Walter E. Olsen vs.

Vicente Aldanese, as Insular Collector of Customs of the petitioner seeks to export is a product of the Philippine Islands, but it is
the Philippine Islands, and W. for the Collector of Internal
Trinidad, as Collector of Internal Revenue Revenue to exercise the power of issuing said certificate if after an inspection
of said tobacco, he should
43 Phil 64 / GR No. L-18740, 28 April 28, 1922, J. Johns
find that "it conforms to the conditions required by Administrative order No.
35 with the exclusion of
FACTS:
those conditions which, according to the said decision of the Supreme
The Philippine Legislature passed on February 4, 1916, Act No. 2613 entitled Courts, the Collector of Internal
"an act to improve the
Revenue is not authorized to require under Act No. 2613."
methods of production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to
develop the export trade
ISSUES:
therein." They empower the Collector of Internal Revenue to establish certain
general and local rules 1.Whether the decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue is wrong; and
respecting the classification, marking, and parking of tobacco for domestic 2.Whether the court has jurisdiction over this case.
sale or for exportation to the
United States. Under the provisions of Act No. 2613, the Collector of Internal
Revenue of the Philippine
Islands promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco RULING:
Inspections Regulations."
For the first issue, yes. It appears from the whole purport and tenor of the
The petitioner applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for a certificate of answer that, in their refusal,
origin covering a
the defendants were acting under, and relying upon, those portions of
consignment of 10,000 machine-made cigars to San Francisco, and Administrative Order No. 35,
represented that the cigars were
known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations," which this court has held in a
made from short-filler tobacco which was not the product of Cagayan, former opinion to be null and
Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya. The
void
Collector of Internal Revenue did not deem it necessary to make an actual
examination and inspection
For the second issue, yes. Although in this class of cases, as a general rule, a
of said cigars, and stated to the petitioner that he did not see his way clear to
demand and refusal are
the granting of
prerequisites to the granting of a writ, it is not necessary where it appears
petitioner's request, in view of the fact that the cigars which the petitioner
from the record that the
was seeking to export were
demand, if made, would have been refused. By the express terms and
not made with long-filler nor were they made from tobacco exclusively the
provisions of such rules and
product of any of the three
regulations promulgated by the Collector of Internal Revenue, it was his duty
provinces, as provided in Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco
to refuse petitioner's
Inspection Regulations," and
request, and decline the certificate or origin, because the cigars tendered
the said cigars were neither inspected nor examined by the said officer.
were not of the specified kind,
Respondents allege that under section 11 of Act No. 2613 and section 5 of
and we have a right to assume that he performed his official duty as the
the Administrative Code of
understood it. After such
1917, the Collector of Internal Revenue has discretionary power to decide
refusal and upon such grounds, it would indeed, have been a vain and
whether the manufactured
useless thing for the Collector of
tobacco that the petitioner seeks to export to the United States fulfills the
Internal Revenue to examine or inspect the cigars. Having refused to issue
requisites prescribed by
the certificate of origin for
Administrative Order No. 35. That it is not within the jurisdiction of this
the reason above assigned, it is very apparent that a request to examine or
court to order the Collector of
inspect the cigars would also
Internal Revenue to issue a certificate to the petitioner to the effect that the
have been refused.
manufactured tobacco that
Petition is granted.
G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HERMIE M. JACINTO,
Facts:
Appellant Hermie Jacinto was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
rape of the then 5-year-old victim. The crime was committed when appellant
was only 17; Judgment was rendered when appellant was already 25.
Issue:
Whether or not, appellant may benefit from the provisions of RA9344
regarding criminal liability of an accused who was a minor during the
commission of the crime and the suspension of sentence of one who is no
longer a minor during the pronouncement of verdict.
Held:
The Court sustained the conviction of the appellant in view of the
straightforward testimony of the victim and the inconsistencies of the
testimonies of the defense witnesses.
The Court did not exempt accused of his criminal liability although he was
only 17 during the commission of the crime since, in view of the
circumstances to which accused committed the felony, it was proved that he
acted with discernment. (Sec 6, RA 9344). There was showing that the
accused understood the consequences of his action.
Applying, the provision of RA 9346, the accused was meted with reclusion
perpetua instead of the death penalty.
As to the civil liability of accused, his minority also had no bearing to the
decision of the Court, ordering accused to pay the victim for damages.
However, the Court afforded the accused the benefit of the suspension of his
sentence provided in Section38 of RA 9344, which made no distinction to an
accused found guilty of a capital offense. The Court stated that what was
important was the intent of the Act to uphold the welfare of a child in conflict
with the law. What was to be considered was the fact that accused committed
the crime at a tender age.
The Court held that accused may be confined in an agricultural camp or any
training facility in accordance with Sec 51 of RA 9344. The case was
remanded to the court of origin to take appropriate action in accordance to
the said provision.
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs AGRAVA
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
FACTS:
Herein petitioner filed for prohibition and injunction against respondent
Agrava, the Director of Philippines Patent Office due to a circular the latter
issued scheduling an examination for determining who are qualified to
practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
Petitioner contended that one who has passed the bar examinations and is
licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is
in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent
Office, and that Agrava is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of
the law for requiring such examination as condition precedent before
members of the bar may be allowed to represent applicants in the
preparation and prosecution of applications for patents. Undaunted, Agrava
argued that that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or
purely the practice of law and that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the
Patent Office from requiring further condition or qualification from those who
would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office.
ISSUE:
Whether appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the
practice of law
HELD:
Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office,
the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the
enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Although the transaction of
business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical
and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be
rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including
the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance
with law. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles,
practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and
experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
As stated in 5 Am. Jur,
“The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and
in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions.”
The Supreme Court ruled that under the present law, members of the
Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, and in good
standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, since much
of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of
the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as
well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of
the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so
that appeals from his orders and decisions are, taken to the Supreme Court.
TOLEDO V CSC and COMELEC
29JAN
202 SCRA 507 | October 4, 1991 | J. Paras
Facts:
Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon
Felipe as Manager of the Education and Information Department of the
Comelec on May 1986, at which time Toledo was already more than 57 years
old. Toledo’s appointment papers and his oath of office were endorsed by the
Comelec to the CSC on June 1986 for approval and attestation. However, no
prior request for exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of
the CSRPAP—which prohibits the appointment of persons 57 years old or
above into government service without prior CSC approval—was secured.
Petitioner then reported for work.
Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required under CSRPAP,
and CSC Memo Circular 5 issued Resolution No. 2066, which declared void
from the beginning Toledo’s appointment. Petitioner appealed to CSC, which
considered him a de facto officer and his appointment voidable, and moved
for reconsideration but was denied, hence the present petition for certiorari.
Issue:
W/N CSRPAP provision is valid
Held:
No. The Civil Service Act of 959 (RA 2260), which established the CSC,
contained no provision prohibiting appointment or reinstatement into
government service of any person already 57 years old. Sec 5 Rule 6 of the
Revised Civil Service Rules, which prohibits such, was purely the creation of
CSC.
Marcos’s PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which established a new CSC and
superseded RA 2260, also provided that rules and regulations shall become
effective only 30 days after publication in the OG or in any newspaper of
general circulation. The new CSC adopted the CSRPAP . No provision re
prohibition of appointment of 57 year old made in PD 807; prohibition was
purely created by CSC.
The provision cannot be valid, being entirely a CSC creation, it has no basis
in the law which it was meant to implement. It cannot be justified as a valid
exercise of its function of promulgating rules and regulations for that
function, to repeat, may legitimately be exercised only for the purpose of
carrying the provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no prohibition
or restriction on the employment of 57-year old persons in the statute—or
any provision respecting age as a factor in employment—there was nothing to
carry into effect through an implementing rule on the matter. The power
vested in the CSC was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to
it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions
in it.
Additionally, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the
application to Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules
were never published as required by both RA 2260 and PD 807. The
argument that it was a “mere reiteration of existing law” and “circularized”
cannot stand as formerly discussed.
Also, Toledo’s separation from service was through no fault of his
own. Petition granted.
Commissioner on Internal Revenue V. Court of Tax Appeals
Facts
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue V. Manila Hotel Corporation, SC
overruled Court of Tax Appeals decision that caterer’s tax under RA 6110 is
illegal because it was vetoed by Former President Marcos and Congress had
not taken steps to override the veto. SC ruled in this case that the law has
always imposed a 3% caterer’s tax, as provided in Par 1, Sec 206 of the Tax
Code.
Presently, Manila Golf and Country Club, a non-stock corporation claims
that it is exempt from the 3% on gross receipts because President Marcos
vetoed Sec 191-A of RA 6110 (Omnibus Tax Law). President Marcos vetoed
Sec 191-A because according to him it would 1) shift the burden of taxation
to the consuming public and 2) restrain the development of hotels which are
essential to the tourist industry. The protestation of the club was denied by
petitioners saying that Sec 42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the words
“hotels, motels, resthouses.” House of Ways and Means concurred with
petitioners stating that veto message only seems to object with certain
portions of 191-A and that can be gleaned by the reasons given by the
President.
Issue
WON veto referred to the entire section or merely the 20% tax on gross
receipts of operators and proprietors of eating places within hotels, motels
and resthouses.
Held and Ratio
President does not have the power to repeal an existing tax. Therefore, he
could not have repealed the 2% caterer’s tax.
CTA agreed with respondent club that president vetoed only a certain part.
CTA mentioned that President can veto only an entire item, and not just
words. The President intentionally only vetoed a few words in Sec 191-A.
Assuming that the veto could not apply to just one provision but all would Name Position/ Nature of Participation in the
render the Presidential veto void and still in favor of petitioner. Designation Transaction
Inclusion of “hotels, motels, resthouses” in the 20% caterer’s tax bracket are
items. President has the right to veto such item, that which is subject to tax 1. Josefina A. Department Approving Officer
and tax rate. It does not refer to an entire section. To construe item as an Sarsonas Manager
entire section would be to tie his hands to either completely agree with a
section he has objections with or to disagree with an entire section where he
only has a portion he disagrees with. 2. Francis S. CLOO Recommending Approval
Manalad

3. Alberto B. Acting Auditor

PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE
(PCSO), Petitioner, v. CHAIRPERSON MA. GRACIA M. PULIDO-TAN,
COMMISSIONER HEIDI L. MENDOZA, COMMISSIONER ROWENA V.
GUANZON, THE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT
(COA), Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules
of Court (Rules) seeks to annul and set aside the June 5, 2014 Decision1 and
December 22, 2014 Resolution2 of the Commission on Audit (COA)
Commission Proper, which affirmed the notice of disallowance on the cost of
living allowance received by the officials and employees of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office-Nueva Ecija Provincial District Office in 2010.
Created by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1169,3 as amended by Presidential Decree
(P.O.) No. 11574 and Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 42,5 the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) is the principal government agency for raising and
providing funds for health programs, medical assistance and services, and
charities of national character. On March 4, 2008, the PCSO Board of
Directors, through Resolution No. 135, approved the payment of monthly
cost of living allowance (COLA) to its officials and employees for a period of
three (3) years in accordance with the Collective Negotiation Agreement.
Pursuant thereto, in 2010, the PCSO released the sum of P381,545.43 to all
qualified officials and employees of its Nueva Ecija Provincial District Office.
A year after, on March 19, 2011, Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.
confirmed the benefits and incentives provided for in Resolution No. 135, but
with a directive to the PCSO to strictly abide by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 7
that imposed a moratorium on any grant of new or increase in the salaries
and incentives until specifically authorized by the President.6
On post audit, the Team Leader and Supervising Auditor of the PCSO-Nueva
Ecija Provincial District Office issued Notice of Disallowance (ND) 11-001-
101-(10)7 dated May 16, 2011 invalidating the payment of P381,545.43 on
the grounds that it is contrary to the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) Circular No. 2001-03 dated November 12, 2001 and it amounts to
double compensation that is prohibited under the 1987 Constitution. Those
found liable for the disallowed disbursement were:
Pertinente
5. Mary Ann T. Acting SLOO Certifies Cash Available
Baltazar
6. Moriel C. Cashier II Issued Check8
Blanco
The PCSO appealed, but the COA Regional Director affirmed the disallowance
in a Decision9 dated September 6, 2012. Similarly, the COA Commission
Proper denied the petition for review and motion for reconsideration of PCSO.
Hence, this petition contending that:
1. The PCSO Board of Directors is authorized under Sections 6 and 9 of
R.A. No. 1169, as amended, to fix salaries and to determine
allowances, bonuses, and other incentives of its officers and
employees;
2. Executive Secretary Ochoa, Jr. approved the grant of benefits and
incentives previously given to the PCSO officials and employees and
such post facto approval/ratification by the Office of the President is
enshrined in Article VII Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution in
relation to Book III Section 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987 as
well as recognized by the Supreme Court in Cruz v. Commission on
Audit10 and GSIS v. Commission on Audit;11
3. The disallowance of COLA violates the principle of non-diminution of
benefits because the PCSO officials and employees already acquired
vested rights over the same for having been a part of their
compensation for a considerable length of time; and
4. The recipients of the disallowed amounts need not return the COLA
received since they are in good faith for lack of knowledge at the time
that the same lacked legal basis.
During the pendency of the case, the COA issued an Order of
Execution12 dated July 3, 2015 directing to withhold the payment of salaries
or any amount due the five above-named officials as settlement of their
liabilities. Arguing that these employees were discriminated against and were
denied due process, the PCSO filed a Petition for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO).13 On August 25, 2015, the Court merely noted the
prayer for TRO.
The petition is denied. No grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction could be attributed to the COA.
Authority of the PCSO
The PCSO stresses that it is a self-sustaining government instrumentality
which generates its own fund to support its operations and does not depend
on the national government for its budgetary support. Thus, it enjoys certain
latitude to establish and grant allowances and incentives to its officers and
employees.
We do not agree. Sections 6 and 9 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended, cannot be
relied upon by the PCSO to grant the COLA. Section 6 merely states, among
others, that fifteen percent (15%) of the net receipts from the sale of
sweepstakes tickets (whether for sweepstakes races, lotteries, or other similar
activities) shall be set aside as contributions to the operating expenses and
capital expenditures of the PCSO. Also, Section 9 loosely provides that among
the powers and functions of the PCSO Board of Directors is "to fix the
salaries and determine the reasonable allowances, bonuses and other
incentives of its officers and employees as may be recommended by the
General Manager x x x subject to pertinent civil service and compensation
laws." The PCSO charter evidently does not grant its Bioard the unbridled
authority to set salaries and allowances of officials and employees. On the
contrary, as a government owned and/or controlled corporation (GOCC), it
was expressly covered by P.D. No. 985 or "The Budgetary Reform Decree on
Compensation and Position Classification of 1976," and its 1978 amendment,
P.D. No. 1597 {Further Rationalizing the System of Compensation and Position
Classification in the National Government), and mandated to comply with the
rules of then Office of Compensation and Position Classification (OCPC)
under the DBM.14
Even if it is assumed that there is an explicit provision exempting the PCSO
from the OCPC rules, the power of the Board to fix the salaries and
determine the reasonable allowances, bonuses and other incentives was still
subject to the DBM review. In Intia, Jr. v. COA,15 the Court stressed that the
discretion of the Board of Philippine Postal Corporation on the matter of
personnel compensation is not absolute as the same must be exercised in
accordance with the standard laid down by law, i.e., its compensation
system, including the allowances granted by the Board, must strictly conform
with that provided for other government agencies under R.A. No. 675816 in
relation to the General Appropriations Act. To ensure such compliance, the
resolutions of the Board affecting such matters should first be reviewed and
approved by the DBM pursuant to Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597. Following
Intia, Jr., We subsequently ruled in Phil. Retirement Authority (PRA) v. Bu
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS vs SSS
Facts
This suit is brought by the employer, Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.
(PBMC)and its alien employees against the Social Security System.
PBMC is a domestic corporation since 1957 which has employed Japanese
technicians for employment contracts ranging from 6 to 24 months. From
April 28, 1957 to October 26, 1958, it employed six Japanese technicians.
PBMC inquired with SSS if the said aliens are subject to compulsory
coverage under SSS, to which the latter replied that while they are
compulsorily covered, they are entitled to rebate a proportionate amount of
their SSS contributions. Their employers shall also be entitled to the same
proportionate rebate.
However, when PBMC filed a claim with SSS for refund of its premiums, SSS
controverted it by saying that at least 2 years of membership in the system
is required to be entitled to a rebate. This requirement was made through an
amendment of the SSS Rules and Regulations which became effective on
January 14, 1958-- before the termination of the employment of the subject
aliens. Appellants contend that this amendment impaired their contract with
SSS.
Issue
(1) whether or not the said amendment violates the non-impairment clause
(2) whether due process was observed in implementing the SSS law, resulting
in the denial of appellants' claim for refund of their premium contributions
Held
(1) NO, there was no violation of the non-impairment clause
(2) YES, due process was observed. Amendments are effective from the time
PROVIDED for by the statute, which in this case is the time of approval of
the president. The date of publication in the Official Gazette is material only
when the statute does not provide a specific date of effectivity.
Ratio
(1) Invoking the non-impairment clause assumes the existence of a contract,
which is not the case here. Membership in SSS is not the result of a
bilateral, consensual agreement where the rights and obligations of the
parties are defined by and subject to their will. Republic Act 1161 requires
compulsory coverage of employers and employees under the System. It is
actually a legal imposition, on said employers and employees, designed to
provide social security to the workingmen. Membership in the SSS is,
therefore, in compliance with a lawful exercise of the police power of the
State, to which the principle of non-impairment of the obligation of contract
is not a proper defense.
(2) Rule I Section 3 (d) and Rule IX was amended to read as follows:
(d) Aliens who are employed in the Philippines shall also be
compulsorily covered (Sec. 3, Rule I)
EFFECT OF SEPARATION FROM EMPLOYMENT
When an employee under compulsory coverage is separated from
employment, his employer's contribution on his account shall cease at the
end of the month of separation; but s
People vs Que Po Lay
TITLE: People of the Phils v Que Po Lay
CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954
FACTS:
The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars,
US checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell
the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.
Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official
Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.
Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty
of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA
265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is
needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding
penalties.
HELD:
It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule,
circular and regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a
penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is
based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially
its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for
the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including
its penalties.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the
appellant, with costs de oficio.
Facts:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in
demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they
claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were
to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April
24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees.
The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all
unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The
petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of
general applicability and those which are not. The publication means
complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official
gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that
the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed.
And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil
code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative,
that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official
gazette.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.
(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.
Held:
(1) The court held that all statute including those of local
application shall be published as condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general
applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no force and effect.
Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298;
G.R. No. 101279, August 6, 1992
Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011
(Admin Law, DOLE, quasi-legislative power)
Facts: DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment by
private employment agencies of Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in view of the
need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for the same.
The DOLE, through POEA took over the business of deploying such HK-
bound workers. Pursuant to the above order, POEA issued memorandum
circular no. 30 providing guidelines on the government processing and
deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to HK and the accreditation of HK
recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers, and the
memorandum circular No. 30, pertaining to the processing of employment
contracts of domestic workers for HK.
Petitioner contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion
and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars.
Issue: WON the take-over of the business deploying DH to HK by DOLE and
POEA through an administrative order and circular is valid.
Held: Yes. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power
to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. The challenge
administrative issuance discloses that the same fall within the administrative
and police powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon the
respondents.
NASECORE V. ERC
FACTS:
The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), created under the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), used to apply the Return on Rate Base
(RORB) method to determine the proper amount a distribution utility (DU)
may charge for the services it provides. The RORB scheme had been the
method for computing allowable electricity charges in the Philippines for
decades, before the onset of the EPIRA. Section 43 (f) of the EPIRA allows the
ERC to shift from the RORB methodology to alternative forms of
internationally accepted rate-setting methodology, subject to multiple
conditions. The ERC, through a series of resolutions, adopted the
Performance-Based Regulation (PBR) method to set the allowable rates DUs
may charge their customers. Meralco, a DU, applied for an increase of its
distribution rate under the PBR scheme docketed as ERC Case No. 2009-057
RC (MAP2010 case) on 7 August 2009. Petitioners NASECORE, FOLVA, FOVA,
and Engineer Robert F. Mallillin (Mallillin) all filed their own Petitions for
Intervention to oppose the application of Meralco.
However, ERC granted the application due to the petitioners’ failure to
appear in the hearing. Hence, petitioners seek for a TRO.
ISSUE: Whethr or not petition shall be granted?
HELD:
No. This Court finds that the real motive behind the filing of the present
Petition is to obtain an indefinite TRO and this, the Court cannot
countenance. Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides the rules for
permanent injunctions, to wit:
Sec. 9. When final injunction granted. —
If after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant
is entitled to have the act or acts complained of
permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final
injunction perpetually restraining the party or person
enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or
acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction.
Petitioners assert that this Court should issue a TRO because of the huge
amount that would unduly burden the consumers with the continued
application of the MAP2010 rates. According to petitioners, "if not stayed, the
present financial hardships of 4.3 million MERALCO customers due to the
global financial meltdown and the recent calamities in the country will surely
further worsen." Petitioners also claim that there is an extreme urgency to
secure a TRO, considering that the assailed Decision is immediately
executory.
The purpose of a TRO is to prevent a threatened wrong and to protect the
property or rights involved from further injury, until the issues can be
determined after a hearing on the merits. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a TRO may be issued only if it appears from
the facts shown by affidavits or by a verified application that great or
irreparable injury would be incurred by an applicant before the writ of
preliminary injunction could be heard.
If such irreparable injury would result from the non-issuance of the
requested writ or if the "extreme urgency" referred to by petitioners indeed
exists, then they should have been more vigilant in protecting their rights. As
they have all been duly notified of the proceedings in the ERC case, they
should have appeared before the ERC and participated in the trials.
We find that petitioners erred in thinking that the non-issuance of the TRO
they requested would put consumers in danger of suffering an "irreparable
injury". But this asserted injury can be repaired, because, had petitioners
participated in the proceedings before the ERC and the latter had found
merit in their appeal, the undue increase in electric bills shall be refunded to
the consumers.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
GMA Network v. MTRCB
G.R. No. 148579
February 5, 2007
Publication of Administrative Issuances
FACTS:
 Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF
television station, EMC Channel 27. On January 7, 2000, respondent
MTRCB issued an order of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami:
The Making" without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7
of PD 1986. A penalty of suspension was imposed based on Memorandum
Circular 98-17 for showing the film without the required permit from
MTRCB.
Petitioner complied with the suspension and it also filed a letter-
protest which was merely "noted" by the MTRCB thereby, in effect, denying
both the motion for reconsideration and letter-protest. They filed with the CA
which affirmed the MTRCB’s suspension order.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the show "Muro
Ami: The Making" prior to its broadcast by television.
2. Whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding
on petitioner (Admin MAIN ISSUE).
HELD:
1. Yes.
Section 3 of PD 1986 empowers the MTRCB to screen, review and
examine all motion pictures, television programs including publicity
materials. This power of review is highlighted in its Rules and Regulation
under Sec. 7.1
The only exemptions from the MTRCB’s power of review are those
expressly mentioned in Section 7, such as:
(1) Television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine
Government and/or departments and agencies, and
(2) Newsreels.
Thus "Muro Ami: The Making" is within the power of MTRCB given
that it is not one of the exemptions. Additionally, even though petitioner
insists that "Muro Ami: The Making" is a public affairs program, this Court
has already ruled that a public affairs program -- described as a variety of
news treatment; a cross between pure television news and news-related
commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions -- is within the
MTRCB’s power of review.
2. No.
The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3, requires
that each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register
(ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies
of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published
or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced. Memorandum
Circular No. 98-17 has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27,
2000. Hence, it is thus unenforceable and cannot be meted out to petitioner
as punishment.
1SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW. -- No motion picture, television
program or related publicity material shall be imported, exported, produced, copied,
distributed, sold, leased, exhibited or broadcasted by television without prior permit
Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp.
2008
Chico-Nazario
alycat
SUMMARY: The OEA informed Pilipinas Shell that the latter’s
contributions to the OPSF were insufficient. As a consequence, a
surcharge was imposed upon Pilipinas Shell. The surcharge was imposed
pursuant to a Department of Finance Circular. Pilipinas Shell challenged
this and refused to pay the surcharges, claiming the payments it made
were based on a valid interpretation of a Department of Finance Order
and Department of Energy Circular. However, the DOE only reiterated
its demand for Pilipinas Shell to settle the surcharges due. The Office of
the President affirmed the DOE. CA reversed, ruling that the Department
of Finance Circular was ineffective for failure to comply with the
requirement to file with ONAR. SC affirmed CA.
DOCTRINE: The requirements of publication and filing were put in place
as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers, and as
guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and information on
matters of public concerns, and therefore, require strict compliance.
Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be
annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence
of the implementing rules.
NOTE: Values are not exact. Also, the case used “Ministry” and “Department”
interchangeably in the case. I stuck with “Department” to avoid confusion.
FACTS:
 Pilipinas Shell – corporation engaged in the business of refining oil,
marketing petroleum, and other related activities
 Department of Energy – government agency under the direct control
and supervision of the Office of the President mandated to prepare,
integrate, coordinate, supervise, and control all plans, programs,
projects, and activities of the Government relative to energy
exploration, development, utilization, distribution, and conservation
 Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) – created under PD 1596 for the
purpose of minimizing frequent price changes of crude oil and
petroleum
 LOI No. 1431 – directed the utilization of the OPSF to reimburse oil
companies the additional costs of importation of crude oil and
petroleum
issued by the BOARD after review of the motion picture, television program or publicity
material
  LOI No. 1441 – mandated the Board of Energy to review and reset
prices of domestic products every two months to reflect the prevailing
prices of crude oil and petroleum
 EO No. 137 – amended PD 1965, expanding the sources and
utilization of the OPSF
 The Office of Energy Affairs (now DOE) informed Pilipinas Shell that
the latter’s contributions to the OPSF were insufficient. The OEA
Audit Taskforce noted an underpayment of 14M. As a consequence, a
surcharge of 11M was imposed upon Pilipinas Shell. The surcharge
was imposed pursuant to a Department of Finance Circular.  The
Circular is the contested issuance in the case.
 The OEA wrote another letter to Pilipinas Shell, advising the latter of
its additional underpayment of the foreign exchange risk fee in the
amount of 10M. Additionally, a surcharge of 2M was imposed.
 Pilipinas Shell wrote a letter to the OEA, justifying that its
calculations for the transactions (for which DOE claimed
underpayment) were based on a valid interpretation of a Department
of Finance Order and a Department of Energy Circular.
 Pilipinas Shell paid the OE the full principal amount, but not the
surcharges.
 The OEA wrote a letter to Pilipinas Shell, notifying it that it is
required to pay the OPSF a total of P18M for surcharges on the late
payment of foreign exchange risk charges.
 The DOE reiterated its demand for Pilipinas Shell to settle the
surcharges due, else, the DOE would proceed against Pilipinas
Shell’s Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit to recover its unpaid
surcharges.
 Pilipinas Shell filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the
President. The Office of the President affirmed the conclusion of the
of the DOE. While it admitted that the implementation of the
Department of Finance Circular was contingent upon its publication
and filing with the ONAR, Pilipinas Shell failed to adduce evidence of
lack of compliance with such requirements.
 Pilipinas Shell’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
 CA reversed and ruled that the Department of Finance Circular was
ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file with
ONAR. Even if the Circular was issued by then Acting Secretary of
Finance long before the Administrative Code of 1987, Sec. 3 of
Chapter 2, Book 7 thereof specifies that rules already in force on the
date of the effectivity of the Administrative Code must be filed within
three months from the date of the effectivity of the Code, otherwise,
such rules cannot be the basis of any sanction.
ISSUE: Did the Department of Finance Circular comply with the
requirements for publication and filing? NO
RATIO:
Tañada v. Tuvera – All statutes shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever delegated by the legislature/ Constitution. Administrative
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Sec. 3, Chapter 2, Book 7, Administrative Code of 1987 – Rules in
force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three
months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons.
As per the Tañada ruling, the Department of Finance Circular is one
of those issuances which should have been published before becoming
effective since it is intended to enforce PD 1956. The circular should also
comply with the requirement under Sec. 3, Chapter 2, Book 7 of the
Administrative Code – filing with the ONAR in the University of the
Philippines Law Center – for rules that are already in force at the time the
Administrative Code became effective. These requirements of publication and
filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of
lawmakers, and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and
information on matters of public concerns, and therefore, require strict
compliance.
Here, the Certifications prove that the Department of Finance
Circular and its amendatory rule have not been filed before said office.
Moreover, the Department of Energy was unable to controvert Pilipinas
Shell’s allegation that neither of the circulars were published in the Official
Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation. Thus, failure to comply
with the requirements of publication and filing render the Department of
Finance Circular ineffective.
National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy
Regulatory Board – Both the requirements of publication and filing of
administrative issuances intended to enforce existing laws are mandatory for
the effectivity of said issuances.
The Department of Energy insists that the registration of the
Department of Finance Circular with the ONAR is no longer necessary since
Pilipinas Shell knew of its existence, despite its non-registration. However,
strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by
a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the
implementing rules. In National Association of Electricity Consumers for
Reforms, the Court ruled that the fact that the parties participated in the
public consultation and submitted their respective comments is not
compliance with the rule.
The Department of Energy avers that the Department of Finance
Circular gains its vitality from the subsequent enactment of an Executive
Order which reiterates the power of the Secretary of Finance to promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations to implement the Executive Order.
However, the power of the Secretary of Finance to promulgate rules and
regulations is not under dispute. The issue is the ineffectivity of his
administrative issuance for non-compliance with the requisite publication
and filing.
RULING: CA affirmed. The Department of Finance Circular is ineffective.

G.R. No. L-16704 March 17, 1962
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.
BARRERA, J.:
Facts
 The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on October 15, 1958
requiring all employers in computing premiums to include employee’s
remuneration all bonuses and overtime time pay, as well as the cash value of
other media remuneration.
 The petitioner(Victorias Milling Company, Inc.) protest against the circular as
it is contrary to a previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957.
 Circular No. 7 excludes overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the
employers’ and the employees’ respective monthly premium contributions.
 The counsel questioned the validity of the circular
 Social Security Commission overruled the objections
 Victorias Miller Company Inc. comes to court on appeal
Issue
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in
Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security
Commission “to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the
President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions and purposes of this Act”
Held
Republic Act No. 1161 before its amendment defines compensation as: All
remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration
paid in any medium other than cash. Except:
 that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month;
 bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and
 dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although
not legally required to do so.
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of “compensation” to: (f)
Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of
any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of
the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month.
Circular No. 22 was issued to advise the employers and employees concerned
with the interpretation of the law as amended which was Social Security
Commission’s duty to enforce. The Commission simply stated their opinion
as to how the law should be construed and that such circular did not require
presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its
effectivity. Whereas if it renders an opinion or a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law. Administrative interpretation of law is at best
merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
Peralta v. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 95832. August 10, 1992]
28
AUG
FACTS
Pursuant to Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) which conferred upon
the Commissioner of Civil Service to prescribe, amend and enforce suitable
rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of this Civil
Service Law, the Commission interpreted provisions of Republic Act No. 2625
amending the Revised Administrative Code and adopted a policy that when
an employee who was on leave of absence without pay on a day before or on
a day time immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, he is also
considered on leave of absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or
Holiday. Petitioner Peralta, affected by the said policy, questioned the said
administrative interpretation.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission’s interpretative construction is:
(1) valid and constitutional.
(2) binding upon the courts.
RULING
(1) NO. The construction by the respondent Commission of R.A. 2625 is not
in accordance with the legislative intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides that
government employees are entitled to leaves of absence with full pay
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays. The law speaks of the
granting of a right and the law does not provide for a distinction between
those who have accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted
their leave credits in order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus.The fact remains that government employees, whether
or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to work
on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and thus they can not be declared
absent on such non-working days. They cannot be or are not considered
absent on non-working days; they cannot and should not be deprived of their
salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they were absent
without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said non-working days.
A different rule would constitute a deprivation of property without due
process.
(2) NO. Administrative construction, is not necessarily binding upon the
courts. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by
the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the
letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. When an administrative or
executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law
is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means.
The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had
never been passed.
But, as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank:
. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of
a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such determination is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate; and
particular conduct, private and official.
To allow all the affected government employees, similarly situated as
petitioner herein, to claim their deducted salaries resulting from the past
enforcement of the herein invalidated CSC policy, would cause quite a heavy
financial burden on the national and local governments considering the
length of time that such policy has been effective. Also, administrative and
practical considerations must be taken into account if this ruling will have a
strict restrospective application. The Court, in this connection, calls upon the
respondent Commission and the Congress of the Philippines, if necessary, to
handle this problem with justice and equity to all affected government
employees.
Sand vs Abad Santos Educational Institution
Petitioner: Annie Sand
Respondent: Abad Santos Educational Institution, School of Nursing
Ponente: Teehankee, J.
DOCTRINE: It is well settled that it is beyond the domain of the courts
to inquire into the wisdom of the Act 9 vesting the petitioner board
with similar powers to that likewise entrusted to the Bureau of Private
Education..
FACTS:
1. The Abad Santos School of Nursing filed a case for declaratory relief
against the chairman and members of the Board of Examiners for
Nurses seeking to declare void Article VIII, Rule 69, Section 5 of the
Rules and Regulations of the Board.
2. The questioned regulation provides for periodic inspection of nursing
schools and barring from admission to the nurses' examination the
graduates of schools that are duly found to be sub-standard during
the period of the deficiency
3. The lower court rendered a decision holding that while the Board has
the full authority under Section 9, RA 877, as amended to
promulgate said rules and regulations, the Board may only apply the
same to new schools or colleges established or opened after the
promulgation of said rules. Thus, such rules are void and of no effect
against Abad Santos and its graduates.
ISSUES:
1. WON the lower court erred in declaring Article VIII, Rule 69,
Section 5 of the Rules and Regulations of the Board void.
PROVISION:
1. (5) Periodic inspection. — Colleges, institutes or schools of nursing
shall be inspected periodically. Whenever a college institute or school
of nursing is not, being conducted in accordance with the minimum
requirements and standards contemplated in these regulations, no
graduate of such college, institute or school attending courses
therein during the period of the deficiency shall be eligible for
admission to the nurses' examination or be entitled to a certificate of
registration as a registered nurse. Findings of such inspection will be
sent to the authorities of the school and the suggestions therein
regarding required improvements should be carried out within one
year."
RULING + RATIO:
1. Yes, the lower court erred. The Philippine Nursing Act, Republic
Act No. 877 as amended by Republic Act No. 4704 expressly
empowers in section 9 thereof the petitioner board "subject
to the approval of the President of the Philippines [to]
promulgate such rules and regularly as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this Act."
2. Section 3 of the cited Act specifically empowers petitioner
board to inspect nursing colleges and schools and vests it
with authority "to issue, suspend, revoke, or reissue
certificates of registration for practice of nursing.
3. Abad Santos contends that to grant the Board of Examiners
the same visitorial powers as those granted to the Bureau of
 Private Education would result in a power struggle between
the two. The Supreme Court however held that this
manifestly addresses itself to the wisdom of the provisions
of the Act which is beyond its domain to inquire into.
4. Abad Santos does not claim and indeed nothing in the record
indicates that the two agencies will not act responsibly and
coordinate their efforts for the maintenance of high
standards for nursing schools, and in the remote event of
any serious disagreement, it may be cleared through the
Office of the President under whose control and supervision
they pertain.
5. The regulation is a proper exercise of police power.
6. The Board of Examiners for Nurses has visitorial powers over
existing nursing schools and those schools which are yet to
be established.
DISPOSITION: ACCORDINGLY, the judgment under review of respondent
court is hereby reversed and set aside, and in lieu thereof judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the validity of Article VIII, Rule 69, section 5
of the Rules and Regulations adopted by petitioner board on July 27,
1967 and its applicability to all existing colleges, institutes or schools
of nursing.
AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. et al.vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS et al.
G.R. No. L-26803; Oct. 14, 1975; Antonio.
Digest by Ian.
Facts: This case involves the validity of the amendment made by the Director
of Patents to Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine
Patent Office in Trademarks.
1. The Trademark Law (RA 166) vested the Director of Patents with
jurisdiction over “inter partes” proceedings (i.e. hearing of opposition of
registration of mark or tradename, interference proceeding instituted for the
purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a
trademark, tradename or servicemark, and cancellation of registration of
trademark and tradename pending at the Patent Office).
2. The Director of Patents drafted and promulgated the Rules of Practice and
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Rule 168 of the
Rules embodies the jurisdiction provided under the Trademark Law.
Subsequently, the Director with the approval of the Secretary amended Rule
168:
3. Petitioners in this case are parties in inter partes proceedings. Due to the
amendment, the Director of Patents delegated the hearing of petitioners’
cases to hearings officers Attys. Marquez, Velasco, Casia, and Buenaluz.
Petitioners claim that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void
because under the law the Director must personally hear and decide the
cases.
Issue: WON it is within the powers of the Director of Patents to delegate the
hearing of the cases.
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
1. The Revised Administrative Code, Trademark Law (RA 166), and Act
creating a Patent Office (RA 165) provide such discretion in the exercise of
the power of Director of Patents.
 Sec. 3 of RA 165 empowered the Director to obtain the assistance of
technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees when
deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to
the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions of the said
Act.
 Sec. 78 empowered the Director to promulgate the rules subject to
the approval of the Secretary.
 There is no provision in either RA 165 or 166 negativing the
existence of the authority to designate hearing examiners. Nor can
the absence of such authority be fairly inferred from
contemporaneous and consistent Executive interpretation of the Act.
2. The nature of the power and authority entrusted to the Director of Patents
suggests that the laws should be construed so as to give him the
administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge
of his duties. It could hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude of his
responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and every case pending
his office.
3. While the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency
vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a
hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will
be made. This sub-delegation of power has been justified by "sound
principles of organization" which demand that "those at the top be able to
concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions of
policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the
consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of detail."
4. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own
judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing as a matter of
practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and
report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions.
It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of
the officer authorized by law.
5. There is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned
as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer.
In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on
the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate
decision on the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the
Director of Patents.
Rabor v. CSC
FACTS:
Dionisio Rabor is a Utility worker in the Office of the Mayor in Davao city.
Since he already reached the age of 68, he is now advised to apply for
retirement but then he wishes for extension so he can avail the benefit s of
the retirement laws given to the employees of the Government by GSIS, in
which one of the requirements is that you have served for 15 years in the
government; by that time, it is just his 13th year in the government that’s
why he requested for extension of service and he also presents a GSIS
certificate with a notation to the effect that his service is extended for him to
complete the 15-years requirement for retirement. The government of Davao
City wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI
(CSRO-XI) and Director Cawad states that Rabor’s request is contrary to
Memorandum Circular No. 65 for it is stated to such memorandum that
employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 shall not
be retained and, only in meritorious cases, may be extend only for 6 months.
Mayor Duterte then informed Rabor about the decision of CSRO-XI and
advised him to stop reporting starting August 16, 1991.
Then, he sent a letter to CSRO-XI asking for extension and asking for
another 2 years so he could avail the benefits given to government
employees. His request was denied. Rabor next wrote to the Office of the
President seeking for reconsideration of CSRO-XI. The Office of the President
referred it to the Civil Service Commission but again, CSC dismissed his
appeal and affirmed decision of CSRO-XI and stated CSC M.C No 27, s. 1990:
1. Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to
complete the fifteen years service requirement for retirement shall
be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who
are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and shall be granted for a period of not exceeding one (1)
year.
Plus the fact that as early as October 1988 Rabor already reached the
retirement age.
On October 28, 1992, invoking the decision in Cena v. Civil Service
Commission, the petitioner sought for reconsideration and asked for
reinstatement with back salaries and benefits. And again, his reconsideration
was denied. Then he filed a petition to the Supreme Court appealing from
CSC. Rabor contends that his case squarely falls within the ruling in the case
of Cena. Opposing, CSC stated that it is different for the court gave the
discretion to the Land Registration Authority.
CENA’s case
Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds of
Malabon, Metropolitan Manila. Before reaching his 65th birthday, for his
total years in the service will just be 11 years and 9 months bythen, Cena
requested the Secretary of Justice, through the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority ("LRA") that he be allowed to extend his service to
complete the fifteen-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the
full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. If
Cena's request were granted, he would complete fifteen (15) years of
government service on 15 April 1994, at the age of sixty-eight (68) years. CSC
affirmed his request but for 1 year only so he filed an appeal to the SC and
the SC granted his request. Thus the court concluded:
Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Land Registration
Authority (LRA) and Department of Justice has the discretion to
allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6
days of government to complete the fifteen-year service so that he may retire
with full benefits under Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146
The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain
and ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. Section 11 may be
quoted in its entirety:
Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. — (a) Old-Age
Pension shall be paid to a member who
(1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service;
(2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and
(3) is separated from the service.
(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities,
retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at sixty-five-
(65) years of age with at least fifteen (15) years of service;
Provided, that if he has less than fifteen (15) years of service,
he shall he allowed to continue in the service to completed
the fifteen (15) years.
While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms,
there were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances which prescribe
limitations on the extension of service that may be granted to an employee
who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age; the Civil Service Commission
Circular No. 27, Series of 1990 and Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the
Office of the President. The former limits the extension for only three years
and the latter, only on meritorious reasons, limits up to 6 months only. And
Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2)
administrative regulations by, firstly, considering as invalid Civil Service
Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the Office of the
President's Memorandum Circular No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of
Gaudencio T. Cena. Medialdea, J wrote:
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in
the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle
that administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions . .
. The rule on limiting to one the year the extension of service of an employee
who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but
has less than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27, S. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has
no relationship or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be
carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not
merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no
power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146.
ISSUE:
WON the ruling, regarding the validity of CSC M.C No. 27, in the case of
Cena can be use as basis for granting Rabor’s request.
HELD:
NO. Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of
detail in the statute to be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It
seems clear that if the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed and
specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion) for
implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the
inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed
situations in respect of any relatively complex subject matter, that makes
subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so important
and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably; demanded is a showing that
the delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations are germane
to the general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statute. This
is the test that is appropriately applied in respect of Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this test we now turn.
Like what Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said in the ruling of People v.
Exconde case:
It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the
making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds
exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may
constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate
its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for
the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in
carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but
conform to standards that the law prescribes
Plus, not only P.D. No. 1146 is the statute that should appropriately be
examined is the present Civil Service law there is Administrative Code of
1987 which provides the Commission was acting as "the central personnel
agency of the government empowered to promulgate policies, standards and
guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration in
the government."
Another thing, the SC find it very difficult to suppose that the
limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached
sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane
to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological
and psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in
fact related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected
from individual persons. The policy considerations which guided the Civil
Service Commission in limiting the maximum extension of service allowable
for compulsory retirees, were summarized by Griño-Aquino, J. in her
dissenting opinion in Cena:
Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil
Service Commission that extending the service of compulsory
retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium
to late-comers in the government service and in effect
discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger
age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank
employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of
qualified young civil service applicants who have already
passed the various government examination but must wait
for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have long passed
the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of
their government service to complete 15 years so they may
qualify for old-age pension.
SC’s conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified
to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of
1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and
effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read together
with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding
in Cena that the head of the government agency concerned is vested with
discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an
official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without
completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is,
nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.
Administrative Law Case Digests
Arellano University School of Law
aiza ebina/2015
REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORPORATION vs SENDINO
233 SCRA 665
Origin and Development of Administrative Law
Growth and Utilization of Administrative Agencies
FACTS: Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino entered into a reservation
agreement with Realty Exchange
Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision
in Sucat, Paranaque for
P307,800.00 as its purchase price. She paid P1,000.00 as partial reservation
fee on January 15, 1989 and
completed payment of this fee on January 20, 1989 by paying P4,000.00. On certainly appropriate for the HLURB-OAALA to have acted on the substantive
July 18, 1989, private questions relating to the
respondent paid REVI P16,600.00 as full downpayment on the purchase validity of petitioners' unilateral rescission of the contract without unduly
price. However, she was advised concerning itself with a mere
by REVI to change her co-maker, which she agreed, asking for an extension procedural slip, the non-joinder of private petitioner's husband in the original
of one month to do so. complaint before the HLURB.
For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of the Moreover, since petitioners participated in the administrative proceedings
appropriate documents under the without objecting to or raising
terms of the original agreement, REVI, through its Vice-President for the procedural infirmity, they were certainly estopped from raising it on
Marketing, informed respondent of the appeal before the Office of the
cancellation of the contract on the 31st of July 1989. President and before this Court.
On April 20, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint for Specific Proceeding to the principal issues raised by the petitioner, while E.O. 85
Performance against REVI with the dated 12 December 1986
office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and abolished the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS), it is patently clear from
Land Use Regulatory Board a reading of its provisions that
(HLURB) asking that respondent be ordered to comply and continue with the the said executive order did not abolish the Human Settlements Regulatory
sale of the house and lot, and Commission (HSRC) which
to pay damages. continued to exercise its powers and functions even after the Ministry of
On April 3, 1991 the HLURB, whose authority to hear and decide the Human Settlements ceased to
complaint was challenged by REVI in exist. In spite of the Aquino Government's stated intention of eradicating
its answer, rendered its judgment in favor of private respondent and ordered what it considered the vestiges of
petitioners to continue with the previous regime, it was not its intention to create a vacuum by abolishing
the sale of the house and lot and to pay private respondent damages and those juridical entities,
costs of the suit. An appeal from agencies, corporations, etc., attached to or supervised by the MHS, which
this decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the performed vital administrative
Board's decision. The decision of functions.
the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the President, herein public Pursuant to this provision therefore, the President subsequently issued
respondent. Executive Order No. 90, series of
On January 7, 1993, the public respondent rendered its decision dismissing 1986, recognizing the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (renamed
the petitioners' appeal. Motion the HLURB) as one of the
for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the public respondent on principal housing agencies of the government. Prior to this, Executive Order
January 26, 1993. Consequently No. 648 in 1981 transferred all
petitioners come before this Court, in this petition, which the Court resolves the functions of the National Housing Authority (pursuant to Presidential
to treat as a petition for Decrees Nos. 957, 1216 and
certiorari. 1344) to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC)
ISSUE: Whether or not the public respondent committed serious error in consolidating all regulatory functions
declaring that the HLURB has relating to land use and housing development in a single entity. Being the
quasi-judicial functions notwithstanding absence of express grant by E.O. sole regulatory body for housing
No. 90 which created it and land development, the renamed body, the HLURB, 11would have been
RULING: No. It is settled that rules of procedure are as a matter of course reduced to a functionally sterile
construed liberally in entity if, as the petitioner contends, it lacked the powers exercised by its
proceedings before administrative bodies. In the instant case, the original predecessor which included the
suit for specific performance and power to settle disputes concerning land use and housing development and
damages was filed by the private respondent with the HLURB-OAALA, an acquisition.
administrative body not
hamstrung by the strict procedural technicalities of the Rules of Court.
Under the circumstances, it was
As explicitly provided by law, jurisdiction over actions for specific of its Board of Commissioners. Denying the body those functions so
performance of contractual and statutory necessary in carrying out its power to
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the regulate housing and land use results in its effective emasculation as an
owner or developer, is vested important regulatory body in an
exclusively in the HSRC. area vital to the national economy.
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in RATIO: One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the
an administrative agency over interpretation of such
certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special contracts and agreements and the determination of private rights under
expertise. The National Housing these agreements is no longer a
Authority (now HLURB) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real uniquely judicial function. The absence of any provision, express or implied,
estate trade and business in in E.O. 90, repealing those
accordance with the terms of PD No. 957 which defines the quantum of quasi-judicial powers inherited by the HSRC from the National Housing
judicial or quasi-judicial powers of Authority, furthermore militates
said agency. against petitioners' position on the question.
Clearly, therefore, the HLURB properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case
filed by the petitioners with Soriano vs. La Guardia G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009 Freedom of Speech
its adjudicative body, the OAALA, in ordering petitioners to comply with their JANUARY 26, 2018
obligations arising from the
Reservation Agreement. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial FACTS:
powers which an On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the
administrative agency may exercise is defined in the agency's enabling act. program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against
The Court recognizes the INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical
HLURB as the successor agency of the HSRC's powers and functions, it affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
therefore follows that the transfer of respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in
such functions from the NHA to the HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who
series of 1981, thereby felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and
resulted in the acquisition by the HLURB of adjudicatory powers which a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
included the power to "hear and
decide cases of unsound real estate business practices and cases of specific ISSUE:
performance." Obviously, in Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the
the exercise of its powers and functions, the HLURB must interpret and religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?
apply contracts, determine the
rights of the parties under these contracts, and award damages whenever RULING:
appropriate. We fail to see how No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and
the HSRC - which possessed jurisdiction over the actions for specific considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’
performance for contractual and fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots against developers - public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang
had suddenly lots its Dating Daan for three months.
adjudicatory powers by the mere fiat of a change in name through E.O. 90. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was
In fine, the HLURB-OAALA acted within the scope of its authority in ordering an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or
petitioners to comply and as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the
continue with the sale of the house and lot subject of the contract between paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a
the original parties. It cannot broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a
be gainsaid that the quasi-judicial functions exercised by the body are requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the
necessary incidents to the proper form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if
exercise of its powers and functions under E.O. 90 and the laws enacted any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.
delineating the scope of authority
Dagan v. Phil. Racing Commission (Philracom)
G.R. No. 175220
February 12, 2009
Tinga
FACTS:
 Aug. 11, 2004- Philracom issued a directive directing the Manila
Jockey Club, Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) to
immediately come up with their respective Clubs’ House Rule to
address Equine Infectious Anemia (EIA) problem and to rid their
facilities of horses infected with EIA.
 Said directive was issued pursuant to Administrative Order No.
5 dated 28 March 1994 by the Department of Agriculture declaring it
unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to ship, drive, or transport
horses from any locality or place except when accompanied by a
certificate issued by the authority of the Director of the Bureau of
Animal Industry (BAI).
 In compliance with the directive, MJCI and PRCI ordered the owners
of racehorses stable in their establishments to submit the horses to
blood sampling and administration of the Coggins Test to determine
whether they are afflicted with the EIA virus. Subsequently, on 17
September 2004, Philracom issued copies of the guidelines for the
monitoring and eradication of EIA.(2nd directive)
 Petitioners refused to comply with the directives. Despite resistance
from petitioners, the blood testing proceeded. The horses, whose
owners refused to comply were banned from the races, were removed
from the actual day of race, prohibited from renewing their licenses or
evicted from their stables.
 Racehorse owners complained before the Office of the President (OP)
which in turn issued a directive instructing Philracom to investigate
the matter.
 Petitioners filed for a TRO with the RTC- granted. RTC however
dismissed their petition for injunction because: 1. The issue is already
moot since almost all racehorse owners complied with the directives;
and 2. It is a valid exercise of police power.
 Upon appeal, CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
 SC level:
Petitioner's arguments: 1. They maintain that the assailed guidelines do not
comply with due process requirements; 2. No investigation or at least a
summary proceeding was conducted affording petitioners an opportunity to be
heard. 3. assailed guidelines are ultra vires in that the sanctions imposed for
refusing to submit to medical examination are summary eviction from the
stables or arbitrary banning of participation in the races, notwithstanding the
penalties prescribed in the contract of lease.
 Philracom's arguments:Philracom also justified its right
under the law to regulate horse raciing MJCI adds that Philracom
need not delegate its rule-making power to the former since
MJCI’s right to formulate its internal rules is subsumed under the
franchise granted to it by Congress.
 That is why petitioners raise for the first time the issue that
Philracom had unconstitutionally delegated its rule-making
power to PRCI and MJCI in issuing the directive for them to come
up with club rules. They said that power granted to PRCI and MJCI
under their respective franchises is limited to: (1) the construction,
operation and maintenance of racetracks; (2) the establishment of
branches for booking purposes; and (3) the conduct of horse races.
ISSUE: WON there is a valid delegation of legislative power to Philracom
RULING: YES
The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines,
hinges on compliance with the following requisites:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure;
3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the
legislature;
4. It must be reasonable.[
All the prescribed requisites are met as regards the questioned issuances.
Philracom’s authority is drawn from P.D. No. 420. The delegation made in
the presidential decree is valid. Philracom did not exceed its authority. And
the issuances are fair and reasonable.
FIRST REQUISITE:
The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated, or as expressed
in the Latin maxim: potestas delegate non delegare potest. This rule is based
upon the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his
own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not
through the intervening mind of another.[29] This rule however admits of
recognized exceptions[30] such as the grant of rule-making power to
administrative agencies. They have been granted by Congress with the
authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to
them. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is
complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out,
or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard—the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate and determinable—to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions.
P.D. No. 420 hurdles the tests of completeness and standards sufficiency.
Complete: Philracom was created for the purpose of carrying out the declared
policy in Section 1 which is “to promote and direct the accelerated development
and continued growth of horse racing not only in pursuance of the sports
development program but also in order to insure the full exploitation of the
sport as a source of revenue and employment.” Philracom was granted premises underwent the same procedure. The guidelines implemented
exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect of the conduct of were undoubtedly reasonable as they bear a reasonable relation to the
horse racing, including the framing and scheduling of races, the construction purpose sought to be accomplished, i.e., the complete riddance of horses
and safety of race tracks, and the security of racing. infected with EIA.

Sufficient Standards: Section 9 provides for Specific Powers: To register race

horses, horse owners or associations or federations thereof, and to regulate
the construction of race tracks and to grant permit for the holding of races;
To issue, suspend or revoke permits and licenses;order the suspension of
any racing event in case of violation of any law, ordinance or rules and
regulations;
g. To prohibit the use of improper devices, drugs, stimulants or other
means to enhance or diminish the speed of horse or materially harm their
condition;
Horse-owners were also informed beforehand. The lease contract executed
between petitioner and MJC contains a proviso reserving the right of the lessor,
MJCI in this case, the right to determine whether a particular horse is a
qualified horse. In addition, Philracom’s rules and regulations on horse racing
provide that horses must be free from any contagious disease or illness in order
to be eligible as race entries.

No delegation of rule-making power to MJCI and PRCI

The Philracom directive is merely instructive in character. Compliance with the
Philracom’s directive is part of the mandate of PRCI and MJCI under Sections
1[33] of R.A. No. 7953[34] and Sections 1[35] and 2[36] of 8407.[As correctly
proferred by MJCI, its duty is not derived from the delegated authority of
Philracom but arises from the franchise granted to them by Congress

SECOND REQUISITE:
While it is conceded that the guidelines were issued a month after
Philracom’s directive, this circumstance does not render the directive
nor the guidelines void. Philracom has every right to issue directives to MJCI
and PRCI with respect to the conduct of horse racing, with or without
implementing guidelines.

Lack of publication:As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the

exercise of an administrative agency of its quasi-legislative power does
not require notice and hearing.[40] InAbella, Jr. v. Civil Service
Commission,[41] this Court had the occasion to rule that prior notice and
hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations issued in
the exercise of quasi-legislative powers since there is no determination
of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained.[

Third requisite:
The administrative body may not make rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly
the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation
of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.The assailed guidelines prescribe the
procedure for monitoring and eradicating EIA. These guidelines are in accord
with Philracom’s mandate under the law to regulate the conduct of horse
racing in the country.

Fourth requisite:

The assailed guidelines do not appear to be unreasonable or

discriminatory. In fact, all horses stabled at the MJCI and PRCI’s