[No. 14078. March 7, 1919.

] 662 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

RUBI ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.

1. 1.STATUTES; SECTION 2145 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF

1917; VALIDITY; CONSTRUCTION ; HISTORY.—Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 reads as follows: "With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when
such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants
to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board." Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, having
reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 411, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550,
579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 1268, 1306 were enacted for the province of Abra, Antique,
Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya,
Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. Act No. 547 referred
especially to the Manguianes. All of these special laws with the exception of Act No. 1306
were repealed by Acts Nos. 1396 and 1397. ,The last named Act incorporated and embodied
the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1916. The last Administrative Code retains the provision which originated in Act No.
387, enacted in 1902, in section 2145 herein quoted.
1. 7.ID.; ID.; ID.; AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY.— From the beginning of the United States, and even
before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation
between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of
guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall
be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.
1. 8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—With reference to the laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is
not within the power of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good
reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction
of the judicial department of the Government.
1. 9.ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.—The maxim of
constitutional law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously
protected.

1. 10.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—"The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to
1. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENT POLICY.—These different laws denote an anxious regard for
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
the welfare of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
practice with reference to the method to be followed for their advancement.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R.
Co. vs.Comrs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio St., 88.)
1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Every really new question that comes before the courts is in the last
analysis determined by the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. In balancing
1. 11.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The legislature may make decisions of executive departments or
conflicting solutions,. that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best
subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on
promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle.
questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the
"necessity," of the case.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; "NON-CHRISTIAN ;" HISTORY.—A skeleton history of the attitude assumed
towards the backward inhabitants of the Islands both before and after the acquisition of the
1. 12.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—An exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice,
Philippines by the United States is set forth in the opinion. The most important of the laws of
permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities.
the Indies having reference to the subject are compiled in Book 6, Title 3. A clear exposition
of the purposes of the Spanish government in its efforts to improve the conditions of such
inhabitants by concentrating them in "reducciones" is f ound in the Decree of the Governor- 1. 13.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful
General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881. Ever since the acquisition of the delegation of legislative power by thePhilippine Legislature to provincial officials and a
Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best method for dealing with department head.
the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one. Organic and statutory law has given the
subject consideration. 1. 14.ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION.—Since the term "nonChristian" is here construed
to refer to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, section 2145 of the
1. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINED.—"Non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory expression. Administrative Code of 1917 does not discriminate between individuals on account of
Legislative, judicial, and executive authority has held that the term "non-Christian" should not religious differences and is therefore not invalid.
be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to
degree of civilization. This has been the uniform construction of executive officials who have 1. 15.ID.; ID.; ID.; CIVIL LIBERTY.—Various conceptions of civil liberty are quoted in the opinion.
been called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The term "non-Christian" refers not to Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a,
religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the civilized
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization.

663
1. 6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE "MANGUlANES."—The name "Manguian" signifies savage, mountaineer,
pagan, negro. The Manguianes are very low in culture. VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 663
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
662
1. community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. Liberty 1. 27.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purposes of
includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and the Government are to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and improve the health and morals—is in fine, to begin the process of civilization.
for that purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to
his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion.
1. 28.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned,
the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing
1. 16.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—"Liberty" as understood in democracies is not license; it is "liberty it, are to protect the settlers in Mindoro and to develop the resources of that great Island.
regulated by law." Whenever and whereever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercised
without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such
1. 29.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PRESUMPTION.—Most cautiously should the power of this court to
assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law.
overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The
whole tendency of the best considered cases is toward non-interference on the part of the
1. 17.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The authority conferred upon executive officials by section 2145 of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration.
Administrative Code of 1917 does not unduly interfere with the liberty of the citizen when
the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered.
1. 30.ID.; ID.; ID.—Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

1. 18.ID.; ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.—"Due process of
Per CARSON, J., concurring:
law" is defined and analyzed in the opinion. The pledge that no person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a class.
1. 31.STATUTES; "NON-CHRISTIAN;" DEFINED.—The words "non-Christian" have a clear, definite
and well settled signification when used in the Philippine statute-book as a descriptive
1. 19.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—Due process of law and the equal protection of the laws are not
adjective, applied to "tribes," "peoples" or "inhabitants," dwelling in more or less remote
violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 since there exists a law; the law
districts and-provinces throughout the Islands.
seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and it
applies to all of a class.
1. 32.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; TESTS.—The tests for the determination of the fact that an individual or tribe
is, or is not of the "low grade of civilization" denoted by the words "non-Christian" are, and
1. 20.ID.; ID.; ID.; SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.—Slavery and involuntary servitude,
throughout the period of American occupation always have been, "the mode of life, the
together with their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory
degree of advancement in civilization, and connection or lack of connection with some
service of one to another."
civilized community."

1. 21.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Confinement in reservations in accordance with section 2145 of the
1. 33.ID.; ID.; STANDARD OF CIVILIZATION OF INHABITANTS NOT NONCHRISTIAN.—The legislative
Administrative Code of 1917 does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
1. 22.ID.; ID.; ID.; THE POLICE POWER.—The police power of the State is a power coextensive with
self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity."
1. 23.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID.—The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and
authority the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general
welfare and the public interest.
1. 24.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual,
as axioms of economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a
widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity.
1. 34.ID.; ID.; ID.—So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of
1. 25.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.—Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot
fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority in enacting section 2145 of
the Administrative Code of 1917.
1. 26.ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; LEGISLATIVE INTENTION.—The fundamental
objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-
Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic
development and advancement in civilization.
and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly discloses that the standard of
civilization to which a specific tribe must be found to have advanced, to justify its removal
from the class embraced within the descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term" is used in
the Philippine statute-book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life within
the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its
membership the general laws and regulations, administrative, legislative, and judicial, which
control the conduct of the admittedly civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a mode of life,
furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend to
brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to
expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those who may be brought in contact with the
members of the tribe.
inhabitants of a particular province in these Islands, or any individual member of such a
group, must be found to have advanced, in order to remove such group or individual from the
class embraced within the statutory description of "non-Christian," is that degree of
civilization which would naturally and normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of
permanent allegiance or adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe, had they at any time adhered
to or maintained allegiance to such a tribe; and which would qualify them whether they
reside within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a mode of
life independent of and apart from that maintained by such tribe, but such a mode of life as
would not be inimical to the lives or property or general welfare of the civilized inhabitants of
the Islands with whom they are brought in contact.
 1. 35.ID.; SECTION 2145 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917; BASIS; WHEN PROPERLY
APPLICABLE.—The power to provide for the issuance of the reconcentration orders
contemplated in section 2145 of the Administrative Code rests upon analogous principles to
those upon which the liberty and freedom of action of children and persons of unsound
minds is restrained, without consulting their wishes, but for their own good and the general
welfare. The power rests upon necessity, that "great master of all things," and is properly
exercised only where certain individuals or groups of individuals are found to be of such a low
grade of civilization, that their own wishes cannot be permitted to determine their mode of
life or place of residence.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
D. R. Williams and Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Solicitor-General Paredes for def endant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History
(Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American
jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight
change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion—This cause, in every point of view
in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of a state, the controlling power
of the constitution and laws, the rights, if they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal
liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to
introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the socalled "non-Christians," next to compare
the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the
constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in f avor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial
sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
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VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 667
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
"1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as
follows:
" The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, jr., presented the following resolution:
" 'Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian
people of Mindoro, which were all a f ailure,
" 'Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the
Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.
" 'Whereas it is deemed necessary to oblige them to live in one place in order to make a permanent
settlement,
" 'Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board,
" 'Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio ofTigbao on Lake Naujan is a place
most convenient f or the Mangyanes to live on, Now, theref ore be it
" 'Resolved, That under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in
Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
" 'Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that
said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.
"2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
"3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which
says:
" 'Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25,
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668 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
current series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro.
" 'Whereas said resolution has been duly approved by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on
February 21, 1917.
" 'Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of
section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the vicinities of
the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts
of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not
later than December 31, 1917.
" 'Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceeding sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.'
"4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive
order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam,
and to introduce civilized customs among them.
"5. That Rubi and those living in his ranchería have not fixed their dwellings within the reservation of
Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
"6. That the undersigned has no information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of
Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act
No. 2711."
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected
by the provincial
669
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 669
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of
the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by
said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This,
therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon to decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
"SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christians upon sites selected by provincial governor.—With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public' lands to be
selected by him and approved by the provincial board."
In connection with the above-quoted provision, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code,
which reads as follows:
"SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation.—Any non-Christian who shall
refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two
thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said
governor shall upon conviction be imprisoned for a period not exceeding sixty days."
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical
tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077,
Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably
of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later
be dis-
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670 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
closed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in
its proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with
ref erence to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of
the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the
legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE
UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book
VI, Title III, in the following language:
"LAW I.
"The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo,
on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10,
1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578.
"THAT THE 'INDIOS' BE REDUCED INTO 'POBLACIONES' (COM
MUNITIES) .
"In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the.evangelical law, and in
order that they may forget the.blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may
live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special
attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this
work with success, our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at various times; the prelates
of New Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five
hundred and forty-six—all of which meetings were actuated with a desire
671
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919 671
Rubi vs. Provincial Board ,of Mindoro.
to serve God and our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in
communities, and not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains,
wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they Can not profit f rom the
aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to
give one another. Having realized the convenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by
different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with
great care and moderation the concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their
doctrine with such f orbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who would
not presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection of those already in
settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be not required
to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has.been executed in the greater part of our
Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the
Indies, and the encomenderos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the
laws of this title."
"LAW VIII.
"Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
"THAT THE 'REDUCCIONES' BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
"The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed, should have the facilities of waters,
lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and a passageway of one league long, wherein
the indioscan have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards;
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672 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
"LAW IX.
"Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560.
"THAT THE 'INDIOS' IN 'REDUCCIONES' BE NOT DEPRIVED OF
THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
"With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they
shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We
hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the lands
held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom."
* * * * * * *
"LAW XIII.
"THE SAME AS ABOVE.
"THAT THE 'REDUCCIONES' BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER
OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
"No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove
the pueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the
viceroy, ,president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests,
or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving information to that end. And, because
these claims are often made for private interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this
law be always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty
of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who should violate this law."
 "LAW XV.
"Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
"THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE 'REDUC
CIONES,' WHO SHALL BE 'INDIOS.'
"We order that in each town and reducción there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the
same reducción;
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even
if the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen. If there
be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one
alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in the presence of the priests, as is the practice in town
inhabited by Spaniards and indios."
"LAW XXI.
"Philip II, in Madrid, on May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At
Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Tordesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1
and December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, See Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
"THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE 'INDIOS,' THERE SHALL LIVE
NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, 'MESTIZOS,' AND MULATTOES.
"We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattoes, or mestizos to live in
the reducciones and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade,
live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers,
gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their
towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing
their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders and
vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation,
increase, and tranquility. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the
acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents,
governors, and courts take great care in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of the
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674 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizosand Indian and Chinese half-
breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indiasand born among them, and who are to inherit their houses
and haciendas,they shall not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them
from their parents." (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of the
less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of
the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
"It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an
integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in f orce therein; while, on the other 'hand, it is
the duty to conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that might
exist in the nation, and which, living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack all the notions which enable them
to grasp the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns under the protection and
vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
"It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and
isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any
longer the commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the
representative of the Government of the metropolis.
"It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with, this most
important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the
missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races might be
brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to allure them have
been insufficient to complete the work under-
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
taken. Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not
been guarded against, thus giving way for the majority of these races to persist in their mode of living and
customs of isolation.
"As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into
account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government has in
enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory
under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful study of this serious
question which involves important interests for civilization, from the moral and material as well as the
political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and
missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous conformity 'of the
meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of
the Orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of
the Council of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the
inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated
races, as well as of the manner and the only f orm of accomplishing such la task.
"For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate
the following:
"DECREE.
"1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Island of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the
common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are based upon the differences of
instruction, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its
territory.
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"2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races—which may be divided
into three classes: one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without f orming a
town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the
social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans—shall be published in their respective
dialects, and the officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby
entrusted in the work of having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have executive character,
beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their compliance, they must be observed in the
manner prescribed below.
"3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the
means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or
settlements already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local
authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or
fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said
towns or settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning of the
fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect the remaining towns of the
archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years they shall not be obliged to render personal
services other than those previously indicated.
"4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located in fertile lands appropriate for
cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of
absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most
convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interests; and, in either of these cases, an
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effort must be made to establish their homes within the reach of the sound of the bell.
"5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force
composed precisely of native Christians, the organization and service of which shall be determined in a
regulation based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policía (division of the Guardia Civil).
"6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and
duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and how they shall till their lands and
sell the products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at
the same price and conditions allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns
as well as the others from engaging in commerce or any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the
violation of which shall be punished with deportation.
"7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the
rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and
assigned governmentally wherever convenient.
"8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic
Church, all who have settled and who profess our sacred religion shall by this fact alone be exempt for
eight years from rendering personal labor.
"9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountain
igorrots) the following advantages in return for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among
their families; concession of good' lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the
way they deem most productive; support during a year, and clothes upon affecting submission; respect for
their habits and customs in
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so far as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether
they want to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who
shall teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of
their harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind of
tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones who
elect such officials under the direct charge of the authority of the province or district.
"10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall,
in return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and
country roads which place them in communication with one another and with the Christians; provided,
that the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have the
good conditions of location and cultivation, and provided further that the putting of families in a place so
selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted.
"11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that,
disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on
the first of next April, committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and
for this purpose, the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the
Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the. territory of such
tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements,
and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year,
and for this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff
to study the zones where such
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operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.
"12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missionaries, local authorities, and other subordinates to my
authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said
forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
"13. With respect to the reducción of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern
part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to
them.
"14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council
or permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of
the foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultation by the chiefs of provinces and priests
and missionaries.
"15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in bringing
about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within their
respective jurisdictions." (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administración, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED
STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best
method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing ,one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the
Philippines, was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly
approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of
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July 1,1902. Portions of these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional
legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce
civilized customs."
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the
Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with
this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine
Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction
over the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of
that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This law transferred the exclusive legislative
jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature
(sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be
composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized
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to appoint senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones
Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law
established a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general
supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by
appointed senators and representatives (sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognize a dividing line between the territory not
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other
non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine Commission
and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the
Igorots; Act No. 82, the Municipal Code; Act No. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the
Charter of the city of Manila; Act No. 787, providing f or the organization and government of the Moro
Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government
Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio Charter; and Act
No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have
been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 and 1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive
peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States
Philippine Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 411, 422, 445, 500,
547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753. 855, 1113, 1145, 1268, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra,
Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela,
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Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and
Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
"No. 547.—AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE
MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
"By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
"SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro have. not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the provincial
governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these
Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to
prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in
excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven
entitled 'An Act providing for the establishment of local civil governments in the townships and
settlements of Nueva Vizcaya.'
"SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further
authorized, when he deems. such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the 'provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon
conviction be imprisoned for a period not exceeding sixty days.
"SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire
the knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision and
control over them shall be exercised to this end, and to the end that law and order and individual freedom
shall be maintained.
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"SEC. 4. When in the .opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has
advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of
sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township,
and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
"SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is
hereby expedited in accordance with section two of' An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the
Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
"SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
"Enacted, December 4, 1902."
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Acts Nos. 1396 and 1397.
The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397
was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in
question.
These different laws, if they mean anything, denote an anxious regard for the welfare of the non-
Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent practice with reference to the
methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
""Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instructions to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are
to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in' section 22 of the Jones Law . They are also to be found
in Act No. 253 of the Philippine Commission, establishing a Bureau of nonChristian Tribes and in Act No.
2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Ad-
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ministrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase, there
can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the
favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized
legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916;
sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674
of the Philippine Legislature, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include
Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of
1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec, 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to it
a religious signification. Obviously, Christians would be those who profess the Christian religion, and non-
Christians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view,
there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities,
as Zuñiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and
Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The
Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol.
I, p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate- further to ascertain what
is its true meaning.
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In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions of
many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized
in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other nonChristian tribes. Again, .the Jones Law
confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now
represented in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippine Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts
making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other
non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section
of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially
organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya,
Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never
seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the
portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a
geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of whom are
Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. (Sec. 2422,
Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so again the geographical conception is likewise
inadequate. The reason is that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their
religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated on
the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatis-
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factory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite
expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these people under his jurisdiction,
recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples,
commonly known as the 'nonChristian tribes.'" (See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines,
United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H. R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of
the people of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a
more autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June
30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated
by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et
seq., and sections 2422 et seq., of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the
Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes
* * * with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in
civilization and material prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United
States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29 Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal
marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal Code concerning the husband who surprises his wife
in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the following language:
"* * * we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called
non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance with
the requisites prescribed by General Orders No. 68. * * * We hold
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also that the f act that the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized. tribe, of a low order of
intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked
extenuating circumstance."
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of executive officials who have been called upon to
interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much
of the legislation relating to the so-called non-Christians and who had these people under his authority,
was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all
governors of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later
received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as
follows:
"SIR: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally non-
Christians but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently
baptized are, for the purposes of Acts 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.
"It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are. not
advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of
individual tribes is so -great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was
finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real purpose
of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people having any particular religious belief as for
those lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought under the
Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
"The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the
person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes,
therefore, you will give
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the member of so-called 'wild tribes' of your province the benefit of the doubt even though they may
recently have embraced Christianity.
"The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction
of regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should be the
degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.
"I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion
above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces
organized under the Provincial Government Act." (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the
following to say on the subject:
"As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better
classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand. * * * I believe
the term carries the same meaning as that expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June
30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious denomination,
for to hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the law invalid as against that
Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom."
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal
Revenue. The question arose for ruling relative to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas.
Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return
indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This construction of the
Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal
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Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
"The internal revenue law exempts 'members of nonChristian tribes' from the payment of cedula
taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons
who profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other persons
are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called
non-Christian tribes are exempt f rom the cedula tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans,
Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in
a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or
profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is moredependent on whether he
is living in a civilized manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a
recruit. So far, this question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but
throwing his lot and living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On
one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula
tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all of
the Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula
taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and
others are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in
Manila also exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this
Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and,
non-civilized people preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) "JNO. S. HORD,
"Collector of Internal Revenue."
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On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by
the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:
"In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes due
from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purpose of settling down
and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws
governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published for the information of all
concerned:
"Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that they
do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three
classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned. * * *
"Whenever any member of a non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs
whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself to some civilized community, becoming a
member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs the
other members of that community and from and after the date when he so attaches himself to the
community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If he
comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to persons
arriving from foreign countries or reaching, the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such
period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without
penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for former years.
"In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factor in determining whether or not a man
is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does
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or does not profess Christianity; nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with
some of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and
connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this reason go called 'Remontados'
and 'Montescos' will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the
application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well
recognized tribe, their mode of lif e, degree of advancement and so f orth are practically the same as
those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christian tribes.
"Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) "ELLIS CROMWELL,
"Collector of Internal Revenue,
"Approved:
(Sgd.) "GREGORIO ARANETA,
"Secretary of Finance and Justice."
The two circulars above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No.
1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of of Internal Revenue, and approved on April
16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is
practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary
requested the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a nonChristian who has been baptized
by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he
entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of
the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The
opinion of Attorney-General Avanceña, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out,
concludes:
"In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
is probable that the person in question remains a nonChristian, so that in purchasing intoxicating liquors
both he and the person selling the same make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of
Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions placed upon the law until a
court shall hold otherwise."
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
"With respect to the meaning which the phrase nonChristian inhabitants has in the provisions of the
Administrative Code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning
which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipinos or strangers, civilized or
uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines
who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order. *
**
"The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos which
carry on a social and civilized life, did not intend to establish a distinction based on the religious belief s of
the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase,
adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the
inhabitants of the Philippines.
"The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No.
2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the
Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its literal
meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions based on the religion of the
individual,"
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than Dr. David P. Barrows, then
"Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the popu-
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 Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
lation into Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands
[1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq.) The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the
classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a
Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of
Insular Affairs, War Department, a subdivision under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political
Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the term refers to culture and
not to religion.
In resumé, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials,
specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" ref ers, not to religious belief, but, in a
way, to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart f rom settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various stages approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903
divided ,them into f our classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimología, de los nombres
de Razas de. Filipinas,says:
"In Tagalog, Bícol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies 'savage,' 'mountainer,' 'pagan,' 'negro.' It may be that
the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only
to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of
that island who bear it to-day, but its employment in three Filipino languages shows that the
radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and
signifies 'ancient/ from which we can deduce
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
that the name was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were
pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the 'ancients.'"
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced
beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They
number approximately 15,000. The Manguianes 'have shown no desire for community life, and, as
indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it
practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See Census of the Philippine Islands
[1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE—THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United
States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippine Islands in its
dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that
followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is
insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a
state of, pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians
may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United
States. .
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the
Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring
Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on—"This act avowedly contem-
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro,
plates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to
effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists,"
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama
([1886], 118 U. S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which
gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indite a brief history of the position of the Indians in the
United States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion
in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
"The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since the
Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a complex
character.
"Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of America towards the Indians
who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since, have
recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and
established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian
tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without the consent of this
paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its land, or any part of it, or the State or the
United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could be done.
The United States recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by
treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relations are equally difficult to define. They were,
and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal
relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a
separate people,
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Rubi vs.. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of
the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided."
The opinion then continues:
"It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian
tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent
largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and
receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are
found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the
course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised,
there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive
and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen. * * * The power of the General
Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in
that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within
the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can
enforce its laws on all the tribes."
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U. S., 28) the question to be considered was
whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the
introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to
statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different superintendents charged with guarding their
interests and found that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the
government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish
dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, were
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subjected to restraints and official supervision in the alienation of their property." And finally, we note the
following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the
Indian tribes, but longcontinued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial
decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of
exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders,
whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the
limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the
courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed
political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of
Heff [1905], 197 U. S., 488; U. S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U. S., 278; U.
S. vs.Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U. S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; The Cherokee
Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall., 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U. S., 218; Thomas vs. Gay [1898], 169 U. S.,
264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock [1903], 187 U. S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U. S.,
415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U. S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U. S., 286; U.
S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U. S., 598; Cyr vs. Walker [1911], 29 Okla., 281; 35 L. R. A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever,
therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass
such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give. to the Indians thereon full protection
in their persons and property. (U. S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U. S., 577.)
All this is borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of
judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the
issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a
hearing upon return to a writ of
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other
Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the
relators are Indians who have f ormerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of lndians, now located in the Indian
Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their
tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring
to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general
government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of
the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George
Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of, and
connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped from a reservation situated some
place within the limits of the Indian Territory—had departed therefrom without permission from the
Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an
order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory,
and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian
Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas
corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to
arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from
which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the
Government had adopted in its dealings with the friendly tribe of Poncas. Then, continuing, the court said:
"Laws, passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and
intercourse with the
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
Indian tribes, conf er upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons
who go upon the reservations without lawful authority. * * * Whether such an extensive discretionary
power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not, need not be questioned. It is enough
to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld."
The decision concluded as follows:
"The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. "1.That an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has,
therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal
judge, in all cases where he may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the
United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the
United States.
2. "2.That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department
of the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States,
and in violation of the laws thereof.
3. "3.That no rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian
Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do.
4. "4.That the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate
white race, and have the inalienable right to 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness/ so
long as they obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And.
5. "5.Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of
the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered."
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine that
Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the
meaning of
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the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race
Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly identical.
But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United
States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservations,
without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been
made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any
lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy
is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the
courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as many
forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of
the different Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power
to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its
authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be
zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not been
violated in this instance.
 The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and
since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation
of power to make the law,
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VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 701
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to
its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no
valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio St.,
88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs.Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be
committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions
of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U. S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in
the decisions is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section
2145 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor,
with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the
execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U. S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the
Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator
out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of
the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the
direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may
prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out of the Indian relations."
Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the long established practice of
the Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously
made for the welfare of
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
the rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been
treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the
absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as
corroborative authority, if any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U. S. [1907], 204 U. S., 364, reviewing the
previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court; U. S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U. S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general
rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative
powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of
Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge "when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order ?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants,
who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by
the Philippine Legislature to provincial officials and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION.
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown
clients, says that—"The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain
and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none
other." The inevitable result, then, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legisla-
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VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 703
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
ture to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently,
unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his argument is unanswerable—the Legislature must be
understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious equality
is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is
invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given to a
common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court
to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action.
We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between
individuals on account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions to the
Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution—and these provisions, it has been said, "are
universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356.) The protection
afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
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Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
"Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of like
liberty by every other." (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
"Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the savage never
understood, and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more
restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have. * * * That man is free who is protected
from injury." (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
"Liberty consists in the ability to do what one ought to desire and in not being forced to do what one
ought not to desire." (Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws.)
"Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's own
will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right
by others." (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U. S., 86.)
"Liberty does not import 'an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances,
wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for
the common good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist with saf ety to its members.
Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and
anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of
each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the
injury that may be done to others. * * * There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may
assert the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government—
especially of any free government existing under a written Constitution—to interf ere with the exercise of
that will. But it is equally
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true that in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members, the
rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be
subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public
may demand.'" (Harlan, J., in Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U. S., 11.)
"Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and
honorable conscience of the individual." (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has
been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As
enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, liberty includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and for that
purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these
purposes. to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right
to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily
done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall., 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland
[1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U. S., 274; Allgeyer
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706 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
vs. Louisiana [1896], 165 U. S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R. C. L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this:
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "liberty. regulated by law." Implied in the term
is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society
and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled
license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the
common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizens would, if exercised without restraint,
deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the
regulation of law. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or' otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-
Jones [1916], 242 U. S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Ala., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in
the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since
a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall
hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always
necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is especially true
where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular
cases. (SeeMcGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of
liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanc-
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tioned by age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the
public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due
process of law." (Hurtado vs, California [1883], 110 U. S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply * * *
"first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the Government; second, that this law shall. be reasonable in its operation; third, that it
shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be
applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U. S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104,
affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.1) "What is due process of law depends on
circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peabody
[1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a
statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be
purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statements, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That
slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment,
since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippines.
However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary modifications, of
sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal
____________
1
218 U. S., 302; 64 L. ed., 1049.
708
708 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
Code, prescribed the punishment f or these crimes. 'Slavery and involuntary servitude, together with their
corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another."
(Hodges vs. U. S. [1906], 203 U. S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has
been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have
been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U. S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom.
Next must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be
held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is the
farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep, and that among
its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and
good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its
resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U. S., 27.) What we
are most interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police
power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, * * * "is a power coextensive with self-protection,
and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 111., 191.) Carried onward by the current of
legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the
purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security f or the public wel-
709
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 709

Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
fare or' do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the
sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be no
doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and
that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the f
oundation of all republican f orms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.
S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding
whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code,
we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible,
such legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation,
it will be remembered, assigned as reasons for the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts
for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successful method for
educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General
adds the following: (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which
they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its
selection, the following:
"To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the
Secretary of
710
710 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to that place. There he found that the site selected is a
good one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc.,
that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of
which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a
somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also
gathered the impression that the results obtained during the period of less than one year since the
beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and development.
"Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was, naturally to be
expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement to
the press:
" 'lt is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life
and evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them into political
communities and to educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this country.
To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of
their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subject to
involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.'"
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian
people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration—"The advancement of the non-Christian
elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This
is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
1. "(a)Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced
to leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.
2. "(b)The extension of the public school system and the
711
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 711
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
1. system of public health throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.
2. "(c)The extension of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their
development and the extension of government control.
3. " (d)Construction of roads and trails between one place and another among non-Christians, to
promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and
with the Christian people.
4. "(e)Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
5. "(f)The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the
fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu."
The Secretary adds:
"To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian
people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they
may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are
being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being made
to understand that it is the purpose of the Government to organize them politically into fixed and
permanent communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid them to live and
work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children, and show them the
advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with
the purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to economic, social, and political equality,
and unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country." (See Report of the Department
for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-
Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and
advancement in
712
712 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
civilization; (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian
Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the nonChristian people in the following unequivocal
terms:
"It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and
liberty in favor of the regions inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in
a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political
development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual
intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the
provinces of the Archipelago." (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the
Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the
"habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully
formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident.
Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on
their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the
advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by bringing them into a
reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and
morals—was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. This method was termed in Spanish times,
"bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with
reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be
improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in .some
cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few
713
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 713
Rubi vs.. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the Manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the
axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, f or instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and
they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed,, they are citizens, with many but
not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the
Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of
the State.
In so f ar as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature
in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must
have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no
argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed
after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the
resources of the great Island of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be in
a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy
and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must
prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
"Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the Manguianes) are
engaged in the works of destruction—burning and destroying the forests and making
illegal caiñgins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its
interests, what will ultimately become of these
714
714 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They
will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit
crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may
want to abuse them.
"There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of liberty and does not
practise liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will—going from
one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caingins thereon.
"Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they
are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
* * * * * * * wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provided for, you can not make them live together and the noble
"But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due
process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not
practise liberty in a rightful way?
"To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to
what liberty is. It will mean, in the- case at bar, that the Government should. not adopt any measures
looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people
should be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest
hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
"In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in
the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure
was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience."
715
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 715
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
"The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards
the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people
under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day
which is not f ar distant when they will become usef ul citizens. In the light of what has already been
accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up the
noble work simply because a certain element, believing that their personal interests would be injured by
such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of the Government to lead this people in
the path of civilization ? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this
people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there has been
erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his
liberty without due process of law? To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at
this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making
them useful citizens. They will thus be left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable
point of attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward
brothers.
"The Manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being
taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that the object
of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are being
aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially established for them. In
short, everything is being done for them in order that their advancement in civilization and material
prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put
them in a condi-
716
716 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
tion compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is,
therefore, no involuntary servitude.
"But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other place under
penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a
nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place to
another as the conditions of living warrant, and the entire space where they are roving about is the
property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one place to
another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a
certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire territory?
This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about which they are
roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives. of the Government. For as
people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the mountains and follow a
intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to naught."
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a general
conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases.
Could he not, however, be kept away from certain localities? To furnish an example from the Indian
legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U. S. Stat. at L., p. 141) punished those intruders who
should cross the line into an Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom
of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any
doubt, this law and other similar laws were accepted and followed time and again without question.
 It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the
confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous officials. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of good of the country.
any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature,
enforcement of the law would have little or no motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered cases is toward non-
presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and interference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice
patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists the power of Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other
removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a redress of grievances. mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U. S., 1.) If in the final
When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the court must take "a chance," it should
called to the attention of the courts, it would seem that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the be, with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy,
Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose. and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the rights and conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other departments
liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a of the Government.
question which has assailed the very existence of government f rom the beginning of time. Not now purely We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section of his liberty without due process of law and
an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance
forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that
government renders imperative a power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of course, section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous
on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree to which the to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a long time Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore,
to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine. not issue. This is the ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxed against petitioners. So ordered.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics
and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest
possible demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to
trail after the other two branches of the Government in this progressive march. ,
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great
malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good
of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws. there exists a law; the law seems to be
reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to
all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to
the determination that section 2145 is valid, is the attitude which the courts should assume towards the
settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gamble vs. Vanderbilt
University(200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
"We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question
that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by
differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such
prior cases. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court
believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule
719
VOL. 39, MARCH 7, 1919. 719
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in
all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense
of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has
been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines
from early days to the present. The idea is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may
approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be
approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must
be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed, The public policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order

VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 659
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
No. L-74457. March 20,1987.*
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Jurisdiction; Lower courts have authority to resolve the issue of constitutionality
of legislative measures.—This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the
same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the
Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of
court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in
the first instance by these lower courts.
Same; Due Process; Judgments must be based on the sporting idea of fair play.—The closed mind
has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before
an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-
half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based
on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement
each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem
not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full
appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or
intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
Same; Same; The ban on slaughter of carabaos is directly related to public welfare.—In the light of
the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so
to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626.
The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be
achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no
doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if
male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be
conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
Same; Same; The ban on the transportation of carabaos from one
661
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 661
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
province to another (E.O. 626-A), their confiscation and disposal without a prior court hearing is
violative of due process for lack of reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
to be achieved and for being confiscatory.—But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the
same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies
with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original
measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and
no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us.
The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing.
Same; Same; Same.—Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be
assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted
out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained
because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and
conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the
property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself,
as forfeited to the government.
Same; Same; Same.—We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition
of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the
seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit,in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even
corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless.
662
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as
they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide
and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a
clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
Same; Same; Same.—To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of
the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to
the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property conf iscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and
punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the of ficers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.
Same; Same; Omission of right to a prior hearing can be justified only where a problem needs
immediate and urgent correction.—It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice
and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted,
however, there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit,
the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it. In the case
before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment.
The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There
certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved
first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the
Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in
nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice,
which alone would have had the
663
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 663
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
Same; Same; Damages; A police officer who confiscated carabaos being transported in violation of
E.O. 626-A is not liable for damages even if said Executive Order were later declared unconstitutional.—
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the
petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its
mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the
police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to
declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it.
Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all
their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
CRUZ, J..
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades: "Strike—but hear
me first!' " It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as f ollows:
"WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with
respect to age;
"WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the
prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
"WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the
prohibition against interprovincial
664
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the
disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
"SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the
case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see
fit, in the case of carabaos.
"SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
"Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines"
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984,
when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the
above measure.1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ
of replevinupon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case,
the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered
the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive
order, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Ap-
_______________
1Rollo, pp. 7, 28, 29, 34.
2Ibid., pp. 6-7; Annex B.
665
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 665
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
pellate Court,**3 which upheld the trial court,*** and he has now come bef ore us in this petition for review
on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim
is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before
a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not
have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper
exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No, 6 of the 1973
Constitution.4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles5 is not applicable here.
The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official
Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due
process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly
affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal.6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide,"
final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of
certain measures.7
_______________
** Justices Coquia, Bartolome and Ejercito.
3 Rollo, pp. 6, 27, 33.
*** Judge Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon.
4 Ibid., pp. 10; 11,14-16, 76.
5 129 SCRA 174.
6
Espiritu vs. Fugoso, 81 Phil. 637.
7
Sec. 5[2(a)], Art. X, 1973 Constitution; Sec. 5[2(a)], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution.
666
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower
courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of
the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily,"8 to recall
Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance
by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should
probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so
heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the
task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of
the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President
Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his
legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment
there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or
was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in
order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and
effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power
then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since
the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment," a
phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really
_______________
8J. Laurel, concurring opinion, Zandueta v. dela Costa, 66 Phil. 615, 627.
9US v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731.
667
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 667
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the
nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the
ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the
wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in
the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body.10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient.
This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron
rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must
be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it
adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and
circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process
lest they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may
need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the
import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion
and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise."11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the
U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process—and in so doing sums it
all up—as nothing more and nothing less than "the
_______________
10I Aruego, The Framing of the Constitution (1936), pp. 153-159.
11Twinning vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78.
668
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play."12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that
Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life, liberty or property of any of its subjects except by
the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their
progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow
that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing
reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the
law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting idea of fair play to hear
"the other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment.
Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial
verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable
that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling af
ter examination of the problem not f rom one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment
based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with
the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum .requirements of due process are notice and hearing13 which, generally speaking, may
not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a
gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with ap-
_______________
12
Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, pp. 32-33.
13
David vs. Aquilizan, 94 SCRA 707; Montemayor vs. Araneta Univ. Foundation, 77 SCRA
321; Lentelera vs. Amores, 70 SCRA 37; Flores vs. Buencamino, 74 SCRA 332; DBP vs. Bautista, 26 SCRA
366; Ong Su Han vs. Gutierrez David, 76 Phil. 546; Banco-Español-Filipino vs. Palanca. 37 Phil 921.
669
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 669
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
plications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play.
We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to
"the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous
Dartmouth College Case,14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond
the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause
into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a
number of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary
evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection
between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the
need for expeditious action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate
danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and
narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person
sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has
fled.16Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy
houses to protect the public morals.17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without
violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to
protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the
_______________
14 Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518.
15 Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1; 1 Cooley 639.
16 Suntay vs. People, 101 Phil. 833.
17 12 C.J. 1224.
670
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare.18 By
reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the
least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation
and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which
affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead—from the womb to beyond the
tomb—in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often
unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public
welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is
found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
 It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A,
amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under
certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases,
that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buff aloes be conserved f or the benefit of the
small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure.
In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional
beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and
preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio,19 where a law regulating the
registration, branding
_______________
18
People v. Vera Reyes, 67 Phil. 190; Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Ass. v. City Mayor, 20
SCRA 849; Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 75; U.S. v. Ling Su Tan, 10 Phil. 114; Collins v. Wolfe, 5 Phil. 297; U.S.
v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 225; Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 603.
19 15 Phil. 85.
671
VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 671
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The
defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required
permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a
valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by
farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted
in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore,
because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had
spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these
animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared
in part as f ollows:
"To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. x x x x x x.
"From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute
under consideration was required by 'the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class' and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as
these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a 'reasonably necessary' limitation on
private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their
slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the
luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably
and dangerously affected."
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor
man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of
Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the
pur-
672
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
pose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited
doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least
seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the
executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz.,that
there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A
imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement,providing that "no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is
missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As
for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be
easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals
for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason
either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
E ven if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still
have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive
authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine
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VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 673
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the
challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is
immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeasbond of
P1 2,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the
trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of
elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly
dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is
also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due
process is not necessarily judicial only.20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justification
for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be
corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's
peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant
destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not
have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to
him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles,21 Executive Order No. 626-
A is penal in nature, the violation
_______________
20 New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. Rivera, 33 SCRA 602; Gas Corp. of the Phil. vs. Inciong, 93
SCRA 653.
21 supra.
674
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would
have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the
accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property
shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis
supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It
is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for
the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must
observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who
shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in
their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping
authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate
and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the
law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein
who are
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VOL. 148, MARCH 20, 1987 675
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we
hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated
the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its
mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the
police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to
declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it.
Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all
their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them,
this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would
have become a fait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present
challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the
Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon
forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to
invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive
tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They
become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright
and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed
above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount
thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 31
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
G.R. No. 111953. December 12, 1997.*
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, HON. JESUS B. GARCIA,
in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department of Transportation and Communications, and ROGELIO A.
DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of Philippine Ports Authority, petitioners, vs.UNITED
HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Due Process; When one speaks of due process of law, a distinction must be
made between matters of procedure and matters of substance—procedural due process “refers to the
method or manner by which the law is enforced,” while substantive due process “requires that the law
itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.”—
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the “due process clause” of the
Constitution, viz.: SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, x x x.” In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that
there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When
one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure
and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process “refers to the method or manner by which
the law is enforced,” while substantive due process “requires that the law itself, not merely the
procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.” PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be
examined in light of this distinction.
Same; Same; As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence
of due process.—Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-
92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby “relevant government agencies” and the pilots
themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the
enactment. Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in
the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, where it declared that “(a)s long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of
law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional
mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.”
Same; Same; Notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are
essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function, but in the performance of
its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not
comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.—Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves
were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and
hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative
functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the
requirements of notice and hearing.
Same; Same; Ships and Shipping; Pilotage; Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a
property right.—There is no
33
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 33
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Even petitioner
Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that “(t)he exercise of one’s
profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with,
property rights without due process.” He merely expressed the opinion that “(i)n the limited context of
this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation
of, the property rights of those affected thereby, and that “PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely
regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession.” As will be presently demonstrated, such
supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate an administrative order which is not only
unreasonable but also superfluous.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Pilotage, Defined.— Pilotage is the act of conducting a
vessel from the high seas into a port. Usually, pilotage is conducted within a two-mile area offshore to an
assigned berthing area and vice versa.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “License” and “Licensure,” Defined.—Pilotage, just like other
professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is “the granting of license
especially to practice a profession.” It is also “the system of granting licenses (as for professional practice)
in accordance with established standards.” A license is a right or permission granted by some competent
authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.
Same; Same; Same; The license granted to harbor pilots in the form of an appointment which
allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age of 70 years is a vested right.—Their license is
granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age
70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92, “(a)ll existing regular appointments
which have been previously issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31
December 1992 only,” and “(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall,
henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by
the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.”
34
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
Same; Same; Same; An administrative order that provides for pre-evaluation cancellation of a
license is unreasonable and constitutionally infirm—in a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without
due process of law.—It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots
to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of
security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they
would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for
mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of
their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance
evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso
facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a “rigid evaluation of
performance” which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the
term “renewal.” It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92
unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Manuel E. Valenzuela and Jesus P. Amparo for private respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of appointment of harbor
pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate
respondents’ right to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law?
The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On December 23,
1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA’s charter. Pursuant to its power of control,
regulation, and supervision of
35
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 35
 9 Qualifying factors are requirements which must be met before a pilot’s application for
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
reappointment is even evaluated by the PPA.
pilots and the pilotage profession,1 the PPA promulgated PPA-AO 03-852 on March 21, 1985, which 10 These criteria are used for evaluation by the PPA after a pilot has complied with all the
embodied the “Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees
requirements to qualify for evaluation. Each criterion is assigned a certain number of points.
in Philippine Ports.” These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot
37
licenses3 and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for
four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance4 that they are given permanent VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 37
and regular appointments by the PPA itself5 to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General
cia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA.
Manager.6 Harbor pilots in every harbor district are further required to organize themselves into pilot
Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the
associations which would make available such equipment as may be required by the PPA for effective
DOTC.
pilotage services. In view of this mandate, pilot associations invested in floating, communications, and
On December 23, 1992 the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the
office equipment. In fact, every new pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a member of a
implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was
pilot association and is required to pay a proportionate equivalent equity or capital before being allowed
issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a
to assume his duties, as reimbursement to the association concerned of the amount it paid to his
(viii), Article IV of P.D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended
predecessor.
to restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services.
Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-927 on July 15,
On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C.
1992, whose
Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier.11 He concluded that
_______________
PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan,
but of the PPA, which was merely implementing Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it “to control,
1
Pilotage is the act of conducting a vessel from the high seas into a port. Usually, pilotage is regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district.”
conducted within a two-mile area offshore to an assigned berthing area and vice versa. On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing
2 Rollo, p. 87.
memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:
3 The pilot licensing function itself which used to be exercised by the Philippine Coast Guard pursuant
“The exercise of one’s profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of,
to the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974 (P.D. No. 601) has been transferred to the Maritime Industry or interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92
Authority (MARINA) by virtue of Executive Order No. 125, which took effect on January 30, 1987. does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of the property rights of
4
Determined by an Evaluation Committee. those affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by
5 Upon the recommendation of the PPA General Manager.
limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a
6 Article IV, Section 20.
rigid evaluation of the appointee’s performance.
7
Rollo, p. 41. PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in
36 PPA’s jurisdictional area.” (Emphasis supplied)
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED _______________

Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils. 11Rollo, pp. 36-40.
avowed policy was to “instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users
38
through the improvement of pilotage services.” This was implemented by providing therein that “all
existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the 38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only” and that “all appointments to harbor pilot positions
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject
Finally, as regards the alleged “absence of ample prior consultation” before the issuance of the
to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.”
administrative order, Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No. 857, which merely requires the PPA to
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association,
consult with “relevant Government agencies.” Since the PPA Board of Directors is composed of the
through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation
Secretaries of the DOTC, the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Finance, and
and Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that “the matter of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as well as the Director-General of the National
reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA’s administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors
Economic Development Agency, the Administrator of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), and the
as its governing body.”
private sector representative who, due to his knowledge and expertise, was appointed by the President to
Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued a Memorandum Order No. 08-928 which laid down
the Board, he concluded that the law has been sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed
the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilots, viz.: (1) Qualifying
administrative order.
Factors:9 safety record and physical/mental medical exam report and (2) Criteria for
Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for
Evaluation:10 promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number of years as
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of
a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot, awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age.
Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65673. On September 6, 1993, the trial court rendered
Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92,
the following judgment:12
but Secretary Gar-
“WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:
_______________

8 Ibid., p. 42.
 1. 1.Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times16 before the
discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade.
Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders; While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, “which issues the licenses of pilots after
2. 2.PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null administering the pilots’ examinations,” was not consulted,17 the facts show that the MARINA, which took
and void; over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors
3. 3.The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04- of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of naval defense involved in the
92 and its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders. issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need to be consulted.18
_______________
No costs.
14
De Leon, Textbook on the Philippine Constitution, 1991, p. 81.
SO ORDERED.”
15
G.R. No. 117565, November 18, 1997, citing Legarda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94457, October
_______________
16, 1997, and Pizza Hut/Progressive Development Corporation v. NLRC, 322 Phil. 573.
16
12 Questioned twice before the DOTC, appealed to the OP, before finding affirmative relief with the
Ibid., pp. 29-35.
RTC of Manila.
39 17 Rollo, p. 55.

VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 39 18 Ibid., p. 163.

41
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage as VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 41
a profession and, therefore, a property right under Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc.13 Thus,
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
abbreviating the term within which that privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the
property rights of the harbor pilots. Consequently, any “withdrawal or alteration” of such property right
administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of
must be strictly made in accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was
procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
apparently not followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-
function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations,
AO No. 04-92; respondents allegedly learned about it only after its publication in the newspapers. From
an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.19
this decision, petitioners elevated their case to this Court on certiorari.
Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise of harbor
After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties, the Court is
pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right has become vested and can only be
convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents’ right against deprivation of
“withdrawn or shortened” by observing the constitutional mandate of due process of law. Their argument
property without due process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.
has thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance. It is here where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the “due process clause” of the
the condition set by the organic law.
Constitution, viz.:
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Even
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, x x x.”
petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that “(t)he exercise of
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a
one’s profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference
deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one
with, property rights without due process.”20 He merely expressed the opinion that “(i)n the limited
speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and
context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful
matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process “refers to the method or manner by which the
deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby, and that “PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but
law is enforced,” while substantive due process “requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by
merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession.” As will be presently demonstrated,
which the law would be
such supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate an administrative order which is not only
_______________
unreasonable but also superfluous.
13
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is
145 SCRA 268 (1986). “the granting of
40 _______________
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
19 Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218(1989), citing 73 C.J.S. 452-
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
453.
enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.”14 PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction. 20Rollo, p. 38.
Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly
42
because no hearing was conducted whereby “relevant government agencies” and the pilots themselves
could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. 42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea,15 where it declared that “(a)s long as a party was given the opportunity
license especially to practice a profession.” It is also “the system of granting licenses (as for professional
to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this
practice) in accordance with established standards.”21 A license is a right or permission granted by some
opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is
competent authority to carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.22
deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.”
 Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass through
the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each followed by actual training
and practice. Thus, the court a quo observed:
“Petitioners (herein respondents) contend, and the respondents (herein petitioners) do not deny, that
here (sic) in this jurisdiction, before a person can be a harbor pilot, he must pass five (5) government
professional examinations, namely, (1) For Third Mate and after which he must work, train and practice on
board a vessel for at least a year; (2) For Second Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for
at least a year; (3) For Chief Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at least a year; (4)
For a Master Mariner and after which he must work as Captain of vessels for at least two (2) years to
qualify for an examination to be a pilot; and finally, of course, that given for pilots.”
Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they
retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92, “(a)ll existing
regular appointments which have been previously issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall
remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only,” and
_______________
Finally, respondents’ insinuation that then PPA General Manager Dayan was responsible for the
issuance of the questioned administrative order may have some factual basis; after all, power and
authority were vested in his office to propose rules and regulations. The trial court’s finding of animosity
between him and private respondents might likewise have a grain of truth. Yet the number of cases filed
in court between private respondents and Dayan, including cases which have reached this Court, cannot
certainly be considered the primordial reason for the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, Dayan should be presumed to have acted in accordance with law and the best of
professional motives. In any event, his actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by higher
administrative authorities.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the court a
quo dated September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

21Webster’s Third World International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 1304.

2253 C.J.S. 445, citing 37 C.J. 168. In Tan v. Director of Forestry, 210 Phil. 244(1983), the Court defined
a license as merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful. It is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted.
Neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation.
43
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 12, 1997 43
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
“(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of
one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a
rigid evaluation of performance.”
It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing
that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a
license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or
physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of their
license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance
evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso
facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a “rigid evaluation of
performance” which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the
term “renewal.” It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92
unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-AO No. 08-92 are already covered by PPA-MO No.
03-85, which is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a
“surplusage”23 and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO No. 03-85 is a comprehensive order
setting forth the “Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage
Fees in Philippine Ports.” It provides, inter alia, for the qualification, appointment, performance
evaluation, disciplining and removal of harbor pilots—matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO No. 04-92
and its implementing memorandum order.
_______________

23Rollo, p. 65.
44
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.
Since it adds nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down.
 legislation.—The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post facto
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 433
provision of the Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that “petitioner’s right of appeal is
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan being diluted or eroded efficacy wise * * *.” A more searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate
the lack of persuasiveness of such an argument. The Kay Villegas Kami decision, promulgated in 1970,
Nos. L-50581-50617. January 30, 1982.*
cited by petitioner, supplies the most recent and binding pronouncement on the matter. To quote from
RUFINO V. NUÑEZ, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: “An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done
Constitutional Law; Courts; Graft and Corrupt Practice Act; Martial Law; The President by virtue of
before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2)
the 1976 amendments was conferred continuous law-making powers until Martial Law shall have been
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and
lifted.—It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E.
inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules
Marcos to create the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this proceeding. While such competence
of evidences, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time
under the 1973 Constitution contemplated that such an act should come from the National Assembly, the
of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
1976 Amendments made clear that he as incumbent President “shall continue to exercise legislative
penal-
powers until martial law shall have been lifted” Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in
435
Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections decided in 1975. In the language of the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it
dissipated “all doubts as to the legality of such law-making authority by the President during the period of VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 435
Martial Law, * * *.” As the opinion went on to state: “It is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period of
ty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person
Martial Law.”
accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a
Same; Same; Same; The Bill of Rights must give way to specific provisions of the Constitution. The
former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.” Even the most careful scrutiny of the above
creation of the Sandiganbayan was provided for in the Constitution in response to a problem. Petitioner
definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The “lawful protection” to which an accused “has become
should therefore, have anticipated that a different procedure that would be prescribed for that tribunal will
entitled” is qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure
not be violative of equal protection clause.—The premise underlying petitioner’s contention on this point
provided for in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced. This is hardly a controversial matter.
is set forth in his memorandum thus: “1. The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner’s right to
Same; Same; Same; The Sandiganbayan Decree does not dilute the right to appeal even if no
equal protection, because—appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of
intermediate appeal to the Court of Appeals is prescribed therein.—Even from the standpoint then of the
discretion;—appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the
American decisions relied upon, it cannot be successfully argued that there is a dilution of the right to
facts and trial evidence; and—there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme
appeal. Admittedly under Presidential Decree No. 1486, there is no recourse to the Court of Appeals, the
Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a
review coining from this Court. x x x Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate
matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals
tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the
and thereafter to the Supreme Court”
negative. In the first place, his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court of a division of
respondent Court. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which “the Presiding Justice shall
_______________ designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming
a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for
*
EN BANC. rendering judgment.” Then if convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any
434 error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner makes much, perhaps
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no review of the facts. What cannot be
too sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining whether or not to give due course to the petition
4 for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome. In
that sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether the
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied. The standard as to when there is
That is hardly convincing, considering that the classification satisfies the test announced by this
proof of such weight to justify a conviction is set forth in People v. Dramayo.
Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera requiring that it “must be based on substantial distinctions
Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Due process in criminal proceedings defined.—But justice, though
which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.” To repeat, the Constitution
narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. What is re-
specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to
436
a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that
those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein,
6
whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling of this Court Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno, a 1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights, included quired for compliance with the due process mandate in criminal proceedings? In Arnault v. Pecson
among which are the due process of law and equal protection clauses must “give way to [a] specific this Court with Justice Tuason as ponente, succinctly identified it with “a fair and impartial trial and
provision,” in that decision, one reserving to “Filipino citizens of the operation of public services or reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense.” In criminal proceedings then, due process is
utilities.” The scope of such a principle is not to be constricted. It is certainly broad enough to cover the satisfied if the accused is “informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he has to meet,
instant situation. with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for
Same; Same; Same; The Presidential Decree (P.D. 1486, as amended by P.D. 1606) creating the him to rebut it and the sentence being imposed in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of course,
Sandiganbayan and prescribing its own unique rules of procedure and appeal is not an ex post facto that the court that rendered the decision is one of competent jurisdiction.
 Same; Same; A review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan calls for strict observance
of the presumption of innocence. The law creating the Sandiganbayan could stand improvement.—It is
true that other Sections of the Decree could have been worded to avoid any constitutional objection. As of
now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion
of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the dire fate of invalidity, they must be
construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the
Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be contested It commends itself for approval. Nor should
there be any doubt either that a review by certiorari of a decision of conviction by the Sandiganbayan calls
for strict observance of the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Teehankee, J.:
I concur with the grounds of Justice Makasiar’s dissent and reserve the right to file a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., concurring:
Constitutional Law; Courts; The Supreme Court must be given its deserved superior status over the
Sandiganbayan.—Strong as my feeling in this respect is, I am aware that my objection to the provision in
question is not ground enough to render the same unconstitutional. In expressing myself as I do, I am just
adding my little voice of protest in order that hopefully those concerned may hear it loud and clear and
thus give the Supreme Court its deserved superior status over the Sandiganbayan.
437
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 437
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
Same; Same; It should not be surprising that the structure and procedure of the Sandiganbayan
should be different from other courts.—It should not be surprising nor unusual that the composition of and
procedure in the Sandiganbayan should be designed and allowed to be different from the ordinary courts.
Constitutionally speaking, I view the Sandiganbayan as sui generis in the judicial structure designed by the
makers of the 1971 Constitution. To be particularly noted must be the fact that the mandate of the
Constitution that the National Assembly “shall create”, it is not under the Article on the Judiciary (Article
X) but under the article on Accountability of Public Officers. More, the Constitution ordains it to be “a
special court.” To my mind, such “special” character endowed to the Sandiganbayan carries with it certain
concomittants which compel that it should be treated differently from the ordinary courts. Of course, as a
court it exercises judicial power, and so under Section 1 of Article X, it must be subordinate to the
Supreme Court.
Same; Same; The Sandiganbayan being a collegiate court it is improper to make its decisions
appealable to another collegiate court.—Since the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court, it is obviously
improper to make appeals therefrom appealable to another collegiate court with the same number of
judges composing it. We must bear in mind that the Sandiganbayan’s primary and primordial reason for
being is to insure the people’s faith and confidence in our public officers more than it used to be.We have
only to recall that the activism and restlessness in the later ‘60’s and the early ‘70’s particularly of the
youth who are always concerned with the future of the country were caused by their conviction that graft
and corruption was already intolerably pervasive in the government and naturally they demanded and
expected effective and faster and more expeditious remedies. Thus, the Tanodbayan or Ombudsman was
conceived and as its necessary counterpart, the Sandiganbayan.
Same; Same; Supreme Court; The Supreme Court is not supposed to re-weigh evidence, but only to
determine its substantiality.—Since the creation of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court’s power of
review over decisions of the former even in criminal cases has been limited statutorily or by the rules only
to legal questions. We have never been supposed to exercise the power to reweigh the evidence but only
to determine its substantiality. If that was proper and legal, and no one has yet been heard to say the
contrary, why should We wonder about the method of review of the decisions of the Sandigan-
438
43 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
8
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
bayan under P.D. 1606? With all due respect to the observation of Justice Makasiar, I believe that
the accused has a better guarantee of a real and full consideration of the evidence and the determination
of the facts where there are three judges actually seeing and observing the demeanor and conduct of the
witnesses.
Makasiar, J., concurring and dissenting:
Constitutional Law; Courts; Anti-Graft Act; Section 7, Paragraph 3 of P.D. 1606 denies petitioner
due process and equal protection of the law.—It should be stressed that the Constitution merely
authorizes the law-making authority to create the Sandiganbayan with a specific limited jurisdiction only
over graft and corruption committed by officers and employees of the government, government
instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled corporations. The Constitution does not
authorize the lawmaker to limit the right of appeal of the accused convicted by the Sandiganbayan to only
the Supreme Court. The Bill of Rights remains as restrictions on the law-maker in creating the
Sandiganbayan pursuant to the constitutional directive.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—It is also clear that paragraph 3, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 trenches
upon the due process clause of the Constitution, because the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals and
thereafter to the Supreme Court was already secured under Sections 17 and 29 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, otherwise known as R.A. No. 296, as amended, and therefore also already part of procedural due
process to which the petitioner was entitled at the time of the alleged commission of the crime charged
against him.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—Then again, paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, by providing
that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the Supreme Court through certiorari,
likewise limits the reviewing power of the Supreme Court only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases
involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first
by the Court of Appeals, and then by the Supreme Court.
Same; Same; Same; Limitation of the review powers of the Supreme Court over the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan to only the issues proper for certiorari violates the constitutional presumption of
439
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 439
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
innocence.—Even if in certiorari proceedings, the Supreme Court, to determine whether the trial
court gravely abused its discretion, can inquire into whether the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is
supported by substantial evidence, the presumption of innocence is still violated; because proof beyond
reasonable doubt cannot be equated with substantial evidence. Because the Supreme Court under P.D.
No. 1606 is precluded from reviewing questions of fact and the evidence submitted before the
Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court is thereby deprived of the constitutional power to determine whether
the guilt of the accused has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt—by proof generating
moral certainty as to his culpability—and therefore subverts the constitutional presumption of innocence
in his favor which is enjoyed by all other defendants in other criminal cases, including defendants accused
of only light felonies, which are less serious than graft and corruption.
Same; Same; Same; Present number of Sandiganbayan magistrates denies an accused equal
protection of the law as it diminishes chances of an acquittal.—The fact that there are only 6 members
now composing the Sandiganbayan limits the choice of the Presiding Justice to only three, instead of 6
members from whom to select the two other Justices to compose a special division of five in case a
member of the division dissents. This situation patently diminishes to an appreciable degree the chances
of an accused for an acquittal. Applied to the petitioner. Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 denies him the equal
protection of the law as against those who will be prosecuted when three more members of the
Sandiganbayan will be appointed to complete its membership of nine.
 Same; Same; Same; The law arbitrarily placed the Sandigan-bayan on same level as the Court of
Appeals which should not be the case.—The Court of Appeals is an appellate tribunal exercising appellate
jurisdiction over all cases—criminal cases, civil cases, special civil actions, special proceedings, and
administrative cases—appealable from the trial courts or quasi-judicial bodies. The disparity between the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan is too patent to require extended demonstration.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has been effectively downgraded and discriminated against
by the Sandiganbayan Decree.—P.D. No. 1606, effectively makes the Sandiganbayan superior to the
Supreme Court; because said Section 14 expressly provides that “the appropriation for the Sandiganbayan
shall be
440
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
0
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
automatically released in accordance with the schedule submitted by the Sandiganbayan” (italics
supplied). There is no such provision in any law or in the annual appropriations act in favor of the Supreme
Court.
Same; Same; Same; P. D. 1606 violates the guarantee against ex post pacto law.—As heretofore
stated, before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978, all persons accused of
malversation of public funds or graft and corruption and estafa were entitled to a review of a trial court’s
judgment of conviction by the Court of Appeals on all questions of fact and law, and thereafter by the
Supreme Court also on both questions of fact and law. This right to a review of the judgment of conviction
by two appellate tribunals on both factual and legal issues, was already part of the constitutional right of
due process enjoyed by the petitioner in 1977. This vital right of the accused has been taken away on
December 10, 1978 by P.D. No. 1606, thus placing herein petitioner under a great disadvantage for crimes
he allegedly committed prior to 1978.
Same; Same; Same; Section 9 of P.D. 1606 clashes with the rule-making authority of the Supreme
Court in that it authorizes the Sandiganbayan to promulgate its own rules without requiring approval
thereof by the Supreme Court.—Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to promulgate
its own rules of procedure without requiring the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, collides with the
constitutional rule-making authority of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of court for all courts of
the land (par. 5, Sec. 5 of Art. X of the New Constitution).
Same; Same; Same; P.D. 1606 subverts the Supreme Courts power of supervision over inferior
courts in that it allows the Sandiganbayan to administer its own affairs.—Section 10 of P.D. No. 1606
authorizing the Sandiganbayan to “administer its own internal affairs, to adopt such rules governing the
constitution of its divisions, the allocation of cases among them and other matters relating to its
business,” without requiring the approval of the Supreme Court also contravenes the constitutional power
of supervision over the Sandiganbayan as an inferior trial court. It cannot be disputed that the
Sandiganbayan is an inferior court.
Same; Same; Same; Certain provisions of P.D. 1606 are unconstitutional.—All the challenged
provisions of P.D. No. 1606, namely, Sections 7 (par. 3), 9, 10, 12 and 13 are separable from the
441
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 441
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
rest of its provisions without affecting the completeness thereof, and can therefore be declared
unconstitutional without necessarily nullifying the entire P.D. No. 1606. The valid provisions amply
determine what is to be done, who is to do it. and how to do it—the test for a complete and intelligible
law (Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. 44; Edu vs. Ericta. Oct. 20, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 496-497). As a matter of
fact, Section 15 acknowledges such separability although under the jurisprudence it is merely a guide for
and persuasive, but not necessarily binding on, the Supreme Court, which can declare an entire law
unconstitutional if the challenged portions are inseparable from the valid portions.
Fernandez, J.:
I concur in the separate concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar.
De Castro, J.:
I concur. I also agree with Justice Makasiar’s observations on matters not covered by the majority opinion.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
In categorical and explicit language, the Constitution provided for but did not create a special Court,
the Sandiganbayan, with “jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices
and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.” 1 It came into
existence with the issuance in 1978 of a Presidential Decree.2 Even under the 1935 Constitution, to be
precise, in 1955, an
________________
1
Article XIII, Section 5 of the Constitution.
2Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606, both issued in 1978.
442
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
anti-graft statute was passed,3 to be supplemented five years later by another act,4 the validity of which
was upheld in Morfe v. Mutuc,5 a 1968 decision. As set forth in the opinion of the Court: “Nothing can be
clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute was precisely aimed at
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in
the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public office must
indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of
all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded such a
remedial device.”6 It should occasion no surprise, therefore, why the 1971 Constitutional Convention, with
full awareness of the continuity need to combat the evils of graft and corruption, included the above-cited
provision.
Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Decree
creating the Sandiganbayan. He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification
of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public
officials, in several cases.7 The informations were filed respectively on February 21 and March 26, 1979.
Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and
jurisdictional grounds.8 A week later, respondent Court denied such motion.9 There was a motion for
reconsideration filed the next day; it met the same fate.10 Hence this petition for certiorari and
prohibition. It is the claim of petitioner that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the
respondent Court is violative of the due process,11 equal protection,12 and ex post facto13 clauses of the
Constitution.14
The overriding concern, made manifest in the Constitution itself, to cope more effectively with
dishonesty and abuse of trust in the public service whether committed by government officials or not,
with the essential cooperation of the private citizens with whom they deal, cannot of itself justify any
departure from or disregard of constitutional rights. That is beyond question. With due recognition,
however, of the vigor and persistence of counsel of petitioner15 in his pleadings butressed by scholarly and
diligent research, the Court, equally aided in the study of the issues raised by the exhaustive
memorandum of the Solicitor General,16 is of the view that the invalidity of Presidential Decree No. 1486
as amended, creating respondent Court has not been demonstrated.
The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionally of such Decree cannot be adjudged.
1. It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos
to create the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this proceeding. While such competence under
the 1973 Constitution contemplated that such an act should come from the National Assembly, the 1976
Amendments made clear that he as incumbent President “shall continue to exercise legislative powers
until martial law shall have been lifted.”17 Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in Aquino
Jr. v. Commission on Elections18 decided in 1975. In the language of the ponente,Justice Makasiar, it
dissipated “all doubts as to the legality of such law-making authority by the President during the period of
Martial Law, * * *.”19 As the opinion went on to state: “It is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a
recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period of
Martial Law.”20
2. Petitioner in his memorandum invokes the guarantee of equal protection in seeking to nullify
Presidential Decree No. 1486. What does it signify? To quote from J. M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure
Administration:21 “The ideal situation is for the law’s benefits to be available to all, that none be placed
outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men
governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law.” 22 There
is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact exists “cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the
law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. The
constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist.
To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut
into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the
equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired
by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason.”23 Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to
quote from the Tuason decision anew “that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under
similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally binding on the rest.”24
3. The premise underlying petitioner’s contention on this point is set forth in his memorandum thus:
“1. The Sandiganbayanproceedings violates petitioner’s right to equal protection, because—appeal as a
matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion;—appeal likewise was shrunk and
limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and—there is only one
chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances;
while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and
to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court.” 25 That is
hardly convincing, considering that the classification satisfies the test announced by this Court
through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera26 requiring that it “must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.”27 To repeat, the Constitution
specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to
a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that
those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17,
1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein,
whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling of this Court
in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno,28 a 1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights, included
among which are the due process of law and equal protection clauses must “give way to [a] specific
provision,” in that decision, one reserving to “Filipino citizens of the operation of public services or
utilities.”29 The scope of such a principle is not to be constricted. It is certainly broad enough to cover the
instant situation.
4. The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post facto provision of
the Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that “petitioner’s right of appeal is being diluted or
eroded efficacy wise * * *.”30 A more searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of
persuasiveness of such an argument. The Kay Villegas Kami31decision, promulgated in 1970, cited by
petitioner, supplies the most recent and binding pronouncement on the matter. To quote from
the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: “An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done
before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2)
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and
inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules
of evidences, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and
_______________
28
83 Phil. 242.
29 Ibid, 251.
30 Memorandum of Petitioner, 7-9, 36.
31 In re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., L-32485, October 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 429.
447
VOL. 111, JANUARY 30, 1982 447
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was
lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.”32 Even
the most careful scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The “lawful
protection” to which an accused “has become entitled” is qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can
be argued that the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced.
This is hardly a controversial matter. This Court has spoken in no uncertain terms. In People v. Vilo,33 a
1949 decision, speaking through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Paras, it made clear that seven of the
nine Justices then composing this Court, excepting only the ponente himself and the late Justice Perfecto,
were of the opinion that Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, doing away with the requirement of
unanimity under Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code with eight votes sufficing for the imposition of the
death sentence, does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. For them its applicability to crimes
committed before its enactment would not make the law ex post facto.
5. It may not be amiss to pursue the subject further. The first authoritative exposition of what is
prohibited by the ex post factoclause is found in Mekin v. Wolfe,34 decided in 1903. Thus: “An ex post facto
law has been defined as one—(a) Which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which
was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) Which aggravates a crime or makes it
greater than it was when committed; or (c) Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) Which alters the legal
_______________
32Ibid, 431.
3382 Phil. 524. It is worthy of mention that the then Justice Paras was the sole member of the Court
relying on the 1908 decision, United States v. Gomez, 12 Phil. 279, cited by petitioner.
34 2 Phil. 74.
448
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.”35 There is relevance to the next paragraph
of the opinion of Justice Cooper: “The case clearly does not come within this definition, nor can it be seen
in what way the act in question alters the situation of petitioner to his disadvantage. It gives him, as well
as the Government, the benefit of the appeal, and is intended as furnishing the means for the correction
of errors. The possibility that the judge of the Court of First Instance may commit error in his favor and
wrongfully discharge him appears to be the only foundation for the claim. A person can have no vested
right in such a possibility.”36
6. Mekin v. Wolfe is traceable to Calder v. Bull,37 a 1798 decision of the United States Supreme Court.
Even the very language as to what falls within the category of this provision is well-nigh identical. Thus: “I
will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of the prohibition. 1st.
Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law; and which was innocent when done,
criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the
law annexed to the crime, when committed 4th Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and
receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense,
in order to convict the offender. All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive.” 38 The
opinion of Justice Chase who spoke for the United States Supreme Court went on to state: “The
expressions ‘ex post facto laws,’ are technical, they had been in use long before the Revolution, and had
acquired an appropriate meaning, by legislators, lawyers, and authors. The celebrated and judicious Sir
William Blackstone in his commentaries, considers an ex post facto law precisely in the same light I have
done. His opinion is confirmed by his successor, Mr. Wooddeson; and by the author of the Federalist, who
I esteem superior to both, for his extensive and accurate knowledge of the true principles of
government.”39
7. Petitioner relies on Thompson v. Utah.40 As it was decided by the American Supreme Court in April
of 1898—the very same year when the Treaty of Paris, by virtue of which, American sovereignty over the
Philippines was acquired—it is understandable why he did so. Certainly, the exhaustive opinion of the first
Justice Harlan, as was mentioned by an author, has a cutting edge, but it cuts both ways. It also renders
clear why the obstacles to declaring unconstitutional the challenged Presidential Decree are well-nigh
insuperable. After a review of the previous pronouncements of the American Supreme Court on this
subject, Justice Harlan made this realistic appraisal: “The difficulty is not so much as to the soundness of
the general rule that an accused has no vested right in particular modes of procedure as in determining
whether particular statutes by their operation take from an accused any right that was regarded, at the
time of the adoption of the constitution, as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he
enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him.”41 An 1894 decision of the
American Supreme Court, Duncan v. Missouri42 was also cited by petitioner. The opinion-of the then Chief
Justice Fuller, speaking for the Court, is to the same effect. It was categorically stated that “the prescribing
of different modes of procedure and the abolition of courts and the creation of new ones, leaving
untouched all the substantial protections with which the existing laws surrounds the person accused of
crime, are not considered within the constitutional inhibition.”43
8. Even from the standpoint then of the American decisions relied upon, it cannot be successfully
argued that there is a dilution of the right to appeal. Admittedly under Presidential Decree No. 1486, there
is no recourse to the Court of Appeals, the review coming from this Court. The test as to whether the ex
post facto clause is disregarded, in the language of Justice Harlan in the just-cited Thompson v.
Utah decision taking “from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the
constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the
commission of the offense charged against him.” The crucial words are “vital for the protection of life and
liberty” of a defendant in a criminal case. Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an intermediate
tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the
negative. In the first place, his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court of a division of
respondent Court. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which “the Presiding Justice shall
designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming
a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for
rendering judg-ment.”44 Then if convicted, this Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any
error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner makes much, perhaps
excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no review of the facts. What cannot be
too sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining whether or not to give due course to the petition
for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence45 has been overcome. In
that sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether the
quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied. The standard as to when there is
proof of such weight to justify a conviction is set forth in People v. Dramayo.46 Thus: “Accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law, as synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to
demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their
behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in
existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always
been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both
oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense, is offered by the accused. Only if the judge
below and thereafter the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been
committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of
conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account.
The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for
the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is
required then is moral certainty.”47 This Court has repeatedly reversed convictions on a showing that this
fundamental and basic right to be presumed innocent has been disregarded.48 It does seem farfetched and
highly unrealistic to conclude that the omission of the Court of Appeals as a reviewing authority results in
the loss “vital protection” of liberty.
9. The argument based on denial of due process has much less to recommend it. In the exhaustive
forty-two page memorandum of petitioner, only four and a half pages were devoted to its discussion.
There is the allegation of lack of fairness. Much is made of what is characterized as “the tenor and thrust”
of the leading American Supreme Court decision, Snyder v. Massachusetts.49 Again this citation cuts both
ways. With his usual felicitous choice of words, Justice Cardozo, who penned the opinion, emphasized:
“The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms
of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent
in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept
inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though
due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is
narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true.”50 What is required for compliance with the due
process mandate in criminal proceedings? In Arnault v. Pecson,51 this Court with Justice Tuason
as ponente,succinctly identified it with “a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the
preparation of defense.”52 In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the accused is “informed
as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made to rest
on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being
imposed in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that rendered the decision
is one of competent jurisdiction.”53 The above formulation is a reiteration of what was decided by the
American Supreme Court in a case of Philippine origin, Ong Chang Wing v. United States 54 decided during
the period of American rule, 1910 to be precise. Thus: “This court has had frequent occasion to consider
the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may
be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against
under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him,
with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law,
then he has had due process of law.”55
10. This Court holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a declaration of
unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606. The
decision does not go as far as passing on any question not affecting the right of petitioner to a trial with all
the safeguards of the Constitution. It is true that other Sections of the Decree could have been worded to
avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression
in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from
the dire fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the
powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be contested. It
commends itself for approval. Nor should there be any doubt either that a review by certiorari of a
decision of conviction by the Sandiganbayan calls for strict observance of the constitutional presumption
of innocence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.

[No. 46496. February 27, 1940]
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and proprietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS'
BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC., respondents.
1. 1.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER.—The nature of the Court of Industrial Relations
and of its power is extensively discussed in the decision.
1. 2.ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF LAW.—The Court of Industrial
Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and Commonwealth
Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.
R. No. 46673). The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable
cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.—There are cardinal primary rights which must
be respected even in proceedings of
636
636 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
1. this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it
does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial
Relations should, in all controvercial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; NEW TRIAL GRANTED.—In the light of the foregoing
fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the
record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in
a rational way, a conclusion of law. This result, however, does not now preclude the
concession of a new trial prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The
interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the
hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant
to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and
under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new
trial should be, and the same is hereby, granted, and the entire record of this case shall be
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it re-open the case,
receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth in the decision.
637
VOL. 69, FEBRUARY 27, 1940 537
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
DECISION on motion for reconsideration on motion for new trial.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Union.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case
has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider
the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
1. "1.Que un contrato de trabajo, así individual como colectivo, sin término fijo de duración o que
no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada
vez que llega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios según costumbre en la localidad o
cuando se termine la obra;
2. "2.Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya
colectivamente, con ella, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus trabajos
por haberse declarado paro forzoso en la fábrica en la cual trabajan, dejan de ser empleados
u obreros de la misma;
3. "3.Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus
obreros sin tiempo fijo de duración y sin ser para una obra determinada y que se niega a
readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es
culpable de práctica injusta ni incurre en la sanción penal del artículo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del
Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a
un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado de ser empleados suyos
por terminación del contrato en virtud del paro."
638
638 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgment
rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations
for a new trial, and avers:
1. "1.That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather
soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
 2. "2.That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from
work.
3. "3.That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re
supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent
the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. "4.That the National Workers' Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U. S.,
548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. "5.That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and
elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5,
Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. "6.That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American
origin where industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. "7.That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers'
Brotherhood.
639
VOL. 69, FEBRUARY 27, 1940 539
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
1. "8.That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
2. "9.That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect
that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein."
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor
Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be hereinaf ter stated With ref erence to the motion f
or a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary
to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the
motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in
the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the
nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which
should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the
proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial
evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity.
The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of
contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their
own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary
value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of
its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ
640
640 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of
Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic.
It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or
dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and
tenants or f arm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with,
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance for purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely
to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of
labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and employees or laborers and
between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or
tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to
the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the
Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest.
(Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to
reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section
4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all pertinent facts
related to the industry concerned or to the industries established in a designated locality, with a view to
determining the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting f or such industry or locality a minimum
641
VOL. 69, FEBRUARY 27, 1940 541
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or
tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the
more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific
controversies between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of
executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September
13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained
by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by
any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed
or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award,
order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the
purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing f urther industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section
13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by
the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative
642
642 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:
 1. (1)The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its
language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, -58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any
ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may
requirements of fair play." delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations
2. (2)Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U. S. 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed.
1288.) In the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce
1. (6)The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that
thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the Court of Industrial Relations personally to
3. (3)"While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such
attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental
statutory authority.
principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited
2. (7)The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
4. (4)Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of
the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
Manila vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI 0. G. 1335), but
authority conferred upon it.
the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) "Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind In the light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the
record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual ,basis upon which to predicate, in a rational
way, a conclusion of law.
643
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for by the
VOL. 69, FEBRUARY 27, 1940 643 respondent National Labor Union, Inc. In the portion of the petition hereinabove quoted of the National
Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
645
(Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor
Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National VOL. 69, FEBRUARY 27, 1940 645
Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) * * * The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar
that "the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union, Inc., from work" and this averment
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48
Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers' Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a
Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 S. Ct.
company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are
185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 288, 44 S. Ct. 565,
illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his
569, 68 Law. ed. 1016; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 442, 50 S. Ct. 220, 225, 74
substantial averments "are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence
Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as
they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroboratborated
Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v.National Labor
effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
rendered therein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence pre-sented at the hearing, or at least contained in
and large, after considerable discussion, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would
the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227
be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in
U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them.
created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the
It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that
fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of
and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case,
determining the facts in any
receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements
644
set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
644 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc.
 related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation
VOL. 185, MAY 20, 1990 523
of the basic tenets of fair play.
Non vs. Dames II Same; Same; Same; Enrolment in another school no bar for readmission.—With regard to petitioner
Emmanuel Barba who respondents claim has enrolled in Ago Foundation, such fact alone, if true, will not
G.R. No. 89317. May 20, 1990.*
bar him from seeking readmission in respondent school. Same; Same; Same; Penalty to be imposed on
ARIEL NON, REX MAGANA, ALVIN AGURA, NORMANDY OCCIANO, JORGE DAYAON, LOURDES BANARES,
student for breach of discipline must be commensurate to offense committed.—But the penalty that
BARTOLOME IBASCO, EMMANUEL BARBA, SONNY MORENO, GIOVANI PALMA, JOSELITO VILLALON, LUIS
could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed and, as set forth in Guzman, it
SANTOS, and DANIEL TORRES, petitioners, vs. HON. SANCHO DAMES II, in his capacity as the Presiding
must be imposed only after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with. This is
Judge of 5th Regional Trial Court, Br. 38, Daet, Camarines Norte; and MABINI COLLEGES, INC.,
explicit from the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides in Paragraph 145 that “[n]o
represented by its president ROMULO ADEVA and by the chairman of the Board of Trustees, JUSTO
penalty shall be imposed upon any student, except for cause as defined in this Manual and/or in the
LUKBAN, respondents.
school’s rules and regulations duly promulgated
Schools and Universities; Constitutional Law; Due Process; Imposition of sanctions on students
525
requires observance of procedural due process.—There are withal minimum standards which must be met
to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed VOL. 185, MAY 20, 1990 525
in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer
Non vs. Dames II
the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.” But this matter of disciplinary
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions have become moot and academic. Petitioners,
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
who have been refused readmission or re-enrollment and who have been effectively excluded from
authorities to hear and decide the case. Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the
respondent school for four (4) semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any
offense committed.
breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that,
Same; Same; Contracts; Contracts between school and students not ordinary; It is impressed with
according to respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary
public interest.—The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the “termination of contract” theory. But it
proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the strained relations
must be repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary
between petitioners and the officials of respondent school which necessarily resulted from the heated
contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to
legal battle here, in the Court of Appeals and before the trial court.
education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions.
Same; Same; Same; A school cannot refuse to enrol a student on the simple ground that his MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Concurring:
contract expires every end of a semester.—Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on
Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides that Schools and Universities; Contracts: The “termination of contract” doctrine should be overturned.—
_______________ In other words, I agree with Mme. Justice Cortes that the “termination of contract doctrine” should be
overturned for being a doctrinal error. It is now clear (it was quoted out of context before) that paragraph
*
EN BANC. 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Public Schools falls under Section VII on Tuition and Other Fees and is
524 intended merely to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on installment basis. It
cannot be construed to mean that a student shall be enrolled for only one semester.
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
4 PADILLA, J., Concurring:
Non vs. Dames II
“[w]hen a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling . . . for the entire Schools and Universities; The school may still refuse re-enrollment on other grounds.—It would
semester for collegiate courses,” which the Court in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to refuse indeed appear that, consistent with this constitutional priority given to education, par. 107 of the Manual
enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already of Regulations for Private Schools should be underscored. It provides that every student has the right to
expired. The “termination of contract” theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137 enroll in any school college or university upon meeting its specific requirements and reasonable
merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein regulations; x x x and that “the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire period he
tuition fees are collected and paid on an installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of the is expected to complete the course, without prejudice to his right to transfer.” It should be stressed,
downpayment upon enrollment and the balance before examinations. Thus, even if a student does not however, that this right of students to enroll is not designed to leave schools completely helpless to deny
complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for more than two weeks, he may be enrollment or re-enrollment. For, par. 107 itself of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools still
required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is given his credentials for transfer. recognizes the right of the school to refuse enrollment in case of academic deficiency or violation of
Same; Same; Same; Exclusion of a student for academic deficiency where the real cause of action disciplinary regulations of the school.
for doing so is related to possible breach of discipline—staging of a mass action and rally—violates tenets 526
of fair play.—On the other hand, it does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the 526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
manner expressed in Guzman, before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear from the
pleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere Non vs. Dames II
afterthought. It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student mass
actions conducted in February 1988 and which were led and/or participated in by petitioners. Certainly, SARMIENTO, J., Concurring:
excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably
 Schools and Universities; Mere fact that student rally disrupted classes is not a ground for
imposition of disciplinary action.—To be sure, the school may punish students for breach of discipline, as,
say, for breaking chairs or window panes or for disrupting classes in the course of a demonstration, but
they may be penalized for those actions alone and not because of the content of their speech or the
vociferousness with which it was said. Moreover, violations of school discipline must be judged on a case
to case basis and measured depending on gravity before school authorities may legitimately act. I do not
think that the fact that a demonstration has disrupted ongoing classes is a ground for penalizing students
taking part therein because a demonstration, from its very nature, is likely to disrupt classes. The school
must convincingly show that the demonstrators had deliberately turned to lawlessness, say, by barricading
the schoolgate or the classroom entrances or otherwise prevented non-demonstrating students or
members of the faculty from attending a class or finishing one by threats or intimidation. Only in that
sense may school heads validly invoke “disruption of classes.”
PETITION for certiorari to review the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, Br. 38.
Dames II, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Antonio A. Ayo, Jr. and Soliman M. Santos, Jr. for petitioners.
Pedro A. Venida, Agustin A. Ferrer and Gil F. Echaro for private respondents.
CORTÉS, J.:
Petitioners urge the Court en banc to review and reverse the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, et al. v.
Philippine School of Business Administration, et al., G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988, 161 SCRA 7, to the effect
that a college student, once admitted by the school, is considered enrolled only for one semester and,
hence, may be refused readmission after the semester is over, as the contract between the student and
the school is deemed terminated.
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not
allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or par-
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ticipating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests
is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quo seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school,
but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated August 8, 1988; the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the fact that the ruling in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA is exactly on the
point at issue in this case but affirming the authority of the school regarding admission of students, save as
a matter of compassionate equity—when any of the petitioners would, at the least, qualify for re-
enrolment, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 12-A.]
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on February 24, 1989 in this
wise:
Perhaps many will agree with the critical comment of Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., and that really there must be
a better way of treating students and teachers than the manner ruled (not suggested) by the Supreme
Court, the Termination of Contract at the end of the semester, that is.
But applicable rule in this case is that enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Sophia Alcuaz,
et al. vs. Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), et al., G.R. No. 76353,
May 2, 1988; that of the termination at the end of the semester, reason for the critical comments of
Joaquin G. Bernas, and Doods Santos, who both do not agree with the ruling.
Petitioners’ claim of lack of due process cannot prosper in view of their failure to specifically deny
respondent’s affirmative defenses that “they were given all the chances to air their grievances on February
9, 10, 16, and 18, 1988, and also on February 22, 1988 during which they were represented by Atty. Jose L.
Lapak” and that on February 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of classes at Mabini College, petitioners
continued their rally picketing, even though without any renewal permit, physically coercing students not
to attend their classes, thereby disrupting the scheduled classes and depriving a great majority of students
of their right to be present in their classes.
Against this backdrop, it must be noted that the petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for
re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form
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528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Non vs. Dames II
for the first semester of school year 1988-89. Said form specifically states that:
The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance
are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or
whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students,
therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline.
In addition, for the same semester, petitioners duly signed pledges which among others uniformly reads:
In consideration of my admission to the Mabini College and of my privileges as student of this institution, I
hereby pledge/ promise under oath to abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by
competent authorities in the College Department or School in which I am enrolled. Specifically:
xxx
3. I will respect my Alma Mater, the Mabini College, which I represent and see to it that I conduct
myself in such a manner that the college will not be put to a bad light;
xxx
9. I will not release false or unauthorized announcement which tend to cause confusion or disrupt the
normal appreciation of the college.
Moreover, a clear legal right must first be established for a petition for mandamus to prosper (Sec. 3,
Rule 65). It being a mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or reenrolled,
respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the
academic freedom enjoyed by the school in accordance with the Supreme Court rulings in the cases
of Garcia vs. Faculty [Admission Committee] (G.R. No. 40779, November 28, 1975) and Tangonon vs. Pano,
et al. (L-45157, June 27, 1985).
WHEREFORE, premises and jurisprudence considered, and for lack of merit, the motion for
reconsideration of the order of this Court dated August 8, 1988 is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, pp. 15-16.]
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction.
The case was originally assigned to the Second Division of the
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Court, which resolved on April 10, 1989 to refer the case to the Court of Appeals for proper determination
and disposition. The Court of Appeals ordered respondents to comment on the petition and set the
application for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for hearing. After considering the
comment and hearing the injunction application, the Court of Appeals resolved on May 22, 1989 to certify
the case back to the Supreme Court considering that only pure questions of law were raised.
The case was assigned to the Third Division of the Court, which then transferred it to the Court en
banc on August 21, 1989 considering that the issues raised are jurisdictional. On September 14, 1989, the
Court en banc accepted the case and required respondents to comment.
Respondents filed their comment on November 13, 1989. Petitioners were required to reply. As reply,
they filed a pleading entitled “Counter-Comment,” to which respondents filed a rejoinder entitled “Reply
to Counter-Comment.” To this, petitioners filed a “Rejoinder to Reply.”
The issues having been joined, the case was deemed submitted.
 At the heart of the controversy is the doctrine encapsuled in the following excerpt from Alcuaz:
It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester. It
is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student
registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in
the Manual, that the “written contracts” required for college teachers are for “one semester.” It is thus
evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either
with the students or with the intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due
process is untenable. It is a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the
contracting parties (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72456, February 19, 1987,
citing: Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 197). The contract
having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter
into another contract with said students and teachers. “The courts, be they the original trial court or the
appellate court,
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530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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have no power to make contracts for the parties.” (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., supra).
[At 161 SCRA 17-18; Italics supplied.]
In Alcuaz, the Second Division of the Court dismissed the petition filed by the students, who were barred
from re-enrolling after they led mass assemblies and put up barricades, but it added that “in the light of
compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to
graduate during the school year when this petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to
graduate in due time.” [At 161 SCRA 22.] Mr. Justice Sarmiento dissented from the majority opinion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the dismissed teachers in Alcuaz. The students did not
move for reconsideration. The Court en banc, to which the case had been transferred, denied the motion
for reconsideration in a Resolution dated September 29, 1989, but added as an obiter dictum:
In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right of students to complete their education
in the school or university of their choice, and while We fully respect their right to resort to rallies and
demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and as part of their freedom of speech and their right
to assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must always be conducted peacefully, and
without resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence. Academic freedom in all its forms, demands the full
display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be to subvert freedom into degenerate license.
The majority’s failure to expressly repudiate the “termination of contract” doctrine enunciated in the
decision provoked several dissents on that issue. Although seven (7) members of the Court**disagreed
with the Second Division’s dismissal of the students’ petition, a definitive ruling on the issue could not
have been made because no timely motion for reconsideration was filed by the students. (As stated
above, the motion for
_______________
** Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, Mr. Justice Narvasa, Mme. Justice Herrera, Mr. Justice Cruz, Mr. Justice
Feliciano, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, and Mme. Justice Cortés.
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reconsideration was filed by the dismissed teachers.)
Be that as it may, the reassessment of the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, insofar as it allowed schools
to bar the readmission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of termination of contract, shall be
made in this case where the issue is squarely raised by petitioners [Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 5].
Initially, the case at bar must be put in the proper perspective. This is not a simple case of a school
refusing readmission or re-enrollment of returning students. Undisputed is the fact that the refusal to
readmit or re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school authorities as a reaction to
student mass actions directed against the school. Petitioners are students of respondent school who, after
leading and participating in student protests, were denied readmission or re-enrollment for the next
semester. This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by students vis-a-vis
the right of school officials to discipline them.
Thus, although respondent judge believed himself bound by the ruling in Alcuaz [Order dated August
8, 1988; Rollo, pp. 12-12-A], he actually viewed the issue as a conflict between students’ rights and the
school’s power to discipline them, to wit:
Students should not be denied their constitutional and statutory right to education, and there is such
denial when students are expelled or barred from enrollment for the exercise of their right to free speech
and peaceable assembly and/or subjected to disciplinary action without abiding with the requirements of
due process. Also, it is understandable for student leaders to let loose extremely critical and, at times,
vitriolic language against school authorities during a student rally.
But the right of students is no license and not without limit . . . . [Order of February 24, 1989; Rollo, p.
13.]
1. The Student Does Not Shed His Constitutionally Protected Rights at the Schoolgate.
Central to the democratic tradition which we cherish is the recognition and protection of the rights of
free speech and assembly. Thus, our Constitution provides:
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Non vs. Dames II
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. [Art. III.]
This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar provision was found in the 1973
Constitution, as amended [Art. VI, sec. 9], the 1935 Constitution, as amended [Art. III, sec. 8], the
Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) [Sec. 3, para. 13], and the Philippine Bill of 1902 [Sec. 15, para. 13].
Thus, as early as 1907, the Court in People v. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422, upheld the right to speech and
assembly to overturn a conviction for sedition. It said:
Section 5 of the Act No. 292 is as follows:
All persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain by force or outside of legal methods any
of the following objects are guilty of sedition:
xxx
2. To prevent the Insular Government, or any provincial or municipal government or any public
official, from freely exercising its or his duties or the due execution of any judicial or administrative order.
But this law must not be interpreted so as to abridge “the freedom of speech” or “the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances” guaranteed by the express
provisions of section 5 of “the Philippine Bill.”
xxx
It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to
protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought
to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less
perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the
prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members
of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the
authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion
and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable
manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if
the pur-
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Non vs. Dames II
poses which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If
instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and
punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly
and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising. [At pp.
424, 426.]
That the protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is
similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. In the leading case of Malabanan v.
Ramento, G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359, the Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Fernando in an en bancdecision, declared:
xxx
4. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so.
They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts
to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the
opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, “shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” While, therefore, the authority of
educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be
violative of constitutional safeguards. [At pp. 367-368.]
The facts in Malabanan are only too familiar in the genre of cases involving student mass actions:
. . . Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent [Gregorio Araneta] University.
They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to
12:00 P.M. on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general
assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not
in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested
in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal
Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the Life
Science building and continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They continued
their demonstration, giving utterance to lan-
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534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Non vs. Dames II
guage severely critical of the University authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a
result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing distance,
stopped their work because of the noise created. They were asked to explain on the same day why they
should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed
through a memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the
holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged by
petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus with damages
against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports. On October 20,
1982, respondent Ramento, as Director of the National Capital Region, found petitioners guilty of the
charge of having violated par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more specifically their holding of an
illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the
disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. . . . [At pp.
363-364.]
The Court found the penalty imposed on the students too severe and reduced it to a one-week
suspension.
The rule laid down in Malabanan was applied with equal force in three other en banc decisions of the
Court.
In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines, G.R. No. 69198, April 17, 1985, 135 SCRA 706, the
Court reiterated that the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis for barring students
from enrolling. It enjoined the school and its officials from acts of surveillance, blacklisting, suspension and
refusal to re-enroll. But the Court allowed the non-enroll-ment of students who clearly incurred marked
academic deficiency, with the followingcaveat:
xxx
4. The academic freedom enjoyed by “institutions of higher learning” includes the right to set
academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of
students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be
utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus
prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause
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Non vs. Dames II
being disregarded. [At p. 711].
In Arreza v. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, G.R. No. 62297, June 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 94, a case
arising from almost the same facts as those in Malabanan, the Court rejected “the infliction of the highly-
disproportionate penalty of denial of enrollment and the consequent failure of senior students to
graduate, if in the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly, improper conduct
could be attributed to them.” [At p. 98].
In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699, respondent school
was directed to allow the petitioning students to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their respective
courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings that may be conducted in connection with their
participation in the protests that led to the stoppage of classes.
2. Permissible Limitations on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights Within the School.
While the highest regard must be afforded the exercise of the rights to free speech and assembly, this
should not be taken to mean that school authorities are virtually powerless to discipline students. This was
made clear by the Court in Malabanan, when it echoed Tinker v. Des Moines Community School
District, 393 US 503, 514: “But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—whether
it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech.”
Thus, in Malabanan, the Court said:
xxx
8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired.
Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that
specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the VMAS building of the
University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed. According to the decision of
respondent Ramento, the “concerted activity [referring to such assem-
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536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Non vs. Dames II
bly] went on until 5:30 p.m.” Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. . . . [At pp. 370-371].
But, as stated in Guzman, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due
process. Thus:
. . . There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall
have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
[At pp. 706-707].
Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed. As stated in Malabanan,
“[i]f the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and sanction imposed is not followed,
an element of arbitrariness intrudes.” [At p. 371].
3. Circumventing Established Doctrine.
Malabanan was decided by the Court in 1984. Since then, student mass actions have escalated not
only because of political events that unfurled but also because of the constantly raging controversy over
increases in tuition fees. But the overeager hands of some school authorities were not effectively tied
down by the ruling in Malabanan. Instead of suspending or expelling student leaders who fell into disfavor
with school authorities, a new variation of the same stratagem was adopted by the latter: refusing the
students readmission or re-enrollment on grounds not related to, their alleged “misconduct” of “illegal
assembly” in leading or participating in student mass actions directed against the school. Thus, the spate
of expulsions or exclusions due to “academic deficiency.”
4. The Nature of the Contract Between a School and its Student.
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Non vs. Dames II
The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the “termina-tion of contract” theory. But it must be
repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract.
It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and
the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions [See Art. XIV,
secs. 1-2, 4(1)].
Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools, which provides that “[w]hen a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is
enrolling . . . for the entire semester for collegiate courses,” which the Court in Alcuaz construed as
authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term
of one semester, has already expired.
The “termination of contract” theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137
merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein
tuition fees are collected and paid on an installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of the
downpayment upon enrollment and the balance before examinations. Thus, even if a student does not
complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for more than two weeks, he may be
required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is given his credentials for transfer. This
is the import of Paragraph 137, subsumed under Section VII on Tuition and Other Fees, which in its totality
provides:
137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire school year for
elementary and secondary courses, and for the entire semester for collegiate courses. A student who
transfers or otherwise withdraws, in writing, within two weeks after the beginning of classes and who has
already paid the pertinent tuition and other school fees in full or for any length of time longer than one
month may be charged ten per cent of the total amount due for the term if he withdraws within the first
week of classes, or twenty per cent if within the second week of classes, regardless of whether or not he
has actually attended classes. The student may be charged all the school fees in full if he withdraws
anytime after the second week of classes. However, if the transfer or withdrawal is due to a justifiable
reason, the student shall be charged the pertinent fees only up to and
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538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Non vs. Dames II
including the last month of attendance.
Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall be enrolled for only one
semester, and that after that semester is over his re-enrollment is dependent solely on the sound
discretion of the school. On the contrary, the Manual recognizes the right of the student to be enrolled in
his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it. Thus, Paragraph 107 states:
Every student has the right to enrol in any school, college or university upon meeting its specific
requirement and reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the case of academic delinquency and
violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is presumed to be qualified for enrolment for the entire
period he is expected to complete his course without prejudice to his right to transfer.
This “presumption” has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the “Education Act of
1982.” Section 9 of this act provides:
SEC. 9. Rights of Students in School.—In addition to other rights, and subject to the limitations prescribed
by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following rights:
xxx
2. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their
course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary
regulations.
xxx
5. Academic Freedom Not a Ground for Denying Students’ Rights.
Respondent judge, in his order dated February 24, 1989, stated that “respondent Mabini College is
free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by
the school” [Rollo, p. 16]. To support this conclusion, he cited the cases of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, G.R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277, and Tangonan
v. Pano, G.R.
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No. L-45157, June 27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245, where the Court emphasized the institutions’ discretion on the
admission and enrollment of students as a major component of the academic freedom guaranteed to
institutions of higher learning.
These cases involve different facts and issues. In Garcia, the issue was whether a female lay student
has a clear legal right to compel a seminary for the priesthood to admit her for theological studies leading
to a degree. In Tangonan, the issue was whether a nursing student, who was admitted on probation and
who has failed in her nursing subjects, may compel her school to readmit her for enrollment.
Moreover, respondent judge loses sight of the Court’s unequivocal statement in Villar that the right
of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discriminate against
students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a
violation of their right to equal protection [At p. 711].
6. Capitol Medical Center and Licup.
In support of the action taken by respondent judge, private respondents cite the recent cases
of Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82499, October 13, 1989, and Licup v.
University of San Carlos, G.R. No. 85839, October 19, 1989, both decided by the First Division of the Court.
We find the issues raised and resolved in these two decisions dissimilar from the issues in the present
case.
In Capitol Medical Center, the Court upheld the decision of the school authorities to close down the
school because of problems emanating from a labor dispute between the school and its faculty. The Court
ruled that the students had no clear legal right to demand the reopening of the school.
On the other hand, in Licup the issue resolved was whether or not the students were afforded
procedural due process before disciplinary action was taken against them. Thus, the Court stated:
The Court finds no cogent basis for the protestations of petitioners that they were deprived of due process
of law and that the investigation conducted was far from impartial and fair. On the
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Non vs. Dames II
contrary, what appears from the record is that the charges against petitioners were adequately
established in an appropriate investigation. The imputation of bias and partiality is not supported by the
record. . . .
Moreover, Licup, far from adopting the “termination of contract” theory in Alcuaz, impliedly rejected it, to
wit:
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an
educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the
concommitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.
True, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to
complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline
or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court should
not review the discretion of university authorities. (Italics supplied.)
7. The Instant Case.
To justify the school’s action, respondents, in their Comment dated November 12, 1989, quoting from
their answer filed in the trial court, allege that of the thirteen (13) petitioners eight (8) have incurred
failing grades, to wit:
1. a)Ariel Non has not only failed in four (4) subjects but also failed to cause the submission of
Form 137 which is a pre-requisite to his reenrollment and to his continuing as a student of
Mabini;
 2. b)Rex Magana not only has failed in one (1) subject but also has incomplete grades in four (4)
subjects as well as no grades in two (2) subjects;
3. c)Elvin Agura failed in two (2) subjects and has three (3) incomplete grades;
4. d)Emmanuel Barba has failed in one (1) subject, and has to still take CMT 11 to 22. He is already
enrolled at Ago Foundation;
5. e)Joselito Villalon has incomplete grades in nine (9) subjects;
6. f)Luis Santos has failed in one (1) subject;
7. g)George Dayaon has failed in four (4) subjects and has to remove the incomplete grade in one
(1) subject;
8. h)Daniel Torres has failed in five (5) subjects, has to remove incomplete grades in five (5) more
subjects, and has no grade in one (1) subject. [Rollo, p. 79.]
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Petitioners have not denied this, but have countered this allegation as follows:
xxx
(11) Petitioners were and are prepared to show, among others, that:
1. a)Three of the 13 of them were graduating. (Admitted in the Answer.)
2. b)Their academic deficiencies, if any, do not warrant non-read-mission. (The Answer indicates
only 8 of the 13 as with deficiencies.)
3. c)Their breach of discipline, if any, was not serious.
4. d)The improper conduct attributed to them was during the exercise of the cognate rights of
free speech and peaceable assembly, particularly a February 1988 student rally. (The crux of
the matter, as shown even in the Answer.)
5. e)There was no due investigation that could serve as basis for disciplinary action. (In effect,
admitted in the Answer; even Alcuaz required due process.)
6. f)Respondents admit students with worse deficiencies—a clear case of discrimination against
petitioners for their role in the student rally. (An equal protection question.)
7. g)Respondent school is their choice institution near their places of residence which they can
afford to pay for tertiary education, of which they have already lost one-and-a-half school-
years—in itself punishment enough. [Rollo, p. 86].
Clearly, the five (5) students who did not incur failing marks, namely, Normandy Occiano, Lourdes Banares,
Bartolome Ibasco, Sonny Moreno and Giovani Palma, were refused reenrollment without just cause and,
hence, should be allowed to re-enroll.
On the other hand, it does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the manner
expressed in Guzman, before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear from the pleadings
that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought. It is not
denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student mass actions conducted in
February 1988 and which were led and/or participated in by petitioners. Certainly, excluding students
because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them undeniably related to possible
breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also
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Non vs. Dames II
constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play.
Moreover, of the eight (8) students with failing grades, some have only one or two failures, namely,
Rex Magana, Elvin Agura, Emmanuel Barba, and Luis Santos. Certainly, their failures cannot be considered
marked academic deficiency within the context of the Court’s decision in Villar.
Then, as to the students who incurred several failing grades, namely, Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon,
George (Jorge) Dayaon, and Daniel Torres, it is not clear from respondents’ enumeration whether the
failures were incurred in only one semester or through the course of several semesters of study in the
school. Neither are the academic standards of respondent school, from which we can gauge whether or
not these students are academically deficient, alleged by respondents. Thus, while the prerogative of
schools to set academic standards is recognized, we cannot affirm respondent school’s action as to
petitioners Non, Villalon, Dayaon and Torres because of insufficient information.
With regard to petitioner Emmanuel Barba who respondents claim has enrolled in Ago Foundation,
such fact alone, if true, will not bar him from seeking readmission in respondent school.
However, these should not be taken to mean that no disciplinary action could have been taken
against petitioners for breach of discipline if the facts had so warranted. In line with the Court’s ruling
in Malabanan, petitioners could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the
February 1988 mass actions. But the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the
offense committed and, as set forth in Guzman, it must be imposed only after the requirements of
procedural due process have been complied with. This is explicit from the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools, which provides in Paragraph 145 that “[n]o penalty shall be imposed upon any student,
except for cause as defined in this Manual and/or in the school’s rules and regulations duly promulgated
and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.”
But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions have
become moot and academic. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or reenrollment and who
have been effectively excluded from re-
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Non vs. Dames II
spondent school for four (4) semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach
of discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that,
according to respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary
proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the strained relations
between petitioners and the officials of respondent school which necessarily resulted from the heated
legal battle here, in the Court of Appeals and before the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated August 8, 1988 and
February 24, 1989 are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED to readmit and to allow
the re-enrollment of petitioners, if they are still so minded, without prejudice to its taking the appropriate
action as to petitioners Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if it is shown
by their records (Form 137) that they have failed to satisfy the school’s prescribed academic standards.
SO ORDERED.