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G.R. No. L-10736 April 30, 1957 or before Dec.

or before Dec.31,1953 with conditions that the spouses would pay 500 per month for the
use and occupation of said premises and upon failure to pay, the agreement shall be
EMILIANO ACUÑA and NIEVES B. ACUÑA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE HERMOGENES immediately and automatically become null and void.
CALUAG, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV; GUILLERMO ROMERO;
and REYNALDO T. SANTOS, respondents
-such will not be treated as contract of lease, and shall be without prejudice to
that right of Santos to enforce the writ of possession in case upon default of the spouses,
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
and that the agreement will not be taken as waiver of Santos’ right under the judgment
This is a petition for certiorari and preliminary injunction to set aside certain orders of in this case.
respondent Judge Caluag of the CFI of Rizal, said to have been issued with grave abuse
of discretion and or without jurisdiction. - The respondent Judge order for the issuance of an alias writ of possession since the
spouses failed to comply with the terms of the agreement. Clerk then issued an alias writ
FACTS: of possession.

- April 21, 1950: in order to secure the payment of a loan, the spouses Acuña executed
- May 8, 1954 (months after the issuance of the writ), spouses filed an urgent petition to
in favor of Reynaldo T. Santos (private respondent), a real estate mortgage over two
quash the writ on the ground that it was null and void since the judgment sought to be
parcels of land with TCT and the improvements thereon, with the undertaking that the
enforced in the writ has been satisfied and or novated by the Agreement issued last
properties mortgaged should be insured and that the insurance policy would be kept in June 9, 1953 and that the writ of possession has no longer any force and effect since its
force, and if it became necessary for the mortgagee to institute judicial or extrajudicial life has already lapsed after the expiration of 60 days.
foreclosure proceedings, the mortgagors would pay as liquidated damages as
additional sum to 20% of the total obligation then due and payable and Php500 as
- Judge ordered the sheriff to refrain from enforcing the said writ until further order.
attorney’s fees.

- May 2, 1951: Santos filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage, the parties - July 8, 1954: Judge order for the issuance of an alias writ of possession to enforce the
submitted a written agreement stating the amount of loan with interest, the decision in the case. - Spouses filed an appeal.
undertakings mentioned as well as the fact that petitioner failed to make payment
within and after the expiration period for payment, including an amount advanced by - October 27, 1955: Judge appointed private respondent Guillermo Romero, as receiver
the mortgagee for the insurance; that the parties agreed to reduce the liquidated of the properties involved. Feb. 7, 1956: issued an order directing the Sheriff to place
damages to Php 500 only, and that judgment be rendered sentencing the spouses to receiver Romero in possession. Feb.27, Judge ordered the spouses to surrender the
jointly and severally pay the plaintiff within 90 days from the said decision. possession of the property within 2 days. It also denied the spouses motion for
reconsideration.
- On the same day, Judge Caluag rendered judgment in accordance with the terms
thereof. The decision having become final and executory, a writ of execution was - Petitioners in these certiorari proceedings alleged that the respondent Judge had no
issued on December 20, same year. The properties mortgaged were sold to Santos who longer jurisdiction over said question of possession much less could he deprive the
received the corresponding, certificate of sale, dated February 23, 1952, from the appellants of their actual possession and deliver the same to another.
Sheriff. On March 10, 1952, the Sheriff's certificate of sale was approved and confirmed
by respondent Judge. On May 10, 1952 upon petition of Santos, an order was issued for
ISSUE:
the issuance of a writ of possession, which writ was actually issued five days later.

WON Judge had no longer jurisdiction over the case (and as an effect, he cannot
- June 27, 1952: petitioners herein filed an urgent motion for extension of time to vacate
appoint a receiver).
the properties in question, which was denied by order of July 2, 1952, on the ground that
the decision had already become final and executory and that "the court has no more,
jurisdiction over the same". Almost a year later, that is on June 2, 1953, "respondent RULING:
Judge issued another alias Writ of Possession directing the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to
take possession of the properties, subject matter of the complaint foreclosure." We agree with counsel for the respondents that, although the perfection of an appeal
said
deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the case, nevertheless, under the law,
- June 9, 1953: Both parties submitted an “Agreement and Petition”
court retains jurisdiction as regards the preservation of the
-Agreement that superseded all previous agreement and shall be treated new property under litigation and involved in the appeal,
and different agreement; that spouses offered to purchase the properties payable on
including necessarily the authority to appoint a receiver
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A decision was rendered in the above-entitled case in favor of plaintiff and against the
who has the power to take and keep possession of the defendants, jointly and solidarily, one of which is the defendant Alto Surety & Insurance
property in controversy. Co., Inc. (Exhibit A-Receivership); that a writ of execution (Exhibit B-Receivership was
issued to enforce said judgment; that said writ of execution was returned by the Sheriff
of Manila unsatisfied
According to respondents' answer to the petition, petitioners did not contest the legality
and propriety of the appointment of the receiver; they did not even file a motion for
reconsideration of the appointment. Consequently, it is now rather late to raise the on August 4, 1958, the Insurance Commissioner wrote a letter addressed to Alto Surety &
question of the propriety and legality of the order of the court appointing said receiver. Insurance Co., Inc. Stating its financial condition and requiring the that the stockholders
According to the same answer, petitioners herein are insolvent: the building and of the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., put up within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
improvements involved in the appeal in danger of being destroyed or impaired; and this letter, the amount of P747,709.04 in order to cover the impairment or deficit of an
petitioners have failed to pay the rents. equal amount, and to comply immediately with all the other requirements mentioned in
the foregoing
Petitioners insinuate in their petition that the order for the delivery of the property to the
receiver "touches a matter litigated by the appeal, i.e., the physical possession of the Plaintiff has offered the provisions of Section 1, Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, more
petitioners". That is not correct. The question litigated in the appeal is whether the particularly paragraph (d) thereof. In support of its claim, plaintiff has cited the case of
The appointment
petitioners or respondent Santos has a better right to possession. Philippine Trust Co. vs. Francisco Santamaria 53 Phil. 463, wherein the Supreme Court
ordered the appointment of a receiver of all the properties and assets of a judgment
of the receiver with order to deliver possession to him does not debtor in aid of execution of judgment rendered against it. The action against the
touch upon, much less decide that question. It merely means judgement debtor in the said case was for the recovery of a sum of money.lawphi1.nêt
that pending appeal, and to preserve the property and keep
the rents, the trial court through its officer, the receiver, would Secondly plaintiff has cited the provisions of Section 2, Rule 61 of the Rule of
court, quoted as follows:
take possession.
SEC. 2. Creditor or stockholder may apply for receiver for corporation.
The orders of respondent Judge on petitioner's to deliver possession of the property to — When a corporation has been dissolved, or is insolvent or is in
the receiver are therefore valid and it was petitioners' duty to obey the same. imminent danger or insolvency, or has forfeited its corporate rights, a
receiver may be appointed on the complaint of a creditor,
G.R. No. L-24508 April 25, 1969 stockholder, or member of the corporation.

CENTRAL SAWMILLS, INC., plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO., ET AL., defendants, Defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., is in imminent danger of insolvency. As a
ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO., defendant-appellant. matter of fact, no less than the Insurance Commissioner of the Philippines has
manifested in his letter dated May 16, 1960 and marked as Exhibit G-Receivership that
M. Peres Cardenas for plaintiff-appellee. the defendant corporation and is in a precarious financial condition.
Aristorenas and Relova for defendant-appellant.

It must be remembered that plaintiff filed the present petition for receivership in view of
FACTS: the return of the Sheriff of Manila (Exhibit C-Receivership) to the effect that the writ of
execution marked Exhibit B-Receivership could not be satisfied for the reasons stated
therein.
This appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated October 4, 1960
in its Civil Case No. 27374, entitled Central Sawmills, Inc. vs. Alto Surety & Insurance Co.,
et al., ordering the appointment of a receiver of the properties of defendant-appellant It is not disputed by the appellant company that though in the years 1955 and 1956 it
Alto Surety & Insurance Company as well as from the order of October 25, 1960 denying was in a position to pay installments, or September 1, 1958 and thereafter, it was no
the motion for reconsideration thereof was certified to this Court by the Court of longer in a position to mark any payments whatsoever.
Appeals in a resolution
In view of all the above, the issue raised in this appeal is purely a question of law; this
appeal is therefore beyond the competence of this Court.
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ACCORDINGLY, let this case be certified, as it is hereby certified, under the provisions of removed, or materially injured unless a receiver be appointed to guard and
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, to the Honorable Supreme Court for proper preserve it;
disposition.
(c) When it appears in an action by the mortgagee for the foreclosure of a
mortgage that the property is in danger of being wasted or materially injured,
and that its value is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt, or
ISSUE: that the parties have so stipulated in the contract of mortgage;

whether or not, in an action for the collection of a debt, where there is already a final
(d) After judgment, to preserve the property during the pendency of an
and executory judgment, the Court has the authority to appoint a receiver of the
appeal or to dispose of it according to the judgment, or to aid execution
properties of the judgment debtor which are not involved in the action, in aid of the
when the execution has been returned unsatisfied or the judgment debtor
execution of said judgement
refuses to apply his property in satisfaction of the judgment, or otherwise to
carry the judgment into effect;

HELD: (e) Whenever in other cases it appears that the appointment of a receiver is
the most convinient and feasible means of preserving, administering, or
YES: disposing of the property in litigation.

The judge may, by order,


SEC. 39. Appointment and bond of receiver. — And it is undisputed that in the case at bar, the properties being placed under
appoint the sheriff, or other proper officer or person, receiver of receivership are not the subject of the action.
the property of the judgment debtor; and he may also, by
order, forbid the transfer or other disposition of, or any Likewise, it is quite plain that Section 2 of Rule 61 4 is not also applicable to this case.
interference with, the property of the judgment debtor not This section refers to a receivership, not as an aid to execution
exempt from execution. If a bonded officer be appointed receiver, he of a final judgment in an ordinary action, but as a consequence of the
and his sureties shall be liable on his official bond as such receiver but if dissolution of a corporation or its forfeiture of its corporate rights; and with respect to
another person be appointed he shall give a bond as receiver as in other cases of insolvency or imminent danger of insolvency of corporations, the receivership
cases.2 contemplated in this section must be in relation exclusively to such insolvency or
imminent danger thereof placed before the court in an appropriate principal action,
Indeed, this is the provision applicable to the circumstances of the case at bar. Clearly, and again, not merely as an ordinary action.
Section 1 (d) of Rule 61 3is not applicable here because, as contended by defendant-
appellant, all the cases of receivers contemplated in said section are only cases In an event, it is necessary or superfluos to bring in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 61, which, to
wherein the property or properties being placed under receivership are those involved say the least, are of doubtful applicability, when Section 39 appears to be
in the very litigation in which such receivership is ordered. This is evident from the
opening paragraph of said section which says that "one or more receivers of the
clearly and fittingly applicable. If at all, the other provisions of Rule 61,
property, real or personal, which is the subject of the action, may be appointed ... in the may be resorted to only insofar as they prescribe the procedure and
following cases. [Emphasis Ours]. In other words, this qualifying clause, "the property, real the bond related to the carrying out of such receivership. There being no
or personal, which is the subject of the action" applies to all the cases specified in the detailed rules under the authority of Section 6, Rule 124 (now Rule 135), the pertinent
five paragraphs in said Section 1, which are: provisions of Rule 61 may be adopted. Said section provides:

Section 1. — .... SEC. 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. — When by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
(a) When a corporation has been dissolved, or is insolvent, or is in imminent means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
danger of insolvency, or has forfeited its corporate rights; officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is
not specifically pointed out by these rules, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of
(b) When it appears from the complaint or answer, and such other proof as said rules.5
the judge may require, that the party applying for the appointment of receiver
has an interest in the property or fund which is in danger of being lost,

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WHEREFORE, with the above clarification that Section 39 of Rule 39 of the Rules of 1940, person. If that were so, a bank would be the owner of whatever is purchased with
now Section 43 of Rule 39 of the current Rules, is the provision applicable to the funds borrowed from it by the vendee. The holding of the trial court and the Court of
receivership herein in question, the same being in aid for money, the disputed orders of Appeals that Jambrich, notwithstanding his legal incapacity to acquire real property in
the court a quo dated October 4, 1960 and October 15, 1960 are hereby affirmed, with the Philippines, is the owner of the house and lot which his erstwhile mistress, Antonietta,
costs against defendant-appellant, Alto Surety & Insurance Company, Inc. purchased with money she obtained from him, is a legal heresy.

G.R. No. 106473 July 12, 1993 In view of the above circumstances, the appointment of a receiver is not proper where
the rights of the parties (one of whom is in possession of the property), are still to be
ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, petitioner, determined by the trial court.
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO F. BORROMEO, respondents. Relief by way of receivership is equitable in nature, and a court of equity will
not ordinarily appoint a receiver where the rights of the parties depend on the
determination of adverse claims of legal title to real property and one party is
in possession. (Calo, et al. vs. Roldan, 76 Phil., 445).
Facts:
Only when the property is in danger of being materially injured or lost, as by the
prospective foreclosure of a mortgage thereon for non-payment of the mortgage loans
 Borromeo, a realtor, filed a civil case against Descallar to recover 3 parcels of
despite the considerable income derived from the property, or if portions thereof are
land and a house built thereon in the possession of Descallar and registered
being occupied by third persons claiming adverse title thereto, may the appointment of
under the name of the latter.
a receiver be justified (Motoomul vs. Arrieta, 8 SCRA 172).
 Borromeo alleged that he purchased the said parcels of land from Jambrich.
(Austrian national and former lover of Descallar) – [So, afam dw ni Descallar c
Jambrich unya gibyaan for another woman…tsk3x.] In this case, there is no showing that grave or irremediable damage may result to
 Descallar answered that the property belongs to her since it is registered under respondent Borromeo unless a receiver is appointed. The property in question is real
her name; and that Jambrich cannot own the land since he is a foreigner, property, hence, it is neither perishable or consummable. Even though it is mortgaged
thus, no title or right of the property can be transferred to Borromeo. to a third person, there is no evidence that payment of the mortgage obligation is
 Borromeo then asked the lower court to appoint a receiver for the property being neglected. In any event, the private respondent's rights and interests, may be
during the pendency of the case. adequately protected during the pendency of the case by causing his adverse claim to
 The application for receivership was granted by the court despite opposition be annotated on the petitioner's certificates of title.
for Descallar. The receiver appointed was the CLERK OF COURT (with a bond
of 250k)
 Desc MFRd but denied. Filed certiorari to CA, dismissed. Thus, this petition for
certiorari.
As regards the appointment of the CLERK OF COURT as RECEIVER:
Issue: WON trial court gravely abused its discretion in appointing a receiver for real
property registered in the name of Descallar in order to transfer its possession from the Another flaw in the order of receivership is that the person whom the trial judge
petitioner to the court-appointed receiver. appointed as receiver is her own clerk of court. This practice has been frowned upon by
this Court:
Ruling: YES.
The respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
connection with the appointment of a receiver. . . . The instant case is
Descallar’s title and possession cannot be defeated by mere verbal allegations that similar to Paranete vs. Tan, 87 Phil. 678 (1950) so that what was there
although she appears in the deed of sale as vendee of the property, it was her Austrian said can well apply to the actuations of the respondent judge. . . .
lover, Jambrich, who paid the price of the sale of the property. Her Torrens certificates "We hold that the respondent judge has acted in excess of his
of title are indefeasible or incontrovertible. jurisdiction when he issued the order above adverted to. That order,
in effect, made the clerk of court a sort of a receiver charged with
There is no law which declares null and void a sale where the the duty of receiving the proceeds of sale and the harvest of every
year during the pendency of the case with the disadvantage that
vendee to whom the title of the thing sold is transferred or the clerk of court has not filed any bond to guarantee the faithful
conveyed, paid the price with money obtained from a third discharge of his duties as depositary; and considering that in actions
involving title real property, the appointment of a receiver cannot be
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entertained because its effect would be to take the property out of  the spouses' attention had been called by several people in
the possession of the defendant, except in extreme cases when there the barangay who threatened to inform the Department of
is clear proof of its necessity to save the plaintiff from grave and Environment and Natural Resources should they fail to take
irremediable loss of damage, it is evident that the action of the
action.
respondent judge is unwarranted and unfair to the defendants.
 Far East Bank filed a "Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiff's Petition for
Receivership
o alleging that the complaint states NO CAUSE OF ACTION and that
VENUE HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY LAID. It also alleged that petitioners
FAILED TO PAY THE PROPER DOCKET FEES and violated the rule on
FORUM-SHOPPING.
Commodities Storage & Ice Plant Corporation v. CA  Eventually, the trial court issued the ASSAILED ORDER which GRANTED the
G.R. No. 125008, June 19, 1997 petition for RECEIVERSHIP and appointed petitioners' nominee, Ricardo
Pesquera, as receiver
 Far East Bank assailed SAID ORDER before the Court of Appeals on a petition
FACTS: for certiorari.
 Court of Appeals ANNULLED the order for receivership and DISMISSED
 Petitioner spouses Victor and Johannah Trinidad obtained a LOAN of petitioners' complaint for IMPROPER VENUE and LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION
P31,000,000.00 from respondent Far East Bank & Trust Company for the
 Motion for Reconsideration was DENIED; thus, the instant petition
purchase of the Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage in Sta. Maria, Bulacan
 The loan was secured by a mortgage over the ice plant and the land on which
it stood
 Spouses Trinidad defaulted so Far East Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the ISSUES:
mortgage
WON the appointment of receiver WAS PROPER?
 Far East Bank won as the highest bidder and eventually TOOK POSSESSION of
the property WON the CA erred in DISMISSING the MAIN CASE even if the Motion to Dismiss
 Spouses Trinidad filed Civil Case No. 94-72076 against respondent bank before was NOT BEFORE IT on appeal on the order of appointing the receiver?
RTC Manila for DAMAGES, accounting and fixing of redemption period.
o alleged that respondent bank took possession of the ice plant
FORCIBLY and WITHOUT NOTICE to them RULING:
 As a provisional remedy, petitioners filed an "Urgent Petition for Receivership"
o argue that the ice plant which is the subject of the action WAS IN WON the appointment of receiver WAS PROPER?
DANGER OF BEING LOST, REMOVED AND MATERIALLY INJURED
NO, the appointment of the receiver was NOT PROPER on two grounds:
because:
 Far East Bank FAILED TO TAKE CARE of the ice plant with due a) spouses Trinidad FAILED to PROVE that the subject ice plant was IN DANGER
diligence such that the plant has started emitting ammonia of being LOST, REMOVED or MATERIALLY INJURED
and other toxic refrigerant chemicals into the atmosphere
and was posing a hazard to the health of the people in the b) the appointed receiver was PETITIONERS’ NOMINEE.
community
Ground #1
 Far East Bank’s occupation resulted in the destruction of
petitioners' financial and accounting records MAKING IT Under Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for valid appointment of
IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO PAY THEIR EMPLOYEES AND receiver of the property in litigation are as follows:
CREDITORS and so drastic action or sanctions that could be
brought against the plaintiff by affected third persons, a) the applicant/petitioner has an ACTUAL INTEREST in it; AND
including workers who have claims against the plaintiff but (b) that
could not be paid due to the numbing manner by which
the defendant took the Sta. Maria Ice Plant;

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(1) such property is IN DANGER OF BEING LOST, REMOVED OR The QUESTION OF VENUE relates to the PRINCIPAL ACTION and is prejudicial to
MATERIALLY INJURED; or the ancillary issue of receivership.

(2) whenever it appears to be the MOST CONVENIENT AND FEASIBLE Although the grounds for dismissal WERE NOT SPECIFICALLY RAISED before the
MEANS OF PRESERVING or administering the property in litigation. appellate court, the said court MAY CONSIDER THE SAME since the petition for
receivership DEPENDS UPON A DETERMINATION THEREOF.
So, a petition for receivership under Section 1 (b) of Rule 59 requires that the
property or fund which is the subject of the action must be in danger of loss, removal or (I think, I point sa SC is that i-dismiss na lang ang case IF PATENTLY DISMISSIBLE
material injury which necessitates protection or preservation. JUD SYA kaysa mag-huwat pa sa RTC ruling unya, in the end, dismissal ra diay gihapon
ang ruling sa RTC. Sayang ra ang pag-uphold sa validity sa appointment of receiver.)
Here, however, spouses Trinidad have NOT SUFFICIENTLY SHOWN that the Sta.
Maria Ice Plant is in danger of disappearing or being wasted and reduced to a "scrap Here, the VENUE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID.
heap." NEITHER HAVE THEY PROVEN that the property has been materially injured which
necessitates its protection and preservation. Sec. 2 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that where the action affects title
to the property, it should be instituted in the Regional Trial Court WHERE THE PROPERTY IS
SITUATED.
In fact, on respondent bank's motion to dismiss, Far East Bank, through counsel,
manifested in open court that THE LEAK IN THE ICE PLANT HAD ALREADY BEEN REMEDIED The Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage is located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
and that no other leakages had been reported since. This statement has not been
disputed by petitioners. Therefore, the venue in Civil Case No. 94-72076 – which was in Manila – was
therefore laid improperly. Hence, the CA DID NOT ERR in DISMISSING the case.
So, whatever danger there was to the COMMUNITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
had ALREADY BEEN CONTAINED.

The "DRASTIC SANCTIONS" that may be brought against petitioners due to their G.R. No. L-14890 September 30, 1963
inability to pay their employees and creditors, as claims, are the PERSONAL LIABILITIES of
CONRADO ALCANTARA, petitioner,
petitioners themselves. Hence, they DO NOT CONSTITUTE "material injury" to the ice
vs.
plant.
HON. MACAPANTON ABBAS, Presiding Judge, Branch II of the Court of First Instance of
Davao and MARTIN T. BACARON, respondents.

Ground #2 Conrado Alcantara in his own behalf as petitioner.


Desquitado and Acurantes for respondent Martin T. Bacaron.
Moreover, the receiver appointed by the court appears to be a representative
of petitioners.
BENGZON, C.J.:
The general rule is that NEITHER PARTY to a litigation SHOULD BE APPOINTED as
receiver without the consent of the other because a RECEIVER SHOULD BE A PERSON
The Case.— Petitioner seeks to annul the order of the respondent judge removing him as
INDIFFERENT to the parties and SHOULD BE IMPARTIAL AND DISINTERESTED.
receiver, and appointing Martin T. Bacaron in his place.
The receiver is NOT THE REPRESENTATIVE of any of the parties but of all of them
Material Facts. — In March, 1957, Alcantara sued Bacaron partly to foreclose the
to the end that their interests may be equally protected with the least possible
chattel mortgage executed by the latter on a caterpillar tractor with its accessories
inconvenience and expense.
(Civil Case No. 2282 of Davao). Pursuant to a clause in the mortgage contract, the
WON the CA erred in DISMISSING the MAIN CASE even if the Motion to Dismiss was NOT Davao court designated Alcantara as receiver of the tractor; and he duly qualified as
BEFORE IT on appeal on the order of appointing the receiver? such. Thereafter, with the court's approval, he leased the machine to Serapio Sablada.
Upon the expiration of the lease, and after Sablada's failure to return the machine, said
NO, the CA DID NOT err in DISMISSING the MAIN CASE even if the Motion to court at the instance of Alcantara,1 declared Sablada to be in contempt of court and
Dismiss was NOT BEFORE IT on appeal on the order of appointing the receiver. fined him in the amount of P100.00 on October 6, 1958.

It must be remembered that Far East Bank’s Motion to Dismiss was anchored Meanwhile, on October 2, 1958, alleging that Alcantara had neglected his duties as
on IMPROPER VENUE, lack of cause of action and forum-shopping. receiver, because he did not get the tractor, Bacaron petitioned the court to relieve
such receiver, and to appoint him (Bacaron) as the receiver instead.2 Opposing the
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petition, Alcantara made the following manifestations, in a pleading to the court dated receiver, the defendant is hereby authorized to receive from the plaintiff the sum of
November 26, 1958. P2,000.00 representing the rentals received by the latter from Sablada for the use of the
tractor, and to spend said sum or so much thereof as may be necessary for bringing the
2. That in fact the herein plaintiff-receiver has exerted all efforts to secure the possession tractor to Davao City and for payment of necessary repairs; and the plaintiff is hereby
of the tractor will question, and has come to court time and again to compel the lessee, ordered to turn over to the defendant the said sum of P2,000.00 on demand.
Serapio Sablada, to deliver the tractor to the receiver, but it seems that even Honorable
Court is at mercy of said Serapio Sablada;. It is not clear what steps the court had in mind when it declared that "plaintiff-receiver
failed to take steps to take possession of the tractor leased to Sablada". It could have
3. That in fact, until and unless the tractor is delivered to the receiver as ordered by the meant that Alcantara failed to take the tractor directly from the hands of Sablada from
Honorable Court, the said Serapio Sablada is liable to the Honorable Court for continues the place where it was, without resorting to official help. If the court meant — as it must
contempt in as much as the subject of the contempt is non-compliance with the order have meant — that Alcantara failed to exhaust judicial remedies to compel Sablada to
of the Honorable Court; .... comply with the order to place the tractor at the "junction" previously mentioned, then it
fell into error, because Alcantara had in effect, suggested that Sablada be held in
6. That in the view of the attendant circumstances related to the tractor in this case, it
"continuous contempt" (Annex J) i.e., imprisoned until he placed the tractor at the
most respectfully prayed that the plaintiff-receiver be immediately authorized to file a
"junction"; and the court instead of acting accordingly under Rule 64, sec. 74 held
case of replevin with damages against the person of Serapio Sablada, holding his surety
Alcantara to be negligent, and removed him.
bond liable therefor, if proper, as most legal and expedient procedure to retake the
tractor in question. . In this connection, it should be observed that in his aforesaid pleading of November 26,
1958, Alcantara even asked for permission to sue Sablada for replevin.
However, despite the above representations, the respondent dent judge of the Davao
court, in an order dated December 10, 1958, relieved Alcantara and appointed If it was error to remove Alcantara, a clearer error occurred when Bacaron — the
Bacaron as receiver of the tractor, without bond, with authority to receive the sum of defendant — was appointed, as receiver without bond, over the objection of Alcantara
P2,000.00 in Alcantara's hands as rentals of the tractor, and to the end the same for
The general rule is that neither to a litigation should be
— the plaintiff.
repairs if necessary.
appointed receiver without the other's consent 5 because "a receiver
His motion to reconsider having been denied, Alcantara filed with this Court the instant ought to be an indifferent person between the parties" 6 and "should be
special civil action. And his request a preliminary injunction was issued to restrain
impartial and disinterested"7. Note that Bacaron was the defendant, and his
enforcement of His Honor's aforesaid order of December 10, 1958.
personal interest would conflict with his duties to the court and the
The questions are: (a) the propriety of Alcantara's removal; and (b) the legality of plaintiff.8 Furthermore, under the Rules of Court, the receiver must file a bond; and yet
Bacaron's appointment and qualifications. Bacaron was exempted from such obligation. The effect of the whole proceeding was
to discharge the receiver ship at the request of the defendant, without so much a bond
Discussion. — It appears that acting on the complaint of Alcantara on September 11, — contrary to sec. 4, Rule 61, of the Rules of Court.9
1958, 3 the court required Sablada under pain of contempt, to deliver the tractor on or
before September 30, 1958, at the junction of the Davao Penal Colony Road and the Conclusion. — Such mistakes causing prejudice to petitioner, call for interference with
National Road going to Agusan in Panabo, Agusan. It also appears that upon Sablada's that discretion which usually vests in trial courts in the matter of receivership
failure, he was declared to be contempt on October 6, 1958, and fined P100.00 — as Consequently, the order of December 10, 1958, should be, and is hereby annulled.
previously stated. The order further said that upon failure to pay in one week, he will be Costs against respondent Bacaron. So ordered.
imprisoned for ten days. Lastly, the order directed Alcantara to take steps to recover
possession of the tractor, with the admonition that "should he fail to take possession of
the tractor within fifteen (15) days after notice thereof, he may relieved as receiver and Abrigo v. Kayanan
the defendant who is willing to be the receiver may be appointed in his G.R. No. L-28601
place".1awphîl.nèt March 18, 1983

Then on December 10, 1958, the court — overlooking or overruling Alcantara's pleading
— issued the order now in question, which for convenience is quoted below:. Nature:

It appearing that plaintiff-receiver failed to take steps to take possession of the tractor Petition to annul and set aside several Orders (1. Order appointing the Branch
leased to Sablada and bring it to Davao City as directed in the Order of the Court Clerk to act as receiver; and 2) Order making Abrigo liable to reimburse the living
dated October 6, 1958, the plaintiff is hereby relieved as receiver, and in his stead the expenses of the opposite party during the pendency of the action) of the respondent
defendant is hereby appointed as receiver without bond. Upon his qualification as such judge on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion.

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Facts: or damage, it is evident that the action of the respondent judge is unwarranted and
unfair to the defendants.
 Abas, et.al sought the partition of seven (7) parcels of land under a claim of
co-ownership with the defendants (Abrigo brothers). Abas claimed that 2. The reason for the appointment of the receiver was the fact that the land had been
except for one-half of the fifth parcel (e), two of the defendants, Leon and entered by numerous squatters. But a receiver who is also burdened with his duties as
Enrique Abrigo, were in possession of the lands. The defendants put up the Clerk of Court cannot be in a better position than the actual possessors in dealing with
defense of ownership; they claimed ownership by hereditary title by virtue of the squatters. As the petitioner has pointed out:
an alleged duly approved Amended Project of Partition in the Testate Estate The appointed receiver does not acquire any advantage from the owners
of Nazario Abrigo. and/or present possessors, nor is he in a better position in order to protect the
 One of the lands (Land A) sought to be partitioned is said to be in the respective interest of the herein parties for he has to apply as are the present
possession of Leon and Enrique Abrigo. This land is occupied by squatters possessors deprived of their possession, for the same remedies and relief
causing great damage and prejudice to the owners of the land. Thus, Abas normally afforded to an aggrieved property owner, under our legal system. On
filed an Urgent Motion for the appointment of a receiver to administer Land A. the contrary, the receivership placed the parties at a disadvantage. He stands
 The motion was heard as scheduled in the absence of defendants' counsel between the squatters and owner-possessors, so much so that any action of
and pursuant thereto then Judge Union C. Kayanan issued an Order the owner-possessor against the squatters will have to pass through the
appointing Atty. Pedro S. Nantes, Acting Clerk of Court, Branch IV, CFI, Quezon receiver. Whereas, if the status quo were left undisturbed, the owner-possessor,
City as receiver and before entering his duties he must be sworn to perform whose holding over the parcel of land under litigation is actually occupied
and entered by squatters can take direct legal action as he has the legal right
them faithfully, without the necessity of a bond being a public officer.
to proceed against the intruders.
 Judge Kayanan also appointed Benjamin Santiago as assistant receiver.
 Abrigo filed an MR. He claimed that there was no legal basis for the 3. The respondent judge should at least have accepted the bond offered by the
appointment of a receiver under the facts of the case; and alternatively, he petitioner. Rule 59, Sec. 4 stipulates that "the receiver (may be) discharged when the
offered to post a bond so that the receiver be discharged. The Motion was party opposing the appointment files a bond executed to the applicant in an amount
denied. to be fixed by the court, to the effect that such party will pay the applicant all damages
 Judge Kayanan issued another Order commanding Abrigo to reimburse the he may suffer by reason of the acts, omissions, or other matters specified in the
living expenses of the 6 witnesses of Abbas incurred during the pendency of application as ground for such appointment.
the case.
Anent the order of the respondent judge that the petitioner should reimburse
 Abrigo now seeks the annulment and setting aside of the foregoing orders on
to the plaintiffs (katung sa living expenses), it suffices to state that it was issued without
the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion. notice and in the absence of the party affected and consequently void for lack of
jurisdiction in its issuance.
Issue:

1. WON Judge Kayanan gravely abused his discretion when he appointed his Branch
Clerk as the receiver

Held:

YES.

1. Court applied the principles laid down in Paranete v. Tan:

We hold that the respondent judge has acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he issued
the order above adverted to. That order, in effect, made the clerk of court a sort of a
receiver charged with the duty of receiving the proceeds of sale and the harvest of
every year during the pendency of the case with the disadvantage that the clerk of
court has not filed any bond to guarantee the faithful discharge of his duties as
depositary; and considering that in actions involving title to real property, the
appointment of a receiver cannot be entertained because its effect would be to take
the property out of the possession of the defendant, except in extreme cases when
there is clear proof of its necessity to save the plaintiff from grave and irremediable loss
8