Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
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MOTION TO QUASH
“Shady past?
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2.2. Since “multiple republication” is not applicable, the only
basis for determining whether an offense exists is the original
posting made in May 2012 and not the supposed republication
in February 2014.
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elsewhere.” (Soriano, supra.) “Multiple republication” was
invoked only to answer the sole issue of venue and
jurisdiction in a libel case filed by a public officer. It does
not constitute authority for the proposition that a multiple
republication gives rise to as many offenses of cyber libel as
there are publications. Using the words of the Court in
Soriano, “(s)tated more succinctly for purposes of
ascertaining jurisdiction under Art. 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, every time the same
written matter is communicated such
communication is considered a distinct and
separate publication of the libel.”
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4.5. Fifth, the “multiple republication” principle does not
apply to online media. In Firth v. State of New York (98
N.Y.2d 365 (2002), the New York Court of Appeals rejected
the application of multiple republication and adopted a
single publication rule because “a multiple publication rule
would implicate an even greater potential for endless
retriggering of the statute of limitations, multiplicity of
suits and harassment of defendants. Inevitably, there
would be a serious inhibitory effect on the open, pervasive
dissemination of information and ideas over the Internet
which is, of course, its greatest beneficial promise.” (Firth,
supra)
1 SEC. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
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with respect to cyber libel for providing a chilling effect on
freedom of expression.
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material on a Web site, for it is not reasonably
inferable that the addition was made either with the
intent or the result of communicating the earlier and
separate defamatory information to a new audience.”
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American laws, thus the persuasive character of American
authorities on the matter:
7. Because there was only one single publication, i.e., May 2012,
this Information which charges the crime of cyber libel based on
a “republication” in 2014 must be quashed for failure to state an
offense.
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republication, the Supreme Court’s Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) barred any action that could have been taken under
RA 10175 until the same was lifted.
12.This court has to obey the Constitution, the law, and the decisions
of the Supreme Court. It is the sworn duty of each magistrate to
do so. Thus, it must strike down the Information for containing
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a charge that resulted from an ex post facto, and thus
unconstitutional, application of RA 10175 to a post made in
February 19, 2014—whether the same be considered an original
post or an alleged republication--when implementation of RA
10175 remained suspended by reason of the Supreme Court’s
TRO. To repeat, the TRO was lifted only when the Supreme Court
denied the various motions for reconsideration in Disini II in
April 2014.
15. Republic Act No. 10175, which took effect in September 2012 but
became fully effective—due to the lifting of the October 2012
TRO—only in April 2014 cannot apply to the original post in May
2012 without grossly offending Article III, section 22, Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code, and Ringor, supra, all of which
proscribe the ex post facto application of a penal statute.
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16. The Supreme Court has ruled in Gumabon v. Director of
Prisons, G.R. No. L-30026, January 30, 1971, that “(o)nce a
deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court
that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction.”
While Gumabon spoke of habeas corpus as a remedy and then
only after a conviction, the principle upon which the great writ of
liberty was granted in Gumabon applies to this case with even
greater cogency and urgency.
17. The accused come not at the end of these proceedings but at the
start to plead what ought to have been evident and manifest—
that this court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of this
charge—one that has arisen out of an unconstitutional and ex
post facto application of law. Should it insist on trying accused,
it would result in an unconstitutional act that ousts the court of
jurisdiction.
19.Section 9 reads:
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If the commission of any of the punishable acts herein defined
was made possible due to the lack of supervision or control by a
natural person referred to and described in the preceding
paragraph, for the benefit of that juridical person by a natural
person acting under its authority, the juridical person shall be
held liable for a fine equivalent to at least double the fines
imposable in Section 7 up to a maximum of Five million pesos
(PhP5,000,000.00).
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23. The dismissal of the complaint as against all corporate
officers, except accused Ressa, is telling. It bars any charge
against the corporate entity under section 9 which expressly
requires an affirmative showing of the act of a specific corporate
director acting within the scope of authority. There is no act
imputable to the corporate officers alleged and there is none
found, as shown by the dismissal of the complaint as against
them, except for accused Ressa.
24. The Information also does not state, as against accused Ressa
or Santos, any acts allegedly committed by them under Section 9
such as would make Rappler, Inc. susceptible to the fine
prescribed. Notably, the elements of the offense as committed by
the natural persons differ from the elements of the offense as may
make a juridical person, acting through a specific natural person,
liable for fines. There is nothing in the Information that would
indicate any act or omission by any of the two natural persons
under section 9 that would make the accusation against the
corporate entity stand.
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Disini I declared section 63 unconstitutional as it relates to
section 74 whereas section 8 does not provide for any penalty in
relation to section 4(c)(4) or section 9.
29. Republic Act No. 10175 does not define a new offense of cyber
libel. It simply adds an additional means to commit libel, as
defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code. This is evident
in section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175:
3 SECTION 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of
information and communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant
provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1)
degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and special laws, as the case may be.
4 SECTION 7. Liability Under Other Laws. — A prosecution under
this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
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merely affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar
means" for committing libel.”
“The movants argue that Section 4 (c) (4) is both vague and
overbroad. But, again, online libel is not a new crime. It is
essentially the old crime of libel found in the 1930 Revised
Penal Code and transposed to operate in the cyberspace.”
31. For this reason, the prescriptive period for cyber libel is
one year because it is, for every intent and purpose, the Article
355 offense committed through new and additional means.
(Revised Penal Code, Article 90, as amended by RA 4661, vis RA
10175, section 4(c)(4); see also Disini I, Disini II) Under Article
91, the prescription period is interrupted only upon the filing of
an Information.
32. The only relevant act of supposed libel in this case is the
original May 2012 post, which under Articles 90 and 91 of the
Revised Penal Code gave the prosecution one year to prosecute.
The complaint, which gave rise to this prosecution, was instituted
only in 2014. The instant Information was filed only in 2019. It
does not take much to conclude that the one year period for
prescription has lapsed, thus making the supposed act of libel
time barred and the instant Information subject to no judicial
action other than quashal.
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which authority the Constitution vests in Congress alone.
Thus, there is no question that Congress may provide a
variety of periods for the prescription of offenses as it sees fit.
What it cannot do is pass a law that extends the
periods of prescription to impact crimes committed
before its passage.”
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
…//signatories
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FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP
(F L A G)
Counsel for the accused Santos Jr., Ressa, and Rappler Inc.*
2nd Floor, Eastside Building
77 Malakas Street, Quezon City, PHL 1100
By:
ARNO V. SANIDAD
SC Roll No. 31374
PTR No. 7347669, January 04, 2019, Q.C.
IBP Lifetime Member No. 07913, January 09, 2009, Ilocos Sur
MCLE Exemption No. VI-001428 (Valid until 4-14-22)
Tel No. 920-0177/920-0044
lawyers@sanidadlawfirm.com
THEODORE O. TE
SC Roll No. 37142
PTR No. 7601766, January 25, 2019, Q.C.
IBP No. 071683, January 31, 2019, Makati City
MCLE Exemption No. VI-001316 (Valid until 4-14-22)
Tel No. 9205514 loc. 418/CP-09175202295
Theodore.te@gmail.com
* The assistance and input of the Disini and Disini Law Office in the preparation
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Request for and Notice of Hearing
THEODORE O. TE
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