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Supreme Court

Manila

DECISION

THIRD DIVISION

SALVADOR YAPYUCO y G.R. Nos. 120744-46 PERALTA, J.:

ENRIQUEZ, Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to
wanton violence is never justified when their duty could be performed
Petitioner, otherwise. A shoot first, think later disposition occupies no decent place in a
civilized society. Never has homicide or murder been a function of law
enforcement. The public peace is never predicated on the cost of human life.
- versus -
These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the June 30, 1995 Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614 cases for murder, frustrated murder and
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and multiple counts of attempted murder, respectively. The cases are predicated
on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured
Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr.
Respondents.
(Yapyuco) and Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who
x---------------------------x were members of the Integrated National Police (INP)[2] stationed at the
Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan)
MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. G.R. No. 122677 and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen,
respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra),
REYES and VIRGILIO A. Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan
(Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were either members of the Civil
MANGUERRA,
Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays
Petitioners, Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all charged with
murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in three
Informations, the inculpatory portions of which read:

- versus -

Criminal Case No. 16612:

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Respondents. Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being then policemen,
Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force
x--------------------------x (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another, and
while responding to information about the presence of armed men in said
GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. and G.R. No. 122776
barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in
ERNESTO PUNO, relation to their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with deliberate intent
Petitioners, Present: to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic
weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by
PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,* Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are
necessarily mortal on the different parts of the body, thereby causing the
- versus - BERSAMIN, **
direct and immediate death of the latter.
ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR., *** and

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
Criminal Case No. 16613:
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondents.
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
June 25, 2012 Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being then policemen,
Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force
(CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another, and
while responding to information about the presence of armed men in said
barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in
relation to their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill,
attack Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V.
Panlican with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota
Tamaraw jitney ridden by said Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera,
Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced the commission
of murder directly by overt acts of execution which should produce the murder
by reason of some cause or accident other than their own spontaneous
desistance.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. 16614:
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being then policemen,
Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force
(CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another, and
while responding to information about the presence of armed men in said
barangay and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in
relation to their office, did then and there, with treachery and evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent of taking
the life of Noel C. Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic weapons by
firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C.
Villanueva and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily
mortal and having performed all the acts which would have produced the
crime of murder, but which did not, by reason of causes independent of the
defendants will, namely, the able and timely medical assistance given to said
Noel C. Villanueva, which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities,[6] the accused except Pabalan who died earlier on June 12,
1990,[7] and Yapyuco who was then allegedly indisposed[8] entered individual
pleas of not guilty.[9] A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities, and at his arraignment likewise entered a negative plea.[10] In the
meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and
Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for Bail relative to Criminal Case No.
16612.[11] Said motion was heard on the premise, as previously agreed upon
by both the prosecution and the defense, that these cases would be jointly
tried and that the evidence adduced at said hearing would automatically
constitute evidence at the trial on the merits.[12] On May 10, 1991, the
Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612.[13] Yapyuco likewise
applied for bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted on May 21,
1991.[14] Pamintuan died on November 21, 1992,[15] and accordingly, the
charges against him were dismissed.
At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived the pre-
trial inquest. [16] Hence, joint trial on the merits ensued and picked up from
where the presentation of evidence left off at the hearing on the bail
applications.
The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva,
Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang
as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The
company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious
procession had passed. As they were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded
Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for
potholes and open canals on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and
the rest of his companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva
allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they
were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and
instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely.[17]
Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim,
allegedly did not see any one on the road flag them down.[18] In open court,
Flores executed a sketch[19] depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw
jeepney on the road, the residence of Salangsang where they had come from
and the house situated on the right side of the road right after the curve where
the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified said house to be that of a
certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly took post and opened fire
at him and his companions. He could not tell how many firearms were
used. He recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and
Villanueva were wounded, jumped out of the jeepney when he saw from
behind them Pamintuan emerging from the yard of Narons house. Frantic and
shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself and his companions to be
employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan reproved them
for not stopping when flagged. At this point, he was distracted when
Villanueva cried out and told him to summon Salangsang for help as he
(Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He dashed back to Salangsangs house
as instructed and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was
also there, and Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney
to be taken to the hospital.[20] This was corroborated by Villanueva who stated
that as soon as the firing had ceased, two armed men, together with
Pamintuan, approached them and transferred him and Licup to another
jeepney and taken to the nearby St. Francis Hospital.[21]
Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which very
rapidly succeeded each other, and that they were given no warning shot at all
contrary to what the defense would say.[22] He professed that he, together
with his co-passengers, were also aboard the Sarao jeepney on its way to the
hospital and inside it he observed two men, each holding long firearms, seated
beside the driver. He continued that as soon as he and his companions had
been dropped off at the hospital, the driver of the Sarao jeepney immediately
drove off together with his two armed companions.[23] He further narrated
that the day after the shooting, he brought Licup to the Makati Medical Center
where the latter expired on April 7, 1988.[24] He claimed that all the accused in
the case had not been known to him prior to the incident, except for
Pamintuan whom he identified to be his wifes uncle and with whom he denied
having had any rift nor with the other accused for that matter, which would
have otherwise inspired ill motives. [25] He claimed the bullet holes on the
Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and that there were no other
bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.[26]
Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant, affirmed
the presence of his companions at his residence on the subject date and time,
and corroborated Villanuevas and Flores narration of the events immediately
preceding the shooting. He recounted that after seeing off his guests shortly
after the procession had passed his house and reminding them to proceed
carefully on the pothole-studded roads, he was alarmed when moments later,
he heard a volley of gunfire from a distance which was shortly followed
by Flores frantic call for help. He immediately proceeded to the scene on his
bicycle and saw Pamintuan by the lamppost just outside the gate of Narons
house where, inside, he noticed a congregation of more or less six people
whom he could not recognize. [27] At this point, he witnessed Licup and
Villanueva being loaded into another jeepney occupied by three men who
appeared to be in uniform. He then retrieved the keys of the Tamaraw jeepney
from Villanueva and decided to deliver it to his mothers house, but before
driving off, he allegedly caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the wheel of an
owner-type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the same
jeepney which he remembered to be that frequently used by Yapyuco in
patrolling the barangay. He claimed he spent the night at his mothers house
and in the morning, a policeman came looking for him with whom, however,
he was not able to talk.[28]
Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because the
electric post in front of Narons house was strangely not lit when he arrived,
and that none of the neighboring houses was illuminated. He admitted his
uncertainty as to whether it was Yapyucos group or the group of Pamintuan
that brought his injured companions to the hospital, but he could tell with
certainty that it was the Sarao jeepney previously identified by Villanueva and
Flores that brought his injured companions to the hospital.[29]
Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory in Camp Olivas, affirmed that she had previously examined the
firearms suspected to have been used by petitioners in the shooting and found
them positive for gunpowder residue. She could not, however, determine
exactly when the firearms were discharged; neither could she tell how many
firearms were discharged that night nor the relative positions of the
gunmen.She admitted having declined to administer paraffin test on
petitioners and on the other accused because the opportunity therefor came
only 72 hours after the incident. She affirmed having also examined the
Tamaraw jeepney and found eleven (11) bullet holes on it, most of which had
punctured the door at the passenger side of the vehicle at oblique and
perpendicular directions. She explained, rather inconclusively, that the bullets
that hit at an angle might have been fired while the jeepney was either at a
standstill or moving forward in a straight line, or gradually making a turn at the
curve on the road.[30] Additionally, Silvestre Lapitan, administrative and supply
officer of the INP-Pampanga Provincial Command tasked with the issuance of
firearms and ammunitions to members of the local police force and CHDF and
CVO members, identified in court the memorandum receipts for the firearms
he had issued to Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra, Pabalan and
Yapyuco.[31]
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center,
examined the injuries of Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered
multiple metal shrapnel from the occipital region of Villanuevas head as well
as from the posterior aspect of his chest; he noted nothing serious in these
wounds in that the incapacity would last between 10 and 30 days only. He also
located a bullet wound on the front lateral portion of the right thigh, and he
theorized that this wound would be caused by a firearm discharged in front of
the victim, assuming the assailant and the victim were both standing upright
on the ground and the firearm was fired from the level of the assailants waist;
but if the victim was seated, the position of his thigh must be horizontal so that
with the shot coming from his front, the trajectory of the bullet would be
upward. He hypothesized that if the shot would come behind Villanueva, the
bullet would enter the thigh of the seated victim and exit at a lower level.[32]
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when examined. On
the patient, he noted a lacerated wound at the right temporal region of the
head one consistent with being hit by a hard and blunt object and not a
bullet. He noted three (3) gunshot wounds the locations of which suggested
that Licup was upright when fired upon from the front: one is a through-and-
through wound in the middle lateral aspect of the middle portion of the right
leg; another, through-and-through wound at the middle portion of the right
forearm; and third one, a wound in the abdomen which critically and fatally
involved the stomach and the intestines. He hypothesized that if Licup was
seated in the passenger seat as claimed, his right leg must have been exposed
and the assailant must have been in front of him holding the gun slightly higher
than the level of the bullet entry in the leg. He found that the wound in the
abdomen had entered from the left side and crossed over to and exited at the
right, which suggested that the gunman must have been positioned at Licups
left side. He explained that if this wound had been inflicted ahead of that in
the forearm, then the former must have been fired after Licup had changed
his position as a reaction to the first bullet that hit him. He said that the wound
on the leg must have been caused by a bullet fired at the victims back and hit
the jeepney at a downward angle without hitting any hard surface prior.[33]
Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licups right forearm must have been
caused by a bullet fired from the front but slightly obliquely to the right of the
victim. Hypothesizing, he held the improbability of Licup being hit on the
abdomen, considering that he might have changed position following the
infliction of the other wounds, unless there was more than one assailant who
fired multiple shots from either side of the Tamaraw jeepney; however, he
proceeded to rule out the possibility of Licup having changed position
especially if the gunfire was delivered very rapidly. He could not tell which of
Licups three wounds was first inflicted, yet it could be that the bullet to the
abdomen was delivered ahead of the others because it would have caused
Licup to lean forward and stoop down with his head lying low and steady.[34]
Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) affirmed that the accused police officers Yapyuco,
Cunanan and Puno had been administratively charged with and tried for gross
misconduct as a consequence of the subject shooting incident and that he had
in fact conducted investigations thereon sometime in 1989 and 1990 which
culminated in their dismissal from service.[35] Dolly Porquerio, stenographer at
the NAPOLCOM, testified that at the hearing of the administrative case,
Yapyuco authenticated the report on the shooting incident dated April 5, 1988
which he had previously prepared at his office. This, according to her, together
with the sketch showing the relative position of the responding law enforcers
and the Tamaraw jeepney at the scene of the incident, had been forwarded to
the NAPOLCOM Central Office for consideration.[36] The Sandiganbayan, in
fact, subpoenaed these documents together with the joint counter-affidavits
which had been submitted in that case by Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno.
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified
himself as the commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando,
Pampanga and the superior officer of petitioners Cunanan and Puno and of
the accused Yu whose jurisdiction included Barangays Quebiawan and
Telebastagan. He narrated that in the afternoon of April 5, 1988, he and his
men were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu suddenly received a
summon for police assistance from David, who supposedly was instructed by
Pamintuan, concerning a reported presence of armed NPA members in
Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for
reinforcement but at the time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence,
he decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and
bring their M-16 rifles with them.[37]
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with
Pamintuan who told him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long
firearms. As if sizing up their collective strength, Pamintuan allegedly
intimated that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby Del Carmen
had also brought in a number of armed men and that there were likewise
Cafgu members convened at the residence of Naron. Moments later,
Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan
and Puno took post in the middle of the road at the curve where the Tamaraw
jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn. As the jeepney
came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target vehicle, so he,
with Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for
it to stop. He claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and
swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him, and his fellow police officers
Cunanan and Puno,[38] to fire warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing
forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and
instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of
Narons house directly at the subject jeepney.[39]
Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and
exclaimed at Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees.
Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his men then immediately searched the vehicle
but found no firearms but instead, two injured passengers whom they loaded
into his jeepney and delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital. From there he
and his men returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and look for the
people who fired directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw
jeepney was likewise gone.[40]
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan
at the time was in bad shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement
officers in the area who had been ambushed supposedly by rebel
elements,[41] and that he frequently patrolled the barangay on account of
reported sightings of unidentified armed men therein.[42] That night, he said,
his group which responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all, comprised of
Cunanan and Puno from the Sindalan Police Substation, [43] the team
composed of Pamintuan and his men, as well as the team headed by Captain
Mario Reyes. He admitted that all of them, including himself, were
armed.[44]He denied that they had committed an ambuscade because
otherwise, all the occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney would have been
killed. [45] He said that the shots which directly hit the passenger door of the
jeepney did not come from him or from his fellow police officers but rather
from Cafgu members assembled in the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said
shots were fired only when the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road
where they were assembled.[46]
Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any one
of the accused after the incident because he was at the time very confused;
yet he did know that his co-accused had already been investigated by the main
police station in San Fernando, but the inquiries did not include himself,
Cunanan and Puno.[47] He admitted an administrative case against him,
Cunanan and Puno at the close of which they had been ordered dismissed from
service; yet on appeal, the decision was reversed and they were
exonerated. He likewise alluded to an investigation independently conducted
by their station commander, S/Supt. Rolando Cinco. [48]
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San Fernando,
Pampanga acknowledged the volatility of the peace and order situation in his
jurisdiction, where members of the police force had fallen victims of
ambuscade by lawless elements. He said that he himself has actually
conducted investigations on the Pamintuan report that rebel elements had
been trying to infiltrate the employment force of San Miguel Corporation
plant, and that he has accordingly conducted clearing operations in sugarcane
plantations in the barangay. He intimated that days prior to the incident,
Yapyucos team had already been alerted of the presence of NPA members in
the area. Corroborating Yapyucos declaration, he confessed having
investigated the shooting incident and making a report on it in which,
curiously, was supposedly attached Pamintuans statement referring to Flores
as being married to a resident of Barangay Quebiawan and found after
surveillance to be frequently visited by NPA members. He affirmed having
found that guns were indeed fired that night and that the chief investigator
was able to gather bullet shells from the scene. [49]
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the testimony
of Yapyuco as well as the latters documentary evidence.[50] Mario Reyes,
Andres Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguera, waived their right to present
evidence and submitted their memorandum as told.[51]
The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted
in the regular and lawful performance of their duties in the maintenance of
peace and order either as barangay officials and as members of the police and
the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in the justifying circumstance
provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code; or whether they had
deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them.[52]With the
evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and
Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals in the separate offense of homicide for the
eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No.
16612) and of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva
(instead of frustrated murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and
acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted all of them of attempted murder
charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and
Calma. The dispositive portion of the June 30, 1995 Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David,
Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the offense of Homicide,
as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and
crediting all of them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
without any aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of said accused
is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to TWELVE
(12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased victim Leodevince
Licup in the amounts of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P600,000.00 as
moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs
of said action.
II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the
accused charged in the information, namely, Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David,
Carlos David y Baez, Ruben Lugtu y Lacson, Moises Lacson y Adona, Renato
Yu y Barrera, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are
hereby acquitted of the offense of Multiple Attempted Murder charged
therein, with costs de oficio.
III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David,
Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the offense Attempted
Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249, in relation to Article 6,
paragraph 3, both of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting them with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating
circumstance present or proven, each of said accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision correccional as the minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor as the maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
offended party Noel Villanueva in the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and
compensatory damages, plus P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and
to pay their proportionate share of the costs of said action.
SO ORDERED.[53]

The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to
Villanueva and which brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed
by petitioners herein willfully under the guise of maintaining peace and
order;[54] that the acts performed by them preparatory to the shooting, which
ensured the execution of their evil plan without risk to themselves,
demonstrate a clear intent to kill the occupants of the subject vehicle; that the
fact they had by collective action deliberately and consciously intended to
inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily performed those acts negates their
defense of lawful performance of official duty;[55] that the theory of mistaken
belief could not likewise benefit petitioners because there was supposedly no
showing that they had sufficient basis or probable cause to rely fully on
Pamintuans report that the victims were armed NPA members, and they have
not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross inexcusable
negligence when they acted as they did;[56] that there was insufficient or total
absence of factual basis to assume that the occupants of the jeepney were
members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the shooting
incident could not have been the product of a well-planned and well-
coordinated police operation but was the result of either a hidden agenda
concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty and
amateurish attempt to gain commendation.[57]
These findings obtain context principally from the open court statements of
prosecution witnesses Villanueva, Flores and Salangsang, particularly on the
circumstances prior to the subject incident. The Sandiganbayan pointed out
that the Tamaraw jeepney would have indeed stopped if it had truly been
flagged down as claimed by Yapyuco especially since as it turned out after the
search of the vehicle they had no firearms with them, and hence, they had
nothing to be scared of.[58] It observed that while Salangsang and Flores had
been bona fide residents of Barangay Quebiawan, then it would be impossible
for Pamintuan, barangay captain no less, not to have known them and the
location of their houses which were not far from the scene of the incident; so
much so that the presence of the victims and of the Tamaraw jeepney in
Salangsangs house that evening could not have possibly escaped his notice. In
this regard, it noted that Pamintuans Sworn Statement dated April 11, 1988
did not sufficiently explain his suspicions as to the identities of the victims as
well as his apparent certainty on the identity and whereabouts of the subject
Tamaraw jeepney. [59] It surmised how the defense, especially Yapyuco in his
testimony, could have failed to explain why a large group of armed men which
allegedly included Cafgu members from neighboring barangays were
assembled at the house of Naron that night, and how petitioners were able to
identify the Tamaraw jeepney to be the target vehicle. From this, it inferred
that petitioners had already known that their suspect vehicle would be coming
from the direction of Salangsangs house such knowledge is supposedly evident
first, in the manner by which they advantageously positioned themselves at
the scene to afford a direct line of fire at the target vehicle, and second, in the
fact that the house of Naron, the neighboring houses and the electric post
referred to by prosecution witnesses were deliberately not lit that night.[60]
The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores sketch depicting the
position of the Tamaraw jeepney and the assailants on the road, and
concluded that judging by the bullet holes on the right side of the jeepney and
by the declarations of Dr. Solis respecting the trajectory of the bullets that hit
Villanueva and Licup, the assailants were inside the yard of Narons residence
and the shots were fired at the jeepney while it was slowly moving past them.
It also gave weight to the testimony and the report of Dabor telling that the
service firearms of petitioners had been tested and found to be positive of
gunpowder residue, therefore indicating that they had indeed been
discharged.[61]
The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming
circumstantial evidence pointing to the culpability of petitioners: the nature
and location of the bullet holes on the jeepney and the gunshot wounds on
the victims, as well as the trajectory of the bullets that caused such damage
and injuries; particularly, the number, location and trajectory of the bullets
that hit the front passenger side of the jeepney; the strategic placement of the
accused on the right side of the street and inside the front yard of Narons
house; the deliberate shutting off of the lights in the nearby houses and the
lamp post; and the positive ballistic findings on the firearms of petitioners. [62]
This evidentiary resum, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only fortified
petitioners admission that they did discharge their firearms, but also provided
a predicate to its conclusion that petitioners conspired with one another to
achieve a common purpose, design and objective to harm the unarmed and
innocent victims. Thus, since there was no conclusive proof of who among the
several accused had actually fired the gunshots that injured Villanueva and
fatally wounded Licup, the Sandiganbayan imposed collective responsibility on
all those who were shown to have discharged their firearms that night
petitioners herein.[63] Interestingly, it was speculated that the manner by
which the accused collectively and individually acted prior or subsequent to or
contemporaneously with the shooting indicated that they were either drunk
or that some, if not all of them, had a grudge against the employees of San
Miguel Corporation;[64] and that on the basis of the self-serving evidence
adduced by the defense, there could possibly have been a massive cover-up of
the incident by Philippine Constabulary and INP authorities in Pampanga as
well as by the NAPOLCOM.[65] It likewise found very consequential the fact that
the other accused had chosen not to take the witness stand; this, supposedly
because it was incumbent upon them to individually explain their participation
in the shooting in view of the weight of the prosecution evidence, their
invocation of the justifying circumstance of lawful performance of official duty
and the declaration of some of them in their affidavits to the effect that they
had been deployed that evening in the front yard of Narons residence from
which the volley of gunfire was discharged as admitted by Yapyuco himself.[66]
As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery has not been proved because first, it was
supposedly not shown how the aggression commenced and how the acts
causing injury to Villanueva and fatally injuring Licup began and developed,
and second, this circumstance must be supported by proof of a deliberate and
conscious adoption of the mode of attack and cannot be drawn from mere
suppositions or from circumstances immediately preceding the
aggression. The same finding holds true for evident premeditation because
between the time Yapyuco received the summons for assistance from
Pamintuan through David and the time he and his men responded at the
scene, there was found to be no sufficient time to allow for the materialization
of all the elements of that circumstance.[67]
Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required leave
from work for 60 days which were all charged against his accumulated leave
credits;[68] that he was earning P8,350.00 monthly;[69] and that he had
spent P35,000.00 for the repair of his Tamaraw jeepney.[70] Also, Teodoro
Licup had stated that his family had spent P18,000.00 for the funeral of his
son, P28,000.00 during the wake, P11,000.00 for the funeral plot
and P20,000.00 in attorneys fees for the prosecution of these cases.[71] He also
submitted a certification from San Miguel Corporation reflecting the income
of his deceased son.[72] On these bases, the Sandiganbayan ordered
petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify (a) Villanueva P51,700.00 as
actual and compensatory damages and P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary
damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action, and (b) the heirs of
deceased Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages
and P600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs
of the action.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present
recourse.
In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayans finding of
conspiracy and labels the same to be conjectural. He points out that the
court a quo has not clearly established that he had by positive acts intended
to participate in any criminal object in common with the other accused, and
that his participation in a supposed common criminal object has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. He believes the finding is belied by Flores
and Villanueva, who saw him at the scene only after the shooting incident
when the wounded passengers were taken to the hospital on his
jeepney.[73] He also points out the uncertainty in the Sandiganbayans
declaration that the incident could not have been the product of a well-
planned police operation, but rather was the result of either a hidden agenda
concocted against the victims by the barangay officials involved or an
amateurish attempt on their part to earn commendation. He theorizes that, if
it were the latter alternative, then he could hardly be found guilty of homicide
or frustrated homicide but rather of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and frustrated homicide. [74] He laments that, assuming arguendo that the
injuries sustained by the victims were caused by his warning shots, he must
nevertheless be exonerated because he responded to the scene of the incident
as a bona fidemember of the police force and, hence, his presence at the scene
of the incident was in line with the fulfillment of his duty as he was in fact in
the lawful performance thereof a fact which has been affirmed by the
NAPOLCOM en banc when it dismissed on appeal the complaint for gross
misconduct against him, Cunanan and Puno.[75] He also invokes the concept of
mistake of fact and attributes to Pamintuan the responsibility why he, as well
as the other accused in these cases, had entertained the belief that the
suspects were armed rebel elements.[76]
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes
claim that the Sandiganbayan has not proved their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and the assailed decision was based on acts the evidence for which has
been adduced at a separate trial but erroneously attributed to them. They
explain that there were two sets of accused, in the case: one, the police
officers comprised of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno and, two, the barangay
officials and CHDFs comprised of David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and themselves who
had waived the presentation of evidence. They question their conviction of the
charges vis-a-vis the acquittal of David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu who, like them,
were barangay officials and had waived their right to present evidence in their
behalf. They emphasize in this regard that all accused barangay officials and
CHDFs did not participate in the presentation of the evidence by the accused
police officers and, hence, the finding that they too had fired upon the
Tamaraw jeepney is hardly based on an established fact.[77] Also, they believe
that the findings of fact by the Sandiganbayan were based on inadmissible
evidence, specifically on evidence rejected by the court itself and those
presented in a separate trial. They label the assailed decision to be speculative,
conjectural and suspicious and, hence, antithetical to the quantum of evidence
required in a criminal prosecution.[78] Finally, they lament that the finding of
conspiracy has no basis in evidence and that the prosecution has not even
shown that they were with the other accused at the scene of the incident or
that they were among those who fired at the victims, and neither were they
identified as among the perpetrators of the crime.[79]
In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of
conspiracy. They claim that judging by the uncertainty in the conclusion of the
Sandiganbayan as to whether the incident was the result of a legitimate police
operation or a careless plot designed by the accused to obtain commendation,
conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This, because they
believe the prosecution has not, as far as both of them are concerned, shown
that they had ever been part of such malicious design to commit an
ambuscade as that alluded to in the assailed decision. They advance that as
police officers, they merely followed orders from their commander, Yapyuco,
but were not privy to the conversation among the latter, David and Pamintuan,
moments before the shooting. They posit they could hardly be assumed to
have had community of criminal design with the rest of the accused.[80]They
affirm Yapyucos statement that they fired warning shots at the subject
jeepney,[81] but only after it had passed the place where they were posted and
only after it failed to stop when flagged down as it then became apparent that
it was going to speed away as supposedly shown by bullet holes on the chassis
and not on the rear portion of the jeepney. They also harp on the absence of
proof of ill motives that would have otherwise urged them to commit the
crimes charged, especially since none of the victims had been personally or
even remotely known to either of them. That they were not intending to
commit a crime is, they believe, shown by the fact that they did not directly
aim their rifles at the passengers of the jeepney and that in fact, they
immediately held their fire when Flores identified themselves as employees of
San Miguel Corporation. They conceded that if killing was their intent, then
they could have easily fired at the victims directly.[82]
Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands by
the finding of conspiracy as established by the fact that all accused, some of
them armed, had assembled themselves and awaited the suspect vehicle as
though having previously known that it would be coming from Salangsangs
residence. It posits that the manner by which the jeepney was fired upon
demonstrates a community of purpose and design to commit the crimes
charged.[83] It believes that criminal intent is discernible from the posts the
accused had chosen to take on the road that would give them a direct line of
fire at the target as shown by the trajectories of the bullets that hit the
Tamaraw jeepney.[84] This intent was supposedly realized when after the volley
of gunfire, both Flores and Licup were wounded and the latter died as a
supervening consequence.[85] It refutes the invocation of lawful performance
of duty, mainly because there was no factual basis to support the belief of the
accused that the occupants were members of the NPA, as indeed they have
not shown that they had previously verified the whereabouts of the suspect
vehicle. But while it recognizes that the accused had merely responded to the
call of duty when summoned by Pamintuan through David, it is convinced that
they had exceeded the performance thereof when they fired upon the
Tamaraw jeepney occupied, as it turned out, by innocent individuals
instead.[86]
As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that the
evidence adduced before the Sandiganbayan as well the findings based
thereon should not be binding on them, the OSP explains that said petitioners,
together with Pamintuan, David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had previously
withdrawn their motion for separate trial and as directed later on submitted
the case for decision as to them with the filing of their memorandum.It asserts
there was no denial of due process to said petitioners in view of their
agreement for the reproduction of the evidence on the motion for bail at the
trial proper as well as by their manifestation to forego with the presentation
of their own evidence. The right to present witnesses is waivable. Also, where
an accused is jointly tried and testifies in court, the testimony binds the other
accused, especially where the latter has failed to register his objection
thereto.[87]
The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences
that seem to rest on loose predicates. Yet we have pored over the records of
the case and found that evidence nonetheless exists to support the
penultimate finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
I.
It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were at
the situs of the incident on the date and time alleged in the
Informations. Yapyuco, in his testimony which was adopted by Cunanan and
Puno as well as Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes in their affidavits
which had been offered in evidence by the prosecution,[88] explained that their
presence at the scene was in response to the information relayed by
Pamintuan through David that armed rebel elements on board a vehicle
described to be that occupied by the victims were reportedly spotted in
Barangay Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this suspicion that petitioners now
appeal to justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code and under
the concept of mistake of fact. Petitioners admit that it was not by accident or
mistake but by deliberation that the shooting transpired when it became
apparent that the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention arises
as to whether or not there was intention to harm or even kill the passengers
aboard, and who among them had discharged the bullets that caused the
eventual death of Licup and injured Villanueva.
The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify the
criminal.[89] To this end, the prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the
joint counter-affidavit[90] of Andres Reyes and Manguerra; the counter-
affidavit[91] of Mario Reyes; the joint counter-affidavit[92] of Cunanan and Puno;
the counter-affidavit[93]of Yapyuco; and the joint counter-affidavit[94] of
Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno executed immediately after the incident in
question. In brief, Cunanan and Puno stated therein that [their] team was
forced to fire at the said vehicle when it accelerated after warning shots were
fired in air and when it ignored Yapyucos signal for it to stop;[95]in their earlier
affidavit they, together with Yapyuco, declared that they were constrained x x
x to fire directly to (sic) the said fleeing vehicle.[96] Yapyucos open court
declaration, which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno, is that he twice
discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to the subject jeepney after it
allegedly failed to stop when flagged down and second, at the tires thereof
when it came clear that it was trying to escape.[97] He suggested substantiating
the implication in his affidavit that it was the whole team [which fired] at the
fleeing vehicle [98] that the bullets which hit the passenger side of the ill-fated
jeepney could have come only from the CHDFs posted inside the yard of Naron
where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes admitted having taken post
while awaiting the arrival of the suspect vehicle.[99]
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that it was
only Manguerra from their group who discharged a firearm but only into the
air to give warning shots,[100] and that it was the policemen [who] directly fired
upon the jeepney.[101] Manguerra himself shared this statement.[102] Yet these
accounts do not sit well with the physical evidence found in the bullet holes
on the passenger door of the jeepney which Dabor, in both her report and
testimony, described to have come from bullets sprayed from perpendicular
and oblique directions. This evidence in fact supports Yapyucos claim that he,
Cunanan and Puno did fire directly at the jeepney after it had made a right turn
and had already moved past them such that the line of fire to the passengers
thereof would be at an oblique angle from behind. It also bolsters his claim
that, almost simultaneously, gunshots came bursting after the jeepney has
passed the spot where he, Cunanan and Puno had taken post, and when the
vehicle was already right in front of the yard of Narons house sitting on the
right side of the road after the curve and where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and
Andres Reyes were positioned, such that the line of fire would be direct and
perpendicular to it.[103]
While Dabors ballistics findings are open to challenge for being inconclusive as
to who among the accused actually discharged their firearms that night, her
report pertaining to the examination of the ill-fated Tamaraw jeepney affirms
the irreducible fact that the CHDFs posted within the yard of Narons house had
indeed sprayed bullets at the said vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres
Reyes seek to insulate themselves by arguing that such finding cannot be
applied to them as it is evidence adduced in a separate trial. But as the OSP
noted, they may not evade the effect of their having withdrawn their motion
for separate trial, their agreement to a joint trial of the cases, and the binding
effect on them of the testimony of their co-accused, Yapyuco.[104]
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible
only against said accused, but is inadmissible against the other accused. But if
the declarant or admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial admission, as
Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and the other accused is accorded the
opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the admission is admissible against
both accused because then, it is transposed into a judicial admission.[105] It is
thus perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno
and Yapyuco, as well as the latters testimony implicating them in the incident,
they still had chosen to waive their right to present evidence when, in fact,
they could have shown detailed proof of their participation or non-
participation in the offenses charged. We, therefore, reject their claim that
they had been denied due process in this regard, as they opted not to testify
and be cross-examined by the prosecution as to the truthfulness in their
affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of their co-
accused.
II.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful
exercise of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests
on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the
lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense
committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty
or the lawful exercise of such right or office.[106] The justification is based on
the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused,
inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal
intent or with fault or negligence.[107] Where invoked, this ground for non-
liability amounts to an acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury
or has committed the offense charged for which, however, he may not be
penalized because the resulting injury or offense is a necessary consequence
of the due performance of his duty or the lawful exercise of his right or
office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the accused relative to the crime
charged were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the burden necessarily shifts
on him to prove such hypothesis.
We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised
Penal Code do not obtain in this case.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a
legitimate law enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to
defeat the claim that all of them who were either police and barangay officers
or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of peace and order were
bound to, as they did, respond to information of a suspected rebel infiltration
in the locality. Theirs, therefore, is the specific duty to identify the occupants
of their suspect vehicle and search for firearms inside it to validate the
information they had received; they may even effect a bloodless arrest should
they find cause to believe that their suspects had just committed, were
committing or were bound to commit a crime. While, it may certainly be
argued that rebellion is a continuing offense, it is interesting that nothing in
the evidence suggests that the accused were acting under an official order to
open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all circumstances. Even more
telling is the absence of reference to the victims having launched such
aggression as would threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or having
exhibited such defiance of authority that would have instigated the accused,
particularly those armed, to embark on a violent attack with their firearms in
self-defense. In fact, no material evidence was presented at the trial to show
that the accused were placed in real mortal danger in the presence of the
victims, except maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects were armed and
were probably prepared to conduct hostilities.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members
and whether or not they were at the time armed, are immaterial in the present
inquiry inasmuch as they do not stand as accused in the prosecution at hand.
Besides, even assuming that they were as the accused believed them to be,
the actuations of these responding law enforcers must inevitably be ranged
against reasonable expectations that arise in the legitimate course of
performance of policing duties. The rules of engagement, of which every law
enforcer must be thoroughly knowledgeable and for which he must always
exercise the highest caution, do not require that he should immediately draw
or fire his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit
without danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal
feelings or a damaged pride. Police work requires nothing more than the
lawful apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the process pertains
to other government officers or agencies.[108]
A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is
reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his
resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect
himself from bodily harm.[109] United States v. Campo[110] has laid down the
rule that in the performance of his duty, an agent of the authorities is
not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked or
is the subject of resistance, and finds no other means to comply with his duty
or cause himself to be respected and obeyed by the offender. In case injury or
death results from the exercise of such force, the same could be justified in
inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender if the officer had used
necessary force.[111] He is, however, never justified in using unnecessary force
or in treating the offender with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous
means when the arrest could be effected otherwise.[112] People v.
Ulep[113] teaches that
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last
resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise
be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers with
authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be true that police
officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a
situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal, action is needed.
However, it must be stressed that the judgment and discretion of police
officers in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither
capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a
clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the
dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit and purpose of the law. We
cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers who
indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are
apprehending. They must always bear in mind that although they are dealing
with criminal elements against whom society must be protected, these
criminals are also human beings with human rights.[114]
Thus, in People v. Tabag,[115] where members of the Davao CHDF had killed
four members of a family in their home because of suspicions that they were
NPA members, and the accused sought exoneration by invoking among others
the justifying circumstance in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the
Court in dismissing the claim and holding them liable for murder said, thus:
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6, Article
11 of the Revised Penal Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals can by no
means be considered as done in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of an office or in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some
lawful purpose. Other than suspicion, there is no evidence that Welbino
Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and their children were members of the
NPA. And even if they were members of the NPA, they were entitled to due
process of law. On that fateful night, they were peacefully resting in their
humble home expecting for the dawn of another uncertain day. Clearly,
therefore, nothing justified the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nighttime,
on the Magdasals. The massacre was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style
execution.[116]
Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney by
claiming that it failed to heed the first round of warning shots as well as the
signal for it to stop and instead tried to flee. While it is possible that the
jeepney had been flagged down but because it was pacing the dark road with
its headlights dimmed missed petitioners signal to stop, and compound to it
the admitted fact that the passengers thereof were drunk from the party they
had just been to,[117] still, we find incomprehensible petitioners quick resolve
to use their firearms when in fact there was at least one other vehicle at the
scene the Sarao jeepney owned by Yapyuco which they could actually have
used to pursue their suspects whom they supposedly perceived to be in flight.
Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute necessity
justifies the use of force, and it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove
such necessity. We find, however, that petitioners failed in that
respect. Although the employment of powerful firearms does not necessarily
connote unnecessary force, petitioners in this case do not seem to have been
confronted with the rational necessity to open fire at the moving jeepney
occupied by the victims. No explanation is offered why they, in that instant,
were inclined for a violent attack at their suspects except perhaps their over-
anxiety or impatience or simply their careless disposition to take no chances.
Clearly, they exceeded the fulfillment of police duties the moment they
actualized such resolve, thereby inflicting Licup with a mortal bullet wound,
causing injury to Villanueva and exposing the rest of the passengers of the
jeepney to grave danger to life and limb all of which could not have been the
necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their duties.
III.
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact
faces certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a mistake of fact is a
misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or
omission which is the subject of the prosecution.[118] Generally, a reasonable
mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent
component of the crime.[119] It may be a defense even if the offense charged
requires proof of only general intent.[120] The inquiry is into the mistaken belief
of the defendant,[121] and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind
of any other person.[122] A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that
the mistake be honest and reasonable;[123] (b) that it be a matter of
fact;[124] and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the
crime[125] or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with
respect to an element of the offense.[126]
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found
in United States v. Ah Chong,[127] but in that setting, the principle was treated
as a function of self-defense where the physical circumstances of the case had
mentally manifested to the accused an aggression which it was his instinct to
repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by the sound of
his bedroom door being broken open and, receiving no response from the
intruder after having demanded identification, believed that a robber had
broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder but at that moment he was struck
by a chair which he had placed against the door and, perceiving that he was
under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned out
to be his roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his
honest mistake of fact. Finding that the accused had no evil intent to commit
the charge, the Court explained:
x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in
point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of
evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability, provided
always there is no fault or negligence on his part and as laid down by Baron
Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they
appear to him." x x x
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to
believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing or, in terms more nicely
in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or
carelessness he does not believe them he is legally guiltless of homicide;
though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is
unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of
self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of
reason, and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some
decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is
justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or
carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly
according to what he thus supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish
him though they are in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the
extreme measure. x x x [128]
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis[129] and Baxinela v. People,[130] the
justification of an act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of
fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the
accused.[131] Thus, Ah Chong further explained that
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can
be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does
an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as
he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time
when he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one
answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal
liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not
due to negligence or bad faith.[132]
IV.
This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated
homicide has been established beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all
criminal cases is that the prosecution is bound by the invariable requisite of
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
evidence of the accused. The weakness of the defense of the accused does not
relieve the prosecution of its responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.[133] By reasonable doubt is meant that doubt engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to
let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.[134] The overriding
consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused,
but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[135]
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt
either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive
evidence.[136] Corpus delicti consists of two things: first, the criminal act and
second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act.[137] In homicide
(by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must prove: (a) the death
of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the
criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of
accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the
criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which
produced the death. In other words, proof of homicide or murder requires
incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was
deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill. Such evidence may
consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the
malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim.
If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.[138] In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the
crime is homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the
penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act
and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences
thereof. [139] Evidence of intent to kill is crucial only to a finding of frustrated
and attempted homicide, as the same is an essential element of these
offenses, and thus must be proved with the same degree of certainty as that
required of the other elements of said offenses.[140]
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution.
It is interesting that, in negating the allegation that they had by their acts
intended to kill the occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-
accused Pamintuan, whose picture depicted in the defense evidence is
certainly an ugly one: petitioners affidavits as well as Yapyucos testimony are
replete with suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who harbored the
motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who their (petitioners) minds that
which they later on conceded to be a mistaken belief as to the identity of the
suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that Pamintuan had once reported to
him that Flores, a relative of his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA
members and that the San Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were
employed was being penetrated by NPA members. He also affirmed Yapyucos
claim that there had been a number of ambuscades launched against
members of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas
supposedly by NPA members at around the time of the incident. But as the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died during
the pendency of these cases even before his opportunity to testify in court
emerged.[141]
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance
and materiality. Motive is generally held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not
an element of a crime. It gains significance when the commission of a crime is
established by evidence purely circumstantial or otherwise
inconclusive.[142] The question of motive is important in cases where there is
doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed the
act, but when there is no doubt that the defendant was the one who caused
the death of the deceased, it is not so important to know the reason for the
deed.[143]
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did
not intend to kill anyone of the victims, admit having willfully discharged their
service firearms; and the manner by which the bullets concentrated on the
passenger side of the jeepney permits no other conclusion than that the shots
were intended for the persons lying along the line of fire. We do not doubt
that instances abound where the discharge of a firearm at another is not
in itself sufficient to sustain a finding of intention to kill, and that there are
instances where the attendant circumstances conclusively establish that the
discharge was not in fact animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is that in
ascertaining the intention with which a specific act is committed, it is always
proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the
attendant circumstances so far as they develop in the evidence.[144]
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle
and .30 caliber carbine.[145] While the use of these weapons does not always
amount to unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently lethal in
nature. At the level the bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is not difficult
to imagine the possibility of the passengers thereof being hit and even killed.
It must be stressed that the subject jeepney was fired upon while it was pacing
the road and at that moment, it is not as much too difficult to aim and target
the tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril to which its passengers would be
exposed even assuming that the gunfire was aimed at the tires especially
considering that petitioners do not appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or
unskilled neophytes in encounters with lawless elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and
the firearms employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver and
in fact even the driver himself of being hit and injured or even killed is great to
say the least, certain to be precise. This, we find to be consistent with the
uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to fire directly at the jeepney
came when it occurred to them that it was proceeding to evade their authority.
And in instances like this, their natural and logical impulse was to debilitate
the vehicle by firing upon the tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and
hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we found on the jeepney
suggests that petitioners actuations leaned towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup
who was seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying
the wheel, together with all the consequences arising from their deed. The
circumstances of the shooting breed no other inference than that the firing
was deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill.
Thus, Cupps v. State[146] tells that:
This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and
natural consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because
men generally act deliberately and by the determination of their own will,
and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that every man
always thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is
found to have killed another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of
themselves show that it was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed
that the death of the deceased was designed by the slayer; and the burden
of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.
V.
Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with the
deliberate intent of killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyucos
alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744 that he and his co-petitioners must be
found guilty merely of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
frustrated homicide. Here is why:
First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence,
the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the
injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being the incident of
another act performed without malice.[147] People v. Guillen[148] and People v.
Nanquil [149] declare that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in People v.
Castillo,[150] we held that that there can be no frustrated homicide through
reckless negligence inasmuch as reckless negligence implies lack of intent to
kill, and without intent to kill the crime of frustrated homicide cannot exist.
Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found
by the Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of reckless
imprudence.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two
or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of
the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing
that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be
implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that
their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in
fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association
and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the
object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To
hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a
view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[151]
Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period
prior to the occurrence. From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the
time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and
were united in its execution.[152] The instant case requires no proof of any
previous agreement among petitioners that they were really bent on a violent
attack upon their suspects. While it is far-fetched to conclude that conspiracy
arose from the moment petitioners, or all of the accused for that matter, had
converged and strategically posted themselves at the place appointed by
Pamintuan, we nevertheless find that petitioners had been ignited by the
common impulse not to let their suspect jeepney flee and evade their
authority when it suddenly occurred to them that the vehicle was attempting
to escape as it supposedly accelerated despite the signal for it to stop and
submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point, petitioners were confronted with
the convenient yet irrational option to take no chances by preventing the
jeepneys supposed escape even if it meant killing the driver thereof. It appears
that such was their common purpose. And by their concerted action of almost
simultaneously opening fire at the jeepney from the posts they had
deliberately taken around the immediate environment of the suspects,
conveniently affording an opportunity to target the driver, they did achieve
their object as shown by the concentration of bullet entries on the passenger
side of the jeepney at angular and perpendicular trajectories. Indeed, there is
no definitive proof that tells which of all the accused had discharged their
weapons that night and which directly caused the injuries sustained by
Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, yet we adopt the Sandiganbayans
conclusion that since only herein petitioners were shown to have been in
possession of their service firearms that night and had fired the same, they
should be held collectively responsible for the consequences of the subject law
enforcement operation which had gone terribly wrong.[153]
VI.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals
in the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the
death of Licup and for the non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that
they deserve an acquittal together with the other accused, of the charge of
attempted murder with respect to the unharmed victims.[154] The allegation of
evident premeditation has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt because
the evidence is consistent with the fact that the urge to kill had materialized
in the minds of petitioners as instantaneously as they perceived their suspects
to be attempting flight and evading arrest. The same is true with treachery,
inasmuch as there is no clear and indubitable proof that the mode of attack
was consciously and deliberately adopted by petitioners.
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished
by reclusion temporal whereas an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in
relation to Article 51, warrants a penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed for principals in a consummated homicide. Petitioners in these
cases are entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance proved and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan has properly fixed in
Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the penalty from six (6) years and one
(1) day, but should have denominated the same as prision
mayor, not prision correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal.
However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had
committed attempted homicide, a modification of the penalty is in order. The
penalty of attempted homicide is two (2) degrees lower to that of a
consummated homicide, which is prision correccional. Taking into account the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence to be meted out on petitioners is within the minimum
period of prision correccional, which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, whereas the minimum of
the sentence, which under the Indeterminate Sentence Law must be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense, which
is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence, and order herein petitioners, jointly and severally, to
indemnify the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual
damages and P50,000.00 in moral damages. With respect to Noel Villanueva,
petitioners are likewise bound to pay, jointly and severally, the amount
of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral
damages. The award of exemplary damages should be deleted, there being no
aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crimes.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27,
1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the indeterminate sentence is hereby
modified to Two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as the
maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum.
(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Leodevince Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00
in moral damages, as well as Noel Villanueva, in the amount of P51,700.00 as
actual and compensatory damages, and P20,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of Ruben del Castillo assailing the Decision[2] dated July 31, 2006 and
Resolution[3] dated December 13, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 27819, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated March 14, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291,
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in
selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after
conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner,
secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon
of September 13, 1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid, which prompted them to immediately
disembark from the jeep they were riding and went directly to petitioner's
house and cordoned it. The structure of the petitioner's residence is a two-
storey house and the petitioner was staying in the second floor. When they
went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and informed her that they will
implement the search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3
Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa
hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he
and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the
place where the subject ran for cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to
G.R. No. 185128
get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with
[Formerly UDKtwo
No. barangay
13980] tanods.
Present: In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister
of petitioner named Dolly del Castillo, searched the house of petitioner
including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men
who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of
VELASCO, JR., J.,
theChairperson,
barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles,
including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline
PERALTA,
substance.Consequently, the articles that were confiscated were sent to the
MENDOZA, PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four (4) heat-
sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination,
REYES,* and the result of which proved positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu.
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging him
Promulgated: with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended. The
Information[5] reads:
January 30, 2012
That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at about 3:00 p.m. in the
City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there have in his
possession and control four (4) packs of white crystalline powder, having a
total weight of 0.31 gram, locally known as shabu, all containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without license or
prescription from any competent authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6] SO ORDERED.[9]

During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the CA,
guilty.[7] Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued. petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court with the following arguments raised:

To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution presented the

testimonies of SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, PO2 Milo Arriola, and Forensic 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE
Analyst, Police Inspector Mutchit Salinas. PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE RULES OF COURT AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-VIS VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT NO. 570-9-1197-
24;
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of petitioner,
Jesusa del Castillo, Dalisay del Castillo and Herbert Aclan, which can be
summarized as follows: 2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FOUR (4)
PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE FLOOR
OF THE NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE SAID COURT SIMPLY PRESUMED THAT
On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner was
IT WAS USED BY THE PETITIONER OR THAT THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT FOR
installing the electrical wirings and airconditioning units of the Four Seasons
COVER WHEN THE SEARCHING TEAM ARRIVED AT HIS RESIDENCE, BUT ALSO,
Canteen and Beauty Parlor at Wacky Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu. He was able to
PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE WAS INDEED USED BY
finish his job around 6 o'clock in the evening, but he was engaged by the owner
THE PETITIONER AND THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER
of the establishment in a conversation. He was able to go home around 8:30-
WERE FOUND THEREAT. THE SUBJECT FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE
9 o'clock in the evening. It was then that he learned from his wife that police
POWDER ARE FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE; and
operatives searched his house and found nothing. According to him, the small
structure, 20 meters away from his house where they found the confiscated
items, was owned by his older brother and was used as a storage place by his
father. 3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE
ELEMENT OF POSSESSION AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN
VIOLATION OF THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.HAD THE
SAID COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION, IT COULD HAVE
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge
BEEN ASSAYED THAT THE SAME HAD NOT BEEN PROVEN.[10]
against him in the Information. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Ruben del
Castillo alyas Boy Castillo, GUILTY of violating Section 16, Article III, Republic The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment dated February 10,
Act No. 6425, as amended. There being no mitigating nor aggravating 2009, enumerated the following counter-arguments:
circumstances proven before this Court, and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Six (6) Months and One
(1) Day as Minimum and Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months as Maximum
of Prision Correccional. I

SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by Executive Judge Priscilla S.

Agana of Branch 24, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is valid.
The four (4) small plastic packets of white crystalline substance having a total
weight of 0.31 gram, positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, are ordered confiscated and shall be destroyed in accordance
II
with the law.
The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are admissible
in evidence against him.
SO ORDERED.[8]

III

The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of illegal possession of
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed prohibited drugs.[11]
the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is

Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant,
DISMISSED, with costs against accused-appellant.
considering that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who applied for
it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs during a test-
buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same search
warrant. The OSG, however, maintains that the petitioner, aside from failing
to file the necessary motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to Section
14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not introduce
clear and convincing evidence to show that Masnayon was conscious of the
falsity of his assertion or representation.
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about
20 meters away from his house is no longer within the permissible area that
may be searched by the police officers due to the distance and that the search
warrant did not include the same nipa hut as one of the places to be
searched. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against
government authorities and not to private individuals such as the barangay
tanod who found the folded paper containing packs of shabu inside the nipa
hut.
As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs,
because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the same just
because they were found inside the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the OSG dismissed
the argument of the petitioner, stating that, when prohibited and regulated
drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to and occupied by a
particular person, the presumption arises that such person is in possession of
such drugs in violation of law, and the fact of finding the same is sufficient to
convict.
With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must be remembered
that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness.[19] In the present case, Search
Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24[20] specifically designates or describes the
residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items
were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the
residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a
place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered
as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an
evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming that the
items seized were found in another place not designated in the search
warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the
one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual,
the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure being
applicable only against government authorities. The contention is devoid of
merit.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search
warrant that they asked the assistance of the barangay tanods, thus, in the
testimony of SPO3 Masnayon:
Fiscal Centino:

This Court finds no merit on the first argument of petitioner.

Q For how long did the chase take place?

A Just a very few moments.

Q After that, what did you [do] when you were not able to reach him?
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; A I watched his shop and then I requested my men to get a barangay tanod.
(3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and
the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
Q Were you able to get a barangay tanod?
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.[12] According to petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable A Yes.
cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.[13] A finding of probable cause Q Can you tell us what is the name of the barangay tanod?
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
A Nelson Gonzalado.
been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause
demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction.[14] The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider
the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and Q For point of clarification, how many barangay tanod [did] your driver get?
rigid formula,[15] and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances
standard.[16] The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or A Two.
opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in
no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the
issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable Q What happened after that?
cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a
reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that A We searched the house, but we found negative.
determination.[17] Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining
judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place Q Who proceeded to the second floor of the house?
sought to be searched.[18] A review of the records shows that in the present
A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola went upstairs and found nothing.
case, a substantial basis exists.
Q What about you, where were you?

A I [was] watching his shop and I was with Matillano. Q And after you cordoned the area, did anything happen?

A We waited for the barangay tanod.

Q What about the barangay tanod?

A Together with Milo and Pogoso. Q And did the barangay tanod eventually appear?

A Yes. And then we started our search in the presence of Ruben del Castillo's
wife.
Q When the search at the second floor of the house yielded negative what
did you do?

A They went downstairs because I was suspicious of his shop because he ran Q What is the name of the wife of Ruben del Castillo?
from his shop, so we searched his shop.
A I cannot recall her name, but if I see her I can recall [her] face.

Q Who were with you when you searched the shop?

Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was she around when [you] conducted the
A The barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder sister of Ruben del Castillo search?
named Dolly del Castillo.
A No. Ruben was not in the house. But our team leader, team mate Bienvenido
Masnayon saw that Ruben ran away from his adjacent electronic shop near his
house, in front of his house.
Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, Barangay
Tanod Nilo Gonzalado and the elder sister of Ruben del Castillo were
together in the shop?
Q Did you find anything during the search in the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A Yes.
A After our search in the house, we did not see anything. The house was clean.

Q What happened at the shop?

Q What did you do afterwards, if any?
A One of the barangay tanods was able to pick up white folded paper.
A We left (sic) out of the house and proceeded to his electronic shop.

Q What [were] the contents of that white folded paper?

Q Do you know the reason why you proceeded to his electronic shop?
A A plastic pack containing white crystalline.
A Yes. Because our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon saw that (sic) Ruben run
from that store and furthermore the door was open.

Q Was that the only item?

A There are others like the foil, scissor. Q How far is the electronic shop from the house of Ruben del Castillo?

A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of his house.

Q Were you present when those persons found those tin foil and others inside
the electric shop?
xxxx
A Yes.[21]

Q So, who entered inside the electronic shop?

The fact that no items were seized in the residence of petitioner and that the
items that were actually seized were found in another structure by a barangay A The one who first entered the electronic shop is our team leader Bienvenido
tanod, was corroborated by PO2 Arriola, thus: Masnayon.

FISCAL: Q You mentioned that Masnayon entered first. Do you mean to say that there
were other persons or other person that followed after Masnayon?

A Then we followed suit.

Q So, upon arriving at the house of Ruben del Castillo alias Boy, can you still
recall what took place?

A We cordoned the area. Q All of your police officers and the barangay tanod followed suit?
A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod.
Q What about you?
A I also followed suit.
Q And did anything happen inside the shop of Ruben del Castillo?
A It was the barangay tanod who saw the folded paper and I saw him open
the folded paper which contained four shabu deck.
Q How far were you when you saw the folded paper and the tanod open the
folded paper?
A We were side by side because the shop was very small.[22]
SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter, thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q And where did you conduct the search, Mr. Witness?
A At his residence, the two-storey house.
Q Among the three policemen, who were with you in conducting the search at
the residence of the accused?
A I, Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q And what transpired after you searched the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A Negative, no shabu.
Q And what happened afterwards, if any?
A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small house.
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house
which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del
Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.
Q And who among the team went inside?
A PO2 Milo Areola and the Barangay Tanod.[23]
Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was
sought by the police authorities who effected the searched warrant, the
same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in
authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority
and agents of persons in authority as:
x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or
as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or
commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a
barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by
competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and
the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman,
barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid
of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the
function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Section 388
of the Local Government Code reads:
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the
punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the
lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in
authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members
who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the
maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or
the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any
barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be
deemed agents of persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay
tanods were acting as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of
the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated
items are inadmissible in evidence. Assuming ex gratia argumenti that
the barangay tanod who found the confiscated items is considered a private
individual, thus, making the same items admissible in evidence, petitioner's
third argument that the prosecution failed to establish constructive possession
of the regulated drugs seized, would still be meritorious.
Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court FISCAL CENTINO:
since the latter has the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting testimonies,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying,[24] unless attended with arbitrariness or plain disregard
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small house
of pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual findings are accorded the
which you proceeded to?
highest degree of respect on appeal[25] as in the present case.
A It is a nipa hut.

It must be put into emphasis that this present case is about the violation of
Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every prosecution for the illegal possession Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del
of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the Castillo?
accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not
authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has A 5 to 10 meters.
knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.[26]

Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?
In People v. Tira,[27] this Court explained the concept of possession of regulated
drugs, to wit: A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.

This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the
A I was just outside the nipa hut.[33]
intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law,
includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual
possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when
the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the
right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. However, during cross-examination, SPO3 Masnayon admitted that there was
Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid an electrical shop but denied what he said in his earlier testimony that it was
conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where owned by petitioner, thus:
the contraband is located, is shared with another.[28]

ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:

Q You testified that Ruben del Castillo has an electrical shop, is that correct?
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be
A He came out of an electrical shop. I did not say that he owns the shop.
owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must
be sufficient showing that the property is under appellants control or
possession.[29] The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated
drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists Q Now, this shop is within a structure?
when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he
has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is A Yes.
found.[30] The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns
the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure
as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used
Q How big is the structure?
the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner
being an electrician by profession. The CA, in its Decision, noted a resolution A It is quite a big structure, because at the other side is a mahjong den and at
by the investigating prosecutor, thus: the other side is a structure rented by a couple.[34]

x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by

occupation. As such, conclusion could be arrived at that the structure, which
housed the electrical equipments is actually used by the respondent. Being the
case, he has control of the things found in said structure.[31]
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also
provide proof as to the ownership of the structure where the seized articles
were found. During their direct testimonies, they just said, without stating
their basis, that the same structure was the shop of petitioner.[32] During the
direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly concluded that the
electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner, thus:
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the
existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and
dominion and the character of the drugs.[35] With the prosecution's failure to
prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion, there
casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is
critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the
accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge
laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.[36] Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient
to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience
of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.[37]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA- the appointees names,[4] dates of appointment and salaries, similarly read as
G. R. No. 27819, which affirmed the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the follows:
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del xxxx
Castillo is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
That on December 12, 2001, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
SO ORDERED. the above-named accused RODOLFO S. DE JESUS a high ranking public officer
with Salary Grade 28, and EDELWINA DG PARUNGAO, a low ranking public
officer with Salary Grade 26, being the Deputy Administrator and the Manager,
HRMD, respectively, of the [Local] Water Utilities Administration (LWUA),
Katipunan Road, Balara, Quezon City, conspiring and confederating together
and helping each other, while in the performance of their official functions,
committing the offense in relation to their office, and taking advantage of their
official positions, with legal obligation to disclose the truth, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify, or cause to be falsified the
appointment of one JESUSITO R. TOREN, a confidential staff of the Trustees of
the said LWUA, which is a public document, by making it appear that the said
appointment paper was prepared, approved and issued on October 15, 2001
and that the said appointee assumed office on the same date, thereby allowing
the said appointee to withdraw or receive the salaries and allowances for the
period from October 15, 2001 to December 31, 2001, when in truth and in fact
the accused had known fully well that said appointee was officially appointed
SECOND DIVISION only on December 12, 2001, as shown by another set of appointment paper of
said JESUSITO R. TOREN, endorsed and subsequently approved by the Civil
Service Commission, thus making untruthful statement in a narration of facts.

RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, G.R. Nos. 164166 &CONTRARY

164173-80TO LAW.[5]

Petitioner, The arraignment was originally set for December 10, 2003.[6] But,
on December 1, 2003, petitioner and Parungao jointly filed a motion to
Present:
quash.[7] They contended that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over the
offense charged which was not committed in relation to their office. More so,
the allegations of fact did not constitute the offense charged.
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
The prosecution in its comment contended that the informations were
- versus - CARPIO, sufficient in form and substance considering that they constituted the various
elements of the crime of falsification.[8] In its rejoinder, it also claimed that the
CARPIO MORALES, appointing power and the function to prepare the documents were inherent
in their position.[9]
TINGA, and
The Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 2, 2004, denied the motion
VELASCO, JR., JJ. to quash and re-set the arraignment on April 28, 2004. It ruled that it was
inherent in the positions of petitioner and Parungao as Deputy Administrator
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
and Manager of Human Resource Management Department (HRMD),
Promulgated: respectively, to issue and approve appointment papers. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but was likewise denied.

Hence this petition where petitioner contends:

Respondents. October 17, 2007
I.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION
OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED.

DECISION II.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING IT IS INHERENT IN

BOTH POSITIONS OF ACCUSED-PETITIONER DE JESUS AS DEPUTY
QUISUMBING, J.: ADMINISTRATOR FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, AND CO-ACCUSED
PARUNGAO AS HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT MANAGER
This special civil action for certiorari seeks the annulment of the
TO APPROVE APPOINTMENTS OF LWUA EMPLOYEES, PARTICULARLY THE
Resolution[1] dated March 2, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos.
CONFIDENTIAL STAFF OF THE LWUA BOARD OF TRUSTEES.
27894-27902, denying the motion to quash and its Resolution[2] dated June 11,
2004, denying the motion for reconsideration. III.
Public respondent Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) filed with the PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN AMENDING BY JUDICIAL
Sandiganbayan nine informations charging petitioner Rodolfo S. de Jesus and LEGISLATION THE PROVISIONS OF P.D. 198, AS AMENDED, AND EXEC. ORDER
one Edelwina DG Parungao with falsification of public document under Article NO. 286, S. 1995, RELATIVE TO APPOINTING AUTHORITIES.
171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[3] These informations, except for
IV.
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE FACTS At the outset, we stress the settled rule that criminal prosecutions may not be
CHARGED IN THE NINE (9) INFORMATIONS CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE. restrained, either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of
prohibition, except in the following instances:
V.
(1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED-PETITIONER DE JESUS [WAS] DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE (2) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
PAYMENT OF BACK SALARIES, ALLOWANCES AND OTHER BENEFITS OF THE oppression or multiplicity of actions;
BOARDS CONFIDENTIAL STAFF.[10]
(3) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice;
Simply, the issue in this case is whether the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
denying petitioners motion to quash were issued with grave abuse of (4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(5) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the
(6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
offense charged since the informations did not show that his position as
Deputy Administrator and Parungaos position as Manager of HRMD had a (7) Where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
connection with the offense. According to him, the material facts proving the
close intimacy of the offense charged and his official functions must be set (8) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
forth in the informations and not mere conclusions of law.[11] More so, the
informations were based on the Ombudsmans erroneous belief that the (9) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for
power to appoint was inherent in the positions of petitioner and Parungao vengeance;
when in fact he could only sign appointment papers already approved by the
(10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
appointing authority, in this case, the LWUA Trustees and Administrator.
motion to quash on that ground has been denied;
Further, petitioner avers that the informations failed to disclose material facts
(11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent
with regard to the other set of appointment papers sent to the Civil Service
the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.[14]
Commission (CSC).
Thus, while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or
Lastly, petitioner claims that the allegations do not constitute an offense such
not a criminal case should be filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing
that he does not have any legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
the Ombudsmans action when there is an abuse of discretion, in which case
narrated in the alleged fraudulent appointment papers and that the narration
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may exceptionally be invoked pursuant to Section
of facts therein is not false. He also asserts that he is not directly responsible
1,[15] Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, where the finding of the
for the payment of the back salaries, allowances and other benefits received
Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse
by the appointees.
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, we have held that
For its part, public respondent Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special while there is no appeal, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari
Prosecutor, counters that the present petition is premature, considering that under Rule 65.[16]
the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners motion for reinvestigation.
Considering the circumstances of this case, we find for petitioner.
It also avers that the very nature of the positions of petitioner and Parungao
It appears that petitioner, under Office Order No. 205.01 dated September 25,
mandates them to disclose the truth when the nine confidential employees of
2001, was authorized under delegated authority to act on and sign for and in
the LWUA Board were officially appointed and when they actually assumed
behalf of the Administrator documents, including appointment papers
office.
previously cleared/approved in writing by the Administrator, or by the Board
Further, it maintains that petitioner can, under a delegated authority, sign the of Trustees, as the case may be.[17]
appointments previously approved by the Administrator or the Board of
In a letter[18] dated August 27, 2001, Administrator Lorenzo Jamora requested
Trustees; he can advise the Administrator and the Board of Trustees on the
authority from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to hire the
legality of the appointments; and he was bound to prepare, approve and issue
confidential staff of the members of the Board of Trustees (Board).Pending
only correct appointments. Upon investigation, it was established that he had
approval of the DBM, Jamora issued Inter-Office Memorandum dated October
prepared, approved and issued the appointment papers with dates of
23, 2001, directing the payment of salaries and allowances of his confidential
appointment different from those when the appointees actually assumed
staff Ma. Susana G. Facto and Jesusito R. Toren, appointed on October 10,
office.[12] It further claims that petitioners admission that there are two sets of
2001 and October 15, 2001, respectively, with the undertaking that in case the
appointment papers more than sustains the prosecutorial indictments against
DBM or the Commission on Audit disallowed the payment, it shall be his
him and Parungao.
personal responsibility or accountability.[19]
Moreover, it maintains that the Ombudsman determined the existence of
The LWUA received a letter[20] from the DBM on December 11, 2001 which
probable cause after it had evaluated the documents submitted by the
approved the hiring of the confidential staff of the members of the
parties. It could not have gone beyond its function of determining probable
Board. On December 11, 2001, Chairman of the Board Francisco Dumpit issued
cause and filing the informations. The alleged failure of the Ombudsman in its
a memorandum[21] appointing, effective August 20, 2001, Michael
investigation would not affect the validity of the informations since the
M. Raval and Ma. Geraldine Rose D. Buenaflor. On the same date, members of
absence of preliminary investigation neither affects the courts jurisdiction
the Board Bayani Dato, Sr. and Solomon Badoy issued their respective
over the case, nor impairs the validity of the informations.[13]
memoranda appointing Albino G. Valenciano, Jr., effective August 20,
Lastly, it contends that the allegations in the informations constitute an 2001;[22] and Kristina Joy T. Badoy and Noelle Stephanie R. Badoy,
offense since petitioner and Parungao, in view of their positions, are required effective June 19, 2001,[23] respectively. On December 18, 2001, Normando
to disclose the truth of the facts they had narrated in the fraudulent Toledo, also a member of the Board, issued a memorandum[24] appointing,
documents, and such narration of facts in the appointment papers was effective August 20, 2001, Marc Anthony S. Verzosa and Ma. Lourdes M.
false. For issuing the appointment papers, petitioner and Parungao are also Manaloto.
directly responsible for the payment of back salaries, allowances and other
benefits of the appointees.
Consequently, petitioner and Parungao prepared, approved and signed the
appointment papers, that is, CSC Form No. 33, bearing retroactive dates of
appointment. Thereafter, Jamora issued a memorandum[25] dated December
20, 2001 ordering the release of back salaries and other remunerations of the
Boards confidential staff. The members of the Board issued certifications on
their confidential staffs dates of assumption of office.
However, another set of CSC Form No. 33 relating to the nine aforementioned
appointees was prepared with December 12, 2001 as the date of appointment
to comply with the CSC reportorial requirement under Section 11, Rule V of
the CSC Omnibus Rules.[26]
The Ombudsman allegedly found a prima facie case of falsification of public
documents under Article 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code against
petitioner because he prepared and signed the appointments of the nine
confidential staff with dates earlier than the actual date of appointment which
was December 12, 2001.
We disagree with the findings of the Ombudsman. The elements of the offense
are:
1. That the offender makes in a document statements in a narration of facts;
2. That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated
by him;
3. That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
thing for us to do would be to remand this case to the
Sandiganbayan. Nevertheless, where the innocence of an accused is manifest
from the evidence, as here, we find neither reason nor logic to merely remand
the case.[36]
The effort to eradicate graft and corruption and remove scalawags in
government is commendable. But we cannot overemphasize the admonition
to agencies tasked with the preliminary investigation and prosecution of
crimes that the very purpose of a preliminary investigation is to shield the
innocent from precipitate, spiteful and burdensome prosecution. They are
duty-bound to avoid, unless absolutely necessary, open and public accusation
of crime not only to spare the innocent the trouble, expense and torment of a
public trial, but also to prevent unnecessary expense on the part of the State
for useless and expensive trials. Thus, when at the outset the evidence cannot
sustain a prima faciecase or the existence of probable cause to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused cannot be ascertained, the
prosecution must desist from inflicting on any person the trauma of going
through a trial.[37]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 2,
2004 and June 11, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan are ANNULLED. For lack of
reasonable ground to believe that petitioner violated Article 171, paragraph 4
of the Revised Penal Code, or for absence of probable cause therefor, the
Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to forthwith DISMISS Criminal Cases Nos. 27894-
27902, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo de Jesus and Edelwina
DG Parungao.

4. That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the SO ORDERED.
wrongful intent of injuring a third person.[27]

Criminal intent must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such

as falsification. In this case, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the FIRST DIVISION
requisite criminal intent or mens rea was present.[28] The Ombudsman assails
the first set of documents with dates of appointment earlier than December
12, 2001. Clearly, the first set of CSC Form No. 33 was prepared earlier as
shown by the serial numbers.[29] The first set has serial numbers 168207,
168210, 168213, 168214, 168215, 168216, 168217, 168287 and 168288; while NOE S. ANDAYA, G.R. No. 168486
the second set has serial numbers 168292, 168293, 168294, 168295, 168297,
168298, 168299, 168301 and 168304. The Ombudsman also admits this Petitioner,
fact.[30]Indeed, petitioner admits having signed two sets of appointment
Present:
papers but nothing in said documents constitutes an absolutely false narration
of facts. The first set was prepared and signed on the basis of the inter-office Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
memoranda issued by the members of the Board appointing their respective
confidential staff conformably with the DBM approval. There was no - versus - Ynares-Santiago,
untruthful statement made on said appointment papers as the concerned
personnel were in fact appointed earlier than December 12, 2001. In fact, the Austria-Martinez,
DBM also clarified that the authority to hire confidential personnel may be
Callejo, Sr., and
implemented retroactive to the date of actual service of the employee
concerned.[31] In any case, Jamora authorized the issuance of the second set of Chico-Nazario, JJ.
appointment papers.[32] Following the CSC Rules, the second set of
appointment papers should mean that the first set was ineffective and that PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
the appointing authority, in this case, the members of the Board, shall be liable
for the salaries of the appointee whose appointment became Respondent. Promulgated:
ineffective.[33] There was nothing willful or felonious in petitioners act
warranting his prosecution for falsification. The evidence is insufficient to
sustain a prima facie case and it is evident that no probable cause exists to June 27, 2006
form a sufficient belief as to the petitioners guilt.[34]
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
We note that the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners motion for
reinvestigation.[35] By allowing the reinvestigation, the Sandiganbayan thus
deferred to the authority of the Ombudsman to further re-assess or re-
examine the facts. In short, the Sandiganbayan was willing to accept and adopt DECISION
the final resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman
on the issue of whether or not the offense charged was in fact committed by
petitioner. But, the Sandiganbayan was not bound by such quasi-judicial
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
findings. In fact, under the principles governing criminal procedure, the
Sandiganbayan, or any trial court for that matter, is mandated to
independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case, and may either agree
or disagree with the recommendation of the prosecutor. Hence, the logical
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the September 29, 2004
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26556, affirming the
January 29, 2002 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104 of Quezon
City in Criminal Case No. 92-36145, convicting petitioner Noe S. Andaya of
falsification of private document, and the April 26, 2005 Resolution[3] denying
the motion for reconsideration.
Complainant Armed Forces and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(AFPSLAI) is a non-stock and non-profit association authorized to engage in
savings and loan transactions. In 1986, petitioner Noe S. Andaya was elected
as president and general manager of AFPSLAI. During his term, he sought to
increase the capitalization of AFPSLAI to boost its lending capacity to its
members. Consequently, on June 1, 1988, the Board of Trustees of AFPSLAI
passed and approved Resolution No. RS-88-006-048 setting up a Finders Fee
Program whereby any officer, member or employee, except investment
counselors, of AFPSLAI who could solicit an investment of not less than
P100,000.00 would be entitled to a finders fee equivalent to one percent of
the amount solicited.
In a letter[4] dated September 1991, the Central Bank wrote Gen. Lisandro C.
Abadia, then Chairman of the Board of Trustees, regarding the precarious
financial position of AFPSLAI due to its alleged flawed management. As a
result, Gen. Abadia requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct an investigation on alleged irregularities in the operations of AFPSLAI
which led to the filing of several criminal cases against petitioner, one of which
is the instant case based on the alleged fraudulent implementation of the
Finders Fee Program.
On October 5, 1992, an information for estafa through falsification of
commercial document was filed against petitioner, to wit:
The undersigned accuses NOE S. ANDAYA of the crime of Estafa thru
Falsification of Commercial Document, committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of April, 1991 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, with intent to gain, by means of deceit, false pretenses
and falsification of commercial document, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the ARMED FORCES AND POLICE SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Chairman of the Board of
Director[s], Gen. Lisandro C. Abadia, AFP, in the following manner, to wit: on
the date and in the place aforementioned the said accused being then the
President and General Manager of the Armed Forces and Police Savings and
Loan Association, Inc., caused and approved the disbursement of the sum of
P21,000.00, Philippine Currency, from the funds of the association, by then
and there making it appear in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380 that said
amount represented the 1% finders fee of one DIOSDADO J. GUILLAS [Guilas];
when in truth and in fact accused knew fully well that there was no such
payment to be made by the association as finders fee; that by virtue of said
falsification, said accused was able to encashed (sic) and received (sic) MBTC
Check No. 583768 in the sum of P21,000.00, which amount once in his
possession, misapplied, misappropriated and converted to his own personal
use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in
the aforesaid sum of P21,000.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
The case was raffled to Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-36145. On May 30, 1994, petitioner was
arraigned[6] and pleaded not guilty to the charge, after which trial on the merits
ensued.
The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely, Diosdado Guilas and Judy
Balangue.
Guilas, a general clerk of AFPSLAIs Time Deposit Section, testified that on April
8, 1991, he was informed by Tini Gabriel and Julie Alabansa of the Treasury
Department that there was a finders fee in the amount of P21,000.00 in his
name. Subsequently, Judy Balangue, an investment clerk of the Time Deposit
Section, told him that the finders fee was for petitioner. When Guilas went to
petitioners office to inform him about the finders fee in his (Guilas) name,
petitioner instructed him to collect the P21,000.00 and turn over the same to
the latter. Guilas returned to the Treasury Department and signed
Disbursement Voucher No. 58380[7] afterwhich he was issued Metrobank
Check No. 683768[8] for P21,000.00. After encashing the check, he turned over
the proceeds to petitioner. On cross-examination, Guilas admitted that there
was no prohibition in placing the finders fee under the name of a person who
did not actually solicit the investment.
Balangue also testified that on April 3, 1991, petitioner instructed him to
prepare Certificate of Capital Contribution Monthly No. 52178[9] in the name
of Rosario Mercader for an investment in AFPSLAI in the amount of
P2,100,000.00 and to inform Guilas that the finders fee for the aforesaid
investment will be placed in the latters name. On cross-examination, Balangue
confirmed that a P2,100,000.00 worth of investment from Rosario Mercader
was deposited in AFPSLAI. He further acknowledged that the Finders Fee
Program did not prohibit the placing of another persons name as payee of the
finders fee.
The defense presented three witnesses, namely, Emerita Arevalo, Ernesto
Hernandez and petitioner.
Arevalo, secretary of petitioner in AFPSLAI, explained that the finders fee was
for the P2,100,000.00 investment solicited by Ernesto Hernandez from Rosario
Mercader. The finders fee was placed in the name of Guilas upon request of
Hernandez so that the same would not be reflected in his (Hernandezs) income
tax return. She alleged that Guilas consented to the arrangement of placing
the finders fee in his (Guilas) name. She also claimed that there was no
prohibition in the Finders Fee Program regarding the substitution of the name
of the solicitor as long as there was no double claim for the finders fee over
the same investment.
Hernandez, an associate member of AFPSLAI and vice president of Philippine
Educational Trust Plan, Inc. (PETP Plans), testified that sometime in 1991, he
was able to solicit from Rosario Mercader an investment of P2,100,000.00 in
AFPSLAI. He also asked petitioner to place the finders fee in the name of one
of his employees so that he (Hernandez) would not have to report a higher tax
base in his income tax return. On April 8, 1991, petitioner handed to him the
finders fee in the amount of P21,000.00.
Petitioner denied all the charges against him. He claimed that the P21,000.00
finders fee was in fact payable by AFPSLAI because of the P2,100,000.00
investment of Rosario Mercader solicited by Ernesto Hernandez. He denied
misappropriating the P21,000.00 finders fee for his personal benefit as the
same was turned over to Ernesto Hernandez who was the true solicitor of the
aforementioned investment. Since the finders fee was in fact owed by
AFPSLAI, then no damage was done to the association. The finders fee was
placed in the name of Guilas as requested by Hernandez in order to reduce the
tax obligation of the latter. According to petitioner, Guilas consented to the
whole setup.
Petitioner also claimed that Hernandez was an associate member of AFPSLAI
because his application for membership was approved by the membership
committee and the Board of Trustees and was in fact issued an I.D. There was
no prohibition under the rules and regulation of the Finders Fee Program
regarding the substitution of the name of the solicitor with the name of
another person. On cross-examination, petitioner claimed that he merely
approved the substitution of the name of Hernandez with that of Guilas in the
disbursement voucher upon the request of Hernandez. He brushed aside the
imputation of condoning tax evasion by claiming that the issue in the instant
proceedings was whether he defrauded AFPSLAI and not his alleged complicity
in tax evasion.
After the defense rested its case, the prosecution presented two rebuttal
witnesses, namely, Ma. Victoria Maigue and Ma. Fe Moreno.
Maigue, membership affairs office supervisor of AFPSLAI, testified that
Hernandez was ineligible to become a member of AFPSLAI under sections 1
and 2 of Article II of the associations by-laws. However, she admitted that the
application of Hernandez as member was approved by the membership
committee.
Moreno, legal officer of AFPSLAI at the time of her testimony on January 25,
2000, stated that there are eight criminal cases pending against the petitioner
in various branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In one case
decided by Judge Bacalla of Branch 216, petitioner was convicted of estafa
through falsification involving similar facts as the instant case. She further
stated that Hernandez was not a member of AFPSLAI under sections 1 and 2
of Article II of the by-laws. On cross-examination, she admitted that the case
decided by Judge Bacalla convicting petitioner was on appeal with the Court
of Appeals.
The defense dispensed with the presentation of Mercader in view of the
stipulation of the prosecution on the fact that Mercader was a depositor of
AFPSLAI and that she was convinced to invest in the association by Ernesto
Hernandez.[10]
On June 20, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision[11] convicting petitioner
of falsification of private document. On July 5, 2001, petitioner filed a motion
for new trial.[12] In an Order[13] dated December 20, 2001, the trial court ruled
that the evidence submitted by petitioner in support of his motion was
inadequate to conduct a new trial, however, in the interest of substantial
justice, the case should still be reopened pursuant to Section 24,[14]Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
Petitioner proceeded to submit documentary evidence consisting of the
financial statements of AFPSLAI from 1996 to 1999 to show that AFPSLAI did
not suffer any damage from the payment of the P21,000.00 finders fee. He
likewise offered the testimony of Paterno Madet, senior vice president of
AFPSLAI, who testified that he was personally aware that Rosario Mercader
invested P2,100,000.00 in AFPSLAI; that Hernandez was a member of AFPSLAI
and was the one who convinced Mercader to invest; that the finders fee was
placed in the name of Guilas; that petitioner called him to grant the request of
Hernandez for the finders fee to be placed in the name of one of the
employees of AFPSLAI; that there was no policy which prohibits the placing of
the name of the solicitor of the investment in the name of another person;
that the substitution of the name of Hernandez with that of Guilas was
approved by petitioner but he (Madet) was the one who approved the release
of the disbursement voucher.
On January 29, 2002, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision convicting
petitioner of falsification of private document based on the following findings
of fact: Hernandez solicited from Rosario Mercader an investment of
P2,100,000.00 for AFPSLAI; Hernandez requested petitioner to place the
finders fee in the name of another person; petitioner caused it to appear in
the disbursement voucher that Guilas solicited the aforesaid investment; the
voucher served as the basis for the issuance of the check for P21,000.00
representing the finders fee for the investment of Mercader; and Guilas
encashed the check and turned over the money to petitioner who in turn gave
it to Hernandez.
The trial court ruled that all the elements of falsification of private document
were present. First, petitioner caused it to appear in the disbursement
voucher, a private document, that Guilas, instead of Hernandez, was entitled
to a P21,000.00 finders fee. Second, the falsification of the voucher was
done with criminal intent to cause damage to the government because it was
meant to lower the tax base of Hernandez and, thus, evade payment of taxes
on the finders fee.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied by the trial court in an
Order[15] dated May 13, 2002. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court and denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration; hence, the instant petition challenging the validity of his
conviction for the crime of falsification of private document.
Preliminarily, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals contradicted the
ruling of the trial court. He claims that the Court of Appeals stated in certain
portions of its decision that petitioner was guilty of estafa through falsification
of commercial document whereas in the trial courts decision petitioner was
convicted of falsification of private document.
A close reading of the Court of Appeals decision shows that the alleged points
of contradiction were the result of inadvertence in the drafting of the
same. Read in its entirety, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court and, necessarily, it affirmed the conviction
of petitioner for the crime of falsification of private document and not of
estafa through falsification of commercial document.
In the main, petitioner implores this Court to review the pleadings he filed
before the lower courts as well as the evidence on record on the belief that a
review of the same will prove his innocence. However, he failed to specify
what aspects of the factual and legal bases of his conviction should be
reversed.
Time honored is the principle that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole
action for review on any question including those not raised by the
parties.[16] After a careful and thorough review of the records, we are
convinced that petitioner should be acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph
2[17] in relation to Article 171[18] of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification under Article 171 which, in the case
at bar, falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to appear that
persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact
so participate; (2) the falsification was committed on a private document; and
(3) the falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to cause
damage to a third party.
Although the public prosecutor designated the offense charged in the
information as estafa through falsification of commercial document, petitioner
could be convicted of falsification of private document, had it been proper,
under the well-settled rule that it is the allegations in the information that
determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given by the
public prosecutor in the preamble of the information. We explained this
principle in the case of U.S. v. Lim San[19] in this wise:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the
accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged.
It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x That to which his attention
should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most
interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime
given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts
alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. x x x
The real and important question to him is, Did you perform the acts alleged in
the manner alleged? not, Did you commit a crime named murder? If he
performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what
the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the accused
performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged, then he ought to be
punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime
which those acts constitute.[20]
The facts alleged in the information are sufficient to constitute the crime of
falsification of private document. Specifically, the allegations in the
information can be broken down into the three aforestated essential elements
of this offense as follows: (1) petitioner caused it to appear in Disbursement
Voucher No. 58380 that Diosdado Guillas was entitled to a finders fee from
AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 when in truth and in fact no finders fee
was due to him; (2) the falsification was committed on Disbursement Voucher
No. 58380; and (3) the falsification caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount
of P21,000.00.
The first element of the offense charged in the information was proven by the
prosecution. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, namely, Diosdado
Guilas and Judy Balangue, as well as the presentation of Disbursement
Voucher No. 58380 established that petitioner caused the preparation of the
voucher in the name of Guilas despite knowledge that Guilas was not entitled
to the finders fee. Significantly, petitioner admitted his participation in
falsifying the voucher when he testified that he authorized the release of the
voucher in the name of Guilas upon the request of Ernesto
Hernandez. While petitioner did not personally prepare the voucher, he could
be considered a principal by induction, had his conviction been proper, since
he was the president and general manager of AFPSLAI at the time so that his
employees merely followed his instructions in preparing the falsified voucher.
The second element of the offense charged in the information, i.e., the
falsification was committed in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380, a private
document, is likewise present. It appears that the public prosecutor
erroneously characterized the disbursement voucher as a commercial
document so that he designated the offense as estafa through falsification of
commercial document in the preamble of the information. However, as
correctly ruled by the trial court,[21] the subject voucher is a private document
only; it is not a commercial document because it is not a document used by
merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions[22]nor is it defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or
other commercial law.[23] Rather, it is a private document, which has been
defined as a deed or instrument executed by a private person without the
intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which
some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth,[24] because it
acted as the authorization for the release of the P21,000.00 finders fee to
Guilas and as the receipt evidencing the payment of this finders fee.
While the first and second elements of the offense charged in the information
were satisfactorily established by the prosecution, it is the third element which
is decisive in the instant case. In the information, it was alleged
that petitioner caused damage in the amount of P21,000.00 to AFPSLAI
because he caused it to appear in the disbursement voucher that Diosdado
Guilas was entitled to a P21,000.00 finders fee when in truth and in fact
AFPSLAI owed no such sum to him. However, contrary to these allegations in
the information, petitioner was able to prove that AFPSLAI owed a finders fee
in the amount of P21,000.00 although not to Guilas but to Ernesto Hernandez.
It was positively shown that Hernandez was able to solicit a P2,100,000.00
worth of investment for AFPSLAI from Rosario Mercader which entitled him to
a finders fee equivalent to one percent of the amount solicited (i.e.,
P21,000.00) under the Finders Fee Program. The documentary evidence
consisting of the Certificate of Capital Contribution Monthly
No. 52178[25] which was presented by the prosecution categorically stated that
Rosario Mercader deposited P2,100,000.00 worth of investment in AFPSLAI. In
fact, Rosario Mercader was no longer presented as a defense witness in view
of the stipulation by the prosecution on the fact that Mercader was a depositor
of AFPSLAI and that Hernandez was the one who convinced her to make such
deposit.[26] Moreover, the defense showed that the disbursement voucher was
merely placed in the name of Guilas upon the request of Hernandez so that he
would have a lower tax base. Thus, after Guilas received the P21,000.00 from
AFPSLAI, he gave the money to petitioner who in turn surrendered the amount
to Hernandez.
It was further established that Hernandez was an associate member of
AFPSLAI and, thus, covered by the Finders Fee Program. The prosecution tried
to cast doubt on the validity of Hernandezs membership in the association but
it merely relied on the unsubstantiated claims of its two rebuttal witnesses,
namely, Ma. Victoria Maigue, membership affairs office supervisor of
AFPSLAI and Ma. Fe Moreno, legal officer of AFPSLAI, who claimed
that Hernandez was disqualified from being an associate member under
AFPSLAIs by-laws. However, except for a recital of certain provisions of the by-
laws, they failed to support their claims with documentary evidence clearly
showing that Hernandez was disqualified from being an associate
member. Significantly, Maigue admitted on cross-examination that
Hernandezs membership was approved by AFPSLAIs membership committee
and was issued an AFPSLAI I.D. card.[27] Documentary evidence consisting of
Hernandezs I.D. card as well as the oral testimonies of petitioner, Arevalo and
Hernandez, and the admission of Maigue on cross-examination, support the
claim of the defense that Hernandez was an associate member of AFPSLAI.
Considering that Hernandez was able to solicit a P2,100,000.00 investment
from Mercader, it follows that he was entitled to receive the finders fee in the
amount of P21,000.00. AFPSLAI suffered no damage because it really owed the
P21,000.00 finders fee to Hernandez albeit the sum was initially paid to Guilas
and only later turned over to Hernandez. Clearly then, the third essential
element of the offense as alleged in the information, i.e., the falsification
caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00, was not proven by (The Bouncing Checks Law) because there was a variance between the identity
the prosecution. and date of issuance of the check alleged in the information and the check
proved by the prosecution during trial:

In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to

establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.[28] It has the duty
to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to
warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any other crime necessarily
included therein. However, in the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove
the third essential element of the crime charged in the
information. Thus, petitioner should be acquitted due to insufficiency of
evidence.
The trial court convicted petitioner of falsification of private document, while
conceding that AFPSLAI suffered no damage, however, the court reasoned that
the third essential element of falsification of private document was present
because the falsification of the voucher was done with criminal intent to
cause damage to the government considering that its purpose was to lower
the tax base of Hernandez and, thus, allow him to evade payment of taxes on
the finders fee.
We find ourselves unable to agree with this ratiocination of the trial court
because it violates the constitutional right[29] of petitioner to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As early as the 1904 case
of U.S. v. Karelsen,[30] the rationale of this fundamental right of the accused
was already explained in this wise:
The object of this written accusation was First. To furnish the accused with
such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to
inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. (United
States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542.) In order that this requirement may be
satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up
of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with
reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of
every fact and circumstances necessary to constitute the crime
charged.[31] (Emphasis supplied)
This Court notes, however, that under the third count, the information alleged
that petitioner issued a check dated May 14, 1992 whereas the documentary
evidence presented and duly marked as Exhibit "I" was BPI Check No. 831258
in the amount of P25,000 dated April 5, 1992. Prosecution witness Fernando
Sardes confirmed petitioner's issuance of the three BPI checks (Exhibits G, H,
and I), but categorically stated that the third check (BPI Check No. 831258) was
dated May 14, 1992, which was contrary to that testified to by private
complainant Violeta Tizon, i.e., BPI check No. 831258 dated April 5, 1992. In
view of this variance, the conviction of petitioner on the third count (Criminal
Case No. Q-93-41751) cannot be sustained. It is on this ground that petitioner's
fourth assignment of error is tenable, in that the prosecution's
exhibit, i.e., Exhibit "I" (BPI Check No. 831258 dated April 5, 1992 in the
amount of P25,000) is excluded by the law and the rules on evidence. Since the
identity of the check enters into the first essential element of the offense under
Section 1 of B.P. 22, that is, that a person makes, draws or issues a check on
account or for value, and the date thereof involves its second element, namely,
that at the time of issue the maker, drawer or issuer knew that he or she did
not have sufficient funds to cover the same, there is a violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged in view
of the aforesaid variance, thereby rendering the conviction for the third count
fatally defective.[40] (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the case of Burgos v. Sandiganbayan,[41] we upheld the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the accusation against
him in a case involving a variance between the means of committing the
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 alleged in the information and the means
found by the Sandiganbayan:
Common and foremost among the issues raised by petitioners is the argument
that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them on a finding of fact that was
not alleged in the information. They contend that the information charged
them with having allowed payment of P83,850 to Ricardo Castaeda despite
being aware and knowing fully well that the surveying instruments were not
actually repaired and rendered functional/operational. However, their
conviction by the Sandiganbayan was based on the finding that the surveying
instruments were not repaired in accordance with the specifications contained
in the job orders.

It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged

xxxx
in the information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a
crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[32] The allegations of In criminal cases, where the life and liberty of the accused is at stake, due
facts constituting the offense charged are substantial matters and an accuseds process requires that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the
right to question his conviction based on facts not alleged in the information accusation against him. An accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless
cannot be waived.[33] No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. To convict him of an
of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted of any offense unless it is offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a
charged in the information on which he is tried or is necessarily included violation of this constitutional right.
therein.[34] To convict him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his
defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and
underhanded.[35] The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the
The important end to be accomplished is to describe the act with sufficient
information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if
certainty in order that the accused may be appraised of the nature of the
it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his
charge against him and to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to
substantial rights.[36]
injustice. Otherwise, the accused would be left in the unenviable state of
speculating why he is made the object of a prosecution.

Thus, in Alonto v. People,[37] Dico v. Court of Appeals[38] and Ongson v.

People,[39] we acquitted the accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
xxxx of the voucher by petitioner caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of
P21,000.00 and not that the falsification of the voucher was done with intent
to cause damage to the government. It is apparent that this variance not
merely goes to the identity of the third party but, more importantly, to the
There is no question that the manner of commission alleged in the information
nature and extent of the damage done to the third party. Needless to state,
and the act the Sandiganbayan found to have been committed are both
the defense applicable for each is different.
violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Nonetheless, they are and remain two
different means of execution and, even if reference to Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
has been made in the information, appellants conviction should only be based
on that which was charged, or included, in the information. Otherwise, there More to the point, petitioner prepared his defense based precisely on the
would be a violation of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature allegations in the information. A review of the records shows that petitioner
of the accusation against them. concentrated on disproving that AFPSLAI suffered damage for this was the
charge in the information which he had to refute to prove his innocence. As
previously discussed, petitioner proved that AFPSLAI suffered no damage
inasmuch as it really owed the finders fee in the amount of P21,000.00 to
In Evangelista v. People, a judgment of conviction by the Sandiganbayan, for
Hernandez but the same was placed in the name of Guilas upon Hernandezs
violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, was
request. If we were to convict petitioner now based on his intent to cause
reversed by the Court on the ground that accused was made liable for acts
damage to the government, we would be riding roughshod over his
different from those described in the information. The accused therein was
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation because he was not
convicted on the finding that she failed to identify with certainty in her
forewarned that he was being prosecuted for intent to cause damage to the
certification the kinds of taxes paid by Tanduay Distillery, Inc., although the
government. It would be simply unfair and underhanded to convict
information charged her with falsifying said certificate. The Court said that,
petitioner on this ground not alleged while he was concentrating his defense
constitutionally, the accused has a right to be informed of the nature and
against the ground alleged.
cause of the accusation against her. To convict her of an offense other than
that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this
constitutional right.
The surprise and injustice visited upon petitioner becomes more evident if we
take into consideration that the prosecution never sought to establish that
petitioners acts were done with intent to cause damage to the government in
Contrary to the stand of the prosecution, the allegations contained in the
that it purportedly aided Hernandez in evading the payment of taxes on the
information and the findings stated in the Sandiganbayan decision are not
finders fee. The Bureau of Internal Revenue was never made a party to this
synonymous. This is clearly apparent from the mere fact that the defenses
case. The income tax return of Hernandez was, likewise, never presented to
applicable for each one are different. To counter the allegations contained in
show the extent, if any, of the actual damage to the government of the
the information, petitioners only had to prove that the instruments were
supposed under declaration of income by Hernandez. Actually, the
repaired and rendered functional/operational. Under the findings stated in
prosecution never tried to establish actual damage, much less intent to cause
the Sandiganbayan decision, petitioners defense would have been to show not
damage, to the government in the form of lost income taxes. There was here
only that the instruments were repaired, but were repaired in accordance with
no opportunity for petitioner to object to the evidence presented by the
the job order.
prosecution on the ground that the evidence did not conform to the
allegations in the information for the simple reason that no such evidence was
presented by the prosecution to begin with.
xxxx

Instead, what the trial court did was to deduce intent to cause damage to the
This is not to say that petitioners cannot be convicted under the information government from the testimony of petitioner and his three other witnesses,
charged. The information in itself is valid. It is only that the Sandiganbayan namely, Arevalo, Hernandez and Madet, that the substitution of the names in
erred in convicting them for an act that was not alleged therein. x x the voucher was intended to lower the tax base of Hernandez to avoid
x.[42] (Underscoring supplied) payment of taxes on the finders fee. In other words, the trial court used part
of the defense of petitioner in establishing the third essential element of the
offense which was entirely different from that alleged in the
information. Under these circumstances, petitioner obviously had no
As in the Burgos case, the information in the case at bar is valid,
opportunity to defend himself with respect to the charge that he committed
however, there is a variance between the allegation in the information and
the acts with intent to cause damage to the government because this was part
proof adduced during trial with respect to the third essential element of
of his defense when he explained the reason for the substitution of the names
falsification of private document, i.e., the falsification caused damage or was
in the voucher with the end goal of establishing that no actual damage was
committed with intent to cause damage to a third party. To reiterate,
done to AFPSLAI. If we were to approve of the method employed by the trial
petitioner was charged in the information with causing damage to AFPSLAI in
court in convicting petitioner, then we would be sanctioning the surprise and
the amount of P21,000.00 because he caused it to appear in the disbursement
injustice that the accuseds constitutional right to be informed of the nature
voucher that Guilas was entitled to a P21,000.00 finders fee when in truth and
and cause of the accusation against him precisely seeks to prevent. It would be
in fact AFPSLAI owed no such amount to Guilas. However, he was convicted by
plain denial of due process.
the trial court of falsifying the voucher with criminal intent to cause damage
to the government because the trial court found that petitioners acts were
designed to lower the tax base of Hernandez and aid the latter in evading
payment of taxes on the finders fee. In view of the foregoing, we rule that it was error to convict petitioner for acts
which purportedly constituted the third essential element of the crime but
which were entirely different from the acts alleged in the information because
it violates in no uncertain terms petitioners constitutional right to be informed
We find this variance material and prejudicial to petitioner which, perforce, is
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
fatal to his conviction in the instant case. By the clear and unequivocal terms
of the information, the prosecution endeavored to prove that the falsification
No doubt tax evasion is a deplorable act because it deprives the government
of much needed funds in delivering basic services to the people. However, the
culpability of petitioner should have been established under the proper
information and with an opportunity for him to adequately prepare his
defense. It is worth mentioning that the public prosecutor has been apprised
of petitioners defense in the counter-affidavit[43] that he filed before the
NBI. He claimed there that AFPSLAI really owed the P21,000.00 finders fee not
to Guilas but to Hernandez and that the finders fee was placed in the name of
Guilas under a purported financial arrangement between petitioner and
Guilas. Yet in his Resolution[44] dated September 14, 1992, the public
prosecutor disregarded petitioners defense and proceeded to file the
information based on the alleged damage that petitioner caused to AFPSLAI in
the amount of P21,000.00 representing unwarranted payment of finders
fee.[45] During the trial proper, the prosecution was again alerted to the fact
that AFPSLAI suffered no actual damage and that the substitution of the names
in the voucher was designed to aid Hernandez in evading the payment of taxes
on the finders fee. This was shown by no less than the prosecutions own
documentary evidence the Certificate of Capital Contribution Monthly No.
52178 in the amount of P2,100,000.00 issued to Rosario Mercader which was
prepared and identified by the prosecution witness, Judy Balangue. Later on,
the testimonies of the defense witnesses, Arevalo, Hernandez, Madet and
petitioner, clearly set forth the reasons for the substitution of the names in the
disbursement voucher. However, the prosecution did not take steps to seek
the dismissal of the instant case and charge petitioner and his cohorts with the
proper information before judgment by the trial court as expressly allowed
under Section 19,[46] Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.[47] Instead, the prosecution
proceeded to try petitioner under the original information even though he had
an adequate defense against the offense charged in the
information. Regrettably, these mistakes of the prosecution can only benefit
petitioner.

In closing, it is an opportune time to remind public prosecutors of their

important duty to carefully study the evidence on record before filing the
corresponding information in our courts of law and to be vigilant in identifying
and rectifying errors made. Mistakes in filing the proper information and in the
ensuing prosecution of the case serve only to frustrate the States interest in
enforcing its criminal laws and adversely affect the administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2004 Decision and
April 26, 2005 Resolution of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26556
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED based on reasonable
doubt. The Bail Bond is CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.