TOPIC 1: INTRODUCTION/GENERAL
CONSIDERATION
CASE #1:
Calalang v. Williams 70 Phil 726
Facts:
1. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a
private citizen and as a taxpayer of
Manila, brought a petition for a writ of
prohibition against the respondents, A.
D. Williams, as Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission, and others, on the
latter’s recommendation to the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications to
prohibit animal-drawn vehicles from
passing along Rosario Street extending
from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmarinas Street from 7:30 AM to 12:30
PM and from 1:30 PM to 5:30 PM; along
Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague
Street from 7 AM to 11 PM, one year from
the date of opening of the Colgante Bridge
to traffic.
2. In pursuance of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which
authorizes the Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic
on national roads, the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications recommended
the approval of the recommendation made
by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission with the modification that the
closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-
drawn vehicles be limited to the portion
thereof extending from the railroad crossing
at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. In his
second indorsement addressed to the
Director of Public Works, the Secretary
approved the recommendation that Rosario
Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic
of animal-drawn vehicles, between the
points and during the hours as above
indicated, for a period of one year from the
date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge
to traffic.
3. Petitioner contends that
Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the
Director of Public Works, with the approval
of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, which is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations for the
regulation and control of the use of and
traffic on national roads and streets is
unconstitutional because it constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power.
Issues:
a. Whether CA 548 is unconstitutional
because it constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power.
b. Whether or not the rules and regulations
promulgated by respondents constitute an
unlawful interference with legitimate
business or trade and abridging of the right
to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion.
c. Whether or not the rules and regulations
complained of infringe the constitutional
precept of social justice.
Ruling:
a.
1. CA 548 is constitutional. The provisions
of CA 548 do not confer legislative power
upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. The authority therein
conferred upon them and under which
they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to
determine what public policy demands
but merely to carry out the legislative
policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote
safe transit upon and avoid obstructions
on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National
Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines" and to
close them temporarily to any or all
classes of traffic "whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic makes
such action necessary or advisable in
the public convenience and interest."
2. The delegated power, if at all, therefore,
is not the determination of what the law
shall be, but merely the ascertainment of
the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the
use of national roads and to determine
when and how long a national road should
be closed to traffic, in view of the condition
of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and
interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the
National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official
to whom is confided the duty of determining
whether the proper occasion exists for
executing the law. But it cannot be said that
the exercise of such discretion is the making
of the law. As was said in Locke’s Appeal
(72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less
than a law, because it is made to depend on
a future event or act, is to rob the
Legislature of the power to act wisely for the
public welfare whenever a law is passed
relating to a state of affairs not yet
developed, or to things future and
impossible to fully know."
3. The proper distinction the court said was
this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its
power to make the law; but it can make a
law to delegate a power to determine some
fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action
depend. To deny this would be to stop the
wheels of government. There are many
things upon which wise and useful
legislation must depend which cannot be
known to the law-making power, and, must,
therefore, be a subject of inquiry and
determination outside of the halls of
legislation."
4. The Court had occasion to observe that
the principle of separation of powers has
been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving
rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of
the principle of "subordinate legislation," not
only in the United States and England but in
practically all modern governments.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulations, and
the increased difficulty of administering the
laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation
of governmental powers has, to a large
extent, been relaxed by permitting the
delegation of greater powers by the
legislative and vesting a larger amount of
discretion in administrative and executive
officials, not only in the execution of the
laws, but also in the promulgation of certain
rules and regulations calculated to promote
public interest.
b.
1. No, there was no unlawful interference.
CA 548 was passed in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state. Said
Act, by virtue of which the rules and
regulations complained of were
promulgated, aims to promote safe transit
upon and avoid obstructions on national
roads, in the interest and convenience of
the public. In enacting said law, therefore,
the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by a desire to
relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say
the least, a menace to public safety. Public
welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez
Jesus, 31 Phil., 218).
2. To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without
which life is a misery, but liberty should not
be made to prevail over authority because
then society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall
into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in
his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established
the resultant equilibrium, which means
peace and order and happiness for all. The
moment greater authority is conferred upon
the government, logically so much is
withdrawn from the residuum of liberty
which resides in the people. The paradox
lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment
of liberty is precisely the very means of
insuring its preservation.
3. The scope of police power keeps
expanding as civilization advances. As was
said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles
(195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the
right to exercise the police power is a
continuing one, and a business lawful today
may in the future, because of the changed
situation, the growth of population or other
causes, become a menace to the public
health and welfare, and be required to yield
to the public good." And in People v. Pomar
(46 Phil., 440), it was observed that
"advancing civilization is bringing within the
police power of the state today things which
were not thought of as being within such
power yesterday. The development of
civilization, the rapidly increasing
population, the growth of public opinion,
with an increasing desire on the part of the
masses and of the government to look after
and care for the interests of the individuals
of the state, have brought within the police
power many questions for regulation which
formerly were not so considered."
c.
1. No. The promotion of social justice is to
be achieved not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group. Social
justice is "neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but
the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces
by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least
be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people,
the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in
the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise
of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle
of salus populi est suprema lex.
2. Social justice, therefore, must be founded
on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to
all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the
state of promoting the health, comfort, and
quiet of all persons, and of bringing about
"the greatest good to the greatest number."
CASE #2
CASE #3
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v.
CA
Topic: Express and Implied Powers (Police
Power)
Facts:
Following the much-publicized death of
Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President
Corazon C. Aquino ordered a total ban
against the deployment of performing artists
to Japan and other foreign destinations. The
ban was, however, rescinded after leaders
of the overseas employment industry
promised to extend full support for a
program aimed at removing kinks in the
system of deployment. The Secretary of
Labor and Employment, subsequently
issued Department Order No. 28, creating
the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council
(EIAC). Pursuant to the EIAC's
recommendations, the Secretary of Labor,
on January 6, 1994, issued Department
Order No. 3 establishing various procedures
and requirements for screening performing
artists under a new system of training,
testing, certification and deployment of the
former. Performing artists successfully
hurdling the test, training and certification
requirement were to be issued an Artist's
Record Book (ARB), a necessary
prerequisite to processing of any contract of
employment by the POEA.
Thereafter, the Department of Labor,
following the EIAC's recommendation,
issued a series of orders fine-tuning and
implementing the new system. Prominent
among these orders were the following
issuances:
1. Department Order No. 3-A, providing for
additional guidelines on the training, testing,
certification and deployment of performing
artists.
2. Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to
the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement,
which could be processed only after the
artist could show proof of academic and
skills training and has passed the required
tests.
3. Department Order No. 3-E, providing the
minimum salary a performing artist ought to
receive (not less than US$600.00 for those
bound for Japan) and the authorized
deductions therefrom.
4. Department Order No. 3-F, providing for
the guidelines on the issuance and use of
the ARB by returning performing artists
who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a
Special Orientation Program (shorter than
the basic program) although they must pass
the academic test.
Petitioner's Contention:
These department orders, 1) violated the
constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged
existing contracts for employment; and 3)
deprived individual artists of their licenses
without due process of law. Further, the
issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB)
was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross
violation of the constitutional right... to life
liberty and property
Respondents Contention:
Respondent court concluded that the
issuances constituted a valid exercise by
the state of the police power.
Issue: WON the department orders
constitute a valid exercise of the state’s
police powers.
(1) Lower Court:
(2) Appellate Court: YES
(3) Supreme Court: YES
a. Majority Decision:
The latin maxim salus populi est suprema
lex embodies the character of the entire
spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting
the general welfare of the people under the
State's police power. As an inherent
attribute of sovereignty which virtually
"extends to all public needs," this "least
limitable" of governmental powers grants a
wide panoply of instruments through which
the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a
host of its regulatory powers.
As to the other provisions of Department
Order No. 3 questioned by petitioners, we
see nothing wrong with the requirement for
document and booking confirmation (D.O.
3-C), a minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), or
the requirement for registration of returning
performers. The requirement for a venue
certificate or other documents evidencing
the place and nature of work allows the
government closer monitoring of foreign
employers and helps keep our entertainers
away from prostitution fronts and other
worksites associated with unsavory,
immoral, illegal or exploitative practices.
Parenthetically, none of these issuances
appear to us, by any stretch of the
imagination, even remotely unreasonable or
arbitrary.
They address a felt need of according
greater protection for an oft-exploited
segment of our OCW's. They respond to
the industry's demand for clearer and more
practicable rules and guidelines. Many of
these provisions were fleshed out following
recommendations by, and after
consultations with, the affected sectors and
non-government organizations. On the
whole, they are aimed at enhancing the
safety and security of entertainers and
artists bound for Japan and other
destinations, without stifling the industry's
concerns for expansion and growth. In any
event, apart from the State's police power,
the Constitution itself mandates government
to extend the fullest protection to our
overseas workers. Obviously, protection to
labor does not indicate promotion of
employment alone. Under the welfare and
social justice provisions of the Constitution,
the promotion of full employment, while
desirable, cannot take a backseat to the
government's constitutional duty to provide
mechanisms for the protection of our
workforce, local or overseas.
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of
petitioners to invoke the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution to support their
argument that the government cannot enact
the assailed regulatory measures because
they abridge the freedom to contract. It was
held that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the
Constitution... must yield to the loftier
purposes targeted by the government."
Equally important, into every contract is
read provisions of existing law, and always,
a reservation of the police power for so long
as the agreement deals with a subject
impressed with the public welfare.
CASE #4
CYNTHIA A. FLORENDO v EXEQUIL
ENRILE
FACTS
1. Complainant Cynthia Florendo was the
plaintiff and winner of certain civil cases, in
which the defendants in those cases were
ordered to vacate the premises and
surrender the possession thereof.
2. After the defendants failure to
vacate, a writ of demolition was granted
by the court and was assigned to
respondent deputy chief Enrile to
execute.
3. Respondent Enrile asked for a total
of Php 5,200 in irregular installments as
“sheriff’s fee” from the complainant and her
counsel, and did not issue an official receipt.
4. After failing to execute the writ,
Complainant Florendo filed the letter-
complaint with the Office of Court
Administrator and asked that Enrile be
dismissed.
5. Respondent claimed that he
returned to the defendants for several times
to advice them to vacate the said place, but
they did not. He returned after the expiration
of an extension period and was threatened.
6. The case was referred to executive
Judge Ballutay and, after the case was
postponed several times due to the
respondent’s plea for time to secure a
counsel and because of non-appearance,
Judge Ballutay rendered a decision ordering
his suspension for one year and 6 months
without pay and to return the money.
7. The recommendation of Judge
Ballutay was then referred to the Office of
the Court Administrator and found that
respondent should be imposed a fine
equivalent for one month’s salary, to return
the money, with a stern warning.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty imposed was
sufficient
RULING:
1. NO, both are, especially that of
the latter, grossly inadequate in the light
of the gravity of the administrative
offenses committed by the respondent.
The respondent is guilty of serious
dereliction or neglect of duty, gross
inefficiency or incompetence, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. He is ordered DISMISSED
from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch of service
2. It must be stressed that
administrative cases involving
misconduct, nonfeasance, misfeasance,
or malfeasance in office of officers and
employees in the judiciary are of
paramount public interest as the
respondents are involved in the
administration of justice, a sacred and
solemn task. Such cases must be resolved
with reasonable dispatch to clear the name
of the innocent and to punish forthwith the
guilty whose stay in office, prolonged by
delay, could further tarnish the image of and
diminish the public's faith in the judiciary.
3. That the complainant "is in
conformity to the dismissal of the complaint"
can by no means be considered a mitigating
circumstance as it is offensive to the
postulate that a complaint for misconduct,
malfeasance, or misfeasance against a
public officer or employee cannot just be
withdrawn at any time by the complainant
and that the need to maintain the faith and
confidence of the people in the Government
and its agencies and instrumentalities
demands the proceedings in such cases
should not be made to depend on the
whims and caprices of the complainants
who are, in a real sense, only witnesses
therein.
4. The respondent did not make any
report on the amount he received from the
complainant nor did he issue an official
receipt therefor. It is then obvious that he
asked for the amount not as lawful fees
alone but as a consideration for the
performance of his duty. Any portion of the
P5,200.00 then in excess of the lawful fees
allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful
exaction which makes the respondent liable
for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty.
5. The respondent's explanation that
he was not able to implement the writ of
demolition because he was threatened with
death by the defendants is unacceptable. If
that were true, he should have either
reported it to the MTCC and requested the
assistance of other sheriffs or law
enforcement authorities, or filed the
appropriate criminal complaint against the
defendants who had threatened him
CASE #5
Roble Arrastre, Inc. v Hon Villaflor,
August 22, 2008
Facts:
● Petitioner Roble Arrastre, Inc. is a
cargo handling service operator,
authorized by the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA).
● Petitioner was granted Business
permits by respondent Altagracia
Villaflor as municipal mayor of
Hilongos, Leyte.
● Later on, PPA issued a 90-day hold-
over authority to petitioner.
● Stated therein was the proviso that
notwithstanding the 90-day period
aforementioned, the authority shall
be deemed ipso facto revoked if an
earlier permit/contract for cargo
handling services is granted or
sooner withdrawn or cancelled for
cause pursuant to PPA
Administrative Order No. 10-81.
● While the 90-day hold-over authority
was in effect, petitioner filed with
respondent mayor an application for
the renewal of its Business Permit
No. 276. However, the same was
denied
● Aggrieved by the denial, petitioner
filed with the RTC, a Petition for
Mandamus with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction.
● Petitioner said the source of the
power of the municipal mayor to
issue licenses is Section 444 Local
Government Code of 1991, which is
merely for the purpose of revenue
generation and not regulation,
hence, the municipal mayor has no
discretion to refuse the issuance of a
business license following the
applicant’s payment or satisfaction
of the proper license fees
● Respondent counters that the
remedy of mandamus does not lie
as the issuance of the permit sought
is not a ministerial function, but one
 that requires the exercise of sound
judgment and discretion.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 444, (3), (IV), R.A.
7160, also known as the Local Government
Code of 1991 gives the respondent mayor
the grant of police power and full discretion
to refuse the issuance of the permit (despite
due compliance of all documentary
requirements and full payment of the
required permit fees by the petitioner
Ruling:
Yes, Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local
Government Code of 1991, whereby the
power of the respondent mayor to issue
license and permits is circumscribed, is a
manifestation of
the delegated police power of a municipal
corporation.
Writ of mandamus is issued to command
the performance of a ministerial, but not a
discretionary duty.
It may be true, as argued by petitioner, that
Resolution No. 93-27, which was enacted
by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hilongos, is
not an ordinance but merely a resolution. A
municipal ordinance is different from a
resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body
on a specific matter. An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in
nature. Additionally, the two are enacted
differently - a third reading is necessary for
an ordinance, but not for a resolution,
unless decided otherwise by a majority of all
the Sanggunian members.
However, the fact that Resolution No. 93-27
is a "mere" resolution can do nil to
support petitioner's cause. As stated earlier,
the proper action is certiorari to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion had been
committed on the part of respondent mayor
in
the refusal to grant petitioner's application.
Petitioner's petition for mandamus is
incompetent against respondent mayor's
discretionary power.
“Discretion,” when applied to public
functionaries, means a power or right
conferred upon them by law or acting
officially, under certain circumstances,
uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience
of others. A purely ministerial act or duty in
contradiction to a discretional act is one
which an officer or tribunal performs in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise
of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when
the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty
is ministerial only when the discharge of the
same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment
CASE #7
Republic vs PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines filed a case
alleging that the defendant-appellee paid to the
Motor Vehicles Office in Baguio the amount of
P78,636.17, not in cash but in the form of
negotiable certificate of indebtedness, the
defendant being merely an assignee and not the
backpay holder itself. The complaint sought the
payment of such amount with surcharges plus
the legal rate of interest from the filing thereof
and a declaration of the nullity of the use of
such negotiable certificate of indebtedness to
satisfy its obligation. The answer by defendant-
appellee, filed on February 18, 1963, alleged
that what it did was in accordance with law,
both the Treasurer of the Philippines and the
General Auditing Office having signified their
conformity to such a mode of payment. It
sought the dismissal of the complaint. In the
decision of the lower court, the evidence
adduced by defendant bus firm was a letter
from x receipts acknowledging full payment of
its registration fees by the Motor Vehicles
Office. He had approved the acceptance of
negotiable certificates of indebtedness in
payment of registration fees of motor vehicles
as other evidences of public debt, such as bonds
and treasury certificates. Significantly, the
Auditor General concurred in the said view of
the National Treasurer. The plaintiff urges that
the negotiable certificates of indebtedness in
question could not use in payment of taxes. The
lower court favors the defendant and the CA
upholds the validity and efficacy of such
payments made and dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
WON the government can be estopped by the
act of mistake or errors committed by its
agents.
RULING:
NO. The Government cannot be estopped to
the errors made by its agent. Such a principle
dates back to Aguinaldo de Romero v. Director
of Lands, a 1919 decision. Insofar as the taxing
power is concerned, Pineda v. Court of First
Instance, a 1929 decision, speaks categorically:
"The Government is never estopped by mistake
or error on the part of its agents. It follows that,
in so far as this record shows, the petitioners
have not made it appear that the additional tax
claimed by the Collector is not in fact due and
collectible. The assessment of the tax by the
Collector creates, it must be remembered, a
charge that is at least prima facie valid." That
principle has since been subsequently followed.
There is nothing to stand in the way, therefore,
of the collection of the registration fees from
defendant-appellee. Thus, defendant was
ordered to pay the sum of P78,636.17.
TOPIC 2: INVESTIGATORY FUNCTION
CASE #8
Ruperto v Torres
FACTS:
Torres filed a complaint against Ruperto
charging him with disloyalty to service,
partiality, favoritism, violation of his oath of
office and acquisition of a big real-estate
beyond his income received from the
government.
A copy of the complaint was submitted to the
Integrity Board, The Board found after hearing
that the charges of prosecution and partiality
were sufficiently established and concluded
that petitioner had made use of his public
office to serve and favor his friends and to
prosecute the enemies of the latter, instead of
observing absolute impartiality and fairness in
the performance of his official duties. In view
of its findings,the Board recommended that
petitioner-appellee be reprimanded with the
warning that any repetition of any misconduct
on his part will be more severely dealt with.
The Integrity Board was created by Executive
Order No. 318, dated May 25, 1950. A cursory
reading of Executive Order No. 318 readily
reveals that the duties and functions of the
Integrity Board are to "proceed to a thorough
and complete investigation of any specific
case of graft, corruption, dereliction of duty or
irregularity in office and to submit to the
President the record of such investigation
together with its findings and
recommendation."
On December 30, 1953, the Integrity Board was
superseded by the Presidential Complaints and
Action Commission, with the same powers,
duties and functions as the Integrity Board.
The members of this Commission have since
then been substituted in this case in place of
the original respondents. The first assignment
of error made in the appeal is that certiorari
does not lie against the Integrity Board as it
exercises only investigatory and advisory
powers.
ISSUE:
Was defunct Integrity Board or its successor,
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission,
a board exercising judicial functions?
HELD:
1. No. Board's function limited to conducting
investigations and making findings. -"The
board neither adjudicates upon nor determines
the rights and interests or duties of parties; it is
limited to investigating the facts and making
findings in respect thereto. After an
investigation by the Integrity Board, the officer
that ultimately passes upon and adjudicates the
rights of the parties is the President, not the
Integrity Board, or its successor, the
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission.
While it is true that the Integrity Board in
performing its duties and exercising its
functions may exercise what is known as
judicial discretion, because it evaluates the
evidence submitted to it on the facts and
circumstances presented, such judicial
discretion is only for the purpose of evaluation
and for the determination of disputed facts."
2. Test of judicial functions. -"Not every
function wherein judgment and discretion are
exercised is a judicial function. The test of a
judicial function is not the exercise of judicial
discretion, but the power and authority to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of
the parties before it. As the Board lacks the
power and authority to adjudicate upon the
matters submitted to it for investigation and
make the final pronouncement thereon
affecting the parties, the second requisite for
the availability of the action of certiorari is
wanting."
CASE #9
CARMELO v. RAMOS
FACTS:
1. The Mayor of Manila issued an
Executive Order creating a committee to
investigate the anomalies involving
the license inspectors and other
personnel. He named Carmelo, the
petitioner, as chairman of said
committee.
2. The committee issued subpoenas
to the respondent Ramos, who
admitted having misappropriated on
several occasions, sums of money
given to him by the owner of Casa de
Alba for the payment of the latter's taxes
for 1956-1959 and that this fact had not
been discovered earlier because Ramos
used to entertain employees in the City
Treasurer's office at Casa de Alba where
Ramos was a bookkeeper as stated
above; the committee required him to
 appear before it in connection with
an administrative case against
Estanislao; but Ramos refused to
appear.
3. Petitioner filed in the CFI a
petition to declare Armando Ramos
in contempt. The lower court
dismissed the petition and held that
there is no law empowering
committees created by municipal
mayors to issue subpoenas and
demand that witnesses testify under
oath.
4. Petitioner invokes Sec. 580 of the
Revised Admin Code –
When authority to take testimony or
evidence is conferred upon an
administrative officer or upon any
nonjudicial person, committee, or
other body, such authority shall be
understood to comprehend the
right to administer oaths and
summons witnesses x x x.
x x x anyone who, without lawful
excuse, fails to appear upon
summons issued under the
authority of the preceding
paragraph or who, appearing
before any individual or body
exercising the power therein
defined, refuses to make oath, give
testimony, or produce documents
for inspection, when thereunto
lawfully required, shall be subject
to discipline as in case of contempt
of court and upon application of the
individual or body exercising the
power in question shall be dealt
with by the judge of first instance
having jurisdiction of the case x x x.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has the
power to issue a subpoena
Whether to subpoena witnesses to
appear before it and to ask for their
punishment in case of refusal (NO)
HELD:
1. One who invokes this provision of
the law must first show that he has
"authority to take testimony or evidence"
before he can apply to the courts for the
punishment of hostile witnesses.
2. There is nothing said in the
executive order of the Mayor creating
the committee about such a grant of
power. All that the order gives to this
body is the power to investigate
anomalies involving certain city
employees.
3. The Court does not agree with
the petitioner that a delegation of
such power to investigation implies
also a delegation of the power to take
testimony or evidence of witnesses
whose appearance may be required
by the compulsory process of
subpoena. The mayor cannot delegate
or confer the powers to administer
oaths, to take testimony, and to issue
subpoenas [Francia v. Pecson]
4. It is doubtful whether the provisions
of section 580 of the Administrative
Code are applicable to the City of
Manila as these pertain to national
bureaus or offices of the government.
CASE #10
CATURA vs. THE COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
FACTS: Catura and Salvador (petitioners)
are the President and Treasurer,
respectively, of the Phil. Virginia Tobacco
Administration Employees Association, a
duly registered labor organization.
Dec. 27, 1966, a complaint against them
under Sec. 17 of the Industrial Peace Act
was filed by the CIR and the principal
complainants, Tabaniag and other
employees constituting more than 10% of
the membership of the labor organization
(respondents). Petitioners were charged of
“unauthorized disbursement of union funds.”
Complainants demand a full and detailed
report of all financial transactions of the
union as well as to make the book of
accounts and other records of the financial
activities of the union open to inspection by
the members. The demands were refused.
The executive board of the organization
also passed a resolution calling for a
general membership meeting to pass on the
issue regarding the union funds. Catura
cancelled the meeting. Another meeting
was called, but there was still no response.
Members were forced to elevate the matter
to the Department of Labor which issued
subpoenas for the presentation of the
account books, but to no avail.
Having exhausted all the remedies provided
in the union’s constitution and by-laws, the
complaint sought to declare petitioners
guilty of unfair labor practice under the
Industrial Peace Act, to cease and desist
from further committing unfair labor practice,
and to render a detailed report of all
financial transactions of the union as well as
to make the book of accounts and other
records of financial activities open to
inspection by the members.
Dec. 28, 1966, private respondents sought
an injunction to prevent Catura, who turned
out to be re-elected as President from
taking oath of his office Then came the
order by Associate Judge Salvador which,
instead of granting the injunction sought,
limited itself to requiring and directing the
petitioners to deliver and deposit documents
related to finances at the hearing of the
petition. A motion for reconsideration was
filed by the petitioners alleging that they
were not heard before such order was
issued. The order was sustained.Hence,
this petition for review of the resolution of
the CIR.
ISSUE: Whether the CIR, in the exercise of
its power of investigation to assure
compliance with the internal labor
organization procedures under the Industrial
Peace Act, can require a labor
organization’s “books of accounts, bank
account, pass books, union funds, receipts,
vouchers and other documents related to
finances” be delivered and deposited with it
at the hearing to conduct such investigation.
HELD: Yes. The controlling provisions of
law concerning the power of investigation of
the CIR may be found in par. (b), (h), and (l)
of Sec. 17 of the Industrial Peace Act.
To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power to
investigate, to be conscientious and rational
at the very least, requires an inquiry into
existing facts and conditions. Clearly, the
matter was deemed serious enough by the
prosecutor of CIR to call for the exercise of
the statutory power of investigation. All the
challenged order did was to require
petitioner to “deliver and deposit” the
documents.
The documents required to be produced
constitutes evidence of the most solid
character as to whether there was a failure
to comply with the mandates of law. The
matter was properly within its cognizance
and the means necessary to give it force
and effectiveness should be deemed
implied unless such is arbitrary. Wherefore,
petition for certiorari is denied.
CASE #11 Evangelista vs. Jarencio , 69 SCRA 99
FACTS:
1. The President, pursuant to his special powers
and duties under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code created the Presidential
Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO).
2. PARGO is charged to
(b) investigate all activities involving or affecting
immoral practices, graft and corruptions,
smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness,
subversion, and all other activities which are
prejudicial to the government and the public
interests, and to submit proper
recommendations to the President of the
Philippines ;
(e) investigate cases of graft and corruption and
violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019,
and gather necessary evidence to establish
prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of
unlawfully amassed wealth; and
(h) to receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-
finding investigations of sworn complaints
against the acts, conduct or behavior of any
public official or employee and to file and
prosecute the proper charges with the
appropriate agency.
3. Pursuant to the power vested to it to issue
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, Petitioner
Quirico Evangelista, the Undersecretary of
PARGO issued a subpoena ad testificandum
against Fernando Manalastas (then acting City
Public Service Officer of Manila) commanding
him “to be and appear as witness at the Office
of the PARGO to testify in certain investigation
pending therein.”
4. Manalastas, instead of obeying, filed with CFI
Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition,
certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order; the trial
court granted the petition.
5. Evangelista elevated the matter directly with
the SC through an original action for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction on
the submission that the order of the trial court
is a patent nullity.
ISSUE: WON PARGO, acting thru its officials,
enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its
conduct of fact-finding investigations.
RULING: YES
1. An administrative agency may be authorized
to make investigations, not only in proceedings
of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in
proceedings, the sole purpose of which is to
obtain information upon which future action of
a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and
may require the attendance of witnesses in
proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It
may conduct general inquiries into evils calling
for correction, and to report findings to
appropriate bodies and make recommendations
for actions.
2. It has been essayed that the life blood of the
administrative process is the flow of fact, the
gathering, the organization and the analysis of
evidence. Investigations are useful for all
administrative functions, not only for rule
making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for
prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for
determining general policy, for recommending,
legislation, and for purposes no more specific
than illuminating obscure areas to find out what
if anything should be done.
3. Such subpoena power operates in extenso to
all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the
aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h). It
is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable,
as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial
or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph
(b).
4. Administrative agencies may enforce
subpoenas issued in the course of
investigations, whether or not adjudication is
involved, and whether or not probable cause is
shown and even before the issuance of a
complaint. The purpose of the subpoena is to
discover evidence, not to prove a pending
charge, but upon which to make one if the
discovered evidence so justifies.
TOPIC 3: QUASI-LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTION
CASE #12
People vs Maceran, October 18, 1977
Facts:
1. The Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, upon the
recommendation of the Fisheries
Commission, issued Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1,
amending section 2 of
Administrative Order No. 84, by
restricting the ban against
electrofishing to fresh water
fisheries.
2. In 1969, Jose Buenaventura,
Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes,
Nazario Aquino and Carlito del
Rosario were charged by a
Constabulary investigator in the
municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna
with having violated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1.
3. The municipal court quashed the
complaint. The prosecution
appealed. The Court of First
Instance of Laguna affirmed the
order of dismissal. Appealed in SC.
4. The lower court held that
electrofishing cannot be penalized
because electric current is not an
obnoxious or poisonous substance
as contemplated in section 1 of the
Fisheries Law and since the law
does not clearly prohibit electro
fishing, the executive and judicial
departments cannot consider it
unlawful.
Issue:
Whether or not, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
Administrative order is valid.
Ruling: NO.
1. The lawmaking body cannot
delegate to an executive official the
power to declare what acts should
constitute an offense.
2. The Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing
Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos.
84 and 84-1 and that those orders
are not warranted under the
Fisheries Commission, Republic Act
No. 3512.
3. Administrative agent are clothed with
rule-making powers because the
lawmaking body finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to
anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations
that may be encountered in
enforcing the law. All that is required
is that the regulation should be
germane to the defects and
purposes of the law and that it
should conform to the standards that
the law prescribes.
4. The grant of the rule-making power
to administrative agencies is a
relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an
exception to the non-deletion of
legislative, powers. Administrative
regulations or "subordinate
legislation calculated to promote the
public interest are necessary
because of "the growing complexity
of modem life, the multiplication of
the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the law.
5. The Fisheries Law does not
expressly prohibit electro fishing. As
electro fishing is not banned under
that law, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. In other
words, Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing
electro fishing, are devoid of any
legal basis.
6. Had the lawmaking body intended
to punish electro fishing, a penal
provision to that effect could have
been easily embodied in the old
Fisheries Law.
7. Nowhere in that law is electrofishing
specifically punished. Administrative
Order No. 84, in punishing electro
fishing, does not contemplate that
such an offense fails within the
category of "other violations"
because, as already shown, the
penalty for electrofishing is the
penalty next lower to the penalty for
fishing with the use of obnoxious or
poisonous substances, fixed in
section 76, and is not the same as
the penalty for "other violations" of
the law and regulations fixed in
section 83 of the Fisheries Law.
CASE #13
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
(SMART) and PILIPINO TELEPHONE
CORPORATION (PILTEL) vs. NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
(NTC), G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS: Petitioners Isla Communications Co.,
Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed
against the National Telecommunications
Commission, an action for declaration of nullity
of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000
(the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that the
NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of
consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards
since such jurisdiction belongs to the
Department of Trade and Industry under the
Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the
Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and
violative of the constitutional prohibition against
deprivation of property without due process of
law; that the Circular will result in the
impairment of the viability of the prepaid
cellular service by unduly prolonging the
validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and
call cards; and that the requirements of
identification of prepaid card buyers and call
balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence,
they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared
null and void ab initio.
ISSUES: 1. WON Respondent court erred in
holding respondents failed to exhaust
administrative remedy.
2. WON NTC has jurisdiction over the case.
3. WON the Billing Circular issued by NTC is
unconstitutional.
HELD: (1) Administrative agencies possess
quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power
is the power to make rules and regulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine
of non-delegability and separability of powers.
The rules and regulations should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. It is
required that the regulation be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law, and be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by law.17 They must
conform to and be consistent with the provisions
of the enabling statute in order for such rule or
regulation to be valid. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it
performs in a judicial manner an act which is
essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative
duty entrusted to it.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of
a rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle
applies only where the act of the administrative
agency concerned was performed pursuant to its
quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or
quasi-legislative power.
Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies applies in this case,
the records reveal that petitioners sufficiently
complied with this requirement. Petitioners were
able to register their protests to the proposed
billing guidelines. They submitted their
respective position papers setting forth their
objections and submitting proposed schemes for
the billing circular. After the same was issued,
petitioners wrote successive letters dated July 3,
2000 and July 5, 2000, asking for the suspension
and reconsideration of the so-called Billing
Circular. This was taken by petitioners as a clear
denial of the requests contained in their previous
letters, thus prompting them to seek judicial
relief.
(2) The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum
dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-
legislative or rule-making power. As such,
petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial
power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said
issuances. What is assailed is the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function,
the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass
upon the same. The determination of whether
a specific rule or set of rules issued by an
administrative agency contravenes the law or
the constitution is within the jurisdiction of
the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution
vests the power of judicial review or the power
to declare a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the
courts, including the regional trial courts. This is
within the scope of judicial power, which
includes the authority of the courts to determine
in an appropriate action the validity of the acts
of the political departments. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or
rule-making power of an administrative agency
is its quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear
and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the
law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law. The administrative body exercises
its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of
an executive or administrative nature, where
the power to act in such manner is incidental
to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In
carrying out their quasi-judicial functions,
the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions from them as
basis for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial nature.
(3) In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was
pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making
power. As such, petitioners were justified in
invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial
Court to assail the constitutionality and validity
of the said issuances. Hence, the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside
the orders of the trial court and in dismissing the
case.
CASE #14
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE
FILIPINAS v THE BOARD OF PUBLIC
UTILITY COMMISSIONERS
G.R. No. 11216, March 06, 1916
FACTS:
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE
FILIPINAS is a foreign corporation organized under
the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the
Philippine Islands as a common carrier of passengers
and merchandise by water; on or about June 7, 1915,
the Board of Public Utility Commissioners issued and
caused to be served an order to show cause why they
should not be required to present detailed annual
reports respecting its finances and operations
respecting the vessels owned and operated by it, in
the form and containing the matters indicated by the
model attached to the petition.
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE
FILIPINAS denied the authority of the board to
require the report asked for on the ground that the
provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by said board
as authority for such requirement was, if construed
as conferring such power, invalid as constituting an
unlawful attempt on the part of the Legislature to
delegate legislative power to the board, and further
on grounds that; “It is cumbersome and unnecessarily
prolix and that the preparation of the same would
entail an immense amount of clerical work.”
ISSUE:
WoN there was a valid delegation of powers
by the Legislative to the Board of Public Utility?
And in corollary, WoN the Board of Public Utility
may validly require the Compania General de
Tobacos de Filipinas to submit such reports?
HELD: YES on both issues.
In the case at bar the provision complained
of does not lay "down the general rules of action
under which the commission shall proceed," nor
does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports
shall contain. Practically everything is left to the
judgment and discretion of the Board of Public
Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to
when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to
what extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon.
The section of Act No. 2307 under which
the Board of Public Utility Commissioners relies for
its authority, so far as pertinent to the case at hand,
reads as follows:
"Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after
hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to
require every public utility as herein defined:
* * * * * * *
 "(e) To furnish annually a detailed report of
finances and operations, in such form and
containing such matters as the Board may from
time to time by order prescribe."
As is apparent at a glance the provision
conferring authority on the board is very general. It is
also very comprehensive. It calls for a detailed report
of the finances and operations of the petitioning
steamship company. That, it would seem, covers
substantially everything; for there is very little to a
steamship company but its finances and operations. x
xx
x x xSuch a provision does not declare, or
set out, or indicate what information the State
requires, what is valuable to it, what it needs in order
to impose correct and just taxation, supervision or
control, or the facts which the State must have in
order to deal justly and equitably with such public
utilities and to require them to deal justly and
equitably with the State. The Legislature seems
simply to have authorized 'the Board of Public
Utility Commissioners to require what
information the board wants.
We believe that the Legislature, by the
provision in question, has abdicated its powers and
functions in favor of the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners with respect to the matters therein
referred to, and that such Act is in violation of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. We believe that
the Legislature, by the provision referred to, has
not asked for the information which the State
wants but has authorized the board to obtain the
information which the board wants.
Doctrine:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves:
(1) a discretion as to what it shall be, and
(2) conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. R.
Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs. 1 Ohio St., 77)
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
Delegation of legislative power
CASE #15: People vs Vera G.R. No. L-
45685 65 Phil 56 | November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI
BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, and
MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
FACTS
Mariano Cu Unjieng was
convicted by the trial court in Manila. He
filed for reconsideration and four
motions for new trial but all were denied.
He then elevated to the Supreme Court
(SC) and the SC remanded the appeal to
the lower court for a new trial. While
awaiting new trial, he appealed for
probation alleging that the he is innocent
of the crime he was convicted of.
The Judge of the Manila CFI
directed the appeal to the Insular
Probation Office (IPO). The IPO denied
the application. However, Judge Vera,
upon another request by petitioner,
allowed the petition to be set for hearing.
The City Prosecutor countered alleging
that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in
violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which
provides that the act of Legislature
granting provincial boards the power to
provide a system of probation to
convicted person. Nowhere in the law is
stated that the law is applicable to a city
like Manila because it is only indicated
therein that only provinces are covered.
And even if Manila is covered by the law
it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3
of the Constitution provides equal
protection of laws. The said law provides
absolute discretion to provincial boards
and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power.
Further, the said probation law
may be an encroachment of the power of
the executive to provide pardon because
providing probation, in effect, is granting
freedom, as in pardon.
ISSUES
a) Whether or not Act No. 4221
constituted an undue
delegation of legislative
power; AND
b) Whether or not the said act
denies the equal protection of
the laws.
RULING
a) YES, the Court concludes that
section 11 of Act No. 4221
constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the
provincial boards and is, for
this reason, unconstitutional
and void.
There is no set standard
provided by Congress on how
provincial boards must act in
carrying out a system of
probation. The provincial boards
are given absolute discretion
which is violative of the
constitution and the doctrine of
the non delegation of power.
Further, it is a violation of equity
so protected by the constitution.
The challenged section of Act No.
4221 in section 11 which reads as
follows: This Act shall apply only
in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not
lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation
officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be
subject to the direction of the
Probation Office.
The provincial boards of
the various provinces are to
determine for themselves,
whether the Probation Law shall
apply to their provinces or not at
all. The applicability and
application of the Probation Act
are entirely placed in the hands of
the provincial boards. If the
provincial board does not wish to
have the Act applied in its
province, all that it has to do is to
decline to appropriate the needed
amount for the salary of a
probation officer.
b) YES, the act denies the equal
protection of the laws. It is
contended that the Probation
Act violates the provisions of
our Bill of Rights which
prohibits the denial to any
person of the equal protection
of the laws. The resultant
 inequality may be said to flow
from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power,
although perhaps this is not
necessarily the result in every
case. Adopting the example
given by one of the counsel for
the petitioners in the course of
his oral argument, one
province may appropriate the
necessary fund to defray the
salary of a probation officer,
while another province may
refuse or fail to do so. In such a
case, the Probation Act would
be in operation in the former
province but not in the latter.
This means that a person
otherwise coming within the
purview of the law would be
liable to enjoy the benefits of
probation in one province while
another person similarly
situated in another province
would be denied those same
benefits. This is obnoxious
discrimination. Contrariwise, it
is also possible for all the
provincial boards to
appropriate the necessary
funds for the salaries of the
probation officers in their
respective provinces, in which
case no inequality would result
for the obvious reason that
probation would be in
operation in each and every
province by the affirmative
action of appropriation by all
the provincial boards.
-------------------------------XX
DISCUSSIONS:
An act of the legislature is incomplete
and hence invalid if it does not lay down
any rule or definite standard by which
the administrative officer or board may
be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it. The
probation Act does not, by the force of
any of its provisions, fix and impose
upon the provincial boards any standard
or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted, as
mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the
recent case of Schecter, supra, is a
“roving commission” which enables the
provincial boards to exercise arbitrary
discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the
legislature does not seemingly on its
own authority extend the benefits of the
Probation Act to the provinces but in
reality leaves the entire matter for the
various provincial boards to determine.
The equal protection of laws is a
pledge of the protection of equal laws.
The classification of equal protection, to
be reasonable, must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and
must apply equally to each member of
the class.
CASE # 16 --YNOT vs IAC, March 20,
1987
 The petitioner had transported six
carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate
to Iloilo, when they were confiscated by
the police station commander of Iloilo,
for violation of section 1 of EO No. 626.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the
RTCof Iloilo City issued a writ of
replevin.
Petitioner challenges the
constitutionality of Executive Order No.
626-A, prohibiting the interprovincial
movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos. The rule
provides ;
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby
amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless
of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in
the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit,
in the case of carabaos.
Q. Is Executive Order No. 626-A, a valid
delegation of powers ?
A. NO, It is there authorized that the
seized property shall "be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission
may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and
to deserving farmers through dispersal
as the Director of Animal Industry may
see fit, in the case of carabaos."The
phrase "may see fit" is an extremely
generous and dangerous condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse,
and even corruption. . Their options are
apparently boundless. Who shall be the
fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they
be chosen? Only the officers named can
supply the answer, they and they alone
may choose the grantee as they see fit,
and in their own exclusive discretion.
Definitely, there is here a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping
authority that is not "canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing," in
short, a clearly profligate and therefore
invalid delegation of legislative powers.
18. Carbonilla v Board of Airline
Representatives, Semt. 14, 2011
FACTS:
● The Bureau of Customs (BOC) issued
Customs Administrative Order No. 1-
2005 (CAO 1-2005), amending CAO
792, which was then approved by the
Department of Finance.
● Said Custom Administrative Order
(CAO) were promulgated pursuant to
Sec. 3506 in relation to Sec. 608 of the
Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines.
● Petitioners Office of the President, et
al. alleged that prior to the
amendment of CAO 7-92, the BOC
created a committee to review the
overtime pay of Customs personnel
in NAIA and to propose its
adjustment from the exchange rate
of P25 to US$1 to the then
exchange rate of P55 to US$1. The
Office of the President, et al. alleged
that for a period of more than two
years from the creation of the
committee, several meetings were
 conducted with the agencies
concerned, including respondent
Board of Airlines Representatives
(BAR), to discuss the proposed rate
adjustment that would be embodied
in an Amendatory Customs
Administrative Order.
● Respondent Board of Airlines (BAR)
alleged that it only learned of the
proposed increase of the overtime rates
only sometime in 2004 and only through
unofficial reports. However, they were
informed that the assailed CAO 1-2005
had already become effective.
● Later on, the BOC sent a letter to BAR’s
member airlines demanding payment of
overtime services of BOC personnel in
compliance with the CAO. The BAR’s
member airlines refused and manifested
their intention to file a petition with the
Commissioner of Customs and
Secretary of Finance to suspend its
implementation.
● The Department of Finance finds no
valid ground to disturb the validity of
CAO, much less to suspend its
implementation or effectivity and that its
implementation is legally proper.
● Thereafter, the said decision was
reviewed by the Office of the President
which denied the appeal, however, was
later reversed by the Court of Appeals.
The Office of the President allege that
Sec. 3506 of the TCCP, CAO No. 1-
2005 and CAO No. 7-92 are valid. Said
law and its implementing regulations
neither constitute undue delegation of
legislative power nor authorize
overpayment of BOC personnel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said laws constitute undue
delegation of legislative power
RULING:
No, Supreme Court does not agree with the
Court of Appeals that Section 3506 of the TCCP
failed the completeness and sufficient standard
tests. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is
to enforce it. The second test requires adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to determine
the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals,
Section 3506 of the TCCP complied with these
requirements. The law is complete in itself that it
leaves nothing more for the BOC to do: it gives
authority to the Collector to assign customs
employees to do overtime work; the
Commissioner of Customs fixes the rates; and it
provides that the payments shall be made by the
importers, shippers or other persons served.
Section 3506 also fixed the standard to be
followed by the Commissioner of Customs when
it provides that the rates shall not be less than
that prescribed by law to be paid to employees
of private enterprise.
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals,
BOC employees rendering overtime services are
not receiving double compensation for the
overtime pay, travel and meal allowances
provided for under CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005.
Section 3506 provides that the rates shall not be
less than that prescribed by law to be paid to
employees of private enterprise. The overtime
pay, travel and meal allowances are payment for
additional work rendered after regular office
hours and do not constitute double
compensation prohibited under Section 8, Article
IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution as they are in fact
authorized by law or Section 3506 of the TCCP.
33.Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association v Duque
October 9, 2007
Facts :
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was
issued by President Corazon Aquino on
October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative
powers granted to the president under the
Freedom Constitution. One of the
preambular clauses of the Milk Code states
that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11
of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code
adopted by the World Health Assembly
(WHA) in 1981.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of
the Child. Article 24 of said instrument
provides that State Parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant and
child mortality, and ensure that all segments
of society, specially parents and children,
are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of
the Child. Article 24 of said instrument
provides that State Parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant and
child mortality, and ensure that all segments
of society, specially parents and children,
are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein
assailed RIRR which was to take effect on
July 7, 2006.
However, on June 28, 2006, petitioner,
representing its members that are
manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes,
filed the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction.
On August 15, 2006, the Court issued a
Resolution granting a TRO enjoining
respondents from implementing the
questioned RIRR.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Administrative Order No.
2006-0012 or the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the
Department of Health (DOH) is not
constitutional.
Held.
No. Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or
the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations (RIRR) issued by the
Department of Health (DOH) is not
constitutional to certain provisions which
rendered the court as null and void
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 provides that
the DOH shall define the national health
policy and implement a national health plan
within the framework of the government's
general policies and plans, and issue orders
and regulations concerning the
implementation of established health
policies.
Health is a legitimate subject matter for
regulation by the DOH (and certain other
administrative agencies) in exercise of
police powers delegated to it. The sheer
span of jurisprudence on that matter
precludes the need to further discuss it..48
However, health information, particularly
advertising materials on apparently non-
toxic products like breastmilk substitutes
and supplements, is a relatively new area
for regulation by the DOH.49
As early as the 1917 Revised Administrative
Code of the Philippine Islands,50 health
information was already within the ambit of
the regulatory powers of the predecessor of
DOH.51 Section 938 thereof charged it with
the duty to protect the health of the people,
and vested it with such powers as "(g) the
dissemination of hygienic information
among the people and especially the
inculcation of knowledge as to the proper
care of infants and the methods of
preventing and combating dangerous
communicable diseases."
Seventy years later, the 1987 Administrative
Code tasked respondent DOH to carry out
the state policy pronounced under Section
15, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which
is "to protect and promote the right to health
of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.To that end, it
was granted under Section 3 of the
Administrative Code the power to "(6)
propagate health information and educate
the population on important health, medical
and environmental matters which have
health implications.
34. Hilado v collector of internal revenue
Aug. 31, 1956
Facts:
On March 31, 1952, Petitioner filed his
income tax return for 1951 with the
treasurer of Bacolod City wherein he
claimed, among other things, the amount of
P12,837.65 as a deductible item from his
gross income pursuant to General Circular
No. V-123 issued by the Collector of Internal
Revenue. This circular was issued pursuant
to certain rules laid down by the Secretary
of Finance On the basis of said return, an
assessment notice demanding the payment
of P9,419 was sent to Petitioner, who paid
the tax in monthly installments, the last
payment having been made on January 2,
1953.
Meanwhile, on August 30, 1952, the
Secretary of Finance, through the Collector
of Internal Revenue, issued General
Circular No. V-139 which not only revoked
and declared void his general Circular No.
V- 123 but laid down the rule that losses of
property which occurred during the period of
World War II from fires, storms, shipwreck
or other casualty, or from robbery, theft, or
embezzlement are deductible in the year of
actual loss or destruction of said property.
As a consequence, the amount of
P12,837.65 was disallowed as a deduction
from the gross income of Petitioner for 1951
and the Collector of Internal Revenue
demanded from him the payment of the sum
of P3,546 as deficiency income tax for said
year. When the petition for reconsideration
filed by Petitioner was denied, he filed a
petition for review with the Court of Tax
Appeals. In due time, this court rendered
decision affirming the assessment made by
Respondent Collector of Internal Revenue.
This is an appeal from said decision.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Secretary of Finance
acted without valid authority in revoking it
and approving in lieu thereof General
Circular No. V-139.
Yes..Secretary of Finance acted with valid
authority in revoking it and approving in lieu
thereof General Circular No. V-139. It
cannot be denied, however, that the
Secretary of Finance is vested with authority
to revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or
previous rulings of his predecessor in office
because the construction of a statute by
those administering it is not binding on their
successors if thereafter the latter become
satisfied that a different construction should
be given.
2. Whether or not general Circular No. V-
139 cannot be given retroactive effect
because that would affect and obliterate the
vested right.
Yes.Art. 2254. — No vested or acquired
right can arise from acts or omissions which
are against the law or which infringe upon
the rights of others.” (Article 2254, New Civil
Code.)
General Circular No. V-123, having been
issued on a wrong construction of the law,
cannot give rise to a vested right that can be
invoked by a taxpayer. The reason is
obvious: vested right cannot spring from a
wrong interpretation. This is too clear to
require elaboration.
“It seems too clear for serious argument that
an administrative officer cannot change a
law enacted by Congress. A regulation that
is merely an interpretation of the statute
when once determined to have been
erroneous becomes nullity. An erroneous
construction of the law by the Treasury
Department or the collector of internal
revenue does not preclude or estop the
government from collecting a tax which is
legally due.
Fact-finding and Rate-Fixing
CASE #26
PRIMITIVO LOVINA, and NELLY
MONTILLA plaintiffs-appellees vs.
FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, and
BENJAMIN YONZON defendants-
appellants.,
G.R. No. L-17821, November 29, 1963
Facts: This is an appeal from a decision of
the CFI of Manila (Branch X), in its Civil
Case, enjoining the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications from causing
the removal of certain dams and dikes in a
fishpond owned by Primitivo and Nelly
Lovina in the Municipality of Macabebe
Province of Pampanga.
Numerous residents of Macabebe,
Pampanga complained that appellees had
blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable
river in the same municipality and asked
that the obstructions be ordered removed,
under the provisions of R.A. No. 2056.
After notice and hearing to the parties, the
said Secretary of Public Works and
Communications found the constructions to
be a public nuisance in navigable waters,
and ordered the land owners, spouses
Lovina, to remove five (5) closures of
Sapang Bulati.
After receipt of the decision, the appellees
filed a petition in CFI of Manila to restrain
the Secretary from enforcing his decision.
The trial court, after due hearing, granted a
permanent injunction. It held that R.A. No.
2056 is unconstitutional and that Sapang
Bulati is not a navigable river but a private
stream. The appellees’ contention is that
R.A. No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it
invests the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications with sweeping,
unrestrained, final and un-appealable
authority to pass upon the issues of whether Formatted: Font: Not Bold
a river or stream is public and navigable,
whether a dam encroaches upon such
waters and is constitutive as a public Formatted: Font: Not Bold
nuisance, and whether the law applies to
the state of facts, thereby Constituting an
alleged unlawful delegation of judicial power
to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
Issue: Whether or not there is an unlawful
delegation of judicial power. Formatted: Font: 11 pt, Not Highlight
Held: The contentions of the appellees are Formatted: Font: Not Bold
not tenable.
R.A. 2056 merely empowers the Secretary
to remove unauthorized obstructions or
encroachments upon public streams,
constructions that no private person was
anyway entitled to make, because the bed
of navigable streams is public property, and
ownership thereof is not acquirable by
adverse possession. It is true that the Formatted: Font: Not Bold
exercise of the Secretary's power under the
Act necessarily involves the determination
of some questions of fact, such as the
existence of the stream and its previous
navigable character; but these functions,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely
incidental to the exercise of the power
granted by law to clear navigable streams of
unauthorized obstructions or
encroachments, and authorities are clear
that they are, validly conferrable upon
executive officials provided the party
affected is given opportunity to be heard, as
is expressly required by R.A. No. 2056,
Section 2.
The mere fact that an officer is required by
law to inquire the existence of certain facts
and to apply the law thereto in order to
determine what his official conduct shall be
and the fact that these acts may affect
private, rights do not constitute an exercise
of judicial powers.
Accordingly, a statute may give to non-
judicial officers the power to declare the
existence of facts which call into operation
its provisions, and similarly may grant to
commissioners and other subordinate
officer, power to ascertain and determine
appropriate facts as a basis for procedure in
the enforcement of particular laws. It is
noteworthy that R. A. 2605 authorizes
removal of the unauthorized dikes either as
"public nuisances or as prohibited
constructions" on public navigable streams,
and those of appellees clearly are in the
latter class.
In fine, it is held that R. A. No. 2056 does
not constitute an unlawful delegation of
judicial power to the Secretary of Public
Works; that the findings of fact of the
Secretary of Public Works under R.A. No.
2056 should be respected in the absence of
illegality, error of law, fraud, or imposition,
so long as the said, findings are supported
by substantial evidence submitted to him.
The decision appealed from is reversed,
and the writs of injunction issued therein are
annulled and set aside.
CASE # 32 - - Tayug RURAL Bank v.
CENTRAL Bank
Tayug Rural Bank, Inc., is a banking
corporation in Tayug, Pangasinan. It
obtained thirteen (13) loans from
Defendant-Appellant, Central Bank of the
Philippines, by way of rediscounting, at the
rate of 1/2 of 1% per annum. The loans,
amounting to P813,000.00 as of July 30,
1963, were all covered by corresponding
promissory notes prescribing the terms and
conditions of the aforesaid loans.
Therafter, Central Bank issued
Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8, informing
all rural banks that an additional penalty
interest rate of ten per cent (10%) per
annum would be assessed on all past due
loans beginning January 4, 1965. Said
Memorandum Circular was actually
enforced on all rural banks effective July 4,
1965.
Rural Bank sued Central Banl in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, to recover
the 10% penalty imposed by Appellant and
to restrain Appellant from continuing the
imposition of the penalty. Appellant justified
the imposition of the penalty by way of
affirmative and special defenses, stating
that it was legally imposed under the
provisions of Section 147 and 148 of the
Rules and Regulations Governing Rural
Banks promulgated by the Monetary Board
under authority of Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 720, as amended.
It is undisputed that no penal clause
has been included in the promissory notes.
For this reason, the trial court is of the view
that Memorandum Circular DLC-8 issued on
December 23, 1964 prescribing retroactive
effect on all past due loans, impairs the
obligation of contract and deprives the
plaintiff of its property without due process
of law.
Issue:
WON the Central Bank can validly
impose the 10% penalty on Appellee's past
overdue loans by virtue of Memorandum
Circular No. DLC-8 dated December 23,
1964
Held:
NO.
Nowhere in any of the side-quoted
pertinent provisions of the law is the
monetary Board authorized to mete out
on rural banks an additional penalty rate
on their past due accounts with
Appellant. As correctly stated by the trial
court, while the Monetary Board
possesses broad supervisory powers,
nonetheless, the retroactive imposition
of administrative penalties cannot be
taken as a measure supervisory in
character. Administrative rules and
regulations have the force and effect of law .
There are, however, limitations to
the rule-making power of administrative
agencies. A rule shaped out by
jurisprudence is that when Congress
authorizes promulgation of
administrative rules and regulations to
implement given legislation, all that is
required is that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes. The
recognition of the power of administrative
officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of the statute, as
necessarily limited to what is provided for in
the legislative enactment. A rule is binding
on the courts so long as the procedure fixed
for its promulgation is followed and its scope
is within the statute granted by the
legislature, even if the courts are not in
agreement with the policy stated therein or
its innate wisdom ...." On the other hand,
"administrative interpretation of the law
is at best merely advisory, for it is the
courts that finally determine what the law
means. There must be strict compliance
with the legislative enactment.
In case of discrepancy between
the basic law and a rule or regulation
issued to implement said law, the basic
law prevails because said rule or
regulation cannot go beyond the terms
and provisions of the basic law. Rules
that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned. Except for constitutional officials
who can trace their competence to act to
the fundamental law itself, a public official
must locate in the statute relied upon a
grant of power before he can exercise it.
Department zeal may not be permitted to
outrun the authority conferred by statute.
When promulgated in pursuance of
the procedure or authority conferred upon
the administrative agency by law, the rules
and regulations partake of the nature of a
statute, and compliance therewith may be
enforced by a penal sanction provided in the
law. Conversely, the rule is likewise clear.
Hence an administrative agency cannot
impose a penalty not so provided in the
law authorizing the promulgation of the
rules and regulations, much less one
that is applied retroactively.
Finally, on March 31, 1970, the
Monetary Board in its Resolution No. 475
effective April 1, 1970, revoked its
Resolution No. 1813, dated December 18,
1964 imposing the questioned 10% per
annum penalty rate on past due loans of
rural banks and amended sub-paragraph
(a), Section 10 of the existing guidelines
governing rural banks' applications for a
loan or rediscount, dated May 7, 1969. As
stated by the trial court, this move on the
part of the Monetary Board clearly shows
an admission that it has no power to
impose the 10% penalty interest through
its rules and regulations but only
through the terms and conditions of the
promissory notes executed by the
borrowing rural banks.

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