Masten 1

Structural Inequalities and Distributive Justice

According to philosopher John Rawls, the basic structure of society is the primary subject

of justice. In his second principle of justice, Rawls asserts that in order to be just, the basic

structure must satisfy two criteria: fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. Many

economists, in concurrence with Rawls and his principles, point out that the United States is a

land of vast inequality, both of income and of opportunity. However, Rawls’ theory lacks an

intersectional approach. By focusing exclusively on class, rather than race or gender, in his

assessment of inequality, Rawls fails to incorporate certain structural inequalities that profoundly

impact the distribution of income and opportunity in the United States.

Rawls’ Theory of Justice

In his seminal work A Theory of Justice, Rawls outlines his theory of justice as fairness,

developing a framework by which the justice of social institutions and distributions can be

evaluated. According to Rawls, justice is achieved when basic social institutions “are arranged so

as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging

to it” (Rawls, 1971). This requires that “no arbitrary distinctions” are made when distributing

social primary goods such as wealth and opportunity among members of society. In other words,

a just distribution must not be influenced by natural fortune or social position.

Rawls’ second principle of justice is often used as a guide for social policy. It holds that

social and economic inequalities are just if, and only if, they are “to the greatest benefit to the

least-advantaged members of society” and “attached to offices and positions open to all” (Rawls,

1971). As such, a just distribution is one that follows a system of democratic equality by

enforcing both fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle.

 Masten 2

Fair equality of opportunity seeks to mitigate the influence of class and social position in

distributing income and wealth across society. According to Rawls, those with the same level of

talent and ability should have the same opportunities for success, regardless of their

socioeconomic status (Rawls, 1971, p. 63). Fair equality of opportunity can be measured in terms

of relative mobility, which refers to the disparity between high- and low-income individuals of

similar talent and ability. To Rawls, ensuring fair equality of opportunity means equal prospects

in “all sectors of society,” including equal accessibility to high quality education (Rawls, 1971).

While fair equality of opportunity prevents inequalities from arising among various social

strata, inequality can still occur as a result of natural fortune. The natural lottery inevitably

distributes talents and abilities unequally, so those who receive a greater endowment have better

life prospects than others. Consequently, the difference principle requires that all inequalities

must benefit society’s least fortunate members (Rawls, 1971, p. 65). Unlike Pareto efficiency,

the difference principle holds that a unequal distribution is only just if it makes everyone better

off; if not, an equal distribution is preferred. The higher expectations of some serve as an

incentive to all, inspiring them to work harder and thus increasing productivity and innovation in

society (Rawls, 1971). As such, lowering the prospects of more advantaged members of society

is unfavorable even for the lower class, as they now have a lower goal to work towards. Rawls

states that the difference principle is a “strongly egalitarian” concept insofar as it protects those

who are disadvantaged by morally arbitrary factors such as the natural lottery (Rawls, 1971).

Inequality in the United States

Intergenerational mobility in the United States is remarkably bleak. To assess fair

equality of opportunity in the U.S., Raj Chetty and his colleagues calculated two measures of

intergenerational mobility. The first, relative mobility, measures the difference in prospects
 Masten 3

between children from high-income and low-income families, while absolute upward mobility

evaluates the prospects of children belonging to households in the 25th percentile of the income

distribution (Chetty, Hendren, Kline, & Saez, 2014). Known as the Equality of Opportunity

Project, the study found that a number of factors are correlated with mobility, including

segregation, inequality, quality of education, family structure, and social capital (Chetty et al.,

2014).

According to another study conducted by Chetty et al., mobility is significantly lower for

African-American populations. In 99% of America, white children were consistently more

successful than their black counterparts, even when raised in the same neighborhoods under

similar family structures (Badger, Miller, Pearce, & Quealy, 2018). However, there is one

exception: in areas with less discrimination and racial bias, poorer black children were nearly, if

not equally, successful as their white counterparts. In these neighborhoods, black children had

greater prospects regardless of family structure, which indicates that racism and discrimination

might be the real problem (Badger et al., 2018). Groundbreaking in more ways than one, the

study refutes the widely-held theory that inequality is contingent upon class position, instead

suggesting that it is more greatly influenced by race or gender.

On the other hand, economists such as Emmanuel Saez and Thomas Piketty have focused

on the issue of income inequality. Income inequality in the United States has reached levels not

seen since the Great Depression, as the share of income held by the richest citizens only

continues to increase over time (Lowrey, 2012). While the earnings of the top 1 percent have

grown significantly, 94 percent of earners have experienced little to no growth in salary; rather,

their earnings have remained quite stagnant (Lowrey, 2012). Given these findings, it can be

concluded that the current income distribution in the United States does not qualify as just under
 Masten 4

the difference principle. The benefits enjoyed by the top 1 percent have not produced comparable

improvements for the rest of society; in fact, the rest of society appears relatively worse off when

factors such as inflation are taken into account. Additionally, Rawls states that a distribution is

unjust when the higher expectations are “excessive” (Rawls, 1971). Given the fact that the top 10

percent of earners enjoy half of the overall income, it is reasonable to conclude that these

expectations qualify as excessive (Lowrey, 2012). The income inequality in the United States

appears to only benefit the most advantaged members of society, while simultaneously harming

the less fortunate.

The inequalities of income and opportunity in the United States clearly violate Rawls’

second principle of justice. Upon observing the lack of opportunity and relative success of the

lower class, it is obvious that the current distribution is not just. Rawls would indubitably concur

with this conclusion and agree that the basic structure of American society does not guarantee

distributive justice. However, the studies of Chetty et al. have shed new light on Rawlsian

theory, calling the reliability of the second principle into question.

Structural Inequalities and Intersectionality

The findings of Chetty et al. highlight an important flaw in Rawls’ theory of justice. Even

under a Rawlsian distribution where socioeconomic position is held constant, there is still a

marked inequality in the prospects of individuals on the basis of race and gender. Rawls fails to

address this aspect of inequality, and therefore does not fully capture the structural inequalities

that contribute to the currently unjust distribution in the United States.

Structural inequalities are those that arise from an unjust social structure that benefits

some more than others: an unjust procedure produces a similarly unjust result (Young, 2001).

Structural inequalities can be identified through group-conscious assessments of inequality,

 Masten 5

which examine social groups rather than individuals by categorizing according to race, gender,

class, and so on (Young, 2001). Similar to Rawls, proponents of group-conscious assessments of

inequality believe that social structures and institutions are the primary mechanisms which lead

to justice – or lack thereof – in a given society.

In his discussions of social justice, Rawls utilizes a group-conscious approach when

differentiating between that which is just and that which is unjust. Rawls clarifies that the

“persons” mentioned in his second principle refer to “representative persons holding the various

social positions” and do not apply to “particular individuals who may be identified by their

proper names” (Rawls, 1971, p. 56). As such, Rawls theorizes that there is a “chain connection”

within the second principle: improving the prospects of the “representative man” in a given

social position presumably raises or lowers the prospects of those in other positions (Rawls,

1971). Justice according to Rawls’ second principle is evaluated in terms of economic classes;

inequalities between classes are just only if they meet the criteria set forth by the second

principle.

However, Rawls’ view of justice is somewhat myopic in that it oversimplifies structural

inequalities by comparing people only in terms of economic classes. Although inequality exists

between socioeconomic classes, there is also vast inequality within the classes themselves that

Rawls fails to account for. By asserting that the fundamental problem is that of class, not race,

Rawls’ second principle might incorrectly classify a distribution as just in spite of marked

inequalities that could be identified if one were to reevaluate from an intersectional perspective.

Factors such as racism and sexism are systemic, and therefore embedded in the social structure.

In this way, they result in a marked disparity between social groups; Rawls’ failure to recognize
 Masten 6

the role these factors play in procedural and distributive justice effectively harms the legitimacy

of his theory.

Rawls wrongly assumes that every “representative man” is the same, with prospects

identical to those belonging to the same economic class as him. Yet the findings of Chetty et al.

serve as evidence to the contrary. Given the notable disparities between blacks and whites

belonging to the same economic class, a representative man who is white cannot in good faith be

considered representative. If inequality and injustice continue even when the second principle is

seemingly satisfied, then it must be that there are more than just two factors that must be

accounted for in order to distributive justice. Whereas Rawls seems to imply that natural fortune

and class position are the only morally arbitrary factors that contribute to inequality, Chetty et al.

have found that race and gender play a similar role in creating injustice.

The discrepancies between Rawls’ theory and the conclusions drawn by Chetty et al.

underscore the need for an intersectional approach when determining whether a distribution is

just or unjust. Focusing solely on socioeconomic inequality does not sufficiently capture the true

extent of injustice within a given distribution. Race and socioeconomic status are interconnected,

and ignoring this connection only perpetuates the injustices caused by such structural factors.

This relationship is a perfect example of intersectionality, a theory referring to the way that

structural factors and oppressive institutions overlap to create injustice. Intersectionality is best

described by the birdcage metaphor: when taken by themselves, the wires seem to do little to

prevent the bird from escaping. However, when viewed as a whole, the connections between the

many wires create a complex structure that render the bird unable to fly freely (Young, 2001).

Similarly, the issue of distributive justice is far more nuanced than Rawls makes it seem. It is

influenced by a myriad of institutions and social positions, each of which relate to one another,
 Masten 7

working together to create a hierarchy of social groups throughout which wealth and opportunity

are distributed unequally.

Although Rawls’ second principle of justice, namely fair equality of opportunity and the

difference principle, is a useful tool for evaluating distributive justice, it is important to consider

the basic structure and distribution of society from an intersectional perspective. American

society is incredibly unjust both in income and in opportunity; however, the inequality

transcends beyond socioeconomic lines. Within a given socioeconomic class, there lie further

inequalities on the grounds of other structural factors such as race. As such, in order to fully

rectify distributive injustices, the role of systemic racism and discrimination in creating them

must be recognized.
 Masten 8

References

Badger, E., Miller, C. C., Pearce, A., & Quealy, K. (2018, March 19). Extensive Data Shows

Punishing Reach of Racism for Black Boys. The New York Times. Retrieved from

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/19/upshot/race-class-white-and-black-

men.html, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/19/upshot/race-class-white-and-

black-men.html

Chetty, R., Hendren, N., Kline, P., & Saez, E. (2014). Where is the Land of Opportunity? The

Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States. The Quarterly Journal of

Economics, 129(4), 1553–1623.

Lowrey, A. (2012, April 17). French Duo See (Well) Past Tax Rise for Richest. The New York

Times.

Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press.

Young, I. M. (2001). Equality of Whom? Social Groups and Judgments of Injustice. The Journal

of Political Philosophy, 9(1), 1–18.