Before taking cognizance of his appeal, the SSC directed the exhaustion of administrative
SECOND DIVISION remedies, by letter of June 30, 2000. The matter was thus referred to the SSS Office of the
Medical Program Director for review of petitioners disability claim.[12]
IBARRA P. ORTEGA, G.R. No. 176150
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
SOCIAL SECURITY TINGA,
COMMISSION, and VELASCO, JR., and
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, DE CASTRO,* JJ.
Respondents.
Promulgated:
June 25, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Ibarra P. Ortega assails the Court of Appeals August 7, 2006 Decision [1] dismissing
his petition for review and upholding the denial by respondent Social Security Commission
(SSC) of his application for total permanent disability benefits, and the Resolution[2] of January
16, 2007 denying his motions for reconsideration and inhibition.
Petitioner, a member of respondent Social Security System (SSS), filed claims
for partial permanent disability benefits on account of his condition of Generalized Arthritis and
Partial Ankylosis,[3] which claims the SSS granted for a total monthly pension of 23 months.[4]
After the expiration of his disability pension, petitioner filed with the SSS Malabon
Branch Office on April 26, 2000 a claim for totalpermanent disability benefits.[5] His
application, docketed as BO-0000-1755, was denied, however, on the ground that he was
already granted disability benefits for the same illness and physical examination showed no
progression of illness.[6] Dr. Juanillo Descalzo III, SSS Malabon Branch senior physician,
observed that petitioner merely had a slight limitation of grasping movement for both hands. [7]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed before the SSC an unverified Petition of June 19,
2000,[8] alleging that the SSS denied his application despite the fact that his attending physician,
Dr. Rafael Recto, Jr., diagnosed him to be suffering from Trigger finger 4th (L) and thumb
(L)[9] while another private medical practitioner, Dr. Flo dela Cruz, diagnosed him to be also
suffering from Bronchial Asthma, Hypertension and Gastro-Esophageal Reflux
Disease.[10]
Further claiming to be afflicted with rheumatoid arthritis of both hands affecting all
fingers and both palms,[11] petitioner contended that the medical opinion of the SSS physician
who interviewed him for less than three minutes cannot prevail over the findings of his
physicians who have been treating him over a long period of time.
Meanwhile, by letter of July 17, 2000, the SSS Legal Department denied a reconsideration of
the denial of his claim,[13] prompting petitioner to submit a letter-opposition of August 15,
2000.[14]
Upon referral of the SSC, the SSS Medical Program Department, through Dr. Carlota A. Cruz-
Tutaan and Dr. Jesus S. Tan, confirmed that, upon examination of petitioner, there was no
progression of his illness,[15] prompting petitioner to submit a letter-opposition of November
11, 2000charging the SSS medical officers of issuing fraudulent medical
findings.[16] Unperturbed, the SSS Medical Program Department stood its ground and denied
with finality petitioners claim, by letter of November 22, 2000.[17]
On January 29, 2001, SSC finally docketed petitioners June 19, 2000 petition as SSC Case No.
1-15115-2001,[18] after petitioner complied with SSCs directives[19] to verify the petition and
submit certain document-annexes. SSS then filed its Answer of May 31, 2001,[20] to which
petitioner submitted a Reply of June 25, 2001.[21] After the August 10, 2001 pre-hearing
conference,[22] the SSS filed its Position Paper of September 7, 2001while petitioner submitted
his Reply of October 19, 2001.
By Resolution of April 3, 2002,[23] the SSC denied petitioners claim for entitlement to total
permanent disability for lack of merit. And it opined that, considering that he had reached the
retirement age of 60, on March 19, 1998, with 41 contributions to his name, petitioner may opt:
(a) [t]o continue paying to the SSS monthly contributions (including
employers share) on his own to complete the required 120 monthly
contributions in order to avail of the retirement pension benefit;
(b) [to] leave his monthly contributions with the SSS for his and his familys
future benefits; or
(c) [to a]vail of the lump sum retirement benefit.[24]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. The SSC thus directed the SSS to file
its comment[25] and, by a subsequent order, to conduct a domiciliary visit and physical
examination on petitioner to ascertain whether he could already qualify for such benefit. [26] In
compliance therewith, Dr. Rebecca Sison, SSS senior physician, examined petitioner on August
29, 2002 and found no sufficient basis to warrant the granting of total permanent disability
benefits to him.[27]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order [28] of January 29, 2003,
petitioner appealed via Rule 43 to the Court of Appeals[29] which promulgated in CA-G.R. SP
No. 75653 the assailed issuances affirming in toto the SSC Resolution and Order.
There is at the outset a need to thresh out procedural issues attending the petition
drafted by petitioner himself, apparently without the aid of counsel. While the petition was
1
admittedly filed as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it contains a rider averring that it was
filed also as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. [30]
In not granting imprimatur to this type of unorthodox strategy, the Court ruled, in a similar
case,[31] that a party should not join both petitions in one pleading. A petition cannot be
subsumed simultaneously under Rule 45 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, nor may it delegate
upon the court the task of determining under which rule the petition should fall.[32] It is a firm
judicial policy that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive.[33]
Palpably, petitioner crafted this unconventional two-headed petition under no other pretext but
to second-guess at the appropriate remedy. His apparent bewilderment led him to later rectify a
supposed typographical error in the caption such that instead of petition for review, the title be
read as a petition for certiorari.[34] The subsequent filing of the Correction of Clerical Errors
served no redeeming purpose as it only evinced petitioners decision to consider the petition as
a special civil action for certiorari, which is an improper remedy.
It bears stressing that Rule 45 and Rule 65 pertain to different remedies and have
distinct applications.[35] It is axiomatic that the remedy of certiorari is not available where the
petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
course of law.[36]The petition for review under Rule 45 covers the mode of appeal from a
judgment, final order, resolution or one which completely disposes of the case, like the herein
assailed Decision and Resolution of the appellate court. There being already a final judgment
at the time of the filing of the petition, a petition for review under Rule 45 is the appropriate
remedy.
Petitioner failed to carve out an exception to this rule, as he did not and could not illustrate the
inadequacy of an appeal as a remedy that could promptly relieve him from the injurious effects
of the assailed judgment.[37] In fact, by seeking the same kind of reliefs via two remedies rolled
into one pleading, he implicitly admits that an appeal suffices. Moreover, the probability of
divergent rulings, a scenario transpiring in G & S Transport Corp. v. CA,[38] is far from
obtaining in this case since the assailed issuances emanated from only one court and cannot be
elevated separately in different fora.
While the Court may dismiss a petition outright for being an improper remedy, [39] it may, in
certain instances where a petition was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65 and in the
interest of justice, proceed to review the substance of the petition and treat it as having been
filed under Rule 45.[40] Either way, however, the present petition just the same merits dismissal
since it puts to issue questions of fact rather than questions of law which are appropriate for
review under a Rule 45 petition.
It is settled that the Court is not a trier of facts and accords great weight to the factual findings
of lower courts or agencies whose function is to resolve factual matters.[41] It is not for the Court
to weigh evidence all over again.[42] Moreover, findings of fact of administrative agencies and
quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but finality when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.[43]
The requisite quantum of proof in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies is
neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence. In this type of cases, a
fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.[44] In this case, substantial evidence abounds.
The conclusion that petitioner is not entitled to total permanent disability benefits under the
Social Security Law was reached after petitioner was examined not just by one but four SSS
physicians, namely, Dr. Juanillo Descalzo III, Dr. Carlota A. Cruz-Tutaan, Dr. Jesus S. Tan and
Dr. Rebecca Sison.
The initial physical examination and interview revealed that petitioner had slight limitation of
grasping movement for both hands. According to Dr. Descalzo, this finding was not enough to
grant an extension of benefit since petitioner had already received benefits equivalent to 30%
of the body.Responding to the allegation that the April 2000 physical examination was
performed in a short period of time, the doctor credibly explained that petitioners movements
were already being monitored and evaluated from a distance as part of the examination of his
extremities in order to minimize malingering and overacting.[45]
Meanwhile, the medical findings of Dr. Carlota A. Cruz-Tutaan and Dr. Jesus S. Tan in August
and September 2000 were summarized as follows:
Heart:
- manifest regular rhythm
- no murmurs
Lungs:
- on ausculation showed no evidence of wheezing
- breath sounds are normal and;
- he is not in a state of respiratory distress
Hypertension:
- Blood Pressure is 140/80, hence, under control
Extremities: (Hands)
- No deformities noted except for the right small finger, the distal
interphalangeal joint is bent at about 30. No abnormal limitation of
movement noted on all the fingers, grasping has improved.[46]
Contrary to petitioners asseverations, the SSC did not ignore the certifications of petitioners
attending physicians as, in fact, it ordered the SSS in June 2001 to conduct an investigation as
to the medical findings and final diagnosis by his attending physicians. [47] It was surfaced that
petitioners medical records in the custody of Dr. Flo dela Cruz could not be found as they were
allegedly destroyed by inundation.[48] And it was found that the July 10, 2001 letter-certification
by Dr. Rafael Recto, Jr. only narrated the recurring condition of petitioners trigger finger, the
administration to him of local steroid injections, and the performance of surgical release on his
left 4th trigger finger on June 16, 1998; and that he was diagnosed on August 28, 2000 with
mallet finger (R, 5th), for which he was advised to undergo reconstructive surgery. [49]
Adopting a liberal attitude and exercising sound discretion, the SSC even directed the
conduct of another physical examination on petitioner to judiciously resolve his motion for
2
reconsideration. Pursuant thereto, Dr. Sison physically examined petitioner in August 2002, the 1. Complete loss of sight of both eyes;
results of which were reflected in a medical report, viz: 2. Loss of two limbs at or above the ankle or wrists;
3. Permanent complete paralysis of two limbs;
Physical Examination: 4. Brain injury resulting to incurable imbecility or
insanity; and
General Survey: well nourished, well developed, conscious, coherent but 5. Such cases as determined and approved by the SSS.
talks with sarcasm and arrogance.
EENT: normocephalic, pinkish conjunctiva, anicteric sclerae; negative xxxx
tonsillo-pharyngeal congestion (f) If the disability is permanent partial and such disability occurs after
C/L: clear breath sounds, no wheezes; (-) dyspnea thirty-six (36) monthly contributions have been paid prior to the semester
Heart: normal rate, regular rhythm. of disability, the benefit shall be the monthly pension for permanent total
Abdomen: negative tenderness disability payable not longer than the period designated in the following
Extremeties: no neurological and sensory deficit schedule:
no gross deformity, (+) scar, 4th finger (L) COMPLETE
no loss of grasping power for large and small objects AND PERMANENT NUMBER OF
no loss of opposition between thumb and forefingers LOSS OF USE OF MONTHS
can bend fully to reach toes One thumb 10
can bend both knees fully without pain or difficulty One index finger 8
can raise both arms above shoulder level without pain and difficulty One middle finger 6
can bend both elbows without limitation One ring finger 5
One little finger 3
The member was requested to submit recent ECG, x-rays and other One big toe 6
laboratory work-up results but he could not locate them during visit and One hand 39
would still look for the said medical documents and mail them to SSS. One arm 50
One foot 31
He was then advised to come to SSS, Diliman Branch for ECG and x-ray, One leg 46
however he refused. One ear 10
Both ears 20
He also refused to affix his signature on the medical field service form to Hearing of one ear 10
confirm the visit of our Medical Officer. Hearing of both ears 50
Sight of one eye 25
Based on these recent physical examination findings and (g) The percentage degree of disability which is equivalent to the ratio that
functional assessment and the medical certificate (Form MMD 102) with the designated number of months of compensability bears to seventy-five
final diagnosis of Trigger Finger, there is no sufficient basis that warrants (75), rounded to the next higher integer, shall not be additive for distinct,
the granting of Total Permanent disability.[50] (Underscoring supplied) separate and unrelated permanent partial disabilities, but shall be additive
for deteriorating and related permanent partial disabilities to a maximum of
one hundred percent (100%), in which case, the member shall be deemed as
Dr. Sison subsequently noted that petitioners Electrocardiograph, Chest X-ray, permanently totally disabled.[52]
Kidney and Urinary Bladder Ultrasound indicated his condition as normal,[51] which conclusion
was arrived at by going through the same medical documents presented by petitioner following
a series of tests conducted on him by hospitals of his choice. Indeed, the evidence indicates that petitioners condition at the time material to the case does
not fall under the enumeration in the above-quoted provisions of the Social Security
From the foregoing recital of petitioners medical history, the SSC concluded that petitioner is Law. Moreover, as correctly held by the appellate court, the proviso of such provisions on the
not entitled to total permanent disability benefits under the Social Security Law, the pertinent percentage degree of disability applies when there is a related deterioration of the illness
provisions of which read: previously considered as partial permanent disability. In this case, there is dearth of evidence
on the proposition that petitioners array of illnesses is related to Generalized Arthritis and
xxxx Partial Ankylosis of the specific body parts.

(d) The following disabilities shall be deemed permanent total: Petitioners reliance on jurisprudence[53] on work-connected disability claims insofar
as it relates to a demonstration of disability to perform his trade and profession[54] is misplaced.

3
 ascertain the claimants related history and subjective complaints.[66] The members of this Court
Claims under the Labor Code for compensation and under the Social Security Law cannot strip their judicial robe and don the physicians gown, so to speak, in a pretense to
for benefits are not the same as to their nature and purpose.On the one hand, the pertinent correlate variances in medical findings.
provisions of the Labor Code govern compensability of work-related disabilities or when there
is loss of income due to work-connected or work-aggravated injury or illness.[55] On the other
hand, the benefits under the Social Security Law are intended to provide insurance or protection
against the hazards or risks of disability, sickness, old age or death, inter alia, irrespective of
whether they arose from or in the course of the employment.[56] And unlike under the Social Finding no cogent reason to discuss the ancillary issues, the Court dismisses the
Security Law, a petition, without prejudice to the filing of a new application by petitioner who is not left without
disability is total and permanent under the Labor Code if as a result of the injury or sickness the any recourse in his legal bout respecting his supervening claims anchored mainly on Coronary
employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 Artery Disease 1VD and Diabetes Mellitus Type 2, these illnesses having been found to be
days regardless of whether he loses the use of any of his body parts. [57] dissimilar from the subject matter of the present action.[67]

The Court notes that the main issue petitioner proffers is whether he is entitled to total WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, DENIED.
permanent disability benefits from the SSS given his angioplasty operation of the heart,
coronary artery disease, ischemic heart disease, severe hypertension and a host of other serious SO ORDERED.
illnesses filed with the SSS[.][58]

A perusal of the records shows that when the case was already submitted for decision before CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
the appellate court, petitioner manifested that he suffered a heart attack on February 25, Associate Justice
2004,[59] for which he claimed to have undergone a coronary angiogram on March 9, 2005 and
a coronary angioplasty on September 27, 2005 at the Philippine Heart Center.[60]
EN BANC
Unfortunate as these events were, the appellate court correctly ruled that it could not consider
such allegation of subsequent events since a factual question may not be raised for the first time
on appeal[,] and documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will not be ELENA P. DYCAICO, G.R. No. 161357
considered in disposing of the issues of an action.[61] Petitioner,
Present:
The issues in every case are limited to those presented in the pleadings. The object of
the pleadings is to draw the lines of battle between the litigants and to indicate fairly the nature DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,
of the claims or defenses of PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
both parties.[62] A change of theory on appeal is not allowed.[63] In this case, the matter of YNARES-SANTIAGO,
petitioners serious heart condition was not raised in his application before the SSS or in his June SANDOVAL-
19, 2000 petition before the SSC. GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CARPIO,
Fair play dictates that the SSS be afforded the opportunity to properly meet the issue [64] with AUSTRIA-
respect to the new ailments besetting petitioner, in line with the actual practice that only MARTINEZ,
qualified government physicians, by virtue of their oath as civil service officials, are competent CORONA,
to examine persons and issue medical certificates which will be used by the government for a CARPIO MORALES,
specific official purpose.[65] This holds greater significance where there exist differences or CALLEJO, SR.,
doubts as to the medical condition of the person. AZCUNA,
TINGA,
In this case, the SSS medical examiners are tasked by law to analyze the extent of SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM CHICO-NAZARIO and
personal incapacity resulting from disease or injury.Oftentimes, a physician who is adequately and SOCIAL SECURITY GARCIA, JJ.
versed in the knowledge of anatomy and physiology will find himself deficient when called COMMISSION,
upon to express an opinion on the permanent changes resulting from a disability. Unlike the Respondents. Promulgated:
general practitioner who merely concerns himself with the examination of his patient for
purposes of diagnosis and treatment, the medical examiner has to consider varied factors and November 30, 2005

4
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Elena P.
Dycaico which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision [1] dated April 15, 2003 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 69632. The assailed decision affirmed the Resolution dated February 6, 2002 of the Social
Security Commission (SSC), denying the petitioners claim for survivors pension accruing from
the death of her husband Bonifacio S. Dycaico, a Social Security System (SSS) member-
pensioner. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is the appellate courts Resolution
dated December 15, 2003, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The case arose from the following undisputed facts:
Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his self-employed
data record (SSS Form RS-1), he named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their eight children
as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from
the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away on June 19, 1997.
A few months prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner on January 6, 1997.
Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for
survivors pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that under Section 12-
B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 or the Social Security Law[2] she could not be
considered a primary beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement. The said proviso
reads:
Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits.
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary
beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the
monthly pension.
Applying this proviso, the petitioner was informed that the
Records show that the member [referring to Bonifacio] was
considered retired on June 5, 1989 and monthly pension was cancelled upon
our receipt of a report on his death on June 19, 1997. In your death claim
application, submitted marriage contract with the deceased member shows
that you were married in 1997 or after his retirement date; hence, you could
not be considered his primary beneficiary.
In view of this, we regret that there is no other benefit due you.
However, if you do not conform with us, you may file a formal petition with
our Social Security Commission to determine your benefit eligibility. [3]
On July 9, 2001, the petitioner filed with the SSC a petition alleging that the denial of her
survivors pension was unjustified. She contended that Bonifacio designated her and their
children as primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1 and that it was not indicated therein that
only legitimate family members could be made beneficiaries. Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No.
8282 does not, likewise, require that the primary beneficiaries be legitimate relatives of the
member to be entitled to the survivors pension. The SSS is legally bound to respect Bonifacios
designation of them as his
beneficiaries. Further, Rep. Act No. 8282 should be interpreted to promote social justice.
On February 6, 2002, the SSC promulgated its Resolution affirming the denial of the
petitioners claim. The SSC refuted the petitioners contention that primary beneficiaries need not
be legitimate family members by citing the definitions of primary beneficiaries and dependents
in Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 8282. Under paragraph (k) of the said provision, primary
beneficiaries are [t]he dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children Paragraph (e) of the same provision, on
the other hand, defines dependents as the following: (1) [t]he legal spouse entitled by law to
receive support from the member; (2) [t]he legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and
illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one
(21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor
has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and
(3) [t]he parent who is receiving regular support from the member. Based on the foregoing,
according to the SSC, it has consistently ruled that entitlement to the survivors pension in ones
capacity as primary beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of relationship with and
dependency for support upon the deceased SSS member during his lifetime.
Under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, the primary beneficiaries who are
entitled to survivors pension are those who qualify as
such as of the date of retirement of the deceased member. Hence, the petitioner, who was not
then the legitimate spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement, could not be considered
his primary beneficiary. The SSC further opined that Bonifacios designation of the petitioner as
one of his primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1 is void, not only on moral considerations
but also for misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petitioner is not entitled to claim the survivors
pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review of the SSCs February
6, 2002 Resolution. In the assailed Decision, dated April 15, 2003, the appellate court dismissed
the petition. Citing the same provisions in Rep. Act No. 8282 as those cited by the SSC, the CA
declared that since the petitioner was merely the common-law wife of Bonifacio at the time of
his retirement in 1989, his designation of the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries in the SSS
Form RS-1 in 1980 is void. The CA further observed that Bonifacios children with the petitioner
could no longer qualify as primary beneficiaries because they have all reached twenty-one (21)
years of age. The decretal portion of the assailed decision reads:
5
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
DISMISSED and the assailed 06 February 2002 Resolution of respondent
Commission is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The petitioner sought reconsideration of the said decision but in the assailed Resolution
dated December 15, 2003, the appellate court denied her motion. Hence, the petitioners recourse
to this Court.
The petitioner points out that the term primary beneficiaries as used in Section 12-
B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not have any qualification. She thus theorizes that regardless of
whether the primary beneficiary designated by the member as such is legitimate or not, he or
she is entitled to the survivors pension. Reliance by the appellate court and the SSC on the
definitions of primary beneficiaries and dependents in Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 8282 is
allegedly unwarranted because these definitions cannot modify Section 12-B(d) thereof.
The petitioner maintains that when she and Bonifacio got married in January 1997, a
few months before he passed away, they merely intended to legalize their relationship and had
no intention to commit any fraud. Further, since Rep. Act No. 8282 is a social legislation, it
should be construed liberally in favor of claimants like the petitioner. She cites the Courts
pronouncement that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and
the law, by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor.[5]
The SSS, on the other hand, contends that Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282
should be read in conjunction with the definition of the terms dependents and primary
beneficiaries in Section 8 thereof. Since the petitioner was not as yet the legal spouse of
Bonifacio at the time of his retirement in 1989, she is not entitled to claim the survivors pension
accruing at the time of his death. The SSS insists that the designation by Bonifacio of the
petitioner and their illegitimate children in his SSS Form RS-1 is void.
According to the SSS, there is nothing in Rep. Act No. 8282 which provides that
should there be no primary or secondary beneficiaries, the benefit accruing from the death of a
member should go to his designated common-law spouse and that to rule otherwise would be to
condone the designation of common-law spouses as beneficiaries, a clear case of circumventing
the SS Law and a violation of public policy and morals.[6]Finally, the SSS is of the opinion that
Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is clear and explicit; hence, there is no room for its
interpretation, only for application.
In the Resolution dated July 19, 2005, the Court required the parties, as well as the
Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective comments on the issue of whether or not
the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. The Court believes that this issue
is intertwined with and indispensable to the resolution of the merits of the petition.
In compliance therewith, in its comment, the SSC argues that the proviso as of the
date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not run afoul of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as it merely determines the reckoning date of qualification
and entitlement of beneficiaries to the survivorship pension. It asserts that this classification of
beneficiaries is based on valid and substantial distinctions that are germane to the legislative
purpose of Rep. Act No. 8282.
The SSC also impugns the marriage of the petitioner to Bonifacio after his retirement
stating that it was contracted as an afterthought to enable her to qualify for the survivorship
pension upon the latters death. It further alleges that there is no violation of the due process
clause as the petitioner was given her day in court and was able to present her side.
The SSS filed its separate comment and therein insists that the petitioner was not the
legitimate spouse of the deceased member at the time when the contingency occurred (his
retirement) and, therefore, she could not be considered a primary beneficiary within the
contemplation of Rep. Act No. 8282. The SSS posits that the statutes intent is to give
survivorship pension only to primary beneficiaries at the time of the retirement of the deceased
member. Rep. Act No. 8282 itself ordains the persons entitled thereto and cannot be subject of
change by the SSS.
The Solicitor General agrees with the stance taken by the SSS that the proviso as of
the date of his retirement merely marks the period when the primary beneficiary must be so to
be entitled to the benefits. It does not violate the equal protection clause because the
classification resulting therefrom rests on substantial distinctions. Moreover, the condition as to
the period for entitlement, i.e., as of the date of the members retirement, is relevant as it set the
parameters for those availing of the benefits and it applies to all those similarly situated. The
Solicitor General is also of the view that the said proviso does not offend the due process clause
because claimants are given the opportunity to file their claims and to prove their case before
the Commission.
For clarity, Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is quoted anew below:
Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits.
(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary
beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the
monthly pension.
Under Section 8(k) of the same law, the primary beneficiaries are:
1. The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and
2. The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and
illegitimate children.
Further, the dependent spouse and dependent children are qualified under paragraph
(e) of the same section as follows:
1. The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support until he or she
remarries; and
2. The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and
illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has
6
 not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one years
of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently
incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.
The SSS denied the petitioners application for survivors pension on the sole ground
that she was not the legal spouse of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement; hence, she could
not be considered as his primary beneficiary under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.
The Court holds that the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act
No. 8282, which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries, is unconstitutional for it violates the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.[7]
In an analogous case, Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros,[8] the Court
invalidated the proviso in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146[9] which stated that the dependent
spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within
three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension. In the said case, the Court
characterized retirement benefits as property interest of the pensioner as well as his or her
surviving spouse. The proviso, which denied a dependent spouses claim for survivorship
pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year
prohibited period, was declared offensive to the due process clause. There was outright
confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving him or her an opportunity to be
heard. The proviso was also held to infringe the equal protection clause as it discriminated
against dependent spouses who contracted their respective marriages to pensioners within three
years before they qualified for their pension.
For reasons which shall be discussed shortly, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in
Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 similarly violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
The proviso infringes the equal protection clause
As illustrated by the petitioners case, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in
Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries results in
the classification of dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries into two groups:
(1) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members
were contracted prior to the latters retirement; and
(2) Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members
were contracted after the latters retirement.
Underlying these two classifications of dependent spouses is that their respective
marriages are valid. In other words, both groups are legitimate or legal spouses. The distinction
between them lies solely on the date the marriage was contracted. The petitioner belongs to the
second group of dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his
retirement. As such, she and those similarly situated do not qualify as primary beneficiaries
under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 and, therefore, are not entitled to survivors pension
under the same provision by reason of the subject proviso.
It is noted that the eligibility of dependent children who are biological offsprings of a
retired SSS member to be considered as his primary beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep.
Act No. 8282 is not substantially affected by the proviso as of the date of his retirement. A
biological child, whether legitimate, legitimated or illegitimate, is entitled to survivors pension
upon the death of a retired SSS member so long as the said child is unmarried, not gainfully
employed and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of
age, he or she is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and
incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.
On the other hand, the eligibility of legally adopted children to be considered primary
beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is affected by the proviso as of the
date of his retirement in the same manner as the dependent spouses. A legally adopted child who
satisfies the requirements in Section 8(e)(2)[10] thereof is considered a primary beneficiary of a
retired SSS member upon the latters death only if the said child had been legally adopted prior
to the members retirement. One who was legally adopted by the SSS member after his or her
retirement does not qualify as a primary beneficiary for the purpose of entitlement to survivors
pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.
In any case, the issue that now confronts the Court involves a dependent spouse who
claims to have been unjustly deprived of her survivors pension under Section 12-B(d) of Rep.
Act No. 8282. Hence, the subsequent discussion will focus on the resultant classification of the
dependent spouses as primary beneficiaries under the said provision.
As earlier stated, the petitioner belongs to the second group of dependent spouses, i.e.,
her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his retirement. She and those similarly situated
are undoubtedly discriminated against as the proviso as of the date of his retirement disqualifies
them from being considered primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors
pension.
Generally, a statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection clause of the law.[11]With respect to Rep. Act No.
8282, in particular, as a social security law, it is recognized that it is permeated with provisions
that draw lines in classifying those who are to receive benefits. Congressional decisions in this
regard are entitled to deference as those of the institution charged under our scheme of
government with the primary responsibility for making such judgments in light of competing
policies and interests.[12]
However, as in other statutes, the classification in Rep. Act No. 8282 with respect to
entitlement to benefits, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy the following requirements: (1)
it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of
the same class.[13]
The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 8282 does not bear out the purpose of Congress
in inserting the proviso as of the date of his retirement to qualify the term primary beneficiaries
in Section 12-B(d) thereof. To the Courts mind, however, it reflects congressional concern with
the possibility of relationships entered after retirement for the purpose of obtaining benefits. In
particular, the proviso was apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those contracted
by persons solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the anticipated death of the other
spouse.
7
 This concern is concededly valid. However, classifying dependent spouses and
determining their entitlement to survivors pension based on whether the marriage was contracted
before or after the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage,
bears no relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e., provide meaningful
protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness,
maternity, old age, death and other contingencies
resulting in loss of income or financial burden."[14] The nexus of the classification to the policy
objective is vague and flimsy. Put differently, such classification of dependent spouses is not
germane to the aforesaid policy objective.
For if it were the intention of Congress to prevent sham marriages or those entered in
contemplation of imminent death, then it should have prescribed a definite duration-of-
relationship or durational period of relationship as one of the requirements for entitlement to
survivors pension. For example, in the United States, a provision in their social security law
which excludes from social security benefits the surviving wife and stepchild of a deceased
wage earner who had their respective relationships to the wage earner for less than nine months
prior to his death, was declared valid.[15]Thus, nine months is recognized in the United States as
the minimum duration of a marriage to consider it as having been contracted in good faith for
the purpose of entitlement to survivorship pension.
In contrast, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) in Rep. Act
No. 8282 effectively disqualifies from entitlement to survivors pension all those dependent
spouses whose respective marriages to retired SSS members were contracted after the latters
retirement. The duration of the marriage is not even considered. It is observed that, in certain
instances, the retirement age under Rep. Act No. 8282 is sixty (60)
years old.[16] A marriage contracted by a retired SSS member after the said age may still last for
more than ten years, assuming the member lives up to over seventy (70) years old. In such a
case, it cannot be said that the marriage was a sham or was entered into solely for the purpose
of enabling one spouse to obtain the financial benefits due upon the death of the other spouse.
Nonetheless, the said surviving spouse is not entitled to survivors pension because he or she is
not a primary beneficiary as of the date of retirement of the SSS member following Section 12-
B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282.
Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their
respective marriages to the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the latters retirement
for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension does not rest on real and substantial
distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is too sweeping because the proviso as of the
date of his retirement, which effectively disqualifies the dependent spouses whose respective
marriages to the retired SSS member were contracted after the latters retirement as primary
beneficiaries, unfairly lumps all these marriages as sham relationships or were contracted solely
for the purpose of acquiring benefits accruing upon the death of the other spouse. The proviso
thus unduly prejudices the rights of the legal surviving spouse, like the petitioner, and defeats
the avowed policy of the law to provide meaningful protection to members and their
beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other
contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden. [17]
The proviso infringes the due process clause
As earlier opined, in Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros,[18] the Court
characterized retirement benefits as a property interest of a retiree. We held therein that [i]n a
pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees
have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of
employment.[19] Thus, it was ruled that, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause
and [r]etirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate
payment under pre-existing law.[20] Further, since pursuant to the pertinent law therein, the
dependent spouse is entitled to survivorship pension, a widows right to receive pension
following the demise of her husband is also part of the husbands contractual compensation. [21]
Although the subject matter in the above-cited case involved the retirement benefits under P.D.
No. 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977[22] covering government
employees, the pronouncement therein that retirees enjoy a protected property interest in their
retirement benefits applies squarely to those in the private sector under Rep. Act No. 8282. This
is so because the mandatory contributions of both the employers[23] and the employees[24] to the
SSS do not, likewise, make the retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282 mere gratuity but
form part of the latters compensation. Even the retirement benefits of self-employed individuals,
like Bonifacio, who have been included in the compulsory coverage of Rep. Act No. 8282 [25] are
not mere gratuity because they are required to pay both the employer and employee
contributions.[26] Further, under Rep. Act No. 8282, the surviving spouse is entitled to survivors
pension accruing on the death of the member; hence, the surviving spouses right to receive such
benefit following the demise of the wife or husband, as the case may be, is also part of the latters
contractual compensation.
The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 runs afoul
of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective
marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement of their
survivors benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without
giving them an opportunity to be heard.
By this outright disqualification of the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to SSS
members were contracted after the latters retirement, the proviso as of the date of his retirement
qualifying the term primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension has
created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement date of SSS members
were entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits under Rep. Act No. 8282. This
presumption, moreover, is conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not afforded any
opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates this
conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily
or universally true. In the United States, this kind of presumption is characterized as an
irrebuttable presumption and statutes creating permanent and irrebutable presumptions have
long been disfavored under the due process clause. [27]
In the petitioners case, for example, she asserted that when she and Bonifacio got
married in 1997, it was merely to legalize their relationship and not to commit fraud. This claim
is quite believable. After all, they had been living together since 1980 and, in fact, during that
time their eldest child was already twenty-four (24) years old. However, the petitioner was not
given any opportunity to prove her claim that she was Bonifacios bona fide legal spouse as she
was automatically disqualified from being considered as his primary beneficiary. In effect, the
petitioner was deprived of the survivors benefits, a property interest, accruing from the death of
Bonifacio without any opportunity to be heard. Standards of due process require that the
8
petitioner be allowed to present evidence to prove that her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted
in good faith and as his bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivors pension accruing upon
his death.[28] Hence, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) which
deprives the petitioner and those similarly situated dependent spouses of retired SSS members
this opportunity to be heard must be struck down.
Conclusion
Even as the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) is nullified, the
enumeration of primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension is not
substantially affected since the following persons are considered as such under Section 8(k) of
Rep. Act No. 8282:
(1) The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and
(2) The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and
illegitimate children.
In relation thereto, Section 8(e) thereof qualifies the dependent spouse and dependent children
as follows:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child
who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-
one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is
congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated
and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally.
Finally, the Court concedes that the petitioner did not raise the issue of the validity of
the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282. The rule is
that the Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary
to a decision of the case.[29] However, the question of the constitutionality of the proviso is
absolutely necessary for the proper resolution of the present case. Accordingly, the Court
required the parties to present their arguments on this issue and proceeded to pass upon the same
in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and in order to render substantial justice to the petitioner
who, presumably in her advanced age by now, deserves to receive forthwith the survivors
pension accruing upon the death of her husband.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 15, 2003 and
Resolution dated December 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69632
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-
B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is declared VOID for being contrary to the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution. The Social Security System cannot deny the claim of
petitioner Elena P. Dycaico for survivors pension on the basis of this invalid proviso.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, G.R. No. 165546
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET CALLEJO, SR., and
H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
H. AGUAS, represented by her
Legal Guardian, ROSANNA Promulgated:
H. AGUAS,
Respondents. February 27, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66531 and its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The antecedents are as follows:
Pablo Aguas, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner, died
on December 8, 1996. Pablos surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS
for death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was
likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn, who was born on October 29, 1991.[2] Her claim
for monthly pension was settled on February 13, 1997.[3]
Sometime in April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter[4] dated April 2, 1997 from
Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablos sister, contesting Rosannas claim for death benefits. She
alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than six years before,
and lived with another man on whom she has been dependent for support. She further averred
that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna, but that the latter had several children with a
certain Romeo dela Pea. In support of her allegation, Leticia enclosed a notarized copy of the
original birth certificate[5] of one Jefren H. dela Pea, showing that the latter was born
on November 15, 1996 to Rosanna Y. Hernandez and Romeo C. dela Pea, and that the two were
married on November 1, 1990.
As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnns monthly pension
in September 1997. It also conducted an investigation to verify Leticias allegations. In a
Memorandum[6] dated November 18, 1997, the Social Security Officer who conducted the
investigation reported that, based on an interview with Mariquita D. Dizon, Pablos first cousin
and neighbor, and Jessie Gonzales (also a neighbor). She learned that the deceased had no legal
children with Rosanna; Jenelyn[7] and Jefren were Rosannas children with one Romeo C. dela
Pea; and Rosanna left the deceased six years before his death and lived with Romeo while she
9
was still pregnant with Jenelyn, who was born on October 29, 1991. Mariquita also confirmed
that Pablo was not capable of having a child as he was under treatment.
On the basis of the report and an alleged confirmation by a certain Dr. Manuel
Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile, the SSS denied Rosannas request to resume the payment of
their pensions. She was advised to refund to the SSS within 30 days the amount of P10,350.00
representing the total death benefits released to her and Jenelyn from December 1996 to August
1997 at P1,150.00 per month.[8]
Rosanna and Jeylnn, through counsel, requested for a reconsideration of the said
decision.[9] However, in its Letter dated February 6, 1998, the SSS denied the claim.[10]
This prompted Rosanna and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for the
Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC) on February 20,
1998.[11] Janet H. Aguas, who also claimed to be the child of the deceased and Rosanna, now
joined them as claimant. The case was docketed as SSC Case No. 3-14769-98.
The claimants appended to their petition, among others, photocopies of the following:
(1) Pablo and Rosannas marriage certificate; (2) Janets certificate of live birth; (3) Jeylnns
certificate of live birth; and (4) Pablos certificate of death.
In its Answer, the SSS averred that, based on the sworn testimonies and documentary
evidence showing the disqualification of the petitioners as primary beneficiaries, the claims
were barren of factual and legal basis; as such, it was justified in denying their claims. [12]
In their Position Paper, the claimants averred that Jeylnn was a legitimate child of
Pablo as evidenced by her birth certificate bearing Pablos signature as Jeylnns father. They
asserted that Rosanna never left Pablo and that they lived together as husband and wife under
one roof. In support thereof, they attached a Joint Affidavit[13] executed by their neighbors,
Vivencia Turla and Carmelita Yangu, where they declared that Rosanna and Pablo lived together
as husband and wife until the latters death. In Janets birth certificate, which was registered in
the Civil Registry of San Fernando, it appears that her father was Pablo and her mother was
Rosanna. As to the alleged infertility of Pablo, the claimants averred that Dr. Macapinlac denied
giving the opinion precisely because he was not an expert on such matters, and that he treated
the deceased only for tuberculosis. The claimant likewise claimed that the information the SSS
gathered from the doctor was privileged communication.[14]
In compliance with the SSCs order, the SSS secured Confirmation Reports[15] signed
by clerks from the corresponding civil registers confirming (1) the fact of marriage between
Pablo and Rosanna on December 4, 1977; (2) the fact of Jefren dela Peas birth on November
15, 1996; (3) the fact of Jeylnns birth on October 29, 1991; and (4) the fact of Pablos death on
December 8, 1996.
The SSC decided to set the case for hearing. It also directed the SSS to verify the
authenticity of Pablos signature as appearing on Jeylnns birth certificate from his claim records,
particularly his SSS Form E-1 and retirement benefit application.[16] The SSS complied with
said directive and manifested to the SSC that, based on the laboratory analysis conducted, Pablos
signature in the birth certificate was made by the same person who signed the members record
and other similar documents submitted by Pablo.[17]
The SSC then summoned Vivencia Turla, Carmelita Yangu and Leticia Aguas-
Macapinlac for clarificatory questions with regard to their respective sworn
affidavits.[18] Vivencia testified that she had known Pablo and Rosanna for more than 30 years
already; the couple were married and lived in Macabacle, Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga;
she was a former neighbor of the spouses, but four years after their marriage, she (Vivencia) and
her family moved to Sto. Nio Triangulo, San Fernando, Pampanga; she would often visit the
two, especially during Christmas or fiestas; the spouses real child was Jeylnn; Janet was only an
adopted child; the spouse later transferred residence, not far from their old house, and Janet,
together with her husband and son, remained in the old house. [19]
On the other hand, Carmelita testified that she had been a neighbor of Pablo and
Rosanna for 15 years and that, up to the present, Rosanna and her children, Janet, Jeylnn and
Jefren, were still her neighbors; Janet and Jeylnn were the children of Pablo and Rosanna but
she did not know whose child Jefren is.[20]
According to Leticia, Janet was not the real child of Pablo and Rosanna; she was just
taken in by the spouses because for a long time they could not have children;[21] however, there
were no legal papers on Janets adoption.[22] Later on, Rosanna got pregnant with Jeylnn; after
the latters baptism, there was a commotion at the house because Romeo dela Pea was claiming
that he was the father of the child and he got mad because the child was named after Pablo; the
latter also got mad and even attempted to shoot Rosanna; he drove them away from the house;
since then, Pablo and Rosanna separated;[23] she knew about this because at that time their
mother was sick, and she would often visit her at their ancestral home, where Pablo and Rosanna
were also staying; Rosanna was no longer living in their ancestral home but Janet resided
therein; she did not know where Rosanna was staying now but she knew that the latter and
Romeo dela Pea were still living together.[24]
Subsequently, Mariquita Dizon and Jessie Gonzales were also summoned for
clarificatory questions.[25] During the hearing, Mariquita brought with her photocopies of two
baptismal certificates: that of Jeylnn Aguas,[26] child of Pablo Aguas and Rosanna Hernandez
born on October 29, 1991, and that of Jenelyn H. dela Pea,[27] child of Romeo dela Pea and
Rosanna Hernandez, born on January 29, 1992.
On March 14, 2001, the SSC rendered a decision denying the claims for lack of merit
and ordering Rosanna to immediately refund to the SSS the amount of P10,350.00 erroneously
paid to her and Jeylnn as primary beneficiaries of the deceased. The SSC likewise directed the
SSS to pay the death benefit to qualified secondary beneficiaries of the deceased, and in their
absence, to his legal heirs.[28]
The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary, it
appearing that she had contracted marriage with Romeo dela Pea during the subsistence of her
marriage to Pablo. The SSC based its conclusion on the birth certificate of Jefren dela Pea stating
that his mother, Rosanna, and father, Romeo dela Pea, were married on November 1, 1990. The
SSC declared that Rosanna had a child with Romeo dela Pea while she was still married to Pablo
(as evidenced by the baptismal certificate of Jenelyn H. dela Pea showing that she was the child
of Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Pea and that she was born on January 29, 1992). The
SSC concluded that Rosanna was no longer entitled to support from Pablo prior to his death
because of her act of adultery. As for Jeylnn, the SSC ruled that, even if her birth certificate was
signed by Pablo as her father, there was
more compelling evidence that Jeylnn was not his legitimate child. The SSC deduced from the
10
records that Jeylnn and Jenelyn was one and the same person and concluded, based on the latters
baptismal certificate, that she was the daughter of Rosanna and Romeo dela Pea. It also gave
credence to the testimonies of Leticia and Mariquita that Jeylnn was the child of Rosanna and
Romeo dela Pea. As for Janet, the SSC relied on Leticias declaration that she was only adopted
by Pablo and Rosanna.[29]
The claimants filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but their motion
was denied by the SSC for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time. [30] The claimants
then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
On September 9, 2003, the CA rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The fallo of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is
entered DECLARING petitioners as ENTITLED to the SSS benefits
accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas. The case is
hereby REMANDED to public respondent for purposes of computing the
benefits that may have accrued in favor of petitioners after the same was cut
and suspended in September 1997.
SO ORDERED.[31]
In so ruling, the CA relied on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing that
they were the children of the deceased. According to the appellate court, for judicial purposes,
these records were binding upon the parties, including the SSS. These entries made in public
documents may only be challenged through adversarial proceedings in courts of law, and may
not be altered by mere testimonies of witnesses to the contrary. As for Rosanna, the CA found
no evidence to show that she ceased to receive support from Pablo before he died. Rosannas
alleged affair with Romeo dela Pea was not properly proven. In any case, even if Rosanna
married Romeo dela Pea during her marriage to Pablo, the same would have been a void
marriage; it would not have ipso facto made her not dependent for support upon Pablo and
negate the presumption that, as the surviving spouse, she is entitled to support from her
husband.[32]
The SSS filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the CA denied for
lack of merit.[33] Hence, this petition.
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the appellate court, contending that it
I
GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ROSANNA AGUAS IS
ACTUALLY DEPENDENT FOR SUPPORT UPON THE MEMBER
DURING HIS LIFETIME TO QUALIFY AS PRIMARY BENEFICIARY
WITHIN THE INTENDMENT OF SECTION 8(e), IN RELATION TO
SECTION (k) OF THE SSS LAW, AS AMENDED.
II
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JANET AGUAS AND JEYLNN AGUAS
ARE ENTITLED TO THE PENSION BENEFIT ACCRUING FROM THE
DEATH OF PABLO AGUAS.[34]
Petitioner invokes Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 735, which defines a dependent spouse as the legitimate spouse dependent for
support upon the employee. According to petitioner, Rosanna forfeited her right to be supported
by Pablo when she engaged in an intimate and illicit relationship with Romeo dela Pea and
married the latter during her marriage to Pablo. Such act constitutes abandonment, which
divested her of the right to receive support from her husband. It asserts that her act of adultery
is evident from the birth certificate of Jefren H. dela Pea showing that he was born on November
15, 1996 to Rosanna and Romeo dela Pea. Petitioner submits that Rosanna cannot be considered
as a dependent spouse of Pablo; consequently, she is not a primary beneficiary. [35]
As for Janet and Jeylnn, petitioner maintains that they are not entitled to the pension
because, based on the evidence on record, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, they are
not the legitimate children of Pablo. It argues that, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial authority
under Section 5(a) of the Social Security Act, the SSC can pass upon the legitimacy of
respondents relationship with the member to determine whether they are entitled to the benefits,
even without correcting their birth certificates.[36]
Respondents, for their part, assert that petitioner failed to prove that Rosanna
committed acts of adultery or that she married another man after the death of her husband. They
contend that Janet and Jeylnns legitimacy may be impugned only on the grounds stated in Article
166 of the Family Code, none of which were proven in this case. [37]
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled
to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo.
The petition is partly meritorious.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed
upon by the Court in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. [38] In an appeal
via certiorari, the Court may not review the factual findings of the CA.[39] It is not the Courts
function under Rule 45 to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the
evidence presented.[40] However, the Court may review findings of facts in some instances, such
as, when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, when the findings of the CA are
contrary to those of the trial court or quasi-judicial agency, or when the findings of facts of the
CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record.[41] The Court finds these instances present in this case.
At the time of Pablos death, the prevailing law was Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 735. Section 13 of the law enumerates those who are
entitled to death benefits:
Sec.13. Death benefits. Effective July 1, 1975, upon the covered
employees death, (a) his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the basic
monthly pension, and his dependents to the dependents pension: Provided,
That he has paid at least thirty-six monthly contributions prior to the
semester of death: Provided, further, That if the foregoing condition is not
11
 satisfied, or if he has no primary beneficiaries, his secondary beneficiaries
shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty times the basic
monthly pension: Provided, however, That the death benefit shall not be less
than the total contributions paid by him and his employer on his behalf nor
less than five hundred pesos: Provided, finally, That the covered employee
who dies in the month of coverage shall be entitled to the minimum benefit.
Section 8(k) and (e), in turn, defines dependents and primary beneficiaries of an SSS
member as follows:
SECTION 8. Terms defined. For the purposes of this Act the
following terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, have the
following meanings:
xxxx
(e) Dependent. The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted
child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one
years of age provided that he is congenitally incapacitated and incapable of
self-support physically or mentally; the legitimate spouse dependent for
support upon the employee; and the legitimate parents wholly dependent
upon the covered employee for regular support.
xxxx
(k) Beneficiaries. The dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their absence,
the dependent parents and, subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent
children, the legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who shall be
the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing, any
other person designated by the covered employee as secondary beneficiary.
Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should establish his or her right thereto
by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence required to establish a
fact in cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, is that level of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. [42]
The Court has reviewed the records of the case and finds that only Jeylnn has
sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension.
Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the
signature of Pablo. Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry
showing that she was born on October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo
were married on December 4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latters death
on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was born during Rosanna and Pablos
marriage.
It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. This Court, in De Jesus v. Estate of
Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon,[43] extensively discussed this presumption
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason
than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there
is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due
to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such
way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably,
upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170,[44] and in proper
cases Article 171,[45] of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August
1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child would no longer be
legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed
and unassailable.[46]
Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband
or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.[47] In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the
legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnns status as a legitimate child of Pablo can
no longer be contested.
The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate
bearing Pablos signature, which was verified from his specimen signature on file with
petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity.[48]
The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend to Janet
because her date of birth was not substantially proven. Such presumption may be availed only
upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the childs parents were legally
married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that
marriage.[49] It should be noted that respondents likewise submitted a photocopy of Janets
alleged birth certificate. However, the Court cannot give said birth certificate the same probative
weight as Jeylnns because it was not verified in any way by the civil register. It stands as a mere
photocopy, without probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn, there was no confirmation by the civil
register of the fact of Janets birth on the date stated in the certificate.
In any case, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein.[50] Here, the witnesses were unanimous in saying that Janet was not the real child but
merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. Leticia also testified that Janets adoption did not undergo
any legal proceedings; hence, there were no papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of Republic
Act No. 1161, as amended, only legally adopted children are considered dependent
children. Absent any proof that the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot consider
her a dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary.
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she
must prove that she was the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the employee. The
claimant-spouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is the legitimate
12
spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support. In this case, Rosanna approximately three months after the birth of Jeylnn Aguas. It is physically
presented proof to show that she is the legitimate spouse of Pablo, that is, a copy of their impossible for Rosanna to have given birth successively to two children in
marriage certificate which was verified with the civil register by petitioner. But whether or not so short a time. x x x The testimony of Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac that
Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was still dependent on Pablo at the time of his Rosanna was driven away by Pablo after the baptism of Jeylnn because of
death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a husband and wife are obliged to support each the commotion that was created by Romeo dela Pea who wanted Jeylnn to
other,[51] but whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other is something that has be baptized using his name explains why Jeylnn was again baptized in the
to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone. Parish of Sto. Nio in San Fernando using the name Jenelyn dela Pea. They
changed her date of birth also to make it appear in the record of the parish
In a parallel case[52] involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the Court that she is another child of Rosanna.[53]
defined a dependent as one who derives his or her main support from another. Meaning, relying
on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform On the other hand, Mariquita categorically affirmed that Rosanna was no longer living
anything without the will, power, or aid of someone else. It should be noted that the GSIS law at Pablos house even before he died, and that she is still living with Romeo dela Pea up to the
likewise defines a dependent spouse as the legitimate spouse dependent for present. Mariquita testified as follows:
support upon the member or pensioner. In that case, the Court found it obvious that a wife who
abandoned the family for more than 17 years until her husband died, and lived with other men, Hearing Officer:
was not dependent on her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during that entire Nagsama ba si Rosanna at Romeo?
period. Hence, the Court denied her claim for death benefits. Mrs. Dizon:
Ngayon at kahit na noon.
The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her
husband cannot be said to be dependent for support upon the husband, absent any showing to Hearing Officer:
the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at Kailan namatay si Pablo?
the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for Mrs. Dizon:
support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself. 1996.
Hearing Officer:
Rosanna had the burden to prove that all the statutory requirements have been Noong bago mamatay si Pablo?
complied with, particularly her dependency on her husband for support at the time of his Mrs. Dizon:
death. Aside from her own testimony, the only evidence adduced by Rosanna to prove that she Nagsasama na sila Romeo at Rosanna noon.
and Pablo lived together as husband and wife until his death were the affidavits of Vivencia
Turla and Carmelita Yangu where they made such declaration. Hearing Officer:
So, buhay pa si Pablo
Still, the affidavits of Vivencia and Carmelita and their testimonies before the SSC Mrs. Dizon:
will not prevail over the categorical and straightforward testimonies of the other witnesses who . nagsasama na sila ni Romeo.
testified that Rosanna and Pablo had already separated for almost six years before the latter
died. Except for the bare assertion of Carmelita that the couple never separated, there was no Hearing Officer:
further statement regarding the witnesses assertion in their affidavits that the couple lived Kailan nagkahiwalay si Romeo at Rosanna?
together until Pablos death. On the contrary, Leticia narrated that the two separated after Jeylnns Mrs. Dizon:
baptism as a result of an argument regarding Romeo dela Pea. According to Leticia, there was Hindi na sila nagkahiwalay.
a commotion at their ancestral house because Romeo dela Pea was grumbling why Jeylnn was
named after Pablo when he was the father, and as a result, Pablo drove them away. The SSCs Hearing Officer:
observation and conclusion on the two baptismal certificates of Jeylnn and Jenelyn convinces Hindi, ibig ko sabihin si Pablo at Rosana?
this Court to further believe Leticias testimony on why Pablo and Rosanna separated. As noted Mrs. Dizon:
by the SSC: Hindi ko alam kasi hindi ako madalas pumunta sa kanila eh, dahil namatay
na yung nanay ni Kuya Pabling, yung tiyahin ko, kapatid ng nanay
It appears from the records that Jeylnn Aguas and Jenelyn H. dela ko. Noonmadalas ako noong buhay pa yung nanay ni Kuya Pabling
Pea are one and the same person. Jeylnn Aguas, born on October 29, dahil kami ang nag aalaga sa kanya.
1991 was baptized at the Metropolitan Cathedral of San Fernando,
Pampanga, on November 24, 1991 as the child of Pablo Aguas and Rosanna Hearing Officer:
Hernandez. Jenelyn H dela Pea, on the other hand, was born on January 29, Bago namatay si Pablo, nagsasama ba sina Romeo at Rosanna?
1992 to spouses Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Pea and baptized Mrs. Dizon:
on February 9, 1992. It will be noted that Jenelyn dela Pea was born Oo.

13
 petitioners were advised by the System that their designation as beneficiaries of Briccio
Hearing Officer: was null and void, pursuant to Resolution No. 1620, series of 1960, of the Commission, and
Sa ngayon, may alam ka pa ba kung nagsasama pa sila Romeo at Rosanna? that a claim for the aforementioned benefits had been filed by Colombina. Still later, or in
Mrs. Dizon: September, 1961, petitioners were informed that the Administrator of the System had
Oo, nagsasama sila, may bahay sila. declared Colombina and Junior as the legal heirs of Briccio and approved payment to them
of said benefits, amounting to P3,388.34. This prompted the petitioners to file with the
Hearing Officer: Commission their present petition, which, after appropriate proceedings, was, by
Saan naman? resolution dated July 20, 1962, dismissed. The Commission, likewise, affirmed the action
Mrs. Dizon: taken by the Administrator and ordered that the corresponding death benefits be paid to
Doon sa malapit sa amin sa may riles ng tren.[54] Colombina and Junior. Hence, this appeal by petitioners herein.
They maintain that the designation made in their favor, as beneficiaries of Briccio
In conclusion, the Court finds that, among respondents, only Jeylnn is entitled to the remained valid and effective, despite his subsequent marriage and the birth of Junior, in
SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was established that she is his view of his (Briccio's) failure to change said designation, and that the choice of
legitimate child. On the other hand, the records show that Janet was merely adopted by the beneficiaries expressly made by Briccio should be respected.
spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it; hence, she cannot qualify as a primary The validity and force of the last part of petitioners' theory is, however, impaired by the
beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not fact that said choice had been made when Briccio was still single, and that, accordingly, his
qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time failure to change the designation of his beneficiaries may have been, and was probably,
of his death, she was still dependent on him for support even if they were already living due to an oversight on his part, especially considering that he died less than a year after
separately. his wedding.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The At any rate, the benefits accruing under Republic Act No. 1161 could not have vested until
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED WITH the death of the decedent, on February 22, 1961, not only because, prior thereto, the rights
MODIFICATION. Only Jeylnn H. Aguas is declared entitled to the SSS death benefits of the designated beneficiaries were purely inchoate, but, also, because Section 30 of said
accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas.
Act — which became Section 31 thereof, as amended by Republic Act No. 1792, which was
in force when Briccio became a member of the System — expressly reserved to Congress
SO ORDERED.
the right to amend, alter or repeal any provision thereof, and explicitly declares that "no
G.R. No. L-20445 February 25, 1967
person shall be or shall be deemed to be vested with any property or other right by virtue
ANICIA V. MERCED, CANDELARIO V. MERCED, CONCEPCION V. MERCED,
of the enactment or operation of this Act."
ATILANO V. MERCED, JR., and JOSEFINA V. MERCED, petitioners,
In pursuance of said reserved power, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 2658 (approved
vs.
on June 18, 1960), which was in force at the time of Briccio's death, amending Section 8 of
COLOMBINA VDA. DE MERCED, BRICCIO MERCED, JR., and the SOCIAL SECURITY
Republic Act No. 1161 (as amended by Republic Act No. 1792) pursuant to subdivision (k)
SYSTEM,respondents.
of which the beneficiaries shall be "those designated as such by the covered employeefrom
J. S. Ancheta, Jr. for petitioners.
among the following:
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
(1) The legitimate spouse, the legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
children and natural children by legal fiction and the legitimate descendants; .
EN BANC
(2) In default of such spouse and children, the legitimate parents of the covered
Appeal from a resolution of the Social Security Commission — hereinafter referred to as
employee;
the Commission — dismissing the petition of Anicia Candelario, Concepcion, Atlanto and
(3) In the absence of any. of the foregoing, any other person designated by
Josefina, all surnamed, Merced, to be declared the beneficiaries of their deceased brother
him.1äwphï1.ñët
Briccio V. Merced — hereinafter referred to as Briccio — and, as such, entitled to the
In other words, the right of choice of the insured is subject to the foregoing limitations,
corresponding death benefits under Republic Act No. 5181, as amended, otherwise known
pursuant to which brothers and sisters may not be designated as beneficiaries except
as the Social Security Act of 1954.
in default, not only of surviving spouse and children, but, also, of "legitimate parents of the
As an employee of the Community Export and Import Corporation, in Dumaguete City,
covered employee."
Negros Oriental Briccio became, sometime in 1957, a member of the Social Security System
It is, accordingly, clear that the Commission was fully justified in holding that the
— hereinafter referred to as the System. As such, he had designated as his beneficiaries
designation in favor of the brothers and sisters of the decedent as his beneficiaries was
his aforementioned brothers and sisters, the petitioners herein. Subsequently, or on May
null and void and that Colombina and Junior are, under the law, the persons entitled to the
29, 1960, Briccio contracted marriage with Columbina Merced, who bore him a child,
corresponding benefits.
Briccio Jr., hereinafter referred to as Columbia and Junior, respectively, Briccio died on
Wherefore, the resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against herein
February 22, 1961.
petitioners-appellants. It is so ordered.
Soon later, or on April 5, 1961, petitioners filed with the Commission their claim for the
benefits accruing under Briccio's social security insurance. However, on April 27, 1961,
14
15