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G.R. No.

176150 June 25, 2008

IBARRA P. ORTEGA, petitioner,


vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner Ibarra P. Ortega assails the Court of Appeals’ August 7, 2006 Decision 1 dismissing his petition for review and upholding the
denial by respondent Social Security Commission (SSC) of his application for total permanent disability benefits, and the Resolution 2 of
January 16, 2007 denying his motions for reconsideration and inhibition.

Petitioner, a member of respondent Social Security System (SSS), filed claims for partial permanent disability benefits on account of his
condition of Generalized Arthritis and Partial Ankylosis, 3 which claims the SSS granted for a total monthly pension of 23 months. 4

After the expiration of his disability pension, petitioner filed with the SSS Malabon Branch Office on April 26, 2000 a claim
for total permanent disability benefits.5 His application, docketed as BO-0000-1755, was denied, however, on the ground that he was
already granted disability benefits for the same illness and physical examination showed no progression of illness. 6 Dr. Juanillo Descalzo III,
SSS Malabon Branch senior physician, observed that petitioner merely had a "slight limitation of grasping movement for both hands." 7

Aggrieved, petitioner filed before the SSC an unverified Petition of June 19, 2000, 8 alleging that the SSS denied his application despite the
fact that his attending physician, Dr. Rafael Recto, Jr., diagnosed him to be suffering from Trigger finger 4th (L) and thumb (L) 9 while
another private medical practitioner, Dr. Flo dela Cruz, diagnosed him to be also suffering from Bronchial Asthma, Hypertension and
Gastro-Esophageal Reflux Disease.10

Further claiming to be afflicted with rheumatoid arthritis of both hands affecting all fingers and both palms, 11 petitioner contended that the
medical opinion of the SSS physician who interviewed him for less than three minutes cannot prevail over the findings of his physicians
who have been treating him over a long period of time.

Before taking cognizance of his appeal, the SSC directed the exhaustion of administrative remedies, by letter of June 30, 2000. The matter
was thus referred to the SSS Office of the Medical Program Director for review of petitioner’s disability claim. 12

Meanwhile, by letter of July 17, 2000, the SSS Legal Department denied a reconsideration of the denial of his claim, 13 prompting petitioner
to submit a letter-opposition of August 15, 2000.14

Upon referral of the SSC, the SSS Medical Program Department, through Dr. Carlota A. Cruz-Tutaan and Dr. Jesus S. Tan, confirmed that,
upon examination of petitioner, there was no progression of his illness, 15 prompting petitioner to submit a letter-opposition of November 11,
2000 charging the SSS medical officers of issuing fraudulent medical findings. 16 Unperturbed, the SSS Medical Program Department stood
its ground and denied with finality petitioner’s claim, by letter of November 22, 2000. 17

On January 29, 2001, SSC finally docketed petitioner’s June 19, 2000 petition as SSC Case No. 1-15115-2001, 18 after petitioner complied
with SSC’s directives19 to verify the petition and submit certain document-annexes. SSS then filed its Answer of May 31, 2001, 20 to which
petitioner submitted a Reply of June 25, 2001.21 After the August 10, 2001 pre-hearing conference, 22 the SSS filed its Position Paper of
September 7, 2001 while petitioner submitted his Reply of October 19, 2001.

By Resolution of April 3, 2002, 23 the SSC denied petitioner’s claim for entitlement to total permanent disability for lack of merit. And it
opined that, considering that he had reached the retirement age of 60, on March 19, 1998, with 41 contributions to his name, petitioner
may opt:

(a) [t]o continue paying to the SSS monthly contributions (including employer’s share) on his own to complete the required 120
monthly contributions in order to avail of the retirement pension benefit;

(b) [to] leave his monthly contributions with the SSS for his and his family’s future benefits; or

(c) [to a]vail of the lump sum retirement benefit.24

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. The SSC thus directed the SSS to file its comment 25 and, by a subsequent order, to
conduct a domiciliary visit and physical examination on petitioner to ascertain whether he could already qualify for such benefit. 26 In
compliance therewith, Dr. Rebecca Sison, SSS senior physician, examined petitioner on August 29, 2002 and found no sufficient basis to
warrant the granting of total permanent disability benefits to him. 27

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order 28 of January 29, 2003, petitioner appealed via Rule 43 to the Court of
Appeals29which promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 75653 the assailed issuances affirming in toto the SSC Resolution and Order.

There is at the outset a need to thresh out procedural issues attending the petition drafted by petitioner himself, apparently without the aid
of counsel. While the petition was admittedly filed as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it contains a rider averring that it was filed also
as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. 30

In not granting imprimatur to this type of unorthodox strategy, the Court ruled, in a similar case, 31 that a party should not join both petitions
in one pleading. A petition cannot be subsumed simultaneously under Rule 45 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, nor may it delegate
upon the court the task of determining under which rule the petition should fall. 32 It is a firm judicial policy that the remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. 33

Palpably, petitioner crafted this unconventional two-headed petition under no other pretext but to second-guess at the appropriate remedy.
His apparent bewilderment led him to later rectify a supposed typographical error in the caption such that instead of "petition for review,"
the title be read as a "petition for certiorari." 34 The subsequent filing of the Correction of Clerical Errors served no redeeming purpose as it
only evinced petitioner’s decision to consider the petition as a special civil action for certiorari, which is an improper remedy.

It bears stressing that Rule 45 and Rule 65 pertain to different remedies and have distinct applications. 35 It is axiomatic that the remedy of
certiorari is not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of
law.36 The petition for review under Rule 45 covers the mode of appeal from a judgment, final order, resolution or one which completely
disposes of the case, like the herein assailed Decision and Resolution of the appellate court. There being already a final judgment at the
time of the filing of the petition, a petition for review under Rule 45 is the appropriate remedy.

Petitioner failed to carve out an exception to this rule, as he did not– and could not– illustrate the inadequacy of an appeal as a remedy
that could promptly relieve him from the injurious effects of the assailed judgment. 37 In fact, by seeking the same kind of reliefs via two
remedies rolled into one pleading, he implicitly admits that an appeal suffices. Moreover, the probability of divergent rulings, a scenario
transpiring in G & S Transport Corp. v. CA, 38 is far from obtaining in this case since the assailed issuances emanated from only one court
and cannot be elevated separately in different fora.

While the Court may dismiss a petition outright for being an improper remedy, 39 it may, in certain instances where a petition was filed on
time both under Rules 45 and 65 and in the interest of justice, proceed to review the substance of the petition and treat it as having been
filed under Rule 45.40 Either way, however, the present petition just the same merits dismissal since it puts to issue questions of fact rather
than questions of law which are appropriate for review under a Rule 45 petition.

It is settled that the Court is not a trier of facts and accords great weight to the factual findings of lower courts or agencies whose function
is to resolve factual matters.41 It is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again. 42 Moreover, findings of fact of administrative agencies
and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not
only respect but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 43

The requisite quantum of proof in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor
preponderance of evidence. In this type of cases, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 44 In this case, substantial evidence
abounds.

The conclusion that petitioner is not entitled to total permanent disability benefits under the Social Security Law was reached after petitioner
was examined not just by one but four SSS physicians, namely, Dr. Juanillo Descalzo III, Dr. Carlota A. Cruz-Tutaan, Dr. Jesus S. Tan and
Dr. Rebecca Sison.

The initial physical examination and interview revealed that petitioner had slight limitation of grasping movement for both hands. According
to Dr. Descalzo, this finding was not enough to grant an extension of benefit since petitioner had already received benefits equivalent to
30% of the body. Responding to the allegation that the April 2000 physical examination was performed in a short period of time, the doctor
credibly explained that petitioner’s movements were already being monitored and evaluated from a distance as part of the examination of
his extremities in order to minimize malingering and overacting. 45

Meanwhile, the medical findings of Dr. Carlota A. Cruz-Tutaan and Dr. Jesus S. Tan in August and September 2000 were summarized as
follows:

Heart:

- manifest regular rhythm

- no murmurs

Lungs:

- on ausculation showed no evidence of wheezing

- breath sounds are normal and;

- he is not in a state of respiratory distress


Hypertension:

- Blood Pressure is 140/80, hence, under control

Extremities: (Hands)

- No deformities noted except for the right small finger, the distal interphalangeal joint is bent at about 30°. No abnormal
limitation of movement noted on all the fingers, grasping has improved. 46

Contrary to petitioner’s asseverations, the SSC did not ignore the certifications of petitioner’s attending physicians as, in fact, it ordered the
SSS in June 2001 to conduct an investigation as to the medical findings and final diagnosis by his attending physicians. 47 It was surfaced
that petitioner’s medical records in the custody of Dr. Flo dela Cruz could not be found as they were allegedly destroyed by
inundation.48 And it was found that the July 10, 2001 letter-certification by Dr. Rafael Recto, Jr. only narrated the recurring condition of
petitioner’s trigger finger, the administration to him of local steroid injections, and the performance of surgical release on his left 4th trigger
finger on June 16, 1998; and that he was diagnosed on August 28, 2000 with mallet finger (R, 5th), for which he was advised to undergo
reconstructive surgery.49

Adopting a liberal attitude and exercising sound discretion, the SSC even directed the conduct of another physical examination on petitioner
to judiciously resolve his motion for reconsideration. Pursuant thereto, Dr. Sison physically examined petitioner in August 2002, the results
of which were reflected in a medical report, viz:

Physical Examination:

General Survey: well nourished, well developed, conscious, coherent but talks with sarcasm and arrogance.

EENT: normocephalic, pinkish conjunctiva, anicteric sclerae; negative tonsillo-pharyngeal congestion

C/L: clear breath sounds, no wheezes; (-) dyspnea

Heart: normal rate, regular rhythm.

Abdomen: negative tenderness

Extremeties: no neurological and sensory deficit

no gross deformity, (+) scar, 4th finger (L)

no loss of grasping power for large and small objects

no loss of opposition between thumb and forefingers

can bend fully to reach toes

can bend both knees fully without pain or difficulty

can raise both arms above shoulder level without pain and difficulty
can bend both elbows without limitation

The member was requested to submit recent ECG, x-rays and other laboratory work-up results but he could not locate them
during visit and would still look for the said medical documents and mail them to SSS.

He was then advised to come to SSS, Diliman Branch for ECG and x-ray, however he refused.

He also refused to affix his signature on the medical field service form to confirm the visit of our Medical Officer.

Based on these recent physical examination findings and functional assessment and the medical certificate (Form MMD 102) with
final diagnosis of Trigger Finger, there is no sufficient basis that warrants the granting of Total Permanent
50
disability. (Underscoring supplied)

Dr. Sison subsequently noted that petitioner’s Electrocardiograph, Chest X-ray, Kidney and Urinary Bladder Ultrasound indicated his
condition as normal,51 which conclusion was arrived at by going through the same medical documents presented by petitioner following a
series of tests conducted on him by hospitals of his choice.

From the foregoing recital of petitioner’s medical history, the SSC concluded that petitioner is not entitled to total permanent disability
benefits under the Social Security Law, the pertinent provisions of which read:

xxxx

(d) The following disabilities shall be deemed permanent total:

1. Complete loss of sight of both eyes;

2. Loss of two limbs at or above the ankle or wrists;

3. Permanent complete paralysis of two limbs;

4. Brain injury resulting to incurable imbecility or insanity; and

5. Such cases as determined and approved by the SSS.

xxxx

(f) If the disability is permanent partial and such disability occurs after thirty-six (36) monthly contributions have been paid prior to
the semester of disability, the benefit shall be the monthly pension for permanent total disability payable not longer than the period
designated in the following schedule:

COMPLETE AND NUMBER OF


PERMANENT LOSS OF USE MONTHS
OF
One thumb 10

One index finger 8

One middle finger 6

One ring finger 5

One little finger 3

One big toe 6

One hand 39

One arm 50

One foot 31

One leg 46

One ear 10

Both ears 20

Hearing of one ear 10

Hearing of both ears 50

Sight of one eye 25


(g) The percentage degree of disability which is equivalent to the ratio that the designated number of months of compensability
bears to seventy-five (75), rounded to the next higher integer, shall not be additive for distinct, separate and unrelated permanent
partial disabilities, but shall be additive for deteriorating and related permanent partial disabilities to a maximum of one hundred
percent (100%), in which case, the member shall be deemed as permanently totally disabled. 52

Indeed, the evidence indicates that petitioner’s condition at the time material to the case does not fall under the enumeration in the above-
quoted provisions of the Social Security Law. Moreover, as correctly held by the appellate court, the proviso of such provisions on the
percentage degree of disability applies when there is a related deterioration of the illness previously considered as partial permanent
disability. In this case, there is dearth of evidence on the proposition that petitioner’s array of illnesses is related to Generalized Arthritis
and Partial Ankylosis of the specific body parts.

Petitioner’s reliance on jurisprudence53 on work-connected disability claims insofar as it relates to a demonstration of disability to perform his
trade and profession54 is misplaced.

Claims under the Labor Code for compensation and under the Social Security Law for benefits are not the same as to their nature and
purpose. On the one hand, the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code govern compensability of work-related disabilities or when there is
loss of income due to work-connected or work-aggravated injury or illness. 55 On the other hand, the benefits under the Social Security Law
are intended to provide insurance or protection against the hazards or risks of disability, sickness, old age or death, inter alia, irrespective
of whether they arose from or in the course of the employment. 56And unlike under the Social Security Law, a disability is total and
permanent under the Labor Code if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a
continuous period exceeding 120 days regardless of whether he loses the use of any of his body parts. 57

The Court notes that the main issue petitioner proffers is whether he is entitled to total permanent disability benefits from the SSS given his
"angioplasty operation of the heart, coronary artery disease, ischemic heart disease, severe hypertension and a host of other serious
illnesses filed with the SSS[.]"58

A perusal of the records shows that when the case was already submitted for decision before the appellate court, petitioner manifested that
he suffered a heart attack on February 25, 2004, 59 for which he claimed to have undergone a coronary angiogram on March 9, 2005 and
a coronary angioplasty on September 27, 2005 at the Philippine Heart Center. 60

Unfortunate as these events were, the appellate court correctly ruled that it could not consider such allegation of subsequent events since
"a factual question may not be raised for the first time on appeal[,] and documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court
will not be considered in disposing of the issues of an action." 61

The issues in every case are limited to those presented in the pleadings. The object of the pleadings is to draw the lines of battle between
the litigants and to indicate fairly the nature of the claims or defenses of

both parties.62 A change of theory on appeal is not allowed. 63 In this case, the matter of petitioner’s serious heart condition was not raised
in his application before the SSS or in his June 19, 2000 petition before the SSC.

Fair play dictates that the SSS be afforded the opportunity to properly meet the issue 64 with respect to the new ailments besetting petitioner,
in line with the actual practice that only qualified government physicians, by virtue of their oath as civil service officials, are competent to
examine persons and issue medical certificates which will be used by the government for a specific official purpose. 65 This holds greater
significance where there exist differences or doubts as to the medical condition of the person.
In this case, the SSS medical examiners are tasked by law to analyze the extent of personal incapacity resulting from disease or injury.
Oftentimes, a physician who is adequately versed in the knowledge of anatomy and physiology will find himself deficient when called upon
to express an opinion on the permanent changes resulting from a disability. Unlike the general practitioner who merely concerns himself
with the examination of his patient for purposes of diagnosis and treatment, the medical examiner has to consider varied factors and
ascertain the claimant’s related history and subjective complaints. 66 The members of this Court cannot strip their judicial robe and don the
physician’s gown, so to speak, in a pretense to correlate variances in medical findings.

Finding no cogent reason to discuss the ancillary issues, the Court dismisses the petition, without prejudice to the filing of a new application
by petitioner who is not left without any recourse in his legal bout respecting his supervening claims anchored mainly on Coronary Artery
Disease 1VD and Diabetes Mellitus Type 2, these illnesses having been found to be dissimilar from the subject matter of the present
action.67

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

ELENA P. DYCAICO, G.R. No. 161357


Petitioner,
Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,


PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
*
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM CHICO-NAZARIO and
and SOCIAL SECURITY GARCIA, JJ.
COMMISSION,
Respondents. Promulgated:

November 30, 2005


x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Elena P. Dycaico which seeks to reverse and set

aside the Decision[1] dated April 15, 2003of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP

No. 69632. The assailed decision affirmed the Resolution dated February 6, 2002 of the Social Security Commission (SSC), denying the

petitioners claim for survivors pension accruing from the death of her husband Bonifacio S. Dycaico, a Social Security System (SSS)

member-pensioner. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is the appellate courts Resolution dated December 15, 2003, denying the

petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The case arose from the following undisputed facts:

Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his self-employed data record (SSS Form RS-1), he named

the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their eight children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband

and wife without the benefit of marriage.

In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from the SSS. He continued to receive the

monthly pension until he passed away on June 19, 1997. A few months prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner

on January 6, 1997.

Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivors pension. Her application, however, was

denied on the ground that under Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 or the Social Security Law [2]she could not be

considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement. The said proviso reads:

Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits.


(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be
entitled to receive the monthly pension.

Applying this proviso, the petitioner was informed that the

Records show that the member [referring to Bonifacio] was considered retired on June 5, 1989 and monthly
pension was cancelled upon our receipt of a report on his death on June 19, 1997. In your death claim application,
submitted marriage contract with the deceased member shows that you were married in 1997 or after his retirement
date; hence, you could not be considered his primary beneficiary.

In view of this, we regret that there is no other benefit due you. However, if you do not conform with us, you
may file a formal petition with our Social Security Commission to determine your benefit eligibility. [3]

On July 9, 2001, the petitioner filed with the SSC a petition alleging that the denial of her survivors pension was unjustified. She contended

that Bonifacio designated her and their children as primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1 and that it was not indicated therein that

only legitimate family members could be made beneficiaries. Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not, likewise, require that the

primary beneficiaries be legitimate relatives of the member to be entitled to the survivors pension. The SSS is legally bound to respect

Bonifacios designation of them as his

beneficiaries. Further, Rep. Act No. 8282 should be interpreted to promote social justice.

On February 6, 2002, the SSC promulgated its Resolution affirming the denial of the petitioners claim. The SSC refuted the

petitioners contention that primary beneficiaries need not be legitimate family members by citing the definitions of primary beneficiaries and

dependents in Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 8282. Under paragraph (k) of the said provision, primary beneficiaries are [t]he dependent

spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children Paragraph (e) of the

same provision, on the other hand, defines dependents as the following: (1) [t]he legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the

member; (2) [t]he legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not

reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been

permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and (3) [t]he parent who is receiving regular support from
the member. Based on the foregoing, according to the SSC, it has consistently ruled that entitlement to the survivors pension in ones

capacity as primary beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of relationship with and dependency for support upon the deceased SSS

member during his lifetime.

Under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, the primary beneficiaries who are entitled to survivors pension are those who

qualify as

such as of the date of retirement of the deceased member. Hence, the petitioner, who was not then the legitimate spouse of Bonifacio as

of the date of his retirement, could not be considered his primary beneficiary. The SSC further opined that Bonifacios designation of the

petitioner as one of his primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1 is void, not only on moral considerations but also for misrepresentation.

Accordingly, the petitioner is not entitled to claim the survivors pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.

Aggrieved, the petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review of the SSCs February 6, 2002 Resolution. In the assailed

Decision, dated April 15, 2003, the appellate court dismissed the petition. Citing the same provisions in Rep. Act No. 8282 as those cited

by the SSC, the CA declared that since the petitioner was merely the common-law wife of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement in 1989,

his designation of the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries in the SSS Form RS-1 in 1980 is void. The CA further observed that Bonifacios

children with the petitioner could no longer qualify as primary beneficiaries because they have all reached twenty-one (21) years of age.

The decretal portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed 06 February
2002 Resolution of respondent Commission is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The petitioner sought reconsideration of the said decision but in the assailed Resolution dated December 15, 2003, the appellate court

denied her motion. Hence, the petitioners recourse to this Court.


The petitioner points out that the term primary beneficiaries as used in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not have any

qualification. She thus theorizes that regardless of whether the primary beneficiary designated by the member as such is legitimate or not,

he or she is entitled to the survivors pension. Reliance by the appellate court and the SSC on the definitions of primary beneficiaries and

dependents in Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 8282 is allegedly unwarranted because these definitions cannot modify Section 12-B(d) thereof.

The petitioner maintains that when she and Bonifacio got married in January 1997, a few months before he passed away, they

merely intended to legalize their relationship and had no intention to commit any fraud. Further, since Rep. Act No. 8282 is a social

legislation, it should be construed liberally in favor of claimants like the petitioner. She cites the Courts pronouncement that the sympathy of

the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor.

[5]

The SSS, on the other hand, contends that Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 should be read in conjunction with the

definition of the terms dependents and primary beneficiaries in Section 8 thereof. Since the petitioner was not as yet the legal spouse of

Bonifacio at the time of his retirement in 1989, she is not entitled to claim the survivors pension accruing at the time of his death. The SSS

insists that the designation by Bonifacio of the petitioner and their illegitimate children in his SSS Form RS-1 is void.

According to the SSS, there is nothing in Rep. Act No. 8282 which provides that should there be no primary or secondary

beneficiaries, the benefit accruing from the death of a member should go to his designated common-law spouse and that to rule otherwise

would be to condone the designation of common-law spouses as beneficiaries, a clear case of circumventing the SS Law and a violation of

public policy and morals.[6] Finally, the SSS is of the opinion that Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is clear and explicit; hence, there

is no room for its interpretation, only for application.

In the Resolution dated July 19, 2005, the Court required the parties, as well as the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their

respective comments on the issue of whether or not the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282

violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. The Court believes that this issue is intertwined with and

indispensable to the resolution of the merits of the petition.


In compliance therewith, in its comment, the SSC argues that the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of

Rep. Act No. 8282 does not run afoul of the equal protection clause of the Constitution as it merely determines the reckoning date of

qualification and entitlement of beneficiaries to the survivorship pension. It asserts that this classification of beneficiaries is based on valid

and substantial distinctions that are germane to the legislative purpose of Rep. Act No. 8282.

The SSC also impugns the marriage of the petitioner to Bonifacio after his retirement stating that it was contracted as an

afterthought to enable her to qualify for the survivorship pension upon the latters death. It further alleges that there is no violation of the

due process clause as the petitioner was given her day in court and was able to present her side.

The SSS filed its separate comment and therein insists that the petitioner was not the legitimate spouse of the deceased member

at the time when the contingency occurred (his retirement) and, therefore, she could not be considered a primary beneficiary within the

contemplation of Rep. Act No. 8282. The SSS posits that the statutes intent is to give survivorship pension only to primary beneficiaries at

the time of the retirement of the deceased member. Rep. Act No. 8282 itself ordains the persons entitled thereto and cannot be subject of

change by the SSS.

The Solicitor General agrees with the stance taken by the SSS that the proviso as of the date of his retirement merely marks the

period when the primary beneficiary must be so to be entitled to the benefits. It does not violate the equal protection clause because the

classification resulting therefrom rests on substantial distinctions. Moreover, the condition as to the period for entitlement, i.e., as of the date

of the members retirement, is relevant as it set the parameters for those availing of the benefits and it applies to all those similarly situated.

The Solicitor General is also of the view that the said proviso does not offend the due process clause because claimants are given the

opportunity to file their claims and to prove their case before the Commission.

For clarity, Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is quoted anew below:

Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits.


(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be
entitled to receive the monthly pension.

Under Section 8(k) of the same law, the primary beneficiaries are:

1. The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and

2. The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children.

Further, the dependent spouse and dependent children are qualified under paragraph (e) of the same section as follows:

1. The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support until he or she remarries; and

2. The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully
employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one years of age, he is congenitally
or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.

The SSS denied the petitioners application for survivors pension on the sole ground that she was not the legal spouse of

Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement; hence, she could not be considered as his primary beneficiary under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act

No. 8282.

The Court holds that the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, which qualifies the term primary

beneficiaries, is unconstitutional for it violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. [7]
In an analogous case, Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros ,[8] the Court invalidated the proviso in Presidential Decree

(P.D.) No. 1146[9] which stated that the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is

contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. In the said case, the Court characterized retirement benefits as

property interest of the pensioner as well as his or her surviving spouse. The proviso, which denied a dependent spouses claim for

survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period, was declared

offensive to the due process clause. There was outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving him or her an

opportunity to be heard. The proviso was also held to infringe the equal protection clause as it discriminated against dependent spouses

who contracted their respective marriages to pensioners within three years before they qualified for their pension.

For reasons which shall be discussed shortly, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 similarly

violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

The proviso infringes the equal protection clause

As illustrated by the petitioners case, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282

which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries results in the classification of dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries into two

groups:

(1) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted prior to the latters

retirement; and

(2) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latters

retirement.

Underlying these two classifications of dependent spouses is that their respective marriages are valid. In other words, both groups

are legitimate or legal spouses. The distinction between them lies solely on the date the marriage was contracted. The petitioner belongs to

the second group of dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. As such, she and those
similarly situated do not qualify as primary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 and, therefore, are not entitled to

survivors pension under the same provision by reason of the subject proviso.

It is noted that the eligibility of dependent children who are biological offsprings of a retired SSS member to be considered as his

primary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is not substantially affected by the proviso as of the date of his

retirement. A biological child, whether legitimate, legitimated or illegitimate, is entitled to survivors pension upon the death of a retired SSS

member so long as the said child is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over

twenty-one (21) years of age, he or she is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-

support, physically or mentally.

On the other hand, the eligibility of legally adopted children to be considered primary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep.

Act No. 8282 is affected by the proviso as of the date of his retirement in the same manner as the dependent spouses. A legally adopted

child who satisfies the requirements in Section 8(e)(2) [10] thereof is considered a primary beneficiary of a retired SSS member upon the

latters death only if the said child had been legally adopted prior to the members retirement. One who was legally adopted by the SSS

member after his or her retirement does not qualify as a primary beneficiary for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension under

Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.

In any case, the issue that now confronts the Court involves a dependent spouse who claims to have been unjustly deprived of

her survivors pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. Hence, the subsequent discussion will focus on the resultant

classification of the dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries under the said provision.

As earlier stated, the petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted

after his retirement. She and those similarly situated are undoubtedly discriminated against as the proviso as of the date of his retirement

disqualifies them from being considered primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension.

Generally, a statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection clause of

the law.[11] With respect to Rep. Act No. 8282, in particular, as a social security law, it is recognized that it is permeated with provisions

that draw lines in classifying those who are to receive benefits. Congressional decisions in this regard are entitled to deference as those of

the institution charged under our scheme of government with the primary responsibility for making such judgments in light of competing

policies and interests.[12]


However, as in other statutes, the classification in Rep. Act No. 8282 with respect to entitlement to benefits, to be valid and

reasonable, must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of

the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. [13]

The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not bear out the purpose of Congress in inserting the proviso as of the date of

his retirement to qualify the term primary beneficiaries in Section 12-B(d) thereof. To the Courts mind, however, it reflects congressional

concern with the possibility of relationships entered after retirement for the purpose of obtaining benefits. In particular, the proviso was

apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those contracted by persons solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the

anticipated death of the other spouse.

This concern is concededly valid. However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivors pension

based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said

marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., provide meaningful protection to members and their

beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other contingencies

resulting in loss of income or financial burden." [14] The nexus of the classification to the policy objective is vague and flimsy. Put differently,

such classification of dependent spouses is not germane to the aforesaid policy objective.

For if it were the intention of Congress to prevent sham marriages or those entered in contemplation of imminent death, then it

should have prescribed a definite duration-of-relationship or durational period of relationship as one of the requirements for entitlement to

survivors pension. For example, in the United States, a provision in their social security law which excludes from social security benefits the

surviving wife and stepchild of a deceased wage earner who had their respective relationships to the wage earner for less than nine months

prior to his death, was declared valid. [15] Thus, nine months is recognized in the United States as the minimum duration of a marriage to

consider it as having been contracted in good faith for the purpose of entitlement to survivorship pension.

In contrast, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) in Rep. Act No. 8282 effectively disqualifies from

entitlement to survivors pension all those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to retired SSS members were contracted after the

latters retirement. The duration of the marriage is not even considered. It is observed that, in certain instances, the retirement age under

Rep. Act No. 8282 is sixty (60)

years old.[16] A marriage contracted by a retired SSS member after the said age may still last for more than ten years, assuming the

member lives up to over seventy (70) years old. In such a case, it cannot be said that the marriage was a sham or was entered into

solely for the purpose of enabling one spouse to obtain the financial benefits due upon the death of the other spouse. Nonetheless, the
said surviving spouse is not entitled to survivors pension because he or she is not a primary beneficiary as of the date of retirement of the

SSS member following Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.

Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their respective marriages to the SSS member were

contracted prior to or after the latters retirement for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension does not rest on real and substantial

distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is too sweeping because the proviso as of the date of his retirement, which effectively

disqualifies the dependent spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS member were contracted after the latters retirement as

primary beneficiaries, unfairly lumps all these marriages as sham relationships or were contracted solely for the purpose of acquiring

benefits accruing upon the death of the other spouse. The proviso thus unduly prejudices the rights of the legal surviving spouse, like the

petitioner, and defeats the avowed policy of the law to provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazards

of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden. [17]

The proviso infringes the due process clause

As earlier opined, in Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros ,[18] the Court characterized retirement benefits as a property

interest of a retiree. We held therein that [i]n a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that

employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment. [19] Thus, it was ruled

that, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due

process clause and [r]etirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing

[20]
law. Further, since pursuant to the pertinent law therein, the dependent spouse is entitled to survivorship pension, a widows right to

receive pension following the demise of her husband is also part of the husbands contractual compensation. [21]

Although the subject matter in the above-cited case involved the retirement benefits under P.D. No. 1146 or the Revised Government

Service Insurance Act of 1977[22] covering government employees, the pronouncement therein that retirees enjoy a protected property

interest in their retirement benefits applies squarely to those in the private sector under Rep. Act No. 8282. This is so because the

mandatory contributions of both the employers [23] and the employees[24] to the SSS do not, likewise, make the retirement benefits under

Rep. Act No. 8282 mere gratuity but form part of the latters compensation. Even the retirement benefits of self-employed individuals, like

Bonifacio, who have been included in the compulsory coverage of Rep. Act No. 8282 [25]are not mere gratuity because they are required to

pay both the employer and employee contributions. [26] Further, under Rep. Act No. 8282, the surviving spouse is entitled to survivors
pension accruing on the death of the member; hence, the surviving spouses right to receive such benefit following the demise of the wife or

husband, as the case may be, is also part of the latters contractual compensation.

The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly

deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement of their

survivors benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard.

By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members were contracted after the latters

retirement, the proviso as of the date of his retirement qualifying the term primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors

pension has created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement date of SSS members were entered into for the purpose

of securing the benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282. This presumption, moreover, is conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not

afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates this conclusive presumption, is

unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true. In the United States, this kind of presumption is

characterized as an irrebuttable presumption and statutes creating permanent and irrebutable presumptions have long been disfavored under

the due process clause. [27]

In the petitioners case, for example, she asserted that when she and Bonifacio got married in 1997, it was merely to legalize their

relationship and not to commit fraud. This claim is quite believable. After all, they had been living together since 1980 and, in fact, during

that time their eldest child was already twenty-four (24) years old. However, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to prove her claim

that she was Bonifacios bona fide legal spouse as she was automatically disqualified from being considered as his primary beneficiary. In

effect, the petitioner was deprived of the survivors benefits, a property interest, accruing from the death of Bonifacio without any opportunity

to be heard. Standards of due process require that the petitioner be allowed to present evidence to prove that her marriage to Bonifacio

was contracted in good faith and as his bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivors pension accruing upon his death. [28] Hence, the

proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) which deprives the petitioner and those similarly situated dependent spouses of

retired SSS members this opportunity to be heard must be struck down.


Conclusion

Even as the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) is nullified, the enumeration of primary beneficiaries

for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension is not substantially affected since the following persons are considered as such

under Section 8(k) of Rep. Act No. 8282:

G.R. No. L-20445 February 25, 1967

ANICIA V. MERCED, CANDELARIO V. MERCED, CONCEPCION V. MERCED,


ATILANO V. MERCED, JR., and JOSEFINA V. MERCED, petitioners,
vs.
COLOMBINA VDA. DE MERCED, BRICCIO MERCED, JR., and the SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM,respondents.

J. S. Ancheta, Jr. for petitioners.


Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

EN BANC

Appeal from a resolution of the Social Security Commission — hereinafter referred to as the Commission — dismissing the petition of Anicia
Candelario, Concepcion, Atlanto and Josefina, all surnamed, Merced, to be declared the beneficiaries of their deceased brother Briccio V.
Merced — hereinafter referred to as Briccio — and, as such, entitled to the corresponding death benefits under Republic Act No. 5181, as
amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1954.

As an employee of the Community Export and Import Corporation, in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental Briccio became, sometime in 1957,
a member of the Social Security System — hereinafter referred to as the System. As such, he had designated as his beneficiaries his
aforementioned brothers and sisters, the petitioners herein. Subsequently, or on May 29, 1960, Briccio contracted marriage with Columbina
Merced, who bore him a child, Briccio Jr., hereinafter referred to as Columbia and Junior, respectively, Briccio died on February 22, 1961.

Soon later, or on April 5, 1961, petitioners filed with the Commission their claim for the benefits accruing under Briccio's social security
insurance. However, on April 27, 1961, petitioners were advised by the System that their designation as beneficiaries of Briccio was null
and void, pursuant to Resolution No. 1620, series of 1960, of the Commission, and that a claim for the aforementioned benefits had been
filed by Colombina. Still later, or in September, 1961, petitioners were informed that the Administrator of the System had declared
Colombina and Junior as the legal heirs of Briccio and approved payment to them of said benefits, amounting to P3,388.34. This prompted
the petitioners to file with the Commission their present petition, which, after appropriate proceedings, was, by resolution dated July 20,
1962, dismissed. The Commission, likewise, affirmed the action taken by the Administrator and ordered that the corresponding death
benefits be paid to Colombina and Junior. Hence, this appeal by petitioners herein.

They maintain that the designation made in their favor, as beneficiaries of Briccio remained valid and effective, despite his subsequent
marriage and the birth of Junior, in view of his (Briccio's) failure to change said designation, and that the choice of beneficiaries expressly
made by Briccio should be respected.

The validity and force of the last part of petitioners' theory is, however, impaired by the fact that said choice had been made when Briccio
was still single, and that, accordingly, his failure to change the designation of his beneficiaries may have been, and was probably, due to
an oversight on his part, especially considering that he died less than a year after his wedding.

At any rate, the benefits accruing under Republic Act No. 1161 could not have vested until the death of the decedent, on February 22,
1961, not only because, prior thereto, the rights of the designated beneficiaries were purely inchoate, but, also, because Section 30 of said
Act — which became Section 31 thereof, as amended by Republic Act No. 1792, which was in force when Briccio became a member of
the System — expressly reserved to Congress the right to amend, alter or repeal any provision thereof, and explicitly declares that "no
person shall be or shall be deemed to be vested with any property or other right by virtue of the enactment or operation of this Act."

In pursuance of said reserved power, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 2658 (approved on June 18, 1960), which was in force at the
time of Briccio's death, amending Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1161 (as amended by Republic Act No. 1792) pursuant to subdivision (k)
of which the beneficiaries shall be "those designated as such by the covered employee from among the following:

(1) The legitimate spouse, the legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction and the
legitimate descendants; .

(2) In default of such spouse and children, the legitimate parents of the covered employee;

(3) In the absence of any. of the foregoing, any other person designated by him.1äwphï1.ñët

In other words, the right of choice of the insured is subject to the foregoing limitations , pursuant to which brothers and sisters may not be
designated as beneficiaries except in default, not only of surviving spouse and children, but, also, of "legitimate parents of the covered
employee."

It is, accordingly, clear that the Commission was fully justified in holding that the designation in favor of the brothers and sisters of the
decedent as his beneficiaries was null and void and that Colombina and Junior are, under the law, the persons entitled to the
corresponding benefits.

Wherefore, the resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against herein petitioners-appellants. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,


vs.
ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS, represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H.
AGUAS, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66531 and its Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The antecedents are as follows:

Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. Pablo’s surviving spouse,
Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was
likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991. 2 Her claim for monthly pension was settled on February
13, 1997.3

Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter 4 dated April 2, 1997 from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting
Rosanna’s claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than six years before, and
lived with another man on whom she has been dependent for support. She further averred that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna,
but that the latter had several children with a certain Romeo dela Peña. In support of her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized copy of
the original birth certificate5 of one Jefren H. dela Peña, showing that the latter was born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna Y. Hernandez
and Romeo C. dela Peña, and that the two were married on November 1, 1990.

As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn’s monthly pension in September 1997. It also conducted an
investigation to verify Leticia’s allegations. In a Memorandum 6dated November 18, 1997, the Social Security Officer who conducted the
investigation reported that, based on an interview with Mariquita D. Dizon, Pablo’s first cousin and neighbor, and Jessie Gonzales (also a
neighbor). She learned that the deceased had no legal children with Rosanna; Jenelyn 7 and Jefren were Rosanna’s children with one
Romeo C. dela Peña; and Rosanna left the deceased six years before his death and lived with Romeo while she was still pregnant with
Jenelyn, who was born on October 29, 1991. Mariquita also confirmed that Pablo was not capable of having a child as he was under
treatment.

On the basis of the report and an alleged confirmation by a certain Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile, the SSS denied
Rosanna’s request to resume the payment of their pensions. She was advised to refund to the SSS within 30 days the amount of
₱10,350.00 representing the total death benefits released to her and Jenelyn from December 1996 to August 1997 at ₱1,150.00 per
month.8

Rosanna and Jeylnn, through counsel, requested for a reconsideration of the said decision. 9 However, in its Letter dated February 6, 1998,
the SSS denied the claim.10

This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for the Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission
(SSC) on February 20, 1998.11 Janet H. Aguas, who also claimed to be the child of the deceased and Rosanna, now joined them as
claimant. The case was docketed as SSC Case No. 3-14769-98.
The claimants appended to their petition, among others, photocopies of the following: (1) Pablo and Rosanna’s marriage certificate; (2)
Janet’s certificate of live birth; (3) Jeylnn’s certificate of live birth; and (4) Pablo’s certificate of death.

In its Answer, the SSS averred that, based on the sworn testimonies and documentary evidence showing the disqualification of the
petitioners as primary beneficiaries, the claims were barren of factual and legal basis; as such, it was justified in denying their claims. 12

In their Position Paper, the claimants averred that Jeylnn was a legitimate child of Pablo as evidenced by her birth certificate bearing
Pablo’s signature as Jeylnn’s father. They asserted that Rosanna never left Pablo and that they lived together as husband and wife under
one roof. In support thereof, they attached a Joint Affidavit 13 executed by their neighbors, Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu, where they
declared that Rosanna and Pablo lived together as husband and wife until the latter’s death. In Janet’s birth certificate, which was
registered in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, it appears that her father was Pablo and her mother was Rosanna. As to the alleged
infertility of Pablo, the claimants averred that Dr. Macapinlac denied giving the opinion precisely because he was not an expert on such
matters, and that he treated the deceased only for tuberculosis. The claimant likewise claimed that the information the SSS gathered from
the doctor was privileged communication.14

In compliance with the SSC’s order, the SSS secured Confirmation Reports 15 signed by clerks from the corresponding civil registers
confirming (1) the fact of marriage between Pablo and Rosanna on December 4, 1977; (2) the fact of Jefren dela Peña’s birth on
November 15, 1996; (3) the fact of Jeylnn’s birth on October 29, 1991; and (4) the fact of Pablo’s death on December 8, 1996.

The SSC decided to set the case for hearing. It also directed the SSS to verify the authenticity of Pablo’s signature as appearing on
Jeylnn’s birth certificate from his claim records, particularly his SSS Form E-1 and retirement benefit application. 16 The SSS complied with
said directive and manifested to the SSC that, based on the laboratory analysis conducted, Pablo’s signature in the birth certificate was
made by the same person who signed the member’s record and other similar documents submitted by Pablo. 17

The SSC then summoned Vivencia Turla, Carmelita Yangu and Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac for clarificatory questions with regard to their
respective sworn affidavits.18 Vivencia testified that she had known Pablo and Rosanna for more than 30 years already; the couple were
married and lived in Macabacle, Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga; she was a former neighbor of the spouses, but four years after their
marriage, she (Vivencia) and her family moved to Sto. Niño Triangulo, San Fernando, Pampanga; she would often visit the two, especially
during Christmas or fiestas; the spouses’ real child was Jeylnn; Janet was only an adopted child; the spouse later transferred residence, not
far from their old house, and Janet, together with her husband and son, remained in the old house. 19

On the other hand, Carmelita testified that she had been a neighbor of Pablo and Rosanna for 15 years and that, up to the present,
Rosanna and her children, Janet, Jeylnn and Jefren, were still her neighbors; Janet and Jeylnn were the children of Pablo and Rosanna but
she did not know whose child Jefren is.20

According to Leticia, Janet was not the real child of Pablo and Rosanna; she was just taken in by the spouses because for a long time
they could not have children; 21 however, there were no legal papers on Janet’s adoption. 22 Later on, Rosanna got pregnant with Jeylnn;
after the latter’s baptism, there was a commotion at the house because Romeo dela Peña was claiming that he was the father of the child
and he got mad because the child was named after Pablo; the latter also got mad and even attempted to shoot Rosanna; he drove them
away from the house; since then, Pablo and Rosanna separated; 23 she knew about this because at that time their mother was sick, and
she would often visit her at their ancestral home, where Pablo and Rosanna were also staying; Rosanna was no longer living in their
ancestral home but Janet resided therein; she did not know where Rosanna was staying now but she knew that the latter and Romeo dela
Peña were still living together.24
Subsequently, Mariquita Dizon and Jessie Gonzales were also summoned for clarificatory questions. 25During the hearing, Mariquita brought
with her photocopies of two baptismal certificates: that of Jeylnn Aguas, 26 child of Pablo Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez born on October
29, 1991, and that of Jenelyn H. dela Peña,27 child of Romeo dela Peña and Rosanna Hernandez, born on January 29, 1992.

On March 14, 2001, the SSC rendered a decision denying the claims for lack of merit and ordering Rosanna to immediately refund to the
SSS the amount of ₱10,350.00 erroneously paid to her and Jeylnn as primary beneficiaries of the deceased. The SSC likewise directed
the SSS to pay the death benefit to qualified secondary beneficiaries of the deceased, and in their absence, to his legal heirs. 28

The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary, it appearing that she had contracted marriage with Romeo dela
Peña during the subsistence of her marriage to Pablo. The SSC based its conclusion on the birth certificate of Jefren dela Peña stating that
his mother, Rosanna, and father, Romeo dela Peña, were married on November 1, 1990. The SSC declared that Rosanna had a child with
Romeo dela Peña while she was still married to Pablo (as evidenced by the baptismal certificate of Jenelyn H. dela Peña showing that she
was the child of Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Peña and that she was born on January 29, 1992). The SSC concluded that
Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from Pablo prior to his death because of her act of adultery. As for Jeylnn, the SSC ruled that,
even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo as her father, there was more compelling evidence that Jeylnn was not his legitimate child.
The SSC deduced from the records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same person and concluded, based on the latter’s baptismal
certificate, that she was the daughter of Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. It also gave credence to the testimonies of Leticia and Mariquita
that Jeylnn was the child of Rosanna and Romeo dela Peña. As for Janet, the SSC relied on Leticia’s declaration that she was only
adopted by Pablo and Rosanna.29

The claimants filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but their motion was denied by the SSC for lack of merit and for
having been filed out of time.30 The claimants then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.

On September 9, 2003, the CA rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered DECLARING
petitioners as ENTITLED to the SSS benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas. The case is hereby REMANDED to public
respondent for purposes of computing the benefits that may have accrued in favor of petitioners after the same was cut and suspended in
September 1997.

SO ORDERED.31

In so ruling, the CA relied on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing that they were the children of the deceased. According to
the appellate court, for judicial purposes, these records were binding upon the parties, including the SSS. These entries made in public
documents may only be challenged through adversarial proceedings in courts of law, and may not be altered by mere testimonies of
witnesses to the contrary. As for Rosanna, the CA found no evidence to show that she ceased to receive support from Pablo before he
died. Rosanna’s alleged affair with Romeo dela Peña was not properly proven. In any case, even if Rosanna married Romeo dela Peña
during her marriage to Pablo, the same would have been a void marriage; it would not have ipso facto made her not dependent for support
upon Pablo and negate the presumption that, as the surviving spouse, she is entitled to support from her husband. 32

The SSS filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the CA denied for lack of merit. 33Hence, this petition.

Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the appellate court, contending that it
I

GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ROSANNA AGUAS IS ACTUALLY DEPENDENT FOR SUPPORT UPON THE MEMBER
DURING HIS LIFETIME TO QUALIFY AS PRIMARY BENEFICIARY WITHIN THE INTENDMENT OF SECTION 8(e), IN
RELATION TO SECTION (k) OF THE SSS LAW, AS AMENDED.

II

ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JANET AGUAS AND JEYLNN AGUAS ARE ENTITLED TO THE PENSION BENEFIT ACCRUING
FROM THE DEATH OF PABLO AGUAS. 34

Petitioner invokes Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 735, which defines a dependent spouse as
"the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the employee." According to petitioner, Rosanna forfeited her right to be supported by
Pablo when she engaged in an intimate and illicit relationship with Romeo dela Peña and married the latter during her marriage to Pablo.
Such act constitutes abandonment, which divested her of the right to receive support from her husband. It asserts that her act of adultery is
evident from the birth certificate of Jefren H. dela Peña showing that he was born on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna and Romeo dela
Peña. Petitioner submits that Rosanna cannot be considered as a dependent spouse of Pablo; consequently, she is not a primary
beneficiary.35

As for Janet and Jeylnn, petitioner maintains that they are not entitled to the pension because, based on the evidence on record,
particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, they are not the legitimate children of Pablo. It argues that, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
authority under Section 5(a) of the Social Security Act, the SSC can pass upon the legitimacy of respondents’ relationship with the member
to determine whether they are entitled to the benefits, even without correcting their birth certificates. 36

Respondents, for their part, assert that petitioner failed to prove that Rosanna committed acts of adultery or that she married another man
after the death of her husband. They contend that Janet and Jeylnn’s legitimacy may be impugned only on the grounds stated in Article
166 of the Family Code, none of which were proven in this case. 37

The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death
of Pablo.

The petition is partly meritorious.

The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by the Court in petitions for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.38 In an appeal via certiorari, the Court may not review the factual findings of the CA. 39 It is not the Court’s
function under Rule 45 to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented. 40However, the Court may
review findings of facts in some instances, such as, when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, when the findings of the
CA are contrary to those of the trial court or quasi-judicial agency, or when the findings of facts of the CA are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 41 The Court finds these instances present in this case.

At the time of Pablo’s death, the prevailing law was Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 735. Section 13 of the
law enumerates those who are entitled to death benefits:

Sec.13. Death benefits. – Effective July 1, 1975, upon the covered employee’s death, (a) his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the
basic monthly pension, and his dependents to the dependent’s pension: Provided, That he has paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions
prior to the semester of death: Provided, further, That if the foregoing condition is not satisfied, or if he has no primary beneficiaries, his
secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty times the basic monthly pension: Provided, however, That
the death benefit shall not be less than the total contributions paid by him and his employer on his behalf nor less than five hundred pesos:
Provided, finally, That the covered employee who dies in the month of coverage shall be entitled to the minimum benefit.

Section 8(k) and (e), in turn, defines dependents and primary beneficiaries of an SSS member as follows:

SECTION 8. Terms defined. – For the purposes of this Act the following terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the
following meanings:

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(e) Dependent. – The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one
years of age provided that he is congenitally incapacitated and incapable of self-support physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse
dependent for support upon the employee; and the legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the covered employee for regular support.

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(k) Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their
absence, the dependent parents and, subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the legitimate descendants and illegitimate
children who shall be the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing, any other person designated by the covered
employee as secondary beneficiary.

Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence, the
quantum of evidence required to establish a fact in cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, is that level of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 42

The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.

Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the
certification from the Civil Registry showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were
married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latter’s death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn
was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.

It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
This Court, in De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, 43 extensively discussed this presumption –

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the
child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are
living separately in such way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, 44 and in proper cases Article 171,45 of the Family
Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child would no longer be legally feasible and the
status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. 46
Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. 47 In this case, there
is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn’s status as a legitimate child of Pablo can
no longer be contested.

The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature, which was verified from his
specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity. 48

The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend to Janet because her date of birth was not substantially proven.
Such presumption may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married
and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. 49 It should be noted that respondents likewise
submitted a photocopy of Janet’s alleged birth certificate. However, the Court cannot give said birth certificate the same probative weight as
Jeylnn’s because it was not verified in any way by the civil register. It stands as a mere photocopy, without probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn,
there was no confirmation by the civil register of the fact of Janet’s birth on the date stated in the certificate.

In any case, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. 50 Here, the witnesses were unanimous in saying
that Janet was not the real child but merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified that Janet’s adoption did not undergo any
legal proceedings; hence, there were no papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, only "legally
adopted" children are considered dependent children. Absent any proof that the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot consider
her a dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.

On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must prove that she was "the legitimate
spouse dependent for support from the employee." The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is the
legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support. In this case, Rosanna presented proof to show that she is
the legitimate spouse of Pablo, that is, a copy of their marriage certificate which was verified with the civil register by petitioner. But
whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was still dependent on Pablo at the time of his death remains to be resolved.
Indeed, a husband and wife are obliged to support each other, 51 but whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other is
something that has to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone.

In a parallel case52 involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the Court defined a dependent as "one who derives his or her main
support from another. Meaning, relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform
anything without the will, power, or aid of someone else." It should be noted that the GSIS law likewise defines a dependent spouse as
"the legitimate spouse dependent for

support upon the member or pensioner." In that case, the Court found it obvious that a wife who abandoned the family for more than 17
years until her husband died, and lived with other men, was not dependent on her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during that
entire period. Hence, the Court denied her claim for death benefits.

The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for
support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living
together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown that
she is capable of providing for herself.

Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory requirements have been complied with, particularly her dependency on her husband
for support at the time of his death. Aside from her own testimony, the only evidence adduced by Rosanna to prove that she and Pablo
lived together as husband and wife until his death were the affidavits of Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu where they made such
declaration.

Still, the affidavits of Vivencia and Carmelita and their testimonies before the SSC will not prevail over the categorical and straightforward
testimonies of the other witnesses who testified that Rosanna and Pablo had already separated for almost six years before the latter died.
Except for the bare assertion of Carmelita that the couple never separated, there was no further statement regarding the witnesses’
assertion in their affidavits that the couple lived together until Pablo’s death. On the contrary, Leticia narrated that the two separated after
Jeylnn’s baptism as a result of an argument regarding Romeo dela Peña. According to Leticia, there was a commotion at their ancestral
house because Romeo dela Peña was grumbling why Jeylnn was named after Pablo when he was the father, and as a result, Pablo drove
them away. The SSC’s observation and conclusion on the two baptismal certificates of Jeylnn and Jenelyn convinces this Court to further
believe Leticia’s testimony on why Pablo and Rosanna separated. As noted by the SSC:

It appears from the records that Jeylnn Aguas and Jenelyn H. dela Peña are one and the same person. Jeylnn Aguas, born on October
29, 1991 was baptized at the Metropolitan Cathedral of San Fernando, Pampanga, on November 24, 1991 as the child of Pablo Aguas and
Rosanna Hernandez. Jenelyn H dela Peña, on the other hand, was born on January 29, 1992 to spouses Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo
dela Peña and baptized on February 9, 1992. It will be noted that Jenelyn dela Peña was born approximately three months after the birth
of Jeylnn Aguas. It is physically impossible for Rosanna to have given birth successively to two children in so short a time. x x x The
testimony of Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac that Rosanna was driven away by Pablo after the baptism of Jeylnn because of the commotion that
was created by Romeo dela Peña who wanted Jeylnn to be baptized using his name explains why Jeylnn was again baptized in the Parish
of Sto. Niño in San Fernando using the name Jenelyn dela Peña. They changed her date of birth also to make it appear in the record of
the parish that she is another child of Rosanna.53

On the other hand, Mariquita categorically affirmed that Rosanna was no longer living at Pablo’s house even before he died, and that she
is still living with Romeo dela Peña up to the present. Mariquita testified as follows:

Hearing Officer:

Nagsama ba si Rosanna at Romeo?

Mrs. Dizon:

Ngayon at kahit na noon.

Hearing Officer:

Kailan namatay si Pablo?

Mrs. Dizon:

1996.

Hearing Officer:

Noong bago mamatay si Pablo?


Mrs. Dizon:

Nagsasama na sila Romeo at Rosanna noon.

Hearing Officer:

So, buhay pa si Pablo ……

Mrs. Dizon:

…. nagsasama na sila ni Romeo.

Hearing Officer:

Kailan nagkahiwalay si Romeo at Rosanna?

Mrs. Dizon:

Hindi na sila nagkahiwalay.

Hearing Officer:

Hindi, ibig ko sabihin si Pablo at Rosana?

Mrs. Dizon:

Hindi ko alam kasi hindi ako madalas pumunta sa kanila eh, dahil namatay na yung nanay ni Kuya Pabling, yung tiyahin ko, kapatid ng
nanay ko. Noon madalas ako noong buhay pa yung nanay ni Kuya Pabling dahil kami ang nag aalaga sa kanya.

Hearing Officer:

Bago namatay si Pablo, nagsasama ba sina Romeo at Rosanna?

Mrs. Dizon:

Oo.

Hearing Officer:

Sa ngayon, may alam ka pa ba kung nagsasama pa sila Romeo at Rosanna?

Mrs. Dizon:

Oo, nagsasama sila, may bahay sila.

Hearing Officer:
Saan naman?

Mrs. Dizon:

Doon sa malapit sa amin sa may riles ng tren.54

In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo,
as it was established that she is his legitimate child. On the other hand, the records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the
spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it; hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna was the
legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time
of his death, she was still dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Only Jeylnn H. Aguas is declared entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo
Aguas.

SO ORDERED.

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