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JURISDICTION OF THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

Q: How many RTC’s are there in the Philippines?

BP 129 Section 13 (1) Creation of Regional Trial


Courts – There are hereby created thirteen (13)
Regional Trial Courts, one for each of the
following regions: x x

The Judiciary law has divided the country into 13 areas called JUDICIAL
REGIONS. From the 1st to the 12th, the 13th is actually in the National Capital
Region (NCR), Metro Manila. Every division is divided into branches.

Every RTC judge is appointed to a region which shall be his permanent


station, and his appointment states the branch of the court and seat to which he
shall be originally assigned. However, the SC may assign temporarily an RTC
judge to another region as public interest may require, provided that such
temporary assignment shall not last longer than 6 months without the consent of
the RTC judge concerned.

The SC shall define the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise
his authority. The law provides:

BP 129, Section 18. Authority to define territory


appurtenant to each branch – The Supreme Court
shall define the territory over which a branch of
the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its
authority. The territory thus defined shall be
deemed to be the territorial area of the branch
concerned for purposes of determining the venue of
all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or
criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may
exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein
granted shall be exercised with a view to making
the courts readily accessible to the people of the
different parts of the region and making the
attendance of litigants and witness as inexpensive
as possible.

Though RTC Cebu City is found in the 7th Judicial Region, which includes
Cebu, Bohol, Negros Oriental and Siquijor province, its territorial area is not the
entire region, (7th Judicial Region), where it belongs or even the entire province of
JBD 28
Cebu or limited to Cebu City only because it depends on the territory as defined
by the SC.

Now, the law says, the SC has the power to define the area of its branch for
purposes of supervising that area and the MTC there. Now, as early as 1983, the
SC has already come out with the administrative order defining the area of
responsibility of each branch throughout the Philippines.

Interim Rules, Sec. 2. Territorial Jurisdiction


of Courts. -
a)MetTCs, MTCs and MCTCs shall exercise their
jurisdiction in the city, municipality or circuit
for which the judge thereof is appointed or
designated.
b)A Regional Trial Court shall exercise its
jurisdiction within the area defined by the SC as
the territory over which the particular branch
concerned shall exercise its authority, in
accordance with Sec. 18 of BP 129.

Jurisdiction of the RTC

EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION– Note that Section 19 of BP 129


was amended by RA 7691, effective April 15, 1994 and entitled “An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts”.

CONCURRENT ORIGINAL JURISDICTION with other courts – Section 21


APPELLATE JURISDICTION – Section 22

EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE RTC

A. Original Jurisdiction
1. Civil
a. Exclusive
1) Subject of the action not capable of pecuniary estimation;
Actions not capable of pecuniary estimation
1. Where it is primarily for the recovery of a SUM OF MONEY, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation – jurisdiction, whether in the MTC or RTC, would
depend on the AMOUNT of the claim.
2. Where the basic issue is other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the
subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money – jurisdiction exclusively of
RTC.
Exs. expropriation

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specific performance
support
foreclosure of mortgage
annulment of judgment
actions questioning the validity of a mortgage
annulment of deed of conveyance
rescission
3. While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation,
the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC
where the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P20,000.00 in
Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. [Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. -
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value- does
not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs:)(Russel vs. Vestil, G.R. No. 119347, March 17, 1999].

2) Actions involving title to, or possession of real property or any interest therein-
where assessed value of property exceeds P20,000.00 (P50,000.00 in Metro Manila),
excluding forcible entry and unlawful detainer

3) Actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction – where demand or claim exceeds


P300,000.00 (P400,000.00 in Metro Manila)

4) Matters of probate, testate and intestate - where gross value of estate exceeds
P300,000.00 (P400,000.00 in Metro Manila)

5) Cases not within exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

6) All other cases where demand – exclusive of interests, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigations expenses and cost, or value of
property in controversy – exceeds P300,000.00 (P400,000.00 in Metro
Manila)

7) Additional original jurisdiction transferred under Sec. 5.2. of the Securities


Regulation Code.

8) Application for issuance of writ of search and seizure in civil actions for
infringement of intellectual property rights (Sec. 3, A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC,
effective February 15, 2002)

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9) Violations of Rep. Act No. 9160 or “Anti-Money Laundering
Act of 2001,” as amended by Rep. Act No. 9194.

Sec. 19 Jurisdiction in civil cases – Regional


Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

[1] In all civil actions in which the subject of


the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

What does incapable of pecuniary estimation mean?

In an action incapable of pecuniary estimation, the basic issue is one other


than the recovery of a sum of money. If ever there is a claim for money, it should
only be incidental to the main issue.
Where the action is principally the recovery of a sum of money, the action is
one capable of pecuniary estimation and jurisdiction would then depend on the
amount of the claim exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys
fees, litigation expenses and costs. (Raymundo vs. CA, 213 SCRA 457 [1992];
Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, 88 SCRA 623 [1979])

The basic issue in an action incapable of pecuniary estimation is one other


than the recovery of money. In this kind of action the money claim is merely
incidental (ibid)

How to determine whether the action is capable or incapable of pecuniary


estimation-

JBD 31
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which
is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the Court has adopted
the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation and whether jurisdiction is in the MTCs or the CFIs
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, the Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by the RTC (Russel v. Vestil, 304 SCRA
739, 744; Bgy San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, 334 SCRA 127,
132-133; Ungria v. CA, 654 SCRA 314, 324-325)

In Genesis Investment Inc. v. Heirs of Ebarasabal, GR No. 181622, Nov. 20, 2013,
the action filed was denominated as one for “Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorneys Fees”.

In resolving the issue whether the action is for recovery of sum of money or one
incapable of pecuniary estimation the Court used as criterion the ascertainment
of the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. It found that the principal
relief sought was the nullification of the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, a
relief that is one other than for recovery of a sum of money, hence, an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation, jurisdiction over which belongs to the RTC.
The Court found the case to be a “joinder of causes of action which comprehends
more than the issue of partition of or recovery of shares or interest over the real
property in question but includes an action for declaration of nullity of contracts
and documents which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.”

ORTIGAS AND CO., LTD PARTNERSHIP vs. HERRERA


120 SCRA 89 [1983]

FACTS: A entered into an agreement with B where A deposited the


sum of P50,000 with B. After certain conditions are complied B has to
return the amount to A. According to A the conditions are already
complied with but B still refuses to return the money. So A filed a
complaint which he denominated as sum of money and since he is only
asking for the return of P50,000.00, A filed the case in the MTC.

ISSUE #1: Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: The MTC has NO jurisdiction. It should be filed in the RTC. It
is not an action to collect a loan. You are not recovering a loan. You are

JBD 32
compelling him to comply with the agreement – to return the money
after certain conditions are complied with. You are trying to enforce
your agreement, therefore your action is an action for SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE which should be tried by the RTC under paragraph
[1].
“When a party to a contract has agreed to refund to the other party a
sum of money upon compliance by the latter of certain conditions and
only upon compliance therewith may what is legally due him under the
written contract be demanded, the action is one not capable of pecuniary
estimation.” So it is cognizable by the RTC.

ISSUE #2: But according to the plaintiff, when he filed the complaint,
it is entitled “for sum of money” which should fall under paragraph [8].
Is the plaintiff correct?
HELD: NO. The plaintiff is wrong. The title of the action is not
determinative on the court. Just like the rule on contracts where the
nature of the contract is not determined by the title but by stipulation.
“The factual allegations in the complaint seeking for the performance
of an obligation of a written contract which is a matter clearly incapable
of pecuniary estimation prevail over the designation of the complaint as
one for the sum of money and damages.”

Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific


performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment,
also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or
conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission which is a
counterpart of specific performance. (Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA, 739, 744-745
[1999])

Such ruling was, however, modified in Go vs. UCPB, GR No. 156182 Nov. 11,
2004 where the court declared the following as real actions:
1.) judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage;
2.) actions to annul real estate mortgage;
for the reason that a real estate mortgage is a real right as well as a real property.
So an action to cancel or annul a real estate mortgage necessarily affects title to
the real property, hence a real action and jurisdiction is determined by the
assessed value of the property.

A complaint for expropriation is incapable of pecuniary estimation (Barangay


San Roque vs. Heirs of Pastor, 334 SCRA 127).

An action seeking to annul a resolution of a government-owned and controlled


corporation is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation (Polomolok Water
District vs. Polomolok General Consumers Association GR No. 162124, October
19, 2007).
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An action to annul a Deed of Declaration of Heirs and for a partition of land with
an assessed value of P5,000.00 is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation
where the partition aspect is only incidental to the action for annulment (Russel
vs. Vestil 304 SCRA 739).

An action for partition of a real property located in Taytay Rizal and with an
assessed value of P20,000.00, the resolution of which involves the determination
of hereditary rights, is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus,
should be filed in the RTC (Suggested answer UP Law Center Bar 2000) Note:
This answer could also be subject to an alternative answer, when it is argued that
an action for partition is one which involves interest in real property. Hence,
jurisdiction would be dependent on the assessed value of the property.

An action for specific performance to compel the defendant to execute a deed of


conveyance covering a parcel of land with an assessed value of P19,000.00 is an
action incapable of pecuniary estimation because the main issue is whether or
not there is a right to compel specific performance (Suggested answer, UP Law
Center Bar 2000). Note: This answer is subject to an alternative answer which
asserts that where the primary purpose of the action is to recover or obtain
ownership of the real property, the action is one affecting title to real property
and is, therefore, a real action. In a real action, jurisdiction is determined by the
assessed value of the property.

An action for specific performance is one generally considered incapable of


pecuniary estimation (Russel vs. Vestil, supra).

The amount of damages that may be claimed in addition to the prayer for
specific performance is not determinative of jurisdiction. Thus, an action for
specific performance and damages of P200,000.00 is cognizable by the RTC even
if the amount of damages sought to be recovered is within the jurisdiction of the
MTC.

Where, however, the demand is in the alternative, as in an action to compel the


defendant to deliver the house by completing its construction or to pay the sum
of P644.31, the action is one that is capable of pecuniary estimation (Cruz vs. Tan
87 Phil. 627). Thus an action for specific performance or in the alternative, for
damages in the amount of P180,000.00 is one capable of pecuniary estimation.
Here, the amount of damages is determinative of jurisdiction (Bar 1997).

If as gleaned from the complaint, the principal relief sought by the complaint is
for the court to issue an injunction against the adverse party and his
representatives to permanently enjoin them from preventing the survey of the
subject land, the complaint is not a possessory action but one for injunction. As
such, the subject matter of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and

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properly cognizable exclusively by the RTC under Sec. 19(1) of BP Blg. 129, as
amended by RA No. 7691 (Bokingo vs. CA 489 SCRA 521).

An action for injunction is within the jurisdiction of the RTC being an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation. (Bar 1997).

An action for replevin of a motorcycle valued at P150,000.00 is capable of


pecuniary estimation. The basis of jurisdiction is the value of the personal
property sought to be recovered. The amount of P150,000.00 falls within the
jurisdiction of the MTC. (Bar 1997).

An action for interpleader is capable of pecuniary estimation. If the subject of


interpleader is real property, then the jurisdictional amount is determined by the
assessed value of the land. If it be personal property, then the value of the
property.

Hence, an action of interpleader to determine who between the defendants is


entitled to receive the amount of P190,000.00 from the plaintiff is within the
jurisdiction of the MTC (Bar 1997; Makati Development Corporation vs.
Tanjuatco 27 SCRA 401).

[2] In all civil actions which involve the title


to, or possession of, real property or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds P20,000 or for civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such value exceeds P50,000
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands and buildings; original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts;

So in all real actions outside of forcible entry and unlawful detainer,


jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the real property subject
thereof.

What is a real action?

It is one affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein.


(Sec. 1, Rule 4)

Examples would be accion publiciana (an action to recover possession of real


property), accion reinvidicatoria (action to recover ownership of real property),
quieting of title, provided the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00.

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So, for a lesser value, MTC has jurisdiction. This is why MTCs now have
jurisdiction over accion publiciana when the value of the property is P20,000 or
less.

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer, jurisdiction lies with the MTC
regardless of the assessed value.

Now, if in Metro Manila, the value is P50,000.

[3] In all civil actions in admiralty and


maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim
exceeds One Hundred Thousand pesos (P100,00.00)
[now PhP 300,000.00] or, in Metro Manila, where
such demand or claim exceeds Two Hundred Thousand
pesos (P200,000.00)[now, PhP 400,000].

Note that the increase in the amount is due to


Sec. 5 of RA 7691 which provides:

RA 7691, Sec. 5. After five (5) years from the


effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts
mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec.
33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this
Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter,
such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted
further to Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case
of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional
amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from
the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000,00).

EXAMPLE: The shipper will ship to you goods involving a common carrier
and while in transit, the goods are lost or they are totally damaged. You would
like to file a claim or a case against the carrier, what kind of a case is it? That is
an admiralty or maritime case.

Another example would be a damage suit arising from a collision between


two vessels.

Q: In which court will you file it?


A: It depends on how much is your claim. If your claim of the damaged or
lost cargo exceeds P300,000, then, RTC; if it is P300,000 or less, MTC. In Metro
Manila, the jurisdictional amount is higher – it should be over P400,000.
JBD 36
[4] In all matters of probate, both testate and
intestate, where the gross value of the estate
exceeds One Hundred Thousand pesos (P100,000.00) [now
php300,000] or, in probate matters in Metro Manila,
where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) [now P400,000].

In the subject of Wills and Succession, when a person dies, his estate, his
property will be settled for the benefit of his creditors and heirs. That is what
you call either as testate or intestate proceedings depending on whether the
deceased left a will or none.

If there are debts due the decedent, thus, payable by his/her estate, settlement
would mean liquidation, which includes inventory of all the assets and
obligations payable, payment of the debts, then distribution of the residue to the
heirs. This is done by the court thru an administrator appointed by it or thru the
executor appointed by the decedent.

Q: Where should the estate of the deceased person be settled, RTC or MTC?
A: It depends on how much is the gross value of his estate. If it exceeds
P300,000, RTC. If it is P300,000 or less, it should be with the MTC. In Metro
Manila again, the gross should be more than P400,000.

The jurisdiction of the court as a probate or intestate court relates only to


matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of the will of
the decedent but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership
that arise during the proceedings.

A probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to


be a part of the estate and also claimed by outside parties. All that the court can
do is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered. For the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should be or should not be included in the inventory,
the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to a final determination in a separate action (Cuizon v.
Ramolete, 129 SCRA 495, 499).

However, in the Coca v. De Pangilinan, 171 Phil 246, the Court said that if the
interested are all heirs, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
the probate court and third parties are not prejudiced or injured thereby, the
probate court may decide questions on ownership.

JBD 37
[5] In all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions

Practically, par. 6 makes the RTC the universal catcher – what does not belong
to any other court, belongs to the RTC. That’s what this provision is saying.

That is why, because of this, there are problems reaching the SC on


jurisdiction – whether a case belongs to this, to the regular court or to a special
quasi-judicial body. And we are going to go over some of these cases.

a. HLURB or RTC?

SANDOVAL vs. CANEBA


190 SCRA 77 [1990]

FACTS: The quarrel in this case involves the owner of the subdivision
and the buyer. Later on, the buyer refused to pay the unpaid
installments. The subdivision developer filed a case for the collection of
unpaid installments over the subdivision lots.
HELD: The regular courts have no jurisdiction. That should be
decided by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
formerly known as NHA. Under PD 957, it is the HLURB not the RTC or
MTC which has the jurisdiction to hear a case involving non-payment
of installments over subdivision lots.

The counterpart of this case was the case of

CT TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. HIBIONADA


191 SCRA 268 [1990]

FACTS: This is also the case between the buyers of a subdivision lot
against the subdivision developer. Only this time it is the subdivision
lot buyers who are suing the developer of the subdivision. The
subdivision lot owners filed against the subdivision developer for not
maintaining properly the roads of the subdivision. So they filed a case
for specific performance with damages to compel the developer to
comply with the contract to maintain the roads.

HELD: The jurisdiction is with the HLURB and not with the regular
courts. But according to the plaintiff “But I’m also claiming for damages so
that it should be filed before the regular courts. How can the HLURB award

JBD 38
damages? Only the regular courts can award the damages.” Can the HLURB
award damages? According to the SC:
“The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims
resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the
fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now
performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the
legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by
them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of
regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise.”
So quasi-judicial bodies are now authorized to award damages.

As a matter of fact in Labor Relations, the question is asked whether the


NLRC is authorized to grant damages also to an employee, moral and
exemplary, which normally is only awarded by courts. The Labor Code says yes.
In other words, even damages now can be awarded by administrative bodies
such as NLRC.

FAJARDO vs. BAUTISTA


232 SCRA 291 [1994]

FACTS: Isabelo and Marita Jareno are the owners and developers of a
subdivision. Fajardo and others, as buyers, signed separate contracts
each designated a contract to sell under which for consideration therein
stated, the Jarenos bound themselves to sell to Fajardo et al the lot
subject thereof, and after the latter shall have paid the purchase price
and interest shall execute in favor of Fajardo et al the corresponding
deeds of sale.
When these contracts to sell are still ongoing the Jarenos sold these
lots to other buyers and the title was transferred to the second buyer. So
when Fajardo et al learned about it, they filed separate complaints with
the RTC for annulment of the sale to the other buyers.
Now, according to Fajardo, the jurisdiction of the case belongs to the
RTC and not with the HLURB because the title of the lots are transferred
to the other buyers. It is no longer under the name of Jareno. Secondly,
their action is for the annulment of title to a third person. Thirdly, these
third persons are not the developers; fourthly, under the Judiciary Law,
actions involving title to a real property are to be tried by the RTC.

HELD: The RTC still has NO jurisdiction because the case involved
unsound real estate business practice on the part of the subdivision
owners and developers. Under the law, unsound real estate business
practice is under the HLURB. The practice in the case is not a sound real
estate business – I am a developer, I enter into a contract with you and
then later on I sold the contract to a third person, that is unsound!
“By virtue of P.D. 1344, the HLURB has the exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide the matter. In addition to involving unsound real estate
JBD 39
business practices, the complaints also involve specific performance of
the contractual and statutory obligations of the owners or developers of
the subdivision.” So it is still with the HLURB and not with the regular
courts.

BENGUET CORPORATION vs. LEVISTE


204 SCRA 99 [1991]

FACTS: A mining company entered into an operations agreement for


management with another mining company. Then later on, one wants to
file a case for rescission of the agreement for one reason or another. So it
was filed with the RTC.

HELD: The RTC has NO jurisdiction again because PD 1281 vested


with the Bureau of Mines with jurisdictional supervision and control
over all issues on mining claims and that the Bureau of Mines shall
have the original exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving the cancellation and enforcement of mining contracts.

The trend is to make the adjudication of mining cases a purely administrative


matter.

b.Re Transfer of jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations to the RTC-

As regards the law transferring the jurisdiction of the CAR to the RTC, it
became partially obsolete with the enactment of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) or RA 6657 (June 15, 1988). Under the CARL, all agrarian
disputes between landlord and tenant, lessor and lessee were transferred to the
DAR particularly the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), making them
quasi-judicial cases. So, from CAR to RTC, from RTC to DARAB

So the RTC has NO jurisdiction, EXCEPT in the following 2 cases:

QUISMUNDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS


201 SCRA 609 [1991]

HELD: “With the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which


took effect on August 29, 1987, the Regional Trial Courts were
divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters.
The said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian
Reform. Said provisions thus delimit the jurisdiction of the regional
trial courts in agrarian cases only to two instances:

JBD 40
1.) petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners; and
2.) prosecution of criminal offenses under said Act.

EXAMPLE: If you are a landowner and your agricultural land is


placed under the CARP coverage, the government will fix the payment
for you. The trouble is that you did not agree on the amount of payment.
You want to contest the amount of compensation payable, in which
court will you file your action?
RTC and you ask for higher compensation.

Another case is the case of

MACHETE vs. COURT OF APPEALS


250 SCRA 176 [1995]

FACTS: This case involves the collection by the landowner of unpaid


back rentals from his leasehold tenants. The landowner filed the money
claims before the RTC.

HELD: The RTC has no jurisdiction over cases for collection of back
rentals for the leasehold tenants. This is an agrarian dispute which is
exclusively cognizable by the DARAB.
“The failure of petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the
leasehold contract with landowner is an issue which is clearly beyond
the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence.”

c. The Professional Regulatory Commission-


That is the government body which administers all government examination
for professionals except members of the law profession. Now, this is what
happened in the case of

LUPANGCO ET AL vs. COURT OF APPEALS


160 SCRA 848 [1988]

FACTS: Lupangco et al were BS Accounting graduates and reviewing


to take the CPA exams in 1985.
There were some anomalies (leakages) in the 1985 CPA Board
Examination. By next year, the PRC passed a resolution prohibiting CPA
examinees to attend review classes or conferences because of leakages.
JBD 41
They are prohibited from receiving any handouts, review materials or
any tip from any school, college or university. That was Resolution No.
105 of the PRC.
So petitioners Lupangco et al, all CPA reviewers filed an injunction
suit against the PRC and to declare the resolution unconstitutional. They
filed it with the RTC. The PRC moved to dismiss alleging that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the case because the one which has the
jurisdiction is the CA – exclusive jurisdiction to review any decision,
order, ruling or- resolution of any quasi-judicial body. And the PRC is a
quasi-judicial body. So their resolution can only be questioned before
the CA and not with the RTC.

HELD: The PRC is WRONG because PRC is not only a quasi-judicial


body, it is also a quasi-legislative body. It also acts as legislative body by
issuing rules and regulations.
Now, what kind of resolution is being questioned here? It is a
resolution pursuant to its purely administrative function. It is a measure
to preserve the integrity of licensure examination. Therefore, it does not
belong to the CA. It is not the type of resolution contemplated by
Section 9.
“The authority of the CA to review all resolutions of all quasi-judicial
bodies pursuant to the law does not cover rules and regulations of
general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its
purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105
which was adopted by the PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of
licensure examinations.” So that is not the resolution reviewable by the
CA.
Now, under what provision under Section 19 can we justify the
jurisdiction of the RTC in the case. The SC said: It is under paragraph 1
where the case is incapable of pecuniary estimation or, it may fall under
paragraph 6 where the case is not within the exclusive jurisdiction by
any court, tribunal or- body exercising Judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.

So, if it is not reviewable by the CA, in what court can you question the
resolution? Definitely, not the CA, definitely not the SC. I don’t think it’s with
the NLRC. So it will fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC. Or, it can also fall
under paragraph [1,] where the subject matter of the suit is not capable of
pecuniary estimation because what is the nature of the demands is to declare
unconstitutional this resolution. So it belongs to the jurisdiction of the RTC.

d.The Energy Regulatory Board-

BERNARDO vs. CALTEX PHIL. INC.


216 SCRA 170 [1992]

JBD 42
FACTS: Under E.O. No. 172, when there is a dispute between an
operator or dealer and an Oil company regarding dealership agreement,
the case shall be under the jurisdiction of the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB). So any dispute regarding their relationship agreement except
disputes arising out of the relationship as debtor and creditor. So if the
dispute arose out of the relationship as debtor and creditor, it should be
filed with the RTC.
Now what happened here is that on December 5, 1990, Bernardo, a
dealer of Caltex, ordered gasoline from Caltex. So he ordered in the
morning. At 6:00 at night on the same day, there was a price increase. So
when the gasoline was delivered the following day, Caltex charged
Bernardo for the increased price. Bernardo refused to pay and he filed a
case before the RTC. Caltex argued that the case should be filed with the
ERB.

HELD: The RTC has jurisdiction because “a contract of sale of


petroleum products was here perfected between Caltex and its
operator/dealer Bernardo; that in virtue of the payment admittedly
made by Bernardo, Caltex became a “debtor” to him in the sense that it
was obligated to make delivery to Bernardo of the petroleum products
ordered by him; and that the only issue is the manner by which Caltex
shall perform its commitment in Bernardo’s favor. It is rather one
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, as a dispute indeed ‘arising out
of their relationship as debtor and creditor.’”
“What the controversy is all about, to repeat, is simply the prices at
which the petroleum products shall be deemed to have been purchased
from Caltex by Bernardo in December 5, 1990. This is obviously a civil
law question, one determinable according to the provisions of the Civil
Code and hence, beyond the cognizance of the Energy Regulatory
Board.”

e. On Customs Matters-

The RTC is devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity
of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs, and
to enjoin or otherwise interfere with the said proceedings even if the seizure was
illegal. Such act does not deprive the Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon.
(RV Marzan Freight, Inc. v. CA, 424 SCRA 596)

The Court held that the Trial court was incompetent to pass upon and nullify:
(1)the seizure of the cargo in the abandonment proceedings, and (2) the
declaration made by the District Collector of Customs that the cargo was
abandoned and ipso facto owned by the government. It, likewise, has no
jurisdiction to resolve the issue of whether or not the private respondent was the
owner of the cargo before it was gutted by fire. The trial court should have
rendered judgment dismissing the complaint, without prejudice to the right of
JBD 43
the private respondent to ventilate the issue before the Commissioner of
Customs and/or to the CTA as provided for in the Tariff and Customs Code.

e. Disputed Assessments-

The CTA has jurisdiction over disputed assessments, and the ordinary courts
over non-disputed ones. Failure of a taxpayer to appeal to the CTA makes the
assessment final and executory. Thereafter, if a collection suit is filed in the court,
there can no longer be any inquiry on the merits of the original case. (Republic v.
Dy Chay 1 SCRA 975; Olivares v. Marquez, 438 SCRA 679)

Non-Disputed Assessments

As provided in RA 9262, the CTA has:

“(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and
executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties; Provided, however,
that collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of
charges and penalties, claimed is less than P1M shall be tried by the proper MTC,
MetTC and RTC.

The tax collection case would fall under the jurisdiction of the first level courts
where the amount does not exceed P300,000.00 or in MM where it does not
exceed P400,000.00.

Where, however, what is being questioned is the very authority and power of
the assessor, acting solely and independently, to impose the assessment and of
the treasurer to collect the tax, and not merely the amounts of the increase in the
tax, jurisdiction over the case was properly with the trial courts. (Olivares v.
Marquez 438 SCRA 679)

f. Special jurisdiction to try special cases-

Sec. 23 of BP 129 provides that certain branches of the RTC may be designated
by the Supreme Court to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and
domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban and land reform cases which do
not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such
other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a
speedy and efficient administration of justice.

[6] In all cases in which the demand, exclusive


of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value
of the property in controversy exceeds One Hundred
Thousand pesos (P100,000.00) [now P300,000] or, in

JBD 44
such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two
Hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00)[now P400,000]

The best example is money claim. Most cases which go to court now are
money claims – an action to collect sum of money.

Q: Unpaid loan – you would like to collect an unpaid loan of your debtor.
Where will you file your case?
A: It depends on how much are you collecting. If it is over P300,000 outside
Metro Manila – RTC, in Metro Manila, – P400,000. If the amount that you are
collecting is only P300,000 or less obviously, you file your case in the MTC.

If the value of the claim is > P300,000 – RTC


If the value of the claim is = or < P300,000 – MTC

Q: Suppose the principal amount that you borrowed from me is P300,000, the
interest is P30,000. And you are collecting P10,000 for moral damages, another
P10,000 for expense of litigation, etc. So my total claim is P350,000. Where will I
file the case?
A: MTC. In determining the jurisdictional limit of P300,000, do not include the
interest, damages, attorney’s fees, etc. So you deduct those from the principal
claim even if you put them in your complaint because the law says, “xxx
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and costs xxx.”

Q: What are litigation expenses and costs?


A: Costs are not the same as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Actually,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses are part of damages. Costs are governed
by Rule 141, while attorney’s fees and litigation expenses are governed by the
Civil Code.

ACTIONS PURELY FOR DAMAGES

SITUATION: Suppose the action is purely for damages, like breach of contract
of carriage. Instead of bringing you to your destination, you ended up in the
hospital. You now sue the common carrier for damages and your claim is P1
million for injuries, moral, exemplary, etc. Where will you file the case?

This question has been clarified by SC Circular No. 09-94: “Guidelines in the
Implementation of RA 7691 Extending the Jurisdiction of the MTCs” where the
SC said that the provision excluding damages applies only if the damages are
INCIDENTAL to the action. If the main cause of action is 100% damages, you
include it in determining tire P300,000 jurisdictional limit of the MTC.

JBD 45
EXAMPLE: Ms. Pastor rode on a PAL fight. The plane crashed but she
survived. She claims for damages for breach of contract of carriage amounting to
P1 million.
Q: Where will she file her case?
A: RTC because the amount of the claim for damages exceeded P300,000.
Since the case is purely for damages, it is included in determining the jurisdiction
of the court.

The rule is, you only exclude the damages if it is a secondary claim. But if
damages is the primary or only claim, you determine whether the total claim for
damages is above P300,000, or equal to or less than P300,000.

The SC said in this Circular, “the exclusive damages of whatever kind” in


determining the jurisdiction under Section 19 paragraph [8] applies to cases
where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause
of action. However, if the claim for damages is the main cause of action, the
amount of such claim should be considered in determining the jurisdiction.

EXAMPLE: P will file a case against D to recover a piece of land worth


P20,000.00 only. But her claim for damages exceeds P300,000.
Q: In what court will P file a civil case where she wants to recover a piece of
land with value of only P20,000?
A: MTC because of paragraph [2]. As regards the damages of P300,000.00,
MTC still has jurisdiction because such damages, being incidental, is not
included in determining the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Now, the law says, “exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,


attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or THE VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY IN CONTROVERSY exceeds P300,000….”

Q: What is the property in controversy?


A: Obviously here, the property is PERSONAL PROPERTY not real. If the
property sought to be recovered is real, apply paragraph [2] of Section 19 on
recovery of real property.

Q: You want to recover your car which your friend borrowed but did not
return, which court has jurisdiction?

MTC if the value is P300,000.00 or less, and RTC, if over.

Q: Who shall determine the value or how should the value be determined?
A: In determining the jurisdiction of the court, over the subject matter, the
allegations in the complaint governs.

JBD 46
7. Jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies

Sec. 5.2 of the Securities Regulation Code (RA No 8799) provides that the
RTCs shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases:

a.) Cases involving devises or schemes employed by or any act, of the board of
directors, business associates, its officers or partnership, amounting to
fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of
the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of associations or
organizations registered with the Commission.
b.) Controversies arising out of inter-corporate or partnership relations,
between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or
all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they
are stockholders, members or associates, respectively, and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns
their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity.
c.) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers
or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations; and
d.)Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in the
state of suspension of payments in cases where the corporation,
partnership or association possesses sufficient property to cover all its
debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they
respectively fall due or in cases where the corporation, partnership or
association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the
management of a Rehabilitation Receiver or Management Committee.

Read Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corporation v. Cullen, GR No.


181416, Nov. 11, 2013.

As may be seen from the foregoing enumeration, jurisdiction is


determined:
(1) by the nature of the action; or
(2) by the value of the demand; or
(3) by the value of the property involved.

CONCURRENT ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE RTC

b. Concurrent
1) with Supreme Court
Actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls (Sec.
21[1], Batas Blg. 129 [1983])

JBD 47
2) with Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
Petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto (Sec. 5 [1], Article
VIII, 1987 Constitution)

3) with Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and Sandiganbayan


a) Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, if they relate to an act
or omission of a municipal trial court, corporation, board, officer, or person
(Sec. 4, Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, dated December
12, 2007)
b) Petitions for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data (Sec. 3, A.M. No. 07
9-12-SC or “The Rule on the Writ of Amparo,” effective October 24,
2007; Sec. 3, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, effective February 2, 2008)

4) with metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, and municipal circuit trial
courts
Application for Protection Order under Sec. 10, Rep. Act No. 9282, unless
there is a Family Court in the residence of petitioner.

5) with Insurance Commission


Claims not exceeding PhP 100,000.00 (Sec. 416, Insurance Code [1974],
Pres. Decree No. 612 [1975]. Applicable if subject of the action is not
capable of pecuniary estimation; otherwise, jurisdiction is concurrent with
Metropolitan Trial Court, etc.

Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. -


Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original
jurisdiction:

Concurrent with the CA and SC-


[1] In the issuance of writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus,
and injunction which may be enforced in any part of
their respective regions;

Q: What is the difference between the original jurisdiction of the RTC in


Section 21 and the original jurisdiction of the RTC in Section 19?
A: In Section 19, you have the EXCLUSIVE original jurisdiction, whereas in
Section 21 you have the original jurisdiction but CONCURRENT with other
courts.

JBD 48
Thus “original” jurisdiction stated in Section 21 is also shared with the SC and
CA. Therefore , the SC, CA, and RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction under
Section 21. Like issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus, etc. This is concurrent with the CA and the SC. Such
writs may be issued by (a) the RTC under Section 19; (b) CA under Section 9; and
(c) SC under Article VIII Section 5 of the Constitution. The 3 courts share
concurrent jurisdiction over these cases.

However the only difference is that writs issued by an RTC can only be
enforced in the same region where the RTC belongs. Unlike writs issued by the
SC and CA, they can be enforced anywhere in the Philippines.

Concurrent with the Supreme Court-


[2] In actions affecting ambassadors and other public
ministers and consuls.

The SC and RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction in actions affecting


ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. Section 21 paragraph 2 states
only of the concurrent original jurisdiction of the SC and RTC. Section 19 on the
jurisdiction of CA does not include the action stated in section 21 paragraph 2 as
part of its (CA’s) jurisdiction.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE RTC

Sec. 22. Appellate jurisdiction. - Regional


Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction
over all cases decided by MetTCs, MTCs and MCTCs in
their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such
cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire
record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the RTCs.
The decision of the RTCs in such cases shall be
appealable by petition for review to the CA which
may give it due course only when the petition show
prima facie that the lower court has committed an
error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal
or modification of the decision or judgment sought
to be reviewed.

All cases decided by lower courts (Metropolitan Trial Courts, etc.) in


their respective territorial jurisdictions (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Sec. 22).

JBD 49
Now take note that the RTC also has appellate jurisdiction under Section 22.
These are cases decided by the MTC. So they act as a sort of ‘court of appeals.’
The RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the MTC in
their respective territorial jurisdiction.

Q: How will the RTC decide on the appeal?


A: It shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had
in the court of origin (MTC) such as memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted. This means that witnesses will not be made to appear again in the
appeal. It is only a matter of reviewing the testimony, stenographic notes,
evidence presented, memoranda and briefs by the RTC judge.

Q: What are memoranda and briefs?


A: It is where the appealing party will argue that the decision is wrong and
try to convince the judge that the decision is wrong, and the other party to
counter act that the decision is correct.

Q: Assuming that the case is originated in the MTC and subsequently


dismissed by the RTC on appeal, is the decision by the RTC rendered pursuant to
its appellate jurisdiction appealable to the CA?
A: YES, but the mode of appeal is now different. The decision of the RTC in
such cases shall be appealable by petition to review to the CA. The CA may or
may not give it due course.

Q: What is the difference between an appeal made from the RTC to CA and
appeal from the MTC to RTC, which is dismissed by the latter and subsequently
appealed to the CA?
A: The former (RTC – CA) is in pursuance to the original jurisdiction of the
RTC. The latter (MTC-RTC-CA) is in pursuance to the appellate jurisdiction of
the RTC. (They are governed by different rules)

To illustrate:

Pursuant to original jurisdiction of Pursuant to appellate jurisdiction of


the RTC: the RTC:

COURT OF APPEALS COURT OF APPEALS

Ordinary appeal Petition for Review


(Rule 41) (Rule 42)

RTC RTC

Ordinary Appeal
(Rule 40)
JBD 50
MTC

Unlike in a case under the original jurisdiction of the RTC, where an appeal to
the CA is a matter of course. Meaning, for as long as your appeal is on time and
properly made, the CA will entertain it.

It is different, however, in a case under the appellate jurisdiction of the RTC,


even if your appeal is on time and properly made, there is no assurance that the
CA will entertain the appeal. The CA may give it due course only when your
petition for review shows prima facie evidence that the lower court has committed
an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision
or judgment sought to be reviewed.

Summary of RTC jurisdiction:


1.) As to the EXCLUSIVE original jurisdiction – Section 19 (BP 129);
2.) As to its original CONCURRENT jurisdiction – Section 21 (BP 129);
3.) As to its APPELLATE jurisdiction – Section 22 (BP 129)

JURISDICTION OF FAMILY COURTS (complete enumeration under RA


8369)

Republic Act 8369 is called the “Family Code Act of 1997”. It is an act
establishing the Family Court granting them exclusive original jurisdiction over
child and family cases amending BP 129. Under this law, it says there that there
shall be established a Family Court in every province and city in the country. In
what way was the Judiciary Law amended, particularly the Law on Jurisdiction
of the trial court? If you still recall the RTC shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over the cases affecting marital relations and it shall have original
jurisdiction over cases, which used to be within the jurisdiction of the Old
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Now, those two provisions of Section 19
has already been modified because according to Section 5 of the “Family Code
Act of 1997”:

“It is the Family Courts which shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide certain cases. Among these are petitions for guardianship and
custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter (this used to be in the
RTC), petitions for adoption of children and revocation of adoption, complaints
for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage, and those relating
to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living
together under different status and agreements and petitions for dissolution of
JBD 51
conjugal partnership of gains. Then there are petitions for support and
acknowledgment , petitions for the status of children as abandoned, etc.”

So the jurisdiction has already been transferred to the newly created Family
Courts.
Question: How are the decisions in the Family Courts appealed? It follows the
same manner of procedure in appealing from the RTC and the Court of Appeals.

How about in the present? I don’t think it is already operational.


According to the law, pending the establishment of the Family Courts, in the
meantime the Supreme Court shall designate for among the branches of the
RTCs at least one Family Court in each of the following cities… one of them is in
Cebu. One branch of the RTC will be acting as a Family Court.

Of course, it did not totally repeal the Judiciary Law because it says here
that “in areas where there is no Family Court, the cases referred to in Section 5 of
this Act shall be adjudicated by the Regional Trial Court.” Meaning, if there is no
Family Court in that area, then you will still follow the Judiciary Law, the RTC.

A. Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction


1. Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years
of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, when one or more of the victims is a
minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is
found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability
which the accused may have incurred. The sentence, however, shall be
suspended without need of application, pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 1903,
otherwise known as “The Child and Youth Welfare Code;”

2. Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, and habeas corpus in relation


to the latter (Sec. 3, A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003; Sec. 3, A.M. No.
03-02-05-SC, effective April 15, 2003);

3. Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof (Secs. A.20 and
B.28, A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, effective August 22, 2002; See also Rep. Act No. 9523,
or “An Act Requiring Certification of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development to Declare A Child ‘Legally Available for Adoption’ as a
Prerequisite for Adoption Proceedings, Amending for this Purpose Certain
Provisions of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as The Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998, Rep. Act No. 8043, otherwise known as The Inter-Country
Adoption Act of 1995, Pres. Decree No. 603, otherwise known as The Child and
Youth Welfare Code, and for Other Purposes,” approved on March 12, 2009);

4. Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage, and


those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or
JBD 52
those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains (Sec. 2, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
effective March 15, 2003);

5. Petitions for involuntary commitment of a child, for removal of custody


against child-placement or child-caring agency or individual, and for
commitment of disabled child (Secs. 4[b], 5[a][ii], 6[b], A.M. No. 02-1-19-SC,
effective April 15, 2002);
6. Petitions for support and/ or acknowledgment;
7. Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Exec. Order
No. 209, otherwise known as “The Family Code of the Philippines;”

8. Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent, or


neglected children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of
children, the suspension, termination, or restoration of parental authority and
other cases cognizable under Pres. Decree No. 603, Executive Order No. 56
(series of 1986) and other related laws;

9. Petitions for constitution of family home;


10. Cases against minors cognizable under Rep. Act No. 9165, or “The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002” (See also A.M. No. 07-8-2-SC,
effective November 5, 2007); and
11. Violation of Rep. Act No. 7610 [1991], otherwise known as the “Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploration and Discrimination
Act,” as amended by Rep. Act No. 7658 [1993] and as further amended by Rep.
Act No. 9231 [2003].
12. Violation of Rep. Act No. 9775, otherwise known as the “Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009”
13. Cases of domestic violence against:
13.1. Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely
to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and
other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which
violate a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom of movement; and
13.2. Children – which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions
prejudicial to their development.
14. Cases of violence against women and their children under Rep. Act No. 9262,
otherwise known as “Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of
2004,” including applications for Protection Order under the same Act; and
15. Criminal cases involving juveniles if no preliminary investigation is required
under Sec. 1, Rule 112 of Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (Sec. 1, A.M. No.
02-1-18-SC, effective April 15, 2002).

Note: In areas where there are no Family Courts, the above enumerated cases
shall be adjudicated by the Regional Trial Court (Sec. 17, RA No. 8369).

JBD 53
Other important considerations-

Jurisdiction and Payment of Docket Fees

Even if the amount of damages and attorney’s fees do not determine


jurisdiction, they must still be specifically alleged in the complaint for the
purpose of payment of docket fees. Thus, the higher the amount one is claiming
the higher the filing fee.

Why pay the docket fee?

Because it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory


pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. (Sun Insurance
Office Ltd. [SIOLI] v. Asuncion 170 SCRA 274, 285 [1989])

Let us review what we learned in criminal procedure.

SECTION 1.

Xxxxxx

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages
without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the
filing fees therefore shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding
such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be
required for actual damages.

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such
civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where
the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay
additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts
are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the
court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment.

JBD 54
For dependent civil action

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001.]
EMILIO EMNACE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF VICENTE
TABANAO, SHERWIN TABANAO, VICENTE WILLIAM TABANAO, JANETTE
TABANAO DEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY TABANAO VARELA, ROSELA TABANAO
and VINCENT TABANAO, respondents.

Payment of Filing fees In Case Civil Aspect Is Deemed Impliedly Instituted In the
Criminal Action:

In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interest of clarity and
certainty, categorically declares for guidance of all concerned that when the civil action is
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court – because the offended party has not waived the civil action, or
reserved the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the
criminal action – the rule is as follows: (1) when the amount of the damages, other than
actual, is alleged in the complaint or information filed in court, then the corresponding
filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon filing thereof in court for trial; (2) in
any other case, however, -- i.e. when the amount of damages is not so alleged in the
complaint or information filed in court the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and
shall simply constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an award for actual
damages. (General vs. Hon. Claravall, et al., 195 SCRA 623)

Q: Suppose there was no mention of any claim for moral or exemplary damages, by
not stating the amount claimed, can he still prove them during the trial?
YES.
But he did not pay docket fee?
A: Never mind, once it is awarded, there is now a lien in the judgment for the payment
of the docket fee.

For Independent Civil Actions

In the case of Sun Insurance if the damages was not mentioned in the complaint in the
civil case they are deemed waived. If it is mentioned, and the amount is fixed you must
pay the docket fee at the start of the case though if it is not complete, you are given the
chance to complete the payment or amend the complaint within reasonable time.

In criminal cases, even if there is no mention of damages in the information, you can still
prove and claim them as long as there is no waiver or reservation.

When docket fee is due for actual damage:

JBD 55
So in criminal cases, if the claim for moral or exemplary damages is mentioned in the
information, you must pay the docket fee upon filing of the information. But whether
alleged in the information or not, you can claim for actual damages and there is no docket
fee for actual damages except in cases under BP 22. That is the exception which is now
embodied in Section 1 paragraph [b] which was taken from SC circular 57-97 – there is
no payment of docket fee for actual damages except in criminal cases for violation of BP
22 because paragraph [b] says:

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed.

OTHER CASES ON FILING FEE IN CIVIL CASES:

In the case of
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. CA
149 SCRA 562

FACTS: The plaintiff files a complaint and paid the docket fee but he
did not specify the amount of the damages he was claiming. He
contended that he is claiming for moral damages in such amount as the
court will grant. Respondent contended, on the other hand, that it
cannot be done, there is a necessity to state the exact amount of the
damages in order to determine the correct amount of the docket fee. So
the plaintiff amended the complaint and paid the balance of the docket
fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent amendment cures the defect?

HELD: No, the defect is incurable. Thus, the action has to be


dismissed. The court acquires no jurisdiction over the case. The remedy
is to re-file the complaint and pay again the complete amount of the
docket fee. The prior payment made is forfeited in as much as the defect
in the first complaint is incurable.

So based on the MANCHESTER ruling, you cannot cure the defect by merely
amending the complaint.

However, the SC, after reflecting on what it said in the case of MANCHESTER,
realized the harshness of their decision. This Manchester ruling was relaxed in
the subsequent case of SUN INSURANCE OFFICE which is now the governing
law:

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE LTD. vs. COURT OF APPEALS


170 SCRA 274 [1989]

HELD: Thus, the Court rules as follows:


JBD 56
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party
claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until
and unless the filing fee prescribed therefore is paid. The court may also
allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the
filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing
fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.

Payment of docket fee and counterclaims


Second rule:

“The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims…”

Re Compulsory Counterclaim

Rule 141 on Legal Fees was revised effective August 26, 2004 by AM No. 04-2-
04-SC and the revision includes the payment of docket fees not only for
permissive counterclaim but also for compulsory counterclaims. But the SC
suspended the enforcement of the new rates of legal fees under Rule 141 effective
September 21, 2004, with respect to compulsory counterclaims, among others. It
did not suspend the imposition of legal fees.

However, in Korea Technologies Co. Ltd. Vs. Lerma, 542 SCRA 1, January 7,
2008, the Court said:

“On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its
counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said
counterclaim being compulsory in nature. We stress, however, that effective
August 16, 2004, under Sec. 7 of Rule 141, as amended by AM No. 04-2-04-SC,
docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or cross
claims.”

JBD 57
And the third rule laid down in Sun Insurance re judgment awarding a
claim not specified or even if specified but amount is not fixed-

If the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleadings, or if specified


the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee.

Q: When can this possibly happen?


A: That can happen for example if I ask for damages. A man was hospitalized
because of physical injuries. While still in the hospital he filed an action for
damages and based the amount of damages on the current billing but alleged
that he continues to incur expenses as may be determined in the course of trial.
He paid the docket fee corresponding to the amount mentioned. After trial he
was able to establish expenses in the sum of P50,000.00.

Q: Can the court award the P 50,000?


A: Yes, because the additional expenses came only after the filing of the case.
The additional docket fee will constitute a lien on the award.

Another instance is when during the trial evidence was presented without
objection on a damage not stated in the complaint or as a counterclaim.

Rule on docket fee when the case involves real property and a claim for
damages

The Sun Insurance is a leading case on docket fee. It was followed with a third
case in December 1989 which further clarified the SUN INSURANCE ruling. This
is the case of

TACAY vs. RTC OF TAGUM, DAVAO DEL NORTE


180 SCRA 433 [1989]

NOTE: When this case was filed, there was no SUN INSURANCE
decision yet. The guiding rule was still MANCHESTER. But while this
was pending the SUN INSURANCE was already out.

FACTS: The case was for recovery of land with damages. So it is not
purely for damages. So the amount of filing fee is assessed based on the
assessed value of the land because it is a real action, which the plaintiff
paid.
Defendant moved to dismiss based on MANCHESTER because the
plaintiff did not specify in the complaint how much damages he was
claiming. Now the RTC of Tagum denies the motion to dismiss. The
defendant goes to the SC citing MANCHESTER.
JBD 58
Of course the SC said that the Manchester ruling was no longer
controlling because of Sun Insurance.

But it enunciated another rule.

HELD:

“Where the action involves real property and a related claim for
damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a)
the value of the property and (b) the total amount of related damages
sought. The court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the
initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees,
or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of
the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the
court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the
meantime.”

In other words, the total docket fee must be based on the assessed
value of the land and for the damages. Thus: (1.) If the docket fee for
the recovery of land is paid but none for the damages, do not dismiss
the entire case! Just do not consider the claim for the damages. Or, (2.)
second option, citing SUN INSURANCE, give him reasonable time to
pay the balance.

[G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001.]


EMILIO EMNACE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF VICENTE
TABANAO, SHERWIN TABANAO, VICENTE WILLIAM TABANAO, JANETTE
TABANAO DEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY TABANAO VARELA, ROSELA TABANAO
and VINCENT TABANAO, respondents.
I. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance of a case despite the failure to pay the required docket
fee;
On August 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, 12 dismissing
the petition for certiorari, upon a finding that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed by the trial court in issuing the questioned
orders denying petitioner's motions to dismiss.
Not satisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review, raising the same issues
resolved by the Court of Appeals, namely:
I. Failure to pay the proper docket fee;

Xxxx xxxx xxxx


It can be readily seen that respondents' primary and ultimate objective in instituting
the action below was to recover the decedent's 1/3 share in the partnership's assets. While
they ask for an accounting of the partnership's assets and finances, what they are actually
asking is for the trial court to compel petitioner to pay and turn over their share, or the
equivalent value thereof, from the proceeds of the sale of the partnership assets. They

JBD 59
also assert that until and unless a proper accounting is done, the exact value of the
partnership's assets, as well as their corresponding share therein, cannot be ascertained.
Consequently, they feel justified in not having paid the commensurate docket fee as
required by the Rules of Court.
We do not agree. The trial court does not have to employ guesswork in ascertaining
the estimated value of the partnership's assets, for respondents themselves voluntarily
pegged the worth thereof at Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00). Hence, this case is
one which is really not beyond pecuniary estimation, but rather partakes of the nature of a
simple collection case where the value of the subject assets or amount demanded is
pecuniarily determinable. 13 While it is true that the exact value of the partnership's total
assets cannot be shown with certainty at the time of filing, respondents can and must
ascertain, through informed and practical estimation, the amount they expect to collect
from the partnership, particularly from petitioner, in order to determine the proper
amount of docket and other fees. 14 It is thus imperative for respondents to pay the
corresponding docket fees in order that the trial court may acquire jurisdiction over the
action. 15
Nevertheless, unlike in the case of Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 16 where there was clearly an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to
pay the correct docket fees, we see no attempt to cheat the courts on the part of
respondents. In fact, the lower courts have noted their expressed desire to remit to the
court "any payable balance or lien on whatever award which the Honorable Court may
grant them in this case should there be any deficiency in the payment of the docket fees
to be computed by the Clerk of Court." 17 There is evident willingness to pay, and the
fact that the docket fee paid so far is inadequate is not an indication that they are trying to
avoid paying the required amount, but may simply be due to an inability to pay at the
time of filing. This consideration may have moved the trial court and the Court of
Appeals to declare that the unpaid docket fees shall be considered a lien on the judgment
award.
Petitioner, however, argues that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
condoning the non-payment of the proper legal fees and in allowing the same to become
a lien on the monetary or property judgment that may be rendered in favor of
respondents. There is merit in petitioner's assertion. The third paragraph of Section 16,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court states that:
The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment in favor of the
pauper-litigant.
Respondents cannot invoke the above provision in their favor because it specifically
applies to pauper-litigants. Nowhere in the records does it appear that respondents are
litigating as paupers, and as such are exempted from the payment of court fees. 18
The rule applicable to the case at bar is Section 5(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
which defines the two kinds of claims as: (1) those which are immediately ascertainable;
and (2) those which cannot be immediately ascertained as to the exact amount. This
second class of claims, where the exact amount still has to be finally determined by the
courts based on evidence presented, falls squarely under the third paragraph of said
Section 5(a), which provides:
In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is less or more in
accordance with the appraisal of the court, the difference of fee shall be refunded or paid
as the case may be. (Emphasis ours)

JBD 60
In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 19 this Court
pronounced that the above-quoted provision "clearly contemplates an initial payment of
the filing fees corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim subject to adjustment
as to what later may be proved." 20 Moreover, we reiterated therein the principle that the
payment of filing fees cannot be made contingent or dependent on the result of the case.
Thus, an initial payment of the docket fees based on an estimated amount must be paid
simultaneous with the filing of the complaint. Otherwise, the court would stand to lose
the filing fees should the judgment later turn out to be adverse to any claim of the
respondent heirs.
The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are necessary
to defray court expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in order to avoid
tremendous losses to the judiciary, and to the government as well, the payment of docket
fees cannot be made dependent on the outcome of the case, except when the claimant is a
pauper-litigant.
Applied to the instant case, respondents have a specific claim — 1/3 of the value of all
the partnership assets — but they did not allege a specific amount. They did, however,
estimate the partnership's total assets to be worth Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00),
in a letter 21 addressed to petitioner. Respondents cannot now say that they are unable to
make an estimate, for the said letter and the admissions therein form part of the records of
this case. They cannot avoid paying the initial docket fees by conveniently omitting the
said amount in their amended complaint. This estimate can be made the basis for the
initial docket fees that respondents should pay. Even if it were later established that the
amount proved was less or more than the amount alleged or estimated, Rule 141, Section
5(a) of the Rules of Court specifically provides that the court may refund the excess or
exact additional fees should the initial payment be insufficient. It is clear that it is only
the difference between the amount finally awarded and the fees paid upon filing of this
complaint that is subject to adjustment and which may be subjected to a lien.
In the oft-quoted case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, 22
this Court held that when the specific claim "has been left for the determination by the
court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment and it shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said
lien and assess and collect the additional fee." Clearly, the rules and jurisprudence
contemplate the initial payment of filing and docket fees based on the estimated claims of
the plaintiff, and it is only when there is a deficiency that a lien may be constituted on the
judgment award until such additional fee is collected.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint
outright despite their failure to pay the proper docket fees. Nevertheless, as in other
procedural rules, it may be liberally construed in certain cases if only to secure a just and
speedy disposition of an action. While the rule is that the payment of the docket fee in the
proper amount should be adhered to, there are certain exceptions which must be strictly
construed. 23
In recent rulings, this Court has relaxed the strict adherence to the Manchester
doctrine, allowing the plaintiff to pay the proper docket fees within a reasonable time
before the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 24
In the recent case of National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court held that:
The court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory
pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not
paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees

JBD 61
within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription
has set in the meantime.
It does not follow, however, that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint
for failure of private respondent to pay the correct amount of docket fees. Although the
payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may
allow the plaintiff in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time before the
expiration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails
to comply within this requirement, the defendant should timely raise the issue of
jurisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. In the latter case, the balance
between the appropriate docket fees and the amount actually paid by the plaintiff will be
considered a lien or any award he may obtain in his favor. (Emphasis ours)
Accordingly, the trial court in the case at bar should determine the proper docket fee
based on the estimated amount that respondents seek to collect from petitioner, and direct
them to pay the same within a reasonable time, provided the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period has not yet expired. Failure to comply therewith, and upon motion
by petitioner, the immediate dismissal of the complaint shall issue on jurisdictional
grounds.

While Sun Insurance relaxed the rule (as to how or when to complete the
payment), it did not however, effect any change in the rule that it is not only
the filing of the complaint but also the payment of the docket fee that is
necessary for the acquisition of the jurisdiction of the court over the
complaint filed. (Gensoli & Co. v. NLRC, 289 SCRA 407, 413 [1998]). If the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fees, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period. (Colarina v. CA, 303 SCRA 647, 654 [1999])

Other interesting cases on docket fees.

No “file now, pay later” policy

FILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS


171 SCRA 674 [1989]

FACTS: Adrian dela Paz sued all oil companies (Shell, Caltex, Mobil,
etc.) of the Philippines for infringement of patent with prayer for the
payment of reasonable compensation for damages. According to him,
these companies used in their operation a certain type of machine which
he claimed he invented. His patent was infringed. Thus, all these
companies are all liable to him for royalties. The estimated yearly
royalty due him is P236,572. Since the violation has been for many years
already, his claims reached millions. The trial court ordered him to pay

JBD 62
P945,636.90 as docket fee. He had no money so he questioned it. The
trial court ruled:
“We will allow you to file the case and the docket fee is deductible
from whatever judgment of damages shall be awarded by the court.”

HELD: There is no such thing as file now pay later. No justification


can be found to convert such payment to something akin to a contingent
fee which would depend on the result of the case.

“Filing fees are intended to take care of court expenses in the


handling of cases in terms of cost of supplies, use of equipments,
salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, etc., computed as to man hours
used in handling of each case. The payment of said fees therefore,
cannot be made dependent on the result of the action taken, without
entailing tremendous losses to the government and to the judiciary in
particular.”

What is the remedy of the plaintiff if he/she cannot really pay the filing fee?

Have himself declared by the court as a pauper litigant.

LACSON vs. REYES


182 SCRA 729

FACTS: There was a case filed and then the lawyer filed a motion to
direct the plaintiff to pay him his attorney’s fees – a motion for payment
of attorney’s fees.

Is the lawyer required to pay a filing fee?

HELD: Yes. “It may be true that the claim for attorney's fees was but
an incident in the main case, still, it is not an escape valve from the
payment of docket fees because as in all actions, whether separate or as
an offshoot of a pending proceeding, the payment of docket fees is
mandatory. The docket fee should be paid before the court would
validly act on the motion.”

SUSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS


278 SCRA 284 [August 21, 1997)

FACTS: Mortz filed a case against Charles in Leyte. After filing, the
court dismissed the case because it should be filed in Cebu. Mortz wrote
a letter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) asking that the

JBD 63
docket fee paid in Leyte be considered applicable to Cebu. OCA granted
his request.

Charles questioned it because of the rule that the payment of docket


fee is jurisdictional.

HELD: “The OCA has neither the power nor the authority to exempt
any party not otherwise exempt under the law or under the Rules of
Court in the payment of the prescribed docket fees. It may be
noteworthy to mention here that even in the Supreme Court, there are
numerous instances when a litigant has had to re-file a petition
previously dismissed by the Court due to a technicality (violation of a
pertinent Circular), and in these instances, the litigant is required to pay
the prescribed docket fee and not apply to the re-filed case the docket
fees paid in the earlier dismissed case.”
“In the case at bar, in the strict sense, Mortz’s complaint cannot be
deemed to have been ‘re-filed’ in Cebu City because it was not originally
filed in the same court but in the RTC Leyte. Thus, when Mortz’s
complaint was docketed by the clerk of court of the RTC Cebu City, it
became an entirely separate case from that dismissed by the RTC of
Leyte due to improper venue. As far as the case in Cebu is concerned,
while undoubtedly the order of dismissal is not an adjudication on the
merits of the case, the order, nevertheless, is a final order. This means
that when private respondent did not appeal therefrom, the order
became final and executory for all legal intents and purposes.”

DE LEON vs. COURT OF APPEALS


287 SCRA 94 [March 6, 1998]

FACTS: The question for decision is whether in assessing the docket


fees to be paid for the filing of an action for annulment or rescission of a
contract of sale, the value of the real property, subject matter of the
contract, should be used as basis, or whether the action should be
considered as one which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and
therefore the fee charged should be a flat rate of P400.00 as provided in
Rule 141, Section 7(b)(1) of the Rules of Court.
Defendant argued that an action for annulment or rescission of a
contract of sale of real property is a real action and, therefore, the
amount of the docket fees to be paid by Plaintiff should be based either
on the assessed value of the property, subject matter of the action, or its
estimated value as alleged in the complaint.
Since Plaintiff alleged that the land, in which they claimed an interest
as heirs, had been sold for P4,378,000.00 to defendant, this amount
should be considered the estimated value of the land for the purpose of
determining the docket fees.
JBD 64
Plaintiff countered that an action for annulment or rescission of a
contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and, so, the docket fees should be the fixed amount of P400.00 in Rule
141, Section 7(b).

HELD: Plaintiff is correct. “In determining whether an action is one


the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of
first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. “
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental
to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have
the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance)
and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.”
“The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases,
besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other
factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of
courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the
time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating
jurisdiction.”
“Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly
pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance and
no cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by the parties,
why an action for rescission (or resolution) should be differently treated,
a "rescission" being a counterpart, so to speak, of ‘specific
performance’.”
“In both cases, the court would certainly have to undertake an
investigation into facts that would justify one act or the other. No
award for damages may be had in an action for rescission without first
conducting an inquiry into matters which would justify the setting aside
of a contract. Issues of the same nature may be raised by a party against
whom an action for rescission has been brought, or by the plaintiff
himself.”
“It is, therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action
for rescission should be taken as the basis for concluding such action as
one capable of pecuniary estimation — a prayer which must be included
in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what he may have
suffered as a result of the breach committed by defendant, and not later
on precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a
cause of action and discouraging multiplicity of suits.”
JBD 65
“Thus, although eventually the result may be the recovery of land, it
is the nature of the action as one for rescission of contract which is
controlling.”
“Since the action of Plaintiff against Defendant is solely for
annulment or rescission which is not susceptible of pecuniary
estimation, the action should not be confused and equated with the
‘value of the property’ subject of the transaction; that by the very nature
of the case, the allegations, and specific prayer in the complaint, sans
any prayer for recovery of money and/or value of the transaction, or for
actual or compensatory damages, the assessment and collection of the
legal fees should not be intertwined with the merits of the case and/or
what may be its end result.”

In Go vs. UCPB, GR No. 156182 Nov. 11, 2004 the court declared the following
as real actions:
3.) judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage;
4.) actions to annul real estate mortgage;
for the reason that a real estate mortgage is a real right as well as a real property.
So an action to cancel or annul a real estate mortgage necessarily affects title to
the real property, hence a real action and jurisdiction is determined by the
assessed value of the property.

JBD 66

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