8. SPOUSES VERGARA V.

ERLINDA SONKIN GR 193659

FACTS:

Spouses. Vergara and Spouses. Sonkin are adjoining landowners. The property owned by the Sps.
Sonkin (Sonkin Property) is slightly lower in elevation than that owned by Sps. Vergara (Vergara
Property).The Sps Sonkin constructed a house on their property using a portion of the partition wall as
part of the wall of the master’s bedroom and bathroom.Thereafter, the Sps. Vergara levelled the uneven
portion of their property making it even higher than that of the Sonkin Property. Eventually, Sps. Sonkin
began to complain that water coming from the Vergara Property was leaking into their bedroom through
the partition wall, causing cracks, as well as damage, to the paint and the wooden parquet floor. Sps.
Sonkin repeatedly demanded that Sps. Vergara build a retaining wall on their property in order to contain
the landfill that they had dumped thereon, but the same went unheeded. Sps. Sonkin filed the instant
complaint for damages and injunction with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and issuance of a
temporary restraining order.

The CA on appeal ruled that while the act of the Sps Vergara in elevating their property was the
proximate cause of the water seepage, the Sps. Sonkin were guilty of contributory negligence in building
their house directly abutting the perimeter wall. Thus, it deleted the actual damages ordered by the RTC.
It nevertheless awarded the Sonkins moral damages and attorney’s fees.Hence this appeal by the Sps
Vergara.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sps Sonkin are entitled to moral damages

HELD:

NO. Article 2179 of the Civil Code reads:Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Verily, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to
the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection.

The CA correctly held that while the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the house of Sps.
Sonkin was the act of Sps. Vergara in dumping gravel and soil onto their property, thus, pushing the
perimeter wall back and causing cracks thereon, as well as water seepage, the former is nevertheless
guilty of contributory negligence for not only failing to observe the two (2)-meter setback rule under the
National Building Code, but also for disregarding the legal easement (to receive water from higher
estates) constituted over their property. As such, Sps. Sonkin must necessarily and equally bear their
own loss.

In view of Sps. Sonkin’s contributory negligence, the Court deems it appropriate to delete the award of
moral damages in their favor. While moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful
act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the
cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, they are only given to
ease the defendant’s grief and suffering and should, therefore, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt
caused and the gravity of the wrong done.
9. LAMBERT v HEIRS OF CASTILLON (Pau) G.R. No. 160709. February 23, 2005

Facts:

In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel
Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to
roam around Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider. At around past 10:00
p.m., after eating supper at Hona’s Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they traversed the highway
towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident with a
Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was
traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous
death of Ray and injuries to Sergio. Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for
damages with prayer for preliminary attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was
subsequently amended to include the claim by Joel Castillon for the damages caused to the motorcycle.
On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown trial, the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the Castillon
heirs but reduced Lambert’s liability by 20% in view of the contributory negligence of Ray. On the claim of
Joel Castillon, the evidence shows that he is not the real owner of the motorcycle. He is not the real party
in interest. Accordingly, his complaint is dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court.

Issue/s:

1. Did the CA err in not applying the doctrine of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla
that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be the cause of the
accident? In other words, was Lambert negligent?

2. Does the act of tailgating merely constitute contributory negligence? Lambert insists that the
negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause of his unfortunate death and therefore she is not
liable for damages.

Held :

1. No. Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his right of
way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio.
Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for without that
left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened.
Petitioner misunderstood our ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta. That case also involved a motorcycle
crashing into the left rear portion of another vehicle, and we declared therein that drivers of
vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be “the cause of the accident,
unless contradicted by other evidence”. Raynera, being the driver of the rear vehicle, had full
control of the situation as he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Thus, the
theory that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be the
cause of the accident is, as in this case, sufficiently contradicted by evidence, which is the
sudden left turn made by Reynaldo which proximately caused the collision. 2. Yes. The SC found
it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of the victim’s
negligence. Article 2179 reads as follows: When the plaintiff’s negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due
 care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for
his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences
of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually
caused by his negligence.[15] The determination of the mitigation of the defendant’s liability
varies depending on the circumstances of each case. In the case at bar, it was established that
Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating
the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a
protective helmet.[21] These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his
demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The contribution of these
circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of percentages of the total cause.
Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover damages only up to
50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall be borne by the private respondents;
the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner.

10. PNR V. ETHEL BRUNTY

G.R. NO.169891 November 2, 2006

FACTS:

Rhonda Brunty, an American citizen and daughter of Ehtel Brunty, visited the Philippines. Before
her departure, she with her Filipino host, Juan Manuel Garcia, went to Baguio on board a Mercedez Benz
driven by Mercelita, around 12 midnight. On the other hand, a PNR train bound for Tutuban, Manila left
La Union station at 11pm. At around 2am, the Benz was approaching the railroad crossing at Moncada,
Tarlac. The car was running at a speed of 70km/hr and had overtaken a vehicle when it collided with the
PNR train. Brunty was rushed to the hospital, but was pronounced dead 10 minutes after arrival, while
Garcia suffered severe head injuries.

A demand letter was sent to PNR which did not respond. A complaint for damages was filed against it.
PNR argues that since there is freedom of control and greater maneuverability on the part of motor
vehicles, it is obvious that in railroad crossings, they have the last clear chance to prevent or avoid an
unwanted accident from taking place.

RTC: PNR negligent; CA: affirmed

ISSUE:

Whether the doctrine of last clear chance applies

RULING:

NO. The proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence of PNR, the
doctrine finds no application in the instant case.PNR was negligent because of its failure to provide the
necessary safety device to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the railroad track: (1.) absence of
flagbars or safety railroad bars; (2.) inadequacy of the installed warning signals; and (3.) lack of proper
lighting within the area.

Thus, even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed by PNR, it would still be impossible to
know or see that there is a railroad crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an approaching train from the
Moncada side of the road since one’s view would be blocked by a cockpit arena. A vehicle coming from
the Moncada side would have difficulty in knowing that there is an approaching train because of the slight
curve, more so, at an unholy hour as 2:00 a.m. Thus, it is imperative on the part of the PNR to provide
adequate safety equipment in the area

This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar,
or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and
disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety
demands that said device or equipment be installed.

There was a contributory negligence on the part driver of the Mercedez Benz, Mercelita, as the place was
not properly illuminated; one’s view was blocked by a cockpit arena; and Mercelita was unfamiliar with the
place, yet he drove at 70km/hr and had overtaken a vehicle before arriving at the railroad track. However,
the effect of contributory negligence on the mitigation of liability does not apply here. Both before the
lower courts, no damages were awarded to Mercelita and he did not appeal. There is neither proof as to
the relationship between Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty.

11. GENOBIAGON VS CA

Facts: On December 31, 1959, at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, a rig driven by appellant bumped an
old woman who was crossing T. Padilla St., Cebu City, at the right side of T. Padilla Market. The
appellant's rig was following another at a distance of two meters. The old woman started to cross when
the first rig was approaching her, but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the
steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him, the
appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who as a consequence fell at the middle of the road. The
appellant continued to drive on, but a by-stander, one Vicente Nangyao, who had just closed his store in
the market in order to celebrate the coming of the New Year, and who saw the incident right before him,
shouted at the appellant to stop. He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop. Overtaking the
appellant, Nangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was, 'it was the old woman
that bumped him.' The appellant went back to the place where the old woman was struck by his rig. The
old woman was unconscious, and the food and viands she was carrying were scattered on her body. The
victim was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died three hours later.

Issue: whether the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident.

Held: NO. The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused.
"The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence
(People vs. Orbeta, CA-G.R. No. 321, March 29, 1947)." (People vs. Quiñones, 44 O.G. 1520).

The petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals unjustly increased his civil liability to P12,000, is
devoid of merit. The prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for death in homicide or
murder is P30,000 (People vs. De la Fuente, [1983] 126 SCRA 518; People vs. Centeno 130 SCRA 198).
Accordingly, the civil liability of the petitioner is increased to P30,000.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the civil liability of the petitioner
which is hereby increased to P30,000. Costs against petitioner.

12. SICAM VS JORGE

FACTS: On different dates, Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam
located in Parañaque to secure a loan. On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and
took away whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault. On the same date, Sicam
sent Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to the robbery incident in the pawnshop.
Respondent Lulu then wroteback expressing disbelief, then requested Sicam to prepare the pawned
jewelry for withdrawal on November 6, but Sicam failed to return the jewelry.

Lulu, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a complaint against Sicam with the RTC of Makati seeking
indemnification for the loss of pawned jewelry and payment of AD, MD and ED as well as AF.

The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing respondents’ complaint as well as petitioners’ counterclaim.
Respondents appealed the RTC Decision to the CA which reversed the RTC, ordering the appellees to
pay appellants the actual value of the lost jewelry and AF. Petitioners MR denied, hence the instant
petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: are the petitioners liable for the loss of the pawned articles in their possession? (Petitioners insist
that they are not liable since robbery is a fortuitous event and they are not negligent at all.)

HELD:

YES. Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation,
or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for
those events which could not be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not
enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must
be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility
to foresee the same.
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply with
obligations must be independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it
must be impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal
manner; and,
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss.

The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it.
And, in order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no
negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.
Sicam had testified that there was a security guard in their pawnshop at the time of the robbery. He
likewise testified that when he started the pawnshop business in 1983, he thought of opening a vault with
the nearby bank for the purpose of safekeeping the valuables but was discouraged by the Central Bank
since pawned articles should only be stored in a vault inside the pawnshop. The very measures which
petitioners had allegedly adopted show that to them the possibility of robbery was not only foreseeable,
but actually foreseen and anticipated. Sicam’s testimony, in effect, contradicts petitioners’ defense of
fortuitous event.Moreover, petitioners failed to show that they were free from any negligence by which the
loss of the pawned jewelry may have been occasioned.

Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does not foreclose the possibility
of negligence on the part of herein petitioners.
Petitioners merely presented the police report of the Parañaque Police Station on the robbery committed
based on the report of petitioners’ employees which is not sufficient to establish robbery. Such report also
does not prove that petitioners were not at fault. On the contrary, by the very evidence of petitioners, the
CA did not err in finding that petitioners are guilty of concurrent or contributory negligence as provided in
Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to pawnshops and other establishments which are
engaged in making loans secured by pledges, the special laws and regulations concerning them shall be
observed, and subsidiarily, the provisions on pledge, mortgage and antichresis.The provision on pledge,
particularly Article 2099 of the Civil Code, provides that the creditor shall take care of the thing pledged
with the diligence of a good father of a family. This means that petitioners must take care of the pawns
the way a prudent person would as to his own property.

In this connection, Article 1173 of the Civil Code further provides:

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall
apply.If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that
which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.

We expounded in Cruz v. Gangan that negligence is the omission to do something which a

reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do; or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is want of care
required by the circumstances.

A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation. Petitioners were guilty of negligence
in the operation of their pawnshop business. Sicam’s testimony revealed that there were no security
measures adopted by petitioners in the operation of the pawnshop. Evidently, no sufficient precaution and
vigilance were adopted by petitioners to protect the pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no clear
showing that there was any security guard at all. Or if there was one, that he had sufficient training in
securing a pawnshop. Further, there is no showing that the alleged security guard exercised all that was
necessary to prevent any untoward incident or to ensure that no suspicious individuals were allowed to
enter the premises. In fact, it is even doubtful that there was a security guard, since it is quite impossible
that he would not have noticed that the robbers were armed with caliber .45 pistols each, which were
allegedly poked at the employees. Significantly, the alleged security guard was not presented at all to
corroborate petitioner Sicam’s claim; not one of petitioners’ employees who were present during the
robbery incident testified in court.

Furthermore, petitioner Sicam’s admission that the vault was open at the time of robbery is clearly
a proof of petitioners’ failure to observe the care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly
demanded.The robbery in this case happened in petitioners’ pawnshop and they were negligent in not
exercising the precautions justly demanded of a pawnshop.

13. Juntilla vs Fontanar

(136 SCRA 624)

Facts: Herein plaintiff was a passenger of the public utility jeepney on course from Danao City to Cebu
City. The jeepney was driven by driven by defendant Berfol Camoro and registered under the franchise of
Clemente Fontanar. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the
vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the
vehicle. Plaintiff suffered a lacerated wound on his right palm aside from the injuries he suffered on his
left arm, right thigh, and on his back.

Plaintiff filed a case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu City. Defendants,
in their answer, alleged that the tire blow out was beyond their control, taking into account that the tire
that exploded was newly bought and was only slightly used at the time it blew up.

Issue: Whether or not the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event?

Held: No. In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not
independent of the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or
because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach drivers not to overload their
vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire
blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times.