Life Proceedings

dismissal and unpaid wages with claim for reinstatement; actual, moral and exemplary damages. PAL
suspended De Veyra after discovering that she and her dependents’ travel documents were tampered to
show that they’re entitled to a higher priority and space classification, which enabled De Veyra and her
dependents to travel first class despite not being entitled to the privilege. De Veyra was administratively
charged

program and formally requesting advance payment of thirty (30%) percent of the training fee in the
amount of US $9,600.00 or P204,960.00. NIACONSULT conducted the training program for six Nepalese
Junior Engineers. ADBN, thru its representative paid to the petitioner the agreed training fee in two
installments of P61,488.00

accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to answer the complaint against him. In fact,
petitioner was given considerable length of time to submit his counter-affidavit. It took more than one
year from February 17, 1992 before petitioner was considered to have waived his right to file his counter-
affidavit and the

Ruling: No. Jurisdiction over a party is acquired by his voluntary appearance or submission to the court
or by the coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons. Section 4, Rule
II of the NLRC Rules of Procedure states that summons "shall be served on the parties to the case." The
mandatory character of the provision is evident from the use of the word "shall."

respondent Judge to give due course to the petitioner’s Motion for New Trial. The
petitioner also prays for the dismissal of the respondent corporation’s application for
registration.

On Sept. 8, 1973, an application for land registration was filed by respondent Garcia in the
CFI of Bataan. A copy of the application was forwarded to the SolGen thru the director of
Lands. On Feb. 19, 1974, the Director of lands filed an opposition to this application, and at
the same time the SolGen entered his appearance and authorized the Provincial Fiscal to
appear on his behalf at the

discretion when it granted the respondent corporation’s application for registration,

without sufficient proof that the applicant possessed an imperfect and incomplete
title that is registrable under Sec. 48, par. b, of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended
by Republic Act 6236, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.

The Supreme Court is not convinced with the conclusion of the respondent Judge and
with the arguments of the respondent corporation that the latter, through its
predecessors-in- interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years.

certificate of title under the Torrens Systems does not necessarily make the holder a true
owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title under the Torrens
system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered
under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become the owner
of the lands illegally included. Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring
ownership but is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. It does not give
the holder any better right than what he actually has, especially if the registration was one
bad faith. The effect is that it is as if no registration

between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, on the 2nd day of
March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After
a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the
plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens
system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for
the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the
registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The
description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall. Several months later
(the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the
certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant. They
immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of
the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties.
The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory
that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make
any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant. The land
occupied by the wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not
a joint wall.
Issue: Whether or not the person who obtained the second certificate has better right over the land
Ruling: No. That in the case where two certificates of title include or cover the same land, the earlier in
date must prevail as between the original parties, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be
wholly or only in part compromised in the earlier certificate. In successive registrations where more than
one certificate is issued in respect of a particular interest in land, the person holding under the prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who obtained the second certificate. The decree of
registration is conclusive upon and against all persons. Legarda obtained a decree of registration on oct.
25 1906 while Saleeby got his on march 25 1912.
The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in
their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete
knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of
the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his
negligence, should suffer the loss, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was
innocent of any act of negligence.
DENR et al VS. YAP et al
FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos issued Proc. No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island,
among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under
the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the
issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised
doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or
through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their
lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation
No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the

public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination
of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not.” Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified
lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however,
respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such
classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior
to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively
classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.