SEGUNDO AMANTE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, Branch No. I, and VIGAAN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

Pedro N. Belmi for petitioner.

Eriberto J. Fante for respondents.

ANTONIO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

This case raises in issue the validity of the Order dated February 14, 1975 of respondent Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch I, setting aside its Order of December 6, 1974, granting
petitioner an extension of fifteen (15) days from December 9, 1974 within which to file his answer to the
complaint in Civil Case No. 7799 (Vigaan Agricultural Development Corporation vs. Segundo Amante) and
declaring the petitioner in default, notwithstanding the fact that said party had already filed his answer.
It appears that the petitioner, on December 2, 1974, filed a written motion with the trial court requesting
for an extension of fifteen (15) days from December 9, 1974, within which to file his answer. Although it
is not disputed that a copy of said motion was furnished the counsel for the plaintiff, the said pleading
appears to have been addressed only to the Clerk of Court, with the request that said official submit the
motion to the Court for its consideration and resolution immediately upon receipt thereof.
On December 6, 1974, the trial court granted, the motion. Petitioner, however, on December 10, 1974,
filed a "Motion for Bill of Particulars". Copy of this motion was appropriately addressed to the counsel of
plaintiff, informing him that petitioner will submit the said motion to the, court for its consideration and
resolution at 8:30 a.m. on December 23, 1974.
In the meantime, on December 11, 1974, private respondent corporation, as plaintiff in said case, filed a
motion to set aside the trial court's Order of December 6, 1974, alleging that the notice in petitioner's
motion of December 2, 1974 was defective for non-compliance with Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised
Rules of Court, and praying that the defendant be declared in default.
The aforecited motions of the petitioner and of the corporation were set for hearing on February 7, 1975.
On said date, after the respondent corporation showed to the petitioner its Articles of Incorporation, the
latter agreed to withdraw his Motion for Bill of Particulars, leaving the private respondent's motion for
resolution by the Court.
On the same date (February 7, 1975.), petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim to the complaint. The
court a quo, however, on February, 14, 1975, on the basis of its opinion that the notice in the motion of
petitioner for the extension of the period within which to file an answer was defective because of its
alleged failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, set
aside its Order of December 6, 1974, declared petitioner in default and authorized the Clerk of Court to
receive the evidence of the plaintiff.
In view of the legal issue involved, this Court considered the Comment of respondent corporation as its
Answer. As the matter was already amply discussed in the pleadings, this case was deemed submitted for
decision.
We grant certiorari and set aside the trial court's Order of February 14, 1975.
1. The motion for extension of time within which a party may plead is not a litigated motion where
notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application,1 but
an ex parte motion "made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the
absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties."2 As "a general rule, notice of
motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of
natural justice demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard..."3
It has been said that "ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in
situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is
sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objection of the motion."4
Section 1 of Rule 11 of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the trial court to permit the submission of
an answer even after the time fixed in the rules for its presentation. The granting of extension to plead is
a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court.5 In some cases the court allowed the defendant
to file his answer "even after the time fixed for their presentation."6
Thus We have set aside orders of default where defendant's failure to answer on time was excusable.7
In the case at bar, respondent private corporation was not deprived of any substantial right by reason of
the alleged defect of notice in petitioner's motion praying for an extension of the time to plead. There are
motions that may be heard and granted ex parte, and a motion for extension of time to file an answer
belongs to such class.8 It was, therefore, error for the court a quo to set aside its Order granting extension
to petitioner within which to file his pleading.
2. Moreover, petitioner had filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars on December 10, 1974, and under
the Rules "after service of the bill of particulars ... or after denial of his motion, the moving party shall
have the same time to serve his responsive pleading, if any is permitted by these rules, as that to which
he was entitled at the time of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days in any event." (Section 1
[b], Rule 12, Revised Rules of Court.) The pendency of the motion for a bill of particulars, therefore,
interrupts the period within which to file a responsive pleading, and movant should have, after notice of
the denial of his motion, the same time to serve his answer "as that to which he was entitled at the time
of serving his motion." 9
It is true that petitioner, on February 7, 1975, withdrew his Motion for a Bill of Particulars, but on the
same date he also filed his answer.
In the attendant circumstances, We cannot perceive how the interests of justice was served and promoted
by the precipitate action of the trial court. A default judgment does not pretend to be based on the merits
of the controversy. Its existence is justified by expediency. It may, however, amount to a positive and
considerable injustice to the defendant. The possibility of such serious consequences necessarily requires
a careful examination of the circumstances under which a default order was issued. And when no real
injury would result to the interests of the plaintiff by the reopening of the case, the only objection to such
action would, therefore, be solely on a technicality. On such an infirm foundation, it would be a grievous
error to sacrifice the substantial rights of a litigant. For the rules should be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective in assisting the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of their cases.
WHEREFORE, the default order of February 14, 1975, as well as the Order of March 14, 1975, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, is hereby set aside, and this case is ordered remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings. Costs against private respondent.

FAUSTINO GOJO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
SEGUNDO GOYALA and ANTONINA ALMOGUERA, respondents-appellees.
Fernando P. Gerona, Sr. for petitioner-appellant.
Agustin Frivaldo for respondents-appellees.
BARREDO, J.:.
Appeal from the favorable decision of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon on the counterclaim of
respondents (herein appellees) in its Civil Case No. 1657-84 — the complaint (petition) of therein
petitioner (herein appellant) having beet previously dismissed, without prejudice, for his failure to submit
an amended complaint as required of him in the court a quo's earlier order.
The record shows that on 26 May 1951, appellee Segundo, Goyala together with his now deceased wife
Antonina Almoguera, who was also named respondent or defendant in the complaint or petition in the
court below, sold to appellant by a "Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale" a certain parcel of agricultural land
having an area of approximately two and one-half hectares for P750.00, the repurchase to be made,
according to the deed, within one year. It also appears from said deed that on July 4, 1951, the vendee
paid another P100.00 as addition to the purchase price. About ten (10) years after the execution of the
said document, or on April 12, 1961, to be precise, the vendee filed with the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon the present case against the vendors by way of a petition for consolidation of ownership of the
land described and involved in the "Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale." In his petition, the vendee, herein
appellant, alleged, inter alia, that the date for repurchase, May 26, 1952, having expired and the vendors
not having been able to repurchase the same under the terms and conditions of the agreement, the
ownership over the land involved had become consolidated in him; and that for the purpose of recording
in the Registry of Property the said consolidation of ownership, it was necessary that a judicial order be
issued to that effect and accordingly prayed for such an order.

On May 26, 1961, appellee Segundo Goyala filed an opposition or answer to the petition. He therein
alleged that his wife Antonina Almoguera had died in the year 1959 and denied the allegation in the
petition regarding the pacto de retro sale, "the fact of the matter being," according to him, "that on May
26, 1951, the respondents obtained a cash load of P750.00 from the petitioner payable in one year
without interest; that only on July 26, 1951, Dolores Goyala, daughter of the respondents, obtained from
the petitioner the sum of P50.00 to be added and credited to the account of the respondents; and then
on August 25, 1951, the said Dolores Goyala received from the petitioner another amount of P10.00 to
be added to and credited to the account of the respondents, (so that) the total loan of the respondents
from the petitioner aggregates P810.00 Philippine Currency" and that to guarantee the payment of the
said loan, the respondents executed a mortgage in favor of the petitioner on a parcel of coconut land
described in Annex A of the petition, hence, altho the deed was executed or drawn in the form of a pacto
de retro sale, the true and real intention of the parties thereto was that the same was a mere mortgage
to secure the payment of the original loan of P750.00 together with the additional amount received
thereafter, making a total loan of P810.00, payable within, one year without interest. He further alleged
that in the evening of May 26, 1952, he and his wife went to the house of the petitioner and tendered to
him the sum of P810.00 to pay the debt, but said petitioner refused to receive the same and to cancel the
document of mortgage, Annex A. The said appellee also reiterated by way of counterclaim the foregoing
allegations of his answer and prayed thus:.

WHEREFORE, the respondent Segundo Goyala respectfully prays this Honorable Court to dismiss the
petition and render judgment in favor of the respondents as follows:.

(a) Ordering the petitioner to receive the sum of P810.00 tendered or deposited by the respondents
in full settlement of their debts to him;

(b) Declaring the document marked Annex A of the petition to be mortgage and not a pacto de retro
sale, and ordering the same cancelled and with no more force and effect;

(c) Ordering the petitioner to pay the respondents the sum of P1,800.00 per annum beginning May
26, 1951 until the final termination of this case as the reasonable monetary value of the products for the
said property, and from this amount, there should be deducted however, the corresponding legal interest
annually on said loans; and

(d) In case, however, of the remote possibility that this Court should find the said instrument (Annex
A) to be a true pacto de retro sale, and not a mere mortgage, it is hereby prayed that the petitioner be
ordered to execute a deed of resale or repurchase of said property in favor of the respondents in
accordance with Art. 1606 third paragraph of the Civil Code."

On December 1, 1962, counsel for respondent Goyala filed a manifestation informing the trial court that
the named defendant (respondent) Antonina Almoguera was already dead, she having died at Labo,
Camarines Norte on March 27, 1959, and that her surviving nearest kin are her children, namely: Leonor,
Pedro, Juliana, Dolores, Valentina, Soledad, Penya, Mamerta, Salvador, Genesa, Felipe, Elegio — all
surnamed Goyala — with residences at Bulan, Sorsogon. Hearing was had on that manifestation, after
which the trial court, under date of December 4, 1962, issued the following order:.

As prayed for in the manifestation of Atty. Agustin Frivaldo counsel for the defendant, dated December
1, 1962, on the ground stated therein, the counsel for the plaintiff is hereby required to submit an
amended Complaint substituting therein for one of the defendants, Antonina Almoguera, now deceased
her successors in interest as party defendants, within the reglementary period.

Subsequently, on January 26, 1963, appellee Goyala filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or petition on
the ground that notwithstanding the lapse of 43 days after appellant's receipt of a copy of the above-
quoted order of the trial court, said appellant had failed and neglected to submit the amended complaint
required of him. The motion was opposed by appellant; and the trial court, resolving the incident, issued
the following order on February 15, 1963:.

The matter under consideration is the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants on the ground that the
plaintiff has failed and neglected to submit the amended complaint as required in the order of this Court
dated December 4, 1962, which the plaintiff has received on December 18, 1962. From December 13,
1962 when the motion to dismiss was filed, 43 days have elapsed. On February 6, 1963 when the plaintiff
has again failed to file together with said opposition the required amended complaint, and although
plaintiff has requested for a reasonable extension of time within which to file the said pleading, it is
regretable to state that up to the present has neglected to do so.

WHEREFORE, the complaint is hereby dismissed without prejudice.

Thereafter, on July 10, 1963, appellee filed a motion to declare appellant in default in respect of said
appellee's counterclaim, contained in his answer (opposition) to the dismissed complaint petition) of
appellant. This motion was granted by the trial court in its order of July 11, 1963, to wit:.

Upon petition of the counsel for the defendant Segundo Goyala to declare the plaintiff in default on the
ground of failure on the part of the plaintiff to answer the counterclaim filed by said defendant Segundo
Goyala within the reglementary period, despite the fact that the plaintiff's counsel was duly served with
a copy thereof, and the plaintiff's complaint was already dismissed by this Court in its order of February
15, 1963 on the ground of neglect to submit the amended complaint as required in the Court order of
December 4, 1962, the plaintiff is hereby declared in default on the counterclaim filed by said defendant
Segundo Goyala.

Let the defendant Segundo Goyala submit his evidence before the Clerk of Court, who is hereby
commissioned to receive the same.
As directed in the order above-quoted, the Clerk of Court received the evidence of appellee in respect of
his counterclaim and, thereafter, on November 15, 1963 the trial court rendered favorable judgment on
appellee's counterclaim. The pertinent portions of the decision referred to read thus:.

It appears that on May 26, 1951, respondents obtained a loan of P750.00 from the petitioner. To secure
the loan, respondents executed a document, which was made a Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale (Exh. "A"),
on suggestion of petitioner to exempt himself from liabilities under the Usury Law. Dolores Goyala, one
of the daughters of respondents, obtained an additional loan of P50.00 on July 26, 1951, (Exh. "A-1") and
another P10.00 on August 19, 1951, (Exh. "A-3") from the petitioner which amounts were duly authorized
and acknowledged by respondent Segundo Goyala. In the late afternoon of May 26, 1952, the last day to
redeem the property, Segundo Goyala, tendered the amount of P810.00 to herein petitioner in complete
payment of the loan and to release the property securing the said loan, but was refused because it was
already night time, and was advised instead to return the following day. When Segundo Goyala returned
the following day to redeem the property he was told by petitioner that the period to redeem has already
expired. Segundo Goyala testified further that he tried no less than three times to redeem the property
but each time petitioner refused the redemption money.

It appears further that the petitioner is in possession of the land since May 26, 1951, after the execution
of Exhibit "A" up to the present time and had appropriated to himself the products during the period. It is
shown further that the land is a productive coconut land and has a fair market value of P5,000.00 with an
annual yield of P1,800.00.

The respondents are not however entitled to be reimbursed of the value of the products obtained by the
petitioner who acted in the belief that the agreement was a Pacto de Retro Sale which turned out to be
otherwise as the Court now so declares.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court hereby declares the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale (Exh.
"A") an equitable mortgage and respondents Segundo Goyala and the heirs of Antonina Almoguera are
allowed to redeem the property; orders Faustino Gojo to withdraw the amount of P810.00 deposited with
the Clerk of Court in full settlement of the loan, and hereby cancels and declares without force and effect
the aforementioned Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale executed by the spouses Segundo Goyala and Antonina
Almoguera in favor of Faustino Gojo. Without costs.

The above-quoted decision was subsequently amended in an order of December 19, 1963, as follows:.

It appearing that in the dispositive part of the decision there was no directive to restore the possession to
the defendants upon execution, the dispositive portion of the said decision is hereby amended to include
therein an additional directive ordering the plaintiff to deliver and restore the possession of the land in
question to the defendants.

Dissatisfied with the decision referred to, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals which upon its
finding that the said appeal involves purely questions of law, certified the same to this Court for resolution.

In his brief, appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:.

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING PLAINTIFF IN DEFAULT WITH RESPECT TO DEFENDANT'S
COUNTERCLAIM;
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPUTIZING OR COMMISSIONING THE CLERK OF COURT TO RECEIVE
THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT SEGUNDO GOYALA;

3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT SEGUNDO
GOYALA AND THE HEIRS OF ANTONINA ALMOGUERA ALLOWING THEM TO REDEEM THE LAND IN
QUESTION FROM THE PETITIONER FAUSTINO GOJO FOR THE SUM OF P810.00.

The thrust of appellant's argument in respect of the first assignment of error is to the effect that there is
no occasion for the trial court to declare him in default in respect of appellee's counterclaim in this case,
for the reasons that: (a) the said counterclaim "falls within the category of compulsory counterclaim"
which does not call for an independent answer as the complaint already denies its material allegations;
and (b) the dismissal of the complaint in this case without prejudice carried with it the dismissal of the
said counterclaim.

The first assignment of error of appellant is well taken. It is now settled that a plaintiff who fails or chooses
not to answer a compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default, principally because the issues
raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the allegations of the complaint.1 In the
instant case, there can be no doubt that appellant's counterclaim was a compulsory one in as much as it
arises out of or is necessarily connected with transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
complaint; the complaint alleged that the right of appellee to repurchase the property in question had
already expired and asked for an order of consolidation; on the other hand, appellant's counterclaim was
for reformation of the deed claiming that it was only a mortgage. Thus the counterclaim was clearly
inconsistent with and directly controverted; the whole theory and basic allegations of the complaint. In
consequence, appellant's complaint stood as the answer to appellee's counterclaim; hence, the
incorrectness of the trial court's order declaring the appellant in default in regard to said counterclaim is
evident.

Regarding the dismissal of petitioner's complaint, We hold also, that the trial court committed reversible
error in ordering the same. It is true that under Section 3 of Rule 17, a complaint may be dismissed for
failure to prosecute if the plaintiff fails to comply with an order of the court, but it is obvious that the said
provision cannot apply when the order supposedly ignored is a void one, as in this case. Here, the trial
court ordered petitioner to amend the complaint only because it was informed that one of the defendants
had died, the court directing that the plaintiff should name the heirs of the deceased as defendants in lieu
of said deceased. Such an order runs counter to the ruling of this Court in Caseñas vs. Resales, et al. 2
which is squarely applicable to the Situation herein obtaining. In that case, We held:.

When certain of the parties to Civil Case No. 261 died and due notice thereof was given to the trial court,
it devolved on the said court to order, not the amendment of the complaint, but the appearance of the
legal representatives of the deceased in accordance with the procedure and manner outlined in Rule 3,
Section 17 of the Rules of Court, which provide:.

"SECTION 17. Death of party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted
for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court
charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs."

In the case of Barrameda vs. Barbara, 90 Phil. 718, this Court held that an order to amend the complaint,
before the proper substitution of parties as directed by the aforequoted rule has been effected, is void
and imposes upon the plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing the said
complaint, for such non-compliance, would similarly be void. In a subsequent case, Ferriera, et al. vs.
Gonzales, et al., G.R. No. L-11567, July 17, 1958, this Court affirmed a similar conclusion on the
determination that the continuance of a proceedings during the pendency of which a party thereto dies,
without such party having been validly substituted in accordance with the rules, amounts to a "lack of
jurisdiction".

The facts of this case fit four square into the Barrameda case above-cited, save for the minor variance that
in the former two of the litigants died while only one predeceased the case in Barrameda. Here, as in
Barrameda, during the pendency of (the) civil case, notice was given to the trial court of the deaths of one
of the plaintiffs and one of the defendants in it. Instead of ordering the substitution of the deceased's
legal representatives in accordance with Rule 3, Sec. 17 of the Rules of Court, the trial court directed the
surviving plaintiff to amend the complaint and when the latter failed to comply therewith, the said court
dismissed the complaint for such non-compliance. We must hold, therefore, as We did in Barrameda that
inasmuch as there was no obligation on the part of the plaintiff-appellant herein to amend his complaint
in Civil Case No. 261, any such imposition being void, his failure to comply with such an order did not
justify the dismissal of his complaint. Grounded as it was upon a void order, the dismissal was itself void."
(To the same effect, see World Wide Insurance & Surety Co. v. Jose, etc., et al., 96 Phil. 45, 50).

Besides, in line with the principle underlying Sec. 2 of Rule 17, it is not proper to dismiss a complaint when
a compulsory counterclaim has been pleaded by defendant. The reason is obvious. Under the cited
provision, the right of the plaintiff to move for the dismissal of an action after the defendant has filed his
answer is qualified by the clause providing that: "If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior
to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the
defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court." With this limitation, the power of the court to dismiss the complaint upon motion of plaintiff,
which is usually without prejudice, is not purely discretionary.3 The purpose is to avoid multiplicity of suits
over the same matter which would necessarily entail unnecessary expense and, what is worse, possibility
of conflict and inconsistency in the resolution of the same questions. The same considerations would
obtain, if the defendant were the one to ask for dismissal. The best interests of justice require that
conflicting claims regarding the same matter should be decided in one single proceeding. Dismissing the
complaint without prejudice, as the trial court has done in this case, albeit upon motion of the defendant,
will not prevent the undesirable multiplication of suits and reventilation of the same issues in the
subsequent action that may be filed by virtue of the reservation made in the disputed order of dismissal.

Having arrived at the foregoing conclusions, it becomes unnecessary to discuss the other two assigned
errors.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside and this case is remanded to the court below for
further proceedings in consonance with the above opinion, with costs against appellee.

SUPERCLEAN SERVICES CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:p

The question in this case is the propriety of filing a Supplemental Complaint in order to seek a different
relief in view of developments rendering the original relief impossible of attainment.

The facts are as follows:

On November 8, 1989, petitioner Superclean Services filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
complaint for Mandamus/Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction And/Or Restraining Order against private
respondent Home Development and Mutual Fund. Petitioner alleged that at the public bidding for
janitorial services for the year 1990 it was the "lowest or best bidder," but private respondent refused
without just cause to award the contract to it and instead caused the publication on October 23, 1989 of
a Notice of Rebidding to be held on November 9, 1989.

In its answer private respondent defended its action on the ground that not a single bid submitted
complied with the terms and conditions agreed upon in the pre-bidding conference held on September 6,
1989.

The trial court thereafter set petitioner's application for preliminary injunction for hearing and in the
meantime ordered private respondent to desist from conducting a rebidding. At the same time, the court
granted leave to private respondent on January 4, 1990 to hire janitorial services on a month-to-month
basis to insure the maintenance of its offices.

On July 24, 1991, petitioner moved for the admission of a "Supplemental Complaint."1 Petitioner alleged
that because the contract of services was for the furnishing of janitorial service for the previous year 1990,
the delay in the decision of the case had rendered the case moot and academic "without [petitioner]
obtaining complete relief to redress the wrong committed against it by [private respondent], which relief
consists in unrealized profits, exemplary damages and attorney's fees." Accordingly, instead of pursuing
its prayer for a writ of mandamus, petitioner sought the payment of damages to it.

On August 23, 1991, the trial court denied petitioner's motion, finding "no merit in and no basis supporting
it" and set the continuation of the trial on September 19, 1991.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied. In its order dated
November 25, 1991, the trial court said that admission of the "Supplemental Complaint" would "not only
radically but substantially [change] the issues" by "materially var[ying] the grounds of relief, and would
operate unjustly to the prejudice of the rights of [private respondent]."

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on August 5, 1992, rendered a
decision, finding no grave abuse of discretion to have been committed by the trial court in not admitting
petitioner's "Supplemental Complaint" and denying the motion for reconsideration of its order. Its ruling
was based on the fact that the relief sought in the "Supplemental Complaint" was different from that
contained in the original complaint which sought to compel private respondent to recognize petitioner as
the lowest qualifying bidder. In addition, the appellate court held that the original complaint had been
rendered moot and academic by supervening events and that a supplemental complaint was
inappropriate since "supplemental pleadings are meant to supply the deficiency in aid of the original
pleading, not to entirely substitute the latter."

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration, but its motion was denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated October 30, 1992. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

First. The "Supplemental Complaint" appears to have been filed under Rule 10 of the Rules of Court which
provides:

§6 Matters Subject of Supplemental Pleadings. -- Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting
forth transactions, occurrence or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to
be supplemented. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party should plead thereto, it shall so
order, specifying the time therefor.

The transaction, occurrence or event happening since the filing of the pleading, which is sought to be
supplemented, must be pleaded in aid of a party's right or defense as the case may be.2 But in the case
at bar, the supervening event is not invoked for that purpose but to justify the new relief sought.

To begin with, what was alleged as a supervening event causing damage to petitioner was the fact that
the year for which the contract should have been made had passed without the resolution of the case.
Only incidentally was it claimed that because of the award of a contract for janitorial services, on a month-
to-month basis to a third party, petitioner failed to realize profits. In its "Supplemental Complaint"
petitioner alleged:

1. Supervening events not attributable to anybody which consist in the delay in the early disposition
of the case within the one (1) year period life span of the contract for janitorial services, have rendered
the case moot and academic, without plaintiff obtaining complete relief to redress the wrong committed
against it by defendant, which is the unjustified and/or unlawful refusal of defendant to recognize plaintiff
as the lowest qualifying bidder for janitorial services for the year 1990;

2. By reason of the unjustified refusal of defendant to recognize the result of the public bidding held
in September 1989 and to award to plaintiff the contract for janitorial services as the lowest qualifying
bidder favorable and advantageous to the defendant for the year 1990, and by hiring another entity to
perform janitorial services during the pendency of the suit, plaintiff suffered unrealized profits in the sum
of P158,117.28;

The supervening event was therefore cited not to reinforce or aid the original demand, which was for the
execution of a contract in petitioner's favor, but to say that, precisely because of it, petitioner's demand
could no longer be enforced, thus justifying petitioner in changing the relief sought to one for recovery of
damages. This being the case, petitioner's remedy was not to supplement, but rather to amend its
complaint.

Indeed the new relief sought (payment of damages in lieu of an award of the contract for janitorial
services) is actually an alternative remedy to which petitioner was entitled even before at the time of the
filing of its original complaint. If petitioner was entitled to the award of the contract, as it claimed it was,
it could have asked either for an award of the contract for janitorial services or for damages. The fact that
it opted for the first does not preclude it from subsequently claiming damages because through no fault
of its own, the year passed without an award in its favor, with the result that it could no longer demand
the execution of a contract in its favor after that year.

Be that as it may, the so-called Supplemental Complaint filed by petitioner should simply be treated as
embodying amendments to the original complaint or petitioner may be required to file an amended
complaint.

Second. But, it is contended, such an amendment of the complaint would change the theory of the case.
Three reasons were cited by the Court of Appeals why it thought the trial court correctly refused to admit
the so-called Supplemental Complaint of petitioner: (1) change in the reliefs prayed for; (2) change in the
issues of the case; and (3) prejudice to the rights of private respondent.

The contention has no merit. An amendment to change the relief sought does not change the theory of a
case. What is prohibited is a change in the cause of action. Thus in Arches v. Villarruz,3 it was held:

The lower court denied the admission of the amended complaint on the ground that the plaintiff therein
has changed the action alleged in the original complaint, but upon comparing the two complaints, we find
that, essentially, there was no change of action for, in both the original and the amended complaints, the
action was for the collection of the value of the same promissory notes and the only difference between
the original and the amended complaints is with regard to the consideration of said promissory notes, for
while in the original complaint it was alleged that these were executed by defendant Villarruz for money
obtained from plaintiff Arches and with which the former paid for labor and materials for the construction
and completion of the Ivisan Bridge, in the amended complaint it was alleged that said promissory notes
were executed for materials supplied to William Villarruz and actually used in the construction of the
Ivisan Bridge. While the rule allowing amendments to a pleading is subject to the general limitation that
the cause of action should not be substantially changed or that the theory of the case should not be
altered, in the furtherance of justice, amendments to a pleading should be favored and the rules thereon
should be liberally construed. In the present case, we find justification for allowing the admission of the
amended complaint in order that the real question between the parties may be properly and justly
threshed out, in a single proceeding, and thus avoid multiplicity of actions.

In Vda. de Villaruel v. Manila Motor Co., Inc.,4 plaintiffs, as lessors of a property, filed an action for the
rescission of the contract of lease for alleged refusal of defendants to pay rentals. While the case was
pending, the buildings leased were destroyed by fire. Plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint for the
recovery of the value of the burned buildings. In holding the supplemental complaint proper, this Court
held:

This action was inceptionally instituted for the rescission of the contract of lease and for the recovery of
unpaid rentals before and after liberation. When the leased buildings were destroyed, the plaintiffs-
lessors demanded from the defendants-lessees, instead, the value of the burned premises, basing their
right to do so on defendants' alleged default in the payment of post-liberation rentals (which was also
their basis in formerly seeking for rescission). This cannot be considered as already altering the theory of
the case which is merely a change in the relief prayed for, brought about by circumstances occurring
during the pendency of the action, and is not improper. (Southern Pacific Co. vs. Conway, 115 F. 2d 746;
Suburban Improvement Company vs. Scott Lumber Co., 87 A.L.R. 555, 59 F. 2d 711). The filing of the
supplemental complaint can well be justified also under Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court (on
amendments) "to the end that the real matter in dispute and all matters in the action in dispute between
the parties may, as far as possible be completely determined in a single proceeding". It is to be noted
furthermore, that the admission or rejection of this kind of pleadings is within the sound discretion of the
court that will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of abuse thereof (see Sec. 5, Rule 17, Rules of
Court), especially so, as in this case, where no substantial procedural prejudice is caused to the adverse
party.5

In this case, the original complaint for Mandamus/Certiorari With Preliminary Injunction And/Or
Restraining Order alleged, as cause of action, private respondent's unjustifiable refusal to award the
contract to petitioner despite the fact that the latter was the "lowest and best qualifying bidder." On the
basis of this allegation, it was prayed that:

1. Upon filing [of] this Complaint, a restraining order be issued to enjoin [private respondent] from
implementing [or] proceeding with its Notice of Rebidding which is scheduled on November 9, 1989 at
10:00 A.M.;

2. After trial on the merits, judgment be rendered —

a. ordering [private respondent] to recognize [petitioner] as the lowest qualifying responsive bidder
at the public bidding held on September 22, 1989 and therefore its right to the award of the contract for
janitorial services;

b. declaring that [private respondent] in publishing its "Notice of Rebidding" acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess and/or lack of jurisdiction;

c. declaring the restraining order or temporary writ of injunction to be permanent; and

d. for costs of suit.

These same allegations constitute petitioner's cause of action for damages, to wit:

1. the sum of P158,117.28 as unrealized profits;

2. the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

3. the sum equivalent to twenty-five (25%) percent of the total amount due and demandable, plus
P1,000.00 for every appearance of counsel in court;

4. the costs of suit.

As already stated, the change in the relief sought was necessitated by a supervening event which rendered
the first relief sought impossible of attainment.

Because the cause of action on which the complaint for mandamus and injunction and the so-called
Supplemental Complaint are based is one and the same, the issue raised is the same, namely, whether
private respondent was justified in refusing to award the contract for janitorial services to petitioner.
Nor would admission of the amended complaint prejudice the rights of private respondent as defendant
in the action below, as the Court of Appeals held. Indeed neither the trial court nor the appellate court
showed in what way the rights of private respondent would be prejudiced by the allowance of the
amendment in question. There will be no unfairness or surprise to private respondent, because after all
private respondent will have a right to file an amended answer and present evidence in support thereof.6

Third. The Court of Appeals also held that the action for mandamus and/or injunction had become moot
and academic and consequently there was no longer any complaint to be supplemented. It is true that a
supplemental or an amended pleading presupposes the existence of a pleading. What was rendered moot
and academic, however, was not petitioner's cause of action but only its prayer for the writ of mandamus.
There was still an alternative remedy left to petitioner of seeking damages in lieu of an award of the
contract. The situation is similar to an action for illegal dismissal in labor law. If reinstatement is no longer
possible, because the position has been abolished and there is no way the dismissed employee can be
reinstated to a comparable position, the employee's action is not thereby rendered moot and academic.
He can instead ask for separation pay.

Indeed, what is important is that, as already stated, the basic allegations of fact in the original and in the
amended complaints are the same, namely, that private respondent, without justification, refused to
award the contract of services to petitioner. Through no fault of petitioner, the year for which janitorial
services were to be rendered expired without the resolution of petitioner's case. It would be to exalt
technicality over substance to require that petitioner file a new complaint. It would best serve the
interests of justice if the so-called Supplemental Complaint is simply considered as embodying
amendments to the original complaint. In fact it appears that the court ordered a continuation of the trial
on September 19, 1991, despite petitioner's statement in its Supplemental Complaint that the original
case had become moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the trial
court with instructions to admit the "Supplemental Complaint" and to treat it as an amendment to the
original complaint or to require petitioner to file an amended complaint, merging the relevant allegations
of its original complaint and "Supplemental Complaint," and thereafter to allow private respondent to file
an answer.

SO ORDERED.

WILFREDO P. VERZOSA and PILAR MARTINEZ, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NICODEMO FERRER, and FE GIRON USON, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

What constitutes the status quo ante in the application of an injunctive writ, in the event a complaint's
subsequently amended?

The Case
This is the main question raised in the present Petition for Review seeking to set aside the consolidated
January 31, 1994 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-GR SP No. 26626 and CA-GR SP No. 27300,
which dismissed the petitions in this wise:

Succinctly put, petitioners have failed to show any grave abuse of discretion, or any act without or in
excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge in issuing the assailed orders.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

Also assailed is the public respondent's February 28, 1995 Reconsideration3 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.

Facts of the Case

The undisputed facts, as narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA) and reiterated by petitioners, are as
follows:4

Records reveal that Fe Giron Uson is the owner of a parcel of land consisting of 19,955 square meters
located at Baquioen, Sual, Pangasinan, covered by O.C.T. No. 12783. She mortgaged the land to Wilfredo
Verzosa.

Fe Uson failed to pay her entire obligation to Verzosa, prompting the latter to have the mortgage
foreclosed. On July 21, 1988, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan set the foreclosure sale on August 17,
1988 at 10:00 A.M.

To prevent the Office of the Provincial Sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosure sale, Fe Uson, on
August 12, 1988, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, a complaint against
Wilfredo Verzosa and the Provincial Sheriff, docketed as Civil Case No. 16590, for annulment of mortgage
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

On August 22, 1988, defendant Verzosa filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.

On June 8, 1989, the complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was not personally verified by plaintiff
Fe Uson.

On June 27, 1989, Fe Uson filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the court.

On June 29, 1989, she filed her amended complaint which bears the proper verification.

Meantime, Verzosa wrote the Provincial Sheriff to proceed with the foreclosure of mortgage.
Whereupon, Fe Uson, through counsel, wrote the Provincial Sheriff requesting him to discontinue the
foreclosure sale in deference to "the said pending case and to the action to be taken by the Honorable
Presiding Judge of the Court.

On July 4, 1989, the foreclosure sale was conducted by the sheriff. The property was sold to Verzosa being
the highest bidder. Thereafter, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was approved by Executive Judge Antonio
Belen and issued to Verzosa.

On September 5, 1989, the trial court issued an order admitting the amended complaint of Fe Uson.

At this point, Verzosa filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 18898 for certiorari. He alleged that
the said order, admitting the amended complaint was issued with grave abuse of discretion.

On June 20, 1990, the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Alaminos,
Pangasinan.

On July 5, 1990, or after the expiration of the redemption period of one year, the defendant Sheriff issued
the Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale. Thus, O.C.T. No. 12783 in Fe Uson's name was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
T.C.T. No. 11087 was issued in the name of Wilfredo Verzosa.

On July 12, 1990, Verzosa sold the land to Pilar Martinez. As a result, Verzosa's T.C.T. No. 11087 was
cancelled and T.C.T. No. 11107 was issued to Martinez.

Meantime, on October 16, 1990, or after one year from the filing of Verzosa's petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, the said court dismissed the petition, thus sustaining the validity of respondent
court's order dated September 5, 1989 admitting Fe Uson's amended complaint.

On May 20, 1991, Fe Uson filed her second amended complaint impleading as additional defendants the
Register of Deeds of Alaminos, Pangasinan and Pilar Martinez and praying, among others, the annulment
of the latter's title — T.C.T. No. 11107.

On August 20, 1991, upon Uson's application for preliminary injunction embodied in her Second Amended
Complaint (which was opposed by Verzosa and Martinez), respondent court issued an order directing the
latter to cease and desist from entering, making constructions and performing any act of possession or
ownership over the land in question covered by O.C.T. No. 12783, upon posting by plaintiff Uson of a bond
of P10,000.00.

Defendant Martinez filed a motion for consideration which was denied on September 18, 1991.

On October 30, 1991, after hearing and upon posting of a bond in the amount of P10,000.00 by Uson,
respondent Judge issued an order directing defendants Verzosa and Martinez and/or any and other
persons acting under their command to desist and cease from entering, intruding and making
constructions on the land covered by O.C.T. No. 12783.
On November 22, 1991, respondent judge, acting on Verzosa's motion for clarification of the order dated
September 18, 1991, issued an order to the effect that the status quo being maintained is the possession
of plaintiff Fe Uson of the land and that such status quo does not refer to defendant Pilar Martinez being
the registered owner of T.C.T. No. 11107.

It should be noted that the Complaint alleged that Private Respondent Uson mortgaged the property to
Verzosa for P25,000, and that the remaining, unpaid balance was P915.75, an amount she was willing to
consign to the trial court.5

Petitioners challenged by certiorari the two orders of the trial court. Because the CA dismissed their
petition, petitioners availed themselves of the present recourse.6

Public Respondent's Ruling

In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals held that "the last peaceable uncontested
status that preceded the controversy [was] that point . . . when private respondent Fe Uson was the
registered owner of the land in dispute mortgaged to petitioner Verzosa. As owner of this property, Fe
Uson has every right to protect her rights as such. Clearly, the issuance of the writ would certainly preserve
that status quo."7

In debunking petitioners' theory that the status quo referred to the period when Martinez had already
purchased the property from Verzosa, the Court of Appeals held that "the property was registered in her
name two years after the start of the controversy, or when private respondent filed her complaint against
Verzosa."8 Thus, the CA sustained the following findings of the trial court:9

For as long as the instant case (Civil Case No. 16590) remains pending, no act of the defendants
subsequent to the filing of this case can make TCT No. 11107 in the name of defendant Pilar Martinez,
and the alleged possession of the latter of the property in question, valid and be considered the status
quo."

Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of the Court: 10

I The Court of Appeals erred in not taking into account or dealing squarely with the nature, effects
and proper interpretation and/or application of the doctrine on amendment of pleadings/complaints to
the instant case.

II The Court of Appeals erred when it concurred with the Respondent judge that the status quo
should be reckoned at the time of the filing of the original complaint.

III The Court of Appeals erred when it completely disregarded the legal implications and effects of
foreclosure, foreclosure sale, expiration of the redemption period, the consolidation of ownership to your
petitioner and the sale to Pilar Martinez.
IV The Court of Appeals erred when it concurred with the respondent judge in granting an injunction
to restrain consummated acts, and in forcing a transfer of possession from Pilar Martinez to private
respondent Fe Uson who has not shown her right thereto.

The present controversy hinges on two questions. First, is private respondent entitled to an injunctive
writ? Second, what is the status quo ante that the said writ seeks to preserve?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit.

First Issue:

Issuance of the Injunctive Writ

Petitioners primarily allege that the injunctive writ was wrongfully issued in favor of private respondent,
as the latter had a doubtful, unclear and unadjudicated right for recovery of the property which had been
mortgaged, foreclosed and sold to a third party. We disagree.

An injunctive writ may be issued when the following requisites are established:

1. The invasion of the right is material and substantial;

2. The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;

3. There is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. 11

The foregoing requisites are present in this case. The undisputed owner of the property which was
mortgaged to Petitioner Verzosa was private respondent who, upon learning of the scheduled foreclosure,
immediately filed a Complaint to annul the mortgage, praying that a restraining order be issued to restrain
such foreclosure. Private respondent insisted that she had paid her P25,000 debt, except for the remaining
unpaid balance of P915.75 which she was willing to consign to the court. In other words, she had title to
and possession of the property and she claimed to have paid her obligation, except for the nominal unpaid
balance which she was willing to consign judicially. Hence, she had a clear and unmistakable right to
protect her title to and possession of the mortgaged property by enjoining the foreclosure sale.

Given the above factual allegations, it is clear that private respondent was entitled to the injunctive writ.

Second Issue: Status Quo Ante

The "status quo" is the last actual peaceful uncontested situation which precedes a controversy, and its
preservation is the office of an injunctive writ. 12 Petitioners insist that the status quo refers to the point
when Pilar Martinez was already the owner of the property, having purchased it from Verzosa.

We cannot sustain the petitioners, for Martinez' claim to the property is precisely the bone of contention.
Private respondent, the origin owner of the property, filed a Complaint against Wilfredo Verzosa and the
provincial sheriff for the annulment of mortgage and the issuance of an injunctive writ to prevent the
foreclosure of the property and the subsequent transfer of ownership. Although the Complaint was
subsequently amended, the controversy began when the first Complaint was filed.

Nevertheless, Petitioner Verzosa and the sheriff proceeded with the foreclosure before the filing of the
Amended Complaint. Worse, Verzosa sold the property to Martinez one week later. Now, Verzosa and
Martinez claim that the status quo to be preserved refers to the time before the filing of the second
Complaint and after Martinez had acquired the property from Verzosa.

Petitioners contend that the controversy started only when the Amended Complaint was filed, because
the previous Complaints were expunged from the records. Petitioners invoke Ruymann v. Director of
Lands, 13 in which the Court ruled that the filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of
the filing of the original. Citing other jurisprudence, such as Waje v. Court of Appeals 14 and Paradise v.
Ng, 15 petitioners contend that the original pleading is deemed abandoned when it is amended.

The cited cases offer scant support to the thesis of petitioners. In Ruymann, the Court held that "an
amendment to a complaint which introduces a new or different cause of action, making a new or different
demand, is equivalent to a fresh suit upon a new cause of action, and the statute of limitations continues
to run until the amendment is filed." 16 In the said case, a complaint for injunction was amended to
include a larger tract of land which had not been included in the original suit. The Court held that "the suit
will be deemed to have been commenced upon the date of amendment, in determining whether the
defendant had acquired title by adverse possession to the portion of the tract of land not included in the
original complaint (Montgomery v. Shaver, 40 Oregon 244)." 17 It is clear therein that the Complaint was
amended to include a new or different cause of action or demand; hence, it was as if a new complaint was
filed.

It follows that when the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, causes of action, or demands,
the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original complaint was filed, not on the date of
the filing of the amended complaint. In other words, for demands already included in the original
complaint, the suit is deemed to have commenced upon the filing of such original complaint. In short, for
purposes of determining the commencement of a suit, the original, complaint is deemed abandoned and
superseded by the amended complaint only if the amended complaint introduces a new or different cause
of action or demand.

Hence, it has been held that "an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies the facts originally
alleged relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of
limitations, the period of which expires after service of the original complaint but before service of
amendment." 18 It is the actual filing in court that controls and not the date of the formal admission of
the amended pleading. 19 The Court in Republic v. Marsman 20 elucidated:

While in the procedural sense, especially in relation to the possible necessity of and time for the filing of
responsive and other corresponding pleadings, an amended complaint is deemed filed only as of the date
of its admission, . . ., the self-evident proposition [is] that for practical reasons and to avoid the
complications that may arise from undue delays in the admission thereof, such an amended complaint
must be considered as filed, for the purpose of such a substantive matter as prescription, on the date it is
actually filed with the court, regardless of when it is ultimately formally admitted by the court. After all,
the only purpose of requiring leave of and formal admission by the court of an amended pleading after
issues have already been joined as to the original ones is to prevent the injection of other issues which
ought either to be considered as barred already or made the subject of another proceeding, if they are
not anyway indispensable for the resolution of the original ones and no unnecessary multiplicity of suits
would result; so, when the court ultimately admits the amendment, the legal effect, for substantive
purposes, of such admission retroacts as a rule to the date of its actual filing.

In the instant case, the Amended Complaint did not introduce a new or different cause of action or
demand. The original Complaint was amended only to rectify the lack of verification and thereafter to
implead Martinez, who had purchased the contested property from Verzosa.

In the same vein, Waje and Paradise do not apply because the Amended Complaints therein alleged new
causes of action.

Similarly unavailing is petitioners' contention that the injunctive writ was applied retroactively and, hence,
violative of Ruymann and other subsequent cases. To repeat, Ruymann was wrongly applied by
petitioners. There being no new issues introduced in the Amended Complaint herein, the present suit is
deemed to have commenced on the date of the filing of the original Complaint. Hence, the CA was correct
in upholding the trial court that the status quo was the situation of the parties at the time of the filing of
the original Complaint.

Finally, petitioners assert that Respondent Court violated the well-entrenched doctrine that
consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. As earlier noted, despite the fact that Pilar
Martinez already had title to and possession of the disputed property, the CA affirmed the order of the
trial court enjoining her from "entering, intruding and making construction and/or performing any act of
ownership or possession and any activity over the
land . . .; " Petitioners cite the following ruling in Reyes v. Harty: 21

It is a universal principle of the law that an injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act
already done. It is undisputed proof in this case, presented by the plaintiffs themselves, that, at the time
this [case] was tried, the plaintiffs had been completely dispossessed, the defendant being in full and
complete possession of the lands in question . . . .

Again, the case cited by petitioner is incongruous with the factual milieu of the present controversy. In
that case, the party praying for an injunctive writ had been completely dispossessed of the land in
question prior to the commencement of the action. In the case at bar, private respondent was still the
owner and was in possession of the property at the time the original Complaint was filed. The rule is that
a court should not by means of preliminary injunction transfer the property in litigation from the
possession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute and the party having possession
asserts ownership thereto. 22 When private respondent filed the original Complaint, she had title to and
possession of the property and was asserting ownership thereto.

Where the acts have been performed prior to the filing of the injunction suit, the general rule is that
consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction. However, "where the acts are performed
after the injunction suit is brought, a defendant may not as [a matter] of right proceed to perform the acts
sought to be restrained and then be heard to assert in the suit that the injunction will not lie because he
has performed these acts before final hearing has been had, but after the beginning of the action. A
defendant thus acts at his peril." 23 It has been held that "[t]he general rule of law is that, where a
defendant completes, after the beginning of an action, the act thereby sought to be restrained, and before
the issue of any final order or decree, the court has the power to, and may, compel, by a mandatory
injunction, the restoration of the former condition of things and thereby prevent the giving of an
advantage by reason of the wrongful act. And where a defendant does an act thus sought to be restrained,
he proceeds at his peril, and the court in which the action is pending may compel a restoration of the
former status or grant to the plaintiff such relief as may be proper." 24

In this case, an action was brought to enjoin Petitioner Verzosa from proceeding with the mortgage sale,
yet he proceeded to do so while the action was still pending. Such conduct is reprehensible. "If one in the
face of a pending suit for injunction, does the thing sought to be enjoined, he cannot thus outwit equity
and the court, but must restore the status quo. . . . Even where an injunction has not been issued, if the
suit is one for injunction, the defendant, if he does the thing sought to be enjoined does so at his peril."
25 Hence, in proceeding with the mortgage sale and subsequently selling the property to Pilar Martinez,
Petitioner Verzosa was acting at his peril.

Clearly, the Respondent Court did not err in sustaining the Decision of the lower court that the status quo
to be maintained was the situation when title to and possession of the property were still with Private
Respondent Uson. The precise ruling of the appellate court is aptly reproduced hereunder:

When the present Civil Case No. 16590 was commenced on August 12, 1988, the property in dispute was
still covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 12783, in the name of plaintiff Fe Giron Uson, and there is
no dispute that the possession of the said property was still with the plaintiff. That is the status quo sought
to be maintained in the questioned preliminary injunction. It is, therefore, incorrect for defendant
Wilfredo P. Verzosa to claim that the status quo refers to Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11107 in the
name of Pilar Martinez, which is precisely what is sought to be annul[l]ed in the present case, and that
the possessor of the property is defendant Pilar Martinez who may possibly have entered into the
property while the present case has long been pending, and by virtue of the purported sale of the same
to her by defendant Verzosa, whose claim of ownership thereof is, in turn, based on the sheriff's sale
which is also the very subject matter of the present case for annulment. 26

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.