. Ranin told him that the color of the car he pointed to was
not white but light gray.43
Ranin then asked Cadenas if he could identify the gunman. Cadenas
replied in the affirmative. Ranin led Cadenas to his office and
showed him ten (10) pictures of different men (Exhibits “CC-1” to
“CC-10”) taken from the NBI files. One of the pictures belonged to
accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Cadenas studied the
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68
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
pictures, picked accused’s picture (Exhibit “CC-7”), and identified
him as the gunman. Cadenas wrote his name and the date at the back
of said picture. Atty. Alex Tenerife of the NBI then took down
Cadenas’ statement.44
Ranin sent his agents and the witnesses to the Makati Regional Trial
Court to apply for a search warrant. After a searching examination of
the witnesses, Judge Rebecca Salvador issued a search warrant
(Exhibit “RR”), authorizing the NBI to search and seize the silver
metallic gray, 1983 Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by accused,
bearing plate number PDW 566. Ranin and his agents drove to
accused’s house at #1339 Caballero Street, Dasmariñas Village, to
implement the warrant.45
At accused’s house, Ranin informed Mrs. Pilar Teehankee, mother of
accused, of their search warrant. Ranin also told Mrs. Teehankee that
they had orders from Director Lim to invite accused to the NBI
office for investigation. Mrs. Teehankee informed them that accused
was not in the house at that time. She excused herself, went to the
kitchen and called up someone on the phone.46
In the meantime, Ranin and his men slipped to the Teehankee garage
and secured accused’s car. After a while, Mrs. Teehankee joined
them. Ranin asked her for the car keys but she told him that the keys
were with accused. Upon Ranin’s request, Mrs. Teehankee got in
touch with accused on the phone. Ranin conversed with accused and
invited him to the NBI for investigation. Accused assured Ranin that
he would report to the NBI later that day. The agents then towed the
car of accused to the NBI office.47
At around 9:00 p.m., accused’s brother, Raul Teehankee, arrived at
the NBI office and waited for accused. Accused came, escorted by
three (3) Makati policemen, after an hour. He informed them that he
just came from the Makati police station where he was also
investigated. He told Lim that he has given a statement to the Makati
police and was brought to the PC Crime
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69
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Laboratory for paraffin test.48
58
Accused’s NBI investigation started. Lim asked accused of the
whereabouts of his Lancer car at the time of the shooting. Accused
claimed that his car was involved in an accident a few weeks back
and was no longer functioning. The car had been parked in his
mother’s house at Dasmariñas Village since then. Due to the lateness
of the evening, the group decided to continue the investigation the
following day.49
The next day, July 17, 1991, after breakfast at the Manila Hotel, Lim
pressed accused on what really happened at Dasmariñas Village.
Accused said he did not see anything. Lim apprised accused that he
would be confronted with some eyewitnesses. Accused sank into
silence.50
Lim directed Ranin to prepare a lineup at his office. Accused was
requested to join the lineup composed of seven (7) men and he
acceded. Cadenas was called from an adjoining room51 and Ranin
asked him to identify the gunman from the lineup. Forthwith,
Cadenas pointed to accused.52 Accused merely stared at Cadenas.53
On the same day, then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco, Ranin and
two (2) other agents brought accused to Forbes Park for further
identification by the surviving victim, Jussi Leino. Leino has just
been discharged from the hospital the day before. Since Leino’s
parents were worried about his safety, they requested the NBI to
conduct the identification of the gunman in Forbes Park where the
Leinos also reside. The NBI agreed.54
House security agents from the U.S. embassy fetched Leino at his
house and escorted him and his father to a vacant house in
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70
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Forbes Park, along Narra Avenue. After a couple of minutes, Leino
was brought out of the house and placed in a car with slightly tinted
windows. The car was parked about five (5) meters away from the
house. Inside the car with Leino was his father, NBI-SOG Chief
Salvador Ranin and a driver. Leino was instructed to look at the men
who would be coming out of the house and identify the gunman from
the lineup.55
A group of five to six men (including accused) then came out of the
unoccupied house, into the street, in a line-up. Leino noticed that one
of them was wearing sunglasses. Since Leino could not yet speak at
that time due to the extensive injury on his tongue, he wrote down on
a piece of paper a request for one of the men in the lineup to remove
his sunglasses. Leino handed this written request to his father. The
men in the lineup were herded back inside the house. After a couple
of minutes, they again stepped out and none was wearing sunglasses.
From the lineup, Leino identified accused as the gunman.56
The agents brought back accused to the NBI. They prepared and
referred the cases of murder and double frustrated murder against
accused to the Department of Justice for appropriate action. At the
inquest, Fiscal Dennis Villa-Ignacio did not recommend bail insofar
as the murder charge was concerned. Hence, accused was detained at
the NBI.57
The shooting incident was also investigated by the Makati Police.
Pat. Baldado went to see security guard Vicente Mangubat at his
post, at the residence of his employer in Dasmariñas Village.
59
Baldado interviewed Mangubat and invited him to the Makati police
station where his statement (Exhibit “D”) was taken.58
The next day, July 16, 1991, at about 8:30 a.m., Pat. Baldado fetched
Mangubat from his house and brought him to the Makati police
station. At the station, Baldado told him to wait for a man who would
be coming and see if the person was the gunman. Mangubat was
posted at the top of the stairs at the second floor of
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VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995
71
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
the station.59
After a couple of hours, accused, came with Makati police Major
Lovete. He ascended the stairs, passed by Mangubat and proceeded
to Major Lovete’s office at the second floor. While accused was
going up the stairs, Pat. Baldado inquired from Mangubat if accused
was the gunman. Mangubat initially declined to identify accused,
saying that he wanted to see the man again to be sure. He also
confided to Pat. Baldado that he was nervous and afraid for accused
was accompanied by a police Major. When accused came out from
Major Lovete’s office, Pat. Baldado again asked Mangubat if
accused was the gunman. Mangubat nodded his head in response.60
Accused, together with Major Lovete and Pat. Baldado, boarded a
Mercedes Benz and left. Mangubat was brought back to his post at
Dasmariñas Village by other Makati policemen.61
Two (2) days later, Pat. Baldado visited Mangubat at his employer’s
house and asked him again if accused was really the gunman. Once
more, Mangubat answered in the affirmative. Pat. Baldado told
Mangubat that he would no longer ask him to sign a statement which
he (Baldado) earlier prepared (Exhibit “HHH”).62 Baldado then
left.63
In the afternoon of July 23, 1991, Mangubat was also questioned by
the NBI agents. Director Lim asked Mangubat if he could recognize
the gunman. Mangubat said he could. Mangubat was shown twelve
(12) pictures (Exhibits “E” to “E-11”) of different men and was
asked to identify the gunman from them. He chose one picture
(Exhibit “E-10”), that of accused, and identified him as the gunman.
Mangubat signed at the back of said picture. Mangubat’s statement
was taken. He was asked to return to the NBI the next day to make a
personal identification.64
When Mangubat returned, a lineup was prepared in Lim’s office in
the presence of the media. At that time, accused’s
___________________
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
counsels, Attys. Jimenez and Malvar, were at the office of then Asst.
Director Epimaco Velasco protesting to the submission of accused to
identification. They pointed out that since the cases against accused
60

had already been filed in court and they have secured a court order CHEST FOR RIBS X-RAY #353322
for the transfer of accused to the Makati municipal jail, any
identification of accused should be made in the courtroom. Asst. July 13, 1991
Director Velasco insisted on the identification as it was part of their ______________
on-going investigation. Eventually, accused’s counsels acquiesced
but requested that identification be made without the presence of the 73
media. Velasco turned them down and explained that if accused is
not identified in the lineup, the media coverage would favor
accused.65
VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995
All that time, accused was at the SOG office. He refused to join the
73
lineup at Lim’s office and remained seated. Ranin was compelled to
bring to the SOG office the men composing the lineup and he asked People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
them to go near accused. Ranin then told Mangubat to go in the
office. Mangubat pointed to accused as the gunman. No demonstrable evidence of fracture. Note of radioopaque foreign
body (bullet fragments) along the superior alveolar border on the
With the identification of accused by Mangubat, the NBI wrote finis right. No remarkable findings.
to its investigation.66
CT SCAN #43992 July 13, 1991
JUSSI LEINO, the surviving victim, suffered the following injuries:
Small hyperdensities presumably
“FINDINGS:
bullet and bone fragments in the
= Abrasion, 0.5 cm., temporal area, left.
right palatine, tongue and
= Wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape, 1.0 cm. in
diameter, located at the upper lip, mouth, along the medial line, tonsillar regions with associated
directed backwards and downwards, fracturing the maxillary bone
soft tissue swelling.
and central and lateral incisors, both sides, to the buccal cavity then
lacerating the tongue with fragments of the bullet lodged in the right Anterior maxillary bone comminuted
palatine, tongue and tonsillar region.
fracture.
SKULL
Temporal lobe contusions with small
61
hematomata on the right side.
Minimal subarachnoid hemorrhage.
Intact bone calvarium.
x x x”67
Dr. Pedro Solis, testified that the bullet entered the left temple of
Leino. After entering Leino’s head, it fractured his upper jaw and his
front teeth. Some of the bullet fragments pierced his palette and
tongue. Brain scanning revealed contusions on the temporal lobe and
hemorrhage on the covering of the brain. Physical deformity resulted
as a consequence of the gunshot wound because of the fractured
upper jaw and the loss of the front teeth. Sutures were performed on
the upper portion of his tongue. Nonetheless, Leino’s injuries on the
tongue caused him difficulty in speaking.68
Dr. Solis also testified as to the relative position of Leino and the
gunman. He opined that the muzzle of the gun, like in the case of
Maureen, must have been at a higher level than the victim’s head. He
concluded that the gun must have been pointed above Leino’s head
considering the acuteness and downward
_________________
67 As per the medico-legal report of Dr. Pedro P. Solis, Exhibit “K,”
Folder of Prosecution Exhibits, p. 138.
68 TSN, September 18, 1991, pp. 85-92.
74
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
trajectory of the bullet.69
Dr. Leovigildo C. Isabela, a neuro-surgeon at the Makati Medical
Center, operated on MAUREEN HULTMAN. He testified that when
he first saw Maureen, she was unconscious and her face was
bloodied all over. Maureen had a bullet hole on the left side of the
forehead, above the eyebrow. Brain tissues were oozing out of her
nostrils and on the left side of the forehead where the bullet
entered.70
They brought Maureen to the x-ray room for examination of her
skull. She was also given a CT scan. The examination revealed that
she suffered injuries on the skull and brain. There were several
splintered bullets in her brain and the major portion of the bullet,
after it fragmented, was lodged beneath her right jaw.71
Maureen was rushed to the operating room for surgery. Dr. Isabela
led a team who operated on her brain to arrest the bleeding inside her
head, remove devitalized brain tissues and retrieve the splintered
bullets embedded in her brain. Due to the extensive swelling of
Maureen’s brain and her very unstable condition, he failed to patch
the destroyed undersurface covering of her brain.72 After the
surgery, Maureen’s vital signs continued to function but she
remained unconscious. She was wheeled to the ICU for further
observation.
62
Two (2) weeks later, brain tissues and fluid continue to flow out of
Maureen’s nostrils due to the unpatched undersurface covering of her
brain, leaving the swollen portion of her brain exposed. A second
surgery was made on July 30, 1991 to repair Maureen’s brain
covering. He used the fascia lata of Maureen’s right thigh to replace
the destroyed covering of the brain. Nonetheless, Maureen remained
unconscious. The trickle of brain tissues through her nose was
lessened but Maureen developed infection as a result of the
destruction of her brain covering. Maureen developed brain abscess
because of the infection. She underwent a third operation to remove
brain abscess and all
_______________
VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995
75
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
possible focus of infection.73
Testifying on the extensive injuries suffered by Maureen Hultman,
Dr. Solis explained that Maureen was shot at the left side of the
forehead. The bullet entry was at 1.5 cm. above the eyebrow. Upon
entering the forehead, the bullet fragmented into pieces and went
from the left to the right side of the temple, fracturing the frontal
bone of the skull. The bullet eventually settled behind the right jaw
of Maureen.74
The wound inflicted on Maureen was mortal for it hit one of the most
vital parts of the body, the brain. When Maureen was subjected to
CT scan, they discovered hemorrhage in her brain. After the bullet
hit her head, it caused hemorrhagic lesion on the ventricles of the
brain and the second covering of the brain.75
The bullet also injured Maureen’s eye sockets. There was swelling
underneath the forehead brought about by edema in the area.
Scanning also showed that Maureen’s right jaw was affected by the
fragmented bullet. The whole interior portion of her nose was also
swollen.76
A team of doctors operated on Maureen’s brain. They tried to control
the internal bleeding and remove the splintered bullets, small bone
fragments and dead tissues. The main bullet was recovered behind
Maureen’s right jaw. There was also an acute downward trajectory of
the bullet. Hence, it was opined that Maureen was shot while she was
seated.77
With each passing day, Maureen’s condition deteriorated. Even if
Maureen survived, she would have led a vegetating life and she
would have needed assistance in the execution of normal and
ordinary routines.78 She would have been completely blind on the
left eye and there was possibility she would have also lost her vision
on the right eye. All her senses would have been modified and the
same would have affected her motor functions. There was practically
no possibility for Maureen to return to
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
63
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
normal.79
Maureen did not survive her ordeal. After ninety-seven (97) days of
confinement in the hospital, she ceased to be a breathing soul on
October 17, 1991.
For his exculpation, accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi.
Accused claimed that on said date and time, he was not anywhere
near the scene of the crime. He alleged that he was then in his house
at #53 San Juan, Barrio Kapitolyo, Pasig. He slept at around 1:00
a.m. on July 13, 1991 and woke up at around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. that
same morning. Accused avowed his two (2) maids could attest to his
presence in his house that fateful day.80
Accused averred that he only came to know the three (3) victims in
the Dasmariñas shooting when he read the newspaper reports about
it. He denied knowing prosecution eyewitnesses Agripino Cadenas
and Vicente Mangubat before they identified him as the gunman.81
Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray
Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He, however,
claimed that said car ceased to be in good running condition after its
involvement in an accident in February 1991. Since May 1991 until
the day of the shooting, his Lancer car had been parked in the garage
of his mother’s house in Dasmariñas Village. He has not used this
car since then. Accused, however, conceded that although the car
was not in good running condition, it could still be used.82
Accused said that on July 16, 1991, he went to the Makati police
station at around 5:00 p.m. upon invitation of Chief of Police Remy
Macaspac and Major Lovete who wanted to ask him about the
ownership of the Lancer car parked in his mother’s house. He readily
gave a statement to the Makati police denying complicity in the
crime. He submitted himself to a paraffin test. He was accompanied
by the Makati police to the Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame and
was tested negative for gunpowder
________________
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77
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
nitrates.83 After the test, he asked the Makati policemen to
accompany him to the NBI for he had earlier committed to his
mother that he would present himself to Director Lim.84
He arrived at Director Lim’s Office at about 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. He
furnished Lim with the statement he earlier gave to the Makati
police. Thereafter, Lim detained him at the NBI against his will.85
The following day, July 17, 1991, Lim and his agents brought him to
the Manila Hotel for breakfast. When they returned to the NBI, he
was asked to proceed to Lim’s office. On his way, he saw a lineup
formed inside Lim’s office. The NBI agents forced him to join the
lineup and placed him in the number seven (7) slot. He observed that
the man who was to identify him was already in the room. As soon
as he walked up to the lineup, Cadenas identified him as the
gunman.86
A second identification was made on the same day at a house in
Forbes Park. The NBI agents brought him to Forbes Park but he
64
never saw Jussi Leino who allegedly identified him as the gunman in
a lineup.87
A third identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He was then
seated at the office of Ranin for he refused to join another lineup.
Despite his protest, the NBI agents insisted on the conduct of the
identification and ordered a group of men to line up alongside him.
While thus seated, he was identified by Mangubat as the gunman. He
complained that he was not assisted by counsel at any stage of said
investigation.88
The defense also presented CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE III, son of
accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. He testified that from May 1989 to
February 1991, he had been using his father’s Lancer car bearing
plate number PDW 566 in going to school.89
In February 1991, while driving his father’s Lancer car, he
accidentally hit a bicycle driver and two (2) trucks parked at the
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
side of the road. The accident resulted in the death of the bicycle
driver and damage to his father’s car,90 especially on its body. The
timing of the engine became a little off and the car was hard to start.
They had the car repaired at Reliable Shop located in Banawe Street,
Quezon City. After a month, he brought the car to the residence of
his grandmother, Pilar Teehankee, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati.
He personally started the car’s engine and drove it to Makati from
the shop in Quezon City. He did not bring the car to their house in
Pasig for it was still scheduled for further repairs and they preferred
to have the repair done in a shop in Makati. Teehankee III claimed
that from that time on, he was prohibited by his father from using the
car because of his careless driving. He kept the keys to the car and
since he was busy in school, no further repair on said car had been
made.91
Accused also imputed the commission of the crimes at bar to Anders
Hultman, adoptive father of deceased victim Maureen Hultman. He
capitalized on a newspaper report that the gunman may have been an
overprotective father. This theory was formed when an eyewitness
allegedly overheard Maureen pleading to the gunman: “Huwag,
Daddy. Huwag, Daddy.” The defense presented Anders Hultman as a
hostile witness.
ANDERS HULTMAN testified that he is a Swedish national. He and
Vivian Hultman were married in the Philippines in 1981. Vivian had
two (2) children by her previous marriage, one of whom was
Maureen. He legally adopted Vivian’s two (2) daughters in 1991. He
and Vivian had three (3) children of their own.92
The defense confronted Anders with one of the angles of the crime in
the initial stage of the investigation, i.e., that Maureen was overheard
pleading to the gunman: “Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy.” Anders
explained that Maureen could not have uttered
___________________
90 As a result of this accident, a criminal charge for reckless
imprudence was filed against him. However, in view of the
65
desistance of the victim’s parents, the case against him was
dismissed; id., pp. 11-14; See also Resolution, dated May 16, 1991,
Exhibit “30,” Folder of Defense Exhibits, p. 60.
VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995
79
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
those words for Maureen never spoke Tagalog. He also said that all
his children call him “Papa,” not “Daddy.”93
On July 12, 1991, he and Vivian permitted Maureen to have a night
out but instructed her to be home by 2:00 a.m. Maureen just received
her first salary in her first job and she wanted to celebrate with
friends. At the time of the shooting, he and his wife were sleeping in
their house. He woke up at around 5:15 a.m. of July 13, 1991 when a
security guard came to their house and informed them about the
killings.94
Anders admitted he had been vocal about the VIP treatment accorded
to accused at the Makati municipal jail. On several occasions, he
checked on accused in jail and discovered that accused was not in his
cell. The jail guards even covered up accused’s whereabouts. His
complaint was investigated by the Congressional Committee on
Crime Prevention, headed by Congressman Concepcion.95
The defense also presented two (2) Makati policemen, PAT. JAMES
F. BALDADO and SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, who
investigated the shooting.
Pat. Baldado testified that in the course of his investigation, he
learned from Mr. Jose Montaño that he sold his white Lancer car,
with plate number PKX 566, to Saldaña Lending Investors in
February 1991. This car was assigned to Ben Conti, Operations
Manager of said company and was in the residence of Conti at the
time of the shooting. The other witnesses he interviewed confirmed
that Montaño’s white Lancer car was not in the vicinity of
Montaño’s residence at the time of the incident.96
SPO3 Fernandez testified that he interviewed security guard Vicente
Mangubat. Mangubat saw the gunman and the get-away car but
could not give the control letters of the car’s license plate. Fernandez
went to one of the houses at the corner of Mahogany and Caballero
Streets and asked the maid therein if he could use the phone. After
placing a call, the maid told him that he saw the gunman and heard
one of the victims say:
________________
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
“Daddy, don’t shoot. Don’t, don’t.” Fernandez tried to get the maid’s
name but the latter refused. The defense did not present this maid in
court nor asked the court to subpoena her to testify. Neither was the
alleged statement of the maid included in the Progress Report
(Exhibit “13”) prepared by the Makati police investigators.97
66
SPO3 Fernandez saw Mangubat the next time on July 16, 1991 when
he and Baldado fetched the latter at Dasmariñas Village for
identification of the gunman at the Makati police station.
At the police station, Fernandez and Baldado posted Mangubat at the
lobby. After a few minutes, accused and company arrived. When
accused passed by them, they instructed Mangubat to look around
and see if he could identify the gunman. Mangubat failed to identify
accused. Mangubat told Fernandez that the gunman was younger and
shorter than accused.98
SPO3 Fernandez also took the statement of security guard Domingo
Florece (Exhibit “MM”). It was signed by Florece in his presence. In
said statement, Florece described the gunman’s car as “medyo puti”
(somewhat white).99
ELIZABETH AYONON, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, testified on the paraffin test she conducted on July 17,
1991 on both hands of accused.100 As per Chemistry Report No. C
274-91,101 the test yielded a negative result of gunpowder nitrates
on accused’s hands. In said Report, she noted that accused was
subjected to paraffin test more than seventy-two (72) hours after the
shooting incident. She explained that 72 hours is the reasonable
period within which nitrate residues may not be removed by ordinary
washing and would remain on the hands of a person who has fired a
gun.102
_________________
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People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
ATTY. MANUEL Q. MALVAR, one of accused’s counsel of
record, also took the stand for the defense. He testified that in the
course of handling the cases, he was able to confer with Ponferrada,
Cadenas’ supervisor at the Security agency where Cadenas was
employed. Ponferrada informed him that Cadenas confided to him
that he was tortured at the NBI and was compelled to execute a
statement. Ponferrada, allegedly, refused to testify. Atty. Malvar,
however, admitted the defense did not compel the attendance of
Ponferrada by subpoena. On rebuttal, Cadenas denied the torture
story.
Atty. Malvar also admitted that he and Atty. Jimenez were aware of
the irregularities committed in the off-court identification of their
client. When asked what he did to remedy this perceived irregularity,
Malvar said he objected to the conduct of the lineup. When further
pressed whether he filed a petition for review raising this issue with
the Department of Justice upon the filing of the cases therewith, he
said he did not. He offered the excuse that he deferred to Atty.
Jimenez, the principal counsel of accused at that time. He also
declared that although they knew that arraignment would mean
waiver of the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the investigation
and preliminary investigation, he and Atty. Jimenez allowed accused
to be arraigned.103
The defense likewise relied on a number of news accounts reporting
the progress in the investigation of the case. It presented seven (7)
newspaper reporters as witnesses, viz: Nestor Barrameda of the
Manila Times, Martin Marfil and Dave Veridiano of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, Nida Mendoza of Malaya, Itchie Kabayan and Alex
67
Allan of the People’s Journal and Elena Aben of the Manila Bulletin.
The bulk of defense evidence consists of newspaper clippings and
the testimonies of the news reporters, thus:
NESTOR BARRAMEDA, a news reporter of the Manila Times
identified two (2) news reports as having been partly written by him.
One was a news item, entitled: “JUSTICE DEPT ORDERS PROBE
OF THREE METRO KILLINGS” (Exhibit “1”), appearing on the
July 16, 1991 issue of the Manila Times.104 He,
___________________
82
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
however, clarified that a news report is usually the product of
collaborative work among several reporters. They follow the practice
of pooling news reports where several reporters are tasked to cover
one subject matter. The news editor then complies the different
reports they file and summarizes them into one story.105
The defense lifted only certain portions of Exhibit “1” and marked
them in evidence as follows:
Exhibit “1-A”:
“Bello directed NBI Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco to take over
the investigation of the murders of Roland Chapman, 21, Eldon
Maguan, 25, and three members of a family—Estrellita Vizconde
and her daughters, Carmela, 19, and Anne Marie Jennifer, 7.”
Exhibit “1-B”
“Police said that Chapman’s assailant could have been angered when
Hultman, a 10th grader at the International School in Makati was
escorted home by Chapman after going to a disco.”
Exhibit “1-C”
“The lone gunman, witnesses told police, first pistol-whipped
Hultman.”
Exhibit “1-D”
“The same witnesses said Chapman and Leino were shot when they
tried to escape.”
Exhibit “1-E”
“Other angles
Velasco said “we are pursuing two angles” in the Chapman murder.
68
One, he said, is the jealousy angle and the other is a “highly
sensitive” matter that might involve influential people.”106
__________________
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Barrameda testified that he had no personal knowledge of the content
of the news items marked as Exhibits “1-C” to “1-D.” He just culled
them from previous news reports of other newspapers. He admitted
that the only portion he wrote based on an actual interview with NBI
Asst. Director Velasco was Exhibit “1-E.”
Barrameda identified another news item in the July 23, 1991 issue of
the Manila Times, entitled: “NBI INSISTS IT HAS ‘RIGHT’
SUSPECT IN CHAPMAN SLAY” which was marked as Exhibit
“2.” Certain portions thereof, which were not written by
Barrameda,107 were lifted by the defense and offered in evidence,
viz:
Exhibit “2-a”
Superintendent Lucas Managuelod, CIS director for the national
capital region, claims, however, that another security guard, Vic
Mangubat, had testified before the police that another man, not
Teehankee, had fired at Chapman and his companions.
Exhibit “2-b”
The CIS official added that the absence of nitrite or powder burns on
Teehankee’s hands as shown by paraffin tests at the CIS laboratory
indicated that he may not have fired the gun.108
MARTIN MARFIL, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
identified two (2) newspaper clippings which were partly written by
him.
One news item, which appeared on the July 17, 1991 issue of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, was entitled: “FBI JOINS PROBE OF
DASMA SLAY” (Exhibit “3”).109
Again, the defense marked in evidence certain portions of Exhibit
“3,” thus:
________________
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Exhibit “3-a”
“Witnesses said Hultman talked with the gunman whom she called
“Daddy” shortly before Chapman’s shooting.”
Exhibit “3-b”
“But Ranin said they were also looking into reports that Hultman
was a dancer before she was adopted by her foster parent.”
69
Exhibit “3-c”
“Investigations showed that the gunman sped along Caballero street
inside the village after the shooting and was believed to have
proceeded toward Forbes Park using the Palm street gate.”
On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that he did not write Exhibits
“3-a” and “3-c.” He just reiterated previous reports in other
newspapers. They were based on speculations.
Marfil also wrote some portions of a news item, entitled:
“TEEHANKEE SON HELD FOR DASMA SLAY,” which appeared
on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit
“4”), viz:
Exhibit “4-B”
“According to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, the break in the case came
when the witness showed up and (said that the gunman was on board
a silver-metallic Lancer.”
Exhibit “4-C”
“The witness said the gunman was standing a few feet away near the
car and was talking to Hultman, who was shouting “Huwag!
Daddy!” several times.”110
Marfil’s source of information was Director Lim. On cross-
examination, Marfil admitted that the news reports marked as
Exhibits “3” and “4” were written based on information available at
that time.111
_______________
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85
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
NIDA MENDOZA, a reporter of the Malaya identified a news
report, entitled: “TEEHANKEE SON HELD ON DASMA
SLAYING,” which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of Malaya.
She testified that she wrote a portion thereof, marked as Exhibit “5-
c,” and the sources of her information were several Makati
policemen.112 Exhibit “5-c” reads:
“Makati policemen, meanwhile, disputed NBI accounts that
Teehankee was arrested at his house.
“They said Teehankee, the last remaining owner of a car with plate
control number 566 who had not been questioned, voluntarily went
to police headquarters upon invitation of Makati police chief
Superintendent Remy Macaspac.”113
The defense presented EXHIBITS “1-5” to prove: (a) the alleged
concerted effort of the investigators to implicate accused as the lone
gunman; (b) that there were other suspects aside from accused and
that someone whom Maureen called as “Daddy” was the actual
gunman; (c) that the initial police investigation showed that the
70
gunman’s car was a white Lancer with plate no. 566; and, (d) that
after the NBI took over the investigation, the white Lancer car of the
gunman became a silver gray Lancer of accused and thereafter, he
became the gunman.
ITCHIE CABAYAN, a reporter of the People’s Journal identified
the portions she wrote in the news item, entitled: “I WILL HOUND
YOU,” which appeared on the October 24, 1991 issue of People’s
Journal (Exhibit “6”). She identified the source of her information as
Mr. Anders Hultman himself.114
The portions thereof were marked in evidence by the defense. viz:
Exhibit “6-a”
“I will be visiting him often and at the most unexpected occasion,”
Hultman said the day after his 17-year old daughter was
cremated.”115
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Exhibit “6-b”
“The day Maureen died, a congressional hearing granted the
Hultman family’s request for permission to visit Teehankee in his
cell “at anytime of their choice.”
Exhibit “6-c”
“If on my next visit he still refuses to come out and is still hiding
behind the curtain,” Hultman said, “Congress told me that I can take
the curtain down and jail authorities will pull him out.”116
ALEX ALLAN, also a reporter of People’s Journal co-wrote the
news item marked as Exhibit “6.” Specifically, he wrote Exhibits “6-
d” and “6-e”117 which read:
Exhibit “6-d”
“Kaawaawa naman ang mga Hultmans, tulungan natin sila,” Ong
was quoted as telling Vergel de Dios.”
Exhibit “6-e”
“BIR insiders said Ong has shown a keen interest in the
ChapmanHultman, Vizconde and Eldon Maguan cases because he
belongs to a secret but very influential multi-sectoral group
monitoring graft and corruption and other crimes in high levels of
government and society.”118
Allan was not able to check or verify the information in Exhibit “6-
e” given to him by BIR insiders for the latter refused to be
identified.119
Exhibit “6” and its sub-markings were offered to prove: (a) the
alleged blind and consuming personal rage and bias of Anders
Hultman against accused; and (b) the unwarranted pressure,
prejudice and prejudgment by some congressional leaders in
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87
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
favor of the Hultmans in violation of due process.
DAVE VERIDIANO, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
identified the news account which appeared on the July 16, 1991
issue of the Inquirer, entitled: “DASMA SLAY SUSPECT
IDENTIFIED” (Exhibit “7”). He wrote a portion of said article
(Exhibit “7-c”) and the source of his information was Camp
Crame.120 It reads:
Exhibit “7-c”
“Witnesses said the gunman fled aboard a white Mitsubishi Lancer
with plate number ‘566.’ The witnesses cannot tell the plate’s control
letters.”121
Veridiano likewise identified a news item which appeared on the
July 1991 issue of the Inquirer, entitled: “N.B.I. FINDINGS
DISPUTED, SECOND WITNESS TAGS TEEHANKEE” (Exhibit
“8”). The portions of said news item which he wrote were marked in
evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit “8-a”
“At the Criminal Investigation Service, however, an investigator who
asked not to be identified insisted that the NBI got the wrong man.
The NBI has taken over the case from the CIS.”
Exhibit “8-c”
“He said the CIS will shortly identify the suspect killer whom he
described as “resembling Teehankee but looks much younger.”
Exhibit “8-e”
“The source said that the police’s “prime witness,” identified only as
Mangubat, saw everything that happened in the early morning of
July 13. The witness, however, failed to identify Teehankee as the
gunman.”122
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88
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Veridiano was shown another news report, entitled: “CIS GIVES UP
CHAPMAN SLAY CASE,” which appeared on the July 26, 1991
issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit “9”).123 He wrote the
entire news account,124 portions of which were marked by the
defense in evidence, thus:
Exhibit “9-a”
72
“The CIS pulled out from the case a day after its so-called “surprise
witness” picked Claudio Teehankee, Jr. from an NBI lineup.” He
gathered this information from his source but he was not able to
interview Mangubat himself.125
Exhibit “9-b”
“Sira ulo pala siya (Mangubat). Ilang beses kong pinarada sa kanya
si Bobby (Teehankee Jr.) puro iling siya. Hindi raw ito ang suspect.
Ngayon bigla niyang ituturo,” said a red-faced Makati investigator
who, as usual, did not want to be identified.”
ELENA ABEN, a reporter from the Manila Bulletin, wrote the entire
article, entitled: “US DIPLOMAT’S SON SHOT DEAD,” which
appeared on the July 14, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin (Exhibit
“10”).126 Two (2) portions thereof were marked as evidence by the
defense, viz:
Exhibit “10-a-1”
“The victims were on their way home in Olavi Leino’s Mercedes
Benz with a diplomat’s plate number when a white Lancer with plate
ninmber PKX-566 blocked its path.”
Exhibit “10-a-2”
“US embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager said Chapman’s father is
a communications specialist. He said the shooting could be the
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89
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
result of an altercation on the street.”127
Finally, VICTOR VEGA, a reporter of the Manila Bulletin,
identified the news account he wrote which appeared on the July 16,
1991 issue of the Bulletin, entitled: “4 MURDER SUSPECTS
FALL” (Exhibit “22”). Portions of said news item were marked by
the defense as follows:
Exhibit “22-b”
x x x “He was shot to death by a group of armed men at the corner of
Mahogany and Caballero Sts. in Dasmariñas Village at past 4 a.m.
Friday.”
Exhibit “22-c”
“The NBI sources said that jealousy sparked the slaying of Chapman
who was killed in front of his friends on his way home from a party.
The armed men, on board a white Lancer car, blocked the path of the
victim’s Mercedes Benz car inside the village before the shooting.”
73
Exhibit “22-a-1”
“The gunmen then alighted from their car and at gunpoint ordered
Chapman to alight from the car. They shot Chapman several times in
the body, while his companions identified as Maureen Hultman, and
Jussi Olavi Leino, were seriously wounded when the gunmen
sprayed the car with bullets.
“The gunmen escaped after the shooting. Lim said he will announce
later the names of the detained suspects after their initial
investigation.”128
Finally, his article, entitled: “MAKATI SLAY SUSPECT
IDENTIFIED” (Exhibit “23”), which appeared on the July 18, 1991
issue of the Manila Bulletin, was introduced by the defense in
evidence as follows:
Exhibit “23-a-1”
“The NBI said Teehankee was one of four men who blocked
Chapman’s car on Mahogany St. in the subdivision.”
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Exhibit “23-a-2”
“Witnesses said they saw Teehankee order Chapman and his two
companions, Maureen Hultman and Jussi Olavi Leino, a Finn, to get
out of their car.”
Exhibit “23-a-3”
“They identified the car used by the suspect, a silver gray Lancer
with plate No. PDW 566. They added that they saw the same car in
the garage of the Teehankee family.”129
On cross-examination, Vega declared that the source of his two (2)
stories was the NBI and they were based on information available to
the NBI at that time.130
The prosecution recalled to the stand eyewitness VICENTE
MANGUBAT as its rebuttal witness. Mangubat insisted that he was
able to identify accused when he saw the latter at the Makati police
station. He reiterated that the next day, Pat. Baldado of the Makati
police went to his place of work in Dasmariñas Village and asked
him if he was sure about the identity of the gunman. He told Baldado
he was positive. Baldado then said he would no longer require him to
sign the statement he prepared for him earlier.131
LEONORA C. VALLADO, chief of the Forensic Chemistry
Division of the NBI, was also presented as a prosecution rebuttal
witness. She testified that extensive washing of hands or excessive
perspiration can eliminate gunpowder nitrates lodged on skin pores
of the hands. Continued washing with hot water can induce
perspiration and remove nitrate residue embedded in the skin pores.
Application of vinegar on the hand can register the same effect.132
________________
74
129 Ibid., p. 64.
130 TSN, August 12, 1992, pp. 68, 72 and 74.
131 TSN, October 19, 1992, pp. 18-19; There was a statement in the
unsigned sworn statement prepared by Baldado (Exhibit “HHH”) to
the effect that Mangubat saw accused at the Makati police station but
categorically stated that accused was not the gunman.
132 Ibid., pp. 110-116.
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VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995
91
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
She testified that their practice at the NBI is to take the paraffin test
on a suspect within 72 hours from the time of the alleged firing of a
gun, during which time, any possible trace of nitrate may still be
found.133
She divulged that questions have been raised regarding the reliability
of the paraffin test. She related that she once attended a training in
Baguio City where they tried to test the accuracy of a paraffin test. In
said training, two (2) NBI agents fired a .38 revolver. One of them
washed his hands. They then subjected both agents to a paraffin test
using diphylamine reagent. Both yielded a negative result. Thus, she
opined, the result of a paraffin test should merely be taken as a
corroborative evidence and evaluated together with other physical
evidence.134
The records show that the case was set for hearing on October 29,
1992 for the presentation by the defense of sur-rebuttal evidence.
However, a day before the scheduled hearing, the defense filed a
Constancia135 manifesting that it shall waive its right to present sur-
rebuttal evidence, the same being unnecessary. The defense,
however, declared that this is without prejudice to the presentation of
its evidence in the trial proper should the same be necessary.
At the hearing of October 29, 1992, the defense counsels did not
appear. The prosecution moved in open court that the main cases and
the petition for bail be submitted for decision in view of the absence
of defense counsels who had manifested that they would no longer
present their sur-rebuttal evidence. The motion was granted and the
parties were given ten (10) days from receipt of the Order within
which to submit their simultaneous Memorandum.136 It does not
appear that the defense objected to this Order. The records show that
the defense even filed a motion asking for additional time to file its
Memorandum.137 In due time, both parties submitted their
respective Memorandum.
__________________
92
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
On December 22, 1992, the trial court convicted accused CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE, JR. of the crimes charged.138 The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
75

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders
judgment:
“(1)In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J.
Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal shooting of Roland John
Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer imprisonment of
Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the sum
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus
moderate or temperate and exemplary damages in the sum of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), Philippine Currency;
“(2)In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J.
Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal shooting of Maureen
Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of
Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the sum
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus the
sums of Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred
Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83),
Philippine Currency, as actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos
(P13,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, for loss of earning capacity
of the said deceased; and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary damages;
“(3)In Criminal Case No. 91-4607, finding accused Claudio J.
Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi
Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the said
offended party the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00),
Philippine Currency; plus the sum of One Hundred Eighteen
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four
Centavos (P118,369.84), Philippine Currency, and another sum
equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $55,600.00, both as actual
damages; an amount equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S.
$40,000.00, as loss of earning capacity of said offended party; and
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine
_______________
138 Decision, penned by Judge Job B. Madayag, presiding judge,
Makati Regional Trial Court, Branch 145; Rollo, pp. 50-78.
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93
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
“(4)In all these three cases, ordering said accused to pay all the
offended parties the sum of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, as and for attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation; and
“(5) To pay the costs in these three cases.
“Consequently the petition for bail is hereby denied for utter lack of
merit.
76

“SO ORDERED.” VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING

Accused hired a new counsel in the person of Atty. Nicanor B.
Gatmaytan, Jr. He filed a Motion for New Trial,139 alleging for the
first time that the trial court erred in considering as submitted for
decision not only the petition for bail but also the case on the merits.
He claimed that accused’s right to adduce further evidence was
violated. His motion for new trial was denied.
ATTORNEY’S FEES OF THREE MILLION PESOS
(P3,000,000.00).
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT
ON THE MERITS AND ON THE PETITION FOR BAIL AT
________________

Accused interposed the present appeal.140 He contends that:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED HAD BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY JUSSI
LEINO, CADENAS AND MANGUBAT AS THE ONE WHO
SHOT HIM, ROLAND CHAPMAN AND MAUREEN NAVARRO
HULTMAN.
139 Original Records, pp. 989-1001.
140 Atty. Lino M. Patajo, Former Associate Justice of this Court,
represented accused in the present appeal.
94

II. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE

GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
94
III. THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE CASE AGAINST THE
APPELLANT WAS MASSIVE, OVERWHELMING, AND SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
PREJUDICIAL AS TO EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVE THE
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
THE SAME TIME WITHOUT GIVING THE ACCUSED THE
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN
KILLING OF CHAPMAN AND HULTMAN AND THE
HIS DEFENSE ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND DENYING
SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS ATTENDED BY TREACHERY.
THE ACCUSED’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING EXORBITANT
We shall discuss these alleged errors in seriatim.
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND LOSS OF
EARNING CAPACITY. Appellant was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of three
(3) eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. He
77
vigorously assails his out-of-court identification by these
eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Jussi Leino, the
lone surviving victim of the crimes at bar. Appellant urges:
First, that Leino’s identification of him outside an unoccupied house
in Forbes Park was highly irregular.
Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers
before he identified him.
Third, that Leino’s interview at the hospital was never put in writing.
Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by
Leino to the CIS agents was suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised
that the sketch must have been among the evidence turned over to
the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction over the investigation.
Lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of appellant.
The shooting lasted for only five (5) minutes. During that period, his
gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunman’s face. His
senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that
night.
It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court
identification by the prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of
error. Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and, in
most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. Yet,
while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and
authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as
the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some authors even describe
eyewitness evidence as “inherently suspect.”141 The causes of
misidentification are known, thus:
_________________
141 LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure, Hornbook Series,
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95
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
xxx
Identification testimony has at least three components. First,
witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves
perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness must
memorize details of the event. Third, the witness must be able to
recall and communicate accurately. Dangers of unreliability in
eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for
whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information
accurately, they are limited by normal human fallibilities and
suggestive influences. (Emphasis Supplied)142
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various
ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought
face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug
shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the
suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of
78
in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have
fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the
requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where
they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity
to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree
of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime
and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.143
Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged
irregularities cited by appellant did not result in his misidentification
nor was he denied due process. There is noth1992 ed., p. 353.
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96
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
ing wrong in Leino’s identification of appellant in an unoccupied
house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode was resorted
to by the authorities for security reasons.144 The need for security
even compelled that Leino be fetched and escorted from his house in
Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials and brought to the
house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused to
have the identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with
people and with high security risk.145 Leino’s fear for his safety was
not irrational. He and his companions had been shot in cold blood in
one of the exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis.
Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the
NBI, correctly testified that there is no hard and fast rule as to the
place where suspects are identified by witnesses. Identification may
be done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the crime
and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim.146
Appellant cannot also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard
radio and TV accounts of the shooting before he personally
identified him. Indeed, the records show that on July 15, 1991, while
Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown three (3) pictures of
different men by the investigators. He identified appellant as the
gunman from these pictures. He, however, categorically stated that,
before the mug shot identification, he has not seen any picture of
appellant or read any report relative to the shooting incident.147 The
burden is on appellant to prove that his mug shot identification was
unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible suggestiveness, he
cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-court
identification by Leino.
We have no reason to doubt the correctness of appellant’s
identification by Leino. The scene of the crime was well-lighted by a
Meralco lamp post. Appellant was merely 2-3 meters away when he
shot Leino. The incident happened for a full five (5) minutes. Leino
had no ill-motive to falsely testify against appellant. His testimony at
the trial was straightforward. He was
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VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995
97
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
79

unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense counsels.
He never wavered in his identification of appellant. When asked how
sure he was that appellant was responsible for the crime, he
confidently replied: “I’m very sure. It could not have been somebody
else.”148
Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the
investigators to reduce to a sworn statement the information revealed
by Leino during his hospital interviews. It was sufficiently
established that Leino’s extensive injuries, especially the injury to
his tongue, limited his mobility. The day he identified appellant in
the line-up, he was still physically unable to speak. He was being fed
through a tube inserted in his throat.149 There is also no rule of
evidence which requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness
whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing. Reliance by
appellant on the case of People v. Alindog150 to erode Leino’s
credibility is misplaced. In Alindog, accused was acquitted not solely
on the basis of delay in taking his statement, but mainly on the
finding that the prosecution’s evidence was, at best, circumstantial
and “suspiciously short in important details,” there being no
investigation whatsoever conducted by the police.
We also reject appellant’s contention that the NBI suppressed the
sketch prepared by the CIS on the basis of the description given by
Leino. There is nothing on the record to show that said sketch was
turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could warrant a
presumption that the sketch was suppressed. The suspicion that the
sketch did not resemble appellant is not evidence. It is unmitigated
guesswork.
We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was
incredible for Leino to have remembered appellant’s face when the
incident happened within a span of five (5) minutes. Five (5) minutes
is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of
appellant. Experience shows that precisely because of the unusual
acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses,
especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a
_______________
148 Ibid.
149 TSN, August 14, 1991, p. 117.
150 Supra.
98
98
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
high degree of reliability the identity of criminals.151 We have ruled
that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to
see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the
crime was committed. Most often, the face and body movements of
the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from
their memory.152 In the case at bar, there is absolutely no improper
motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to appellant. The victims
and appellant were unknown to each other before their chance
encounter. If Leino identified appellant, it must be because appellant
was the real culprit.
80
Appellant also assails his identification by Cadenas. He contends that
Cadenas did not witness the crime. He stresses that when the
Dasmariñas security force and the Makati police conducted an on-
the-spot investigation on the day of the incident, neither came across
Cadenas. The next day, in the afternoon of July 14, 1991, an NBI
agent interviewed Cadenas and asked if he saw the incident. He
merely replied: “Nakita ko pero patay na.” He did not volunteer
information to anyone as to what he supposedly witnessed. That
same night, the NBI subpoenaed him for investigation. He went to
the NBI the next morning. It was only the next day, July 16, 1991,
that he gave his statement to the NBI. Cadenas allegedly told
Ponferrada, his supervisor, that the NBI tortured him.
We reject appellant’s submission. Cadenas’ initial reluctance to
reveal to the authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently explained
during the trial. He related that he feared for his and his family’s
safety. His fear was not imaginary. He saw with his own eyes the
senseless violence perpetrated by appellant. He knew appellant
belonged to an influential family. It was only after consistent
prodding and assurance of protection from NBI officials that he
agreed to cooperate with the authorities.153 The Court has taken
judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in
the solution of crimes considering the
__________________
risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the
court has not considered the initial reluctance of fear-gripped
witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an indicium of
incredulity.154 It will not depart from this ruling.
Appellant’s assertion that Cadenas was tortured by the NBI is not
borne out by the records. Supposedly, Cadenas passed on to his
superior, a certain Ponferrada, information about his torture. The
allegation is an out and out hearsay as Ponferrada was not presented
in the witness stand. Cadenas himself stoutly denied this allegation
of torture. The claim of torture is also belied by the fact that
Cadenas’ entire family was allowed to stay with him at the NBI
headquarters and likewise extended protection.155
Appellant then discredits his identification by VICENTE
MANGUBAT, citing the testimony of defense witness Pat. James
Baldado of the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado testified that Mangubat
failed to identify appellant as the gunman the first time he was
brought to the Makati police station. Mangubat, however, belied
Baldado’s story. He declared he positively identified appellant as the
gunman at the Makati police station. He averred that the day after he
identified appellant, Pat. Baldado returned to his place of work in
Dasmariñas and asked him again whether appellant was the gunman.
Again, he replied in the affirmative. Forthwith, Pat. Baldado said he
would no longer ask him to sign a statement (Exhibit “HHH”)156
earlier prepared by Baldado. In said statement previously prepared
by Baldado, Mangubat was supposed to state that appellant, whom
he saw at the Makati police station, was NOT the gunman. We give
more weight to the testimony of Mangubat. We find nothing in the
records to suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself. The Court
cannot be as generous to Pat. Baldado of the Makati Police. Mr.
Hultman has proved that the Makati police, including some of its jail
officials, gave appellant favored treatment while in their custody.
The anomaly triggered nothing less than a congressional investiga-
______________
100
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
81
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
tion.
II
We now rule on appellant’s second assignment of error, i.e., that the
trial court erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his
involvement in previous shooting incidents for this contravenes the
rule157 that evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did or omitted to do the
same or similar thing at another time. Second, the NBI failed to
conduct an examination to compare the bullets fired from the gun at
the scene of the crime with the bullets recovered from the body of
Chapman. Third, the prosecution eyewitnesses described the
gunman’s car as white, but the trial court found it to be silver
metallic gray. Fourth, appellant could not have been the gunman for
Mangubat, in his statement dated July 15, 1991, said that he
overheard the victim Maureen Hultman plead to the gunman, thus:
“Please, don’t shoot me and don’t kill me. I promise Mommy,
Daddy.” Appellant also contends that a maid in a house near the
scene of the crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she
heard Maureen say: “Daddy, don’t shoot. Don’t.” Fifth,the NBI
towed accused’s car from Dasmariñas Village to the NBI office
which proved that the same was not in good running condition.
Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted on appellant showed
he was negative of nitrates.
Appellant points to other possible suspects, viz: (a) ANDERS
HULTMAN, since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the
newspapers as having overheard Maureen plead to the gunman:
“Huwag, Daddy.”; and, (b) JOSE MONTAÑO, another resident of
Dasmariñas Village, who had a white Lancer car, also bearing
license plate control number 566.
We reject appellant’s thesis as bereft of merit.
Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial
judge violated the rule on res inter alios acta when he considered his
involvement in previous shooting incidents. This
_____________
stance is a specie of a mid-1800 rule known as the English
Exchequer Rule pursuant to which “a trial court’s error as to the
admission of evidence was presumed to have caused prejudice and
therefore, almost automatically required a new trial.”158 The
Exchequer rule has long been laid to rest for even English appellate
courts now disregard an error in the admission of evidence “unless in
its opinion, some substantial wrong or miscarriage (of justice) has
been occasioned.”159 American courts adopted this approach
especially after the enactment of a 1915 federal statute which
required a federal appellate court to “give judgment after an
examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to
technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.”160 We have likewise followed the
harmless error rule in our jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence
improperly admitted in trial, we examine its damaging quality and its
impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight
and insignificant, we disregard the error as it will not overcome the
82
weight of the properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced
party.161
In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the
troublesome character of appellant is a harmless error. The reference
is not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial
judge in convicting appellant. As aforestated, the appellant was
convicted mainly because of his identification by three (3)
eyewitnesses with high credibility.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the
fatal gun with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. The
omission, however, cannot exculpate appellant. The omitted
comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive
________________
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
identification of appellant.
There is also little to the contention of appellant that his Lancer car
was not in running condition. Allegedly, this was vicariously proved
when the NBI towed his car from Dasmariñas Village where it was
parked to the NBI office. Again, the argument is negated by the
records which show that said car was towed because the NBI could
not get its ignition key which was then in the possession of appellant.
Clearly, the car was towed not because it was not in running
condition. Even appellant’s evidence show that said car could run.
After its repairs, appellant’s son, Claudio Teehankee III, drove it
from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmariñas Village,
in Makati, where it was parked.162
Nor are we impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the
eyewitnesses’ description of the color of the gunman’s car. Leino
described the car as light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat
white (“medyo puti”);163 Mangubat declared the car was white;164
and Cadenas testified it was silver metallic gray.165 These alleged
discrepancies amount to no more than shades of differences and are
not meaningful, referring as they do to colors white, somewhat white
and silver metallic gray. Considering the speed and shocking nature
of the incident which happened before the break of dawn, these
slight discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the
prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.
Appellant’s attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the
adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant consideration.
Appellant cites a newspaper item166 where Maureen was allegedly
overheard as saying to the gunman: “Huwag, Daddy, Huwag,
Daddy.” The evidence on record, however, demonstrates that Anders
Hultman could not have been the gunman. It was clearly established
that Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two (2)
reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog,
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People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
and she addressed Anders Hultman as “Papa,” not “Daddy.”167
Moreover, Leino outrightly dismissed this suspicion. While still in
the hospital and when informed that the Makati police were looking
83
into this possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was
NOT the gunman.168Leino is a reliable witness.
Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was
negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the
paraffin test has “x x x proved extremely unreliable in use. The only
thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of
nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this test
alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a
firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of
substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or
nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals,
and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person
who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his
hands since these substances are present in the products of
combustion of tobacco.”169 In numerous rulings, we have also
recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of
gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the
assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the
time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the
gunman at the time of firing.170 In the case at bar, NBI Forensic
Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and confirmed that excessive
perspiration or washing of hands with the use of warm water or
vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She
likewise opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than
seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the shooting may not lead to
a reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
have already been removed by washing or perspiration.171 In the
Report172 on the paraffin test conducted on appellant, Forensic
Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when appellant was tested for
the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already lapsed from
the time of the alleged shooting.
III
In his third assigned error, appellant blames the press for his
conviction as he contends that the publicity given to his case
impaired his right to an impartial trial. He postulates there was
pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking government officials
avidly followed the developments in the case (as no less than Vice-
President Joseph Estrada and then Department of Justice Secretary
Franklin Drilon attended some of the hearings and, President
Corazon Aquino even visited victim Maureen Hultman while she
was still confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial judge
failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive
influences which attended the prosecution of the cases. He claims
there were placards displayed during the hearing of the cases,
spectators inside the courtroom clapped their hands and converted
the proceedings into a carnival. In another instance, he was allegedly
given the “finger sign” by several young people while he was leaving
the courtroom on his way back to his cell.
We cannot sustain appellant’s claim that he was denied the right to
impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and
broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all
84
high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule
that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right
to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, “a responsible press has always
been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration,
especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply
publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by
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105
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive
public scrutiny and criticism.”173
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused
to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-
to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the
publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members
of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of
sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication
system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables
and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday
menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair
and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with
the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are
overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality.
Criticisms against the jury system are mounting and Mark Twain’s
wit and wisdom put them all in better perspective when he observed:
“When a gentleman of high social standing, intelligence, and probity
swears that testimony given under the same oath will outweigh with
him, street talk and newspaper reports based upon mere hearsay, he
is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance
and stupidity x x x. Why could not the jury law be so altered as to
give men of brains and honesty an equal chance with fools and
miscreants?”174 Our judges are learned in the law and trained to
disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties
to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity
stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the
part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that
characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et
al. v. Alejandro, et al.,175 we rejected this standard of possibility
_______________
106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that
to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation
and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply
that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the
records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the
pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the
85
case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a
result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by
evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to
prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
We have minutely examined the transcripts of the proceedings and
they do not disclose that the trial judge allowed the proceedings to
turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any
manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the
courtroom during the trial of the case at bar. The transcripts reveal
the following:
1. At the August 14, 1991 hearing, the defense counsel called the
attention of the court to the visible display of a placard inside the
courtroom. Acting on the manifestation, the trial judge immediately
directed that the placard be hidden. Only then did he order the start
of the arraignment of accused.176
On the same hearing, the defense counsel asked for the exclusion
of the media after they had enough opportunity to take pictures. The
court granted defense’s request, noting that the courtroom was also
too crowded.177
2. During the testimony of Domingo Florece, an argument ensued
between the defense lawyer and the fiscal. When part of the audience
clapped their hands, the defense counsel invoked Rule 119, Section
13 of the Rules of Court and moved for the exclusion of the public.
Assistant Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio objected on the ground that the
public was not unruly. The trial judge noted that there were yet no
guidelines drafted by the Supreme Court regarding media coverage
of trial proceedings.178 Collaborating defense counsel, Atty. Malvar,
com-
107
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
plained that the outpouring of sympathy by spectators inside the
courtroom has turned the proceedings into a carnival. He also
manifested that he personally saw that when accused was being
brought back to his cell from the courtroom, a group of young people
were pointing dirty fingers at accused in full view of policemen.
Forthwith, the trial judge declared that he could not be dissuaded by
public sentiments. He noted that the clapping of hands by the public
was just a reaction at the spur of the moment. He then admonished
the audience not to repeat it.179
3. At the hearing of July 14, 1992, the parties again argued on the
coverage of the trial by the press. The defense alleged that the media
coverage will constitute mistrial and deny accused’s constitutional
right to due process. It invoked the provision in the Rules of Court
which allows the accused to exclude everybody in the courtroom,
except the organic personnel. The prosecutor, however, argued that
exclusion of the public can be ordered only in prosecution of private
offenses and does not apply to murder cases. He added that the
public is entitled to observe and witness trial of public offenses. He
quoted the U.S. case of Sheppard v. Maxwell180 where it was held:
“A responsible press is always regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration especially in the criminal field. The
press does not simply publish information about trials but guards
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, the
prosecutors and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism. What transpires in the courtroom is public property.” The
trial judge then ruled that the media should be given a chance to
cover the proceedings before the trial proper but, thereafter, he
prohibited them from taking pictures during the trial. They were
86
allowed to remain inside the courtroom but were ordered to desist
from taking live coverage of the proceedings.181
________________
cases. This en banc Resolution was brought about by the live
coverage of the hearing of the libel case filed by then President
Aquino against newspaper columnist Luis Beltran. The testimony of
Pres. Aquino as complainant was fully carried on air by the media.
Then Congressman Art Borjal called the attention of this Court to the
possible excessiveness and impropriety of such coverage. Forthwith,
the Court issued the October 22, 1991 Resolution proscribing the live
radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of
hearings for news purposes was to be taken prior to the
commencement of the trial proper.
179 TSN, August 27, 1991, pp. 95-104.
180 Supra.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
4. At the August 14, 1992 hearing, before the hearing began, the trial
judge gave the media two (2) minutes to take video coverage and no
more. Trial then ensued.182
5. At the September 8, 1992 hearing, the trial judge again gave the
media two (2) minutes to take pictures before the trial proper.
Afterwards, the reporters were duly admonished to remain silent, to
quietly observe the proceedings and just take down notes.183
6. On September 10, 1992, before the start of the afternoon session,
the judge admonished the media people present in the court-room to
stop taking pictures.184
Parenthetically, appellant should be the last person to complain
against the press for prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records
reveal he presented in court no less than seven (7) newspaper
reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their reports for
his defense. The defense’s documentary evidence consists mostly of
newspaper clippings relative to the investigation of the case at bar
and which appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be
fair and unfair to appellant at the same time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that on May 29, 1992, the trial
judge voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing the case at
bar to assuage appellant’s suspicion of bias and partiality.185
However, upon elevation of the trial judge’s voluntary Order of
Inhibition to this Court, we directed the trial judge to proceed with
the trial to speed up the administration of justice.186 We found
nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of
partiality against the trial judge.
IV
In his fourth assigned error, appellant claims that treachery was not
present in the killing of Hultman and Chapman, and the wounding of
Leino for it was not shown that the gunman con-
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VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995
109
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
sciously and deliberately adopted particular means, methods and
forms in the execution of the crime. Appellant asserts that mere
suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.
The three (3) Informations charged appellant with having committed
the crimes at bar with treachery and evident premeditation. Evident
premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial court for,
admittedly, the shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a
chance meeting on the street since the victims were unknown to
appellant and vice-versa. It, however, appreciated the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.
We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing
of Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino established the sequence of
events leading to the shooting. He testified that for no apparent
reason, appellant suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him
and Maureen Hultman who were then walking along the sidewalk.
Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D. After
Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino
and asked what was going on. Chapman then stepped down on the
sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was wrong. There and
then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt,
and shot him. The gun attack was unexpected. “Why did you shoot
me?” was all Chapman could utter.
Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and
left him with no chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no
evidence on record to prove that appellant consciously and
deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment
of his criminal design without risk to himself. It appears to us that
appellant acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by
chance. They were strangers to each other. The time between the
initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The
shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous
impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of will.
We have consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the
victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery.187 Hence, absent
any qualifying circum-
________________
187 People v. Supremo, G.R. No. 100915, May 31, 1995, citing
110
110
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
stance, appellant should only be held liable for Homicide for the
shooting and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen
Hultman, we hold that treachery clearly attended the commission of
88
the crimes. The evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold
blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen
became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant’s car. When
appellant went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to
put some distance between them. After a minute or two, appellant
got to Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement.
While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were gunned
down by appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two
victims in a completely defenseless position before shooting them.
There was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing of
Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman—a period which
appellant used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the
execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was thus
correctly appreciated by the trial court against appellant insofar as
the killing of Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.
V and VI
We come now to the civil liability imposed against appellant.
Appellant posits that the awards of moral and exemplary damages
and for loss of earning capacity of Maureen Hultman, Roland
Chapman and Jussi Leino were exorbitant. He likewise claims that
the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was excessive.
In its Decision, the trial court awarded to Jussi Leino and the heirs of
victims Hultman and Chapman the following damages:
1. For the murder of Roland John Chapman, appellant was sentenced
to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as indemnity for death and the sum of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moderate or temperate and
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People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
exemplary damages.
2. For the murder of Maureen Navarro Hultman, appellant was
sentenced to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of: Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50.000.00) as indemnity for death; Two Million
Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-one Pesos and
Eighty-three Centavos (P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Thirteen
Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for loss of earning capacity of
deceased; and, One Million Pesos as moral, moderate and exemplary
damages.
3. For the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, appellant was sentenced to
pay: Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as indemnity for the injury;
One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three-Hundred Sixty Nine Pesos
and Eighty-four Centavos (P118,369.84) and the sum equivalent in
Philippine pesos of U.S. $55,600.00, both as actual damages; an
amount equivalent in Philippine pesos of U.S. $40,000.00, for loss of
earning capacity of Jussi Leino; and, One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
4. In all three cases, appellant was also ordered to pay each of the
offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos (or a total of three
million pesos) for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
5. Costs of litigation.188
89
The early case of Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos189 discussed
in detail the master of damages recoverable in case of death arising
from a felony, thus:
“When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil
obligations arising therefrom are governed by penal laws, ‘x x x
subject to the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent provisions
of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and of Title
XVIII of this Book (Book IV) regulating damages.’ (Art. 1161, Civil
Code)
“Thus, ‘every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code). This civil liability, in case the
felony involves death, includes indemnification for consequential
damages (Art. 104, id.) and said consequential damages in turn
include ‘x x x those suffered by his family or by a third person by
reason of the crime.’ (Art. 107, id.) Since these provisions are
subject, however, as above indicated, to certain provisions of the
Civil Code, (w)e will now turn to said provisions.
“The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
112
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
“In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act
or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages
have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendant.” (Art. 2202)
“When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art.
2206 which provides thus:
“The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict
shall be at least three thousand pesos even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
“(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity
of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by
the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the
time of his death;
“(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the
descendant’s inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession,
may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
“(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.”
“The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already
been increased by this Court first, to P6,000.00 in People v.
Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to P12,000.00 in the case of
People v. Pantoja, G.R. No. L-18793, promulgated October 11,
1968,190 and it must be stressed that this amount, as well as the
amount of moral damages, may be adjudicated even without proof of
pecuniary loss, the assessment of the moral damages being ‘left to
90
the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each
case.’ (Art. 2216)
_______________
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
“Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil
liability when the crime has been committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances, such damages being ‘separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.’ (Art.
2230). Exemplary damages cannot however be recovered as a matter
of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be given.
(Art. 2233)
“In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the
indemnity for the sole fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and in cases
wherein exemplary damages are awarded precisely because of the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230) ‘x x x damages
to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances,’ (Art.
2204) ‘but the party suffering the loss or injury must exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages
resulting from the act or omission in question.’ (Art. 2203) ‘Interest
as a part of the damages, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the
discretion of the Court.’ (Art. 2211) As to attorneys’ fees and
expenses of litigation, the same may be recovered only when
exemplary damages have been granted (Art. 2208, par. 1) or x x x
when there is a separate civil action.”
“Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the
heirs of the deceased are entitled to the following items of damages:
“1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense—
P12,000.00 (now P50,000.00), without the need of any evidence or
proof of damages, and even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances attending the commission of the offense.
“2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased—an
amount to be fixed by the court according to the circumstances of the
deceased related to his actual income at the time of death and his
probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and
awarded by the court as a matter of duty, unless the deceased had no
earning capacity at said time on account of permanent disability not
caused by the accused. If the deceased was obliged to give support,
under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who is not an heir, may
demand support from the accused for not more than five years, the
exact duration to be fixed by the court.
“3. As moral damages for mental anguish,—an amount to be fixed
by the court. This may be recovered even by the illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased.
“4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or
more aggravating circumstances,—an amount to be fixed in the
discretion of the court, the same to be considered separate from fines.
114
114
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
91
“5. As attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation,—the actual amount
thereof, (but only when a separate civil action to recover civil
liability has been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded).
“6. Interests in the proper cases.
“7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased and for moral damages are recoverable
separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00 (now
P50,000.00) corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of
death, and that these damages may, however, be respectively
increased or lessened according to the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, except items 1 and 4 above, for obvious reasons.”191
We shall first review the damages awarded to the heirs of ROLAND
JOHN CHAPMAN in light of the law and the case law.
Appellant claims that the award of Five Hundred Thousand
(P500,000.00) pesos as moderate or temperate and exemplary
damages to the heirs of Ronald John Chapman was baseless.
We start with the observation that the trial court should not have
lumped together the awards for moderate or temperate and
exemplary damages at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00),
without specifying the particular amount which corresponds to each,
as they are of a different kind. We shall, however, consider their
propriety and reasonableness.
The amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos cannot
be given as temperate or moderate damages for the records do not
show any basis for sustaining the award. Nor can it be given as
exemplary damages. The killing of Chapman was not attended by
either evident premeditation or treachery. Be that as it may, the
award can be considered as one for moral damages under Article
2206 (3) of the New Civil Code.192 It states:
“Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime x x
x shall be at least (fifty thousand pesos, under current jurisprudence)
x x x. In addition:
__________________
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
xxx
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants
of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased.”
Moreover, considering the shocking and senseless aggression
committed by appellant, we increase the amount of moral damages to
One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos for the death of Chapman.
We next rule on the legality of damages awarded to the heirs of
MAUREEN NAVARRO HULTMAN.
Appellant argues that the damages for the death of Maureen should
be awarded to her mother, Vivian Hultman, and her natural father.
He contends that under Article 352 of the New Civil Code, Anders
Hultman as adoptive father of Maureen, is not entitled to said award.
Only the parents by nature of Maureen should inherit from her.
We reject the argument. Under the Family Code which was already
in effect at the time of Maureen’s death, Anders Hultman, as
adoptive father, is entitled to the award made by the trial court.
Article 190 of the Family Code provides:
92
xxx
“(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
descendants of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall
divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or
ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
“(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire
estate”;
It does not appear on the records whether Maureen was survived by
her natural father. During the trial of these cases, only Vivian and
Anders Hultman testified on their claim of damages. Hence, we find
that the award of damages in their favor has sufficient factual and
legal basis.
_________________
xxx
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants
of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by
reason of the death of the deceased.”
116
116
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Appellant also urges that the award to the heirs of Maureen Hultman
of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral and exemplary
damages is unjustified or, at the very least, exorbitant and should be
reduced.
We hold that the award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos is
amply justified by the circumstances. The records reveal that
Maureen hovered between life and death for ninety-seven (97) days.
Her family experienced the peaks and valleys of unspeakable
suffering. During that time, she underwent brain surgery three (3)
times. Her condition was never stable and remained critical. It was
always touch and go with death. She could not be left alone at the
hospital. Her parents had to be perpetually by her side at least six (6)
to seven (7) hours daily. After the shooting, their siblings had to be
sent back to Sweden for their safety. Left unattended, her family’s
business took a downspin. Soon, her family’s assets were depleted,
then wiped out. A total of twenty-three (23) doctors attended to her
and their bills ballooned without abatement. They were forced to rely
on the goodness of the gracious. Her family started receiving
contributions from other people to defray the medical expenses and
hospital bills.193 Maureen never regained consciousness until her
demise on October 17, 1991, at the tender age of seventeen. Under
the foregoing circumstances, we thus find the award of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages to be reasonable.
Moreover, we find that the grant of exemplary damages is called for
by the circumstances of the case. Under Article 2229 of the Civil
Code,194 in addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or
corrective damages may be adjudged in order to deter the
commission of similar acts in the future. The award for exemplary
damages is designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has
93
socially deleterious consequences. Its imposition is required by
public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender.
________________
193 TSN, October 4, 1991, pp. 21-25; TSN, July 22, 1992, p. 69.
194 “Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by
way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.”
117
VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995
117
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
In the case at bar, appellant’s unprovoked aggression snuffed the life
of Maureen Hultman, a girl in the prime of her youth. Hultman and
her companions were gunned down by appellant in cold-blood, for
no apparent reason. Appellant’s vicious criminality led to the
suffering of his victims and their families. Considering our soaring
crime rate, the imposition of exemplary damages against appellant to
deter others from taking the lives of people without any sense of sin
is proper. Moreover, since the killing of Hultman was attended by
treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of the New Civil Code,195
we impose an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as
exemplary damages against appellant for the death of Maureen
Hultman.
We now review the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as
moral, moderate and exemplary damages to victim JUSSI LEINO.
From the record, it is incontrovertible that Leino likewise suffered
extensive injuries as a result of the shooting. His upper jaw bone was
shattered. He would need a bone transplant operation to restore it.
His tongue was also injured. He partially lost his sense of taste for
his taste buds were also affected. When he was discharged from the
hospital, he had difficulty in speaking and had to be fed through a
tube running down his nose. He lost eight of his teeth. The roots of
his teeth were cut off and the raw nerves were exposed. But all these
speak only of his physical injuries and suffering. More devastating
was the emotional strain that distressed Leino. His parents were in
Europe for a vacation at the time of the shooting. Only a neighbor
attended to him at the hospital. It took two (2) days for his father to
come and comfort by his bedside. Leino had trouble sleeping in
peace at night. The traumatic event woke him up in the middle of the
night. Black memories of the incident kept coming back to mind.196
Understandably, the ill-effects of the incident spilled over his family.
Seppo Leino, Jussi’s father, was tortured by thoughts of insecurity.
He had to relocate his entire family to
_________________
195 Supra.
196 TSN, October 4, 1991, pp. 68-70, 76 & 78; TSN, August 14,
1991, p. 46.
118
94
118
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Europe where he felt they would be safe.197 Under the foregoing
circumstances, we find that an award of One Million (P1,000,000.00)
pesos to Jussi Leino as indemnity for moral damages is justified and
reasonable.
As in the case of Hultman, since the shooting of Leino was
committed with treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of the New
Civil Code,198 appellant is additionally adjudged liable for the
payment to Leino of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as
exemplary damages.
We come now to the trial court’s monetary award to compensate the
LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY OF VICTIMS JUSSI LEINO and
MAUREEN HULTMAN.
To be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary
that the victim, at the time of injury or death, is gainfully employed.
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but
for loss of capacity to earn money. In Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas
Bus Company,199 we awarded to the heirs of Cariaga a sum
representing loss of his earning capacity although he was still a
medical student at the time of injury. However, the award was not
without basis for Cariaga was then a fourth year medical student at a
reputable school; his scholastic record, which was presented at the
trial, justified an assumption that he would have been able to finish
his course and pass the board in due time; and a doctor, presented as
witness for the appellee, testified as to the amount of income Cariaga
would have earned had he finished his medical studies.
In the case at bar, the trial court awarded the amount, equivalent in
Philippine pesos, of Forty Thousand Dollars (U.S. $40,000.00) for
loss of earning capacity of JUSSI LEINO. We agree with appellant
that this amount is highly speculative and should be denied
considering that Leino had only earned a high school degree at the
International School, Manila, in 1989. He went back to Finland to
serve the military and has just arrived in Manila in February 1991 to
pursue his ambition to become a pilot. At the time of the shooting on
July 13, 1991, he has just
________________
enrolled at the Manila Aero Club to become a professional pilot. He
was thus only on his first year, first semester, in said school and was
practically, a mere high school graduate. Under the foregoing
circumstances, we find the records wanting with substantial evidence
to justify a reasonable assumption that Leino would have been able
to finish his studies at the Manila Aero Club and ultimately become a
professional pilot.
We now pass upon the propriety of the award of Thirteen Million
Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for loss of earning capacity of deceased
MAUREEN HULTMAN. We find that the award is not supported by
the records.
In adjudging an award for Maureen’s loss of earning capacity, the
trial court incorrectly used the monthly salary of a secretary working
in Sweden, computed at two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) a month,
as per the estimate given by Anders Hultman. Nowhere in the
records does it appear that, at the time of her death, Maureen had
acquired the skills needed for a secretarial job or that she intended to
take a secretarial course in preparation for such job in Sweden.
95
Anders Hultman himself testified that there was uncertainty as to
Maureen’s future career path, thus:
“ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q
Mr. Witness, if Maureen would not been (sic) shot and she continued
her studies, what professional career would she would (sic) like to
pursue considering her interests and inclinations?
“WITNESS:
A
That is very difficult to say. She has just turned 17 and our projection
is that, certainly she would have been an artist in the creative side.
She would have become an actress or a movie producer or probably
she would have been a college graduate.
“ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q
But if you would just say based on the salary of a secretary in
Sweden, how much would she have earned?
A would amount to P26,859.17.202 Hence, using the formula
Not less than Two Thousand Dollars a month.”200
_______________
200 TSN, October 4, 1991, pp. 36-38.
120
120
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Clearly, there is no factual basis for the award of thirteen million
(P13,000,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maureen for loss of earning
capacity as a probable secretary in Sweden.
In any event, what was proved on record is that after graduating from
high school, Maureen took up a short personality development
course at the John Roberts Powers. Maureen was employed at the
John Roberts Powers at the time of her death. It was her first job. In
fact, she had just received her first salary, for which reason she went
out with her friends to celebrate on that fateful day. However, neither
the nature of her work nor her salary in said company was disclosed
at the trial. Thus, to compute the award for Maureen’s loss of earning
capacity, we are constrained to use the minimum wage prevailing as
of the date of her death (October 17, 1991), i.e., one hundred
eighteen pesos (P118.00).201 Allowing for reasonable and necessary
expenses in the amount of P19,800.00, her net income per annum
repeatedly adopted by this Court:203 (2/3 x [80—age of victim at
time of death]) x a reasonable portion of the net income which would
_________________
96
201 As per Wage Order Nos. NCR-02 and 02-A, effective January 8,
1991.
202 Using the equation: Equivalent Monthly Rate = Applicable
Daily Rate x 365 divided by 12; See Annex “A” of Rules
Implementing Wage Orders Nos. NCR-02 and NCR-02-A, January
8, 1991. Thus:
Equivalent Monthly Rate
=
P118.00 x 365
12
= Lastly, appellant seeks a reduction of the award of attorney’s fees in
P3,589.17
With allowance for the requirement of at least one (1) month salary
as 13th month pay, the gross income per annum would amount to
P46,659.17.
203 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 54470,
May 8, 1990, 185 SCRA 110; Monzon v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 72828, January 31, 1989, 169 SCRA 760; Davila v.
Philippine Airlines, No. L-28512, February 28, 1973, 49 SCRA 497;
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-25499, February
18, 1970, 31 SCRA 511.
121
VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995
121
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
have been received by the heirs as support,204 we fix the award for
loss of earning capacity of deceased Maureen Hultman at Five
Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven
Centavos (P564,042.57).
It also bears emphasis that in the computation of the award for loss
of earning capacity of the deceased, the life expectancy of the
deceased’s heirs is not factored in. The rule is well-settled that the
award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life
expectancy of the deceased, and not the beneficiary.205
the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), claiming that
the same is exorbitant.
We disagree. The three (3) private complainants were represented by
the ACCRA law firm, with Atty. Rogelio Vinluan as lead counsel.
They agreed to pay the amount of One Million (P1,000,000.00)
pesos each as attorney’s fees and for litigation expenses. The three
criminal cases were consolidated. A continuous trial was conducted,
with some hearings having both morning and afternoon sessions. The
trial lasted for almost one and a half years. More than forty (40)
witnesses testified during the hearings. Several pleadings were
prepared and filed. A total of sixty-eight (68) documentary exhibits
were presented by the prosecution. Incidents related to the trial of the
cases came up to this Court for review at least twice during the
pendency of the trial.206 Given these circumstances and the evident
effort exerted by the private prosecutor throughout the trial, the trial
97
court’s award of a total of Three Million (P3,000,000.00) pesos as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses appears just and reasonable.
________________
204 People v. Alvero, Jr., G.R. No. 72319, June 30, 1993, 224 SCRA
16.
205 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 54470,
May 8, 1990, 185 SCRA 110, 121, citing Davila v. Philippine
Airlines, No. L-28512, February 28, 1973, 49 SCRA 497.
206 Motion to Inhibit Presiding Judge and Order of Inhibition, Adm.
Matter No. 91-6-508-RTC, Original Records, at p. 564; and, Petition
for Certiorari relative to the conduct of another preliminary
investigation for the Amended Information for Murder for the
supervening death of Maureen Hultman, G.R. No. 103102, March 6,
1992, 207 SCRA 134, Original Records, pp. 329-336.
122
122
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
VII
In his last assigned error, appellant urges that the hearings conducted
on the cases, where no less than forty-one (41) witnesses were
presented by the parties,207 were merely hearings on the petition for
bail concerning the murder charge for the killing of Roland
Chapman, and not a trial on the merits of all three (3) cases.
Appellant insists that after the termination of the hearing, he still had
the right to adduce evidence at the trial proper. He claims he was
denied due process when the trial court considered all the cases
submitted for decision after the defense waived its right to present its
surrebuttal evidence.
Appellant’s position is untenable. This issue was resolved at the very
first hearing of the cases on August 9, 1991. The incident then
pending was appellant’s petition for bail for the murder of Chapman.
It will be remembered that, initially, there was only one murder
charge against appellant since Maureen Hultman succumbed to death
during the course of the proceedings on October 17, 1991.
Thus, at the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the incident for
resolution was appellant’s petition for bail. The prosecution sought
to present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on all three (3)
charges to obviate delay and inconvenience since all three (3)
charges involved one continuing incident. Appellant, through
counsel, objected to the testimony of Leino insofar as the two (2)
frustrated murder charges (with respect to the wounding of Leino
and Hultman) were concerned. He argued that since the pending
incident was the petition for bail with respect to the killing of
Chapman, any testimony relative to the two (2) other charges in
which bail were recommended was irrelevant.
After arguments, the defense suggested that if the prosecution would
present Leino to testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait until
after accused’s arraignment on August 14, 1991.208 The prosecution
98
agreed on the condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at
the same time, hearing on the petition for bail.
________________
207 Appellant himself presented more than twenty (20) witnesses.
208 TSN, August 9, 1991, pp. 35-36.
123
VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995
123
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
Defense counsel agreed.209
As agreed upon, accused was arraigned and the prosecution
presented Jussi Leino as its first witness to testify on all three (3)
cases. No objection was made by the defense.210
Subsequent proceedings likewise disprove appellant’s insistence that
the hearings conducted by the trial court were limited to the petition
for bail, viz:
1. The prosecution presented all their witnesses and documentary
evidence relative to the shooting incident, including evidence in
support of the claim for damages. These witnesses were extensively
cross-examined by the defense counsels. The defense never objected
that evidence on damages would be unnecessary if its intention was
really to limit presentation of evidence to appellant’s petition for
bail.
2. After the prosecution and the defense rested their cases, the trial
court issued an Order211 directing the parties to submit their
Memorandum, after which “the main case as well as the petition for
bail are respectively submitted for Decision and Resolution.” After
receipt of this Order, the defense counsel filed two (2) motions for
extension of time to file the defense Memorandum. In both Motions,
the defense did not object to the trial court’s Order submitting for
decision the main case and the petition for bail. Neither did it move
for a reconsideration of this Order and notify the court that it still had
witnesses to present.
3. In compliance with said Order, appellant’s counsel, Atty. Rodolfo
Jimenez, filed a Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum
praying for accused’s acquittal. This is inconsistent with the
defense’s position that the hearing conducted was only on the
petition for bail. If the defense insist that what was submitted for
decision was only his petition for bail, he would have only prayed
that he be granted bail.
4. Upon receipt of the notice of promulgation of judgment from the
trial court, the defense did not interpose any objection to the intended
promulgation. In fact, the defense attended the promulgation of the
Decision and manifested that they were ready therefor.
All these clearly show that the merits of the cases and the petition for
bail were heard simultaneously and appellant acquiesced thereto.
Moreover, appellant’s right to present additional
________________
99
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
evidence was not abridged by the trial court. On the contrary, the
records disclose that the trial court afforded the defense fair
opportunity to adduce its evidence. It took the defense almost one
and a half years to submit its evidence. The defense presented more
than twenty (20) witnesses and several documentary evidence. It was
only after the trial court rendered a decision against appellant that he
filed a motion for new trial,212 through his new counsel, Atty.
Gatmaytan, Jr. For the first time, he alleged that the joint decision of
the cases, both on the merits and on the petition for bail, was
irregular for he was not given a chance to present further evidence to
corroborate his alibi. We note that in his motion for new trial,213
appellant did not even identify his alleged additional witnesses and
the substance of their testimonies. Nor was it shown that he could not
have produced these evidence at the trial with reasonable diligence.
Appellant’s motion was a patent ploy to delay the decision on his
cases. His motion was properly denied by the trial court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH
MODIFICATIONS the Decision of the trial court, dated December
22, 1992, thus:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J.
Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide for the shooting of Roland John Chapman, and sentencing
said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the
following amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity
for the victim’s death; and, One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as
moral damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J.
Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Maureen Navarro
Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following
amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for her
death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred
Sixty-One Pesos and
_______________
Eighty-Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Five
Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven
Centavos (P564,042.57) for loss of earning capacity of said
deceased; One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and
Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
(3)In Criminal Case No. 91-4807, finding accused Claudio J.
Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi
Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and
to pay the said offended party the following amounts: Thirty
Thousand (P30,000.00) pesos as indemnity for his injuries; One
Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and
Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and the equivalent in Philippine
Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and, Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
100

(4)In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay each of the three
(3) offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00);
or a total of Three Million [P3,000,000.00] pesos for attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation; and

(5) To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado,Mendoza and Francisco,JJ., concur.

Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), On official leave.

Judgmentaffirmedwithmodifications.

Notes.—The more important variables taken into account in

determining the compensable amount of lost earnings are (1) the
number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived;
and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased.
(People vs. Quilaton, 205 SCRA 279 [1992])

Exemplary damages in criminal cases, may be imposed when the

crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
(People vs. Rabanes, 208 SCRA 768 [1992])

——o0o—— People vs. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54, G.R. Nos.
111206-08 October 6, 1995
101
58
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sison vs. People
G.R. Nos. 108280-83. November 16, 1995.*
ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS
SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 114931-33. November 16, 1995.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANNIE
FERRER, accused. ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN,
RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, accused-
appellants.
Evidence; Witnesses; The fact that a witness was argumentative and evasive
is not enough reason to reject his testimony if he did not exhibit this
undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony.—The records show that
Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial court on the witness
stand for being argumentative and evasive. This is
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
59
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995
59
Sison vs. People
not enough reason to reject Sumilang’s testimony for he did not exhibit this
undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the whole, his
testimony was correctly given credence by the trial court despite his
evasiveness at some instances.
Same; Same; Except for compelling reasons, the Supreme Court cannot
disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses.—Except for
compelling reasons, we cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the
credence of witnesses considering their visual view of the demeanor of
witnesses when on the witness stand. As trial courts, they can best
appreciate the verbal and non-verbal dimensions of a witness’ testimony.
Same; Same; The mistake of a witness in identifying another person as one
of the accused does not make him an entirely untrustworthy witness—an
honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony.—Banculo’s
mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does not make
him an entirely untrustworthy witness. It does not make his whole
testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful
testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with
imperfect senses. In the court’s discretion, therefore, the testimony of a
witness can be believed as to some facts but disbelieved with respect to the
others.
Same; Photographs; The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when
presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its
production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were
produced.—The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented
in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and
testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value
of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or
reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its
accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime.
102
Same; Same; The photographer is not the only witness who can identify the
pictures he has taken—they can also be identified by any other competent
witness who can testify to their exactness and accuracy.—The
photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures
he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation
of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of
the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the
court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs,
therefore, can be identi-
60
60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sison vs. People
fied by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify
to its exactness and accuracy.
Same; Same; Even if the person who took the photographs was not
presented to identify them, the use of said photographs by some of the
accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission
of the exactness and accuracy thereof.—The objection of Atty. Lazaro to
the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the person
who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use
of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-
participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy
thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling
incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar
and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their
presence thereat.
Same; Same; Even if the pictures did not record two of the accused hitting
the victim, they were unequivocally identified by witnesses—their denials
and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification.—Appellant Romeo
Sison appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia, is shown
merely running after the victim. Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not
identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the
photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the
entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While
the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were
unequivocally identified by Sumilang and Banculo. Appellants’ denials and
alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification.
Criminal Law; Death in a Tumultuous Affray; Elements.—For Article 251
of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be established that: (1) there be
several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3)
these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and
tumultuous manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5)
it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the
person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used
violence can be identified.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Tumultuous Affray” Explained.—A
tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course
of which some person is killed or wounded and the
61
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995
61
Sison vs. People
103
author thereof cannot be ascertained.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or
affray, nor is there a reciprocal aggression where one distinct group picks
on one defenseless individual and attacks him repeatedly, taking turns in
inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him.—The quarrel in the instant
case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one
individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of
the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to
Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said dispersal that one
distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless individual
and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and
blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray,
nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.
Same; Murder; Aggravating Circumstances; Abuse of Superior Strength;
The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless
victim qualifies the killing to murder.—As the lower courts found, the
victim’s assailants were numerous by as much as fifty in number and were
armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of
their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by
Salcedo to escape and free himself. They followed Salcedo from the
Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument several meters away and hit him
mercilessly even when he was already fallen on the ground. There was a
time when Salcedo was able to get up, prop himself against the pavement
and wipe off the blood from his face. But his attackers continued to pursue
him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself nor could he find means
to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save him from his assailants but they
continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for
mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost unconsciousness. The
deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim
qualifies the killing to murder.
Same; Same; Same; Treachery; The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person
being attacked.—Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be
appreciated in the instant case. There is no proof that the attack on Salcedo
was deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure the assailants’ safety
from any defense the victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo
was sudden and unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he
was wearing a yellow t-shirt
62
62
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sison vs. People
or because he allegedly flashed the “Laban” sign against the rallyists,
taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate court well found, Salcedo
had the opportunity to sense the temper of the rallyists and run away from
them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person being attacked.
Same; Same; Same; Evident Premeditation; Evident premeditation cannot
be appreciated where the attack against the victim was sudden and
spontaneous.—The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was
alleged in the information against Joselito Tamayo. Evident premeditation
cannot be appreciated in this case because the attack against Salcedo was
sudden and spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the so-
called “Coryistas.” It was not preceded by cool thought and reflection.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; There is conspiracy where, at the time the
malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a
unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of
the victim.—We find however the existence of a conspiracy among
appellants. At the time they were committing the crime, their actions
impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to
104
bring about the death of Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is proved,
a showing as to who among the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not
required to sustain a conviction. Each of the conspirators is liable for all
acts of the others regardless of the intent and character of their participation,
because the act of one is the act of all.
Same; Same; Damages; The reckless disregard for a young person’s life and
the anguish wrought on his widow and three small children warrant an
increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00.—The trial
court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages,
P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of
the suit. At the time he died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo was twenty three
years old and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in Saudi
Arabia. The reckless disregard for such a young person’s life and the
anguish wrought on his widow and three small children, warrant an increase
in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The indemnity of
P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the death of the victim.
PETITION for review on certiorari and AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
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The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor-General for respondents in G.R. Nos. 108280-83 and for
plaintiff-appellee in G.R. Nos. 114931-33.
M.M. Lazaro and Associates and Lazaro Law Firm for petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 108280-83 and for accused-appellants in G.R. Nos. 114931-33.
PUNO, J.:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the
aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. This was the time when the
newly-installed government of President Corazon C. Aquino was being
openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by
“Marcos loyalists,” supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Tension and animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into
violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a
known “Coryista.”
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court
against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the
murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No. 86-47322 was filed against Raul
Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No. 86-
47617 against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y
Mostero; Criminal Case No. 86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y
Arambulo; Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against Joselito Tamayo y Ortia;
and Criminal Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y Mandapat.
Also filed were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against Oliver
Lozano and Benjamin Nuega as well as Annie Ferrer charging them as
accomplices to the murder of Salcedo.
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLIX, Manila. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial
ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses, including
two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the police
officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of
their testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented documen-
64
105
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sison vs. People
tary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various
photographs taken during the mauling.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to
be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a
permit to hold the rally but their application was denied by the authorities.
Despite this setback, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal
Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led
by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both members of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, the loyalists started an impromptu singing contest,
recited prayers and delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula
Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived
and asked the leaders for their permit. No permit could be produced.
Colonel Dula Torres thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse. The
loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano
turned towards his group and said “Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory
infiltrators.”Atty. Nuega added “Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!”The police then
pushed the crowd, and used tear gas and truncheons to disperse them. The
loyalists scampered away but some of them fought back and threw stones at
the police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the
situation later stabilized.1
At about 4:00 P.M., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese
Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular
movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos, jogging around the
fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and
Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them “Gulpihin ninyo ang mga Cory
hecklers!”Then she continued jogging around the fountain chanting
“Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos,
Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!”The loyalists replied “Bugbugin!”A few
minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then
shouted “Kailangang gumanti tayo ngayon!”A commotion ensued and
Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in
yellow, the color of the “Coryistas.” Renato
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65
Sison vs. People
took off his yellow shirt.2 He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being
chased by a group of persons shouting “Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!”The
man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be
Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled
him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again
pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him
on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician
at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo’s aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so
he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo
unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave
Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo’s attackers.
They backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away
from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as
another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos
also boxed Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was
already fallen.3 Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on
the left side of his head and ear.4 Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo
on his nape, shouting: “Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!”5Sumilang tried to pacify
Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo
boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell. Banculo
saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when
he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed him.6 Sumilang saw accused
Gerry Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he did.7
106
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the
blood from his face. He sat on some cement steps8 and then tried to flee
towards Roxas Boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but
accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sison vs. People
pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for his life
exclaiming “Maawa na kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo ako.”He cried: “Pulis,
pulis. Wala bang pulis?”9
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas
Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged
down a van and with the help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the
Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him to
the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
Salcedo died of “hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic.” He sustained various
contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures as revealed in
the following post-mortem findings:
“Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.
Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm., frontal region, right
side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm., frontal region, left side; 5.0 x 4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x
3.5 cm., face, left side; 3.5 x 2.0 cm., nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0
x 4.0 cm. left suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right elbow.
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right knee.
Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm., upper lip.
Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal region; right
temporal region; occipital region, right side.
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior cranial fossa; right
anterior cranial fossa.
Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive. Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, about ½ filled with grayish brown food materials and fluid.”10
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press
people, both local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the
event which became front-page news the following day, capturing national
and international atten-
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Sison vs. People
tion. This prompted President Aquino to order the Capital Regional
Command and the Western Police District to investigate the incident. A
reward of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was put up by Brigadier General
Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for persons who could give information
leading to the arrest of the killers.11 Several persons, including Ranulfo
Sumilang and Renato Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on the basis
of their identification, several persons, including the accused, were
apprehended and investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the
mauling of the victim and offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito
107
Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the photographs presented by the
prosecution12 because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in Quezon
City.13 Gerry Nery claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of
the incident.14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at
his office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at that
time.15 He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility; he
cannot run normally nor do things forcefully.16 Richard de los Santos
admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting
Salcedo.17 He said that he merely watched the mauling which explains why
his face appeared in some of the photographs.18 Unlike the other accused,
Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako’y
Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that fateful day.
According to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los
Santos, merely viewed the incident.19 His face was in the pictures because
he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sison vs. People
Salcedo.20 Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers because
he pitied Salcedo. The maulers however ignored him.21
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer
opted not to testify in their defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo
Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo
guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery and
sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was
likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court, however, found that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused and thus acquitted
Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the aforementioned cases
as follows:
1.In ‘People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery.’ Criminal Case No. 86-
47322,the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the
two (2) Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby
acquits them of said charge;
2.In ‘People versus Romeo Sison, et al.,’ Criminal Case No. 86-47617, the
Court finds the Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, as principals for the crime of Murder, defined, in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and, there being no other mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, hereby imposes on each of them an
indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10)
MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as
minimum, to TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum,
to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
3.In ‘People versus Richard de los Santos,’ Criminal Case No. 86-47790,the
Court finds the Accused Richard de los Santos guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal for the crime of Murder defined in
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Sison vs. People
108
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no other extenuating
circumstances, the Court hereby imposes on him an indeterminate penalty
of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY
(20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20)
YEARS of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum;
4.In ‘People versus Joselito Tamayo,’ Criminal Case No. 86-48538,the
Court finds the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, for the
crime of ‘Murder’ defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion
Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal,
as Maximum;
5.In ‘People versus Rolando Fernandez,’ Criminal Case No. 86-48931,the
Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Accused for
the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of said
charge;
6.In ‘People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.,’ Criminal Case No. 86-49007,the
Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Accused
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits them of
said charge;
7.In ‘People versus Annie Ferrer,’ Criminal Case No. 86-49008, the Court
finds the said Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as accomplice to the
crime of Murder under Article 18 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby imposes on her an indeterminate penalty of NINE
(9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to
TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of
Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum.
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los Santos, Joel Tan,
Joselito Tamayo and Annie Ferrer are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, to the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the total amount of P74,000.00 as
actual damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages, and one-half (1/2) of the costs of suit.
The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar, Romeo Sison, Joel Tan,
Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo had been under detention during
the pendency of these cases shall be credited to them provided that they
agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and
regulations of the City Jail.
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to release the
Accused Gerry Nery, Raul Billosos and Rolando Fernandez from the City
Jail unless they are being detained for another cause or charge.
The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez has become moot
and academic. The Petition for Bail of the Accused Joel
Tan, Romeo Sison and Joselito Tamayo is denied for lack of merit.
The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega
are hereby cancelled.”22
On appeal, the Court of Appeals23on December 28, 1992, modified the
decision of the trial court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the
penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion
perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by
abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide
because the information against him did not allege the said qualifying
circumstance. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe, Joel Tan
y Mostero and Richard de los Santos are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;
109
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the generic
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a
consequence, an indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision
mayor as Minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as
Maximum is hereby imposed upon him;
3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED of being an
accomplice to the crime of Murder.
CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has been imposed
in the instant consolidated cases, the said cases are now hereby certified to
the Honorable Supreme Court for review.”24
Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court inasmuch as Joselito Tamayo was not sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. G.R. Nos. 114931-33 was certi-
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71
Sison vs. People
fied to us for automatic review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
against the four accused-appellants sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Before this court, accused-appellants assign the following errors:
“I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
IT NOTED THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED TO CITE ANYTHING ON
RECORD TO SUPPORT THEIR AVERMENT THAT THERE WERE NO
WITNESSES WHO HAVE COME FORWARD TO IDENTIFY THE
PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF STEPHEN SALCEDO.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL,
SUSPICIOUS AND INCONCLUSIVE TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS RANULFO SUMILANG.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THERE WAS NO
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT ANY OF THE ACCUSED CARRIED A
HARD AND BLUNT INSTRUMENT, THE ADMITTED CAUSE OF
THE HEMORRHAGE RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF THE
DECEASED.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THERE EXISTS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE
PRINCIPAL ACCUSED.
V
110
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS MURDER AND NOT
DEATH (HOMICIDE) CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY.”25
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sison vs. People
In their additional brief, appellants contend that:
“I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REACHING A CONCLUSION OF FACT UTILIZING SPECULATIONS,
SURMISES, AND NON-SEQUITUR CONCLUSIONS, AND EVEN THE
DISPUTED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, TO UPHOLD THE
VALIDITY OF THE VERY SAME JUDGMENT, ALL CONTRARY TO
THE RULES OF EVIDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING
EXHIBITS “D,” “G,” “O,” “P,” “V,” TO “V-48,” T TO “W-13,” ALL OF
WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT
BAR DISREGARDING ALTOGETHER THE SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER, NOT
DEATH (HOMICIDE) IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY SIDESTEPPING IN
THE PROCESS THE FACTUAL GROUNDS SURROUNDING THE
INCIDENT.”26
Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the
testimonies of the two prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and
Renato Banculo, because they are unreliable, doubtful and do not deserve
any credence. According to them, the testimonies of these two witnesses are
suspect because they surfaced only after a reward was announced by
General Lim. Renato Banculo even submitted three sworn statements to
_______________the police geared at providing a new or improved version
of the incident. On the witness stand, he mistakenly identified a detention
prisoner in another case as accused Rolando Fernandez.27 Ranulfo
Sumilang was evasive and unresponsive prompting the trial court to
reprimand him several times.28
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward
announced by General Lim, much less that both or either of them ever
received such reward from the government. On the contrary, the evidence
shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and submitted his
sworn statement immediately two hours after the mauling, even before
announcement of any reward.29 He informed the police that he would
111
cooperate with them and identify Salcedo’s assailants if he saw them
again.30
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them
and his testimony incredible. The sworn statements were made to identify
more suspects who were apprehended during the investigation of Salcedo’s
death.31
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial
court on the witness stand for being argumentative and evasive.32 This is
not enough reason to reject Sumilang’s testimony for he did not exhibit this
undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the whole, his
testimony was correctly given credence by the trial court despite his
evasiveness at some instances. Except for compelling reasons, we cannot
disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses considering
their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses when on the Witness stand.
As trial courts, they can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal
dimensions of a witness’ testimony.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sison vs. People
Banculo’s mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does
not make him an entirely untrustworthy witness.33
It does not make his whole testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not
inconsistent with a truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be
expected from persons with imperfect senses. In the court’s discretion,
therefore, the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts but
disbelieved with respect to the others.34
We sustain the appellate and trial court’s findings that the witnesses’
testimonies corroborate each other on all important and relevant details of
the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of all petitioners jibe
with each other and their narration of the events are supported by the
medical and documentary evidence on record.
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, testified that the victim had various wounds on his body
which could have been inflicted by pressure from more than one hard
object.35 The contusions and abrasions found could have been caused by
punches, kicks and blows from rough stones.36 The fatal injury of
intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures in Salcedo’s skull which
may have been caused by contact with a hard and blunt object such as
fistblows, kicks and a blunt wooden instrument.37
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched.
Sumilang in fact testified that Salcedo was pummelled by his assailants with
stones in their hands.38
Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly
disregarded Exhibits “D,” “G,” and “P,” it erroneously gave evidentiary
weight to Exhibits “O,” “V,” “V-1” to “V-48,” “W,”
_______________
“W-1” to “W-13.”39 Exhibit “O” is the Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and
Pat. Bautista, the police intelligence operatives who witnessed the rally and
subsequent dispersal operation. Pat. Flores properly identified Exhibit “O”
as his sworn statement and in fact gave testimony corroborating the contents
thereof.40 Besides, the Joint Affidavit merely reiterates what the other
prosecution witnesses testified to. Identification by Pat. Bautista is a
surplusage. If appellants wanted to impeach the said affidavit, they should
have placed Pat. Flores on the witness stand.
112
Exhibits “V,” “V-1” to “V-48” are photographs taken of the victim as he
was being mauled at the Luneta—starting from a grassy portion to the
pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard,41—as he
was being chased by his assailants42 and as he sat pleading with his
assailants.43 Exhibits “W,” “W-1” to “W-13” are photographs of Salcedo
and the mauling published in local newspapers and magazines such as the
Philippine Star,44 Mr. and Ms. Magazine,45 Philippine Daily Inquirer,46
and the Malaya.47The admissibility of these photographs is being
questioned by appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or
persons who took the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence,
must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as
to the circumstances under which they were produced.48 The value of this
kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of
the
________________
original,49 and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying
the scene at the time of the crime.50 The photographer, however, is not the
only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken.51 The correctness
of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be
proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by
other competent witnesses, after Which the court can admit it subject to
impeachment as to its accuracy.52 Photographs, therefore, can be identified
by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to
its exactness and accuracy.53
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part
of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr.
objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification.54 However,
when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas,
counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Nery used Exhibits “V,”
“V-1” to “V-48” to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and
therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim.55 The
photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry
Nery as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas
represented all the other accused per understanding with their respective
counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings,
the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who
took the witness stand.56 No objection was made by
________________
counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third
hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility.57
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is
anchored on the fact that the person who took the same was not presented to
identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by some of the
accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission
of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful
representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants
Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves
therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat.58
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused’s testimonies reveal
that only three of the appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo
Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various belligerent poses
lunging or hovering behind or over the victim.59 Appellant Romeo Sison
appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia, is shown merely
running after the victim.60 Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in
any of the pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the photographs
does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire
sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the
pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were
unequivocally identified by Sumilang and Banculo.61 Appellants’ denials
and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification.
113
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of
conspiracy among the principal accused and in convicting them of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength,
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78
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sison vs. People
not death in tumultuous affray.
Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal
Code as follows:
“Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray.—When, while several
persons, not composing groups organized for the common purpose of
assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each
other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray
someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries
can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished by prision
mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the
deceased, the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall have used violence upon
the person of the victim.”
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be several
persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for the common
purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several
persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous
manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or
persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be
identified.62
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course
of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained.63
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one
distinct group and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of
the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually
after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after
said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one
_______________
defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting
punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous
quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the
incident.64
As the lower courts found, the victim’s assailants were numerous by as
much as fifty in number65 and were armed with stones with which they hit
the victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive
force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself.
They followed Salcedo from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument
several meters away and hit him mercilessly even when he was already
fallen on the ground. There was a time when Salcedo was able to get up,
prop himself against the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face. But
his attackers continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend
himself nor could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save
him from his assailants but they continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in
the process. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he
114
finally lost consciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior
strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant
case. There is no proof that the attack on Salcedo was deliberately and
consciously chosen to ensure the assailants’ safety from any defense the
victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo was sudden and
unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he was wearing a
yellow t-shirt or because he allegedly flashed the “Laban” sign against the
rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate court well found,
Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the temper of the rallyists and run
away from them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person being attacked.66
________________
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sison vs. People
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the
information against Joselito Tamayo. Evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated in this case because the attack against Salcedo was sudden and
spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the so-called
“Coryistas.” It was not preceded by cool thought and reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the
time they were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a
unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of
Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing as to who
among the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a
convic-tion.67 Each of the conspirators is liable for all acts of the others
regardless of the intent and character of their participation, because the act
of one is the act of all.68
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages,
P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of
the suit. At the time he died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo was twenty three
years old and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in Saudi
Arabia.69 The reckless disregard for such a young person’s life and the
anguish wrought on his widow and three small children,70 warrant an
increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The indemnity
of P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the death of the victim.71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and
modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan and Richard de
los Santos are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder without
any aggravating or
_______________
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995
81
Sison vs. People
mitigating circumstance and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance
of abuse of superior strength and, as a consequence, he is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as
minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum;
3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the
heirs of Stephen Salcedo the following amounts:
115

(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages;

(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and

(c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim.

4. Costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Francisco, J., On leave.

Judgment affirmed with modification.

Note.—Inconsistency regarding the identity of the assailant is not just a

lapse of memory on a trivial point but a glaring inconsistency in a material
factor which affects the credibility of a witness. (People vs. Pidia, 249
SCRA 687 [1995])

——o0o—— Sison vs. People, 250 SCRA 58, G.R. Nos. 108280-83, G.R.
Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995
116
G.R. No. 170723. March 3, 2008.*
GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MICHELINA S.
AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, DR. JUVIDO
AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B. PASCUAL, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Definition of Probable
Cause.—Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such
facts and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
The term does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief; that is, the belief that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable
cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
Same; Same; The determination of whether or not probable cause
exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused is consigned
and entrusted to the Department of Justice (DOJ); A public
prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal
information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop
up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a
different conclusion.—The executive department of the government
is accountable for the prosecution of crimes, its principal obligation
being the faithful execution of the laws of the land. A necessary
component of the power to execute the laws is the right to prosecute
their violators, the responsibility of which is thrust upon the DOJ.
Hence, the determination of whether or not probable cause exists to
warrant the prosecution in court of an accused is consigned and
entrusted to the DOJ. And by the nature of his office, a public
prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal
information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop
up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a
different conclusion.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
432
432
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
Same; Same; Court leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient
latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of
an information against the supposed offender.—Public prosecutors
under the DOJ have a wide range of discretion, the discretion of
whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends
on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by (public)
prosecutors. And this Court has consistently adhered to the policy of
non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to
leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion
in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will
establish probable cause for the filing of an information against the
supposed offender.
117
Same; Same; Court’s duty in an appropriate case is confined to a
determination of whether the assailed executive determination of
probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction
resulting from a grave abuse of discretion.—Prescinding from the
above, the court’s duty in an appropriate case, therefore, is confined
to a determination of whether the assailed executive determination of
probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction
resulting from a grave abuse of discretion. For courts of law to grant
the extraordinary writ of certiorari, so as to justify the reversal of the
finding of whether or not there exists probable cause to file an
information, the one seeking the writ must be able to establish that
the investigating prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it
must be patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a
unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough.
Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case
but has transcended the same or acted without authority.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jorge V. Miravite for petitioner.
Alampay, Gatchalian, Mawis and Alampay for respondent Dra.
Marissa B. Pascual.
433
VOL. 547, MARCH 3, 2008
433
Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
Bernas Law Office for respondents M. Olondriz and P. Aguirre.
Antonio L. Albano for respondent Dr. J. Agatep.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, as amended, petitioner Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre (Gloria
Aguirre) seeks the reversal of the 21 July 2005 Decision2 and 5
December 2005 Resolution,3 both of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 88370, entitled “Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre v. Secretary of
the Department of Justice, Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz, Dr.
Juvido Agatep, Dra. Marissa B. Pascual, Pedro B. Aguirre and John
and Jane Does.”
The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) when the latter
issued the twin resolutions dated 11 February 20044 and 12
November 2004,5 respectively, which in turn affirmed the 8 January
2003 Resolution6 of the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Quezon City.
The Assistant City Prosecutor for the OCP of Quezon City
recommended the dismissal of the criminal complaint, docketed as
I.S. No. 02-12466, for violation of Articles 172 (Falsification by
Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents) and 262
(Mutilation), both of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic
Act No. 7610, otherwise known as “Child
_______________
118
434
434
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,” for insufficiency of
evidence.
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner Gloria
Aguirre against respondents Pedro B. Aguirre (Pedro Aguirre),
Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz (Olondriz), Dr. Juvido Agatep (Dr.
Agatep), Dr. Marissa B. Pascual (Dr. Pascual) and several John/Jane
Does for falsification, mutilation and child abuse.
The antecedents of the present petition are:
Laureano “Larry” Aguirre7 used to be a charge of the Heart of Mary
Villa, a child caring agency run by the Good Shepherd Sisters and
licensed by the Department of Social Work and Development
(DSWD). Sometime in 1978, respondent Pedro Aguirre; the latter’s
spouse, Lourdes S. Aguirre (Lourdes Aguirre); and their four
daughters, who included petitioner Gloria Aguirre and respondent
Olondriz, came to know Larry, who was then just over a year old.
The Aguirres would have Larry spend a few days at their home and
then return him to the orphanage thereafter. In June 1980, Larry, then
two years and nine months of age, formally became the ward of
respondent Pedro Aguirre and his spouse Lourdes Aguirre by virtue
of an Affidavit of Consent to Legal Guardianship executed in their
favor by Sister Mary Concepta Bellosillo, Superior of the Heart of
Mary Villa. On 19 June 1986, the Aguirre spouses’ guardianship of
Larry was legalized when the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3
of Balanga, Bataan, duly appointed them as joint co-guardians over
the person and property of Larry.
As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses and their children
noticed that his developmental milestones were remarkably delayed.
His cognitive and physical growth did not appear normal in that “at
age 3 to 4 years, Larry could only
_______________
crawl on his tummy like a frog x x x”;8 he did not utter his first word
until he was three years of age; did not speak in sentences until his
sixth year; and only learned to stand up and walk after he turned five
years old. At age six, the Aguirre spouses first enrolled Larry at the
Colegio de San Agustin, Dasmariñas Village, but the child
experienced significant learning difficulties there. In 1989, at age
eleven, Larry was taken to specialists for neurological and
psychological evaluations. The psychological evaluation9 done on
Larry revealed the latter to be suffering from a mild mental
deficiency.10 Consequent thereto, the Aguirre spouses transferred
Larry to St. John Ma. Vianney, an educational institution for special
children.
In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a urologist/surgeon,
was approached concerning the intention to have Larry, then 24
years of age, vasectomized. Prior to performing the procedure on the
intended patient, respondent Dr. Agatep required that Larry be
evaluated by a psychiatrist in order to confirm and validate whether
or not the former could validly give his consent to the medical
procedure on account of his mental deficiency.
119
In view of the required psychiatric clearance, Larry was brought to
respondent Dr. Pascual, a psychiatrist, for evaluation. In a psychiatric
report dated 21 January 2002, respondent Dr. Pascual made the
following recommendation:
“[T]he responsibility of decision making may be given to his parent
or guardian.”11
the full text of which reads—
_______________
PSYCHIATRY REPORT
21 January 2002
GENERAL DATA
LAUREANO AGUIRRE, 24 years old, male, high school graduate
of St. John [Marie Vianney], was referred for psychiatric evaluation
to determine competency to give consent for vasectomy.
CLINICAL SUMMARY
Larry was adopted at age 3 from an orphanage and prenatal history is
not known to the adoptive family except that abortion was attempted.
Developmental milestones were noted to be delayed. He started to
walk and speak in single word at around age 5. He was enrolled in
Colegio de San Agustin at age 6 where he showed significant
learning difficulties that he had to repeat 1st and 4th grades. A
consult was done in 1989 when he was 11 years old. Neurological
findings and EEG results were not normal and he was given Tecretol
and Encephabol by his neurologist. Psychological evaluation
revealed mild to moderate mental retardation, special education
training was advised and thus, he was transferred to St. John Marie
Vianney. He finished his elementary and secondary education in the
said school. He was later enrolled in a vocational course at Don
Bosco which he was unable to continue. There has been no reported
behavioral problems in school and he gets along relatively well with
his teachers and some of his classmates.
Larry grew up with a very supportive adoptive family. He is the
youngest in the family of four sisters. Currently, his adoptive parents
are already old and have medical problem and thus, they could no
longer monitor and take care of him like before. His adoptive mother
has Bipolar Mood Disorder and used to physically maltreat him. A
year ago, he had an episode of dizziness, vomiting and headaches
after he was hit by his adoptive mother. Consult was done in Makati
Medical Center and several tests were done, results of which were
consistent with his developmental problem. There was no evidence
of acute insults. The family subsequently decided that he should stay
with one of his sisters to avoid similar incident and the possibility
that he would retaliate although he has never hurt anybody. There
has been no episode of violent outburst or aggressive behavior. He
would often keep to himself when sad, angry or frustrated.
437
VOL. 547, MARCH 3, 2008
437
Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
He is currently employed in the company of his sister and given
assignment to do some photocopying, usually in the mornings. He
enjoys playing billiards and basketball with his nephews and, he
120

spends most of his leisure time watching TV and listening to music.
He could perform activities of daily living without assistance except
that he still needs supervision in taking a bath. He cannot prepare his
own meal and never allowed to go out and run errands alone. He
does not have friends and it is only his adoptive family whom he has
significant relationships. He claims that he once had a girlfriend
when he was in high school who was more like a best friend to him.
He never had sexual relations. He has learned to smoke and drink
alcohol few years ago through his cousins and the drivers. There is
no history of abuse of alcohol or any prohibited substances.
CT scan done 09 January 2001 showed nonspecific right deep
parietal subcortical malacia. No localized mass lesion in the brain.
MRI done on 10 January 2001 showed bilateral parietal x x x volume
loss, encephalomalacia, gliosis and ulegyria consistent with sequela
of postnatal or neonatal infarcts. Ex-vacuo dilatation of the atria of
lateral ventricles associated thinned posterior half of the corpus
callosum.
438

MEDICAL STATUS EXAMINATION

438
The applicant was appropriately dressed. He was cooperative and he
had intermittent eye contact. Speech was spontaneous, soft, and SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
relevant. He responded to questions in single words or simple
sentences. He was anxious specially at the start of the interview, with Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
full affect appropriate to mood and thought content. There was no
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION
apparent thought or perceptual disturbance. No suicidal/
Axis I None
homicidal thoughts elicited. He was oriented to time, place and
person. He has intact remote and recent memory. He could do simple Axis II Mental Retardation, mild to moderate type
calculation. He could write his name and read simple words. His
human figure was comparable to a 7-8 year old. He demonstrated Axis III None
fair judgment and poor insight. He had fair impulse control.
Axis IV None at present
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS
Axis V Current GAF = 50-60
Psychological tests done on March 6, 1990 (Dr. Lourdes Ledesma)
Larry’s mental deficiency could be associated with possible perinatal
and on August 4, 2000 (Dr. Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villaosor)
insults, which is consistent with the neuroimaging findings. Mental
consistently revealed mild to moderate mental deficiency.
retardation associated with neurological problems usually has poorer
SIGNIFICANT LABORATORY EXAMS RESULTS prognosis. Larry is very much dependent on his family for his needs,
adaptive functioning, direction and in making major life decisions.
121
At his capacity, he may never understand the nature, the foreseeable
risks and benefits, and consequences of the procedure (vasectomy)
that his family wants for his protection. Thus, the responsibility of
decision making may be given to his parent or guardian.
Marissa B. Pascual, M.D.
Psychiatrist12
Considering the above recommendation, respondent Pedro Aguirre’s
written consent was deemed sufficient in order to proceed with the
conduct of the vasectomy. Hence, on 31 January 2002, respondent
Dr. Agatep performed a bilateral vasectomy on Larry.
On 11 June 2002, petitioner Gloria Aguirre, respondent Pedro
Aguirre’s eldest child, instituted a criminal complaint for the
violation of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Articles 172 and
262, both in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 against respondents
Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several
John/Jane Does before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City.
The Complaint Affidavit,13 docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466,
contained the following allegations:
_______________
Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
“2. x x x Dr. Agatep and Dra. Pascual were (sic) medical
practitioners specializing in urology and psychiatry respectively;
while respondent Pedro B. Aguirre is my father; Michelina S.
Aguirre-Olondriz is my sister, and the victim Laureano “Larry”
Aguirre x x x is my common law brother. JOHN and JANE DOES
were the persons who, acting upon the apparent instructions of
respondents Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz and/or Pedro B. Aguirre,
actually scouted, prospected, facilitated, solicited and/or procured the
medical services of respondents Dra. Pascual and Dr. Agatep vis-à-
vis the intended mutilation via bilateral vasectomy of my common
law brother Larry Aguirre subject hereof.
In addition to the above, the complaint included therein an allegation
that—
“v. x x x without a PRIOR medical examination, professional
interview of nor verification and consultation with my mother,
Lourdes Sabino-Aguirre, respondent Dra. Pascual baselessly,
fraudulently and with obvious intent to defame and malign her
reputation and honor, and worse, that of our Sabido family, falsely
440
440
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
concluded and diagnosed, via her falsified Psychiatry Report, that
my mother Lourdes Sabido-Aguirre purportedly suffers from
“BIPOLAR MOOD DISORDER” x x x.”
To answer petitioner Gloria Aguirre’s accusations against them,
respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual
submitted their respective Counter-Affidavits.
122
In her defense,14 respondent Olondriz denied that she “prospected,
scouted, facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement,
mutilated or abused” her common-law brother, Larry Aguirre.
Further, she countered that:
“3. x x x While I am aware and admit that Larry went through a
vasectomy procedure, there is nothing in the Complaint which
explains how the vasectomy amounts to a mutilation.
xxxx
5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state with
complete confidence that I did not participate in any way in the
alleged mutilation.
6. Neither did I procure or solicit the services of the physician who
performed the vasectomy, Dr. Juvido Agatep x x x. It was my father,
Pedro Aguirre, Larry’s guardian, who obtained his services. I merely
acted upon his instructions and accompanied my brother to the
physician, respondents Dra. Marissa B. Pascual x x x.
xxxx
10. Neither does the Complaint explain in what manner the
Complainant is authorized or has any standing to declare that Larry’s
consent was not obtained. Complainant is not the guardian or relative
of Larry. While she argues that Larry’s consent should have been
obtained the Complaint does not dispute the psychiatrist’s findings
about Larry’s inability to give consent.
xxxx
13. x x x the Complaint does not even state what alleged
participation was falsified or the portion of the psychiatric report that
allegedly states that someone participated when in fact that person
did not so participate.
_______________
xxxx
15. Again, I had no participation in the preparation of the report of
Dr. Pascual x x x.
xxxx
17. x x x the Complaint does not dispute that he (Larry) is mentally
deficient or incompetent to give consent.
xxxx
19. x x x I verified that the effect of a vasectomy operation was
explained to him (Larry) by both respondent doctors.
20. x x x I accompanied Larry and obeyed my father on the belief
that my father continues to be the legal guardian of Larry. I know of
no one else who asserts to be his legal guardian x x x.”15
Alleging the same statement of facts and defenses, respondent Pedro
Aguirre argues against his complicity in the crime of mutilation as
charged and asserts that:
“5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state with
complete confidence that I did not participate in any way in the
alleged mutilation.”16
Nevertheless, he maintains that the vasectomy performed on Larry
does not in any way amount to mutilation, as the latter’s reproductive
organ is still completely intact.17 In any case, respondent Pedro
123
Aguirre explains that the procedure performed is reversible through
another procedure called Vasovasostomy, to wit:
“8. I understand that vasectomy is reversible through a procedure
called Vasovasostomy. I can also state with confidence that the
procedure enables men who have undergone a vasectomy to sire a
child. Hence, no permanent damage was caused by the procedure.”
_______________
442
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
Respondent Pedro Aguirre challenges the charge of falsification in
the complaint, to wit:
“14. x x x I did not make it appear that any person participated in
any act or proceeding when that person did not in fact participate
x x x.
xxxx
16. x x x I had no participation in the preparation of the report of
Dra. Pascual. She arrived at her report independently, using her own
professional judgment x x x.
xxxx
31. What I cannot understand about Petita’s Complaint is how
Larry is argued to be legally a child under the definition of one law
but nonetheless and simultaneously argued to be capacitated to give
his consent as fully as an adult.”18
Respondent Pedro Aguirre further clarifies that co-guardianship over
Larry had been granted to himself and his wife, Lourdes Aguirre,
way back on 19 June 1986 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of
Balanga, Bataan. Respondent Pedro Aguirre contends that being one
of the legal guardians, consequently, parental authority over Larry is
vested in him. But assuming for the sake of argument that Larry does
have the capacity to make the decision concerning his vasectomy,
respondent Pedro Aguirre argues that petitioner Gloria Aguirre has
no legal personality to institute the subject criminal complaint, for
only Larry would have the right to do so.
Just as the two preceding respondents did, respondent Dr. Agatep
also disputed the allegations of facts stated in the Complaint.
Adopting the allegations of his co-respondents insofar as they were
material to the charges against him, he vehemently denied failing to
inform Larry of the intended procedure. In his counter-statement of
facts he averred that:
_______________
“(b) x x x I scheduled Larry for consultative interview x x x
wherein I painstakingly explained what vasectomy is and the
consequences thereof; but finding signs of mental deficiency, x x x I
advised his relatives and his nurse who accompanied him to have
Larry examined by a psychiatrist who could properly determine
whether or not Larry x x x can really give his consent, thus I required
them to secure first a psychiatric evaluation and clearance prior to
the contemplated procedure.
(c) On January 21, 2002, I was furnished a copy of a psychiatric
report prepared by Dr. Marissa Pascual x x x. In her said report, Dr.
Pascual found Larry to suffer from “mental retardation, mild to
moderate type” and further stated that “at his capacity, he may never
124
understand the nature, the foreseeable risks and benefits and
consequences of the procedure (vasectomy) x x x, thus the
responsibility of decision making may be given to his parent or
guardian x x x.”
(d) x x x I was likewise furnished a copy of an affidavit executed
by Pedro Aguirre stating that he was the legal guardian of Larry
x x x Pedro Aguirre gave his consent to vasectomize Larry x x x.
(e) Only then, specifically January 31, 2002, vasectomy was
performed with utmost care and diligence.”19
In defense against the charge of falsification and mutilation,
respondent Dr. Agatep argued that subject complaint should be
dismissed for the following reasons:
“1. The complainant has no legal personality to file this case. As
mentioned above, she is only a common law sister of Larry who has
a legal guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre, one of the herein
respondents x x x.
2. x x x [t]he allegations in the complaint clearly centers on the
condition of complainant’s mother, Lourdes Aguirre, her reputation,
and miserably fails to implicate the degree of participation of herein
respondent. x x x
xxxx
_______________
(b) Falsification. x x x I strongly aver that this felony does not
apply to me since it clearly gives reference to co-respondent, Dr.
Marissa Pascual’s Psychiatry Report, dated January 21, 2002, in
relation with her field of profession, an expert opinion. I do not have
any participation in the preparation of said report, x x x neither did I
utilized (sic) the same in any proceedings to the damage to another.
x x x I also deny using a falsified document x x x.
(c) Mutilation. x x x Vasectomy does not in anyway equate to
castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an
organ in the context of law and medicine, it is quite remote from the
penis x x x.
(d) Child Abuse. x x x the complaint-affidavit is very vague in
specifying the applicability of said law. It merely avers that Laureano
“Larry” Aguirre is a child, and alleges his father, Pedro Aguirre, has
parental authority over him x x x.”20
Similarly, respondent Dr. Pascual denied the criminal charges of
falsification and mutilation imputed to her. She stands by the
contents of the assailed Psychiatric Report, justifying it thus:
“x x x My opinion of Larry Aguirre’s mental status was based on my
own personal observations, his responses during my interview of
him, the results of the two (2) psychological tests conducted by
clinical psychologists, the results of laboratory tests, including a CT
Scan and MRI, and his personal and family history which I obtained
from his sister, Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz x x x.
5. x x x the reference in my report concerning Mrs. Lourdes
Aguirre is not a statement of my opinion of Mrs. Aguirre’s mental
status, x x x. Rather, it is part of the patient’s personal and family
history as conveyed to me by Mrs. Aguirre-Olondriz.
6. x x x An expression of my opinion, especially of an expert
opinion, cannot give rise to a charge for falsification. A contrary
opinion by another expert only means that the experts differ, and
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does not necessarily reflect on the truth or falsity of either opinion
x x x.
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7. x x x I never stated that I examined Mrs. Aguirre, because I
never did x x x.
8. I had no participation in the surgery performed on Larry Aguirre
except to render an opinion on his capacity to give informed consent
to the vasectomy x x x.
9. Without admitting the merits of the complaint, I submit that
complainants are not the proper persons to subscribe to the same as
they are not the offended party, peace officer or other public officer
charged with the enforcement of the law violated x x x.”21
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the circumstances attendant
to the case did not amount to the crime of falsification. He held
that—
“[T]he claim of the complainant that the Psychiatric Report was
falsified, because consent was not given by Larry Aguirre to the
vasectomy and/or he was not consulted on said operation does not
constitute falsification. It would have been different if it was stated
in the report that consent was obtained from Larry Aguirre or that it
was written therein that he was consulted on the vasectomy, because
that would mean that it was made to appear in the report that Larry
Aguirre participated in the act or proceeding by giving his consent or
was consulted on the matter when in truth and in fact, he did not
participate. Or if not, the entry would have been an untruthful
statement. But that is not the case. Precisely (sic) the report was
made to determine whether Larry Aguirre could give his consent to
his intended vasectomy. Be that as it may, the matter of Larry’s
consent having obtained or not may nor be an issue after all, because
complainant’s (sic) herself alleged that Larry’s mental condition is
that of a child, who can not give consent. Based on the foregoing
consideration, no falsification can be established under the
circumstances.”22
Even the statement in the Psychiatric Report of respondent Dr.
Pascual that Lourdes Aguirre had Bipolar Mood Disorder cannot be
considered falsification since—
_______________
“The report did not state that Lourdes Aguirre was in fact personally
interviewed by respondent Dr. Pascual and that the latter concluded
that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder. The report merely
quoted other sources of information with respect to the condition of
Lourdes Aguirre, in the same manner that the fact that Lourdes
Aguirre was physically abusing Larry Aguirre was also not of Dra.
Pascual personal knowledge. But the fact that Dra. Pascual cited
finding, which is not of her own personal knowledge in her report
does not mean that she committed falsification in the process. Her
sources may be wrong and may affect the veracity of her report, but
for as long as she has not alleged therein that she personally
diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation would not then be true,
she cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it goes without
saying that if the author of the report is not guilty, then with more
reason the other respondents are not liable.”23
126
Respecting the charge of mutilation, the Assistant City Prosecutor
also held that the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of
mutilation as defined and penalized under Article 262 of the Revised
Penal Code, i.e., “[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way
deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very
much part of his physical self.” He ratiocinated that:
“While the operation renders him the inability (sic) to procreate, the
operation is reversible and therefore, cannot be the permanent
damage contemplated under Article 262 of the Revised Penal
Code.”24
The Assistant City Prosecutor,25 in a Resolution26 dated 8 January
2003, found no probable cause to hold respondents Pedro Aguirre,
Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual liable for the complaint of
falsification and mutilation, more specifically, the violation of
Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610. Accordingly,
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the Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of
petitioner Gloria Aguirre’s complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:
“WHEREFORE, it is recommended that the above-entitled case be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.”27
On 18 February 2003, petitioner Gloria Aguirre appealed the
foregoing resolution to the Secretary of the DOJ by means of a
Petition for Review.28
In a Resolution dated 11 February 2004, Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño, for the Secretary of the DOJ, dismissed the
petition. In resolving said appeal, the Chief State Prosecutor held
that:
“Under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of Department Circular
No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, the Secretary of Justice may, motu
proprio, dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any
reversible error in the questioned resolution or finds the same to be
patently without merit.
We carefully examined the petition and its attachments and found no
error that would justify a reversal of the assailed resolution which is
in accord with the law and evidenced (sic) on the matter.”29
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied with finality by the DOJ in another Resolution dated 12
November 2004.
Resolute in her belief, petitioner Gloria Aguirre went to the Court of
Appeals by means of a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
On 21 July 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
dismissing petitioner Gloria Aguirre’s recourse for lack of merit.
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Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Consequently, the assailed Resolutions dated February 11,
2004 and November 12, 2004 of the Secretary of Justice in I.S. No.
02-12466 are hereby AFFIRMED.”30
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre’s motion for reconsideration proved futile
as it was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 5
December 2005.
Hence, the present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, premised on the following arguments:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS, GRAVE
AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT CONCLUDED,
BASED PURPORTEDLY ON THE INTERNET WHICH RUNS
AMUCK WITH OUR SYSTEM OF THE RULE OF LAW AND
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT BILATERAL
VASECTOMY IS PURPORTEDLY 100% REVERSIBLE BY A
FUTURE MEDICAL PROCEDURE HENCE NOT AMOUNTING
TO MUTILATION, X X X; AND
xxxx
II.
WORSE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE,
SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT
REFUSED TO DIRECT THE INDICTMENT OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FOR MUTILATION AND FALSIFICATION
DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE
CAUSE THEREFOR X X X.31
The foregoing issues notwithstanding, the more proper issue for this
Court’s consideration is, given the facts of the case, whether or not
the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
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the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when the latter affirmed the public
prosecutor’s finding of lack of probable cause for respondents Pedro
Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual to stand trial for the
criminal complaints of falsification and mutilation in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610.
In ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals
explained that:
“Evidently, the controversy lies in the permanency of sterilization as
a result of a vasectomy operation, and the chances of restoring
fertility with a reversal surgery x x x.
128
We sustain the DOJ in ruling that the bilateral vasectomy performed
on Larry does not constitute mutilation even if intentionally and
purposely done to prevent him from siring a child.
xxxx
Sterilization is to be distinguished from castration: in the latter act
the reproductive capacity is permanently removed or damaged.”32
It then concluded that:
“The matter of legal liability, other than criminal, which private
respondents may have incurred for the alleged absence of a valid
consent to the vasectomy performed on Larry, is certainly beyond the
province of this certiorari petition. Out task is confined to the issue
of whether or not the Secretary of Justice and the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City committed grave abuse of discretion in
their determining the existence or absence of probable cause for
filing criminal cases for falsification and mutilation under Articles
172 (2) and 262 of the Revised Penal Code.”33
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, contends that the Court of
Appeals and the DOJ failed to appreciate several
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
important facts: 1) that bilateral vasectomy conducted on petitioner’s
brother, Larry Aguirre, was admitted34; 2) that the procedure caused
the perpetual destruction of Larry’s reproductive organs of
generation or conception;35 3) that the bilateral vasectomy was
intentional and deliberate to deprive Larry forever of his
reproductive organ and his capacity to procreate; and 4) that
respondents, “in conspiracy with one another, made not only one but
two (2) untruthful statements, and not mere inaccuracies when they
made it appear in the psychiatry report”36 that a) Larry’s consent
was obtained or at the very least that the latter was informed of the
intended vasectomy; and b) that Lourdes Aguirre was likewise
interviewed and evaluated. Paradoxically, however, petitioner Gloria
Aguirre does not in any way state that she, instead of respondent
Pedro Aguirre, has guardianship over the person of Larry. She only
insists that respondents should have obtained Larry’s consent prior to
the conduct of the bilateral vasectomy.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for public
respondent DOJ, argues that “the conduct of preliminary
investigation to determine the existence of probable cause for the
purpose of filing (an) information is the function of the public
prosecutor.”37 More importantly, “the element[s] of castration or
mutilation of an organ necessary for generation is completely absent
as he was not deprived of any organ necessary for reproduction,
much less the destruction of such organ.”38
Likewise, in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
respondents Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz assert that, fundamentally,
petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no standing to file the complaint, as she
has not shown any injury to her person or
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Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
asserted any relationship with Larry other than being his “common
law sister”; further, that she cannot prosecute the present case, as she
has not been authorized by law to file said complaint, not being the
offended party, a peace officer or a public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law. Accordingly, respondents Pedro Aguirre and
Olondriz posit that they, together with the other respondents Dr.
Agatep and Dr. Pascual, may not be charged with, prosecuted for and
ultimately convicted of: 1) “mutilation x x x since the bilateral
vasectomy conducted on Larry does not involve castration or
amputation of an organ necessary for reproduction as the twin
elements of the crime of mutilation x x x are absent”39; and 2)
“falsification x x x since the acts allegedly constituting falsification
involve matters of medical opinion and not matters of fact,”40 and
that petitioner Gloria Aguirre failed to prove damage to herself or to
any other person.
Respondent Dr. Agatep, in the same vein, stresses that vasectomy is
not mutilation. He elucidates that vasectomy is merely the “excision
of the vas deferens, the duct in testis which transport semen”41; that
it is the penis and the testis that make up the male reproductive organ
and not the vas deferens; and additionally argues that for the crime of
mutilation to be accomplished, Article 262 of the Revised Penal
Code necessitates that there be intentional total or partial deprivation
of some essential organ for reproduction. Tubes, seminal ducts, vas
deferens or prostatic urethra not being organs, respondent Dr. Agatep
concludes, therefore, that vasectomy does not correspond to
mutilation.
Anent the charge of falsification of a private document, respondent
Dr. Agatep asseverates that he never took part in disclosing any
information, data or facts as contained in the contentious Psychiatric
Report.
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For her part, respondent Dr. Pascual insists that the assailed
Psychiatry Report was the result of her independent exercise of
professional judgment. “Rightly or wrongly, (she) diagnosed Larry
Aguirre to be incapable of giving consent, based on interviews made
by the psychiatrist on Larry Aguirre and persons who interacted with
him.”42 And supposing that said report is flawed, it is, at most, an
erroneous medical diagnosis.
The petition has no merit.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.43 The
term does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import
absolute certainty.44 It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief;45 that is, the belief that the act or omission complained of
130
constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause merely
binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of
guilt.46
The executive department of the government is accountable for the
prosecution of crimes, its principal obligation being the faithful
execution of the laws of the land. A necessary component of the
power to execute the laws is the right to prosecute their violators,47
the responsibility of which is thrust upon the DOJ. Hence, the
determination of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the
prosecution in court of an accused is consigned and entrusted to the
DOJ. And by the nature of his office, a public prosecutor is under no
compulsion to file a
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particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has
evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at
hand points to a different conclusion.
Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ have a wide range of
discretion, the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the
exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are
best appreciated by (public) prosecutors.48 And this Court has
consistently adhered to the policy of non-interference in the conduct
of preliminary investigations, and to leave to the investigating
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of
what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause
for the filing of an information against the supposed offender.49
But this is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses
on the part of the prosecutor. It is entirely possible that the
investigating prosecutor may erroneously exercise the discretion
lodged in him by law. This, however, does not render his act
amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.50
Prescinding from the above, the court’s duty in an appropriate case,
therefore, is confined to a determination of whether the assailed
executive determination of probable cause was done without or in
excess of jurisdiction resulting from a grave abuse of discretion. For
courts of law to grant the extraordinary writ of certiorari, so as to
justify the reversal of the finding of whether or not there exists
probable cause to file an information, the one seeking the writ must
be able to establish that the investigating prosecutor exercised his
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as
would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the
131
duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of
discretion is not enough.51 Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he
had jurisdiction over the case but has transcended the same or acted
without authority.52
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the
reasons of the Assistant City Prosecutor in dismissing the criminal
complaints for falsification and mutilation, as affirmed by the DOJ,
is determinative of whether or not he committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In ruling the way he did—that no probable cause for falsification and
mutilation exists—the Assistant City Prosecutor deliberated on the
factual and legal milieu of the case. He found that there was no
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for the crimes
complained of as defined and punished under Articles 172,
paragraph 2, and 262 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610, respectively. Concerning the crime of
falsification of a private document, the Assistant City Prosecutor
reasoned that the circumstances attendant to the case did not amount
to the crime complained of, that is, the lack of consent by Larry
Aguirre before he was vasectomized; or the fact that the latter was
not consulted. The lack of the two preceding attendant facts do not in
any way amount to falsification, absent the contention that it was
made to appear in the assailed report that said consent was obtained.
That would have been an untruthful statement. Neither does the fact
that the Psychiatric Report state that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar
Mood Disorder by the same token amount to falsification because
said report does not put forward that such finding arose after an
examination of the concerned patient. Apropos the charge
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Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
of mutilation, he reasoned that though the vasectomy rendered Larry
unable to procreate, it was not the permanent damage contemplated
under the pertinent provision of the penal code.
We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the DOJ and the Assistant City Prosecutor
was not shown in the present case.
In the present petition, respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr.
Agatep and Dr. Pascual are charged with violating Articles 172 and
262 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
Article 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, defines the
crime of falsification of a private document, viz.—
“Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified
documents.—The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon:
xxxx
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the
intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit
any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding
article.”
132
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre charges respondents with falsification of a
private document for conspiring with one another in keeping Larry
“in the dark about the foregoing (vasectomy) as the same was
concealed from him by the respondents x x x,”53 as well as for
falsely concluding and diagnosing Lourdes Aguirre to be suffering
from Bipolar Mood Disorder.
A scrutiny, however, of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code which
defines the acts constitutive of falsification, that is—
_______________
53 Rollo, pp. 235-243.
456
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
“Art. 171. x x x shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document
which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a
copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that
of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance
thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.”
vis-à-vis the much criticized Psychiatric Report, shows that the acts
complained of do not in any manner, by whatever stretch of the
imagination, fall under any of the eight (8) enumerated acts
constituting the offense of falsification.
In order to properly address the issue presented by petitioner Gloria
Aguirre, it is necessary that we discuss the elements of the crime of
falsification of private document under the Revised Penal Code, a
crime which all the respondents have been accused of perpetrating.
The elements of said crime under paragraph 2 of Article 172 of our
penal code are as follows: 1) that the offender committed any acts of
falsification, except those in par. 7, enumerated in Article 171; 2)
that the falsification was committed in any private document; and 3)
that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the
falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage. Under
Article 171, paragraph 2, a person may commit falsification of a
private document by causing it to appear in a document that a person
or persons participated in
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Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
an act or proceeding, when such person or persons did not in fact so
participate in the act or proceeding. On the other hand, falsification
under par. 3 of the same article is perpetrated by a person or persons
who, participating in an act or proceeding, made statements in that
act or proceeding and the offender, in making a document, attributed
to such person or persons statements other than those in fact made by
such person or persons. And the crime defined under paragraph 4
thereof is committed when 1) the offender makes in a document
statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated
by the offender are absolutely false; and 4) the perversion of truth in
the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a
third person.
Applying the above-stated elements of the crime to the case at bar, in
order that respondent Dr. Pascual, and the rest acting in conspiracy
with her, to have committed the crime of falsification under par. 3
and 4 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is essential that
that there be prima facie evidence to show that she had caused it to
appear that Larry gave his consent to be vasectomized or at the very
least, that the proposed medical procedure was explained to Larry.
But in the assailed report, no such thing was done. Lest it be
forgotten, the reason for having Larry psychiatrically evaluated was
precisely to ascertain whether or not he can validly consent with
impunity to the proposed vasectomy, and not to obtain his consent to
it or to oblige respondent Dr. Pascual to explain to him what the
import of the medical procedure was. Further, that Larry’s consent to
be vasectomized was not obtained by the psychiatrist was of no
moment, because nowhere is it stated in said report that such assent
was obtained. At any rate, petitioner Gloria Aguirre contradicts her
very own allegations when she persists in the contention that Larry
has the mental age of a child; hence, he was legally incapable of
validly consenting to the procedure.
In the matter of the supposed incorrect diagnosis of Lourdes Aguirre,
with regard to paragraph 2 of Article 171 of
458
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
the Revised Penal Code, we quote with approval the succinct
statements of the Assistant City Prosecutor:
“[T]he fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is not of her own
personal knowledge in her report does not mean that she committed
falsification in the process. Her sources may be wrong and may
affect the veracity of her report, but for as long as she has not alleged
therein that she personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre, which
allegation would not then be true, she cannot be charged of
falsification. Therefore, it goes without saying that if the author of
134
the report is not guilty, then with more reason the other respondents
are not liable.”54
As to the charge of mutilation, Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code
defines the crime as—
“Art. 262. Mutilation.—The penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or
partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor
in its medium and maximum periods.”
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the
elements55 of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the
Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is,
mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the
mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the
offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. According
to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime
of mutilation as defined and penalized above, i.e., “[t]he vasectomy
operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive
organ, which is still very much part of his physical self.” Petitioner
Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this
_______________
54 Id., at p. 208.
55 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two (13th ed.), p. 457.
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Court to make a ruling that bilateral vasectomy constitutes the crime
of mutilation.
This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary to
the intentions of the framers of our penal code.
A fitting riposte to the issue at hand lies in United States v.
Esparcia,56 in which this Court had the occasion to shed light on the
implication of the term mutilation. Therein we said that:
“The sole point which it is desirable to discuss is whether or not the
crime committed is that defined and penalized by article 414 of the
Penal Code. The English translation of this article reads: “Any
person who shall intentionally castrate another shall suffer a penalty
ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.” The Spanish
text, which should govern, uses the word “castrare,” inadequately
translated into English as “castrate.” The word “capar,” which is
synonymous of “castrar,” is defined in the Royal Academic
Dictionary as the destruction of the organs of generation or
conception. Clearly it is the intention of the law to punish any person
who shall intentionally deprived another of any organ necessary for
reproduction. An applicable construction is that of Viada in the
following language:
“At the head of these crimes, according to their order of gravity, is
the mutilation known by the name of ‘castration’ which consists of
the amputation of whatever organ is necessary for generation. The
law could not fail to punish with the utmost severity such a crime,
135
which, although not destroying life, deprives a person of the means
to transmit it. But bear in mind that according to this article in order
for ‘castration’ to exist, it is indispensable that the ‘castration’ be
made purposely. The law does not look only to the result but also to
the intention of the act. Consequently, if by reason of an injury or
attack, a person is deprived of the organs of generation, the act,
although voluntary, not being intentional to that end, it would not
come under the provisions of this article, but under No. 2 of article
431.” (Viada, Codigo Penal, vol. 3, p. 70. See to same effect, 4
Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 525.)”
_______________
56 36 Phil. 840, 840-841 (1917).
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice
Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or
partially, of some essential organ of reproduction? We answer in the
negative.
In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular passage,
called the vas deferens, through which the sperm (cells) are
transported from the testicle to the urethra where they combine with
the seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided and the cut ends
merely tied.57 That part, which is cut, that is, the vas deferens, is
merely a passageway that is part of the duct system of the male
reproductive organs. The vas deferens is not an organ, i.e., a highly
organized unit of structure, having a defined function in a
multicellular organism and consisting of a range of tissues.58 Be that
as it may, even assuming arguendo that the tubular passage can be
considered an organ, the cutting of the vas deferens does not divest
or deny a man of any essential organ of reproduction for the simple
reason that it does not entail the taking away of a part or portion of
the male reproductive system. The cut ends, after they have been
tied, are then dropped back into the incision.59
Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of
reproduction, such procedure does not deprive him, “either totally or
partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.” Notably, the
ordinary usage of the term “mutilation” is the deprivation of a limb
or essential part (of the body),60 with the operative expression being
“deprivation.” In the same manner, the word “castration” is defined
as the removal of the testies or ovaries.61 Such being the case in this
present petition, the bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not
have
_______________
57 Solis, Legal Medicine (1987 ed.), p. 623.
58 Clugston, Dictionary of Science (1998 ed.), p. 558.
59 Schwartz, Shires, Spencer, Storer, Principle of Surgery, Vol. Two
(4th ed.), pp. 1729-1730.
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60 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993 ed.), p. judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But that is not
1493. the case herein.

61 Id., at p. 349. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED

for lack of merit. The assailed 21 July 2005 Decision and 5
461 December 2005 Resolution, both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88370 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner
Gloria Aguirre.
VOL. 547, MARCH 3, 2008
SO ORDERED.
461
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Corona** and
Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of Justice Reyes, JJ., concur.

amounted to the crime of mutilation as defined and punished under ______________

Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. And no
criminal culpability could be foisted on to respondent Dr. Agatep, 62 Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, 9 November 1993,
the urologist who performed the procedure, much less the other 227 SCRA 627, 643.
respondents. Thus, we find sufficient evidence to explain why the 63 Id.
Assistant City Prosecutor and the DOJ ruled the way they did.
Verily, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the writ of certiorari ** Justice Renato C. Corona was designated to sit as additional
is unavailing; hence, should not be issued. member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle
dated 10 December 2007. Aguirre vs. Secretary, Department of
It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the Court’s general policy Justice, 547 SCRA 431, G.R. No. 170723 March 3, 2008
of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations. As
it has been oft said, the Supreme Court cannot order the prosecution
of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient
evidence to support at least a prima facie case.62 The courts try and
absolve or convict the accused but, as a rule, have no part in the
initial decision to prosecute him.63 The possible exception to this
rule is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that will justify
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