take unnecessary risks in the performance of
their duties. xxx
1. Terry v. Ohio
DOCTRINE:
The Supreme Court determined that the practice of
stopping and frisking a suspect in public without
probable cause does not violate the Fourth
Amendment, as long as the officer has a “reasonable
suspicion” that the person may be committing a crime,
have committed a crime, or is planning to commit a
crime, and that the person “may be armed and
presently dangerous”. The court justified this decision
with the clarification that the Fourth Amendment is
meant to be applied to gathering evidence, not to
crime prevention.
FACTS:
Cleveland, Ohio detective McFadden was on a
downtown beat that he had been patrolling for many
years when he observed two strangers (Terry and
another man, Chilton) at a street corner. He saw them
proceed alternately back and forth along an identical
route, pausing to stare in the same store window,
which they did for a total of about 24 times. Each
completion of the route was followed by a conference
between the two on a corner, at one of which they
were joined by a third man (Katz) who thereafter left
swiftly.
Suspecting the two men of ‘casing a job, a stick-up’,
the officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third
man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The
officer approached the three, identified himself as a
policeman, and asked their names. The men
mumbled something, whereupon McFadden spun
Terry around, patted down his outside clothing, and
felt in his overcoat pocket – but was unable to remove
– a pistol. He removed Terry’s overcoat, took out a
revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with
their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing
of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from
Chilton’s outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his
hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he
discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have
been a weapon), or under Terry’s or Chilton’s outer
garments until he felt the guns.
Terry and Chilton were charged with carrying
concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress
the weapons, which was denied by the trial court.
Terry eventually went to the U.S. Supreme Court to
question the admissibility of the gun and his resulting
conviction.
II. THE ISSUE
Was the gun seized from Terry admissible in
evidence against him and thus his conviction of
carrying concealed weapon was proper?
III. THE RULING
YES, the gun seized from Terry was admissible in
evidence against him; thus, his conviction of
carrying concealed weapon was proper.
First, in assessing the reasonableness of stop-and-
frisk as a valid form of warrantless search, the U.S.
Supreme Court held:
The crux of this case, however, is not the
propriety of Officer McFadden’s taking steps
to investigate [Terry’s] suspicious behavior,
but rather, whether there was justification for
McFadden’s invasion of Terry's personal
security by searching him for weapons in the
course of that investigation. We are now
concerned with more than the governmental
interest in investigating crime; in addition,
there is the more immediate interest of the
police officer in taking steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he is
dealing is not armed with a weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against him. Certainly it would be
unreasonable to require that police officers
xxx [W]e cannot blind ourselves to the need
for law enforcement officers to protect
themselves and other prospective victims of
violence in situations where they may lack
probable cause for an arrest. When an
officer is justified in believing that the
individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close range is armed and
presently dangerous to the officer or to
others, it would appear to be clearly
unreasonable to deny the officer the power
to take necessary measures to determine
whether the person is in fact carrying a
weapon and to neutralize the threat of
physical harm.
xxx xx
x xxx
xxx. A search for weapons in the absence of
probable cause to arrest, however, must, like
any other search, be strictly circumscribed
by the exigencies which justify its initiation.
Thus it must be limited to that which is
necessary for the discovery of weapons
which might be used to harm the officer or
others nearby, and may realistically be
characterized as something less than a full
search, even though it remains a serious
intrusion.
Next, on the distinction between protective search for
weapons under stop-and-frisk on one hand, and
arrest (and the search incidental thereof) on the other
hand, it was declared:
An arrest is a wholly different kind of
intrusion upon individual freedom from a
limited search for weapons, and the interests
each is designed to serve are likewise quite
different. An arrest is the initial stage of a
criminal prosecution. It is intended to
vindicate society's interest in having its laws
obeyed, and it is inevitably accompanied by
future interference with the individual’s
freedom of movement, whether or not trial or
conviction ultimately follows. The protective
search for weapons, on the other hand,
constitutes a brief, though far from
inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of
the person. It does not follow that because
an officer may lawfully arrest a person
only when he is apprised of facts
sufficient to warrant a belief that the
person has committed or is committing a
crime, the officer is equally unjustified,
absent that kind of evidence, in making
any intrusions short of an arrest.
Moreover, a perfectly reasonable
apprehension of danger may arise long
before the officer is possessed of adequate
information to justify taking a person into
custody for the purpose of prosecuting him
for a crime. Petitioner’s reliance on cases
which have worked out standards of
reasonableness with regard to seizures
constituting arrests and searches incident
thereto is thus misplaced. It assumes that
the interests sought to be vindicated and the
invasions of personal security may be
equated in the two cases, and thereby
ignores a vital aspect of the analysis of the
reasonableness of particular types of
conduct under the [right against
unreasonable search and seizure].
Our evaluation of the proper balance that
has to be struck in this type of case leads us
to conclude that there must be a narrowly
drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of
the police officer, where he has reason to
believe that he is dealing with an armed
and dangerous individual, regardless of
whether he has probable cause to arrest
the individual for a crime. The officer need
not be absolutely certain that the individual is
armed; the issue is whether a reasonably
prudent man in the circumstances would be
warranted in the belief that his safety or that
of others was in danger.
xxx xx
x xxx
xxx [The protective search for weapons
under stop-and-frisk], unlike a search without
a warrant incident to a lawful arrest, is not
justified by any need to prevent the
disappearance or destruction of evidence of
crime. The sole justification of the search in
the present situation is the protection of the
police officer and others nearby, and it must
therefore be confined in scope to an
intrusion reasonably designed to discover
guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden
instruments for the assault of the police
officer.” (Emphasis supplied)
Revolver seized from Terry admissible in
evidence
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the revolver
seized from Terry was properly admitted in evidence
against him, thus:
“xxx. At the time he seized [Terry] and
searched him for weapons, Officer
McFadden had reasonable grounds to
believe that petitioner was armed and
dangerous, and it was necessary for the
protection of himself and others to take swift
measures to discover the true facts and
neutralize the threat of harm if it
materialized. The policeman carefully
restricted his search to what was appropriate
to the discovery of the particular items which
he sought. Each case of this sort will, of
course, have to be decided on its own facts.
We merely hold today that where a police
officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course
of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable
fear for his own or others’ safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault
him. Such a search is a reasonable search
under the [contest of the constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure],
and any weapons seized may properly be
introduced in evidence against the person
from whom they were taken.”
2. ESQUILLO VS. PEOPLE
G.R 182010 August 25, 2010
Doctrine:
A stop-and-frisk practice serves a dual purpose: (1)
the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against the police officer.
Facts:
PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas were sent to conduct
surveillance on the activities of an alleged notorious
snatcher operating in the Pasay area known only as
Ryan. As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle
that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target area,
he glanced in the direction of petitioner who was
standing three meters away and seen placing inside a
yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
white substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what
the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious
when petitioner started acting strangely as he began
to approach her. He then introduced himself as a
police officer to petitioner and inquired about the
plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette
case. Instead of replying, however, petitioner
attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely
restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then requested her to
take out the transparent plastic sachet from the
cigarette case and thereafter arrested her. RTC found
appellant guilty of illegal possession of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. Before
the Court of Appeals, appellant questioned as illegal
her arrest without warrant to thus render any evidence
obtained on the occasion thereof inadmissible. She
assails the appellate court’s application of the stop-
and-frisk principle in light of PO1 Cruzin’s failure to
justify his suspicion that a crime was being
committed, he having merely noticed her placing
something inside a cigarette case which could hardly
be deemed suspicious. To petitioner, such legal
principle could only be invoked if there were overt
acts constituting unusual conduct that would arouse
the suspicion.
Issue:
Whether or not the stop-and-frisk principle was
properly applied by the CA.
Held:
In a top-and-frisk, it is essential is that a genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person who manifests unusual
suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband
concealed about him. Such a stop-and-frisk practice
serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes
of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit
the police officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer. The circumstances
under which petitioner was arrested indeed engender
the belief that a search on her person was warranted:
The police officers were on a surveillance operation
as part of their law enforcement efforts when PO1
Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance into her
cigarette case. Given his training as a law
enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be
drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner
reacted by attempting to flee after he introduced
himself as a police officer and inquired about the
contents of the plastic sachet all the more pricked his
curiosity. From these standards, the Court finds that
the questioned act of the police officers constituted a
valid stop-and-frisk• operation. The search/seizure of
the suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioner’s
possession later voluntarily exhibited[24] to the police
operative was undertaken after she was interrogated
on what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after
PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a
police officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner
was exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact
attempted to flee after the police officer had identified
himself. Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse
petitioner of such a grave offense, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the
findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility
of witnesses prevail over that of petitioner.
3. RIZALDY SANCHEZ Y CAJILI, Petitioner, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Doctrine: The CA found no cogent reason to reverse
or modify the findings of facts and conclusions
reached by the RTC and, thus, upheld the conviction
of the accused for violation of Section 11, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165. According to the CA, there was
probable cause for the police officers to believe that
Sanchez was then and there committing a crime
considering that he was seen leaving the residence of
a notorious drug dealer where, according to a tip they
received, illegal drug activities were being
perpetrated. It concluded that the confiscation by the
police operative of the subject narcotic from Sanchez
was pursuant to a valid search. The CA then went on
to write that non-compliance by the police officers on
the requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165, particularly on the conduct of
inventory and photograph of the seized drug, was not
fatal to the prosecution’s cause since its integrity and
evidentiary value had been duly preserved.
Facts: March 19, 2003, acting on the information that
Jacinta Marciano, aka “Intang,” was selling drugs to
tricycle drivers, SPO1 Elmer Amposta, together with
CSU Edmundo Hernandez, CSU Jose Tagle, Jr., and
CSU Samuel Monzon, was dispatched to Barangay
Alapan 1-B, Imus, Cavite to conduct an operation.
While at the place, the group waited for a tricycle
going to, and coming from, the house of Jacinta. After
a few minutes, they spotted a tricycle carrying Rizaldy
Sanchez coming out of the house. The group chased
the tricycle. After catching up with it, they requested
Rizaldy to alight. It was then that they noticed Rizaldy
holding a match box. SPO1 Amposta asked Rizaldy if
he could see the contents of the match box. Rizaldy
agreed. While examining it, SPO1 Amposta found a
small transparent plastic sachet which contained a
white crystalline substance. Suspecting that the
substance was a regulated drug, the group accosted
Rizaldy and the tricycle driver. The group brought the
two to the police station. On 24 February 2005, the
accused Rizaldy Sanchez took the witness stand. He
testified that on the date and time in question, he,
together with a certain Darwin Reyes, was on their
way home from Brgy. Alapan, Imus, Cavite, where
they transported a passenger, when their way was
blocked by four (4) armed men riding an owner-type
jeepney. Without a word, the four men frisked him and
Darwin. He protested and asked what offense they
committed. The arresting officers told him that they
had just bought drugs from Alapan. He reasoned out
that he merely transported a passenger there but the
policemen still accosted him and he was brought to
the Imus Police Station where he was further
investigated. The police officer, however, let Darwin
Reyes go. On cross-examination, the accused
admitted that it was the first time that he saw the
police officers at the time he was arrested. He also
disclosed that he was previously charged with the
same offense before Branch 90 of this court which
was already dismissed, and that the police officers
who testified in the said case are not the same as
those involved in this case. On April 21, 2005, the
RTC rendered its decision finding that Sanchez was
caught in flagrante delicto, in actual possession of
shabu. It stated that the police operatives had
reasonable ground to believe that Sanchez was in
possession of the said dangerous drug and such
suspicion was confirmed when the match box
Sanchez was carrying was found to contain shabu.
The RTC lent credence to the testimony of
prosecution witness, SPO1 Elmer Amposta (SPO1
Amposta) because there was no showing that he had
been impelled by any ill motive to falsely testify
against Sanchez.
Issue: Whether the arrest of Sanchez is wrongly
arrested or not.
Held: Preliminarily, the Court notes that this petition
suffers from procedural infirmity. Under Section 1,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy to
question the CA judgment, final order or resolution, as
in the present case, is a petition for review on
certiorari, which would be but a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case. By filing a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,
Sanchez therefore clearly availed himself of the
wrong remedy.
Be that as it may, the Court, in several cases before,
had treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for
review under Rule 45, in accordance with the liberal
spirit and in the interest of substantial justice,
particularly (1) if the petition was filed within the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review; (2)
errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is
sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.
The case at bench satisfies all the above requisites
and, hence, there is ample justification to treat this
petition for certiorari as a petition for review. Besides,
it is axiomatic that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or
petition and the character of the relief sought. Here,
stripped of allegations of “grave abuse of discretion,”
the petition actually avers errors of judgment rather
than of jurisdiction, which are the appropriate subjects
of a petition for review on certiorari. Although it is true
that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great
respect and not to be disturbed on appeal, this rule,
however, is not a hard and fast one. It is a time-
honored rule that the assessment of the trial court
with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the
utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the
trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate
judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants
in the course of their testimonies. But an exception
exists if there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts
or circumstances of weight and substance that would
have affected the case. After going over the records
of the case at bench, the Court finds some facts of
weight and substance that have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court
which cast doubt on the guilt of Sanchez. A judicious
examination of the evidence on record belies the
findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA.
At the outset, it is observed that the CA confused the
search incidental to a lawful arrest with the stop-and-
frisk principle, a well-recognized exception to the
warrant requirement. Albeit it did not expressly state
so, the CA labored under the confused view that one
and the other were indistinct and identical. That
confused view guided the CA to wrongly affirm the
petitioner's conviction. The Court must clear this
confusion and correct the error. A search as an
incident to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules
of Court. It bears emphasis that the law requires that
the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it
is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the
search of a person and his belongings; the process
cannot be reversed.
Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez.
There was no arrest prior to the conduct of the
search. Arrest is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into
custody that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. Under Section 2, of the
same rule, an arrest is affected by an actual restraint
of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary
submission to the custody of the person making the
arrest.
4. Laud v. People
Doctrine: READ THE RULING. MAGIGING 8 PAGES
PAG NI-COPY KO PA UNG DOCTRINES
Facts:
· (PNP) applied with the (RTC) of Manila for a
warrant to search three (3) caves located inside the
Laud Compound in Davao City, where the alleged
remains of the victims summarily executed by the so-
called "Davao Death Squad" may be found. In support
of the application, a certain Avasola was presented to
the RTC and there testified that he personally
witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in December
2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that buried
the victims.
· Judge Peralta, acting as Vice Executive Judge
of the Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant, and thus, issued
Search Warrant No. 09-14407
· On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired
SPO4 Laud, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to
Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence premised on the
following grounds: (a) Judge Peralta had no authority
to act on the application for a search warrant since he
had been automatically divested of his position as
Vice Executive Judge when several administrative
penalties were imposed against him by the Court; (b)
the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search
Warrant which was to be enforced in Davao City; (c)
the human remains sought to be seized are not a
proper subject of a search warrant; (d) the police
officers are mandated to follow the prescribed
procedure for exhumation of human remains; (e) the
search warrant was issued despite lack of probable
cause; (f) the rule against forum shopping was
violated; and (g) there was a violation of the rule
requiring one specific offense and the proper
specification of the place to be searched and the
articles to be seized.
· Ruling of the RTC: Granted the Petitioners
motion. The respondent, The People of the
Philippines filed a motion of reconsideration which
was denied.
· Ruling of the CA: the CA granted the People’s
petition and thereby annulled and set aside the
Orders of the Manila-RTC for having been tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: (a) whether the administrative penalties
imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated Search Warrant
No. 09-14407; (b) whether the Manila-RTC had
jurisdiction to issue the said warrant despite non-
compliance with the compelling reasons requirement
under Section 2, Rule126 of the Rules of Court; (c)
whether the requirements of probable cause and
particular description were complied with and the one-
specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court was violated; and (d) whether the
applicant for the search warrant,i.e., the PNP, violated
the rule against forum shopping.
Ruling: Petition is without merit.
a) Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-
SC which provides that "[t]he imposition upon an
Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of an
administrative penalty of at least a reprimand shall
automatically operate to divest him of his position as
such," Laud claims that Judge Peralta had no
authority to act as Vice-Executive Judge and
accordingly issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407 in
view of the Court’s Resolution in Dee C. Chuan &
Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta wherein he was
administratively penalized with fines of P15,000.00
and P5,000.00.35
While the Court does agree that the imposition of said
administrative penalties did operate to divest Judge
Peralta’s authority to act as Vice Executive Judge, it
must be qualified that the abstraction of such authority
would not, by and of itself, result in the invalidity of
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that Judge
Peralta may be considered to have made the
issuance as a de facto officer whose acts would,
nonetheless, remain valid.
Funa v. Agra defines who a de facto officer is and
explains that his acts are just as valid for all purposes
as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or
third persons who are interested therein are
concerned, viz.: A de facto officer is one who derives
his appointment from one having colorable authority
to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and
whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also
be one who is in possession of an office, and is
discharging [his] duties under color of authority, by
which is meant authority derived from an
appointment, however irregular or informal, so that
the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently,
the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all
purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the
public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned.
In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the
following elements must concur: (a) there must be a
de jure office; (b) there must be color of right or
general acquiescence by the public; and (c) there
must be actual physical possession of the office in
good faith.
The existence of the foregoing elements is rather
clear in this case. Undoubtedly, there is a de jure
office of a 2nd Vice-Executive Judge. Judge Peralta
also had a colorable right to the said office as he was
duly appointed to such position and was only divested
of the same by virtue of a supervening legal
technicality. Also, it may be said that there was
general acquiescence by the public since the search
warrant application was regularly endorsed to the sala
of Judge Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the Manila-RTC under his apparent authority as 2nd
Vice Executive Judge.42 Finally, Judge Peralta’s
actual physical possession of the said office is
presumed to be in good faith, as the contrary was not
established.43 Accordingly, Judge Peralta can be
considered to have acted as a de facto officer when
he issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407, hence,
treated as valid as if it was issued by a de jure officer
suffering no administrative impediment.
b) Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
states the requirements for the issuance of search
warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of
Manila and Quezon City. These special criminal
cases pertain to those "involving heinous crimes,
illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions, as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code,
as amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included
herein by the Supreme Court." Search warrant
applications for such cases may befiled by "the (NBI),
(PNP) and the AntiCrime Task Force (ACTAF)," and
"personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies."
As in ordinary search warrant applications, they "shall
particularly describe therein the places to be searched
and/or the property or things to be seized as
prescribed in the Rules of Court." "The Executive
Judges [of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on
official leave of absence or are not physically present
in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges" are
authorized to act on such applications and "shall issue
the warrants, if justified, which may be served in
places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said
courts."
As the records would show, the search warrant
application was filed before the Manila-RTC by the
PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus
Ame Versosa,44 particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized (as will be
elaborated later on) in connection with the heinous
crime of Murder.45 Finding probable cause therefor,
Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive
Judge, issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which,
as the rules state, may be served in places outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.
Notably, the fact that a search warrant application
involves a "special criminal case" excludes it from the
compelling reason requirement under Section 2, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court
As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of
A.M. No. 03-8- 02-SC, the rule on search warrant
applications before the Manila and Quezon City RTCs
for the above-mentioned special criminal cases "shall
be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court." Perceptibly, the fact that a search warrant is
being applied for in connection with a special criminal
case as above-classified already presumes the
existence of a compelling reason; hence, any
statement to this effect would be super fluous and
therefore should be dispensed with. By all indications,
Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows
the Manila and Quezon City RTCs to issue warrants
to be servedin places outside their territorial
jurisdiction for as long as the parameters under the
said section have been complied with, as in this case.
Thus, on these grounds, the Court finds nothing
defective in the preliminary issuance of Search
Warrant No. 09-14407. Perforce, the RTC-Manila
should not have overturned it.
c) In this case, the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is evident
from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his
deposition, stated that he personally witnessed the
commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact,
part of the group that buried the victims
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause
needs only torest on evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it
was committed by the accused. Probable cause
demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less
than evidence which would justify conviction. The
existence depends to a large degree upon the finding
or opinion of the judge conducting the examination.
However, the findings of the judge should not
disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the
clear dictates of reason
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the
quantum of proof to establish the existence of
probable cause had been met. That a "considerable
length of time" attended the search warrant’s
application from the crime’s commission does not, by
and of itself, negate the veracity of the applicant’s
claims or the testimony of the witness presented. As
the CA correctly observed, the delay may be
accounted for by a witness’s fear of reprisal and
natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal
case.50 Ultimately, in determining the existence of
probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be
personally examined by the judge in their totality,
together with a judicious recognition of the variable
complications and sensibilities attending a criminal
case. To the Court’s mind, the supposed delay in the
search warrant’s application does not dilute the
probable cause finding made herein. In fine, the
probable cause requirement has been sufficiently
met.
The Court similarly concludes that there was
compliance with the constitutional requirement that
there be a particular description of "the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
"[A] description of a place to be searched is sufficient
if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. Any
designation or description known to the locality that
points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and
on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies
the constitutional requirement.
d) There is forum shopping when a litigant repetitively
avails of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court to
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision
if not in one court, then in another.
Forum shopping cannot be said to have been
committed in this case considering the various points
of divergence attending the search warrant
application before the Manila-RTC and that before the
Davao-RTC. For one, the witnesses presented in
each application were different. Likewise, the
application filed in Manila was in connection with
Murder, while the one in Davao did not specify any
crime. Finally, and more importantly, the places to be
searched were different – that inManila sought the
search of the Laud Compound caves, while that in
Davao was for a particular area in the Laud Gold Cup
Firing Range. There being no identity of facts and
circumstances between the two applications, the
ruleagainst forum shopping was therefore not
violated.
5. Sy Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue
GR No. 174570 December 15, 2010
Doctrine: A search warrant may be issued only if
there is probable cause in connection with only one
specific offense alleged in an application on the basis
of the applicant’s personal knowledge and his or her
witnesses. Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the
evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants
issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a
separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases
emanated from the same incident.
Facts: Petitioner Romer Sy Tan filed a criminal case
against Sy Tiong Gue. The respondents filed a Motion
for Reconsideration wherein respondents informed
this Court, albeit belatedly, that the RTC granted their
motion for the withdrawal of the Information filed in
Criminal Case No. 06-241375. As such, respondents
prayed that the decision be reconsidered and set
aside and that the quashal of the subject search
warrants be rendered moot and academic on the
basis of the dismissal of the criminal case. This Court
issued a resolution granting the motion to withdraw
the Information without prejudice on the ground that
the elements of Robbery i.e., unlawful taking with
intent to gain, with force and intimidation, were
absent. Thus, there was lack of probable cause,
warranting the withdrawal of the Information.
Consequently, in view of the withdrawal of the
Information for Robbery, the quashal of the subject
search warrants and the determination of the issue of
whether or not there was probable cause warranting
the issuance by the RTC of the said search warrants
for respondents alleged acts of robbery has been
rendered moot and academic. Petitioner filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila a Complaint for
Qualified Theft against the respondents based on the
same incidents and that should the Information for
Qualified Theft be filed with the proper court, the
items seized by virtue of the subject search warrants
will be used as evidence therein.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner can utilize the
evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants
issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a
separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases
emanated from the same incident.
Held: No. Verily, there is no more reason to further
delve into the propriety of the quashal of the search
warrants as it has no more practical legal effect. Even
if an Information for Qualified Theft be later filed on
the basis of the same incident subject matter of the
dismissed case of robbery, petitioner cannot include
the seized items as part of the evidence therein.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, he cannot use the
items seized as evidence in any other offense except
in that in which the subject search warrants were
issued. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A
search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Thus, a search warrant may be issued only if there is
probable cause in connection with only one specific
offense alleged in an application on the basis of the
applicant’s personal knowledge and his or her
witnesses. Petitioner cannot, therefore, utilize the
evidence seized by virtue of the search warrants
issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a
separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases
emanated from the same incident.
Moreover, considering that the withdrawal of the
Information was based on the findings of the CA, as
affirmed by this Court, that there was no probable
cause to indict respondents for the crime of Robbery
absent the essential element of unlawful taking, which
is likewise an essential element for the crime of
Qualified Theft, all offenses which are necessarily
included in the crime of Robbery can no longer be
filed, much more, prosper. Based on the foregoing,
the Court resolves to Grant the motion.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the respondents is
GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated
February 17, 2010 is RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE. The petition filed by Romer Sy Tan is
DENIED for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.
People v. Lo Ho Wing
G.R. No. 88017 January 21, 1991
Doctrine: Search and seizure must be supported by
a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at
least three (3) well-recognized exceptions thereto.
These are: [1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a
search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of
evidence in plain view.
Facts: In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a
unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one
of its informers about an organized group engaged in
the importation of illegal drugs; a project codenamed
"OPLAN SHARON 887" was created in order to bust
the suspected syndicate.
As part of the operations, the recruitment of
confidential men and "deep penetration agents' was
carried out to infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of
those recruited was the discharged accused,
Reynaldo Tia
As a "deep penetration agent," Tia regularly
submitted reports of his undercover activities on the
suspected criminal syndicate.
On October 4, 1987, appellant and Tia left
for Hongkong on board a Philippine Airlines flight.
Before they departed, Tia was able to telephone
Captain Palmera to inform him of their expected date
of return to the Philippines as declared in his round-
trip plane ticket-October 6, 1987 at two o'clock in the
afternoon.
The day after they arrived in Hongkong, Tia
and appellant boarded a train bound for Guangzhou,
in the People's Republic of China. Upon arriving
there, they checked in at a hotel, and rested for a few
hours. That evening, Tia went to appellant's room to
talk to him. Upon entering, he saw two other men with
appellant. One was fixing the tea bags, while the
other was burning substance on a piece of aluminum
foil using a cigarette lighter. Tia asked the latter what
they would be bringing back to the Philippines. He
was informed that their cargo consisted of Chinese
drugs.
The next day, October 6,1987, the two
returned to Manila via a China Airlines flight.
Appellant had with him his red traveling bag with
wheels. The contents of the cans were not closely
examined, and appellant was cleared along with Tia.
The plane landed at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA), then named Manila
International Airport, on schedule. Lim met the newly-
arrived pair at the arrival area. Lim talked to appellant,
while Tia, upon being instructed, looked after their
luggage. After Lim and appellant finished their
conversation, the latter hailed a taxicab. Appellant
and Tia boarded the taxicab after putting their
luggage inside the back compartment of the vehicle.
Lim followed in another taxi cab.
Meanwhile, a team composed of six
operatives headed by Captain Palmera was formed to
act on the tip given by Tia. Upon seeing appellant and
Tia leave the airport, the operatives who first spotted
them followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the car of
the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by
appellant and Tia and cut into its path forcing the taxi
driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the other
taxicab carrying Lim sped away in an attempt to
escape. The operatives disembarked from their car,
approached the taxicab, and asked the driver to open
the baggage compartment.
Three pieces of luggage were retrieved from
the back compartment of the vehicle. The operatives
requested from the suspects permission to search
their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the red
traveling bag owned by appellant. Sgt. Roberto
Cayabyab, one of the operatives, pried the lid open,
pulled out a paper tea bag from the can and pressed
it in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline
white powder resembling crushed alum came out of
the bag. The sergeant then opened the tea bag and
examined its contents more closely. Suspecting the
crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the
three traveling bags opened for inspection. From the
red traveling bag, a total of six (6) tin cans were
found, including the one previously opened. Nothing
else of consequence was recovered from the other
bags. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS
Headquarters in Quezon City for questioning.
The tea bag opened by Sgt. Cayabyab
during the search and seizure was sent to the PC-INP
Crime Laboratory for preliminary examination. Tests
conducted on a sample of the crystalline powder
inside the tea bag yielded a positive result that the
specimen submitted was metamphetamine.
Issue: Whether or not the Trial Court erred in not
declaring the search and seizure on the accused as
illegal
Held: No. The contentions are without merit. As
correctly averred by appellee, that search and seizure
must be supported by a valid warrant is not an
absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-
recognized exceptions thereto. These are: [1] a
search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a
moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain
view. The circumstances of the case clearly show that
the search in question was made as regards a moving
vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary
to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused.
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the
factual findings of the trial court that the authorities
had reasonable ground to believe that appellant
would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it
within the country. The belief was based on
intelligence reports gathered from surveillance
activities on the suspected syndicate, of which
appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this,
they were also certain as to the expected date and
time of arrival of the accused from China. But such
knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to
fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search
warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there
was probable cause to conduct the warrantless
search, which must still be present in such a case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is thereby
DISMISSED. No costs.
6. OEBANDA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 208137, June 8, 2016
DOCTRINE:
In an application for search warrant, the
mandate of the judge is for him to conduct a full and
searching examination of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. The searching questions
propounded to the applicant and the witnesses must
depend on a large extent upon the discretion of the
judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule as to
how a judge may conduct his examination, it is
axiomatic that the said examination must be probing
and exhaustive and not merely routinary, general,
peripheral or perfunctory. He must make his own
inquiry on the intent and factual and legal justifications
for a search warrant. The questions should not merely
be repetitious of the averments stated in the
affidavits/deposition of the applicant and the
witnesses.
A search warrant is an order in writing issued
in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed
by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property
described therein and bring it before the court. The
relevant provisions on the issuance of a search
warrant for personal property, as governed by Sec. 4,
5 and 6 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
To paraphrase this rule, a search warrant
may be issued only if there is probable cause in
connection with a specific offense alleged in an
application based on the personal knowledge of the
applicant and his witnesses. This is the substantive
requirement for the issuance of a search warrant.
Procedurally, the determination of probable cause is a
personal task of the judge before whom the
application for search warrant is filed, as he has to
examine the applicant and his or her witnesses in the
form of "searching questions and answers" in writing
and under oath. The warrant, if issued, must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
In the issuance of a search warrant,
probable cause requires such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.
As implied by the words themselves,
"probable cause" is concerned with probability, not
absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution
need not present at this stage proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
FACTS:
In a letter dated 6 August 2012, the United States
Office of Inspector General, through Special Agent
Daniel Altman, sought the assistance of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate alleged
financial fraud committed by Visayan Forum
Foundation, Inc. (Visayan Forum), against the United
States Agency for International Development
(USAID). Visayan Forum was then receiving funding
from USAID which suspected that Visayan Forum
was fabricating documents and official receipts for
purchase of goods and services to justify expenses
and advances covered by USAID funding.
On 29 August 2012, two NBI Agents, Atty. Dennis R.
Villasfer and Atty. Erickson Donn R. Mercado, entered
the premises of Visayan Forum. The NBI Agents
represented themselves to be part of the audit team
of B.F. Medina and Company, an independent
external audit firm accredited by USAID and engaged
by Visayan Forum to conduct an audit of its USAID
funds. After gaining entry, the NBI Agents went
through boxes, sifted through documents and
photocopied some documents and receipts.
On 31 August 2012, the NBI Agents jointly applied for
a search warrant with the RTC, QC. The NBI Agents
cited violation of Article 172(2) of the RPC and
alleged that petitioners Maria Cecilia Oebanda
(Oebanda), the Executive Director of Visayan Forum,
and/or the occupants and employees of Visayan
Forum are in possession or have in their control
falsified private documents which were used and are
being used to defraud the donors of USAID, to its
damage and prejudice.
On the same date, Judge Cabochan, the Presiding
Judge of RTC-QC, conducted a hearing on the
application for search warrant. Plaintiff People of the
Philippines presented the following witnesses: (1)
Atty. Dennis R. Villasfer, NBI Agent, Anti-Graft
Division; (2) Atty. Erickson Donn R. Mercado, NBI
Agent, Anti-Graft Division; (3) Maria Analie L.
Villacorte (Villacorte), a former bookkeeper of Visayan
Forum; and (4) Celestina M. Aguilar (Aguilar), an
auditor from B.F. Medina and Company.
Judge Cabochan issued Search Warrant against
Visayan Forum. The NBI implemented the search
warrant against Visayan Forum and seized more than
30 boxes of documents, as well as the computers of
the finance manager, finance officer, and
administration officer.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the
Search Warrant on the ground of lack of probable
cause to issue the search warrant. Presiding Judge
Ma. Lourdes A. Giron of the RTC-QC, Branch 102,
denied the motion. Judge Cabochan of RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 98, who originally issued the
search warrant, inhibited herself from the case.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC committed reversible error
in finding that probable cause exists to issue Search
Warrant
RULING:
In the present case, the Transcript of Stenographic
Notes, comprised of 72 pages which was taken during
the hearing, shows that Judge Cabochan extensively
interrogated the two NBI Agents who applied for the
search warrant. By representing themselves to be
part of the audit team of B.F. Medina and Company,
the two NBI Agents were able to freely enter and
move around Visayan Forum's premises. There, the
NBI Agents were able to sufficiently observe the
layout of the office buildings, the location of relevant
documents and equipment, and the movement of the
employees. Most importantly, the NBI Agents were
able to distinctly describe the alleged wrongful acts
that Visayan Forum committed and was committing at
that time. The records also show that the NBI Agents'
two witnesses, Villacorte and Aguilar, submitted their
respective affidavits and were subjected to the same
probing questioning by the trial judge.
The records show that Judge Cabochan personally
examined NBI Agents Villasfer and Mercado, the
applicants for the search warrant, as well as their
witnesses, Villacorte and Aguilar. The interrogations
conducted by the trial judge showed that the
applicants and their witnesses had personal
knowledge of the offense petitioners committed or
were then committing. The judge properly asked how
the applicants came to know of the falsification, where
it was committed, what was involved, the extent of
their participation, and what they have seen and
observed inside Visayan Forum's premises. We
believe that the questions propounded on them were
searching and probing. The trial judge made an
independent assessment of the evidence submitted
and concluded that the evidence adduced and the
testimonies of the witnesses support a finding of
probable cause which warranted the issuance of a
search warrant for violation of Article 172(2) of the
Revised Penal Code.
Absent a showing to the contrary, it is presumed that
a judicial function has been regularly performed. The
judge has the prerogative to give his own judgment on
the application of the search warrant by his own
evaluation of the evidence presented before him. We
cannot substitute our own judgment to that of the
judge.
Here, the records show that the applicants for the
search warrant and their witnesses were able to
sufficiently convince the judge of the existence of
probable cause based on their own personal
knowledge, or what they have actually seen and
observed, in Visayan Forum's premises. The NBI
Agents related to the RTC how they entered Visayan
Forum, in the guise of representing themselves as
part of the audit team of B.F. Medina and Company.
The NBI Agents personally saw that Visayan Forum's
employees and occupants altered and fabricated
documents and official receipts covered by USAID
funding. They even photocopied some documents
and receipts proving such fabrication. Also, the NBI
Agents were able to particularly describe Visayan
Forum's premises, exactly locating the place to be
searched with sketches of the buildings and various
floors and rooms. Further, they described in great
detail the things that were seized documents,
receipts, books of account and records, and
computers used by Visayan Forum's employees.
Likewise, the NBI Agents' witnesses, Villacorte and
Aguilar, were able to substantiate the statements and
allegations of the NBI Agents by testifying on what
they have personally seen and experienced while
working in Visayan Forum, and how they came to
know that fraud was being perpetrated by the
company. Thus, the applicants' and their witnesses'
testimonies, together with the affidavits they
presented, are adequate proof to establish that there
exists probable cause to issue the search warrant for
violation of Article 172(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of
a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding
is accorded respect by the reviewing courts. Here, in
issuing the search warrant, Judge Cabochan
sufficiently complied with the requirements set by the
Constitution and the Rules of Court. Therefore, we
find nothing irregular.
7) Mata vs. Bayona – GR No. 50720, March 26,
1984
DOCTRINE:
Section 4 of Rule 126 provides that the judge m
ust before issuing the warrant personally examine on
oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce and take their depositions in
writing, and attach them to the record, in addition
to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses
are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order
that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be
found later that his declarations are false.
FACTS: Soriano Mata was accused under
Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD
1306, the information against him alleging that
Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets
on the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets
known as ‘Masiao tickets’
without any authority from the Philippine Jai
Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the
government authorities concerned.”
Petitioner discovered that nowhere from the records
of the said case could be found the search warrant
and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance
of the same. This led Mata to file a motion to quash
and annul the search warrant and for the return of the
articles seized, citing and invoking, among others,
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The motion was
denied by the Judge, stating that the court
has made a thorough investigation and examination
under oath by the members of the Intelligence Section
of Police and that the fact that
the rule does not specify when these documents
are to be attached to the records. Mata came to the
Supreme Court and prayed that the search warrant
be declared invalid.
Issue: Whether or not the search warrant was valid.
Held: NO. The Court held that the search warrant is
tainted with illegality for being violative of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause to be determined by
the Judge or such other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce".
Section 4 of Rule 126 provides that the judge m
ust before issuing the warrant personally examine on
oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce and take their depositions in
writing, and attach them to the record, in addition
to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses
are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order
that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be
found later that his declarations are false. We,
therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted
with illegality by the failure of the Judge to confo
rm with the
essential requisites of taking the depositions in wr
iting and
attaching them to the record, rendering the
search warrant invalid.
The judge's insistence that she examined the
complainants under oath has become dubious by
petitioner's claim that at the particular time when
he examined all the
relevant papers connected with the
issuance of the questioned search warrant, after
he demanded the same from the lower court since
they were
not attached to the records, he did not find any
certification at the back of the joint affidavit of th
e complainants. As stated earlier, before he filed his
motion to
quash the search warrant and for the return of th
e articles
seized, he was furnished, upon his request, certifi
ed true
copies of the said affidavits by the Clerk of Court
but which certified true copies do not bear any
certification at the back. Petitioner likewise claims that
his xerox copy of the said joint affidavit obtained at
the outset of this case does not show also the
certification of respondent judge. This doubt becomes
more
confirmed by respondent Judge's own admission,
while insisting that she did examine thoroughly the
applicants, that "she did not take the deposition of
Mayote and Goles because to have done so would be
to hold a judicial proceeding which
will be open and public", such that, according to
her, the persons subject of the intended raid
will just disappear and move his illegal operations
somewhere else.
Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to
cure the defect of the warrant? Be that as it may,
there was no
"deposition in writing" attached to the records of t
he case in
palpable disregard of the statutory prohibition
heretofore quoted.
Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the
urgency to stop the illegal gambling that lures ev
ery man,
woman and child, and even the lowliest laborer
who could
hardly make both ends meet justifies her action.
She claims that in order to abate the proliferation of
this illegal “masiao" lottery, she thought it more
prudent not to conduct the taking of deposition which
is done usually and publicly in the court room.
Two points must be made clear. The term
"depositions" is sometimes used in a broad sense to
describe any written statement verified by oath; but in
its more technical
and appropriate sense the meaning of the word i
s limited to written testimony of a witness given in
the course of a judicial
proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upo
n oral examination. A deposition is the testimony of a
witness, put
or taken in writing, under oath or affirmation befo
re a
 commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer, in
answer to interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and
usually subscribed by the witnesses. The
searching questions propounded to the
applicants of the search warrant and his witnesse
s must depend to a large extent upon the discretion
of the Judge just
as long as the answers establish a reasonable gr
ound to
believe the commission of a specific offense and
that the
applicant is one authorized by law, and said
answers
particularly describe with certainty the place to be
searched
and the persons or things to be seized. The
examination or investigation which must be under
oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the
secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that
the examination or investigation is not merely
routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the r
equired information. To repeat, it must be under oath
and must be in writing.
9) Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co, v. Razon Alvarez
Facts:
Case timeline for better appreciation:
1. During a test call placed at the PLDT Alternative
Calling Patterns Detection Division office, the
receiving phone reflected a PLDT telephone
number (2–8243285) as the calling number used,
as if the call was originating from a local
telephone in Metro Manila. Upon verification with
the PLDT’s Integrated Customer Management
(billing) System, the ACPDD learned that the
subscriber of the reflected telephone number is
Abigail R. Razon Alvarez, with address at 17
Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound, Barangay
Don Bosco, Parañaque City. It further learned
that several lines are installed at this address
with Abigail and Vernon R. Razon (respondents),
among others, as subscribers.
2. In the cards they tested, however, once the
caller enters the access and pin numbers, the
respondents would route the call via the internet
to a local telephone number (in this case, a PLDT
telephone number) which would connect the call
to the receiving phone. Since calls through the
internet never pass the toll center of the
PLDT’s IGF, users of these prepaid cards can
place a call to any point in the Philippines
(provided the local line is NDD–capable)
without the call appearing as coming from
abroad.
3. On November 6, 2003 and November 19, 2003,
Mr. Narciso of the PLDT’s Quality Control
Division, together with the operatives of the PNP,
conducted an ocular inspection and discovered
that PLDT telephone lines were connected to
several pieces of equipment
4. December 3, 2003, a consolidated application for
a search warrant was filed before Judge Mendiola
of the RTC, for the crimes of theft and violation of
PD No. 401 – granted.
Accordingly, four search warrants20 were issued
for violations of Article 308, in relation to Article
309, of the RPC (SW A–1 and SW A–2) and of
PD No. 401, as amended (SW B–1 and SW B–2)
for the ISR activities
5. On December 10, 2003, a return was made with
a complete inventory of the items seized.22
6. On January 14, 2004, the PLDT and the PNP
filed with the Department of Justice a joint
complaint–affidavit for theft and for violation of
PD No. 401 against the respondents.23
7. On February 18, 2004, the respondents filed with
the RTC a motion to quash24 the search warrants
essentially on the following grounds: first, the RTC
had no authority to issue search warrants which were
enforced in Parañaque City; second, the enumeration
of the items to be searched and seized lacked
particularity; and third, there was no probable cause
for the crime of theft – denied.
Issues:
1. Whether or not “telecommunication or
telephone services” be considered as
personal property and susceptible of
appropriation under the provisions of
Article 308 of RPC – YES.
2. Whether or not the CA gravely abused
its discretion in granting the motion to
quash the search warrants (SWA–l and
SWA–2) based on whether the
commission of an ISR activity meets the
elements of the offense of theft for
purposes of quashing an information –
YES
3. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its
discretion in granting the motion to quash the
search warrants (SWB–l and SWB–2) on the issue
of particularity - NO
Ruling:
1. On January 13, 2009 (or while the present
petition was pending in court), the Court En
Banc unanimously granted PLDT’s motion for
reconsideration. In Laurel v. Judge Abrogar,
the Court ruled that even prior to the passage
of the RPC, jurisprudence is settled that “any
personal property, tangible or intangible,
corporeal or incorporeal, capable of
appropriation can be the object of theft.” 40
This jurisprudence, in turn, applied the
prevailing legal meaning of the term “personal
property” under the old Civil Code as
“anything susceptible of appropriation and not
included in the foregoing chapter (not real
property).” 41 PLDT’s telephone service or its
business of providing this was appropriable
personal property and was, in fact, the subject
of appropriation in an ISR operation, facilitated
by means of the unlawful use of PLDT’s
facilities.
It is the use of these communications facilities
without the consent of PLDT that constitutes
the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking
of the telephone services and business.
Therefore, the business of providing
telecommunication and the telephone service
are personal property under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in
ISR is an act of “subtraction” penalized under
said article.42
2. This is based on the requisite - existence of
probable cause in connection with one specific
offense.
Ordinarily, the CA’s determination under Rule
65 is limited to whether the RTC gravely
abused its discretion in granting or denying
the motion to quash based on facts then
existing. Nonetheless, the Court recognizes
that supervening facts may transpire after the
issuance and implementation of the search
warrant that may provide justification for the
quashal of the search warrant via a petition for
certiorari.
For one, if the offense for which the warrant is
issued is subsequently decriminalized during
the pendency of the petition for certiorari, then
the warrant may be quashed.54 For another, a
subsequent ruling from the Court that a similar
set of facts and circumstances does not
constitute an offense, as alleged in the search
warrant application, may be used as a ground
to quash a warrant.55In both instances, the
underlying reason for quashing the search
warrant is the absence of probable cause
 a police informant that a certain Abdullah Sultan and
which can only possibly exist when the
his wife Ina Aderp was engaged in the selling of
combination of facts and circumstances points
dangerous drugs at a residential compound in
to the possible commission of an offense that
Caloocan City; that buy-bust operation resulted in the
may be evidenced by the personal properties
arrest of Aderp and a certain Moctar Tagoranao; that
sought to be seized. To the CA, the second
Sultan run away from the scene of the entrapment
instance mentioned justified the quashal of the
operation and PO3 Moran, PO2 Masi and PO1
search warrants.
Mateo, pursued him; that in the course of the chase,
With the Court En Banc’s reversal of the earlier
Sultan led the said police officers to his house; that
Laurel ruling, then the CA’s quashal of these
inside the house, he police operatives found Ambre,
warrants would have no leg to stand on. This is
Castro and Mendoza having a pot session; that
the dire consequence of failing to appreciate
Ambre in particular, was caught sniffing what was
the full import of the doctrine of stare decisis
suspected to be a shabu in a rolled up alumni
that the CA ignored.
foil; and that PO3 Moran ran after Sultan while PO2
3. This is based on the requisite - search
Masi and PO1 Mateo arrested Ambre, Castro and
warrant must particularly describe the place to
Mendoza for illegal use of shabu.
be searched and the things to be seized. This
Ambre insists that the warrantless arrest and search made
requirement of particularity in the description,
against her were illegal because no offense was
especially of the things to be seized, is meant
being committed at the time and the police operatives
to enable the law enforcers to readily identify
were not authorized by a judicial order to enter the
the properties to be seized and, thus, prevent
dwelling of Sultan. She argues that the alleged “hot
the seizure of the wrong items. It seeks to
pursuit” on Sultan which ended in the latter's house,
leave the law enforcers with no discretion at all
where she, Mendoza and Castro were supposedly
regarding these articles and to give life to the
found having a pot session, was more imaginary than
constitutional provision against unreasonable
real.
searches and seizures.
Issues:
One of the tests to determine the particularity
1.) Whether the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the
in the description of objects to be seized under
search of her person was valid; and
a search warrant is when the things described
2.) Whether the items seized are inadmissible in evidence
are limited to those which bear direct relation
Ruling:
to the offense for which the warrant is being
Yes, the Court held that the arrest and search done
issued.
against the petitioner is valid. Section 5, Rule 113 of
For clarity, PD No. 401 punishes:
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides three (3)
Section 1. Any person who installs any water,
instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully
electrical, telephone or piped gas connection
effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto;
without previous authority from xxx the
(b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable
xxx
cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a
These items could not be the subject of a
crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a
violation of PD No. 401 since PLDT itself does
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
not claim that these items themselves
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency
comprise the unauthorized installations. For
of his case or has escaped while being transferred
emphasis, what PD No. 401 punishes is the
from one confinement to another.
unauthorized installation of telephone
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended
connection without the previous consent of
at the very moment he is committing or attempting to
PLDT. In the present case, PLDT has not
commit or has just committed an offense in the
shown that connecting printers, scanners,
presence of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute
diskettes or tapes to a computer, even if
a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
connected to a PLDT telephone line, would or
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
should require its prior authorization.
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
Neither could these items be a means of crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
committing a violation of PD No. 401 since or within the view of the arresting officer.
these copying, printing and storage devices
in no way aided the respondents in making 12. People vs. Cogaed
the unauthorized connections. While these G.R. No. 200334
items may be accessory to the computers July 30, 2014
and other equipment linked to telephone
lines, PD No. 401 does not cover this kind of Doctrine:
items within the scope of the prohibition. To Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit
allow the seizure of items under the PLDT’s of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional
interpretation would, as the CA correctly provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno. This rule
observed, allow the seizure under the warrant prohibits the issuance of general warrants that
of properties for personal use of the encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions.
respondents. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should
be excluded as evidence because it is "the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional
11) Ambre vs. People injunction against unreasonable searches and
DOCTRINE: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal seizures." It ensures that the fundamental rights to
Procedure, provides three (3) instances when one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not
warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a Facts:
suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan of the San
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel, La
suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just Union,received a text message from an unidentified
been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has civilian informer that one Marvin Buya would be
escaped from custody serving final judgment or transporting marijuana from Barangay Lunoy, San
temporarily confined during the pendency of his case Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La
or has escaped while being transferred from one Union. PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order to
confinement to another. intercept the suspect. A passenger jeepney from
FACTS: On or about April 20, 2005, the Caloocan Police Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s
Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Unit checkpoint. The jeepney driver disembarked and
conducted a buy-bust operation pursuant to a tip from signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male
passengers who were carrying marijuana. SPO1
Taracatac approached the two male passengers who
were later identified as Victor Romana Cogaed and
Santiago Sacpa Dayao. SPO1 Taracatac asked
Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags.
Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did
not know since they were transporting the bags as a
favor for their barriomate named Marvin. After this
exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing
three bricks of what looked like marijuana. SPO1
Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and
brought them to the police station. While at the police
station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3
Stanley Campit requested Cogaed and Dayao to
empty their bags. Inside Cogaed’s sack was "four (4)
rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,"
and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of
suspected marijuana. Forensic Chemical Officer
Police Inspector Valeriano Panem Laya II performed
the tests and found that the objects obtained were
indeed marijuana.
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch
28 of San Fernando City, La Union. The case was
dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14
years old at that time and was exempt from criminal
liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006 or Republic Act No. 9344. On the other hand,
the RTC found Cogaed guilty. The trial court judge
initially found Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that
"Cogaed at that time was not, at the moment of his
arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that hewas
about to do so or that had just done so. He just
alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was
no outward indication that called for his arrest." Since
the arrest was illegal, the warrantless search should
also be considered illegal. However, the trial court
stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest,
Cogaed "waived his right to object to such irregularity"
when "he did not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after
identifying himself, asked him to open his bag."
Issues:
(1) whether there was a valid search and seizure of
marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the
evidence obtained through the search should be
admitted; and (3) whether there was enough evidence
to sustain the conviction of the accused
Ruling:
No! Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows
for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to
be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of
arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a
warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated
in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were
present whenthe arrest was made. At the time of his
apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not
committing, or was about to commit a crime. As in
People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante
delictoto be affected, "two elements must concur: (1)
the person to bearrested must execute anovert act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done inthe presence or within the
view of the arresting officer." Both elements were
missing when Cogaed was arrested. There were no
overt acts within plain view of the police officers that
suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at
that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner
that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the
last allowable warrantless arrest.
The Constitution provides: Any evidence obtained in
violation of [the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional
provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno. This rule
prohibits the issuance of general warrants that
encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions.
Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should
be excluded as evidence because it is "the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures." It ensures that the fundamental rights to
one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not
lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of
Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a
pronouncement of the illegality of that search means
that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our
society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law
enforcers should be equipped with the resources to
be able to perform their duties better. However, we
cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s
fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution.
Otherwise, we will be seen as slowlydismantling the
very foundations of the society that we seek to
protect.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, San Fernando City, La Union and
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03394
are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of
evidence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y
ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
RELEASED from confinement unless he is being
heldfor some other legal grounds. No costs.
12. Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency vs.
Brodett
GR No. 196390 – September 28, 2011
DOCTRINE:
Property or income in custodia legis cannot be
disposed, alienated or transferred during the
pendency of the case, even if owned by an innocent
party.
FACTS:
On April 13, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) of Muntinlupa charged Richard Brodett and
Joseph Jorge for violating Section 5, in relation to
Section 26 (b) of RA 9165 after being caught selling
and trading 9.8388 grams of methamphetamine HCL
on September 19, 2008. Likewise, on April 16, 2009,
Brodett was charged for violating Sec. 11 of RA 9165
for possession of various drugs in an incident on the
previously noted date. On July 30, 2009, Brodett filed
a Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence, among which
is a 2004 Honda Accord car registered in the name of
Myra S. Brodett that PDEA refused to return as it was
used in the commission of the crime and which was
supported by the OCP, stating that such vehicle be
kept during the duration of the trial to allow the
prosecution and defense to exhaust its evidentiary
value.
On November 4, 2009, the RTC ordered the return of
the car to Myra S. Brodett after it was duly
photographed. PDEA filed a motion for
reconsideration, such being denied. PDEA then filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which
was also denied, citing Sec. 20 of RA 9165.
ISSUE:
Whether the car owned by an innocent third party not
liable for the unlawful act be returned to its owner
although such car was used in the commission of a
crime?
RULING:
The Court ruled that a property not found to be used
in an unlawful act and taken as evidence can be
returned to its rightful owner but only when the case is
finally terminated. The Court further states that the
order to release the car was premature and in
contravention of Section 20, Par. 3 of RA 9165 which
states that property or income in custodia legis cannot
be disposed, alienated or transferred during the
pendency of the case. Court resolves that all RTC’s
comply with Section 20, RA 9165 and not release
articles, drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the
trial and before rendition of judgment, even if owned
by innocent third party.
Respondents having been acquitted of the crime
charged the Court will not annul the orders of the RTC
nor reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petition is DENIED.
13. COMERCIANTE v PEOPLE
[ G.R. No. 205926; 22 July 2015 ]
Doctrine:
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes
referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given
the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of
offenses. However, this should be balanced with the
need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance
with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of
"suspiciousness" present where the police officer
finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly
based on the experience of the police officer.
Experienced police officers have personal experience
dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence,
they should have the ability to discern - based on
facts that they themselves observe - whether an
individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a
basic criterion would be that the police officer,
with his or her personal knowledge, must observe
the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
Facts:
On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed
before the RTC charging Comerciante of violation
of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act; in possession of two heated-
sealed sachet of shabu.)
According to the prosecution, at around 10
o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent
Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS
group and PO3 Bienvy Calag II (PO3 Calag) were
aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their
way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo,
Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30
kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted,
at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later
identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla 7
(Dasilla) - standing and showing "improper and
unpleasant movements," with one of them handing
plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets
may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and
approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance of
around five (5) meters, PO3 Calag introduced himself
as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla,
and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory
examination later confirmed that said sachets
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
In his defense, Comerciante averred that
PO3 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was
a notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly,
he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a
jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken
to a police station. There, the police officers claimed
to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were
asked money in exchange for their release. When
they failed to accede to the demand, they were
brought to another police station to undergo inquest
proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs.
The RTC found Comerciante guilty beyond
reasonable. The RTC found that PO3 Calag
conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Comerciante,
which yielded two (2) plastic sachets containing
shabu. In this relation, the RTC opined that there was
probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest,
considering that PO3 Calag saw, in plain view, that
Comerciante was carrying the said sachets when he
decided to approach and apprehend the latter.
Further, the RTC found that absent any proof of intent
that PO3 Calag was impelled by any malicious
motive, he must be presumed to have properly
performed his duty when he arrested Comerciante.
CA affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid warrantless
arrest on the basis of the “stop and frisk” rule.
Held:
No, there was no valid warrantless arrest
made. The contention that it is in line with the “stop
and frisk” rule lacks merit.
The Supreme Court found it highly
implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that
he has perfect vision, would be able to identify
with reasonable accuracy especially from a
distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a
motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers
per hour miniscule amounts of white crystalline
substance inside two (2) very small plastic
sachets held by Comerciante.
The Court also notes that no other overt act could
be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the
former had just committed, was committing, or
was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of
standing around with a companion and handing over
something to the latter cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante
and his companion were showing "improper and
unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the
same would not have been sufficient in order to effect
a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. That
his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that
he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in
possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and
seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned
in the province are insufficient to create a conclusion
that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was
indeed shabu.
In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante's
acts of standing around with a companion and
handing over something to the latter do not constitute
criminal acts. These circumstances are not enough to
create a reasonable inference of criminal activity
which would constitute a "genuine reason" for PO3
Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the
former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search made
on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.
15. Dela Cruz vs. People
Doctrine:
Routine baggage inspections conducted by port
authorities, although done without search warrants,
are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional
provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally
understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to
ensure the safety of the traveling public.
Facts:
Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island
vessel. He frequently traveled, "coming back and forth
taking a vessel." At around 12:00 noon of May 11,
2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic
Port to go home to Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he
allegedly left his bag on the floor with a porter. It took
him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket. Dela
Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal
and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for
inspection. The operator of the x-ray machine saw
firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag. Cutie Pie Flores
(Flores) was the x-ray machine operator-on-duty on
May 11, 2007. She saw the impression of what
appeared to be three (3) firearms inside Dela Cruz’s
bag. Upon seeing the suspected firearms, she called
the attention of port personnel Archie Igot (Igot) who
was the baggage inspector then. Igot asked Dela
Cruz whether he was the owner of the bag. Dela Cruz
answered Igot in the affirmative and consented to
Igot’s manual inspection of the bag. "Port Police
Officer Adolfo Abregana [(Officer Abregana)] was on
duty at the terminal of the Cebu Domestic Port in Pier
1-G when his attention was called by . . . Igot." Igot
told Officer Abregana that there were firearms in a
bag owned by a certain person. Igot then pointed to
the person. That person was later identified as Dela
Cruz. Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of the
bag. The bag was then inspected and the following
items were found inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI
clearance; seaman’s book; other personal items; and
four (4) live ammunitions placed inside the cylinder.
When asked whether he had the proper documents
for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative.
Dela Cruz was then arrested and informed of his
violation of a crime punishable by law. He was also
informed of his constitutional rights.
In the Information dated November 19, 2003, Dela
Cruz was charged with violation of Republic Act No.
8294 for illegal possession of firearms. Subsequently,
another Information was filed charging Dela Cruz with
the violation of Commission on Elections Resolution
No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881. Dela Cruz entered a plea of not
guilty to both charges during arraignment.
Trial Court's Decision:
After trial, Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court,
Cebu City found Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. According to the trial court, the prosecution
was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dela
Cruz committed illegal possession of firearms. It
proved the following elements: "(a) the existence of
the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused
who owned or possessed it does not have the license
or permit to possess the same." The prosecution
presented the firearms and live ammunitions found in
Dela Cruz’s possession. It also presented three (3)
prosecution witnesses who testified that the firearms
were found inside Dela Cruz’s bag. The prosecution
also presented a Certification that Dela Cruz did not
file any application for license to possess a firearm,
and he was not given authority to carry a firearm
outside his residence. The trial court also held that the
search conducted by the port authorities was
reasonable and, thus, valid.
The trial court did not give credence to Dela Cruz’s
claim that the firearms were "planted" inside his bag
by the porter or anyone who could have accessed his
bag while he was buying a ticket. According to the
trial court, Dela Cruz’s argument was "easy to
fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove." Dela Cruz
also did not show improper motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses to discredit their testimonies.
The trial court dismissed the case for violation of
Republic Act No. 8294. It held that "Republic Act No.
8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms,
provided that the person arrested committed ‘no other
crime.’" Dela Cruz, who had been charged with illegal
possession of firearms, was also charged with
violating the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections
Resolution No. 7764.
CA's Decision:
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s Judgment. It held that the defense failed to
show that the prosecution witnesses were moved by
improper motive; thus, their testimonies are entitled to
full faith and credit. The acts of government
authorities were found to be regular. The Court of
Appeals did not find Dela Cruz’s defense of denial
meritorious. "Denial as a defense has been viewed
upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with
which it can be concocted." Dela Cruz did not present
any evidence "to show that he had authority to carry
outside of residence firearms and ammunition during
the period of effectivity of the Gun Ban [during]
election time." The prosecution was able to prove
Dela Cruz’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Dela Cruz
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated August
23, 2013.
Petitioner's Contentions:
Dela Cruz claims that he was an on-the-job trainee for
an inter-island vessel. He was "well[-]acquainted with
[the] inspection scheme [at the] ports." He would not
have risked placing prohibited items such as
unlicensed firearms inside his luggage knowing fully
the consequences of such an action. Dela Cruz
argues that there was no voluntary waiver against
warrantless search.
In petitioner’s case, it may well be said that, with the
circumstances attending the search of his luggage, he
had no actual intention to relinquish his right against
warrantless searches. He knew in all honest belief
that when his luggage would pass through the routine
x-ray examination, nothing incriminating would be
recovered. It was out of that innocent confidence that
he allowed the examination of his luggage. . . . [H]e
believed that no incriminating evidence w[ould] be
found. He knew he did not place those items. But
what is strikingly unique about his situation is that a
considerable time interval lapsed, creating an
opportunity for someone else to place inside his
luggage those incriminating items.
Respondent's Contentions:
Respondent argues that there was a valid waiver of
Dela Cruz’s right to unreasonable search and seizure,
thus warranting his conviction. Dela Cruz was "caught
in flagrante delicto carrying three (3) revolvers and
four (4) live ammunitions when his bag went through
the x-ray machine in the Cebu Domestic Port on May
11, 2007, well within the election period." The firearms
were seized during a routine baggage x-ray at the
port of Cebu, a common seaport security procedure.
According to respondent, this case is similar to valid
warrantless searches and seizures conducted by
airport personnel pursuant to routine airport security
procedures. Records are also clear that Dela Cruz
voluntarily waived his right to unreasonable searches
and seizure.The trial court found that Dela Cruz
voluntarily gave his consent to the search.
Dela Cruz’s claim that his bag was switched is also
baseless. The witnesses categorically testified that
Dela Cruz was "in possession of the bag before it
went through the x-ray machine, and he was also in
possession of the same bag that contained the
firearms when he was apprehended."
Dela Cruz raised the lone issue of "whether the Court
of Appeals gravely erred in finding [him] guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite the
failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt[.]"
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner waived his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and assuming
that there was no waiver, whether or not there was a
valid search and seizure in this case.
Ruling:
Petition denied.
To understand the nature of the constitutional rights
involved, the three (3) points of alleged intrusion into
the right to privacy of petitioner must be examined: (1)
when petitioner gave his bag for x-ray scanning to
port authorities; (2) when the baggage inspector
opened petitioner’s bag and called the Port Authority
Police; and (3) when the police officer opened the bag
to search, retrieve, and seize the firearms and
ammunition.
1. The first point of intrusion occurred when petitioner
presented his bag for inspection to port personnel—
the x-ray machine operator and baggage inspector
manning the x-ray machine station. With regard to
searches and seizures, the standard imposed on
private persons is different from that imposed on state
agents or authorized government authorities. If the
search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a
warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass
the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a
private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked
for only the act of private individual, not the law
enforcers, is involved.
Port authorities were acting within their duties and
functions when it used x-ray scanning machines for
inspection of passengers’ bags. When the results of
the x-ray scan revealed the existence of firearms in
the bag, the port authorities had probable cause to
conduct a search of petitioner’s bag. Notably,
petitioner did not contest the results of the x-ray scan.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Hence, items seized pursuant to a reasonable search
conducted by private persons are not covered by the
exclusionary rule.
2. Was the search rendered unreasonable at the
second point of intrusion—when the baggage
inspector opened petitioner’s bag and called the
attention of the port police office? No. The port
personnel’s actions proceed from the authority and
policy to ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles
within the port. At this point, petitioner already
submitted himself and his belongings to inspection by
placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine. The
presentation of petitioner’s bag for x-ray scanning was
voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of whether to
present the bag or not. He had the option not to travel
if he did not want his bag scanned or inspected. X-ray
machine scanning and actual inspection upon
showing of probable cause that a crime is being or
has been committed are part of reasonable security
regulations to safeguard the passengers passing
through ports or terminals.
3. A third point of intrusion to petitioner’s right to
privacy occurred during petitioner’s submission to port
security measures. The Constitution safeguards a
person’s right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. A warrantless search is presumed to be
unreasonable. However, this court lays down the
exceptions where warrantless searches are deemed
legitimate: (1) warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest; (2) seizure in "plain view"; (3) search of
a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search;
(5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent
and emergency circumstances.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it
is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first
appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Petitioner anchors his case on the claim that he did
not validly consent to the search conducted by the
port authorities. He argues that he did not have an
actual intention to relinquish his right against a
warrantless search. It was after the port personnel’s
inspection that Officer Abregana’s attention was
called and the bag was inspected anew with
petitioner’s consent.
We do not find anything erroneous as to the findings
of fact of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
There was probable cause that petitioner was
committing a crime leading to the search of his
personal effects. Petitioner is precluded from claiming
an invalid warrantless search when he voluntarily
submitted to the search on his person. In addition,
petitioner’s consent to the search at the domestic port
was not given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances.
16. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION AND PETRON CORPORATION,
Petitioners, v. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL GASES
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DOCTRINE:
proceedings for said applications (search warrant) are
not criminal in nature and, thus, the rule that venue is
jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Evidently, the
issue of whether the application should have been
filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one
involving jurisdiction because, as stated in the afore-
quoted case, the power to issue a special criminal
process is inherent in all courts
FACTS:
Petitioners received information that respondent was
selling, offering for sale, or distributing liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) by illegally refilling the steel
cylinders manufactured by and bearing the duly
registered trademark and device of respondent
Petron.
Petron then obtained the services of a paralegal
investigation team who sent their people to
investigate.
The investigators went to respondent's premises
located in San Juan, Baao, Camarines Sur, bringing
along four empty cylinders of Shellane, Gasul, Total
and Superkalan and asked that the same be refilled.
Respondent's employees then refilled said empty
cylinders at respondent's refilling station.
The refilled cylinders were brought to the Marketing
Coordinator of Petron Gasul who verified that
respondent was not authorized to distribute and/or
sell, or otherwise deal with Petron LPG products,
and/or use or imitate any Petron trademarks.
Petitioners then requested NBI to investigate said
activities of respondent for the purpose of
apprehending and prosecuting establishments
conducting illegal refilling, distribution and/or sale of
LPG products using the same containers of Petron
and Shell, which acts constitute a violation of Section
168,3 in relation to Section 1704 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8293, and/or Section 25 of R.A. No. 623,
The NBI proceeded with their investigation and
reportedly found commercial quantities of Petron
Gasul and Shellane cylinders stockpiled at
respondent's warehouse.
NBI filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naga City
(RTC-Naga), two separate Applications for Search
Warrant
Motion to Quash was filed and was denied
Respondents new counsel filed an appearance with
MR
It was only in said motion where respondent raised for
the first time, the issue of the impropriety of filing the
Application for Search Warrant at the RTC-Naga City
when the alleged crime was committed in a place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City.
MR of respondent was granted thus the warrants
were quashed
Appeal to the CA was made but was denied as well
as petitioner's MR
ISSUE: WON CA erred in giving due course to the
motion to quash
HELD:
YES.
It gravely erred in equating the proceedings for
applications for search warrants with criminal actions
themselves. As elucidated by the Court, proceedings
for said applications (search warrant) are not criminal
in nature and, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional
does not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue of
whether the application should have been filed in
RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one involving
jurisdiction because, as stated in the afore-quoted
case, the power to issue a special criminal process is
inherent in all courts.
17. Nogales v. People
GR No. 191080 November 21, 2011
Doctrine: The dismissal of the case does not
necessarily entail the return of the things seized.
Facts: Special Prosecutor Garry Meez of the NBI
applied for a search warrant before the RTC so that
they can be authorized to search the premises of
petitioner Phil-Pacific Outsourcing Services Corp.
Nogales et al were occupants of the mezzanine of the
said building, which allegedly have materials being
used to create and sell pornographic websites:
1. Computer Sets
2. Television Sets
3. Internet Servers
4. Fax Machines
5. Pornographic Films and other Pornographic
Materials
6. Web Cameras
7. Telephone Sets
8. Photocopying Machines
9. List of clients and
10. Other tools and materials used or intended to be
used in the commission of the crime.
The Judge, after conducting searching questions,
authorized and approved the list, granting the search
warrant and ordering a submission of a return 10 days
from its date of issuance. The things seized after the
search were:
1. Ten (10) units of Central Processing Units
(CPUs);
2. Ten (10) units of monitors;
3. Ten (10) units of keyboard;
4. Ten (10) units of mouse; and
5. Ten (10) units of AVRs.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a motion to quash
search warrant and return seized properties. They
argued that:
A. Respondents do not have programmers making,
designing, maintaining, editing, storing, circulating,
distributing, or selling said websites or the contents
thereof;
B. Respondents do not have any website servers;
C. Respondents do not own the websites imputed to
them, which are actually located outside the
Philippines, in foreign countries, and are owned by
foreign companies in those countries
D. The testimony of the witnesses presented by the
NBI are contradicted by the facts of the case as
established by documentary evidence;
E. The NBI withheld verifiable information from the
Honorable Court and took advantage of the limited
knowledge of courts in general in order to obtain the
search warrant for their personal intentions;
F. The NBI raided the wrong establishment; and
G. The element of publicity is absent.
The RTC denied the motion, stating that:
1.) It cannot be said that publicity is not present. The
Phil-Pacific Outsourcing Services Corp., is actually
persuading its clients, thru its agents (call center
agents), to log-on to the pornographic sites listed in its
web page. In that manner, Phil-Pacific Outsourcing
Services Corporation is advertising these
pornographic web sites, and such advertisement is a
form of publicity
2.) Even if some of the listed items intended to be
seized were not recovered from the place where the
search was made, it does not mean that there was no
really crime being committed. As in fact, pornographic
materials were found in some of the computers which
were seized
3.) In the same way that the names listed in the
Search Warrant were not arrested or not in the
premises subject of the search, it does not mean that
there are no such persons existing nor there is no
crime being committed.
4.) As a rule, Search Warrant may be issued upon
existence of probable cause. Probable cause for a
search is defined as such fact and circumstances
which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be reached. Hence,
in implementing a Search Warrant, what matters most
is the presence of the items ought to be seized in the
place to be searched, even in the absence of the
authors of the crime committed.
5.) The Search Warrant was issued in accordance
with Secs. 3 to 6, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Search Warrant may be quashed or invalidated
if there is an impropriety in its issuance or irregularity
in its enforcement. Absent such impropriety or
irregularity, quashal is not warranted.
During the development of the case, the Assistant
Prosecutor recommended dismissal of the case due
to insufficiency of evidence. Petitioners asked for the
return of the properties because of the said dismissal.
The Judge of the RTC partially granted the request,
but ordered the retention of all the other CPUs and
software, while allowing the release of the computer
sets. It said that the dismissal of the case cannot be a
ground for the return of the other properties which
were acquired through a search warrant. Petitioners
appealed to the CA.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC, and ordered the destruction of the software and
CPU seized, on the ground that the software
obviously contained pornographic materials.
Issue: Whether or not the CA commited grave abuse
of discretion in ordering the destruction of the
pornographic materials
Held: No. While it may be true that the criminal case
for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code
was dismissed as there was no concrete and strong
evidence pointing to them as the direct source of the
subject pornographic materials, it cannot be used as
basis to recover the confiscated hard disks. At the risk
of being repetitious, it appears undisputed that the
seized computer units belonging to them contained
obscene materials or pornographic files. Clearly,
petitioners had no legitimate expectation of protection
of their supposed property rights.
The CA is correct in stating that the removal of the
hard disk from the CPU is a reliable way of
permanently removing the obscene or pornographic
files. Significantly, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 969
is explicit:
b. Where the criminal case against any violator of this
decree results in an acquittal, the obscene/immoral
literature, films, prints, engravings, sculpture,
paintings or other materials and other articles involved
in the violation referred to in Section 1 hereof shall
nevertheless be forfeited in favor of the government to
be destroyed, after forfeiture proceedings conducted
by the Chief of Constabulary.
Taking into account all the circumstances of this case,
the Court holds that the destruction of the hard disks
and the softwares used in any way in the violation of
the subject law addresses the purpose of minimizing if
not totally eradicating pornography. This will serve as
a lesson for those engaged in any way in the
proliferation of pornography or obscenity in this
country. The Court is not unmindful of the concerns of
petitioners but their supposed property rights must be
balanced with the welfare of the public in general.
18. PEOPLE vs BELOCURA
G.R. No. 173474 August 29, 2012
Reynaldo Belocura y Perez, a police officer charged
with illegal possession of 1,789.823 grams of
marijuana in violation of Republic Act No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, was found guilty of the crime
charged on April 22, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Manila, and sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P 500,000.00.1
Antecedents
That on or about March 22, 1999, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control one (1)
plastic bag colored red and white, with label "SHIN
TON YON", containing a total weight of 1,789.823
grams of a prohibited drug.
The State’s Evidence
On March 22, 1999, at 11 o’clock in the morning,
Chief Insp. Divina was in his office in the
headquarters of the Western Police District (WPD) on
United Nations Avenue in Manila when he received a
call from a male person who refused to identify
himself for fear of reprisal. The caller tipped him off
about a robbery to be staged along Lopez Street,
Tondo, Manila. After relaying the tip to his superior
officer, he was immediately ordered to form a team
composed of operatives of the District Intelligence
Group and to coordinate with the Special Weapons
and Attack Team (SWAT) and the Mobile Patrol of the
WPD.
After a briefing, Chief Insp. Divina and the other
operatives proceeded to Lopez Street, reaching the
site before 1:00 pm. Chief Insp. Divina and PO2
Eraldo Santos positioned themselves along Vitas
Street. At around 2:00 pm, Chief Insp. Divina spotted
an owner-type jeep bearing a spurious government
plate (SBM-510) cruising along Vitas Street and told
the rest of the team about it. The numbers of the car
plate were painted white. The driver was later
identified as Belocura. Chief Insp. Divina signaled for
Belocura to stop for verification but the latter ignored
the signal and sped off towards Balut, Tondo. The
team pursued Belocura’s jeep until they blocked its
path with their Tamaraw FX vehicle, forcing Belocura
to stop. At this point, Chief Insp. Divina and the rest of
the team approached the jeep and introduced
themselves to Belocura as policemen. Chief Insp.
Divina queried Belocura on the government plate.
SPO1 Rojas confiscated Belocura’s Berreta 9 mm.
pistol (Serial Number M13086Z) that was tucked in
his waist and its fully loaded magazine when he could
not produce the appropriate documents for the pistol
and the government plate. They arrested him.
PO2 Santos searched Belocura’s jeep, and recovered
a red plastic bag under the driver’s seat. Chief Insp.
Divina directed PO2 Santos to inspect the contents of
the red plastic bag, which turned out to be two bricks
of marijuana wrapped in newspaper.
Afterwards, the team returned with Belocura to the
WPD Headquarters on board the Tamaraw FX. The
team turned over the jeep and the red plastic bag with
its contents to the General Assignment Section for
proper disposition.
Chief Insp. Divina said that the caller did not mention
anything about any vehicle; that he and his men were
in civilian clothes at the time; that it was PO2 Santos
who recovered the red plastic bag containing the
marijuana bricks; and that SPO1 Rojas examined the
contents of the bag in his presence.
SPO1 Rojas confirmed his part in the operation. He
conceded that he was not present when the red
plastic bag containing the bricks of marijuana was
seized, and saw the marijuana bricks for the first time
only at the police station.
II
Evidence of the Defense
Belocura denied the charge. His version, which
differed from that of the Prosecution, was as follows.
On March 22, 1999, Belocura was a police officer
assigned in Police Station 6 of the WPD with a tour of
duty from 3:00 pm to 11:00 pm. At 2:00 pm of that
day, he was on his way to work on board his owner-
type jeep when about thirty police officers blocked his
path. He introduced himself to them as a police
officer, but they ignored him. Instead, they disarmed
and handcuffed him, and confiscated the
memorandum receipt covering his firearm, his money
and his police ID card. He recognized some of his
arrestors as former members of the CIS. They forced
him into their jeep, and brought him to the WPD
headquarters, where they locked him up in a room
that looked like a bodega. They subjected him to
interrogation on his alleged involvement in a robbery
hold-up. They informed him of the drug-related charge
to be filed against him only three days later.
On re-direct examination, Belocura replied that he did
not see the bricks of marijuana whether at the time of
his arrest, or at the police precinct, or during the
inquest proceedings. On re-cross, he clarified that
while the driver’s seat were fixed to the jeep, the
bricks of marijuana could nevertheless be placed
under the driver’s seat only if pressed hard enough,
but in that case the wrappings would get torn because
the wirings of the car underneath the seat were
exposed. He recalled that the wrappings of the bricks
of marijuana were intact.13
On April 22, 2003, the RTC convicted Belocura of the
crime charged and sentenced him to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to pay the fine of P 500,000.00.14
As already stated, the CA affirmed the conviction.15
Belocura submits that the Prosecution did not
establish his guilt for the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt; that his warrantless arrest was
unlawful considering that his only violation was only a
breach of traffic rules and regulations involving the
illegal use of a government plate on his newly-
assembled jeep; that the warrantless search of his
jeep was contrary to law for violating his right against
illegal search and seizure protected under Section 17,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution;17
and that the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized
from him, being the fruit of a poisonous tree, were
inadmissible against him.
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
IN EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA DESPITE THE
ILLEGALITY OF ITS SEIZURE DUE TO THE
ABSENSE (sic) OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT.
RULING: YES.
No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a
valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority.
So sacred are the right of personal security and
privacy and the right from unreasonable searches and
seizures that no less than the Constitution ordains in
Section 2 of its Article III, viz:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The consequence of a violation of the guarantees
against a violation of personal security and privacy
and against unreasonable searches and seizures is
the exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained. This
rule of exclusion is set down in Section 3(2), Article III
of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 3. xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Even so, the right against warrantless arrest, and
the right against warrantless search and seizure
are not absolute. There are circumstances in
which the arrest, or search and seizure, although
warrantless, are nonetheless valid or reasonable.
Among the circumstances are those mentioned in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which lists
down when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully
made by a peace officer or a private person, namely:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
On the other hand, the constitutional proscription
against warrantless searches and seizures admits
of the following exceptions, namely: (a) warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court;19 (b)
seizure of evidence under plain view; (c) search of a
moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless search; (e)
customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk situations (Terry
search); and (g) exigent and emergency
circumstances.20 In these exceptional situations, the
necessity for a search warrant is dispensed with.
Belocura argues that his arrest and the ensuing
search of his vehicle and recovery of the incriminating
bricks of marijuana were in violation of his
aforementioned rights under the Constitution because
he was then violating only a simple traffic rule on
the illegal use of a government plate. He claims
that the arresting policemen had no probable cause
to search his vehicle for anything.
The argument of Belocura does not persuade.
Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating
Section 31 of Republic Act No. 4139 (The Land
Transportation and Traffic Code). In flagrante delicto
means in the very act of committing the crime. To be
caught in flagrante delicto necessarily implies the
positive identification of the culprit by an
eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification is a
direct evidence of culpability, because it "proves the
fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or
presumption."
Even by his own admission, he was actually
committing a crime in the presence or within the view
of the arresting policemen. Such manner by which
Belocura was apprehended fell under the first
category in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
The arrest was valid, therefore, and the arresting
policemen thereby became cloaked with the
authority to validly search his person and effects
for weapons or any other article he might use in
the commission of the crime or was the fruit of
the crime or might be used as evidence in the trial
of the case, and to seize from him and the area
within his reach or under his control, like the jeep,
such weapon or other article. The evident purpose
of the incidental search was to protect the arresting
policemen from being harmed by him with the use of
a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the warrantless
character of the arrest could not by itself be the basis
of his acquittal.
What must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the
fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself. This
may be done by presenting the police officer who
actually recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness,
being the person who has the direct knowledge of the
possession.
Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas’ declarations were
insufficient to incriminate Belocura, much less to
convict him. If neither of them was personally
competent to be an eyewitness regarding the seizure
of the marijuana bricks from Belocura, their
testimonies could not be accorded probative value,
considering that the Rules of Court requires that a
witness could testify only to facts that he knew of his
own knowledge, that is, only to those facts derived
from his own perception.
It is basic under the Rules of Court, indeed, that
evidence, to be relevant, must throw light upon, or
have a logical relation to, the facts in issue to be
established by one party or disproved by the other.41
The test of relevancy is whether an item of evidence
will have any value, as determined by logic and
experience, in proving the proposition for which it is
offered, or whether it would reasonably and actually
tend to prove or disprove any matter of fact in issue,
or corroborate other relevant evidence. The test is
satisfied if there is some logical connection either
directly or by inference between the fact offered and
the fact to be proved.
The Court holds that the guilt of Belocura for the
crime charged was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Mere suspicion of his guilt, no matter how
strong, should not sway judgment against him.
19. Worldwide Web Corp. vs. People
GR No. 161106, 161266; January 13, 2014
DOCTRINE: 1. There is no exact test for the
determination of probable cause in the issuance of
search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on
the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising
their judicial function. They determine probable cause
based on "evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed" by the offender.
2. A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or
arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to
be arrested or the property to be seized.” It is one that
allows the "seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another" and gives the officer executing
the warrant the discretion over which items to take.
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of
particularity in the description of the things to be
seized when the things described are limited to those
that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued.
FACTS: Petitioners filed the present Petitions under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing the
quashal of the search warrants previously issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the
Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office
(RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed
applications for warrants before the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 78, to search the office premises of
petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC), as
well as the office premises of petitioner Planet
Internet Corporation (Planet Internet). The
applications alleged that petitioners were conducting
illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft
and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401
(Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water,
Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of
Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts),
to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).
The trial court conducted a hearing on the
applications for search warrants. The applicant and
Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund Gali (Gali)
of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of
PLDT testified as witnesses. During the hearing, the
trial court required the identification of the office
premises/units to be searched, as well as their floor
plans showing the location of particular computers
and servers that would be taken.
The RTC granted the application for search warrants.
Accordingly, the following warrants were issued
against the office premises of petitioners, authorizing
police officers to seize various items.
The warrants were implemented on the same day by
RISOO operatives of the National Capital Region
Police Office. Over a hundred items were seized,
including 15 central processing units (CPUs), 10
monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files,
and a laptop computer. Planet Internet notes that
even personal diskettes of its employees were
confiscated; and areas not devoted to the
transmission of international calls, such as the
President’s Office and the Information Desk, were
searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and
broken computers, were also seized. Petitioners
WWC and Cherryll Yu, and Planet Internet filed their
respective motions to quash the search warrants,
citing basically the same grounds: (1) the search
warrants were issued without probable cause, since
the acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll
bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime; (3)
the search warrants were general warrants; and (4)
the objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of the
poisonous tree.”
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition to the motions
to quash. The RTC granted the motions to quash on
the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature
of general warrants. Thus, the properties seized
under the said warrants were ordered released to
petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its motion was
denied on the ground that it had failed to get the
conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the
motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
ISSUE/S: I. Whether the assailed search warrants
were issued upon probable cause, considering that
the acts complained of allegedly do not constitute
theft.
II. Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the
assailed search warrants were not general warrants.
HELD: 1. Trial judges determine probable cause in
the exercise of their judicial functions. A trial judge’s
finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant is accorded respect by reviewing courts when
the finding has substantial basis. Petitioners claim
that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance
of the search warrants. The rules pertaining to the
issuance of search warrants are enshrined in Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause
requires "such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and the objects sought in
connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched.”
There is no exact test for the determination of
probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It
is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial
judges in the process of exercising their judicial
function. They determine probable cause based on
"evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed and that it was committed" by the
offender.
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of
a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding
is accorded respect by reviewing courts:
x x x. It is presumed that a judicial function has been
regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary.
A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant is paid great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was
substantial basis for that determination. Substantial
basis means that the questions of the examining
judge brought out such facts and circumstances as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and the
objects in connection with the offense sought to be
seized are in the place sought to be searched.
The transcript of stenographic notes during the
hearing for the application for search warrants on 25
September 2001 shows that Judge Percival Mandap
Lopez asked searching questions to the witnesses
and particularly sought clarification on the alleged
illegal toll bypass operations of petitioners, as well as
the pieces of evidence presented. Thus, the Court will
no longer disturb the finding of probable cause by the
trial judge during the hearing for the application for the
search warrants.
However, petitioners insist that the determination of
the existence of probable cause necessitates the prior
determination of whether a crime or an offense was
committed in the first place. In support of their
contention that there was no probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrants, petitioners put
forward the adage nullum crimen, nulla poena sine
lege–there is no crime when there is no law punishing
it. Petitioners argue that there is no law punishing toll
bypass, the act complained of by PLDT. Thus, no
offense was committed that would justify the issuance
of the search warrants.
According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international
calls to appear as local calls and not overseas calls,
thus effectively evading payment to the PLDT of
access, termination or bypass charges, and
accounting rates; payment to the government of
taxes; and compliance with NTC regulatory
requirements. PLDT concludes that toll bypass is
prohibited, because it deprives "legitimate telephone
operators, like PLDT of the compensation which it is
entitled to had the call been properly routed through
its network." As such, toll bypass operations
constitute theft, because all of the elements of the
crime are present therein.
On the other hand, petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu
argue that there is no theft to speak of, because the
properties allegedly taken from PLDT partake of the
nature of "future earnings and lost business
opportunities" and, as such, are uncertain,
anticipative, speculative, contingent, and conditional.
PLDT cannot be deprived of such unrealized earnings
and opportunities because these do not belong to it in
the first place.
Upon a review of the records of the case, the Court
understands that the Affidavits of Rivera and Gali that
accompanied the applications for the search warrants
charge petitioners with the crime, not of toll bypass
perse, but of theft of PLDT’s international long
distance call business committed by means of the
alleged toll bypass operations.
2. The requirement of particularity in the description of
things to be seized is fulfilled when the items
described in the search warrant bear a direct relation
to the offense for which the warrant is sought.
Petitioners claim that the subject search warrants
were in the nature of general warrants because the
descriptions therein of the objects to be seized are so
broad and all-encompassing as to give the
implementing officers wide discretion over which
articles to seize. In fact, the CA observed that the
targets of the search warrants were not illegal per se,
and that they were "innocuous goods." Thus, the
police officers were given blanket authority to
determine whether the objects were legal or not, as in
fact even pieces of computer equipment not involved
in telecommunications or Internet service were
confiscated.
On the other hand, PLDT claims that a search warrant
already fulfills the requirement of particularity of
description when it is as specific as the circumstances
will ordinarily allow. Furthermore, it cites Kho v.
Makalintal, in which the Court allowed leeway in the
description of things to be seized, taking into
consideration the effort and the time element involved
in the prosecution of criminal cases.
A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest
warrant that is not particular as to the person to be
arrested or the property to be seized.” It is one that
allows the "seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another" and gives the officer executing
the warrant the discretion over which items to take.
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person,
against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to
abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards
have been put in place to ensure that people and their
properties are searched only for the most compelling
and lawful reasons.
Furthermore, the Court also had occasion to rule that
the particularity of the description of the place to be
searched and the things to be seized is required
"wherever and whenever it is feasible." A search
warrant need not describe the items to be seized in
precise and minute detail. The warrant is valid when it
enables the police officers to readily identify the
properties to be seized and leaves them with no
discretion regarding the articles to be seized.
In this case, considering that items that looked like
"innocuous goods" were being used to pursue an
illegal operation that amounts to theft, law
enforcement officers would be hard put to secure a
search warrant if they were required to pinpoint items
with one hundred percent precision.
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of
particularity in the description of the things to be
seized when the things described are limited to those
that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued.
20. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee vs JULIET PANCHO, Accused-Appellant
Doctrine: Section 11, paragraph 2(1), Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the
quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty
(50) grams[.]
Facts: On 14th day of September, 2005, at about
2:40 p.m in the City of Cebu, Philippines, the said
accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there
have in her possession and under her control three
(3) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags each of white
crystalline substance weighing 14.49 grams locally
known as shabu, containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, without authority of
law. On arraignment, accused-appellant entered a
non-guilty plea. Trial ensued. The prosecution
witnesses narrated that on the basis of a search
warrant, members of the Criminal Investigation and
Intelligence Bureau of Cebu City conducted a search
in the house of accused-appellant and her husband
Samuel Pancho located in Sitio Plastikan, Barangay
Duljo-Fatima, Cebu City. Police Superintendent Pablo
Labra served the search warrant on accused-
appellant. Police Officer 1 Roy Carlo Veloso (PO1
Veloso) was designated as the searcher, while PO2
Benigno Andrew Ilagan (PO2 Ilagan) was assigned as
the recorder of the raiding team. The raiding team
was accompanied by three barangay tanods. The
search yielded three big plastic packets of suspected
shabu weighing a total of 14.49 grams, which were
recovered under a jewelry box placed on top of a
cabinet divider. PO1 Veloso handed the packets of
shabu to PO2 Ilagan who recorded them in the
confiscation receipt and made markings on the plastic
packets. Accused-appellant denied the charge
against her and alleged that she was sewing a
blanket in her bedroom on the second floor when two
police officers barged into her room and ordered her
to go down. When she went down, two other police
officers came and one of them went up to the
bedroom. After a few seconds, the said police officer
went back down and called the barangay tanods.
When the barangay tanods arrived, accused-
appellant was handcuffed and brought to the police
station. Accused-appellant later learned that she was
being charged with illegal possession of shabu. On 5
October 2009, the RTC rendered judgment finding
accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of
shabu and sentencing her to life imprisonment and to
pay a P1, 000,000.00 fine.
Issue: Whether accused-appellant's guilt has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt is the crux of this
controversy.
Held: It was actually accused-appellant's lawyer who
asked if the markings were done at the office, and
PO1 Veloso inadvertently answered in the affirmative,
but he immediately corrected himself when the
mistake was pointed out to him.
The non-presentation of the barangay tanods is not
fatal to the case of the prosecution. The more relevant
testimonies are those of the members of the raiding
team who testified that they recovered packets of
shabu from accused-appellant's house.
With respect to non-compliance with procedure laid
down in the seizure and custody of prohibited drugs,
the primordial consideration is the preservation of the
identity and integrity of the corpus delicti.
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 provides the procedure
to be followed in the seizure and custody of prohibited
drugs, to wit:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated,
Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof[.]
Accused-appellant cites as an irregularity the failure
of the prosecution to present photographs of the
seized items and that there were no representatives
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
during the conduct of the inventory of the seized
items.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Section
21 (a) of R.A. No. 9165 offer some flexibility when a
proviso added that "non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items."
The failure of the members of the raiding team to
deliver the seized items to the judge who issued the
warrant becomes immaterial because records show
that the chain of custody is intact.
We affirm the penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals. It was specified in the Information that the
shabu found in the possession of the accused-
appellant weighted 14.49 grams. This weight is as
certified to in the Chemistry Report. Such weight is
within the range stated for by law.
21. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JERRY
AND PATRICIA PUNZALAN
Doctrine:
1. Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
authorizes the Executive Judges and the Vice-
Executive Judges of the RTC of Manila and Quezon
City to issue search warrants to be served in places
outside their territorial jurisdiction in special criminal
cases such as those involving heinous crimes, illegal
gambling, illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for as
long as the parameters under the said section have
been complied with.
2. The rule that "two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality" must be
present applies only in the absence of either the
lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his
family.
Facts:
Jerry and Patricia Punzalan were charged
for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). A
search warrant was served in their residence in Pasay
City where the PDEA agents discovered 40.78 grams
of Shabu. The search warrant was issued by Judge
Peralta Jr of the Manila RTC.
The PDEA search team was composed of
IO2 (Intelligence Officer) Pagaran, IO2 Alvarado, IA1
Sandaan. They coordinated with Barangay Chairman
Reynaldo Flores, Kagawad Larry Fabella and
Kagawad Edwin Razon and were accompanied by a
media representative affiliated with "Sunshine Radio"
to cover the operation. According to PDEA, they
knocked on the residence and Patricia Punzalan
opened the door slightly. She would not let the agents
in but the door was forcefully opened by the agents in
order to serve the warrant. In the first floor of the
house, they saw the Shabu. Later on, the barangay
officials arrived and proceeded to search the other
floors of the house. After that, Kagawad Razon signed
the document certifying the evidence collected.
The Punzalans pled not guilty and raised as
their defense an alibi. According to them, they were in
their store 50 meters from their house when the
PDEA agents arrived. They were apprehended by the
PDEA before the latter executed the search warrant.
The RTC convicted the Punzalans and the
CA affirmed their conviction. Thus, this appeal where
the Punzalans assail the issuance of the search
warrant and the validity of the search. They contend,
in particular, the absence of the PDEA Director
General’s approval and the absence of the Barangay
Officials in the Initial Search.
Issue:
1. W.O.N the Search Warrant was validly
issued
2. W.O.N the search was valid
Ruling:
1. Yes. Sec. 12, AM No. 03-8-02-SC entitled as
“Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of
Executive Judges and Defining their Powers,
Prerogatives and Duties” provide:
“SEC. 12. Issuance of search warrants in
special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of
Manila and Quezon City. - The Executive Judges and,
whenever they are on official leave of absence or are
not physically present in the station, the Vice-
Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon
City shall have authority to act on applications filed by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime
Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code,
as amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included
herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be endorsed by the
heads of such agencies or their respective duly
authorized officials and shall particularly describe
therein the places to be searched and/or the property
or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of
Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive
Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified,
which may be served outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the said courts.”
In this case, the RTC of Manila validly issued a
search warrant even without the PDEA Director
General’s approval because AM No. 03-8-02-SC
provides that duly authorized officials may comply
with the requirement. Furthermore, the case involves
a violation of RA No. 9165 so the RTC of Manila may
validly issue a search warrant outside its territorial
jurisdiction.
2. Yes. Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
“SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be
made in presence of two witnesses. - No search of a
house, room, or any other premises shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof
or any member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality.”
As correctly ruled by the CA, even if the barangay
officials were not present during the initial search, the
search was witnessed by accused-appellants
themselves, hence, the search was valid since the
rule that "two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality" must be
present applies only in the absence of either the
lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his
family.
22. BERNARD R. NALA v JUDGE JESUS M. BARROSO
G.R No. 153087, August 7, 2003
DOCTRINE: The settled rule is that where entry into the
premises to be searched was gained by virtue of a
void search warrant, prohibited articles seized in the
course of the search are inadmissible against the
accused. Prohibited articles may be seized but only
as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not
because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2)
absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not
validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military
officers who entered the petitioner’s premises had no
right to be there and therefore had no right either to
seize the pistol and bullets.”
FACTS:
On June 25, 2001, PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser
together with his witness Ruel Nalagon applied for the
issuance of a warrant to search the person and
residence of petitioner Bernard R. Nala, who was
referred to in the application as “Rumolo Nala alias
Long” of “Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon.”
The application was filed in connection with
petitioner’s alleged illegal possession of one caliber
.22 magnum and one 9 mm. pistol in violation of
Illegal Possession of Firearms. On the same day,
respondent Presiding Judge of RTC of Malaybalay
City, issued Search and Seizure Warrant .On July 4,
2001, at around 6:30 in the morning, Alcoser and
other police officer search the petitioner’s house and
allegedly seized the following: (1) one piece caliber
.38 revolver (snub-nose) with Serial Number
1125609; (2) one pc. Fragmentation grenade (cacao
type); (3) one pc. .22 long barrel; (4) 5- pcs live
ammunition for caliber .38 revolver; and (5) 4- four
pcs. of disposable lighter and unestimated numbers of
cellophane used for packing of shabu. Petitioner
questioned the validity of the search warrant and filed
an Omnibus Motion to Quash but was denied by the
judge.
Lower court found that probable cause was duly
established from the deposition and examination of
witness Ruel Nalagon and the testimony of PO3
Alcoser who personally conducted a surveillance to
confirm the information given by Nalagon. The fact
that the items seized were not exactly the items listed
in the warrant does not invalidate the same because
the items seized bear a direct relation to the crime of
illegal possession of firearms. Respondent judge also
found that petitioner was sufficiently identified in the
warrant although his first name was erroneously
stated therein as “Romulo” and not “Bernard”,
considering that the warrant was couched in terms
that would make it enforceable against the person
and residence of petitioner and no other.
ISSUES:
(1) Was petitioner sufficiently described in the search and
seizure warrant?
(2) Was there probable cause for the issuance of a search
and seizure warrant against petitioner?
(3) Whether or not the firearms and explosive allegedly
found in petitioner’s residence are admissible in
evidence against him even though said firearms were
not listed in the search and seizure warrant.
Immaterial due to a void search warrant.
RULING:
(1) YES. the failure to correctly state in the search and
seizure warrant the first name of petitioner, which is
“Bernard” and not “Romulo” or “Rumolo”, does not
invalidate the warrant because the additional
description “alias Lolong Nala who is said to be
residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon”
sufficiently enabled the police officers to locate and
identify the petitioner. . What is prohibited is a warrant
against an unnamed party, and not one which, as in
the instant case, contains a descriptio personae that
will enable the officer to identify the accused without
difficulty.
(2) NO. Nowhere in the affidavit and testimony of
witness Ruel Nalagon nor in PO3 Macrino L.
Alcoser’s application for the issuance of a search
warrant was it mentioned that petitioner had no
license to possess a firearm. PO3 Alcoser and his
witness Ruel Nalagon did not have personal
knowledge but only personal belief of petitioner’s
lack of license to possess firearms, ammunitions and
explosives; and did not adduce the evidence required
to prove the existence of probable cause. Hence, the
search and seizure warrant issued on the basis of the
evidence presented is void.
(3) The settled rule is that where entry into the
premises to be searched was gained by virtue of a
void search warrant, prohibited articles seized in
the course of the search are inadmissible against
the accused. Prohibited articles may be seized but
only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it
was not because: 1) there was no valid search
warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right
thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In
short, the military officers who entered the
petitioner’s premises had no right to be there and
therefore had no right either to seize the pistol
and bullets.”
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is
GRANTED. Search and Seizure Warrant is declared
VOID and the articles seized by virtue thereof are
declared inadmissible in evidence.
23. Prudente vs Dayrit
Doctrine:
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has
been defined "as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet arid prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that
objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched." This probable
cause must be shown to be within the personal
knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he
may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, this Court laid
the following test in determining whether the
allegations in an application for search warrant or in a
supporting deposition, are based on personal
knowledge or not—
The true test of sufficiency of a
deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of
a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and the affiant be held
liable for damage caused. The oath required
must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the applicant for
search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of
the facts merely reported by a person whom
one considers to be reliable.
Facts:
On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw,
Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division
(ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33,
presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit,
now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. an
application 1 for the issuance of a search warrant,
docketed therein as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 87-14,
for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession
of Firearms, etc.) entitled "People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, versus Nemesis E. Prudente, Defendant."
In support of the application for issuance of search
warrant, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, OIC of the
Intelligence Section of (ISAD) executed a "Deposition
of Witness" dated 31 October 1987, subscribed and
sworn to before respondent Judge.
On the same day, 31 October 1987, respondent
Judge issued Search Warrant No. 87-14 which read
as follows:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the
undersigned, after examining under oath
applicant ALLADIN M. DIMAGMALIW and
his witness FLORENIO C. ANGELES that
there are good and sufficient reasons to
believe (probable cause) that NEMESIO
PRUDENTE has in his control in the
premises of Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, Anonas St., Sta. Mesa,
Sampaloc, Manila, properties which are
subject of the above offense or intended to
be used as the means of committing the said
offense.
You are hereby commanded to make an
immediate search at any time in the day or
night of the premises of Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, more
particularly (a) offices of the Department of
Military Science and Tactics at the ground
floor and other rooms at the ground floor; (b)
office of the President, Dr. Nemesio
Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other
rooms at the second floor, and forthwith
seize and take possession of the following
personal properties, to wit:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunition;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and hand grenades; and
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.
and bring the above described properties to
the undersigned to be dealt with as the law
directs.
On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day,
the search warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD
operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy
Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto,
Precinct 8 Commander.
In his affidavit, dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo
Abando y Yusay, a member of the searching team,
alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside
the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging
brown envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand
grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers,
classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows (a) one (1)
pc.—M33 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); (b) one
(11) pc.—M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live);
and (c) one (1) pc.—PRB—423 Fragmentation hand
grenade (live).
On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the
search warrant. He claimed that (1) the complainant's
lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal
knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the
issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of
the said witness was not in the form of searching
questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a
general warrant, for the reason that it did not
particularly describe the place to be searched and
that it failed to charge one specific offense; and (4)
the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular
No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant
failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the
search warrant on a Saturday was urgent.
Thereafter, on 9 March 1988, respondent Judge
issued an order, denying the petitioner's motion and
supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in the
order dated 20 April 1988.
Hence, the present recourse, petitioner alleging that
respondent Judge has decided a question of
substance in a manner not in accord with law or
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, or that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
tantamount to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the
disputed orders.
Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
Held:
Granted.
For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be
probable cause, which is to be determined personally
by the judge, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. The probable cause must be in connection
with one specific offense and the judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and any witness he may
produce, on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together
with any affidavits submitted.
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has
been defined "as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet arid prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that
objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched." This probable
cause must be shown to be within the personal
knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he
may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin
Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed" that
Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and
possession" the firearms and explosives described
therein, and that he "has verified the report and found
it to be a fact." On the other hand, in his supporting
deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as
a result of their continuous surveillance for several
days, they "gathered informations from verified
sources" that the holders of the said fire arms and
explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other
words, the applicant and his witness had no personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances which
became the basis for issuing the questioned search
warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through
information from other sources or persons.
While it is true that in his application for search
warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated that he
verified the information he had earlier received that
petitioner had in his possession and custody the t
there is nothing in the record to show or indicate how
and when said applicant verified the earlier
information acquired by him as to justify his
conclusion that he found such information to be a fact.
He might have clarified this point if there had been
searching questions and answers, but there were
none. In fact, the records yield no questions and
answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said
applicant.
What the records show is the deposition of witness,
P/Lt. Angeles, as the only support to P/Major
Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is
based on hearsay. For, it avers that they (presumably,
the police authorities) had conducted continuous
surveillance for several days of the suspected
premises and, as a result thereof, they "gathered
information from verified sources" that the holders of
the subject firearms and explosives are not licensed
to possess them.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, this Court laid
the following test in determining whether the
allegations in an application for search warrant or in a
supporting deposition, are based on personal
knowledge or not—
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or
affidavit to warrant issuance of a search
warrant is whether it has been drawn in a
manner that perjury could be charged
thereon and the affiant be held liable for
damage caused. The oath required must
refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the applicant for
search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of
the facts merely reported by a person whom
one considers to be reliable.
Tested by the above standard, the allegations of the
witness, P/Lt. Angeles, in his deposition, do not come
up to the level of facts of his personal knowledge so
much so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for
such allegations in causing the issuance of the
questioned search warrant.
In the same Alvarez case, the applicant stated that
his purpose for applying for a search warrant was
that: "It had been reported to me by a person whom I
consider to be reliable that there are being kept in
said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits
and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as a money lender, challenging usurious
rate of interests, in violation of law." The Court held
that this was insufficient for the purpose of issuing a
search warrant.
In People vs. Sy Juco, where the affidavit contained
an allegation that there had been a report to the
affiant by a person whom lie considered reliable that
in said premises were "fraudulent books,
correspondence and records," this was likewise held
as not sufficient for the purpose of issuing a search
warrant. Evidently, the allegations contained in the
application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the
declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his
deposition were insufficient basis for the issuance of a
valid search warrant. As held in the Alvarez case:
The oath required must refer to the truth of
the facts within the personal knowledge of
the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause.
Besides, respondent Judge did not take the
deposition of the applicant as required by the Rules of
Court. As held in Roan v. Gonzales, "(m)ere affidavits
of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and attach them to the
record."
Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio
Angeles shows that it was too brief and short.
Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form
of searching questions and answers." On the
contrary, the questions asked were leading as they
called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in
Quintero vs. NBI," the questions propounded by
respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness
are not sufficiently searching to establish probable
cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in
an application for search warrant, and conducting of
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy
the requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant."
Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to
show the existence of probable cause to justify the
issuance of the search warrant. The Court also notes
post facto that the search in question yielded, no
armalites, handguns, pistols, assorted weapons or
ammunitions as stated in the application for search
warrant, the supporting deposition, and the search
warrant the supporting hand grenades were itself
Only three (3) live fragmentation found in the
searched premises of the PUP, according to the
affidavit of an alleged member of the searching party.
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict
requirements for determination of "probable cause" in
the valid issuance of a search warrant, as enunciated
in earlier cases. True, these requirements are
stringent but the purpose is to assure that the
constitutional right of the individual against
unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both
meaningful and effective.
24. ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE HERRERA, as Judge, City Court of
Manila, NBI Agent CELSO J. ZOLETA, JR. and
MANUEL CUARESMA, respondents.
Facts:
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera,
upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta,
Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel
Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection
with an undocketed criminal case for estafa,
falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against
the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines.
Petitioner assails the validity of the search warrant,
claiming that it was issued in contravention of the
explicit provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, particularly Section 1, of Art. III of the 1935
Constitution, now Section 3, of Art. IV of the new
Constitution, and Sections 3, 5, 8 and 10 of Rule 126
of the Rules of Court.
Issue: WON the Search warrant issued by the
respondent is invalid
Held:
Yes. No search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court). In
the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for
four separate and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2)
falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud,
in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3,
Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
25. People v. Estrada 
 has been committed and that the objects sought in
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ESTRELLA T.
ESTRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 83,
QUEZON CITY; and AIDEN LANUZA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 124461. September 25, 1998]
DOCTRINE:
To establish the existence of probable cause
sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant,
the applicant must show "facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched."
The facts and circumstances that would show
probable cause must be the best evidence that could
be obtained under the circumstances. The
introduction of such evidence is necessary especially
in cases where the issue is the existence or the
negative ingredient of the offense charged — for
instance, the absence of a license required by law, as
in the present case — and such evidence is within the
knowledge and control of the applicant who could
easily produce the same. But if the best evidence
could not be secured at the time of application, the
applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor
during the examination by the judge. The necessity of
requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a
search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to
the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his
home and personalties.
FACTS:
Atty. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and
Compliance Division (LICD) of BFAD filed an
application for the issuance of a search warrant
against Aiden Lanuza (private respondent) of San
Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City for
violation of Article 40(k) of RA 7934 (The Consumer
Act of the Philippines). However, the application
ended with a statement that the warrant is to search
the premises of another person at a different address
(Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay,
Cebu - who happened to be the subject on whom
another search was applied for by the same
applicant)
Respondent Judge issued search warrant on June 27,
1995 which was served the next day. The present
petition stated that, during the search, the team
discovered that said address was actually a 5,000-
meter compound containing at least 15 structures.
The policemen proceeded to search the residence of
private respondent Lanuza at Lot 41 of said address.
Failure to find any drug products prompted the
policemen to proceed to search a nearby warehouse
at Lot 38 which yielded 52 cartons of assorted drug
products.
On August 22, 1995, private respondent Lanuza filed
a motion to quash the search warrant on the ground
that the search warrant is illegal and null and void.
Respondent judge granted Lanyza’s motion to quash
the search warrant and denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting
Lanuza’s motion to quash Search Warrant.
HELD:
There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash
the search warrant.
Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for
nullifying the search warrant as she was not
convinced that there was probable cause for its
issuance due to the failure of the applicant to present
documentary proof indicating that private respondent
Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs.
We hold that to establish the existence of probable
cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search
warrant, the applicant must show "facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.
The facts and circumstances that would show
probable cause must be the best evidence that could
be obtained under the circumstances. The
introduction of such evidence is necessary especially
in cases where the issue is the existence or the
negative ingredient of the offense charged — for
instance, the absence of a license required by law, as
in the present case — and such evidence is within the
knowledge and control of the applicant who could
easily produce the same. But if the best evidence
could not be secured at the time of application, the
applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor
during the examination by the judge. The necessity of
requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a
search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to
the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his
home and personalities.
In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under
the circumstances to prove that private respondent
Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the
certification to that effect from the Department of
Health. SPO4 Manuel Cabiles could have easily
procured such certification when he went to the BFAD
to verify from the registry of licensed persons or
entity. No justifiable reason was introduced why such
certification could not be secured. Mere allegation as
to the non-existence of a license by private
respondent is not sufficient to establish probable
cause for a search warrant.
Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not
been described with sufficient particularity in the
questioned search warrant, considering that private
respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually
located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana
St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be
seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38
within the same compound. The said warehouse is
owned by a different person.
This Court has held that the applicant should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized, wherever and
whenever it is feasible. In the present case, it must be
noted that the application for search warrant was
accompanied by a sketch of the compound at 516
San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The
sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of
private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a
square. Within the same compound are residences of
other people, workshops, offices, factories and
warehouse. With this sketch as the guide, it could
have been very easy to describe the residential house
of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as
to segregate it from the other buildings or structures
inside the same compound. But the search warrant
merely indicated the address of the compound which
is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu
City. This description of the place to be searched is
too general and does not pinpoint the specific house
of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the
description of the residence of private respondent
sought to be searched has characterized the
questioned search warrant as a general warrant,
which is violative of the constitutional requirement.
26. People vs. Salanguit
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO
SALANGUIT y KO
[G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001]
SECOND DIVISION
Doctrine: The officer, if refused admittance to the
place of directed search after giving notice of his
purpose and authority, may break open any outer or
inner door or window of a house or any part of a
house or anything therein to execute the warrant or
liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him
when unlawfully detained therein.
Facts: On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar
applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, to search the
residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko
on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He
presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who
testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to
purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-
appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant’s
room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by
accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room.
The application was granted, and a search warrant
was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L.
Español.
Prosecution Version: At about 10:30 p.m. of
December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen,
along with one civilian informer, went to the residence
of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.
The police operatives knocked on accused-
appellant’s door, but nobody opened it. They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The
police operatives then forced the door open and
entered the house.
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of
the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching
the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline
substance, a paper clip box also containing a white
crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves
which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint
having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A
receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the
accused-appellant refused to sign it.
Version of Defense: On the night of December 26,
1995, as they were about to leave their house, they
heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their
house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian acre,
brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and
descended through an opening in the roof.
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a
search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was
waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled
for his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn
and he had no chance to read it.
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to
stay in one place of the house while the policemen
conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and
taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45
caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods.
Aftermath:
After the search, the accused together with the
confiscated contraband were taken to the police
station.
The RTC convicted the accused of viola[on
of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425 and to suffer the
penalty of indeterminate sentence with a minimum of
six (6) months of arresto mayor and a maximum of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional and in viola[on of Sec. 8 of the same law
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reculsion
perpetua and a fine of Php 700,000.00
Issue(s):
1.Whether or not the Search Warrant issued is valid.
2.Whether or not the marijuana seized falls under the
plain view doctrine.
3.Whether or not the force used in the raid was
necessary.
Held:
1.Accused assailed the validity of the warrant on three
grounds: (1) that there was no probable cause to
search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search
warrant was issued for more than one specific
offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not
described with sufficient particularity.
•On the first ground, it was testified by SPO1 Edmund
Badua, the intelligence officer who acted as a poseur-
buyer that when he went inside the house of the
accused, he saw the accused get the shabu in the
cabinet which is in the room of the accused. Hence,
there was probable cause as to the shabu but no
testimony was offered in regards to the drug
paraphernalia. This does not mean however that the
search warrant as a whole is void or invalid.
Accordingly, it was held that the first part of the
search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-
appellant’s house for an undetermined quantity of
shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with
respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
•On the second ground, the accused avers that one
warrant should be issued for shabu, one warrant
should be issued for marijuana and one warrant
should be for drug paraphernalia. The Court held that
one warrant would suffice since all acts were covered
under Republic Act No. 6425, a special law that deals
specifically with dangerous drugs which are
subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated” drugs and
defines and penalizes categories of offenses which
are closely related or which belong to the same class
or species.
•On the third ground, while the address stated in the
warrant is merely “Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon
City,” the trial court took note of the fact that the
records of Search Warrant contained several
documents which identified the premises to be
searched, to wit: 1) the application for search warrant
which stated that the premises to be searched was
located in between No. 7 and 11 at Binhagan Street,
San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness
which described the premises as “a house without a
number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon
City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the
premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers
who raided appellant’s house under the leadership of
Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not
have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in
the same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant
lives and in fact Aguilar’s place is at the end of
appellant’s place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house
raided by Aguilar’s team is undeniably the house of
the accused and it was really the accused who was
the target. The raiding team even first ascertained
through their informant that appellant was inside his
residence before they actually started their operation.
2. The marijuana found was covered with newspaper
and thus does not fall under the doctrine of plain view.
What was in plain view were the newspaper and not
the marijuana. Accordingly, the marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence but the confiscation is valid
and must be upheld.
3. The occupants of the house, especially accused-
appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact
that the searching party knocked on the door several
times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious
movements of the people inside the house. These
circumstances justified the searching party’s forcible
entry into the house, founded as it is on the
apprehension that the execution of their mission
would be frustrated unless they do so. Furthermore,
no testimonies from disinterested parties were offered
to corroborate the story of the accused that the police
used excessive force in enforcing the warrant.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96,
Quezon City, finding accused- appellant Roberto
Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs
under §16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing
him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of 11.14
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is
AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the
same court finding accused-appellant Roberto
Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited
drugs under §8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the
confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well
as the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the
trial court is AFFIRMED.
27. MACABATO:
WHO vs. Aquino
l-35131 November 29 1972
DOCTRINE:
Diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question
and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is
then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal
law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in
this case, or other officer acting under his direction.
FACTS:
Dr. Verstuyft, assigned by WHO to its regional office
in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health
Services, was suspected by the Constabulary
Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers of carrying
dutiable goods under the Customs and Tariff Code of
the Philippines. Respondent Judge then issued a
search warrant at the instance of the COSAC officers
for the search and seizure of the personal effects of
Dr. Verstuyft, notwithstanding his being entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement
executed between Philippine Government and WHO.
Such diplomatic immunity carries with it, among other
diplomatic privileges and immunities, personal
inviolability, inviolability of the official's properties,
exemption from local jurisdiction, and exemption from
taxation and customs duties.
Upon protest of WHO Regional Director Dr. Dy, DFA
Sec. Carlos Romulo personally wired Judge Aquino
that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search
in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to
members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host
Agreement and further requested for the suspension
of the search warrant. The Solicitor General
accordingly joined the petitioner for the quashal of the
search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless
summarily denied the quashal.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set
aside Judge Aquino’s refusal to quash
the search warrant. WHO joins Dr. Verstuyft in
asserting diplomatic immunity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not personal effects of Dr. Verstuyft can
be exempted from search and seizure under the
diplomatic immunity.
HELD:
Yes.
RATIO:
1. The executive branch of the Philippines has
expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the
Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised
respondent judge of the Phil. Gov’t's official position.
TheSolGen, as principal law officer of the
government, likewise expressly affirmed said
petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for
the quashal of the search warrant. It is a recognized
principle of international law and under our system of
separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is
essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of government, and where the plea
of diplomatic immunity is recognized by the executive
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is
then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal
law officer of the government, the SolGen in this case,
or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts
may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and
detention of property, as to embarrass the executive
arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.
2. Philippines is bound by the procedure laid down in
Article VII of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations
3. Article VII on abuse of privilege calls for
consultations between the Host State and the UN
agency concerned and in case no satisfactory result
is reached, for submission to the ICJ.
3. The seriousness of the matter is underscored when
the provisions of RA 75 enacted since October 21,
1946 to safeguard the jurisdictional immunity of
diplomatic officialsin the Philippines are taken into
account. Said Act declares as null and void writs or
processes sued out or prosecuted whereby inter alia
the person of an ambassador or public minister is
arrested or imprisoned or his goods or chattels are
seized or attached and makes it a penal offense for
"every person by whom the same is obtained or
prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and
every officer concerned in executing it" to obtain or
enforce such writ or process.
4. The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge
acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search
warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic
immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.
28. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HUANG
ZHEN HUA
G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004
Doctrine:
The plain view doctrine has been applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object. Where the initial intrusion that
brings the police within plain view of such an article is
supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the
seizure is also legitimate. Thus, the police may
inadvertently come across evidence while in hot
pursuit of a fleeing suspect. And an object that comes
into view during a search incident to arrest that is
appropriately limited in scope under existing law may
be seized without a warrant.
Facts:
Police operatives received word from their confidential
informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao, and
appellants Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua were
engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The policemen also
learned that Lee was handling the payments and
accounting of the proceeds of the illegal drug
trafficking activities of Lao and Chan. Officer Anciro,
Jr. and other police operatives conducted surveillance
operations and were able to verify that Lao and
appellant Lee were living together as husband and
wife. They were able to secure search warrants, one
for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866
(illegal possession of firearms and explosives) and
two for violation of R.A No. 6425, as amended
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drug Act. The
implementation of the first Search Warrant, no
persons were found inside, however the policemen
found two kilos shabu, paraphernalia for its
production, and machines and tools apparently used
for the production of fake credit cards. Thereafter, the
police operatives received information that Lao and
Chan would be delivering shabu. The policemen
rushed to the area and saw Chan and Lao on board
the latters car. Thereafter, the shoot-out resulted to
death of the two suspect during the encounter. The
policemen found two plastic bags, each containing
one kilo of shabu, in Lao’s car. The policemen then
proceeded to the area where to enforce the other
search warrant. The policemen coordinated with
Antonio Pangan, the officer in charge of security in
the building. The policemen, Pangan and two security
guards proceeded to the condominium unit. Anciro,
Jr. knocked repeatedly on the front door, but no one
responded. Pangan, likewise, knocked on the door
until Lee peeped through the window beside the front
door. The policemen allowed Pangan to communicate
with appellant Lee by sign language and pointed their
uniforms to her to show that they were policemen.
The Lee then opened the door and allowed the team
into the condominium unit. The policemen conducted
the search in all the rooms within the unit. The team
proceeded with the search and found other articles
not described on the the search warrant. Huang Zhen
Hua was found sleeping in one of the rooms during
the search and was surprised to see police officers.
Anciro, Jr. found two transparent plastic bags each
containing one kilo of shabu, a feeding bottle, a
plastic canister and assorted paraphernalia. Anciro,
Jr. also found assorted documents, pictures, bank
passbooks issued by the Allied Banking Corporation,
credit cards, passports and identification cards of Lao
and Lee. Anciro, Jr. told Lee to bring some of her
clothes because they were bringing her to the PARAC
headquarters. Lee did as she was told and took some
clothes from the cabinet in the master’s bedroom
where Anciro, Jr. had earlier found the shabu.
Issue: Whether or not the articles not specified in the
search warrant, are inadmissible evidence.
Held:
No, Admittedly, Anciro, Jr. seized and took custody of
certain articles belonging to the appellant and Lao
which were not described in the search warrants.
However, the seizure of articles not listed in a search
warrant does not render the seizure of the articles
described and listed therein illegal; nor does it render
inadmissible in evidence. Such articles were in plain
view of Anciro, Jr. as he implemented the search
warrants and was authorized to seize the said articles
because of their close connection to the crime
charged. An example of the applicability of the plain
view doctrine is the situation in which the police have
a warrant to search a given area for specified objects,
and in the course of the search come across some
other article of incriminating character. An object that
comes into view during a search incident to arrest that
is appropriately limited in scope under existing law
may be seized without a warrant. Finally, the plain
view doctrine has been applied where a police officer
is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. It cannot be denied that the
cards, passbook, passport and other documents and
papers seen by the policemen have an intimate
connection with the crime charged. The passport of
the appellant would show when and how often she
had been in and out of the country. Her credit cards
and bank book would indicate how much money she
had amassed while in the country and how she
acquired or earned the same. The pictures and those
of the other persons shown therein are relevant to
show her relationship to Lao and Chan. The Supreme
Court ruled that Huang Zhen Hua should be acquitted
on the ground of reasonable doubt, but that the
conviction of Lee should be affirmed.
29. LACADIN VS. MANGINO
Doctrine:
As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake
of a judge in the performance of his official duties
make him liable therefor. In the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
official capacity does not always amount to
misconduct although such acts may be erroneous.
Facts:
Respondent MTC Judge Mangino issued two
search warrants, on February 16, 1999 for the search
and seizure of firearms and shabu in the house of
Antonio Lim. On February 26, 1999, or ten days after,
respondent Judge granted a motion to extend the
validity of the search warrant to 15 days from
February 26, 1999. The search warrant was used on
March 2, 1999 and evidence were collected. Antonio
Lim moved for the quashal of information for Illegal
possession of firearms against him and it was granted
by RTC Judge Adriano.
P/Supt. Rudy Lacadin filed an complaint
against Judge Mangino for gross ignorance of the
law. In his comment, Judge Mangino said that he
granted the motion to extend on grounds that the
witness Romeo Collado could not be presented in
order to issue a new search warrant upon expiration
of the original search warrant.
The Office of the Court Administrator found
that respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of law
when it granted the extension.
Issue:
W.O.N respondent Judge Mangino commit grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper
administration of justice in granting an extension of
the period of validity of the search warrants issued by
him
Ruling:
No. Under Section 9, Rule 126, 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 9. Validity of search warrant. --- A search
warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from its date.
Thereafter it shall be void.
There is grave misconduct when an order issued by a
judge is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence
and the order is imposed with ignominy and ill will.
The acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial
functions are not subject to disciplinary power unless
they are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption
or bad faith.
In Atty. Relova vs Judge Rosales: As a matter of
public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in
the performance of his official duties make him liable
therefor. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity
does not always amount to misconduct although such
acts may be erroneous. A judge may not be
disciplined for error of judgment unless there is proof
that the error was made with a conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice.
In this case, there is no evidence that the
issuance of the herein assailed order was made by
respondent with ignominy and ill will.
30 Caballes v. CA
Doctrine: PLEASE READ THE RULING, MASYADO
MAHABA PAG NI COPY KO PA J
Facts:
· In an Information3 dated October 16, 1989,
petitioner was charged with the crime of theft. “"[At]
about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Noceja and
Pat. de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay
Sampalucan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep
unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. With
appellant's consent, the police officers checked the
cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively
owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). The
conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,
244.45. Noceja asked appellant where the wires
came from and appellant answered that they came
from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away
from Sampalucan. Thereafter, appellant and the
vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to
the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took
pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with the
wires which were turned over to the Police Station
Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was
incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
· Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with
smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down
the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant.
· During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not
guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.
· On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered
judgment finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft.
· On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of conviction but deleted the award for
damages on the ground that the stolen materials were
recovered and modified the penalty imposed.
Issue: whether the evidence taken from the
warrantless search is admissible against the
appellant.
Ruling: Accused Rudy Caballes is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
1) Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of
an individual's right against unreasonable search. The
search which is normally permissible in this instance
is limited to the following instances: (1) where the
officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2)
simply looks into a vehicle; flashes a light therein
without opening the car's doors; (4) where the
occupants are not subjected to a physical or body
search (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is
limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (6)
where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in
the case at bar. The police officers did not merely
conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein
petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach inside the
vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the
sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It
cannot be considered a simple routine check.
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search would be constitutionally permissible only if
the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe, before the search, that
either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in
the vehicle to be searched.
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was
flagged down because the police officers who were
on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw
that the back of the vehicle was covered with
kakawati leaves which, according to them, was
unusual and uncommon. We hold that the fact that
the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not
common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves
does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify
the conduct of a search without a warrant.
2) It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found
in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view, making its
warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain
view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight.
Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and
therefore cannot be seized without a warrant.
However, if the package proclaims its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an
observer, then the contents are in plain view and may
be seized. In other words, if the package is such that
an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then
the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure.38
It is clear from the records of this case that the cable
wires were not exposed to sight because they were
placed in sacks39 and covered with leaves. The
articles were neither transparent nor immediately
apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue
as to what was hidden underneath the leaves and
branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask
petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In such a
case, it has been held that the object is not in plain
view which could have justified mere seizure of the
articles without further search.
3) In case of consented searches or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it
is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first
appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the
petitioner intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. The manner by which the
two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of
petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much
to be desired. When petitioner's vehicle was flagged
down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told
him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he
answered in the positive." We are hard put to believe
that by uttering those words, the police officers were
asking or requesting for permission that they be
allowed to search the vehicle of petitioner. For all
intents and purposes, they were informing, nay,
imposing upon herein petitioner that they will search
his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances is no consent within the
purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in
cases where this Court upheld the validity of
consented search, it will be noted that the police
authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for
the consent of the accused to be searched. And the
consent of the accused was established by clear and
positive proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the
statements of the police officers were not asking for
his consent; they were declaring to him that they will
look inside his vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful whether
permission was actually requested and granted
because when Sgt. Noceja was asked during his
direct examination what he did when the vehicle of
petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the
cover of the vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It
was only after he was asked a clarificatory question
that he added that he told petitioner he will inspect the
vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an
afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was
asked twice in his direct examination what they did
when they stopped the jeepney, his consistent answer
was that they searched the vehicle. He never testified
that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the
search.
32. PEOPLE V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 126379, JUNE 26, 1998
DOCTRINE:
What is material in determining the validity of a search
is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the
applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in
the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the
warrant.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution, providing that:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the things to be seized.
it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed
valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally
determined by the judge after examination under
oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it
particularly describe the place to be searched, the
manifest intention being that the search be confined
strictly to the place so described.
FACTS:
On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes
applied for search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of
QC against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in
his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail
Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Ave.
Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte Bulacan.
The following day, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95)
against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety
Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to
Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4)
Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal
belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist
watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts,
sunglasses and travelling bags including cash
amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US
$5,175.00 (receipted) which were never mentioned in
the warrant. The sum of $5,175.00 was however
returned to the respondents upon order of the court
on respondents motion or request. Included allegedly
are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic
explosives C-4 type and one (1) fragmentation
grenade. But without the items described in the
search warrant are: (a) three (3) Ingram machine
pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d)
fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives;
and (f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions.
Three days after the warrant was served, a return was
made without mentioning the personal belongings,
papers and effects including cash belonging to the
private respondents. There was no showing that
lawful occupants were made to witness the search.
On January 22, 1996, private respondents upon
arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged; and on the same date, submitted their
Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant
and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible),
dated January 15, 1996.
On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge issued its
order duly granting the motion to quash search
warrant. On February 12, 1996, private respondents
filed the concomitant motion to dismiss. On February
19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan
filed a motion for reconsideration and supplemental
motion on the order quashing the search warrant. On
February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private
respondent filed opposition/comment and
supplemental opposition/comment on the motion for
reconsideration. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge
issued its order denying the motion for
reconsideration and on June 11, 1996, private
respondents filed extremely urgent reiterated motion
to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not that particular apartment had
been specifically described in the warrant
RULING:
Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP is
inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search
warrants which, upon perusal, immediately disclosed
an obvious typographical error. The case at bar,
however, does not deal with the correction of an
obvious typographical error involving ambiguous
descriptions of the place to be searched, as in
Burgos, but the search of a place different from that
clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search
warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for
clarification was immediately perceptible on the face
of the warrants in question. In the instant case, there
is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity
lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence
of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched
between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge
issuing the same; and what was done was to
substitute for the place that the judge had written
down in the warrant, the premises that the executing
officers had in their mind. This should not have been
done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to
search a place different from that stated in the warrant
on the claim that the place actually searched --
although not that specified in the warrant -- is exactly
what they had in view when they applied for the
warrant and had demarcated in their supporting
evidence. What is material in determining the validity
of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not
what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court
issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers
theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four
(4) apartment units at the rear of Abigails Variety
Store would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the
warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the
officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or
the evidence they adduced in support of their
application for the warrant. Such a change is
proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter
alia the search warrant to particularly describe the
place to be searched as well as the persons or things
to be seized. It would concede to police officers the
power of choosing the place to be searched, even if
not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open
wide the door to abuse of search process, and grant
to officers executing a search warrant that discretion
which the Constitution has precisely removed from
them. The particularization of the description of the
place to be searched may properly be done only by
the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be
left to the discretion of the police officers conducting
the search.
There was therefore in this case an
infringement of the constitutional requirement that a
search warrant particularly describe the place to be
searched; and that infringement necessarily brought
into operation the concomitant provision that any
evidence obtained in violation (inter alia of the search-
and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Where a search warrant is issued by one
court and the criminal action based on the results of
the search is afterwards commenced in another court,
it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or
to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only
with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for
the first time in either the issuing Court or that in
which the criminal action is pending. However, the
remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court first
taking cognizance of the motion does so to the
exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon
are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule
against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the
third policy guidelines which indeed is what properly
applies to the case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant
was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the
interested party may move in the court where
the criminal case is pending for the suppression
as evidence of the personal property seized
under the warrant if the same is offered therein
for said purpose. Since two separate courts with
different participations are involved in this
situation, a motion to quash a search warrant
and a motion to suppress evidence are
alternative and not cumulative remedies. In
order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to
quash shall consequently be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided however, that
objections not available, existent or known
during the proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant may be raised in the hearing of the
motion to suppress. The resolution of the court
on the motion to suppress shall likewise be
subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate
higher court.
In this case, the search warrant was applied
for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the RTC-QC, and
the return was made to said court. On the other hand,
the criminal action in connection with the explosives
subject of the warrant was filed in Branch 80 of the
RTC-Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash the
search warrant, or for the return of the personal
property seized (not otherwise contraband) could
have properly been presented in the RTC-QC. No
such motion was ever filed. It was only after the
criminal action had been commenced in the Bulacan
RTC that the motion to quash and to suppress
evidence was submitted to the latter. The case thus
falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in
accordance with which the latter court must be
deemed to have acted within its competence.
BALAYON, JR. vs. DINOPOL
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1969; June 15, 2006
DOCTRINE: The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce and take their testimonies in writing, and
attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant
and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to make searching questions
and elicit answers of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce in writing and to attach
them to the record.
FACTS: This is an administrative complaint against
Judge Oscar E. Dinopol of the RTC of Koronadal City
for Gross Ignorance of the Law, relative to his
issuance of Search Warrant No. 01-03. The
complainant is Atty. Hugolino V. Balayon, Jr., a
private practicing lawyer. Complainant alleged that on
6 January 2003, Filoteo B. Arcallo, a public school
teacher, submitted his sworn statement before SPO2
Carlito Lising accusing Tito Cantor of Illegal
Possession of Firearms. Based on the said sworn
statement, P/S Insp. Virgilio Carreon, Intelligence and
Investigation Officer of the South Cotabato Police
Provincial Office, filed an application for search
warrant against Tito Cantor. On 13 January 2003,
respondent Judge issued the search warrant. In the
evening of the same day, a team of policemen
headed by P/Supt. Fred Juan Bartolome implemented
the search warrant. After the search conducted by the
raiding team, a written report/information was
submitted by P/S Insp. Virgilio Carreon, where it was
stated therein that the search was negative, meaning
not a single firearm was found inside the house of Tito
Cantor. Claiming that the search warrant was issued
in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC, the instant
complaint was filed.
Respondent Judge denied the charge, he alleged that
complainant is not the proper party to file the instant
complaint as the aggrieved party in said case should
have been Tito Cantor, and not the complainant, who
was not authorized by the former to file the complaint
in his behalf. Respondent Judge likewise negated the
fact that he issued the search warrant based alone on
the sworn statement of complainant and the
application of P/S Insp. Carreon for the issuance
thereof. He maintained that it was only after he made
exhaustive clarificatory interviews of Filoteo B. Arcallo
in his chambers that the subject search warrant was
issued on 13 January 2003. He alleged further that
complainant is not privy nor does he have actual
knowledge of the implementation of the search
warrant in question.
Respondent Judge surmised that the instant
complaint was the result of the ill-will and hatred the
complainant had against him due to his dismissal,
without prejudice, for nonpayment of docket fees, of
the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession filed by
the same complainant, in behalf of Sta. Teresita Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, in another unrelated case.
As to respondent Judge’s allegation that complainant
had no legal personality to file the instant complaint
against him as the complainant is neither the
aggrieved party nor a relative of Tito Cantor,
complainant counters that whether or not he is a
relative of Tito Cantor, he can file this administrative
complaint against the respondent Judge. Allegedly,
Tito Cantor already filed a criminal complaint against
Filoteo Arcallo and P/S Insp. Virgilio Carreon for
perjury before the City Court of Koronadal City, on the
basis of malicious lies they made in their sworn
statements involving the issuance of the search
warrant by the respondent Judge. Additionally,
complainant reiterated in his reply respondent Judge’s
noncompliance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court by not conducting and attaching
the written searching questions and answers he made
before issuing the search warrant.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
submitted its recommendation, finding Judge Dinopol
guilty of gross ignorance of the rules.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the respondent Judge in issuing the
search warrant failed to comply with the requirements
of the law
2)Whether complainant Balayon, Jr. is not the proper
party to file the administrative complaint, as he was
not the person aggrieved by the issuance of the
search warrant nor a relative thereof
RULING:
1) Yes. The Court upheld the OCA’s findings that
respondent Judge professed gross ignorance of the
law for his failure to reduce the examination in writing.
Specifically, respondent Judge failed to conform to
the high standards of competence required of judges
under the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates
that:
Rule 1.01. - A judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence.
Rule 3.01- A judge shall x x x maintain professional
competence.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge
displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he
erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of
our courts.
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. –
A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and
the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)
Corollarily, Section 5 of the same rule further states
that:
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. –
The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on
facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted. (Underscoring supplied)
The foregoing provisions provides that the judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine,
under oath or affirmation, the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their testimonies
in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to
any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses
are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
make searching questions and elicit answers of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce in
writing and to attach them to the record. The
searching questions propounded to the applicant of
the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to
a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as
long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to
believe the commission of a specific offense, and that
the applicant is one authorized by law, and that said
answers particularly described with certainty the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. The examination or investigation which must
be under oath may not be in public. It may even be
held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more
important is that the examination is not merely
routinary but one that is thorough and elicits the
required information. To repeat, it must be under oath
and must be in writing. Such searching questions and
answers are necessary in order that the judge may be
able to properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold for perjury
the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false.
In the case at bar, respondent Judge failed to observe
his mandate as required by the rules. There was no
record of searching questions and answers attached
to the records of the case in palpable disregard of the
statutory requirement previously quoted. This was
admitted by respondent Judge in his comment to the
effect that there were no written searching questions
and answers to support the issuance of the search
warrant because the peace officer who accompanied
the complainant requested not to take down the
exhaustive searching inquiry of Filoteo Arcallo
2) The court ruled in the negative. Section 1, Rule 140
of the Rules of Court (as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-
10-SC, which took effect on 1 October 2001) provides
that:
Section 1. How instituted. – Proceedings for the
discipline of Judges of regular and special courts and
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the
Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint,
supported by affidavits of persons who have personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by
documents which may substantiate said allegations,
or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by
public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint
shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely
the acts and omissions constituting violations of
standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law,
the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
(Underscoring supplied)
A careful perusal of the above-cited provision shows
that the complainant need not be the person allegedly
aggrieved by the actuations of a court officer or
employee or someone related thereto. The rule does
not mention that the complainant must be the
aggrieved party or his relative so as to initiate the
prosecution of an administrative case. As correctly
observed by the OCA, the above-quoted rule allows
the filing by even an anonymous complainant as the
rule merely requires that it should be supported by
public records of indubitable integrity.
36) Cybercrime Law insofar as Section 4(a)(1) as
discussed in Disini v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 203335: February 11, 2014
DOCTRINES:
- Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in
our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by law and in
accordance with customary legal process.
- Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of
privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable
searchesand seizures, which is the basis of the right
to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of
communication and correspondence.I
FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of several
provision of the Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the
cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.
The government of course asserts that the law merely
seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace
activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful
attacks on the system.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal
Access is valid and constitutional
HELD: Section 4(a)(1) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(a)(1) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts
constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under
this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of computer data and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any
part of a computer system without right.
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet
the strict scrutiny standard required of laws that
interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and
should thus be struck down.
The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls
for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since
no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in
punishing what is essentially a condemnable act
accessing the computer system of another without
right. It is a universally condemned conduct.
Besides, a client’s engagement of an ethical hacker
requires an agreement between them as to the extent
of the search, the methods to be used, and the
systems to be tested. Since the ethical hacker does
his job with prior permission from the client, such
permission would insulate him from the coverage of
Section 4(a)(1).
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our
laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by law and in
accordance with customary legal process. The
meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises
not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is
a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by
civilized men," but also from our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the
right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks." In the Matter of the Petition
for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v.
Senator Gordon, 535 Phil. 687, 714-715 (2006).
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of
privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable
searchesand seizures, which is the basis of the right
to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of
communication and correspondence.
In assessing the challenge that the State has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a
court must determine whether a person has exhibited
a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so,
whether that expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion. Petitioners
simply fail to show how government effort to curb
computer-related identity theft violates the right to
privacy and correspondence as well as the right to
due process of law.
34. Yao Sr. vs. People
G.R. No. 168306; June 19, 2007
DOCTRINE: RE: PROPOSED RULE ON SEARCH
AND SEIZURE IN CVIL ACTIONS FOR
INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS. Section 1. Coverage. - This Rule shall
govern the provisional seizure and impounding of
documents and articles in pending and intended civil
actions for the purpose of preventing infringement and
preserving relevant evidence in regard to [the] alleged
infringement under Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise
known as the Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines, Article 50 of the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
otherwise known as TRIPS and other related laws
and international conventions
FACTS: NBI Agent Ritche Oblanca applied for 2
search warrants with RTC Cavite against petitioners
along with other occupants of MASAGANA compound
for allegedly violating the Intellectual Property rights of
Petron and Pilipinas Shell with attached affidavits
stating the following:
1) NBI received a letter-complaint from Atty.
Bienvenido Somera Jr. in behalf of Petron and Shell
requesting assistance in the investigation and if
warranted, prosecution of the persons/establishment
in violation of their Intellectual Property rights.
2) Based on the letter-complaint, Oblanca and Agent
Angelo Zarzoso were assigned on the case. 3) Prior
to conducting investigations, Oblanca reviewed the
trademark registrations issued to Petron and Shell as
well as other documents and evidence obtained when
Petron and company employed an investigative
agency by Mr. Bernabe Alajar.
4) MASAGANA Gas Corporation is not authorized to
refill and sell and distribute Gasul and Shellane
products. Petitioners are the directors and
stockholders of said corporation.
5) Oblanca and Alajar conducted test-buys on 2
occasions, Feb. 13, 2003 and Feb. 27, 2003. After
stating their intent to do business, were allowed inside
the MASAGANA refilling plant, receipts were issued
and were assisted in choosing empty Gasul cylinders.
In their presence, the empty cylinders were refilled
where Oblanca noticed that there was no valve seal
placed on the cylinders.
Oblanca furnished copies of photographs of the
delivery trucks in his application for the search
warrant. RTC issued 2 search warrants for the search
and seizure of transaction records, the trucks used in
the delivery of illegally refilled cylinders, machinery
and equipment being used or intended to be used in
illegally refilling the cylinders bearing the trademarks
of Gasul and Shellane, and Gasul and Shellane
cylinders and any other items bearing their trademark.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds
that there is no probable cause, that Oblanca and
Alajar do not have the authority to apply for search
warrant, allegedly committing perjury when they
submitted their sworn statements that they conducted
test-buys, that the area was not specified as the place
to be searched must be indicated with particularity
and that the search warrant was general in nature as
the items seized were being used in the conduct of
lawful business. Petitioners also filed for a Motion for
the Return of the Motor Compressor and the LPG
Refilling Machine as said items were being used in
the conduct of lawful business as third-party
claimants.
RTC denied both motions holding that the search
warrant issued was based on probable cause
considering the testimonies of Oblanca and Alajar, the
documentary evidence presented that MASAGANA
was in violation of Petron and Shell’s intellectual
property rights. It was also ruled that Oblanca and
Alajar had personal knowledge since they were the
ones who conducted the search warrant, the search
warrant was not general in nature since the are
described was solely being used by MASAGANA and
the items to be seized were sufficiently described with
particularity as the same was limited to cylinders
bearing the trademarks of Gasul and Shellane.
Denying the motion of MASAGANA for the Return of
the equipment as third party complainant cannot be
considered since evidence show that the petitioners
are the stockholders of MASAGANA, conducting their
business through the same judicial entity. RTC added
that the ownership of another person or entity of the
seized items is not a ground to order its return, in
seizures pursuant to a warrant what is important is
that the seized items were being used or intended to
be used as means of committing the offense
complained of that by its very nature, the properties
sought to be returned in the instant case appear to be
related to and intended for the illegal activity for which
the search warrants were applied for; and that the
items seized are instruments of an offense.
Petitioners claim that MASAGANA has the right to
intervene and to move for the return of the seized
items; that the items seized by the raiding team were
being used in the legitimate business of MASAGANA;
that the raiding team had no right to seize them under
the guise that the same were being used in refilling
GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and that
there being no action for infringement filed against
them and/or MASAGANA from the seizure of the
items up to the present, it is only fair that the seized
articles be returned to the lawful owner in accordance
with Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC.
ISSUE/S: 1) W/N there was probable cause.
2) W/N A.M. No 02-1-06-SC is applicable in this case
3) W/N the complaint was against MASAGANA [to not
consider it as third party claimant whose rights were
violated as a result of the seizure].
HELD: 1. As provided for by Art. III, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution and Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure regarding requisites of issuing
search warrants. According to these provisions, a
search warrant can only be issued upon a finding of
probable cause. The facts and circumstances referred
to pertain to facts and information personally known to
the applicant and the witness he may present. As
provided by Sec. 155 of RA 8293, mere unauthorized
use of a container bearing a registered trademark in
connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of
goods or services which is likely to cause confusion,
mistake or deception among the buyers/consumers
can be considered as trademark infringement.
Oblanca in his sworn affidavits stated that in
reviewing the trademark registrations issued by
Philippine Intellectual Property Office to Petron and
Pilipinas Shell, he confirmed that MASAGANA is not
authorized to sell, use, refill or distribute Gasul and
Shellane LPG cylinders. Aside from the documentary
evidence Oblanca submitted, both him and Alajar had
personal knowledge, stating in their affidavits that
they used different names during the test-buys to
avoid suspicion and personally witnessed the refilling,
of cylinders bearing the marks Gasul and Shellane
inside the plant and the deliveries of these refilled
containers to some outlets using mini-trucks.
Such facts and circumstances establish a sufficient
probable cause. As the term implies, probable cause
is concerned with probability, not absolute or even
moral certainty. The standards of judgment are those
of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting
calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial. Using
different names do not negate the personal
knowledge that Oblanca and Alajar have since it is
the common practice of officers of the law such as
NBI agents during covert investigations to use
another name to conceal their true identities.
Oblanca having reviewed the trademark registrations
issued to Petron ans Shell and Alajar, a private
investigator employed by both [Petron and Shell] to
verify the reports that MASAGANA is involved in the
illegal refilling, selling and distribution of cylinders
bearing their trade marks cannot be said incompetent
to testify on the trademarks infringed by the
petitioners. As provided by Section 5 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the searching questions
propounded to the applicant and the witnesses
depend largely on the discretion of the judge.
Reviewing the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the
preliminary examination, it was found that the
questions of Judge Sadang to be sufficiently probing,
not at all superficial and perfunctory. The reviewing
court can overturn such findings only upon proof that
the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored
the clear dictates of reason.
2. Petitioners' reliance on Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-
1-06-SC, is not tenable. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, A.M. 02-1-06-SC is not applicable in
the present case because it governs only searches
and seizures in civil actions for infringement of
intellectual property rights. The offense complained of
herein is for criminal violation of Section 155 in
relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293.
3. It is an elementary and fundamental principle of
corporation law that a corporation is an entity
separate and distinct from its stockholders, directors
or officers. However, when the notion of legal entity is
used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons, or in the
case of two corporations merge them into one. In
other words, the law will not recognize the separate
corporate existence if the corporation is being used
pursuant to the foregoing unlawful objectives. This
non-recognition is sometimes referred to as the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity or
disregarding the fiction of corporate entity. Where the
separate corporate entity is disregarded, the
corporation will be treated merely as an association of
persons and the stockholders or members will be
considered as the corporation, that is, liability will
attach personally or directly to the officers and
stockholders.
As we now find, the petitioners, as directors/officers of
MASAGANA, are utilizing the latter in violating the
intellectual property rights of Petron and Pilipinas
Shell. Thus, petitioners collectively and MASAGANA
should be considered as one and the same person for
liability purposes. Consequently, MASAGANA's third
party claim serves no refuge for petitioners.
Even if we were to sustain the separate personality of
MASAGANA from that of the petitioners, the effect will
be the same. The law does not require that the
property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrants is directed.
Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is
sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is
directed has control or possession of the property
sought to be seized. Hence, even if, as petitioners
claimed, the properties seized belong to MASAGANA
as a separate entity, their seizure pursuant to the
search warrants is still valid.
Further, it is apparent that the motor compressor,
LPG refilling machine and the GASUL and SHELL
LPG cylinders seized were the corpus delicti, the
body or substance of the crime, or the evidence of the
commission of trademark infringement. These were
the very instruments used or intended to be used by
the petitioners in trademark infringement. It is possible
that, if returned to MASAGANA, these items will be
used again in violating the intellectual property rights
of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. Thus, the RTC was
justified in denying the petitioners' motion for their
return so as to prevent the petitioners and/or
MASAGANA from using them again in trademark
infringement.