PEOPLE v PANTALEON, JR falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister.
or notary or ecclesiastic minister. Any of PD2 1606 3, as amended by RA 4 82495 where the Sandiganbayan shall
G.R. Nos. 158694-96, March 13, 2009
FACTS:
A joint affidavit-complaints filed by V-Mayor Billman and company
alleged that the appellants, Ken Swan Tiu, and Engr. Ramos conspired to illegally
disburse and misappropriate the public funds of the Municipality of Castillejos,
Zambales by falsifying the supporting documents relating to 3 fictitious or ghost
construction projects. It further alleged that the disbursement vouchers were
not signed by the municipal accountant and budget officer; that the Sangguniang
Bayan did not adopt a resolution authorizing Pantaleon to enter into a contract
with La Paz Construction and/or Ken Swan Tiu; and that no projects were actually
undertaken by the Municipality of Castillejos.
OSP recommended to file the filing of an Information for
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents against
the appellants and Ken Swan Tiu, and the dismissal of the complaint against
Engr. Ramos.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed 3 separate Informations for
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents against
the appellants before the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan found guilty the appellants Pantaleon and
Vallejos, former Municipal Mayor and Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of the
Municipality of Castillejos, of the charged malversation of public funds through
falsification of public documents, defined and penalized under Article 217, in
relation with Articles 48 and 171 of the RPC.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED COMMIT THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS
HELD:
YES, the accused committed complex crime of malversation of public
funds through falsification of public documents. The essential elements common
to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the RPC are the following: (a) That
the offender be a public officer. (b) That he had the custody or control of funds
or property by reason of the duties of his office. (c) That those funds or property
were public funds or property for which he was accountable. (d) That he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them, were present in the case,
thus committing the crime of malversation.
Falsification was a necessary means to commit the crime of
malversation under Article 171, paragraphs (2) and (5) of the RPC whereby
public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position,
shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: 2. Causing it to
appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did
not in fact so participate; 5. Altering true dates commits falsification. In the case,
evidence showed that Vallejos filled up the spaces for the voucher number and
the accounting entry of Disbursement Vouchers. These items were required to
be filled up by Nida as the municipal accountant. Thus, Vallejos made it appear
that the municipal accountant participated in signing the disbursement vouchers.
ULEP v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 183373, January 30, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was a government employee serving as money order teller
at the Fort Bonifacio Post Office with a salary grade lower than grade 27. She was
charged with the crime of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
Subsequently, she was convicted as charged and was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 19
years of reclusion temporal as maximum, to pay a fine of ₱113,768 and to pay
Philippine Postal Corporation the same amount.
On appeal, the trial court issued order that the records of the case
and all the evidence be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It
held that malversation belongs to the classification of public office-related
crimes under subparagraph (b) of Section 4 of PD2 1606 3, as amended by RA 4
82495 where the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
Thus, petitioner filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating her
argument that the appellate court should have ordered the transfer of the
records of the case to the Sandiganbayan instead of dismissing her appeal
outright. She asks this Court to reconsider its earlier resolution denying her
petition for review since this case involves her constitutional right to liberty.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CASE ONSTEAD OF ORDERING THE TRANSFER OF THE RECORDS TO
SANDIGANBAYAN.
HELD:
YES, as held by the court, petitioner did not even have to specify the
court to which her appeal was to be taken. Malversation belongs to the
classification of public office-related crimes under subparagraph (b) of Section 4
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: A. Violations of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense. B. Other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in
relation to their office.
The trial court was duty bound to forward the records of the case to
the proper forum, the Sandiganbayan. Hence, the Court of Appeals is directed to
remand the records of this case and evidences to the Regional Trial Court for
transmission to the Sandiganbayan.
CAMPOMANES v PEOPLE
G.R. No. 161950, December 19, 2006
FACTS:
There were alleged irregularities in the disbursement and liquidation
of the funds that the PSC made available to the FIDE through Campomanes in
connection with the PSC’s bid to host the 1992 Chess Olympiad and Congress in
Manila from 6 to 25 June 1992.
Campomanes were charged with conspiracy in violating Article 218 of
the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes the failure of an
accountable officer to render accounts.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted then Philippine Sports Commission
(PSC) Chairman Hechanova for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy.
The Sandiganbayan, however, convicted accused-petitioner Campomanes, then
President of the Federation Internationale Des Echecs (FIDE), of the crime of
failure to render accounts as defined in Article 218 in relation to Article 222 of
the Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan sentenced Campomanes to one year
and ten months of imprisonment.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED IS INDEED GUILTY OF FAILURE TO
RENDER ACCOUNTS AS DEFINED IN ARTICLE 218 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 222 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
HELD:
NO, the accused was acquitted of the charged information. There are
four elements of the crime of Failure to Render Accounts under Article 218. 1)
the offender is a public officer. 2) he must be an accountable officer for public
funds or property. 3) the offender is required by law or regulation to render
accounts to the COA, or to a provincial auditor. 4) he fails to render an account
for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered. The
Sandiganbayan acknowledged that the accused is not a public officer and applied
Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 218. The elements of
the crime as applied was: 1. That the offender is a private individual. 2. That he
has charge of any national, provincial, or municipal funds, revenues, or property
or is administrator or depository of funds, property attached, seized, or
deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a private
individual. 3. That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the
Commission on Audit, or to a provincial auditor. 4. That he fails to do so for a
period of two months after such accounts should be rendered.
Campomanes was acquitted because neither the Sandiganbayan nor
the OSP was able to show any law or regulation requiring Campomanes to
render an accounting to the COA, considering the fact that there was no
agreement between the PSC and FIDE. Consequently, Campomanes, as
representative of the FIDE which has no legal obligation to render an accounting,
cannot be liable under Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code.
The prosecution failed to prove all the elements. Hence, the court
acquitted Florencio B. Campomanes of the crime of failure to render accounts as
defined in Article 218, in relation to Article 222, of the Revised Penal Code.
LUCIA F. LAYOLA v. JUDGE BASILIO R. GABO, JR.
FACTS:
Complainant Lucia F. Layola filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy
of the Ombudsman for the Military, charging two police officers with
homicide for the death of her son. The Ombudsman Investigator
recommended the indictment of murder against the two officers. The case
was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Basilio R. Gabo. A petition to
take custody of one of the accused police officers was filed by the Chief of
Police based on a law providing that police personnel who are charged of
any crime before any court of justice may be placed under the custody of
his immediate superior officers upon request. Judge Gabo, relying on the
provisions of law cited in the petition, granted the same without conducting
a hearing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Gabo is guilty of issuing an unjust interlocutory
order?
RULING:
NO. Rendering an unjust interlocutory order must have the elements: 1) that
the offender is a judge; 2) that he performs any of the following acts: a) he
knowingly renders unjust interlocutory order or decree; or b) he renders a
manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree through inexcusable
negligence or ignorance. The Court perceived no sufficient evidence that
respondent issued the questioned order knowing it to be unjust; and neither
is there any proof of conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. The
quantum of proof required for a judge to be held liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Here, the
allegations of the complaint-affidavit are unsubstantiated thus, respondent
judge cannot be held guilty of the charge. However, he is liable for gross
ignorance of the law for granting the release of the accused to his immediate
superior without conducting a hearing. Murder being a capital offense,
respondent judge should have been mindful that bail cannot be allowed as
a matter of right.
SAMANIEGO v. AGUILA
FACTS:
Petitioners are tenants in a landholding that belongs to Salud Aguila, whose
children, Vic Alvarez Aguila and Josephine Taguinod, are private
respondents. It appears that the land in question was identified by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as covered by the Operation Land
Transfer Program of the government. Aguila, in behalf of her children, herein
private respondents, filed a petition for exemption from such coverage. The
DAR granted the application for exemption but later on reversed its decision.
Private respondents appealed to the Office of the President wherein it
reinstated the first decision of the DAR. Petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but their petition was dismissed. The CA held that that the
questioned decision and resolution were both issued by the Office of the
President. As such, the Office of the President is an indispensable party to
the case. Failure to implead said Office is fatal to the petitioners cause and,
hence, should be dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or nor the CA committed an error in ruling that Office of the
President is an indispensable party?
RULING:
YES. The Office of the President is merely a pro forma party, one who is
joined as a plaintiff or defendant, not because such party has any real
interest in the subject matter or because any relief is demanded, but merely
because the technical rules of pleadings require the presence of such party
on the record. The only participation of the Office of the President in this
case is its role as the office which entertains appeals from decisions of the
DAR. Thus, the CA's ruling is an error.
SALVADOR M. DE VERA v. HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO
FACTS:
Petitioner instituted a special civil action with the RTC to enjoin the
municipal trial court from proceeding with a complaint for ejectment against
him. When the Judge originally assigned to the case inhibited himself, the
case was re-raffled to respondent Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo who denied
the petition. petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an affidavit-
complaint against Judge Pelayo, accusing him of violating some provisions
of the RPC. Associate Graft Investigation Officer recommended the case to
be referred to the Supreme Court, in which the Ombudsman affirmed.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to entertain criminal
charges filed against a judge of the regional trial court in connection with
his handling of cases before the court?
RULING:
NO. The Court finds that the Ombudsman acted in accordance with law and
jurisprudence when he referred the case against Judge Pelayo to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action. The determination of whether a judge
has maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is an exclusive judicial
function. Also, the Court laid down the rule that before a civil or criminal
action against a judge for a violation of Art. 204 and 205 (knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment or order) can be entertained, there must first
be "a final and authoritative judicial declaration" that the decision or order in
question is indeed "unjust." That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.
NORMA A. ABDULLA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers of the
Sulu State College, and by reason of their positions and duties are
accountable for public funds under their administration, while in the
performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with MAHMUD
I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of
the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the
amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), which amount was
appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school
teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service.
Aguil & Darkis were acquitted. Abdulla persistently pleas innocence of the
crime charged.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER COMMITTED TECHNICAL
MALVERSATION UNDER ARTICLE 220 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE?
RULING:
NO. The essential elements of the crime of technical malversation defined
in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are: 1. That the offender is a
public officer; 2. That there is public fund or property under his
administration; 3. That such public fund or property has been appropriated
by law or ordinance; 4. That he applies the same to a public use other
than that for which such fund or property has been appropriated by law or
ordinance. The third and fourth elements of the crime are lacking in this
case. The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary
differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA
6688 (General Appropriations Act January 1 December 31, 1989). The
third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the
public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore
absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and
Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00)
allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school
teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the
RPC. Also, the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00)
released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the
terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College,
cannot make petitioner guilty of technical malversation in the absence of
any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for
payment of salary differentials only.
G.R. No. 156643 June 27, 2006
BFRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
That on or about January 12, 1994 thereto in the City of Manila accused
VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ and VICTOR CONANAN, being then
employed both as Immigration officers of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, Intramuros, Manila, hence are public officers, taking
advantage of their official positions and committing the offense in relation
to office, conspiring and confederating with Senior Police Officer 3
EXPEDITO S. PERLAS of the Western Police District Command, Manila,
together with co-accused Atty. FRANCISCO SB. ACEJAS III, of the
LUCENARIO, MARGATE, MOGPO, TIONGCO & ACEJAS LAW
OFFICES, and co-accused JOSE P. VICTORIANO, a private individual,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand, ask,
and/or extort One Million (P1,000,000.00) PESOS from the spouses
BETHEL GRACE PELINGON and Japanese TAKAO AOYAGI and
FILOMENO PELINGON, JR., in exchange for the return of the passport of
said Japanese Takao Aoyagi confiscated earlier by co-accused Vladimir
S. Hernandez and out of said demand
Victoriano was acquitted on reasonable doubt.25 Although he had picked
up the envelope containing the payoff, this act did not sufficiently show
that he had conspired with the other accused.26
Issue:
WON the prosecution failed to prove the elements of direct bribery
RULING:
NO.
The Court held that the prosecution proved the elements of direct bribery.
First, there is no question that the offense was committed by a public
officer. BID Agent Hernandez extorted money from the Aoyagi spouses for
the return of the passport and the promise of assistance in procuring a
visa. Petitioner Acejas was his co-conspirator. Second, the offenders
received the money as payoff, which Acejas received for the group and
then gave to Perlas. Third, the money was given in consideration of the
return of the passport, an act that did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both
the confiscation and the return of the passport were made in the exercise
of official duties.
Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of direct bribery, which
contained the following elements: 1) the offender was a public officer, 2)
who received the gifts or presents personally or through another, 3) in
consideration of an act that did not constitute a crime, and 4) that act
related to the exercise of official duties.33
UNLAWFUL APPOINTMENTS
PEOPLE VS SANDIGAN BAYAN
G.R. No. 164185 July 23, 2008
FACTS:
That on or about 01 July 1998 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
San Vicente, Palawan, Philippines, accused, ALEJANDRO A.
VILLAPANDO, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of San
Vicente, Palawan, committing the crime herein charged, in relation to and
taking advantage of his official functions, conspiring and confederating
with accused Orlando M. Tiape, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously appoint ORLANDO M. TIAPE as a Municipal Administrator of
San Vicente, Palawan, accused Alejandro A. Villapando knowing fully well
that Orlando Tiape lacks the qualification as he is a losing mayoralty
candidate in the Municipality of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte during the
May 1998 elections, hence is ineligible for appointment to a public office
within one year (1) from the date of the elections, to the damage and
prejudice of the government and of public interest.
Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002, Villapando pleaded not guilty.
Meanwhile, the case against Tiape was dismissed after the prosecution
proved his death which occurred on July 26, 2000.
ISSUE: WON Orlando Tiape, at the time of [his] designation as Municipal
Administrator, was lacking in legal qualification to be appointed to any
office in the Government?
RULING:
NO.
In ascertaining the legal qualifications of a particular appointee to a public
office, "there must be a law providing for the qualifications of a person to
be nominated or appointed" therein. The offender in this article is a public
officer who nominates or appoints a person to a public office. The person
nominated or appointed is not qualified and his lack of qualification is
known to the party making the nomination or appointment. The
qualification of a public officer to hold a particular position in the
government is provided by law. The purpose of the law is to ensure that
the person appointed is competent to perform the duties of the office,
thereby promoting efficiency in rendering public service.
It is noteworthy to mention that the prosecution did not allege much less
prove that Mayor Villapando’s appointee, Orlando Tiape, lacked any of the
qualifications imposed by law on the position of Municipal Administrator. It
bears stressing that temporary prohibition is not synonymous with
absence or lack of legal qualification. A person who possessed the
required legal qualifications for a position may be temporarily disqualified
for appointment to a public position by reason of the one year prohibition
imposed on losing candidates. Upon the other hand, one may not be
temporarily disqualified for appointment, but could not be appointed as he
lacked any or all of the required legal qualifications imposed by law.
PEOPLE VS LICAYO
G.R. No. 170974 March 3, 2008
FACTS:
At around 7:30 that night, petitioner Suerte-Felipe and the deceased
Godofredo Ariate were arguing over something and all of a sudden,
petitioner fired around four shots at Godofredo. Seeing Godofredo fall
down, Alumbres rushed to his aid and attempted to bring the latter to the
hospital, but petitioner shot him twice and hit him once on the right leg.
Fearing that he might be shot again, Alumbres pretended to be dead.
Godofredo’s son, William Ariate, and Barangay Chairman Pio Arce
witnessed the incident. Arce, upon arriving at the scene of the crime,
attempted to appease petitioner by shouting, "Romy, ayusin na lang natin
‘to." Petitioner did not heed Arce’s appeal and instead fired at Arce. Arce
used his .38 caliber revolver to defend himself against petitioner who was
then more than six meters from him. Arce took cover and exchanged fire
with petitioner. Petitioner’s companions, Madriago and Jimeno, also fired
at Arce.
Godofredo was declared dead on arrival at the Pasay City General
Hospital.
The Regional Trial Court found petitioner guilty as charged
ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of the crime of Homicide
RULING:
YES.
The records clearly show that the body autopsied and referred to in the
autopsy report of Dr. Ludovino Lagat of the NBI was no other than that of
Godofredo Ariate. The body submitted for autopsy was identified by
Godofredo’s son, Edgardo.14 Pictures of Godofredo’s body, taken by
Armando Mancera during the autopsy, likewise establish the identity of the
victim. Moreover, the entries found in the assailed Autopsy Report should
be deemed prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, as there had
been no proof of any intent on the part of Dr. Lagat to falsely testify on the
identity of the victim’s body. the ballistics examination of the subject slug
revealed a diameter and a set of riflings which were peculiar to a .45
caliber pistol. Petitioner was admittedly the only one holding a .45 caliber
gun at the time of the incident. His two companions, Madriago and
Jimeno, were each armed with a 9mm firearm, while Arce was holding a
.38 caliber revolver. Furthermore, Godofredo had a heated argument
before Godofredo was shot. Thus, it was petitioner who had the motive to
kill Godofredo.
All things considered, there is nothing to indicate that both Alumbres and
Arce deviated from the gist of their testimonies, i.e., that both of them saw
petitioner gun down Godofredo Ariate. The aforesaid alleged contradictory
statements are but minor inconsistencies when a witness is testifying in
court, which only shows that both men witnessed the unfolding of the
shooting incident from different vantage points. The slight divergence in
their testimonies also goes to show that both men were not rehearsed
before they testified at the trial, but testified based on their own
perceptions.
PEOPLE VS ABARCA
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
FACTS:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had
illicit relationship. On July 15, 1984, upon reaching home, the accused
found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse.
When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her
paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping above
the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away.
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He got Talbo's
firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision.
He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the
"mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. He fired at
Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle. Arnold and Lina Amparado who
were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was playing
mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused. Kingsley Koh
died instantaneously. Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on
in the kidney to remove a bullet. His wife, Lina Amparado, was also
treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments.
ISSUE: WON Abarca can avail of the absolutory cause of death or
physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances
RULING:
YES.
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional
circumstances. — Any legally married person who, having surprised his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person,
shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter,
or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the
penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be
exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents
with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their
seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or
daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies
in the instant case. There is no question that the accused surprised his
wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit
copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of
passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that
a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or
both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are
present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of
murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the
time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse
with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must
be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the
accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused
"shall kill any of them or both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his
spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the
killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing
upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have
been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have
been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-
product of the accused's rage.
PEOPLE vs AMAMANGPANG (G.R 108491, JULY 2, 1998)
FACTS: In the early morning of 8 November 1991, SPO1 Placido Flores, a
member of the Philippine National Police in Carmen, Bohol, was fatally
hacked with a scythe and shot with a .38 caliber revolver in the home of
appellant Sergio Amamangpang in Guadalupe, Carmen, Bohol. On 17
January 1992, appellant was charged with the murder of Flores committed
contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon
the
Appellant admitted killing Flores but claimed that he did it in defense
of his wifes honor. As an alternative defense, appellant contended that his
action was justified under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. After he
caught his wife, Sinforiana and Flores engaged in the sexual act on that
fateful day
The trial court ruled that appellants act of emptying the bullets of the
gun on the body of the victim, even when the latter was already helpless
and severely wounded on the nape constituted treachery. Likewise, the trial
court appreciated nighttime as a generic aggravating circumstance.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE KILLING HAS THE CHARACTER OF
DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AS PROVIDED FOR
PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
HELD: NO.
ART. 247. Death of physical injuries inflicted under exceptional
circumstances.--Any legally married person who, having surprised his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall
kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall
inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty
of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be
exempt from punishment.
Appellants assertion is unmeritorious. His two bases for exoneration
are markedly inconsistent with each other. On one hand, he claims that he
was defending his wife from Flores who was trying to force himself upon
her. On the other, he gives the implication that his wife and Flores were
having an illicit affair. Such contradictory theories are a manifest indication
that appellants defenses are nothing but mere concoctions. Besides,
appellants alternative defense is inconsistent with the testimonies of his wife
and daughter that Flores threatened to kill them if they refused to accede to
his wishes. In the absence of treachery, appellant should be held liable only
for homicide under article 249 of the revised Penal Code.
SIENES VS PEOPLE ( G.R 132925, Dec. 13, 2006)
FACTS: That on or about the 15th day of May, 1981, at Barangay
Kabulacan, Municipality of Sta. Catalina, Province of Negros Oriental,
accused, and acting in concert, with evident premeditation, treachery and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab Felipe de la Cruz, Sr. with the use
of canes long bolo and jungle knife with which said accused were then
armed and provided, thereby inflicting upon the body of said victim the
injuries. the trial court found all four (4) accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder as charged, and sentenced them accordingly.
On Appeal, the charges changed from murder to homicide.
ISSUE: Whether the accused are guilty of Homicide
HELD: YES.
After careful scrutiny of the records, particularly the testimonies
of the two (2) principal prosecution witnesses, the Court finds no valid
reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on this matter. Alibi is a weak
defense. Positive identification, when categorical and consistent and
without any ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on a matter at
issue, prevails over sheer denial and alibi which are basically negative, self-
serving and undeserving of any weight in law, unless substantiated by clear
and convincing proof
However, We are also in agreement with the CA's finding that there was no
conspiracy between and among the three accused-petitioners and their
father, no treachery and abuse of superior strength. Absent these, murder
can be modified to homicide.
URBAN vs PEOPLS (G.R No. 182750, Jan. 20, 2009)
FACTS: That on or about the 28th of September 1993 in the evening, in
Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Lingayen, Province of Pangasinan, the
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there attack, assault, hit and maul
Brigido Tomelden, inflicting upon him mortal injuries. The cause of death
being Cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with
resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident, CONTRARY to
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The exchange of words led to an
exchange of blows. Petitioner delivered a lucky punchon Tomeldens face,
which made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden was on the verge of hitting
his head on the ground had their companions not caught him and prevented
the fall. The blow, however, caused Tomeldens nose to bleed and rendered
him unconscious.
ISSUE: Whethter the CA erred in affirming the decision of the [RTC] finding
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the homicide.
HELD: NO
It was through the direct accounts of the prosecution witnesses of the events
that transpired during the fisticuff taken together with the result of the
medical examinations and autopsy report which described the death of the
victim as cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with
resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident that we are
convinced that the lucky punch was the proximate cause of victim’s death.
The prosecution had satisfactorily proven that it was only after the incident
that transpired on September 28, 1993 that the victim was hospitalized on
several occasions until he expired, twelve days later.
However, there are the mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit
so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation on the part of the victim
The prescribed penalty for homicide under Art. 249 of the RPC is reclusion
temporal or from 12 years and one day to 20 years. With the appreciation
of two mitigating circumstances and the application of par. 5 of Art. 64, RPC,
the imposable penalty would, thus, be the next lower penalty prescribed for
homicide and this should be prision mayor.
PEOPLE VS SPO1 ULEP (G.R No. 132547, Sept. 20, 2000)
FACTS:
At around two o' clock in the morning of 22 December 1995
Buenaventura Wapili was having a high fever and was heard talking
insensibly to himself in his room. He became wild and violent. Suddenly,
Wapili bolted out of his room naked and chased Leydan. Leydan went to
the house of policewoman Norma Plando, a neighbor, and asked for
assistance. Plando then contacted SPO1 Ernesto Ulep and others . The
police claimed that he was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while
Wapili's relatives and neighbors said he had no bolo, but only a rattan stool.
SPO1 Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down
his weapons or they would shoot him. SPO1 Ulep shot the victim with his
M-16 rifle, hitting him in various parts of his body. As the victim slumped to
the ground, SPO1 Ulep came closer and pumped another bullet into his
head and literally blew his brains out.
The trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused of murder
and sentencing him to death The means employed by the accused to
prevent or repel the alleged aggression is not reasonable.
Accused prays for his acquittal mainly on the basis of his claim that
the killing of the victim was in the course of the performance of his official
duty as a police officer, and in self-defense.
ISSUE: Is the accused guilty of murder?
HELD: NO, he is guilty of Homicide.
The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11, par.
5, of The Revised Penal Code may be successfully invoked, the accused
must prove the presence of two (2) requisites, namely, that he acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office, and
that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such
right or office. The second requisite is lacking in the instant case.
It cannot therefore be said that the fatal wound in the head of the
victim was a necessary consequence of accused-appellant's due
performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a right or office.
Incomplete justification is a special or privileged mitigating
circumstance, which, not only cannot be offset by aggravating
circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law. We likewise credit in favor of accused-appellant the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
PEOPLE VS. PASCUAL
FACTS:
Last December 24, 2000, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, Rodolfo
Jundos, Jr. was preparing to celebrate noche buena with his son and the
accused-appellant, Alfredo Pascual who was with his 2-year old youngest
child. Alfredo Pascual appeared to have had liquor already. For three (3)
instances, the accused would ask permission to go inside the house but
nonetheless will return 10 to 15 minutes later, twice. On the third time, he
was without the child anymore and partake (sic) of liquor until 1:00 oclock
a.m. when he left, leaving Rodolfo Jundos, Jr. alone. Twenty (20) minutes
later, Divina Pascual, appellants wife, came out the house looking for her
husband. Moments later, Jundos saw Divina chasing Alfredo running out
towards the gate at the same time asked (sic) Jundos for help. Divina told
him to instead go upstairs as the accused might have done something
wrong to Ling-ling (Lorelyn). Together, Jundos and Divina rushed to the
second floor. They switched on the light and there they saw Ling-ling
(Lorelyn Pacubas) flat on her back on the floor almost naked with arms and
legs open, her panty and shorts down to her ankle and t-shirt pulled up
above the breast with blood on the right breast. They tried to wake up Ling-
ling but the latter was already dead. Trial court rendered judgment finding
BOYET GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide.
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him. Forensic chemist of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), testified on the result of the DNA
analysis which she conducted on the specimens submitted by the trial court
consisting of the victims vaginal smear and panty. No DNA sample from the
suspect was present on the aforesaid specimens. On cross-examination,
the chemist declared that based on DNA testing, she could not determine if
a woman was raped or not. She further declared that in this case, it was
possible that the stained vaginal smear prevented a complete and good
result for the DNA profiling. Upon being questioned by the court, the forensic
chemist confirmed that DNA testing on the subject specimens was
inconclusive and that the result was not good, as the specimens submitted,
i.e., the stained vaginal smear and the dirty white panty, had already
undergone serological analysis.
ISSUE: whether or not does the result of the DNA examination entitle the
accused-appellant to an acquittal
HELD: YES
The Court held that in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples
were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and
the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
Here, while the DNA analysis of the victims vaginal smear showed no
complete profile of the accused-appellant, the same is not conclusive
considering that said specimen was already stained or contaminated which,
according to the forensic chemist, Aida Villoria-Magsipoc, deters a complete
and good result for DNA profiling. She explained in her testimony that
generally, with the vaginal smear, they could see if there is a male profile in
the smear. However, in this case, when they received the vaginal smear on
the stained slide, the same had already undergone serological analysis.
Hence, according to the chemist, the DNA testing conducted on the
specimen subject of this case was inconclusive. In light of this flawed
procedure, we hold that the result of the DNA examination does not entitle
accused-appellant to an acquittal.
PEOPLE VS. JUAN MUPAS ET AL.
FACTS:
Rogelio, victim, testified that at around 7:30 in the morning of 18 February
1993, he was walking to school with his companion Eduardo Murao, Jr.
when Jun suddenly stopped and stabbed him using a 29-inch Batangas
knife. Meantime, Banjo bodily restrained him but luckily Rogelio was able to
avoid the blow. Next, Gil alias Banjo and Jun hurled stones at him and hit
him on the leg while Rogelio was running eastward. Rogelio then flagged
down a motorized tricycle but the two assailants continued to pursue him.
While inside the tricycle, Banjo held Rogelio by his neck and punched him
while Jun stabbed him several times. Then, Rogelio alighted from the
tricycle and ran home. Afterwards, his father and mother accompanied him
to the hospital.
Prior to the incident, Rogelio recalled that in January of the same year, he
had a misunderstanding with Jun where he and the latter hurled invectives
at each other. Rogelio suspected that this event gave rise to the subject
incident. Jun and Gil were found guilty as charged by the RTC. CA affirmed
the RTC’s ruling. The Court of Appeals held that Jun already performed all
the acts of execution necessary to bring about the death of Rogelio which
would have transpired had it not been for the timely medical intervention.
As such, the trial court correctly found him liable for the crime of frustrated
homicide.
ISSUE: whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming RTC’s ruling.
HELD: YES
Intent to kill is the principal element of homicide or murder, in whatever
stage of commission. Such intent must be proved in a clear and evident
manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the
aggressor.
Although it can be fairly assumed that the injuries suffered by Rogelio were
sustained during the fistfight, it is not conclusive that the same were inflicted
purposely to kill him. For one, if Jun in fact had been carrying a bolo with
intent of killing Rogelio, and if indeed Banjo had conspired with Jun, it is no
small wonder why the wounds inflicted were more superficial than mortal,
more mild than grave. That Rogelio was able to go home shortly after the
tricycle incident without being pursued by his aggressor also shows that Jun
and Banjo were not intent on beating him to death or even leaving him for
dead. It is thus wrong to infer that the intent to kill was present in the
absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable
doubt. Moreover, Rogelios suggested motive for killing him, i.e., his
previous altercation with Jun, was too weak and shallow a reason to kill
under the circumstances.
When such intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not
frustrated but physical injuries only and in this case, less serious physical
injuries considering the attending physicians opinion hat the wounds
sustained by Rogelio would take two (2) weeks to heal.
Giovani Serrano vs. People
FACTS: Prosecution witnesses testified that, at around 9:30 p.m. of March
8, 1999, the victim and his two friends, Arceo and Richard Tan, were on
their way to UP Campus when they came across Gener Serrano, the
petitioners brother, who was with his group of friends. The victim, Arceo and
Tan approached Gener and his friends to settle a previous quarrel between
Gener and Roberto Comia. While the victim and Gener were talking, Comia
suddenly appeared and hurled invectives at Gener. Irked, Gener challenged
Comia to a fistfight to settle their quarrel once and for all.
The petitioner arrived and watched Gener fight Comia. When Gener lost the
fight, the petitioner sought to get back at the victim and his friends. Thus,
the one-on-one escalated into a rumble between the members of the two
groups. The victim and Arceo saw that the petitioner had a knife and used
it to chase away the members of their group. The petitioner also chased
Arceo away, leaving the victim alone; the petitioners group ganged up on
him. Petitioner stabbed the left side of victim’s stomach while the latter was
standing, with Gener and Orieta holding his arms. The petitioner, Gener and
Orieta thereafter continued to beat and stone the victim until he fell into a
nearby creek. The petitioner and his group left him there.
From his fallen position, the victim inspected his stab wound and saw that
a portion of his intestines showed. The victim underwent surgery at East
Avenue Medical Center. The victim stayed at the hospital for a week, and
thereafter stayed home for one month to recuperate. RTC found petitioner
guilty of frustrated homicide. CA ruled that the prosecution evidence failed
to conclusively show that the victims single stab wound was sufficient to
cause death without timely medical intervention. Wherefore, Appellant is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED
HOMICIDE.
ISSUE: w/n petitioner can only be convicted of serious physical injuries as
the intent to kill the victim was not sufficiently proven.
HELD: NO
Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through
external manifestations. In Rivera v. People, the Court considered the
following factors to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means
used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the
time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances
under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We
also consider motive and the words uttered by the offender at the time he
inflicted injuries on the victim as additional determinative factors.
In this case, the records show that the petitioner used a knife in his assault.
The petitioner stabbed the victim in the abdomen while the latter was held
by Gener and Orieta. Immediately after the stabbing, the petitioner, Gener
and Orieta beat and stoned the victim until he fell into a creek. It was only
then that the petitioner, Gener and Orieta left. We consider in this regard
that the stabbing occurred at around 9:30 p.m. with only the petitioner,
Gener, Orieta, and the victim as the only persons left in the area. The CA
aptly observed that a reasonable inference can be made that the victim was
left for dead when he fell into the creek. Under these circumstances, we are
convinced that the petitioner, in stabbing, beating and stoning the victim,
intended to kill him. Thus, the crime committed cannot be merely serious
physical injuries. The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound
inflicted which must be supported by independent proof showing that the
wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victims death without timely
medical intervention.
PP vs. GARCHITORENA
FACTS:
Testimonies of the prosecution revealed that he victim, Betty D. Angus,
arrived at the Lanisi Patrol Base at around 7:00 p.m. on January 9, 2002.
Appellant fetched her at the gate and they proceeded to his bunker. Later,
CAFGU members Malaran and Carpio heard the two (2) arguing about
appellants relationship with another woman. The following day, January 10,
2002, at around 7:00 a.m., appellant had breakfast at the mess hall without
his wife. After eating, they went on their separate ways.
On their way to the mess hall, appellant passed by his bunker but was not
able to open the door at once because something was blocking it from the
inside. When appellant pushed the door, Malaran saw the back of the victim
in a slanting position and leaning at the door. Appellant went inside and
almost immediately shouted for help. Malaran and Carpio saw appellant
embracing his wife. They helped appellant carry Bettys body to the bed.
Malaran observed that her skin below the jaw was reddish and her knees
were covered with mud. There was food on the table and a multi-colored
tubao was hanging on the purlins of the roof about a meter away from the
victim. The lower tip of the tubao was in a circular form and was hanging
Dr. Alex R. Uy, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory stated that Betty may have died two (2) hours after taking
her last meal. He believed that the cause of her death was asphyxia by
strangulation and not by hanging, as the victim did not sustain a fractured
bone on her neck or hyoid bone and there was no hemorrhage above the
trachea and larynx. Dr. Uy clarified that the absence of a fractured bone
would only happen if the person hangs herself very slowly without a sudden
force or if she was in a kneeling position. RTC convicted accused of the
crime of Parricide. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: W/N the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.
HELD: NO
Art. 246 Parricide- Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants,
or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father,
mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any of
his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.
The Court is not satisfied that the circumstantial evidence in this case
constitutes an unbroken chain which leads to the conclusion that appellant,
to the exclusion of all others, is guilty of killing his wife. The trial court relied
on the testimonies of Malaran and Carpio who heard the appellant and his
wife arguing about the latters illicit relationship with another woman, which
supposedly proves motive for him to commit the crime. However, granting
that appellant and Betty had an argument on the night before her death, it
would be too much to presume that such an argument would drive appellant
to kill his wife. Clearly, the motive is not convincing.
[G.R. NO. 184172 : May 8, 2009]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUIS ANTONIO
GARCHITORENA
FACTS:
On August 16, 2000, Luis Antonio Garchitorena, legitimate
husband of victim, Flordeliza Tabla Garchitorena, shot the latter with a 9mm.
caliber pistol, loaded with 2 bullets, inflicting a mortal wound which led to
Flordeliza’s death. The incident was predicated by an altercation between
the spouses where the Luis suspected that his wife had an extramarital
affair. Luis contended that the wound of Flordeliza was self-inflicted, after
his wife took the gun from him and shot herself in the head when he uttered
“kung guilty ka, ituloy mo.” However, based on autopsy, it was established
that the injury was self-inflicted since Flordeliza is left-handed and the entry
of the bullet was on the head’s right side and its trajectory downward. RTC
convicted accused of parricide based on circumstantial evidence, sustained
by CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Garchitorena committed the crime of parricide?
RULING: Yes, Garchitorena is guilty of the crime of parricide since all the
elements of the crime were sufficiently proved in trial: (1) a person is killed;
(2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father,
mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any of
his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. It was stipulated during the
pre-trial that appellant and the victim are married on 24 August 1999. The
totality of the circumstances warrants the guilt of accused. The fact that
accused and the deceased were the only persons in the bedroom when the
shooting incident occurred is undisputed. Secondly, there was an argument
between the spouses, as narrated by the accused to the police investigator
and during trial. Thirdly, accused, giving no logical excuse, got a gun. In
this, the Court finds criminal purpose. Also, there is a finding by this Court
of improbability of the deceased shooting herself.
[G.R. No. 110994. October 22, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. CRESENCIANO MARAMARA alias
Cresing
FACTS:
In the evening of November 18, 1991, the benefit dance sponsored
by the Calpi Elementary School Parents-Teachers Association of which
Maramara is the president was held at the latter’s yard. While Ricardo
Donato was dancing with Rowena del Rosario, one Dante Arce, a friend of
Maramara, approached Ricardo and boxed him on the chest. Frightened,
Rowena ran away while Ricardo scampered toward the fence for
safety. Miguelito Donato was about two (2) meters away from where
Ricardo Donato stayed. Not for long, Maramara took his handgun tucked in
his waist and fired at Miguelito Donato, hitting the latter on the left
breast. Ricardo Donato tried to help his fallen brother Miguelito but
somebody struck Ricardo’s head with an iron bar which knocked him out for
about three minutes. Miguelito was rushed to the hospital but later died.
Before he expired, he told his father that it was Maramara who shot him.
RTC convicted him of murder. On appeal, Marmara asserted that he can
only be held liable for the death of Miguelito Donato in a tumultuous affray
as defined under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maramara only liable for Donato’s death in a
tumultuous affray.
RULING: No. He is not liable only for death caused in a tumultuous affray
under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code, but for homicide. It was in
such situation that accused came at the scene and joined the fray
purportedly to pacify the protagonists when Miguelito attacked him causing
four (4) stab wounds in different parts of his body. Then accused-appellant
with his handgun shot Miguelito. Assuming that a rumble or a free-for-all
fight occurred at the benefit dance, Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code
cannot apply because prosecution witnesses Ricardo and Regarder Donato
positively identified accused-appellant as Miguelito Donato’s killer. While
accused-appellant himself suffered multiple stab wounds which, at first
blush, may lend verity to his claim that a rumble ensued and that victim
Miguelito inflicted upon him these wounds, the evidence is inadequate to
consider them as a mitigating circumstance because the defense’s version
stands discredited in light of the more credible version of the prosecution as
to the circumstances surrounding Miguelito’s death.
G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995
ROMEO SISON et al. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT
OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On July 27, 1986, Marcos loyalists, 3000 of them, held a rally, without a
permit, at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon. Led
by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, members of the IBP, the loyalists
started an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered
speeches in between. Police authorities, finding them with no permit,
asked them to disperse. When their request to dispurse after 30 minutes
was not heeded, Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said "Gulpihin
ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." The police then pushed the
crowd, and used tear gas and truncheons to disperse them. The loyalists
scampered away but some of them fought back and threw stones at the
police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the
situation later stabilized. At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists
converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the Luneta picked on one
defenseless individual, Salcedo and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns
in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him, despite his pleas until he lost
consciousness. Sumilang tried to save him from his assailants but they
continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo later died.
Romel Sison et al were convicted by the trial court of murder qualified by
treachery, while CA increased their penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in finding the existence of
conspiracy among the principal accused and in convicting them of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength, not death in tumultuous affray.
RULING: No. A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs
between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous
affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the
author thereof cannot be ascertained. The quarrel in the instant case, if it
can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one
individual. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor
was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident. As the
lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as much as
fifty in number and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim.
They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and
frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. The
deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim
qualifies the killing to murder.
G.R. No. 179035 April 16, 2008
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES- versus JESUS PAYCANA, JR.
FACTS:
Jesus Paycana Jr. was charged with the complex
crime of parricide with unintentional abortion before the RTC of Iriga City,
after stabbing his wife 14 times during an altercation regarding his wife’s
alleged extramarital affair. He pleaded not guilty during the arraignment.
Pre-trial ensued, in which appellant admitted that the
victim LilybethBalandra-Paycana (Lilybeth) is his legitimate wife. He sought
to exculpate himself from the crime by setting up self-defense, claiming that
it was his wife who attacked him first. In view of the nature of self-defense,
it necessarily follows that appellant admits having killed his seven (7)-month
pregnant wife, and in the process put to death their unborn child. The trial
court found him guilty of the crime charged, which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paycana is guilty of the complex
crime of parricide with unintentional abortion.
RULING: Yes. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the
offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof
of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the
marriage certificate. The testimony of the accused of being married to the
victim, in itself, may also be taken as an admission against penal interest.
As distinguished from infanticide, the elements of unintentional abortion are
as follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2) that violence is used upon
such pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence is
intentionally exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus dies,
either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of
infanticide, it is necessary that the child be born alive and be viable, that is,
capable of independent existence. However, even if the child who was
expelled prematurely and deliberately were alive at birth, the offense is
abortion due to the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6 months is
not viable. In the present case, the unborn fetus was also killed when the
appellant stabbed Lilybeth several times. This case is a complex crime
because by a single act, that of stabbing his wife, appellant committed the
grave felony of parricide as well as the less grave felony of unintentional
abortion.
Lenido Lumaog et. al (Gr. Nos. 182555/185123/187745) Sept. 7, 2010
Facts:
Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the ambush-slay of
Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla. The principal witness for the prosecution was
Freddie Alejo, a security guard employed assigned at Katipunan Avenue,
Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where the ambush-slay happened. All the
accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of
ballistic and fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture in the
hands of police officers and denial of constitutional rights during custodial
investigation. The trial court however convicted the accused-appellants.
The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. The CA
upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on the credible
eyewitness testimony of Alejo.
Issue: Whether the CA decision comply with the constitutional standard that
“no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based?”
Held:
Yes, the CA decision complied with the constitutional standard
that “no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” Examining
the CA decision, it cannot be deemed unconstitutional, as it clearly stated
the facts and law on which the ruling was based. Though it did not
specifically address each and every assigned error raised by appellants, it
cannot be said that the appellants were left in the dark as to how the CA
reached its ruling affirming the trial court’s judgment of conviction. The
principal arguments raised in their Memorandum submitted before this
Court actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the
alleged sufficiency of prosecution evidence, their common defense of alibi,
allegations of torture, probative value of ballistic and fingerprint test results,
circumstances qualifying the offense and modification of penalty imposed
by the trial court.
People vs. Brodett (Gr. No. 170136) Jan. 18, 2008
Facts:
Robert Brodett was charged for the murder of Dr. April Duque, his live-in
partner, whose body was found burning on the spillway of Laoac Alacala.
The sole witness to the killing was Giobert, their five-year-old son, who
testified in court that he saw his father hit his mother with a hammer and
thereafter stab her. Appellant was found guilty and the aggravating
circumstances of superior strength, dwelling, disrespect on account of sex,
cruelty, and scoffing at the corpse, were considered to have attended the
killing of the victim, thus the court sentenced him to death by lethal injection.
Issue: Whether the aggravating circumstances of superior strength,
dwelling, disrespect on account of sex, cruelty, and scoffing at the corpse
should be considered
Held:
The court ruled that the killing of April was attended with
treachery, because the injuries suffered by April clearly show that she did
not have any chance to defend herself. The aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength was also appreciated but is already absorbed in
treachery. Furthermore, the court appreciated the aggravating circumstance
of outraging or scoffing at the victim’s corpse because it was burned and
left on the spillway in order to conceal the crime. The Court however did not
appreciate dwelling and disrespect on account of sex because appellant
and April resided in the same house and appellant did not deliberately
intend to insult or disrespect April’s womanhood.
People vs. Khaddafy Janjalani et al. (Gr. No. 188314) Jan. 10, 2011
Facts:
Trinidad and Baharan were trained by Abu Sayyaf group and
bombed a bus in 2005. After the bombing, Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News
Network an exclusive interview sometime after the incident, confessing his
participation in the Valentine’s Day bombing incident. In another exclusive
interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the
bombing incident. Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested.
They were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder.
On arraignment they pleaded guilty on the charge of multiple murder. On
multiple frustrated murder, Trinidad and Baharan pleaded not guilty. In the
light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused
Baharan and Trinidad were willing to changing their not guilty pleas to the
charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the
heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in
their pleas. After the Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad
pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-
appellants plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.
Held:
No, the Court observed that accused Baharan and Trinidad
previously pled guilty to another charge multiple murder based on the same
act relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further
noted that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and
Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt one through an extrajudicial
confession and the other through judicial admission. Considering the
foregoing circumstances, the Court deem it unnecessary to rule on the
sufficiency of the searching inquiry in this instance. Remanding the case for
re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused plea of guilt was not the
sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration
People vs. Domingo (Gr. No. 184343) March 2, 2009
Facts:
On March 2000, complainant and her children were sleeping
inside their house when Domingo entered their kitchen armed with a
screwdriver and a kitchen knife. He stabbed the complainant and her
children.
Five years passed, the defense counsel said that nine days prior
the commission of the crime, appellant suffered sleeplessness, lack of
appetite, and nervousness. Occasionally, a voice would tell him to kill.
Appellant stated that when he regained his memory, one week had already
passed since the incidents, and he was already detained. They submitted a
psychiatric evaluation and psychological examination as evidence that
appellant suffered from Schizophrenia. The doctor could not find out when
the appellant started to suffer this illness, but the symptoms of
Schizophrenia which were manifested by the patient indicated that he
suffered from the illness six months before the Center examined the
appellant. The counsel of the appellant raised the defense of insanity of the
appellant.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability on the
ground of insanity.
Held:
No, the defense of insanity is unmeritorious. Insanity exempts the
accused only when the finding of mental disorder refers to appellant’s state
of mind immediately before or at the very moment of the commission of the
crime. This was not the case in the issue at bar, what was presented was
proof of appellant’s mental disorder that existed five years after the incident,
but not at the time the crimes were committed. The RTC also considered it
crucial that appellant had the presence of mind to respond to Raquel Indon’s
pleas that her daughters be spared by saying, “Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na.”
A person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of
insanity has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or she
was insane immediately before or at the moment the crime was committed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALDO BARDE G.R. No.
183094, September 22, 2010
FACTS:
Reynaldo Barde (appellant) and Jimmy Barde (Jimmy) were charged in an
Information, dated 13 August 1999 with the complex crime of multiple
murder and multiple frustrated murder.
The accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 1999 at more or less 12:30 o'clock
in the morning, at Sitio Santo Niño, Barangay Liguan, Municipality of
Rapu-Rapu, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant and Jimmy], conspiring
and confederating and acting in concert to achieve a common purpose,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and committed with
the qualifying circumstances of treachery (alevosia), evident
premeditation, and by means of explosion, did then and there roll and
explode a hand grenade (M26-A1 Fragmentation grenade) inside the
dance area which exploded and resulted to the instantaneous deaths of 15
persons and injured 76 persons.
The trial court rendered its Decision on 29 January 2005 finding appellant
guilty. Jimmy, on the other hand, was acquitted. Appellant filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied.
The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration but was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding appellant guilty of the
crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
No, the contention is untenable.
Prosecution witnesses, Elmer and Antonio, actually witnessed the
explosion incident. Both of them narrated in detail the events that
transpired prior, during and after the explosion. They had a vivid
recollection of how appellant entered the dancing place, walked towards
the people who were dancing, got a rounded object from the belt bag tied
on his waist, pulled something from it, rolled it to the ground towards the
people who were dancing and left the place rapidly. Immediately
thereafter, the explosion occurred. The trial court characterized their
testimonies as candid, spontaneous and straightforward that despite rigid
cross-examination their testimonies on who and how the crime was
committed remained unshaken and undisturbed.
Appellant's defense of denial cannot be given any considerable weight as
it was unsubstantiated. The testimony of Violeta pointing at Eddie Oloroso
as the real culprit is intended to bolster appellant's defense of denial.
However, it cannot be given credence. Her testimony was given only after
more than two years from the time the incident happened, and she failed
to offer any convincing evidence to justify such delay.
Violeta's categorical admission that Eddie was outside the dancing place
and it was appellant whom she saw inside the dancing place prior to the
explosion incident, with this testimony, Violeta made appellant's defense of
denial even weaker.
All told, this Court affirms the findings of the trial court and the appellate
court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CARMELO CATBAGAN
G.R. Nos. 149430-32,
February 23, 2004
FACTS:
That on or about the 15th day of March, 1998, in the Municipality of San
Jose del Monte, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a caliber .9MM pistol, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, attack,
assault and shoot with the said caliber .9MM pistol one Ernesto Lacaden y
Tacata, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries, which ordinarily would
have caused the death of the said Ernesto Lacaden y Tacata, thus
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime
of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said Ernesto Lacaden y Tacata which
prevented his death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellant
Carmelo Catbagan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses
charged in Criminal Case No.1099-M-98, respectively.
HELD:
Although the injury sustained by Lacaden was inflicted by appellant, the
facts do not support a finding that the latter had been impelled by an intent
to injure to the point of killing the former. The intent to kill is absent in this
case. It was found that the shooting was sudden and unexpected, having
been brought about by a confrontation between appellant and Suico and
the commotion that ensued. The absence of such intent was, in fact, even
more apparent in the testimony of appellant, who said therein that he did
not even look at the victim anymore. The formers attention was
concentrated on the latter, who was shouting, Ang mahaba, ang mahaba!
The intent to kill, an essential element of the offense of frustrated or
attempted homicide, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence
and with the same degree of certainty as that required of the other
elements of the crime. The inference that such intent existed should not be
drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove it beyond
reasonable doubt. If it was absent but wounds were inflicted, the crime is
not frustrated murder, but only physical injuries. In this case, the expert
opinion of the doctor who treated Lacaden was that it would take the latter
thirty days to heal and recover from the lone gunshot wound and to
resume his normal work. Thus, a finding of less serious physical injuries is
proper.
RONNIE CALUAG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO.
171511, March 4, 2009
FACTS:
The prosecution presented the two private complainants, the spouses
Nestor and Julia Denido, as witnesses. Their version of the facts are as
follows:
In the afternoon of March 19, 2000, around 4 o'clock in the afternoon,
Nestor learned that two of his guests from an earlier drinking spree were
mauled. At that time, Caluag and Sentillas were drinking at the store
owned by the son of Sentillas. When Nestor inquired from several people
including his own son Raymond what happened, Caluag butted in and
replied, "Bakit kasama ka ba roon?," and immediately boxed him without
warning. Nestor retaliated but he was overpowered by Caluag and
Sentillas. Julia saw Caluag and Sentillas box her husband. Although she
tried to pacify them, they did not listen to her. To avoid his assailants,
Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed him. At around 6:00 p.m., Nestor
told his wife to report the boxing incident to the barangay authorities.
Later, at around 7:30 in the evening, when Julia encountered Caluag, who
blocked her way at the alley near her house. Caluag confronted Julia with
a gun, poked it at her forehead, and said "Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo
ito?" Despite this fearful encounter, she was still able to proceed to the
barangay hall where she reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay
authorities.
For its part, the defense presented the accused Caluag and Sentillas; and
the barbecue vendor Pablo Barrameda, Jr. as witnesses. According to
them, in the afternoon of March 19, 2000, Nestor was drunk and unruly
and he boxed Caluag. Thereafter, an unidentified man from the crowd
armed with a knife went towards Nestor but Sentillas timely interceded and
pacified the man. Sentillas never boxed Nestor. Caluag also denied poking
a gun at Julia.
In a Decision dated January 28, 2004, the MeTC found Caluag and
Sentillas guilty of slight physical injuries, and Caluag guilty of grave
threats.
Caluag and Sentillas appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto the joint
decision of the MeTC.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC on
December 9, 2005.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to sustain petitioner's
conviction of slight physical injuries and of grave threats.
HELD:
Yes.
As the lower courts and the Court of Appeals correctly stated, the
testimonies of Nestor and Julia were more in accord with the natural
course of things. There could be no doubt that Caluag and Sentillas lost
control of their temper as Caluag himself admitted that he got annoyed by
Nestor's unruly behavior. Likewise, the gun-poking incident also happened
since Julia did not waste time in reporting it to the barangay authorities.
Indeed, the positive declarations of Nestor and Julia that petitioner
committed the acts complained of undermined his negative assertions.
The fact that Barrameda testified in petitioner's behalf cannot be given
more weight than the straightforward and credible statements of Nestor
and Julia. Indeed, we find they had no reason to concoct stories to pin
down petitioner on any criminal act, hence their testimonies deserve full
faith and credit.
The MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals uniformly found petitioner
guilty of grave threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
Art. 282 of the Revised Penal Code provides, among others, any person
who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or
property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime,
shall suffer:
2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the
threat shall not have been made subject to a condition.
Considering what transpired earlier between petitioner and Julia's
husband, petitioner's act of pointing a gun at Julia's forehead clearly
enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her person.
GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE v. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, MICHELINA S. AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ, PEDRO B.
AGUIRRE, DR. JUVIDO AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B. PASCUAL G. R.
No. 170723, March 3, 2008
FACTS:
Laureano Larry Aguirre1 used to be a charge of the Heart of Mary Villa, a
child caring agency run by the Good Shepherd Sisters and licensed by the
Department of Social Work and Development (DSWD). On 19 June 1986,
the Aguirre spouses’ guardianship of Larry was legalized when the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan, duly appointed
them as joint co-guardians over the person and property of Larry.
As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses and their children noticed
that his developmental milestones were remarkably delayed. His cognitive
and physical growth did not appear normal in that at age 3 to 4 years. In
1989, at age eleven, Larry was taken to specialists for neurological and
psychological evaluations. The psychological evaluation done on Larry
revealed the latter to be suffering from a mild mental deficiency.
Consequent thereto, the Aguirre spouses transferred Larry to St. John Ma.
Vianney, an educational institution for special children.
In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a urologist/surgeon, was
approached concerning the intention to have Larry, then 24 years of age,
vasectomized. Prior to performing the procedure on the intended patient,
respondent Dr. Agatep required that Larry be evaluated by a psychiatrist in
order to confirm and validate whether or not the former could validly give
his consent to the medical procedure on account of his mental deficiency.
In a psychiatric report dated 21 January 2002, respondent Dr. Pascual
made the following recommendation that the responsibility of decision
making may be given to his parent or guardian.
Considering the above recommendation, respondent Pedro Aguirres
written consent was deemed sufficient in order to proceed with the
conduct of the vasectomy. Hence, on 31 January 2002, respondent Dr.
Agatep performed a bilateral vasectomy on Larry.
On 11 June 2002, petitioner Gloria Aguirre, respondent Pedro Aguirres
eldest child, instituted a criminal complaint for the violation of the Revised
Penal Code, particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic
Act No. 7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr.
Pascual and several John/Jane Does before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DOJ did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when the latter affirmed the public prosecutors finding of lack of
probable cause for respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and
Dr. Pascual to stand trial for the criminal complaint of mutilation in relation
to Republic Act No. 7610
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
The elements of Mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the
Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation
of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused
purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some
essential organ for reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the
facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and
penalized above, i.e., the vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived
(sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his
physical self. Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this Court to
make a ruling that bilateral vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation.
Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction,
such procedure does not deprive him, either totally or partially, of some
essential organ for reproduction. Notably, the ordinary usage of the term
mutilation is the deprivation of a limb or essential part (of the body), with
the operative expression being deprivation. In the same manner, the word
castration is defined as the removal of the testies or ovaries. Such being
the case in this present petition, the bilateral vasectomy done on Larry
could not have amounted to the crime of mutilation as defined and
punished under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. And
no criminal culpability could be foisted on to respondent Dr. Agatep, the
urologist who performed the procedure, much less the other respondents.
Thus, we find sufficient evidence to explain why the Assistant City
Prosecutor and the DOJ ruled the way they did. Verily, We agree with the
Court of Appeals that the writ of certiorari is unavailing; hence, should not
be issued.
G.R. No. 181900 October 20, 2010
PEOPLE vs. SALAZAR,
FACTS:
On 18 May 1999 and 25 June 1999, at about 10pm and 12pm,
respectively at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar,
Philippines, Salazar, with abuse of confidence being his step father,
entered the bedroom where AAA was sleeping, with lewd designs, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, cover her mouth and
by means of force and intimidation, and taking advantage of his superior
strength, undressed her, took off her shorts and panty, place on top of her
and have sexual intercourse with AAA, who is a minor, 12 years of age, all
against the will of the latter.
Salazar was charged with 2 counts of statutory rape before the
RTC. RTC convicted the accused for 2 counts of Statutory Rape however
CA affirmed with modification the conviction for 2 counts of Simple Rape.
ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty of simple rape.
HELD:
Yes, Accused-appellant is guilty of simple rape. Article 266-A.
RPC provides Rape: When and How Committed ¾ Rape is committed. In
order for the accused to be found guilty of the crime of statutory rape 2
elements must concur: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the
victim; and (2) that the victim is below twelve (12) years old. Considering,
however, that AAA was already 12 years old when she was raped, the
second element for statutory rape that "that the victim is below twelve (12)
years old" is not present. Consequently, the finding of the appellate court
for simple rape is correct, not on the ground of the age of AAA not being
proved, but on the fact that she was no longer below 12 years of age at
the time the crime was committed.
G.R. No. 146803 January 14, 2004
PEOPLE vs.LOU
FACTS:
On April 22, 1996 at about 12 mn at the house of the victim at
Bayugan 3, Rosario, Agusan del Sur, Philippines Lou with the use of his
superior strength, with intent of lewd design, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with force and intimidation, succeed in having
sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter Elgie S. Bulaqueña, a girl who
was then fifteen (15) years old, and a woman of good reputation, against
her will and consent to the damage and prejudice of the said victim.
The trial court found Clementino Lou guilty beyond reasonable
doubt in the commission of the crime of rape "defined and penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
Section 11 thereof."
ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty for the crime of rape
HELD:
Yes, The crime of rape can be committed by, among other
ways, "having carnal knowledge of a woman" with the use of force or
intimidation. Intimidation is subjective, and it is addressed to the mind of
the person against whom it is employed at the time and occasion of the
crime. While there is no hard and fast rule to test its presence, one
accepted norm, nevertheless, is whether the intimidation produces a
reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she were to resist or were
not to yield to the desires of the malefactor, the threat would be carried
out. Appellant repeatedly maltreated the girl, a fact that he himself
admitted. The threat of another round of abuse proved all too real that
midnight of 22 April 1996, when appellant verbalized his intention to harm
her upon entering her room. It was not unnatural that the young girl would
be cowed by appellant.
G.R. No. 170566 March 3, 2006
PEOPLE vs.CALONGUI
FACTS:
On 1 January 1998 at about 2am, at Tagbong, Pili, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, Alejandro Calongui, with lewd design, and by means of
threats, force and violence, and being the first-cousin of the complaining
witness did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie, sexually
assaulted and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with one Marinel O.
Colangui, a 13 years old girl, at the latter's house and against her will-to
the latter's damage and prejudice in such amount as may be proven in
court. Witnesses affirmed that the rape was done again in September 26,
2998.
Two separate informations were filed against Calongui. CA
affirmed with modification RTC decision convicting Calongui for two counts
of rape.
ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty of crime of rape.
HELD:
Yes, the clear, candid and straightforward testimony of Marinel
firmly established that appellant raped her on January 1, 1998. As regards
the September 26, 1998 rape incident, we are not persuaded that what
transpired between appellant and Marinel was consensual sexual
intercourse. Well-settled is the rule that the sweethearts defense must be
proven by compelling evidence, specifically, that the accused and the
victim were lovers and that the victim consented to the alleged sexual
relations. Appellant's claim that he and Marinel were lovers remained
uncorroborated and unsubstantiated. No documentary evidence like
mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like were presented.
Marinel denied the alleged love relationship on direct and cross-
examination. Besides, the sweethearts defense does not rule out rape.
Even if it were true, the relationship does not, by itself, establish consent
for love is not a license for lust.
The presence of force, threats, and intimidation during the two
rape incidents was clearly established, thus it was proven that appellant
had carnal knowledge of Marinel, hence committed crime of rape.
G.R. No. 175238 February 24, 2009
PEOPLE vs. BALDO
FACTS:
On 10 February 2000 in Antipolo City, Philippines, Baldo,
professed his love for AAA, however she admonished him against his
protestation for they are relatives. Thereafter, Baldo, while armed with a
fan knife, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one [AAA], against
her will and consent. It was repeated the following day.
Three informations for rape were filed against Baldo. CA
affirmed RTC decision convicting and sentencing appellant Elmer S. Baldo
to reclusion perpetua for the crime of rape.
Baldo, raised the defense that he and AAA were lovers since
November 1999, and that she had consented to have sex with him even
prior to February 2000. Baldo presented witnesses providing testimonies.
ISSUE:
WON Baldo commited crime of rape.
HELD:
Yes, the prosecution has proven all the elements of the offense
of simple rape, having carnal knowledge including the use of force or
intimidation.
For the Court to even consider giving credence to the
"sweetheart theory" or "sweetheart defense", it must be proven by
compelling evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial
evidence in support of the theory, as in the instant case. Independent
proof is required -- such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. There is
none presented here by the defense. Moreover, even if it were true that
they were sweethearts, a love affair does not justify rape. As wisely ruled
in a previous case, a man does not have the unbridled license to subject
his beloved to his carnal desires.
G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000
PEOPLE vs. CAMPUHAN
FACTS:
On 25 April 1996, at around 4 pm, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan,
mother of 4-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor
of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her 2 children. As
Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters’
cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she
saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel
whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while
his short pants were down to his knees.
Physical examination of the victim yielded negative results.
However, was pronounced guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the
extreme penalty of death by the RTC. Hence, the automatic appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the crime of repe was consummated
HELD:
No. Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal
Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of
rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of
attempted rape — and only of attempted rape — are present in the instant
case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for
rape to be consummated, 16 and not merely for the penis to stroke the
surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female
organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to
constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the
pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it
can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
G.R. No. 117691 March 1, 2000
PEOPLE vs. SAMPIOR
FACTS:
On about 10:00 am and 3 pm of March 5, 1994, in Roxas City,
Philippines, Eduardo Sampior, by means of force and intimidation, and
exercising moral and parental ascendancy over the person of the
complainant who is his natural daughter, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, had carnal knowledge with EVELYN
SAMPIOR, an eighteen (18) year old girl, against her will.
RTC found appellant Eduardo Sampior y Berico guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of rape.
Appellant contends that he should have been convicted of
frustrated rape only, and that the sentence on him should be reduced,
correspondingly.
ISSUE:
WON the court of origin erred in convicting the accused-
appellant of the crime of consummated rape.
HELD:
No, we hold that the crime of frustrated rape is non-existent in
our criminal law. The Court declared that the merest touch of the male
organ upon the labia of the pudendum, no matter how slight,
consummates the rape. A broken hymen or laceration of any part of the
female genitalia is not a prerequisite for a rape conviction. Nor is a medical
examination indispensable to the prosecution of rape, as long as the
evidence on hand convinces the court that a conviction for rape is
proper. A medical examination of the victim, as well as the medical
certificate, is merely corroborative in character. What is important, the trial
court said, is that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is
clear, unequivocal, and credible. A daughter would not accuse her own
father of such an unspeakable crime as incestuous rape had she really not
been aggrieved.
The transcripts show that private complainant categorically,
credibly, and convincingly testified that there was phallic penetration of her
private parts. For no woman in her right mind will admit to having been
raped, allow an examination of her most private parts and subject herself
as well as her family to the humiliation and shame concomitant with a rape
prosecution, unless the charges are true.
G.R. No. 130586 January 29, 2004
PEOPLE vs. BLANCAFLOR
FACTS:
Mylene, 14 years old, recounted that one very early morning
sometime during the last week of July, 1995, her mother, a fish vendor
who leaves their home at dawn everyday, woke her up and asked her to
transfer from the floor where she was sleeping, to the bed where her four- gravely endangering her survival and normal growth and development, to
year old brother slept. At around 3:30 or 4:00 that same morning, she was the damage and prejudice of AAA.
again roused from sleep when she felt appellant on top of her, with his
penis already at the entrance of her vagina. She could not do anything as
RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
her hands were pinned against appellant’s chest and he was threatening
punishable under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
to kill all of them with a gun that was then just beside him. Appellant went
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. CA affirmed the decision.
on to push his penis into her vagina, continuing to touch her breast and
vagina.
The Court of Appeals (CA), on intermediate appellate review,6 affirmed the
findings of the RTC but modified the penalty and award of damages.
Information of rape were charged against Blancaflor. RTC found
him guilty of Rape beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of death. Hence, the automatic review. ISSUE:
ISSUE: WON the accused guilty for the crime of rape.
WON the accused is guilty of rape. HELD:
HELD: Yes as concurred by the elements. Under Section 5(b), Article III
of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12
years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but
Yes, the supreme court affirm the conviction. The defense
for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code. On
argument that the accused has not employed force upon his daughter in
the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be
order to have sex with him does not at all persuade. The force or violence
charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape
necessary in rape is a relative term that depends not only on the age, size,
under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. In
and strength of the persons involved but also on their relationship to each
this case, the victim was 13 years old when the crime was committed
other. In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the
against her, thus, may be prosecuted either.
former’s parental authority and moral ascendancy over the latter
substitutes for violence or intimidation who, expectedly, would just cower
in fear and resign to the father’s wicked deeds. In this case, appellant, who The offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act
had been the common-law husband of Mylene’s mother for fifteen years, because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. Likewise,
was practically the one exercising parental authority over Mylene, as he rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610.
himself testified that he took it upon himself to try to discipline her. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a
In People vs. Labayne,21 we ruled that a child of tender years would blindly felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed
follow her "stepfather" who not only exercised strong, moral and physical with an offense penalized by a special law.21
ascendancy over her, but who made explicit threats on her life should she
make any noise.
Thus, we find appellant’s contention that the delay of fourteen months in
reporting the alleged rape clouded her credibility, to be unmeritorious.
Mylene greatly feared appellant, believing him capable of carrying out his
threat to kill them all.
G.R. No. 177752 February 24, 2009
PEOPLE vs. ABAY
FACTS:
On December 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, Abay by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly commit sexual abuse and lascivious conduct against AAA, a
minor, 13 years of age, by then and there kissing her breast and whole
body, lying on top of her and inserting his penis into her vagina, thus
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, against her will and consent
thereafter threatening to kill her should she report the incident, thereby