Icasiano v.

Icasiano, GR L-18979, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 422

Facts:

Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his appointment as executor thereof.
It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through
the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an original and a carbon copy. On the day that it was subscribed and
attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan.
One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the original copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages
simultaneously instead when he signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and
other witnesses in his presence.

Issue:

Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a page is sufficient to deny probate
of the will

RULING:

No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the duplicated bore the required
signatures, this proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a duplicate may still be
admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be defective, then in law, there is no other will bu the duly signed
carbon duplicate and the same can be probated. The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the
testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of.

Rey v. Cartagena, GR 34288, Nov. 10, 1931, 56 Phil. 282

Facts:

On March 26, 1930, Rosario Rey filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the probate of the will of the
deceased Agustina Celiz. She also asked that she be appointed administratrix of the estate. To said petition Guillermo
Cartagena and four others filed an opposition, alleging that said will, Exhibit A, was not the last will and testament of the
deceased Agustina Celiz; that the signature appearing thereon was not her signature, and that said will was not executed
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Upon the issue thus presented the cause was brought on for trial.
After hearing the evidence Conrado Barrios, auxiliary judge, reached the conclusion that said will, Exhibit A, was the last
will and testament of the deceased Agustina Celiz, and that it was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law, and rendered a judgment admitting said will to probate. From that judgment the opponents appealed, and now
allege that the lower court erred in declaring that said will was executed in compliance with the requisites of the law.

Issue:

Whether or not the will was in compliance with the law

Ruling:

In the interpretation of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, the court must bear in mind that that purpose of the
law is not to curtail the exercise of the right to make a will, but to safeguard it; and where a will has been executed in
substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is
obviated, said will should be admitted to probate. For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from admitting the will
to probate should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Montinola-Sanson v. CA, GR 76648, Feb. 26, 1988, 158 SCRA 247

Facts:

On April 29,1981, private respondent who was named executor in the will filed an urgent motion for appointment of
special administrator. 5 With the conformity of all the relatives and heirs of the testatrix except oppositor, the court in its
order of May 5, 1981 6 appointed private respondent as Special Administrator of the testate estate of deceased.

On June 29,1981, Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving sister of the deceased but who was not
named in the said win, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, 7 alleging inter alia: that the subject will was not entirely
written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the same was falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not
in full possession of her mental faculties to make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon the
person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the win; and that the will failed to institute a residual heir
to the remainder of the estate.

Issue:

Whether or not the effect of partial disposition of the estate will affect the validity of the will

Ruling:

Said motion for new trial is not in substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 53. The lone affidavit of a
witness who was already presented said the hearing is hardly sufficient to justify the holding of new trial. The alleged
new witnesses were unnamed without any certainty as, to their appearance before the court to testify. Affiant attests
only on his belief that they would testify if and when they are subpoenaed by the court. Furthermore, the allegations in
the affidavit as to the undue influence exerted on the testatrix are mere conclusions and not statement of facts. The
requisite affidavits must state facts and not mere conclusions or opinions, otherwise they are not valid. 14 The affidavits
are required to avoid waste of the court's time if the newly discovered evidence turns out to be immaterial or of any
evidentiary weight.

Cuenco v. CA, GR L-24742, Oct. 26, 1973, 53 SCRA

Facts:

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon
City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate
in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City. The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she
was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance
resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings. Lourdes filed an opposition
and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu
already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA
ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

Issue:

Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition

Ruling:

The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from
proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its
admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.

130. Hacbang v. Alo, GR L-191031, Oct. 05, 2015

FACTS:

Bishop Sofronio Hacbang died leaving several properties behind. Bishop Sofronio was survived by his parents, Basilio and
Maria Hacbang, and his siblings: Perfecto Hacbang, Joaquin Hacbang, Lucia Teresita Hacbang, and Dolores Hacbang Alo.
In his will he instituted half of his estate to his parents and the other half to Dolores. The will was accepted for probated
but was archived before the proceeding was completed.

ISSUE:

Whether Or Not the ownership of properties passes to the heirs even without completing the probate.
Ruling:

No. Article 777 of our Civil Code provides that the inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent’s death without a
moment’s interruption. Heirs, legatees, and devisees bequeathed with specific properties do not require Court
adjudication to identify which particular properties become theirs; the testator had already identified these. From the
very moment of the testator’s death, title over these particular properties vests on the heir, legatee, or devisee.

131. Austria v. Reyes, GR L-23079, Feb. 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754

Facts:

Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, alll have been declared by
the former as her legally adopted children. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was
opposed by the petitioners who are the nephews and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was allowed. In
1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the nearest kin of Basilia and
that the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, hence the latter were
strangers with no right to succeed as heirs. The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the
institution of heirs. It held that the testator was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free
from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence.

Issue:

Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid

RULING:

Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary institution does not affect the validity or
efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is that the falsity will set aide the institution if certain factors are
present. Before the institution of the heirs will be annulled under Art. 850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the
cause must be stated in the will, 2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover, testacy is favored and doubts are
resolved on its side especially when the will shows a clear intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically
his whole estate as in this case.

132. Aznar v. Duncan, GR L-24365, June 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 590

FACTS:

Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court declared that Helen Garcia was a natural child of
the deceased. The Court of First Instance equally divided the properties of the estate of Christensen between Lucy
Duncan (whom testator expressly recognized in his will as his daughter) and Helen Garcia. In the order, the CFI held that
Helen Garcia was preterited in the will thus, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled and the properties
passed to both of them as if the deceased died intestate.

ISSUE:

Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided or whether the inheritance of Lucy as
instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to ¼ of
the entire estate.

HELD:

The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia. Christensen refused to
acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. When a testator leaves
to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative,
and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled
entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.

133. Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian, GR 155733, Jan. 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 334

Facts:
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the sister of Josefa, filed a Petition on Letters of Administration of the estate of deceased
spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia (died 1972 and 1974 respectively). Such letter was opposed by Marciana
Rustia, a sister of Guillermo, claiming that they should be the beneficiaries of the estate. The trial court then allowed
Guillerma Rustia, a legitimate child of Guillermo, to intervene in the case as she claimed that she possessed the status of
an acknowledged legitimate natural child, hence, she should be the sole heir of the estate. Later, Luisa Delgado said that
the spouses were living together without marriage. Luisa Delgado died and was substituted dela Rosa (herein petitioner)
in this case. The RTC appointed dela Rosa as the administrator of the estates of the deceased.

Issue:

Whether or not dela Rosa should be the sole administrator of the estate noting that Josefa and Guillermo did not
contract marriage.

Ruling:

The Court held, through the testimonies of the witnesses, that marriage between Josefa and Guillermo never occurred.
Although it is presumed that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage, such testimonies shall prevail. Since, no marriage had occurred between the two, the estate must
be settled in different proceedings. Therefore, dela Rosa cannot be appointed as the sole administrator of the estate of
the deceased.

134. Neri v. Akutin, GR L-47799, May 21, 1943, 74 Phil. 185

Facts:

Testator in his will left all his property by universal to the children by his second marriage, the respondents, with
preterition of the children by his first marriage, the petitioners. The court annulled the institution of heirs and declared
total intestacy. Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondents on the ground that there is no preterition and
assuming if there was, the effect would not be the annulment of the institution of heirs but simply the reduction of
bequest made to them.

Issues:

Whether receipt in advance of shares in the properties of the decedent a ground of preterition?

Ruling:

Upon the findings of facts, all the parcels that corresponds to the decedent is on the hands of the administrator after the
inventory was filed in court thus the property of the deceased has remained intact and that no portion has been given to
the first marriage. The testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage and that
without expressly disinheriting the children by first marriage, he left nothing to them upon erroneous belief that he had
given them already more shares in his property than those given to the children by the second marriage. This is
accordingly a case of preterition governed by Art. 184 of the Civil Code, which provides that the institution of heirs shall
be annulled and intestate succession should be declared open.

135. Reyes v. Barretto-Datu, GR L-17818, Jan. 20, 1967, 19 SCRA 85

FACTS:

Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto died he left his share in a will to Salud Barretto
and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his
nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. Maria Gerardo, as
administratrix prepared a project of partition. It was approved and the estate was distributed and the shares delivered.
Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she executed two wills, in the first, she instituted
Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her
properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will
presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the LC held that Salud was not the daughter of
the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the SC, which affirmed the
same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and Salud did not acquire valid title
to it.

Ruling:

NO. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto’s last will and testament together with
defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to
be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of
children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that
Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his
testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the
share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a
testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.

136. Borromeo-Herrera v. Borromeo, GR 41171, July 23, 1987

FACTS

Fortunato claimed a portion of the legitime being an illegitimate son of the deceased, by incorporating a Waiver of
Hereditary Rights supposedly signed by the rest of the Borromeo’s. In the waiver, of the 9 heirs relinquished to Fortunato
their shares in the disputed estate. The petitioners opposed this Waiver for reason that this is without force and effect
because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance
from the heirs who intend to transfer the same.

ISSUE

Whether or not a Waiver of Hereditary Rights can be executed without a valid acceptance from the heirs in question.

RULING

YES. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that “the properties included in an existing inheritance
cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the
personality of the former. The heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from
the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the
acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right
is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion.

137. Crisologo v. Singson, GR L-13876, Feb. 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 491

Facts:

Donya Leona left a will stating that upon Consolacions Crisologo's death death—whether this happens before or after
that of Donya Leona's death—Consolacion's share shall belong to the brothers of the Donya Leona.

Issue:

Whether or not such substitution is a fideicommissary substitution.

Ruling:

No, it is not fideicommissary substitution. A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that
the substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the o f ideicommissa kind, nor does it contain a
clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property
bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely
provides that upon appellee's death—whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix—her share shall belong
to the brothers of the testatrix. Designation of heirs; Purpose of fideicommissary substitution.—It is of the essence of a
fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve and transmit to
another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event.
The last will of the deceased Dña. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the substitution Consolacion
Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it
happens before or after that of the testatrix.

138. PCIB v. Escolin, GR L-27860 and L-27896, Mar. 29, 1974

FACTS:

Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of the Philippines at the moment of
her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary provisions, she had made a will in favor of her husband. A
question arose as to what exactly were the laws of Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her death (for while
one group, contended that Texan Law should result to renvoi, the other group contended that no renvoi was possible).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Texas law should apply.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that what the Texas law contains at the time of Jane Hodges’ death is a question of fact to be
resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. At the time of her death, Texas law governs,
thus, it would be the law to be applied (and not said law at any other time).

139. Palacios v. Vda. De Ramirez, GR L-27952, Feb. 15, 1982, 111 SCRA 704

Facts:

The testator instituted Wanda as the first heir, and Juan and Horacio as second heir in a fideicommissary substitution.
Juan and Horacio are strangers to Wanda.

Issue:

Whether or not the fideicommissary substitution is valid.

Ruling:

No, because the second heirs are not within one degree relationship or strangers to Wanda.

A fideicommissary substitution is void if first heir is not related in the 1st degree to the second heir.—As regards the
substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the following
reasons: The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally
instituted. Art 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution “provided such substitution does not go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted.”

140. Palad v. Governor of Quezon Province, GR L-24302, Aug. 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 354 –

Facts:

Plaintiffs-appellants appealed on January 15, 1965 from the decision dated November 28, 1964 of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon, dismissing their complaint as well as the complaint in intervention. In their complaint dated April 20,
1958 against the governor of Quezon province and the municipality of Tayabas, plaintiffs-appellants Miguel Palad, Fe
Palad, Victoria Queano, Jose Palomera, Concepcion Palomera, Edgardo Obciana, Galo Nosce, Celso Zafranco and Ernesto
Zafranco alleged that they are the remaining immediate heirs and/or successors-in-interest of the deceased Luis Palad,
they being the grandchildren of Policarpio Palad and Victor Palad, both deceased brothers of the late Luis Palad; that the
defendant provincial governor is the trustee and/or administrator and the defendant municipality of Tayabas the
beneficiary of Lots Nos. 3464 and 3469 respectively covered by O.C.T. No. 6448 and O.C.T. No. 6656 situated in Barrio
Colongcolong (now Talawtalaw), Lucena, Quezon; that the purpose of the trusteeship of the aforesaid lots as constituted
by the last will and testament of the deceased Luis Palad dated January 25, 1892 and duly protocolized on July 27, 1897,
was to erect or establish a high school in the town of Tayabas out of the income of the aforesaid two lots for the benefit
of the said town of Tayabas; that the said trust was duly fulfilled upon the complete establishment in or about 1932 of a
high school now known as "Luis Palad High School" in the town of Tayabas financed with the income of said lots and is
actually self-supporting, that the town of Tayabas has been enjoying the income of the said lots as beneficiary for the last
54 years since November 9, 1904 up to the present time (when complaint was filed), while the defendant provincial
governor continues to be the trustee and/or administrator of the two lots in violation of Article 605 of the Civil Code;
that the pertinent facts are well-established in the decision of the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the trust was permanent

Ruling:
As to the nature of the trust created by the last will and testament of the late Luis Palad, the law of the case is the
decision in Government vs. Abadilla, et al., supra, that "the testator proposed to create a trust for the benefit of a
secondary school to be established in the town of Tayabas, naming as trustee ... the civil governor of the province of
Tayabas (now Quezon) ..." 4and that "if the trustee holds the legal title and the devise is valid, the natural heirs of the
deceased have no remaining interest in the land except their right to the reversion in the event the devise for some
reason should fail, an event which has not as yet taken place.

141. Miciano v. Brimo, GR L-22595, Nov. 1, 1927, 50 Phil. 867

FACTS:

Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish
citizen.

ISSUE:

Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates.

Ruling:

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with
the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the
testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.

The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre
Brimo, as one of the legatees.

142. Vizconde v. CA, GR 118449, Feb. 11, 1998, 286 SCRA

FACTS:

Spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas have five children, namely: Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde (wife of herein petitioner
LauroVizconde); Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon; and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. On June
30, 1991, Estrellita and her two daughters were killed. In an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita,
Rafael and Salud, together with petitioner Vizconde, inherited from Estrellita’s estate. Subsequently, when Rafael died in
1992, an intestate estate proceeding was instituted by one of the heirs of Rafael. Private respondent Ramon, among
other things, averred that petitioner should be impleaded as one of Rafael’s children “by right of representation as the
widower of deceased legitimate daughter Estrellita.” Pursuant to the order of the probate court, petitioner filed a
Manifestation contending that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to
participate in the proceedings. The trial court granted Ramon’s motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the intestate estate proceeding regarding Rafael’s estate is proper.

RULING:

No. The enumeration of compulsory heirs in Article 887 of the Civil Code is exclusive, which negates the rulings of the
RTC and CA that Lauro shall be included in the proceeding as a compulsory heir for he is only a son-in-law of decedent
Rafael. Thus, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of decedent is considered a third person or stranger.
Petitioner may not be dragged into the proceeding herein instituted; neither may he be permitted to intervene as he has
no personality or interest in the said proceeding. Thus, petition is granted.
143. Imperial v. CA, GR 112483, Oct. 8, 1999, 316 SCRA

FACTS:

In 1951, Leoncio sold his 32, 837m² parcel of land to his acknowledged natural son Eloy Imperial. However, in 1953,
Leoncio filed a copmplaint for annulment of the sale alleging that he was deceived by his son. They entered into a
compromise agreement that Leoncio will recognize the validity and legality of the sale but Eloy has to sold the 1000m² to
Leoncio. In 1962, Leoncio died and Victor, his adopted child, substituted him in the execution of the compromise
agreement. However, in 1977, Victor died single and without issue. After 4 years, Ricardo, Victors’s natural father, died
too. Cesar and Trasa, children of Ricardo, filed a complaint for annulment of the donation. A motion to dismiss was filed
on the ground of res judicata. The trial court dismissed the case. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court
and remanded the case for further proceedings. Cesar and Teresa filed an Amended Complaint alleging that the
conveyance impaired the legitime of Victor. The RTC ruled that the donation is inofficiousimparing the legitime of Victor.
CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for inofficious donation has prescribed.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme court applied Article 1144 of the Civil Code which atates that “actions upon an obligation created by
law must be brought within ten years from the time the right accrues. Here, the right accrues from the moment Leoncio
died, but it took the respondents 24 years to file the action. Also, there is estoppel by laches on their part. First, Victor is
a lawyer; he even substituted his father in the execution of the compromise agreement regarding the contested
conveyance of parcel of land. Second, Richardo is the lessee of the contested land and it is expected that he was aware
of the sale of the land. And, the respondents only institud the complaint five years after the death of Ricardo. The
petition is granted

145. De Papa v. Camacho, GR L-28032, Sept. 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 281

FACTS:

Appellees and appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by
the name of Romana Tioco), father of appellees and great grandfather of defendant. During her lifetime, Romana
gratuitously donated four parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of appellees). When Toribia died,
she was survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children Faustino and Trinidad (mother of
Dalisay). The 4 parcels of land were left as inheritance of Toribia‟s two children in equal pro-indiviso shares. They too
inherited 3 parcels of land which was supposed to be the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco from her father Balbino.
However, when Faustino died intestate, single and without issue, the ½ pro-indiviso share in the 7 parcels of land was left
to his father Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserve troncal.
Subsequently, Trinidad died intestate and her rights and interests in the parcels of land were inherited by her only
legitimate childe, appellant Dalisay. Eustacio thereafter died intestated, survived by his only legitimate defendant Dalisay
Tongko-Camacho.

The lower Court declared that the appellees as well as appellant Dalisay were entitled as reservatarios to ½ of the seven
parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not all relatives of the prepositus (Faustino) within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without
distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista.

RULING:

No. Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees
must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the prepositus), they
are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the
same degree as the latter. As held in the case of Abellana v. Ferraris, under the Article 1009, the absence of brothers,
sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called
to the succession. Hence, a decedent’s uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of
the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed, similar to the case at hand.

150. Padura v. Baldovino, GR L-11960, Dec. 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065

FACTS:

Agustin Padura died on April 26, 1908 leaving a last will and testament wherein he bequeathed his properties among his
children, Manuel (child on his first wife), Candelaria and Fortunato (children on his second wife), and his surviving
spouse, Benita Garing. Fortunate was adjudicated four parcels of land. Fortunato died unmarried without having
executed a will; and not having any issue, the said parcels of land were inherited exclusively by her mother.

On August 26, 1934, Candelaria died leaving as her only heirs, her four legitimate children, Cristeta, Melania, Anicia and
Pablo, all surnamed Baldovino. Years later Manuel Padura also died. Surviving him are his legitimate children, Dionisia,
Felisa, Flora, Gornelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino, all surnamed Padura. Upon the death of Benita Garing (the
reservista), the question on the distribution of the said parcels became a dispute between the nephews and nieces of
Fortunato by half-blood (Paduras) and the nephew and nieces by full-blood (Baldovinos).

ISSUE:

How should the four parcels of land be divided among the nephews and nieces of Fortunato?

RULING:

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that
whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property
should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules
of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise.

The reservatarios who are nephews of the whole blood are declared entitled to a share twice as large as that of the
nephews of the half-blood.