PEOPLE vs.
Lacson, October 7, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of
penal laws should also cover procedures, and that these
should be applied only to the sole benefit of the
accused. Petitioner
asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to
provide relief to the accused in line with the
constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices inhibit
themselves from deciding in the Motion for
Reconsideration given they were only appointed in the
SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.
The rule should be applied prospectively. The court
upheld the petitioners’ contention that while Sec.8
secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should
not preclude the equally important right of the State to
public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right,
or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a
retroactive application.
2. WON the application of the time-bar under Section 8
Rule 117 be given a retroactive application without
reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being
favorable to the accused.
The Court is not mandated to apply rules retroactively
simply because it is favorable to the accused. The time-
bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the
State and
the accused. When the rule was approved by the court,
it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and
not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to
the denial
of the State’s right to due process. A retroactive
application would result in absurd, unjust and
oppressive consequences to the State and to the victims
of crimes and their heirs.
Go vs dimagiba
Facts: Fernando Dimagiba issued to Susan Go thirteen
checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for
encashment or payment on the due dates,
were dishonored for the reason “account closed.”
Subqequently, Dimagiba was prosecuted for 13 counts
of violation of BP 22 (An Act Penalizing the Making or
Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient
Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes, approved on
April 3, 1979). He was found guilty by the MTCC, was
sentenced three months imprisonment, and was
ordered to pay the offended party the amount he owed
plus interest. On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for the Partial
Quashal of the Writ of Execution, praying for the recall
of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final
decision. Citing SC-AC No. 12-2000, he pointed out that
the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also,
should have been imposed on him. The MTCC denied
the motion for reconsideration; Dimagiba was arrested
and imprisoned for the service of his sentence. On
October 9, 2001, Dimagiba filed with the RTC of Baguio
city a petition for writ of habeas corpus which was
granted by the said court after hearing the case.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petition for writ of
habeas corpus is the proper remedy.
(2) Whether or not SC-AC No. 12-2000 can be given
retroactiveapplication.
Held:
(1) No. The respondent had previously sought the
modification of his sentence in a Motion for
Reconsideration and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal
of the Writ of Execution. The remedy should have been
an appeal of the MTCC Order denying these motions.
His petition for writ of habeas corpus was clearly an
attempt to reopen a case that had already become final
and executory, an action deplorably amounting to forum
shopping.
(2) No. The rule on retroactivity states that criminal
laws may be applied retroactively if favorable to the
accused. SC-AC No. 12-2000 cannot be given
retroactive application for it is not a law that deletes the
penalty of imprisonment. It is merely a rule of
preference as to which penalty should be imposed
under the peculiar circumstancesof the case.
ORIEL MAGNO v. CA, GR No. 96132,
1992-06-26
Facts:
Petitioner was in the process of putting
up a car repair shop sometime in April
1983, but he did not have complete
equipment... he lacked funds with
which... to purchase the necessary
equipment to make such business
operational. Thus, petitioner,
representing Ultra Sources
International Corporation, approached
Corazon Teng, (private complainant)
Vice President of Mancor Industries
(hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for
his needed... car repair service
equipment of which Mancor was a
distributor. (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
(Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS
Finance and Management Corporation
(LS Finance for brevity) advising its
Vice-President, Joey
Gomez, that Mancor was willing and
able to supply the pieces of equipment
needed if LS Finance could
accommodate petitioner and provide
him credit facilities.
on condition that petitioner has to put
up a warranty deposit equivalent to
thirty per centum (30%) of the total
value of the pieces of equipment to be
purchased, amounting to P29,790.00.
unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon
Teng who advanced the deposit in
question, on condition that the same
would be paid as... a short term loan at
3% interest.
petitioner and LS Finance entered into
a leasing agreement
After the documentation was
completed, the equipment... were
delivered to petitioner who in turn
issued a postdated check and gave it to
Joey Gomez who, unknown to the
petitioner, delivered the same to
Corazon Teng.
Issues:
four counts of the aforestated charges
subject of... the petition... petitioner
could not pay LS Finance the monthly
rentals, thus it pulled out the garage
equipments. It was then on this
occasion that petitioner became aware
that Corazon Teng was the one who
advanced the warranty deposit.
Petitioner with his wife went to see
Corazon Teng and promised to pay the
latter but the payment never came and
when the four (4) checks were
deposited they were returned for the
reason "account closed."
Ruling:
finding the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and
sentencing the accused to
imprisonment for one year in each
Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695
and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant
the respective... amounts reflected in
subject checks
As the transaction did not ripen into a
purchase, but remained a lease with
rentals being paid for the loaned
equipment, which were pulled out by
the Lessor (Mancor) when the
petitioner failed to continue paying
possibly... due to economic constraints
or business failure, then it is lawful and
just that the warranty deposit should
not be charged against the petitioner.
To argue that after the termination of
the lease agreement, the warranty
deposit should be refundable in full to
Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not
cash out the
"warranty deposit" for his official or
personal use, is to stretch the nicety of
the alleged law (B.P. No. 22) violated.
It would have been different if this
predicament was not communicated to
all the parties he dealt with regarding
the lease agreement the financing of
which was... covered by L.S. Finance
Management.
the appealed decision is REVERSED
and the accused-petitioner is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
Principles:
the noble objective of the law is tainted
with materialism and opportunism in
the highest degree.
Case Title: US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code
Facts:
On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel
engaged in the transport of animals named
Stanford commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the
port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said
vessel from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674
heads of cattle without providing appropriate
shelter and proper suitable means for securing
the animals which resulted for most of the
animals to get hurt and others to have died while
in transit.
This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to
Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
Constitution. It is however contended that cases
cannot be filed because neither was it said that
the court sitting where the animals were
disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it
say about ships not licensed under Philippine
laws, like the ships involved.
Issue:
Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an
offense committed on board a foreign ship while
inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from
the headlines which embrace the entrance of
Manila Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters
and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall apply.
A crime committed on board a Norwegian
merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is
within the jurisdiction of the courts of the
Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during
the time the ship was within the territorial waters -
regardless of the fact that the same conditions
existed when the ship settled from the foreign
port and while it was on the high seas,
In light of the above restriction, the defendant
was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of
two hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
Case Title: People vs Wong
Cheng, 46 Phil 729
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code
Facts:
The appellant, in representation of the Attorney
General, filed an appeal that urges the revocation
of a demurrer sustained by the Court of First
Instance of Manila presented by the defendant.
The defendant, accused of having illegally
smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel
Changsa of English nationality while the said
vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two and a
half miles from the shores of the city. In the said
demurrer, the defendant contended the lack of
jurisdiction of the lower court of the said crime,
which resulted to the dismissal of the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine courts have

jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard
merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional
waters.

Held:

Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed

in our internal waters thus the Philippine courts
have a right of jurisdiction over the said offense.
The Court said that having the opium smoked
within our territorial waters even though aboard a
foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public
order because it causes such drugs to produce
pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore,
the demurrer is revoked and the Court ordered
further proceedings.